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Re: [Kierkegaardian] The Grammar of Subjectivity

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  • Will Brown
    Yo, Reg, I ll pick up your words here: WB: In other words, the grammar of subjectivity belongs to the world-view. At the center of every world-view is the
    Message 1 of 23 , May 31 7:52 PM
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      Yo, Reg, I'll pick up your words here:

      WB: >> In other words, the grammar of subjectivity belongs to the
      world-view. At the center of every world-view is the grasp of oneself
      in relation to oneself, as oneself, in what I would call the self to
      self relation. If that self-grasp is not grasped, which is to say that
      it, the self to self relation, has not undergone a revelatory
      metamorphosis in which the category is revealed, then the self to self
      relation remains present to itself only as a possibility, which is to
      say that it remains only intuitive; it recognizes itself in the mirror
      and is able to pound its chest and vocalize "me" but is, in a sense
      yet to be discovered, absent to itself. <<

      RN: >Yes, for the difference to be the difference as opposed to the
      thought of the difference, the change must be self-morphic in fact and
      not simply the possibility that talk about the self-morphic may signify. <

      It all comes down to the term Ben just raised: appropriation, and what
      it means, to appropriate. Serendipitously, I was leaning on the word,
      which means that I was silently chewing the cud that the term brings
      to mind, and while I was reading thru E/O again looking for passages
      to increase the number of quotes in my collection of K-quotes, I came
      across the following passage. It caught my attention as saying
      something interesting having to do with appropriation. I think what I
      have already written here will move us along. [I may comment in
      brackets on what I have already written as I read through it now. I
      trust you don't mind this second-hand response. I had written it and
      set it aside as an exercise, but it fits so well here.]

      "But he who has now infinitely chosen himself –can he say, 'Now I own
      myself, I ask nothing more, and to all the world's vicissitudes I
      oppose the proud thought: I am the one I am'? By no means! If anyone
      were to express themselves in such a way one could easily see they had
      gone astray. The basic mistake would also lie in his not having chosen
      himself in the strictest sense; choose himself he may have done, but
      he has done it from outside himself; he has understood quite
      abstractly what it was to choose and had failed to grasp himself in
      his concretion; he has not so chosen himself that, in the choice, he
      came to be within himself, had not clothed himself in himself; he had
      chosen in respect to his necessity, not of his freedom; he had taken
      the ethical option in vain, aesthetically." (E/O, Hannay, p. 528)

      [You had said, "The self provides the grammar or, to further lighten
      the burden of expression, *is* the entelechy of the grammar." Yes,
      this informs my thoughts about the above quote.]

      I would begin by suggesting that the quote above allows for two
      meanings of appropriation, where the first meaning would be the
      appropriation not yet appropriated, where the second sense of the term
      means the concretion of the appropriation; which is to say, make
      concrete, or become that which is appropriated.

      Another way of expressing that double meaning would be to think in
      terms of understanding, where to understand would mean to become that
      which one understands. In my terms, I would say that one's grasp of
      oneself as oneself and one's understanding of that grasp are one and
      the same, which is to say that there is no room in the understanding
      for a third-person identity to reflect upon an identity. This is what
      I see SK speaking to above; the concrete understanding will not admit
      of the reflection necessary to locate an identity in which there is a
      choice in the location.

      Let me repeat that: it is not that one understands that one should not
      judge or compare oneself in terms either relative or absolute, but
      that one's understanding does not contain the category necessary for
      such a comparison. If, for example, the lack of understanding is a
      sign of the presence of a seeker, and the concomitant judgment of
      having found that sought, then the presence of understanding cannot
      say that the understanding has been found.

      [Of course, here I was thinking of the category of judgment that
      signifies the esthetic sphere no longer being operative; there is
      neither finding nor losing is that category is no longer operative.
      And, of course, I am speaking categorically.]

      If one is then to speak of finding and losing in terms of concretion,
      then those words must be taken down, either through some form of
      governance, such as allowing as how it is one's understanding that is
      speaking when one gets out of the way of its release, or perhaps as
      follows:

      "When subjectivity is truth, the definition of truth must also contain
      in itself an expression of the antithesis to objectivity, a memento of
      that fork in the road, and this expression will at the same time
      indicate the resilience of the inwardness. Here is such a definition
      of truth: /An objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation
      with the most passionate inwardness, is the truth/, the highest truth
      there is for an /existing/ person." (CUP, Hong, p. 203; Lowrie, p. 182)

      Here, the reduction of subjectivity to objectivity through the act of
      definition requires the identification of the identity revealed in the
      definition as an artifact of the definition. To define is to separate,
      and if the separation upon which the definition rests must be negated
      in its definition, the contortion necessary in the defining will
      become the mark of the definition.

      [Here is where the way we use the words, the grammar, if you will,
      carries the meaning of the words used; it's not what we say, but how
      we say it.]

      = = == === ===== ========

      I have just expressed the interest concerning appropriation the first
      quote set in motion. I will change the focus of that interest to say
      that there is first an experience and then a necessary understanding
      of that experience. Here again I will resort to the metaphor of the
      seeker and the finding of the seeker. If the finding is a losing, and
      that lost is the esthetic sense of self, the finding is
      transcendental. Yet, since there can be no finder, there can be no
      finding. The Buddhist Koan about the gateless gate, in which one must
      pass through without passing through, speaks to the same sign.

      [Hey, I can't resist the use of itching powder; how dare I bring the
      Eastern world-view into this?]
      = = == === ===== ========

      Here are two more quotes from the same section of the book that I see
      adding to that interest; the interest being the contortions SK goes
      through to give an indication of absolute separation that cannot be
      allowed to remain after the description has been laid down; in fact,
      the laying down is the act of taking up what is being laid down.

      "But I return to my category, I am not a logician, I have only one
      such bit I assure you it is the choice of both my heart and my mind,
      my soul's desire and my salvation – I return to the significance of
      choice. In choosing absolutely, then, I choose despair, and in despair
      I choose the absolute, for I myself am the absolute, I posit the
      absolute and am myself the absolute. But, as amounts to exactly the
      same, I must say: I choose the absolute which chooses me, I posit the
      absolute which posits me. For unless I bear in mind that this second
      expression is just as absolute, my category of choice is false; for
      that category is precisely the identity of both. What I choose I do
      not posit, for if it were not posited I could not chose it, and yet if
      it were not posited through my choosing it I would not choose it. If
      is for if it were not I could not choose it; it is not, for it can
      only come to be by my choosing it, otherwise my choice would be
      illusory." (E/O, Hannay, pp.515-16)

      "But the reason why it can seem to an individual that he could
      constantly change yet remain the same, as if his innermost being were
      an algebraic entity that could stand for whatever might be, is to be
      found in the fact that he has the wrong attitude; he has not chosen
      himself, he has no conception of doing so, and yet even in his lack of
      understanding there is an acknowledgment of the eternal validity of
      personal existence. For someone with the right attitude, on the other
      hand, things go differently. He chooses himself, not in a finite
      sense, for then this 'self' would be something finite along with other
      finite things, but in an absolute sense. And still he chooses himself
      and not another. This self he chooses is infinitely concrete, for it
      is himself, and yet it is absolutely different from his former self,
      for he has chosen it absolutely. This self did not exist previously,
      for it came into existence through the choice, and yet it has been in
      existence, for it was indeed 'he himself'." (E/O, Hannay, p. 517)

      = = == === ===== ========

      There is a change that can only be described in transcendental terms.
      The reason for that is that the change, when reflected upon, is from a
      sense of self that was to a sense of self that is, in which the
      separation between the self that was and the self that is is absolute,
      which is to say that a discontinuity is sensed as having happened
      between the self that was and the self that is. Since the face in the
      mirror remains the same face, that change can only be said to have
      occurred in a different dimension.

      It can be said that the change itself has brought another dimension
      into play, which is to say, available as a category for thought. Let
      us attach a meaning to that category as the category of spirit. Once
      that category of spirit is available for use, the contortions begin,
      and it is that wrestling to both say and unsay that, to my ears at
      least, gives the existential its power to express indirectly that
      which cannot be expressed directly.

      Ok, the steam has gone out of this particular engine, its transverse
      ceases translating the linear to the circular, and all that remains to
      do is affix a signature and post it. ----- William Iodine Brown, Esq.

