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Re: [Kierkegaardians] Re: Repetition

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  • william deubel
    I believe the book by Hannay is a joy to read because it confirms many of my own experiences, and I hope those of others who also seek confirmation. It just
    Message 1 of 36 , Sep 13, 2006
      I believe the book by Hannay is a joy to read because it confirms many of my own
      experiences, and I hope those of others who also seek confirmation. It just takes a lot of time and work to follow the authour until you
      realise he is also writing about yourself.

      On page 168, he writes that "Kierkegaard is really only saying once again that the
      category of the spiritual, and therefore ethics and therefore sin, is autonomous and
      the transition into it is inexplicable.". I was taken to task by venturing that the
      Good can be found in the world with everything else. In retrospect I wrote hastily.
      There was a 'call' , as Heidegger too describes, by which I believed my future
      was in the world. The call was a call to silence. This 'call' was entirely unexplainable,
      but with faith in the 'call' I believed I would discover the Good.

      My point would also, I believe, be Kierkegaard's, or that spiritual development does not
      occur by ascending to Religiousness B, but is a series of successive states where
      the transitions involve repetitions of the fall in to sin. However, the importance of
      the experience of Repetition is that the individual has withdrawn from believing
      objective reality has much consequence for the freedom to be the self one knows
      one should be. To have this freedom is to know how to be swayed by this rather
      than that, and not determined in advance by a determinstic state so as to stamp-out
      one's own nature entirely.

      James Rovira <jamesrovira@...> wrote:
      I've read a couple of Hannay's books and they're generally good. His
      biography is not a good biography--not that he's wrong, but that he devolves
      into writing another interpretation of Kierkegaard rather than a biography,
      with little connection to K's life. The Garff bio is -much- better -- it's
      actually a biography. Hannay is a good writer with clear ideas, though. If
      anyone can come close to being a fun read...

      Jim R

      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

      Talk is cheap. Use Yahoo! Messenger to make PC-to-Phone calls. Great rates starting at 1¢/min.

      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • Will Brown
      Bill, I almost included the following Note from SK, and deferred because of its length. It is from this note that I derive my view of what SK is saying. I
      Message 36 of 36 , Sep 18, 2006
        Bill, I almost included the following "Note" from SK, and deferred
        because of its length. It is from this "note" that I derive my view of
        what SK is saying. I will back up, explain what I meant and why I said
        it, and pass it back to you. Yep, these things do take time, but their
        unfolding is part of the pleasure of communication.

        I see two reasons for there being no historical point of departure for
        RA; first is the given that the incarnation is not part of it, and the
        second being that the God-relation is that of immanence; there being
        no finite self involved, that the self has been set aside. I read this
        setting aside as the ending of the temporal sense of self, which
        leaves only the timeless. In the experience of it, there is only a
        singular space, call it reality if you will, or call it the "at once,"
        or, as I called, and call it, Home. The self that has been set aside
        is the temporal sense of self. There is, in reflection upon that
        sojourn, no other time other than the time present. Reminds me of
        Burnt Norton, it does.

        SK insists that RA must be in place before RB can be entertained, that
        without this qualification, RB is not RB, the second immediacy, but
        the first immediacy, which is the esthetic grasp of Christianity.

        I am reminded of another quote, which I have appended as the first
        quote below. In it the meaning of immediacy, immanence, and repetition
        are combined in a way that I see adding clarity to the terms. ----willy

        "Repetition is basically the expression for immanence; thus one
        finishes despairing and has oneself; one finishes doubting and has the
        truth. Constantin Constantius, the esthetic schemer, who ordinarily
        despairs of nothing, despairs of repetition, and the Young Man
        illustrates that if it is to come into existence it must be a new
        immediacy, so that it is itself a movement by /virtue of the absurd/,
        and the teleological suspension /an ordeal/." (CUP, Hong, p. 263;
        Lowrie, p. 235) [I show /italics/ this way]

        "Note. Insofar as the upbuilding is the essential predicate of all
        religiousness, Religiousness A also has its upbuilding. Whenever the
        relationship with God is found by the existing person in the
        inwardness of subjectivity, there is the upbuilding, which belongs to
        subjectivity, whereas by becoming objective one relinquishes that
        which, although belonging to subjectivity, is nevertheless no more
        arbitrariness than erotic love and being in love, which indeed one
        relinquishes by becoming objective. The totality of
        guilt-consciousness is the most upbuilding element in Religiousness A*
        The upbuilding element in the sphere of Religiousness A is that of
        immanence, is the annihilation in which the individual has set himself
        aside in order to find God, since it is the individual himself who is
        the hindrance. ** Here the upbuilding is quite properly
        distinguishable by the negative, by the self-annihilation that finds
        the relationship with God within oneself, that suffering-through sinks
        into the relationship with God, finds its ground in it, because God is
        in the ground only when everything in the way is cleared out, every
        finitude, and first and foremost the individual in his finitude, in
        his caviling against God. Esthetically, the sacred resting place of
        the upbuilding is outside the individual; he seeks that place. In the
        ethical-religious sphere, the individual himself is the place, if the
        individual has annihilated himself.

        This is the upbuilding of Religiousness A. If one does not pay
        attention to this and to have this of the upbuilding in between,
        everything is confused again as one defines the paradoxical
        upbuilding, which then is mistakenly identified with an external
        esthetic relation. In religiousness B, the upbuilding is something
        outside the individual; the individual does not find the upbuilding by
        finding the relationship with God within himself but relates himself
        to something outside himself in order to find the upbuilding. The
        paradox is that this apparently esthetic relationship, that the
        individual relates himself to something outside himself, nevertheless
        is to be the absolute relationship with God, because in immanence God
        is neither a something, but everything, and is infinitely everything,
        nor outside the individual, because the upbuilding consists in his
        being within the individual. The paradoxical upbuilding therefore
        corresponds to the category of God in time as an individual human
        being, because, if that is the case, the individual relates himself to
        something outside himself.

        That this cannot be thought is precisely the paradox. Whether the
        individual is not thrust back from this is another matter – that
        remains his affair. But if the paradox is not held fast in this way,
        then Religiousness A is higher, and all Christianity is pushed back
        into the esthetic categories, despite Christianity's insistence that
        the paradox it speaks about cannot be thought, is thus different from
        a relative paradox, which at best can be thought with difficulty. It
        must be conceded to speculative thought that it holds to immanence,
        even though it must be understood as different than Hegel's pure
        thinking, but speculative thought must not call itself Christian. That
        is why I have never called Religiousness A Christian or Christianity.

        *The reader will please recall that the direct relationship with God
        is esthetics and is actually no relationship with God, any more than a
        direct relationship to the absolute is an absolute relation, since the
        separation of the absolute has not commenced. In the religious sphere,
        the positive is distinguished by the negative. The highest well-being
        of a happy immediacy, which jubilates joy over God and all existence,
        is very endearing but not upbuilding and essentially not any
        relationship with God.

        **The esthetic always consists in the individual's fancying that he
        has been busy searching for God and taking hold of him, consequently
        in the illusion that the undialectical individual is really clever if
        he can take hold of God as something external." (CUP, Hong, Note pp.
        560-61: Lowrie, pp. 497-98)
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