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  • Fred Cohen
    U.S. prepares for possible Y2K violence The U.S. government is preparing for possible violence from cults, guerrillas, hate groups and end-of-world-fearing
    Message 1 of 6 , Sep 1, 1999
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      U.S. prepares for possible Y2K violence
      The U.S. government is preparing for possible violence from cults,
      guerrillas, hate groups and end-of-world-fearing zealots as 2000 approaches.
      Law enforcement officials are working on contingency plans to cope with
      everything from cyber attacks to bombs at New Year's Eve parties, though
      they say they lack knowledge of specific, credible threats.
      http://www.sjmercury.com/svtech/news/breaking/merc/docs/051166.htm

      ====================================================================

      General: Cyberattacks against NATO traced to China
      Hackers with Chinese Internet addresses launched coordinated cyberattacks
      against the United States and allied forces during the air war against
      Yugoslavia this spring, the Air Force's top network communicator confirmed today.
      http://www.fcw.com/pubs/fcw/1999/0830/web-china-09-01-99.html

      ====================================================================

      Cyberterror: Thing That Goes Bump in the Net?
      Some Wonder if the Goverment is Hyping Fear of Attack
      Who are America's cyberenemies? Don't ask the White House, it doesn't know
      -- but it insists they're out there. Watchdogs and experts in the computer
      security field say there is a real threat of hostile hackers penetrating
      sensitive government and private computer systems, and intrusions are
      detected constantly.
      http://www.apbnews.com/911/1999/08/28/cyber0828_01.html

      ====================================================================

      --
      Fred Cohen at Sandia National Laboratories at tel:925-294-2087 fax:925-294-1225
      Fred Cohen & Associates: http://all.net - fc@... - tel/fax:925-454-0171
      Fred Cohen - Practitioner in Residence - The University of New Haven
      Have a great day!!!

      Per the official policy of Sandia National Laboratories, the reader should be
      aware that:
      - Fred Cohen of Fred Cohen & Associates is the same Fred Cohen who is a
      Principal Member of Technical Staff at Sandia National Laboratories.
      - Fred Cohen & Associates - is owned and operated by Fred Cohen and is
      separate and independent from the work done by Fred Cohen at Sandia
      National Laboratories.
    • Rob Rosenberger
      ... Okay, I ll ask an obvious question. Did DISA at least block all IANA-assigned Chinese IP addresses so they couldn t visit .mil sites? Did DISA s civilian
      Message 2 of 6 , Sep 1, 1999
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        >Hackers with Chinese Internet addresses launched coordinated
        >cyberattacks against the United States and allied forces during
        >the air war against Yugoslavia this spring

        Okay, I'll ask an obvious question. Did DISA at least block all
        IANA-assigned Chinese IP addresses so they couldn't visit .mil sites? Did
        DISA's civilian counterpart do the same for .gov sites? Or does our
        government pursue an "allow unless denied" policy with adversaries?

        We restrict Chinese nationals from visiting U.S. government installations
        except under specific circumstances, so why can't we restrict Chinese IPs
        from visiting U.S. government computers except under specific circumstances?

        Rob Rosenberger, webmaster
        Computer Virus Myths home page
        http://www.kumite.com/myths
      • Clayton, Charlie
        Interesting question and a good point, Rob. National level planners, take heed! The capability undoubtedly exists. However, the effort would need to be
        Message 3 of 6 , Sep 2, 1999
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          Interesting question and a good point, Rob. National level planners, take
          heed! The capability undoubtedly exists. However, the effort would need to
          be centrally coordinated (for DISA and the national civilian agencies) and
          further managed within each agency. Unless I'm mistaken, there is no
          Internet or Infosec FEMA type organization (yet) and I don't think that DISA
          has a single civilian counterpart.

          For a protracted operation, this would be possible but it would also take
          time to coordinate. Hence, the barn door is left open for short operations
          where there has never been an exercise to test such a plan. If it isn't part
          of someone's national contingency planning, it should be. The recent
          Yugoslavia difficulties would have been an excellent opportunity to test
          such a plan. But alas, I doubt that our planning has advanced far enough as
          to actually be able to coordinate mass blockages such as you suggest.
          Staffing such a plan around the different government agencies would be a
          nightmare without a presidential directive.

          Sorry, but I never did get around to announcing myself as a newbee here. I'm
          Charlie Clayton. Former IWO for Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR)
          when I was called up for the Bosnia thing (9 month Presidential Selective
          Recall as an Army Reservist). Former Special Security Officer for Fort
          Bragg, NC. Currently the UNIX security guy for a medium sized company in
          Greensboro stuck doing the Y2K project (yuck!).