      [Well, I think that makes your point. If not, correct what I say. You
      may move in any direction from here you see fit and I will gladly
      follow. ----willy]
    • Reg Narak
      ... As I come out of the cave of hibernation and stagger into the light, I see the connection you are making here. The false choice, if I may call it that, is
      Message 2 of 23 , Jun 3, 2006
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        On 5/31/06, Will Brown <wilbro99@...> wrote:
        > Yo, Reg, I'll pick up your words here:
        >
        > WB: >> In other words, the grammar of subjectivity belongs to the
        > world-view. At the center of every world-view is the grasp of oneself
        > in relation to oneself, as oneself, in what I would call the self to
        > self relation. If that self-grasp is not grasped, which is to say that
        > it, the self to self relation, has not undergone a revelatory
        > metamorphosis in which the category is revealed, then the self to self
        > relation remains present to itself only as a possibility, which is to
        > say that it remains only intuitive; it recognizes itself in the mirror
        > and is able to pound its chest and vocalize "me" but is, in a sense
        > yet to be discovered, absent to itself. <<
        >
        > RN: >Yes, for the difference to be the difference as opposed to the
        > thought of the difference, the change must be self-morphic in fact and
        > not simply the possibility that talk about the self-morphic may signify. <
        >
        > It all comes down to the term Ben just raised: appropriation, and what
        > it means, to appropriate. Serendipitously, I was leaning on the word,
        > which means that I was silently chewing the cud that the term brings
        > to mind, and while I was reading thru E/O again looking for passages
        > to increase the number of quotes in my collection of K-quotes, I came
        > across the following passage. It caught my attention as saying
        > something interesting having to do with appropriation. I think what I
        > have already written here will move us along. [I may comment in
        > brackets on what I have already written as I read through it now. I
        > trust you don't mind this second-hand response. I had written it and
        > set it aside as an exercise, but it fits so well here.]
        >
        > "But he who has now infinitely chosen himself �can he say, 'Now I own
        > myself, I ask nothing more, and to all the world's vicissitudes I
        > oppose the proud thought: I am the one I am'? By no means! If anyone
        > were to express themselves in such a way one could easily see they had
        > gone astray. The basic mistake would also lie in his not having chosen
        > himself in the strictest sense; choose himself he may have done, but
        > he has done it from outside himself; he has understood quite
        > abstractly what it was to choose and had failed to grasp himself in
        > his concretion; he has not so chosen himself that, in the choice, he
        > came to be within himself, had not clothed himself in himself; he had
        > chosen in respect to his necessity, not of his freedom; he had taken
        > the ethical option in vain, aesthetically." (E/O, Hannay, p. 528)

        > This is what
        > I see SK speaking to above; the concrete understanding will not admit
        > of the reflection necessary to locate an identity in which there is a
        > choice in the location.

        As I come out of the cave of hibernation and stagger into the light, I see
        the connection you are making here. The false choice, if I may call it that,
        is to choose in a way that excludes the act of choice, which would be the
        true choice. In this way of considering choice, the false choice is no
        choice. No choice is made. Grunt, honey, grunt, no honey, grunt, honey,
        grunt.

        > Let me repeat that: it is not that one understands that one should not
        > judge or compare oneself in terms either relative or absolute, but
        > that one's understanding does not contain the category necessary for
        > such a comparison. If, for example, the lack of understanding is a
        > sign of the presence of a seeker, and the concomitant judgment of
        > having found that sought, then the presence of understanding cannot
        > say that the understanding has been found.
        >
        > [Of course, here I was thinking of the category of judgment that
        > signifies the esthetic sphere no longer being operative; there is
        > neither finding nor losing is that category is no longer operative.
        > And, of course, I am speaking categorically.]
        >
        > If one is then to speak of finding and losing in terms of concretion,
        > then those words must be taken down, either through some form of
        > governance, such as allowing as how it is one's understanding that is
        > speaking when one gets out of the way of its release, or perhaps as
        > follows:
        >
        > "When subjectivity is truth, the definition of truth must also contain
        > in itself an expression of the antithesis to objectivity, a memento of
        > that fork in the road, and this expression will at the same time
        > indicate the resilience of the inwardness. Here is such a definition
        > of truth: /An objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation
        > with the most passionate inwardness, is the truth/, the highest truth
        > there is for an /existing/ person." (CUP, Hong, p. 203; Lowrie, p. 182)

        Yes, Soren, I think I can form an idea of what you are saying here and slap
        the banner of truth over it. That banner flies over the chasm into which
        objectivity is led by the truth, and falls, but into which objectivity
        cannot peer, having eyes seen but not seeing.

        >
        > Here, the reduction of subjectivity to objectivity through the act of
        > definition requires the identification of the identity revealed in the
        > definition as an artifact of the definition. To define is to separate,
        > and if the separation upon which the definition rests must be negated
        > in its definition, the contortion necessary in the defining will
        > become the mark of the definition.

        There, if in saying what is being said requires an unsaying of what is said,
        what is said is something unsayable, which must then again be said to not
        have been said. If what occurs is something that cannot possibly occur, it
        must be said that it did not occur. Something like this:

        "...please notice that they were not the offended ones but the very ones who
        held firmly to the paradox and yet spoke as if they were the offended ones,
        and offense cannot come up with a more striking expression than that."

        Place the paradox in expression and, whalla, you have bear talk. I wonder
        what the paradox will have to say about that? Now, if you try to wrap your
        head around that, I guarantee failure. I've tried. It's not fitting. Someday
        if I find the right way to stretch it, maybe it will.

        >
        > [Here is where the way we use the words, the grammar, if you will,
        > carries the meaning of the words used; it's not what we say, but how
        > we say it.]

        You poker faced outlaw - let's just say I'm responding in the wrong way
        here? How are you gonna know I'm not using the right way and making it look
        like the wrong way?

        Help me Rhonda, help, help me Rhonda.
        Help me Rhonda, help, help me Rhonda.
        Help me Rhonda, yeah - get her out of my heart.

        >
        > = = == === ===== ========
        >
        > I have just expressed the interest concerning appropriation the first
        > quote set in motion. I will change the focus of that interest to say
        > that there is first an experience and then a necessary understanding
        > of that experience. Here again I will resort to the metaphor of the
        > seeker and the finding of the seeker. If the finding is a losing, and
        > that lost is the esthetic sense of self, the finding is
        > transcendental. Yet, since there can be no finder, there can be no
        > finding. The Buddhist Koan about the gateless gate, in which one must
        > pass through without passing through, speaks to the same sign.

        Ok, what is first experienced is a failure to find anything. No, wait, is
        what first experienced is that finding. Nick? Jim(es)? Willy? Rhonda?

        >
        > [Hey, I can't resist the use of itching powder; how dare I bring the
        > Eastern world-view into this?]
        > = = == === ===== ========

        Clarence and Christ are discussing this and will release the smoke when the
        holy spirit has breathed into the right answer.

        >
        > Here are two more quotes from the same section of the book that I see
        > adding to that interest; the interest being the contortions SK goes
        > through to give an indication of absolute separation that cannot be
        > allowed to remain after the description has been laid down; in fact,
        > the laying down is the act of taking up what is being laid down.
        >
        > "But I return to my category, I am not a logician, I have only one
        > such bit I assure you it is the choice of both my heart and my mind,
        > my soul's desire and my salvation � I return to the significance of
        > choice. In choosing absolutely, then, I choose despair, and in despair
        > I choose the absolute, for I myself am the absolute, I posit the
        > absolute and am myself the absolute. But, as amounts to exactly the
        > same, I must say: I choose the absolute which chooses me, I posit the
        > absolute which posits me. For unless I bear in mind that this second
        > expression is just as absolute, my category of choice is false; for
        > that category is precisely the identity of both. What I choose I do
        > not posit, for if it were not posited I could not chose it, and yet if
        > it were not posited through my choosing it I would not choose it. If
        > is for if it were not I could not choose it; it is not, for it can
        > only come to be by my choosing it, otherwise my choice would be
        > illusory." (E/O, Hannay, pp.515-16)

        I would love to have seen Mr. Hannay tackling that translation. His hair was
        probably messy.

        >
        > "But the reason why it can seem to an individual that he could
        > constantly change yet remain the same, as if his innermost being were
        > an algebraic entity that could stand for whatever might be, is to be
        > found in the fact that he has the wrong attitude; he has not chosen
        > himself, he has no conception of doing so, and yet even in his lack of
        > understanding there is an acknowledgment of the eternal validity of
        > personal existence. For someone with the right attitude, on the other
        > hand, things go differently. He chooses himself, not in a finite
        > sense, for then this 'self' would be something finite along with other
        > finite things, but in an absolute sense. And still he chooses himself
        > and not another. This self he chooses is infinitely concrete, for it
        > is himself, and yet it is absolutely different from his former self,
        > for he has chosen it absolutely. This self did not exist previously,
        > for it came into existence through the choice, and yet it has been in
        > existence, for it was indeed 'he himself'." (E/O, Hannay, p. 517)
        >

        Yes, here's another short one. (I don't feel like scribing too long
        tonight.)

        "...the discovery, if it may be put this way, does not belong to the
        understanding but to the paradox, for just as truth is index sui et falsi,
        so also is the paradox, and offense does not understand itself but is
        understood by the paradox. Thus, although the offense, however it expresses
        itself, sounds from somewhere else -- indeed, from the opposite corner --
        nevertheless it is the paradox that resounds in it, and this indeed is the
        acoustical illusion." PF Hong p.50

        I say to you, Mr. SK, that you have equivocated here. Not only that in doing
        so you have the audacity to say, in the same breath, that the equivocation
        was a device used to point out the necessity to equivocate to express the
        unequivocal truth.

        > = = == === ===== ========
        >
        > There is a change that can only be described in transcendental terms.
        > The reason for that is that the change, when reflected upon, is from a
        > sense of self that was to a sense of self that is, in which the
        > separation between the self that was and the self that is is absolute,
        > which is to say that a discontinuity is sensed as having happened
        > between the self that was and the self that is. Since the face in the
        > mirror remains the same face, that change can only be said to have
        > occurred in a different dimension.

        Ok, let's say the change occurs in the second dimension. That's the
        dimension in which there are two dimensions. In the other dimension, there
        is only one dimension although it may be said to be multidimensional it is
        still really the one-dimensional side of the two dimensional world. Phew,
        the expression almost carried me away there. Got my feet back on the sand
        now.

        >
        > It can be said that the change itself has brought another dimension
        > into play, which is to say, available as a category for thought. Let
        > us attach a meaning to that category as the category of spirit. Once
        > that category of spirit is available for use, the contortions begin,
        > and it is that wrestling to both say and unsay that, to my ears at
        > least, gives the existential its power to express indirectly that
        > which cannot be expressed directly.
        >
        > Ok, the steam has gone out of this particular engine, its transverse
        > ceases translating the linear to the circular, and all that remains to
        > do is affix a signature and post it. ----- William Iodine Brown, Esq.
        >
        > [Well, I think that makes your point. If not, correct what I say. You
        > may move in any direction from here you see fit and I will gladly
        > follow. ----willy]

        I have moved in direction of the Trophy Shop. Let's go!

        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        > Yahoo! Groups Links
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >


        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      • Reg Narak
        Oh, I didn t cite this quote. I ll do so so we can know where it s coming from. ...please notice that they were not the offended ones but the very ones who
        Message 3 of 23 , Jun 3, 2006
        • 0 Attachment
          Oh, I didn't cite this quote. I'll do so so we can know where it's coming
          from.

          "...please notice that they were not the offended ones but the very ones who
          held firmly to the paradox and yet spoke as if they were the offended ones,
          and offense cannot come up with a more striking expression than that." CP
          Hong p.54

          On 6/3/06, Reg Narak <steaksauced@...> wrote:
          >
          >
          >
          > On 5/31/06, Will Brown <wilbro99@...> wrote:
          > > Yo, Reg, I'll pick up your words here:
          > >
          > > WB: >> In other words, the grammar of subjectivity belongs to the
          > > world-view. At the center of every world-view is the grasp of oneself
          > > in relation to oneself, as oneself, in what I would call the self to
          > > self relation. If that self-grasp is not grasped, which is to say that
          > > it, the self to self relation, has not undergone a revelatory
          > > metamorphosis in which the category is revealed, then the self to self
          > > relation remains present to itself only as a possibility, which is to
          > > say that it remains only intuitive; it recognizes itself in the mirror
          > > and is able to pound its chest and vocalize "me" but is, in a sense
          > > yet to be discovered, absent to itself. <<
          > >
          > > RN: >Yes, for the difference to be the difference as opposed to the
          > > thought of the difference, the change must be self-morphic in fact and
          > > not simply the possibility that talk about the self-morphic may signify.
          > <
          > >
          > > It all comes down to the term Ben just raised: appropriation, and what
          > > it means, to appropriate. Serendipitously, I was leaning on the word,
          > > which means that I was silently chewing the cud that the term brings
          > > to mind, and while I was reading thru E/O again looking for passages
          > > to increase the number of quotes in my collection of K-quotes, I came
          > > across the following passage. It caught my attention as saying
          > > something interesting having to do with appropriation. I think what I
          > > have already written here will move us along. [I may comment in
          > > brackets on what I have already written as I read through it now. I
          > > trust you don't mind this second-hand response. I had written it and
          > > set it aside as an exercise, but it fits so well here.]
          > >
          > > "But he who has now infinitely chosen himself �can he say, 'Now I own
          > > myself, I ask nothing more, and to all the world's vicissitudes I
          > > oppose the proud thought: I am the one I am'? By no means! If anyone
          > > were to express themselves in such a way one could easily see they had
          > > gone astray. The basic mistake would also lie in his not having chosen
          > > himself in the strictest sense; choose himself he may have done, but
          > > he has done it from outside himself; he has understood quite
          > > abstractly what it was to choose and had failed to grasp himself in
          > > his concretion; he has not so chosen himself that, in the choice, he
          > > came to be within himself, had not clothed himself in himself; he had
          > > chosen in respect to his necessity, not of his freedom; he had taken
          > > the ethical option in vain, aesthetically." (E/O, Hannay, p. 528)
          >
          > > This is what
          > > I see SK speaking to above; the concrete understanding will not admit
          > > of the reflection necessary to locate an identity in which there is a
          > > choice in the location.
          >
          > As I come out of the cave of hibernation and stagger into the light, I see
          > the connection you are making here. The false choice, if I may call it that,
          > is to choose in a way that excludes the act of choice, which would be the
          > true choice. In this way of considering choice, the false choice is no
          > choice. No choice is made. Grunt, honey, grunt, no honey, grunt, honey,
          > grunt.
          >
          >
          > > Let me repeat that: it is not that one understands that one should not
          > > judge or compare oneself in terms either relative or absolute, but
          > > that one's understanding does not contain the category necessary for
          > > such a comparison. If, for example, the lack of understanding is a
          > > sign of the presence of a seeker, and the concomitant judgment of
          > > having found that sought, then the presence of understanding cannot
          > > say that the understanding has been found.
          > >
          > > [Of course, here I was thinking of the category of judgment that
          > > signifies the esthetic sphere no longer being operative; there is
          > > neither finding nor losing is that category is no longer operative.
          > > And, of course, I am speaking categorically.]
          > >
          > > If one is then to speak of finding and losing in terms of concretion,
          > > then those words must be taken down, either through some form of
          > > governance, such as allowing as how it is one's understanding that is
          > > speaking when one gets out of the way of its release, or perhaps as
          > > follows:
          > >
          > > "When subjectivity is truth, the definition of truth must also contain
          > > in itself an expression of the antithesis to objectivity, a memento of
          > > that fork in the road, and this expression will at the same time
          > > indicate the resilience of the inwardness. Here is such a definition
          > > of truth: /An objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation
          > > with the most passionate inwardness, is the truth/, the highest truth
          > > there is for an /existing/ person." (CUP, Hong, p. 203; Lowrie, p. 182)
          >
          > Yes, Soren, I think I can form an idea of what you are saying here and
          > slap the banner of truth over it. That banner flies over the chasm into
          > which objectivity is led by the truth, and falls, but into which objectivity
          > cannot peer, having eyes seen but not seeing.
          >
          >
          > >
          > > Here, the reduction of subjectivity to objectivity through the act of
          > > definition requires the identification of the identity revealed in the
          > > definition as an artifact of the definition. To define is to separate,
          > > and if the separation upon which the definition rests must be negated
          > > in its definition, the contortion necessary in the defining will
          > > become the mark of the definition.
          >
          > There, if in saying what is being said requires an unsaying of what is
          > said, what is said is something unsayable, which must then again be said to
          > not have been said. If what occurs is something that cannot possibly occur,
          > it must be said that it did not occur. Something like this:
          >
          > "...please notice that they were not the offended ones but the very ones
          > who held firmly to the paradox and yet spoke as if they were the offended
          > ones, and offense cannot come up with a more striking expression than that."
          >
          >
          > Place the paradox in expression and, whalla, you have bear talk. I wonder
          > what the paradox will have to say about that? Now, if you try to wrap your
          > head around that, I guarantee failure. I've tried. It's not fitting. Someday
          > if I find the right way to stretch it, maybe it will.
          >
          >
          > >
          > > [Here is where the way we use the words, the grammar, if you will,
          > > carries the meaning of the words used; it's not what we say, but how
          > > we say it.]
          >
          > You poker faced outlaw - let's just say I'm responding in the wrong way
          > here? How are you gonna know I'm not using the right way and making it look
          > like the wrong way?
          >
          > Help me Rhonda, help, help me Rhonda.
          > Help me Rhonda, help, help me Rhonda.
          > Help me Rhonda, yeah - get her out of my heart.
          >
          >
          > >
          > > = = == === ===== ========
          > >
          > > I have just expressed the interest concerning appropriation the first
          > > quote set in motion. I will change the focus of that interest to say
          > > that there is first an experience and then a necessary understanding
          > > of that experience. Here again I will resort to the metaphor of the
          > > seeker and the finding of the seeker. If the finding is a losing, and
          > > that lost is the esthetic sense of self, the finding is
          > > transcendental. Yet, since there can be no finder, there can be no
          > > finding. The Buddhist Koan about the gateless gate, in which one must
          > > pass through without passing through, speaks to the same sign.
          >
          > Ok, what is first experienced is a failure to find anything. No, wait, is
          > what first experienced is that finding. Nick? Jim(es)? Willy? Rhonda?
          >
          >
          > >
          > > [Hey, I can't resist the use of itching powder; how dare I bring the
          > > Eastern world-view into this?]
          > > = = == === ===== ========
          >
          > Clarence and Christ are discussing this and will release the smoke when
          > the holy spirit has breathed into the right answer.
          >
          >
          > >
          > > Here are two more quotes from the same section of the book that I see
          > > adding to that interest; the interest being the contortions SK goes
          > > through to give an indication of absolute separation that cannot be
          > > allowed to remain after the description has been laid down; in fact,
          > > the laying down is the act of taking up what is being laid down.
          > >
          > > "But I return to my category, I am not a logician, I have only one
          > > such bit I assure you it is the choice of both my heart and my mind,
          > > my soul's desire and my salvation � I return to the significance of
          > > choice. In choosing absolutely, then, I choose despair, and in despair
          > > I choose the absolute, for I myself am the absolute, I posit the
          > > absolute and am myself the absolute. But, as amounts to exactly the
          > > same, I must say: I choose the absolute which chooses me, I posit the
          > > absolute which posits me. For unless I bear in mind that this second
          > > expression is just as absolute, my category of choice is false; for
          > > that category is precisely the identity of both. What I choose I do
          > > not posit, for if it were not posited I could not chose it, and yet if
          > > it were not posited through my choosing it I would not choose it. If
          > > is for if it were not I could not choose it; it is not, for it can
          > > only come to be by my choosing it, otherwise my choice would be
          > > illusory." (E/O, Hannay, pp.515-16)
          >
          > I would love to have seen Mr. Hannay tackling that translation. His hair
          > was probably messy.
          >
          >
          > >
          > > "But the reason why it can seem to an individual that he could
          > > constantly change yet remain the same, as if his innermost being were
          > > an algebraic entity that could stand for whatever might be, is to be
          > > found in the fact that he has the wrong attitude; he has not chosen
          > > himself, he has no conception of doing so, and yet even in his lack of
          > > understanding there is an acknowledgment of the eternal validity of
          > > personal existence. For someone with the right attitude, on the other
          > > hand, things go differently. He chooses himself, not in a finite
          > > sense, for then this 'self' would be something finite along with other
          > > finite things, but in an absolute sense. And still he chooses himself
          > > and not another. This self he chooses is infinitely concrete, for it
          > > is himself, and yet it is absolutely different from his former self,
          > > for he has chosen it absolutely. This self did not exist previously,
          > > for it came into existence through the choice, and yet it has been in
          > > existence, for it was indeed 'he himself'." (E/O, Hannay, p. 517)
          > >
          >
          > Yes, here's another short one. (I don't feel like scribing too long
          > tonight.)
          >
          > "...the discovery, if it may be put this way, does not belong to the
          > understanding but to the paradox, for just as truth is index sui et falsi,
          > so also is the paradox, and offense does not understand itself but is
          > understood by the paradox. Thus, although the offense, however it expresses
          > itself, sounds from somewhere else -- indeed, from the opposite corner --
          > nevertheless it is the paradox that resounds in it, and this indeed is the
          > acoustical illusion." PF Hong p.50
          >
          > I say to you, Mr. SK, that you have equivocated here. Not only that in
          > doing so you have the audacity to say, in the same breath, that the
          > equivocation was a device used to point out the necessity to equivocate to
          > express the unequivocal truth.
          >
          >
          > > = = == === ===== ========
          > >
          > > There is a change that can only be described in transcendental terms.
          > > The reason for that is that the change, when reflected upon, is from a
          > > sense of self that was to a sense of self that is, in which the
          > > separation between the self that was and the self that is is absolute,
          > > which is to say that a discontinuity is sensed as having happened
          > > between the self that was and the self that is. Since the face in the
          > > mirror remains the same face, that change can only be said to have
          > > occurred in a different dimension.
          >
          > Ok, let's say the change occurs in the second dimension. That's the
          > dimension in which there are two dimensions. In the other dimension, there
          > is only one dimension although it may be said to be multidimensional it is
          > still really the one-dimensional side of the two dimensional world. Phew,
          > the expression almost carried me away there. Got my feet back on the sand
          > now.
          >
          >
          > >
          > > It can be said that the change itself has brought another dimension
          > > into play, which is to say, available as a category for thought. Let
          > > us attach a meaning to that category as the category of spirit. Once
          > > that category of spirit is available for use, the contortions begin,
          > > and it is that wrestling to both say and unsay that, to my ears at
          > > least, gives the existential its power to express indirectly that
          > > which cannot be expressed directly.
          > >
          > > Ok, the steam has gone out of this particular engine, its transverse
          > > ceases translating the linear to the circular, and all that remains to
          > > do is affix a signature and post it. ----- William Iodine Brown, Esq.
          >
          > >
          > > [Well, I think that makes your point. If not, correct what I say. You
          > > may move in any direction from here you see fit and I will gladly
          > > follow. ----willy]
          >
          > I have moved in direction of the Trophy Shop. Let's go!
          >
          >
          > >
          > >
          > >
          > >
          > >
          > >
          > >
          > >
          > > Yahoo! Groups Links
          > >
          > >
          > >
          > >
          > >
          > >
          > >
          >


          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        • Reg Narak
          Hey Nic Shady, Still have dirt under my fingernails from all that digging. Thanks for the endorsement of my for the endorsement of Clarence. I know your words
          Message 4 of 23 , Jun 3, 2006
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            Hey Nic Shady,

            Still have dirt under my fingernails from all that digging. Thanks for the
            endorsement of my for the endorsement of Clarence. I know your words are
            words of personal care because the personal care that crafts them. The care,
            although not a quality directly of the words, comes through. As is in
            keeping with only slightly outdated parlance ---> keep on keeping it real,
            man.

            -Reg

            On 5/31/06, nnn88388 <no_reply@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
            >
            > Well rrr, you really had to dig way back for this one. Have you just
            > escaped from some kind of time warp? Good; glad to see you're o.k. I
            > see you still got your tongue and haven't forgotten how to speak. I
            > meant to tell you way back when that I like 'Clarence'. It is an
            > appropriate, and for me, a good name.
            > Having learned grammar in more than one tongue, I've always payed
            > strict attention to names and how things are said. I sort of bounce
            > things back and forth before I decide on the right expression. And of
            > course the right expression has to be the right expression.
            > What Am I saying? I sound like WB. Oh Lord, help me please!
            > nnn
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > Yahoo! Groups Links
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >


            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
          • Reg Narak
            Hey Jim, Good to be here, good to greet you. Hope things are well. I don t know. I will say this - I watched the hope I had invested in reality wither into
            Message 5 of 23 , Jun 3, 2006
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              Hey Jim,

              Good to be here, good to greet you. Hope things are well.

              I don't know. I will say this - I watched the hope I had invested in reality
              wither into nothing when I found out reality wasn't going to become the
              precious ideality I wanted it to attain. The withering of that reality
              showed the existence of ideality, reality as distinct from reality. Or,
              rather, the ideality showed the withering of reality, objectivity, the
              world, the past self, what have you. I see Kierkegaard chock full of such an
              accounting of things. We had this discussion earlier when you and I were
              sparring over whether I really had ditched history, truly killed Jesus, etc.
              You had said it never happened, I think, and I was sitting there forming a
              clear memory of the moment of release that pierced his heart. I don't think
              the conversation got beyond that and I suspect any discussion of objective
              reality would end up in the same ditch as the one into which I tossed
              history.

              Doesn't mean I wouldn't enjoy the motion, though. :)

              -Reg

              On 6/3/06, Reg Narak <steaksauced@...> wrote:
              >
              > Hey Nic Shady,
              >
              > Still have dirt under my fingernails from all that digging. Thanks for the
              > endorsement of my for the endorsement of Clarence. I know your words are
              > words of personal care because the personal care that crafts them. The care,
              > although not a quality directly of the words, comes through. As is in
              > keeping with only slightly outdated parlance ---> keep on keeping it real,
              > man.
              >
              > -Reg
              >
              >
              > On 5/31/06, nnn88388 <no_reply@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
              > >
              > > Well rrr, you really had to dig way back for this one. Have you just
              > > escaped from some kind of time warp? Good; glad to see you're o.k. I
              > > see you still got your tongue and haven't forgotten how to speak. I
              > > meant to tell you way back when that I like 'Clarence'. It is an
              > > appropriate, and for me, a good name.
              > > Having learned grammar in more than one tongue, I've always payed
              > > strict attention to names and how things are said. I sort of bounce
              > > things back and forth before I decide on the right expression. And of
              > > course the right expression has to be the right expression.
              > > What Am I saying? I sound like WB. Oh Lord, help me please!
              > > nnn
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > > Yahoo! Groups Links
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              >


              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
            • Will Brown
              Reg, look what I found in the Trophy Shop; a stuffed bear; well, at least the stuff trophies are made of! ... reality wither into nothing when I found out
              Message 6 of 23 , Jun 3, 2006
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                Reg, look what I found in the Trophy Shop; a stuffed bear; well, at
                least the stuff trophies are made of!

                > I don't know. I will say this - I watched the hope I had invested in
                reality wither into nothing when I found out reality wasn't going to
                become the precious ideality I wanted it to attain. The withering of
                that reality showed the existence of ideality, reality as distinct
                from reality. Or, rather, the ideality showed the withering of
                reality, objectivity, the world, the past self, what have you. I see
                Kierkegaard chock full of such an accounting of things. We had this
                discussion earlier when you and I were sparring over whether I really
                had ditched history, truly killed Jesus, etc. You had said it never
                happened, I think, and I was sitting there forming a clear memory of
                the moment of release that pierced his heart. I don't think the
                conversation got beyond that and I suspect any discussion of objective
                reality would end up in the same ditch as the one into which I tossed
                history. <

                Let me scratch my back on the tree that stands in the middle of our
                forest.

                Ben [1927]: <What do I mean by `grammar'? It is a term borrowed from
                late Wittgenstein, which can be brought to some clarity as follows: To
                understand a word is to understand the sentence; to understand a
                sentence is to understand the language; to understand a language is to
                understand the whole world-view. The grammar of a language is the set
                of rules for the use of that language. These rules are de facto, and
                form a base agreement such that there is a language and that it is
                that language; and so is what enables us to understand each other. To
                share (communicate, agree) a world view is therefore to share a
                grammar. Essence is expressed by grammar - 372: Philosophical
                Investigations." >

                The world-view we approach, the one that determines bear-speak, is the
                one centered in what we may call the self to self relation, the
                relation without which there is no possibility of a self to world
                relation, seeing as how there would be no reference point from which
                to set up such a relation. The world-view thus defined is a definition
                that makes sense; it presents a picture that we may look at and locate
                ourselves within it. Practically, which is to say that the most that
                can be made of that picture is that we can locate ourselves in it,
                that is it. Like being presented with the picture that inhabits our
                driver's license, the most we can say is that we recognize the mug
                shot as representing ourselves. If we go on from there to wax
                philosophically about the picture, we enter the field of speculation.

                However – and with this the picture changes absolutely, if the self to
                self relation changes in an absolute sense, and, as I had said, the
                face in the mirror remains the same, the face in the mirror looks at
                those eyes it meets with a different sense of what is behind that
                glance; a presence comes into being that was no present before. As you
                stated, the world-view now finds itself standing on a presence that is
                a paradox.

                If the grammar one inhabits depends upon one's world view, which is to
                say that the language of self one speaks, the language of
                subjectivity, reflects the world-view that centers upon the self to
                self view, and if one can reflect upon an absolute change in the self
                to self view, then that language must reflect the paradox engendered
                by that change.

                Since the grammar of paradox is something that can only be acquired by
                the individual who has acquired it, which is to say that the self to
                self relation acquired signifies the one who has acquired it, there
                can be no sharing of such a grammar other than through the description
                of the acquisition and of the difference that acquisition brings into
                being. This is a private grammar that signifies the race; to know
                oneself is to know the other, and if the other is not present to
                themselves, why then SK could write scads of books about that difference.

                = = == === =====

                Griz, I'll use a reference by JR to move to another slice of this
                singular pie. I will admit that when I said, "it's not what you say,
                it's how you say it," that I was paraphrasing the following quote.
                Yes, I cheated, but hey, I dead-panned it. Obviously, or so I would
                assume, SK didn't say it, Climacus said it, and as we all know, they
                ain't the same container, so the content can't be the same.

                JR: < So I don't think you'll ever read Kierkegaard saying "it's not
                what you say, it's how you say it" -- whether or not this is an
                accurate paraphrase of Wittgenstein (doubtful), it's certainly not
                Kierkegaard. "Saying" and "appropriating" or even "believing" are very
                different things. "How we say something" is ultimately an aesthetic
                concern, and those who insist on things being said a certain way are
                applying aesthetic criteria and are primarily concerned with the
                aesthetic, at least at that point. >

                "/Objectively the emphasis is on *what* is said; subjectively the
                emphasis is on *how* it is said/. This distinction applies even
                aesthetically and is specifically expressed when we say that in the
                mouth of this or that person something that is truth can become
                untruth. Particular attention should be paid to this distinction in
                our day, for if one were to express in a single sentence the
                difference between ancient times and our time, one would no doubt have
                to say: In ancient times there were only a few individuals who knew
                the truth; now everyone knows it, but inwardness has an inverse
                relation to it. Viewed esthetically, the contradiction that emerges
                when truth becomes untruth in this and that person's mouth is best
                interpreted comically. Ethically-religiously, the emphasis is again
                on: how. But this is not to be understood as manner, modulation of
                voice, oral delivery, etc., but it is to be understood as the relation
                of the existing person, in his very existence, to what is said.
                Objectively, the question is about categories of thought;
                subjectively, about inwardness. At its maximum, this how is the
                passion of the infinite, and the passion of the infinite is the very
                truth. But the passion of the infinite is precisely subjectivity, and
                thus subjectivity is the truth. From the objective point of view,
                there is no infinite decision, and thus it is objectively correct that
                the distinction between good and evil is canceled, along with the
                principle of contradiction, and thereby also the infinite distinction
                between truth and falsehood. Only in subjectivity is there decision,
                whereas wanting to become objective is untruth. The passion of the
                infinite, not its content, is the deciding factor, for its content is
                precisely itself. In this way the subjective how and subjectivity are
                the truth." (CUP, Hong, pp. 202-03; Lowrie, pp. 181-82)

                Look at the center hidden in this fairly long collection of words! It
                is this center that the *how* spins about. It is that form where the
                noun-verbs and the verb-nouns. It is that form in which the result of
                the act is the act. Transparency is the term assigned to such a grasp:
                "The passion of the infinite, not its content, is the deciding factor,
                for its content is precisely itself."

                The self to self relation that is the center of the subjective
                world-view has shifted from the given, where a self to self relation
                is the requirement of subjectivity, the self-recognition necessary to
                put the hat on our own head and not the head of another, to a shift in
                that relation of such a nature where the prior recognition is seen to
                be a false recognition, and, in that seeing, positing the one who sees
                that change in subjectivity, thus making concrete that which was
                before only metaphor.

                Well, again, the steam has escaped me ears and the tongue stops
                waggin'. ----willy
              • Reg Narak
                Hey Willy, comments upon comments below. I see quite an exchange has been created below. Should we toss it out soon in search of a new beginning always in
                Message 7 of 23 , Jun 6, 2006
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                  Hey Willy, comments upon comments below. I see quite an exchange has been
                  created below. Should we toss it out soon in search of a new beginning
                  always in season? You found the house of trophies!

                  Willy: >Let me scratch my back on the tree that stands in the middle of our
                  forest.<

                  Ben [1927]: <What do I mean by `grammar'? It is a term borrowed from
                  late Wittgenstein, which can be brought to some clarity as follows: To
                  understand a word is to understand the sentence; to understand a
                  sentence is to understand the language; to understand a language is to
                  understand the whole world-view. The grammar of a language is the set
                  of rules for the use of that language. These rules are de facto, and
                  form a base agreement such that there is a language and that it is
                  that language; and so is what enables us to understand each other. To
                  share (communicate, agree) a world view is therefore to share a
                  grammar. Essence is expressed by grammar - 372: Philosophical
                  Investigations." >


                  Willy: >If the grammar one inhabits depends upon one's world view, which is
                  to
                  say that the language of self one speaks, the language of
                  subjectivity, reflects the world-view that centers upon the self to
                  self view, and if one can reflect upon an absolute change in the self
                  to self view, then that language must reflect the paradox engendered
                  by that change.<

                  Reg: >>It is fun to watch you plying variously linked terms around a single
                  link, many understandings around one understanding. Yes, if the change is
                  the change that creates the change (as opposed to a change that brings
                  something else into being, such as various thoughts about the change [and
                  the expression hidden here cannot say anything more about the qualifying
                  factor than it already is saying]), and the change is the beginning of the
                  author, and all the words of the author are of the author that begins with
                  the change, then everything wordable is grounded in the change and can be
                  read in that way. Words about the change, coming from the change, going to
                  the change � and the words are � then we can rest assured that something is
                  truly being said. It is in this way that I read most of that dodaddle some
                  of which you've corralled into something you call your quote bin. There's
                  some other dodaddle I don't see in there but could just as well be tossed
                  in. I saw a soccer game tonight and enjoyed the play of offense and defense.
                  It was then that I decided to mention this � and so I say, without further
                  recourse to faint images.<<

                  Willy: >Since the grammar of paradox is something that can only be acquired
                  by
                  the individual who has acquired it, which is to say that the self to
                  self relation acquired signifies the one who has acquired it, there
                  can be no sharing of such a grammar other than through the description
                  of the acquisition and of the difference that acquisition brings into
                  being. This is a private grammar that signifies the race; to know
                  oneself is to know the other, and if the other is not present to
                  themselves, why then SK could write scads of books about that difference.<

                  Reg: >>Willy, you stole my thunder here. Apparently we have whisked the same
                  fire from the same god. "Acquisition" from your stuffer correlates to
                  "change" from my stuffer. Two words from one understanding - the
                  understanding that creates the division in understanding.

                  Sleep waits and I will soon be checking out � however, by tying this into
                  your discussion with Jim about how things work looks like something I want a
                  piece of. I'll try and spin off a reply tomorrow to tie in some specific
                  whirls of this particular wind that hears itself blowing into the wind.<<

                  -Reg


                  [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                • Reg Narak
                  Hey, willy the promised followup to my post yesterday - see, there is a bear who doesn t make bad on all promises! SK: But this is not to be understood as
                  Message 8 of 23 , Jun 7, 2006
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                    Hey, willy the promised followup to my post yesterday - see, there is a bear
                    who doesn't make bad on all promises!

                    SK: "But this is not to be understood as manner, modulation of
                    voice, oral delivery, etc., but it is to be understood as the relation
                    of the existing person, in his very existence, to what is said."

                    Willy: "The self to self relation that is the center of the subjective
                    world-view has shifted from the given, where a self to self relation
                    is the requirement of subjectivity, the self-recognition necessary to
                    put the hat on our own head and not the head of another, to a shift in
                    that relation of such a nature where the prior recognition is seen to
                    be a false recognition, and, in that seeing, positing the one who sees
                    that change in subjectivity, thus making concrete that which was
                    before only metaphor."

                    Reg: Ok, so in this case, the true recognition would distinguish between
                    true recognition of personal existence and the false recognition of personal
                    existence. On the false recognition side of what you call the bright line
                    would be the idea that the bright line that divides the true recognition
                    from the false recognition *is* a false recognition. However, that is a
                    false recognition of what the true recognition *would* identify as the false
                    recognition. The false recognition misidentifies the false recognition and
                    that is the basis of the false recognition. Any consciousness of the false
                    recognition within the false recognition would then be couched in the
                    subjunctive - an assumption made in and about the difference. And in such
                    manner, with the variety of assumptions that can be made about and around
                    the difference to delineate various possible forms of the misrelation - and
                    a book such as Sickness Unto Death is born.

                    In SUD I see a quantitive reflection built around a qualitative reflection.
                    This results in the appearance of various quantities or degrees of
                    qualitative reflection. The irony in all such discussion is that the
                    quantitative reflection is a quantitative reflection - one has placed the
                    qualitative within the quantitative - the results are prodigious - yet,
                    something is hidden. To see that SK is holding a trump card that places the
                    entire achievement at the disposal of the qualitative reflection that would
                    reveal the entire project to be nothing - well, that is an achievement in
                    itself.

                    So, if someone were to ask, in the subjunctive - wouldn't there be a
                    question of whether the one who sees himself putting the hat on his own head
                    actually recognizes that he is the one putting the hat on his own head? -
                    isn't the answer already present in order to put the question?

                    "From this we can easily perceive that the aesthetic concept of
                    spiritlessness by no means furnishes the scale for judging what is despair
                    and what is not -- which moreover is a matter of course; for since it is
                    unable to define what spirit truly is, how could the aesthetical make answer
                    to a question which does not exist for it at all?"
                    **Kierkegaard, SUD
                    http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=2067&C=1865

                    -Reg


                    [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                  • Reg Narak
                    So....yes, there is a grammar of communication that guides communication about the change that creates the grammar. Such a description is only possible on the
                    Message 9 of 23 , Jun 7, 2006
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                      So....yes, there is a grammar of communication that guides communication
                      about the change that creates the grammar. Such a description is only
                      possible on the assumption that the grammar has come into being, and that
                      assumption can only be made within the grammar that comes into being. There
                      is no other grammar in which to describe it because, if there were, it would
                      not be another grammar but the same grammar. It is self-change. Since it is
                      the self that means change it the self-change entails a change in the
                      meaning of change - another description to affix to the wall of trophies.
                      I'll now desist from further movement and allow you to comment upon a
                      stationary target.

                      What will you come up with now?

                      -Reg

                      On 6/3/06, Will Brown <wilbro99@...> wrote:
                      >
                      > Reg, look what I found in the Trophy Shop; a stuffed bear; well, at
                      > least the stuff trophies are made of!
                      >
                      > > I don't know. I will say this - I watched the hope I had invested in
                      > reality wither into nothing when I found out reality wasn't going to
                      > become the precious ideality I wanted it to attain. The withering of
                      > that reality showed the existence of ideality, reality as distinct
                      > from reality. Or, rather, the ideality showed the withering of
                      > reality, objectivity, the world, the past self, what have you. I see
                      > Kierkegaard chock full of such an accounting of things. We had this
                      > discussion earlier when you and I were sparring over whether I really
                      > had ditched history, truly killed Jesus, etc. You had said it never
                      > happened, I think, and I was sitting there forming a clear memory of
                      > the moment of release that pierced his heart. I don't think the
                      > conversation got beyond that and I suspect any discussion of objective
                      > reality would end up in the same ditch as the one into which I tossed
                      > history. <
                      >
                      > Let me scratch my back on the tree that stands in the middle of our
                      > forest.
                      >
                      > Ben [1927]: <What do I mean by `grammar'? It is a term borrowed from
                      > late Wittgenstein, which can be brought to some clarity as follows: To
                      > understand a word is to understand the sentence; to understand a
                      > sentence is to understand the language; to understand a language is to
                      > understand the whole world-view. The grammar of a language is the set
                      > of rules for the use of that language. These rules are de facto, and
                      > form a base agreement such that there is a language and that it is
                      > that language; and so is what enables us to understand each other. To
                      > share (communicate, agree) a world view is therefore to share a
                      > grammar. Essence is expressed by grammar - 372: Philosophical
                      > Investigations." >
                      >
                      > The world-view we approach, the one that determines bear-speak, is the
                      > one centered in what we may call the self to self relation, the
                      > relation without which there is no possibility of a self to world
                      > relation, seeing as how there would be no reference point from which
                      > to set up such a relation. The world-view thus defined is a definition
                      > that makes sense; it presents a picture that we may look at and locate
                      > ourselves within it. Practically, which is to say that the most that
                      > can be made of that picture is that we can locate ourselves in it,
                      > that is it. Like being presented with the picture that inhabits our
                      > driver's license, the most we can say is that we recognize the mug
                      > shot as representing ourselves. If we go on from there to wax
                      > philosophically about the picture, we enter the field of speculation.
                      >
                      > However � and with this the picture changes absolutely, if the self to
                      > self relation changes in an absolute sense, and, as I had said, the
                      > face in the mirror remains the same, the face in the mirror looks at
                      > those eyes it meets with a different sense of what is behind that
                      > glance; a presence comes into being that was no present before. As you
                      > stated, the world-view now finds itself standing on a presence that is
                      > a paradox.
                      >
                      > If the grammar one inhabits depends upon one's world view, which is to
                      > say that the language of self one speaks, the language of
                      > subjectivity, reflects the world-view that centers upon the self to
                      > self view, and if one can reflect upon an absolute change in the self
                      > to self view, then that language must reflect the paradox engendered
                      > by that change.
                      >
                      > Since the grammar of paradox is something that can only be acquired by
                      > the individual who has acquired it, which is to say that the self to
                      > self relation acquired signifies the one who has acquired it, there
                      > can be no sharing of such a grammar other than through the description
                      > of the acquisition and of the difference that acquisition brings into
                      > being. This is a private grammar that signifies the race; to know
                      > oneself is to know the other, and if the other is not present to
                      > themselves, why then SK could write scads of books about that difference.
                      >
                      > = = == === =====
                      >
                      > Griz, I'll use a reference by JR to move to another slice of this
                      > singular pie. I will admit that when I said, "it's not what you say,
                      > it's how you say it," that I was paraphrasing the following quote.
                      > Yes, I cheated, but hey, I dead-panned it. Obviously, or so I would
                      > assume, SK didn't say it, Climacus said it, and as we all know, they
                      > ain't the same container, so the content can't be the same.
                      >
                      > JR: < So I don't think you'll ever read Kierkegaard saying "it's not
                      > what you say, it's how you say it" -- whether or not this is an
                      > accurate paraphrase of Wittgenstein (doubtful), it's certainly not
                      > Kierkegaard. "Saying" and "appropriating" or even "believing" are very
                      > different things. "How we say something" is ultimately an aesthetic
                      > concern, and those who insist on things being said a certain way are
                      > applying aesthetic criteria and are primarily concerned with the
                      > aesthetic, at least at that point. >
                      >
                      > "/Objectively the emphasis is on *what* is said; subjectively the
                      > emphasis is on *how* it is said/. This distinction applies even
                      > aesthetically and is specifically expressed when we say that in the
                      > mouth of this or that person something that is truth can become
                      > untruth. Particular attention should be paid to this distinction in
                      > our day, for if one were to express in a single sentence the
                      > difference between ancient times and our time, one would no doubt have
                      > to say: In ancient times there were only a few individuals who knew
                      > the truth; now everyone knows it, but inwardness has an inverse
                      > relation to it. Viewed esthetically, the contradiction that emerges
                      > when truth becomes untruth in this and that person's mouth is best
                      > interpreted comically. Ethically-religiously, the emphasis is again
                      > on: how. But this is not to be understood as manner, modulation of
                      > voice, oral delivery, etc., but it is to be understood as the relation
                      > of the existing person, in his very existence, to what is said.
                      > Objectively, the question is about categories of thought;
                      > subjectively, about inwardness. At its maximum, this how is the
                      > passion of the infinite, and the passion of the infinite is the very
                      > truth. But the passion of the infinite is precisely subjectivity, and
                      > thus subjectivity is the truth. From the objective point of view,
                      > there is no infinite decision, and thus it is objectively correct that
                      > the distinction between good and evil is canceled, along with the
                      > principle of contradiction, and thereby also the infinite distinction
                      > between truth and falsehood. Only in subjectivity is there decision,
                      > whereas wanting to become objective is untruth. The passion of the
                      > infinite, not its content, is the deciding factor, for its content is
                      > precisely itself. In this way the subjective how and subjectivity are
                      > the truth." (CUP, Hong, pp. 202-03; Lowrie, pp. 181-82)
                      >
                      > Look at the center hidden in this fairly long collection of words! It
                      > is this center that the *how* spins about. It is that form where the
                      > noun-verbs and the verb-nouns. It is that form in which the result of
                      > the act is the act. Transparency is the term assigned to such a grasp:
                      > "The passion of the infinite, not its content, is the deciding factor,
                      > for its content is precisely itself."
                      >
                      > The self to self relation that is the center of the subjective
                      > world-view has shifted from the given, where a self to self relation
                      > is the requirement of subjectivity, the self-recognition necessary to
                      > put the hat on our own head and not the head of another, to a shift in
                      > that relation of such a nature where the prior recognition is seen to
                      > be a false recognition, and, in that seeing, positing the one who sees
                      > that change in subjectivity, thus making concrete that which was
                      > before only metaphor.
                      >
                      > Well, again, the steam has escaped me ears and the tongue stops
                      > waggin'. ----willy
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      > Yahoo! Groups Links
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >


                      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                    • Will Brown
                      ... that ... being. There ... it would ... Since it is ... trophies. ... Ok, what I need is a form, a structure, something my limited mind can use to capture
                      Message 10 of 23 , Jun 7, 2006
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                        --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "Reg Narak" <steaksauced@...>
                        wrote:
                        >
                        > So....yes, there is a grammar of communication that guides communication
                        > about the change that creates the grammar. Such a description is only
                        > possible on the assumption that the grammar has come into being, and
                        that
                        > assumption can only be made within the grammar that comes into
                        being. There
                        > is no other grammar in which to describe it because, if there were,
                        it would
                        > not be another grammar but the same grammar. It is self-change.
                        Since it is
                        > the self that means change it the self-change entails a change in the
                        > meaning of change - another description to affix to the wall of
                        trophies.
                        > I'll now desist from further movement and allow you to comment upon a
                        > stationary target.
                        >
                        > What will you come up with now?
                        >
                        > -Reg
                        >

                        Ok, what I need is a form, a structure, something my limited mind can
                        use to capture what I come up with.

                        I come up with a question? What is going on in this matter of a
                        self-change that allows us to create a grammar such as you have
                        described, where a change in world-view is subsumed into the grammar
                        that depends upon a world-view? Here is the thought that drives that
                        question: a self-change, a change in oneself, whatever that ends up
                        meaning, would be the most personal of matters, perhaps even defining
                        the personal, yet there seems to be a particular change of the
                        particular that allows us to reflect upon it and create an in-common
                        language concerning it.

                        All that says, and nothing more, is that there is a particular
                        experience of self-change that allows us to develop an in-general
                        language from it, which, in the process of development, defines the
                        self-change in question. For instance, say that something happens to
                        the me to whom things happen, and in the process of saying what
                        happened, a new language of self-change is developed to cover the
                        change in the changer; it is not that the changer changes, but that
                        there is a change in the changer, which leads me to the following
                        contention.

                        It would be my contention, and I will admit up front that my argument
                        is circular, that such a self-change would have to transcend the
                        particular, both figuratively, for it to become generic, and
                        literally, for it to be communicated as generic. The form of the
                        communication would then be transcendental. Ok, now I can capture what
                        I will come up with, which is to say that I have created the form to
                        hold that which I want to place within it, and have done so so that
                        the form and that captured by it are indistinguishable.

                        Why would I create such a form in the first place? I suspect it is to
                        take care of the identity that inhabits every description that
                        signifies the subjective. Well, that's what I came up with. Big deal,
                        huh? ----willy
                      • Don Anderson
                        Will, Reg, Nick What you all miss I think is that all language is objective and cannot express what the subjective self experiences except by indirect and
                        Message 11 of 23 , Jun 7, 2006
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                          Will, Reg, Nick
                          What you all miss I think is that all language is objective and cannot
                          express what the subjective self experiences except by indirect and
                          inadequate means.
                          Aloha,
                          Don
                          -----Original Message-----
                          From: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
                          [mailto:kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com]On Behalf Of Will Brown
                          Sent: Wednesday, June 07, 2006 7:16 PM
                          To: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
                          Subject: Re: [Kierkegaardian] The Grammar of Subjectivity


                          --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "Reg Narak" <steaksauced@...>
                          wrote:
                          >
                          > So....yes, there is a grammar of communication that guides communication
                          > about the change that creates the grammar. Such a description is only
                          > possible on the assumption that the grammar has come into being, and
                          that
                          > assumption can only be made within the grammar that comes into
                          being. There
                          > is no other grammar in which to describe it because, if there were,
                          it would
                          > not be another grammar but the same grammar. It is self-change.
                          Since it is
                          > the self that means change it the self-change entails a change in the
                          > meaning of change - another description to affix to the wall of
                          trophies.
                          > I'll now desist from further movement and allow you to comment upon a
                          > stationary target.
                          >
                          > What will you come up with now?
                          >
                          > -Reg
                          >

                          Ok, what I need is a form, a structure, something my limited mind can
                          use to capture what I come up with.

                          I come up with a question? What is going on in this matter of a
                          self-change that allows us to create a grammar such as you have
                          described, where a change in world-view is subsumed into the grammar
                          that depends upon a world-view? Here is the thought that drives that
                          question: a self-change, a change in oneself, whatever that ends up
                          meaning, would be the most personal of matters, perhaps even defining
                          the personal, yet there seems to be a particular change of the
                          particular that allows us to reflect upon it and create an in-common
                          language concerning it.

                          All that says, and nothing more, is that there is a particular
                          experience of self-change that allows us to develop an in-general
                          language from it, which, in the process of development, defines the
                          self-change in question. For instance, say that something happens to
                          the me to whom things happen, and in the process of saying what
                          happened, a new language of self-change is developed to cover the
                          change in the changer; it is not that the changer changes, but that
                          there is a change in the changer, which leads me to the following
                          contention.

                          It would be my contention, and I will admit up front that my argument
                          is circular, that such a self-change would have to transcend the
                          particular, both figuratively, for it to become generic, and
                          literally, for it to be communicated as generic. The form of the
                          communication would then be transcendental. Ok, now I can capture what
                          I will come up with, which is to say that I have created the form to
                          hold that which I want to place within it, and have done so so that
                          the form and that captured by it are indistinguishable.

                          Why would I create such a form in the first place? I suspect it is to
                          take care of the identity that inhabits every description that
                          signifies the subjective. Well, that's what I came up with. Big deal,
                          huh? ----willy






                          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                        • Don Anderson
                          James, Are you using my name in vain? Are you implying that Derrida says that words mean nothing? Or are you implying that others say incorrectly that Derrida
                          Message 12 of 23 , Jun 7, 2006
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                            James,
                            Are you using my name in vain? Are you implying that Derrida says that words
                            mean nothing? Or are you implying that others say incorrectly that Derrida
                            says that words mean nothing?
                            Don
                            -----Original Message-----
                            From: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
                            [mailto:kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com]On Behalf Of James Rovira
                            Sent: Wednesday, June 07, 2006 6:46 PM
                            To: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
                            Subject: Re: [Kierkegaardian] The Grammar of Subjectivity


                            Nick -- Who said anything about words meaning nothing? You should have
                            pulled that one out when Don invoked Derrida...that's the more usual
                            response. My reading of SK about words are that the grammar stays the
                            same,
                            but the person relating to the grammar changes. SK couldn't be any
                            clearer,
                            as has been quoted more than once in this thread:

                            "But this is not to be understood as manner, modulation of voice, oral
                            delivery, etc., but it is to be understood as the relation of the existing
                            person, in his very existence, to what is said."

                            It is not about the -manner of presentation- (the grammar) but about the
                            -relation of the existing person to what is said.-

                            Or do those words not mean anything? Ultimately, words are externals we
                            cannot see beyond, ideas standing in for actualities -- but not the
                            actualities themselves. Words are not meaningless, but words are not
                            -people- (which were my previous words).

                            People like the idea that something like a definable grammar can be used
                            to
                            determine who's in and who's out. This is an aesthetic concern at best and
                            Pharisaical at worst, and is ultimately a form of determining one's
                            interior
                            based upon their exterior.

                            SK did claim that he was engaged in a Socratic task in a Christian
                            culture.
                            Just as Socrates taught all the people who thought they knew something
                            that
                            they were ignorant, so did SK teach all the people who thought they were
                            Christians that they were not -- employing irony and indirect
                            communication,
                            like Socrates.

                            But, SK also recognized Socrates' limitations. If it were not for Christ,
                            we would not be talking about SK right now.

                            Jim R

                            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]






                            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                          • Don Anderson
                            Nick see below Don ... From: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com [mailto:kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com]On Behalf Of nnn88388 Sent: Wednesday, June 07, 2006 8:39
                            Message 13 of 23 , Jun 7, 2006
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                              Nick
                              see below
                              Don
                              -----Original Message-----
                              From: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
                              [mailto:kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com]On Behalf Of nnn88388
                              Sent: Wednesday, June 07, 2006 8:39 PM
                              To: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
                              Subject: Re: [Kierkegaardian] The Grammar of Subjectivity



                              Jim R: Who said anything about words meaning nothing?

                              Nick: You did. "Reg -- self change isn't a change in grammar,
                              because human beings
                              > aren't made up of words."

                              Jim R:
                              You should have
                              > pulled that one out when Don invoked Derrida...that's the more
                              usual
                              > response.

                              Nick: What's Don's Dorrito got to do with anything? Jim, talk to me
                              in simple one syllable words please.
                              [Don Anderson] Don't you know who Derrida is?
                              JimR: "My reading of SK about words are that the grammar stays the
                              same,
                              > but the person relating to the grammar changes. SK couldn't be any
                              clearer,
                              > as has been quoted more than once in this thread:

                              Nick: You're absolutely right Jim; but the person only changes in
                              that he finally comes to himself and becomes himself. He's still the
                              same person but with a different attitude. He doesn't become another
                              person. If having a different attitude makes him a different person
                              then, o.k., he's a different person.
                              [Don Anderson] Is SK talking only about a change in attitude or is it
                              deeper than that?
                              JimR: "But this is not to be understood as manner, modulation of
                              voice, oral
                              > delivery, etc., but it is to be understood as the relation of the
                              existing
                              > person, in his very existence, to what is said."
                              >
                              > It is not about the -manner of presentation- (the grammar) but
                              about the
                              > -relation of the existing person to what is said.-
                              >
                              > Or do those words not mean anything? Ultimately, words are
                              externals we
                              > cannot see beyond, ideas standing in for actualities -- but not the
                              > actualities themselves. Words are not meaningless, but words are
                              not
                              > -people- (which were my previous words).

                              Nick: Oh, I don't know Jim. Our Lord said "I Am the Word": and you,
                              being a man of the word, should heed those words. And people say "my
                              word is my bond". What do these words mean to you? Nothing?
                              [Don Anderson] Nick, does the Greek Orthodox Bible say that Jesus says "I
                              Am the Word." I want to see that. I can't find it in any of mine.
                              JimR: People like the idea that something like a definable grammar
                              can be used to
                              > determine who's in and who's out. This is an aesthetic concern at
                              best and
                              > Pharisaical at worst, and is ultimately a form of determining
                              one's interior
                              > based upon their exterior.

                              Nick: Why bring in those poor maligned Pharisees into an SK
                              discussion? And, If a discussion of SK is only an aesthetic concern
                              then we're wasting our existential energy for nothing but
                              decorations and bragging rights.
                              [Don Anderson] Don't you think Jesus is talking about the Biblical image
                              of the Pharasee when he talks about the ethical stage?
                              > SK did claim that he was engaged in a Socratic task in a Christian
                              culture.
                              > Just as Socrates taught all the people who thought they knew
                              something that
                              > they were ignorant, so did SK teach all the people who thought
                              they were
                              > Christians that they were not -- employing irony and indirect
                              communication,
                              > like Socrates.
                              >
                              > But, SK also recognized Socrates' limitations. If it were not for
                              Christ,
                              > we would not be talking about SK right now.
                              > Jim R
                              >

                              I don't know about that. Not everyone who is enamored with SK comes
                              to him by way of Christ
                              [Don Anderson] But in saying this are you meaning to talk about what SK
                              said or about what those who read SK said.

                              Nick

                              > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                              >






                              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                            • Don Anderson
                              See below ... From: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com [mailto:kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com]On Behalf Of James Rovira Sent: Wednesday, June 07, 2006 6:46 PM
                              Message 14 of 23 , Jun 7, 2006
                              • 0 Attachment
                                See below
                                -----Original Message-----
                                From: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
                                [mailto:kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com]On Behalf Of James Rovira
                                Sent: Wednesday, June 07, 2006 6:46 PM
                                To: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
                                Subject: Re: [Kierkegaardian] The Grammar of Subjectivity


                                Nick -- Who said anything about words meaning nothing? You should have
                                pulled that one out when Don invoked Derrida...that's the more usual
                                response. My reading of SK about words are that the grammar stays the
                                same,
                                but the person relating to the grammar changes. SK couldn't be any
                                clearer,
                                as has been quoted more than once in this thread:
                                [Don Anderson] James, I don't think this is quite what SK is saying. He is
                                saying more than that the person relating to the grammar changes. He is
                                saying that there are many things that cannot be expressed fully by means of
                                words. He is saying that there are things that cannot be expressed by
                                grammer period. When we talk about Love for example there are no words. When
                                we want to express Love words don't work. We can use poetry, analogy, and a
                                whole host of words to point toward the meaning but nothing is adequate. It
                                may be that I have changed so that I want for the first time to express
                                these inexpressible things but that has nothing to do with why they are
                                inexpressible or nearly so.
                                "But this is not to be understood as manner, modulation of voice, oral
                                delivery, etc., but it is to be understood as the relation of the existing
                                person, in his very existence, to what is said."
                                [Don Anderson] I agree
                                It is not about the -manner of presentation- (the grammar) but about the
                                -relation of the existing person to what is said.-
                                [Don Anderson] I agree
                                Or do those words not mean anything? Ultimately, words are externals we
                                cannot see beyond, ideas standing in for actualities -- but not the
                                actualities themselves. Words are not meaningless, but words are not
                                -people- (which were my previous words).
                                [Don Anderson] I agree words are not people and would add that words can
                                never express the full range of the self.
                                People like the idea that something like a definable grammar can be used
                                to
                                determine who's in and who's out. This is an aesthetic concern at best and
                                Pharisaical at worst, and is ultimately a form of determining one's
                                interior
                                based upon their exterior.
                                [Don Anderson] This is true but it goes beyond grammar. SK is in some of
                                his discourses very adamant to say that when one reads the Bible one must be
                                very clear that the Bible doesn't apply to others but only to me, myself and
                                I. We all seem to like to see whats wrong with the other and let ourselves
                                off scot-free.
                                SK did claim that he was engaged in a Socratic task in a Christian
                                culture.
                                Just as Socrates taught all the people who thought they knew something
                                that
                                they were ignorant, so did SK teach all the people who thought they were
                                Christians that they were not -- employing irony and indirect
                                communication,
                                like Socrates.
                                [Don Anderson] SK felt he was engaged in a Socratic task not in a
                                Christian culture but in the culture of Christendom. He suggested that these
                                who had always been told they were Christian were in fact pagans who had not
                                come even as far as Socrates. They were speculators. You are correct in what
                                you say but I think what you have left out is that he felt that by useing
                                Socrates as a model for the ethical he could help these people to see that
                                they were pagans who hadn't even come as far as the pagan Socrates so they
                                had a long way to go if they were to really be Christian.
                                But, SK also recognized Socrates' limitations. If it were not for Christ,
                                we would not be talking about SK right now.

                                Jim R

                                [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]






                                [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                              • Reg Narak
                                Jim, Excellent snipe. You perceived a missing insight. Like Gray Davis, you are contending with a lack. Either there is no energy or call me Jeffrey Skilling.
                                Message 15 of 23 , Jun 8, 2006
                                • 0 Attachment
                                  Jim,

                                  Excellent snipe. You perceived a missing insight. Like Gray Davis, you are
                                  contending with a lack. Either there is no energy or call me Jeffrey
                                  Skilling.

                                  Amendment: "It is self-change." is now "It is the grammar of self-change."

                                  As it is written in the Chronicles of Clarence:

                                  "the true recognition [of personal existence] would distinguish between true
                                  recognition of personal existence and the false recognition of personal
                                  existence"

                                  -Reg


                                  On 6/7/06, James Rovira <jamesrovira@...> wrote:
                                  >
                                  > Reg -- self change isn't a change in grammar, because human beings
                                  > aren't made up of words.
                                  >
                                  > Jim R
                                  >
                                  >
                                  >
                                  >
                                  > Yahoo! Groups Links
                                  >
                                  >
                                  >
                                  >
                                  >
                                  >
                                  >


                                  [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                • Reg Narak
                                  Jim, A reflection: It is self-change was amended to It is the grammar of self-change to make it clearer that the energy signified by means of the
                                  Message 16 of 23 , Jun 8, 2006
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                                    Jim,

                                    A reflection:

                                    "It is self-change" was amended to "It is the grammar of self-change" to
                                    make it clearer that the energy signified by means of the word-amendment is
                                    not the word-amendment but the energy that produces word-amendments that
                                    signify the energy.

                                    -Reg

                                    On 6/8/06, Reg Narak <steaksauced@...> wrote:
                                    >
                                    > Jim,
                                    >
                                    > Excellent snipe. You perceived a missing insight. Like Gray Davis, you are
                                    > contending with a lack. Either there is no energy or call me Jeffrey
                                    > Skilling.
                                    >
                                    > Amendment: "It is self-change." is now "It is the grammar of self-change."
                                    >
                                    > As it is written in the Chronicles of Clarence:
                                    >
                                    > "the true recognition [of personal existence] would distinguish between
                                    > true recognition of personal existence and the false recognition of personal
                                    > existence"
                                    >
                                    > -Reg
                                    >
                                    >
                                    >
                                    > On 6/7/06, James Rovira <jamesrovira@...> wrote:
                                    > >
                                    > > Reg -- self change isn't a change in grammar, because human beings
                                    > > aren't made up of words.
                                    > >
                                    > > Jim R
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > > Yahoo! Groups Links
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    >


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