          CHARLES J. CLAYTON, CISSP
          UNIX Security/Y2K
          New Breed Corporations

          > -----Original Message-----
          > From: Rob Rosenberger [SMTP:us@...]
          > Sent: Wednesday, September 01, 1999 9:29 PM
          > To: iwar@onelist.com
          > Subject: RE: [iwar] Today in the news
          >
          > From: "Rob Rosenberger" <us@...>
          >
          > >Hackers with Chinese Internet addresses launched coordinated
          > >cyberattacks against the United States and allied forces during
          > >the air war against Yugoslavia this spring
          >
          > Okay, I'll ask an obvious question. Did DISA at least block all
          > IANA-assigned Chinese IP addresses so they couldn't visit .mil sites? Did
          > DISA's civilian counterpart do the same for .gov sites? Or does our
          > government pursue an "allow unless denied" policy with adversaries?
          >
          > We restrict Chinese nationals from visiting U.S. government installations
          > except under specific circumstances, so why can't we restrict Chinese IPs
          > from visiting U.S. government computers except under specific
          > circumstances?
          >
          > Rob Rosenberger, webmaster
          > Computer Virus Myths home page
          > http://www.kumite.com/myths
          >
          >
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        • Ross Stapleton-Gray
          ... Guess I should do the same! I m a long-time information technology and policy analyst type; I did my doctoral work on IT within the then-Soviet Bloc (to
          Message 4 of 6 , Sep 2, 1999
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            At 08:53 AM 9/2/1999 -0400, you wrote:
            >From: "Clayton, Charlie" <cclayton@...>
            >...
            >Sorry, but I never did get around to announcing myself as a newbee here.

            Guess I should do the same! I'm a long-time information technology and
            policy analyst type; I did my doctoral work on IT within the then-Soviet
            Bloc (to 1988) followed by six years at the CIA and Intelligence Community
            Management Staff back before it was "hip" to think of computers as relevant
            to national security (other than Reagan-era export controls on
            high-performance systems), including work with the White House Information
            Infrastructure Task Force, leaving USG in 1994.

            I've been a speaker/organizer of the Computers, Freedom & Privacy
            conference for 4 of the last 6 yars, and am one of the legion of folks that
            think it'd be a nice thing when we get past the log-rolling on the
            availability of commercial strong encryption, though I'm rather catholic on
            the various issues of privacy, surveillance, etc.

            I'm currently an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, and the
            DC-based VP government relations for Sandstorm Enterprises
            (http://www.sandstorm.net), a Cambridge, MA company marketing computer
            security audit tools, including PhoneSweep, a telephone scanner (i.e., "war
            dialer").

            Additional info on me at http://www.telediplomacy.com

            Ross

            ___________________________________________________________________
            Ross Stapleton-Gray Sandstorm Enterprises, Inc.
            rsgray@... 2503 Columbia Pike, Suite 118
            Arlington VA 22204
            http://www.sandstorm.net/ +1 703 685-5197 / 5257 fax
          • Tony Bartoletti
            All, The ability to block all incoming packets from certain IP addresses (Chinese today, who-knows-who tomorrow) via limited choke points is probably an
            Message 5 of 6 , Sep 2, 1999
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              All,

              The ability to block all incoming packets from certain IP addresses
              (Chinese today, who-knows-who tomorrow) via limited "choke points"
              is probably an inadvisable strategy. Such a capability could be
              exploited by an adversary to deny us our own communications.

              The internet was designed to survive large-scale takedowns, allowing
              packets to automatically route around damage, and the notion of
              choke-points or highly centralized access control is antithetical
              to this valuable capability.

              I believe the best security is distributed. If each subdomain were
              to develop their own "dealing with hostile packets" strategies, then
              an adversary could not hope to coordinate a "death-blow" exploit.

              My 2 cents.

              ___tony___

              IOWA Center
              Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory


              At 08:53 AM 9/2/99 -0400, Clayton, Charlie wrote:
              >From: "Clayton, Charlie" <cclayton@...>
              >
              >Interesting question and a good point, Rob. National level planners, take
              >heed! The capability undoubtedly exists. However, the effort would need to
              >be centrally coordinated (for DISA and the national civilian agencies) and
              >further managed within each agency. Unless I'm mistaken, there is no
              >Internet or Infosec FEMA type organization (yet) and I don't think that DISA
              >has a single civilian counterpart.
              >
              >For a protracted operation, this would be possible but it would also take
              >time to coordinate. Hence, the barn door is left open for short operations
              >where there has never been an exercise to test such a plan. If it isn't part
              >of someone's national contingency planning, it should be. The recent
              >Yugoslavia difficulties would have been an excellent opportunity to test
              >such a plan. But alas, I doubt that our planning has advanced far enough as
              >to actually be able to coordinate mass blockages such as you suggest.
              >Staffing such a plan around the different government agencies would be a
              >nightmare without a presidential directive.
              >
              >Sorry, but I never did get around to announcing myself as a newbee here. I'm
              >Charlie Clayton. Former IWO for Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR)
              >when I was called up for the Bosnia thing (9 month Presidential Selective
              >Recall as an Army Reservist). Former Special Security Officer for Fort
              >Bragg, NC. Currently the UNIX security guy for a medium sized company in
              >Greensboro stuck doing the Y2K project (yuck!).
              >
              >CHARLES J. CLAYTON, CISSP
              >UNIX Security/Y2K
              >New Breed Corporations
              >
              >> -----Original Message-----
              >> From: Rob Rosenberger [SMTP:us@...]
              >> Sent: Wednesday, September 01, 1999 9:29 PM
              >> To: iwar@onelist.com
              >> Subject: RE: [iwar] Today in the news
              >>
              >> From: "Rob Rosenberger" <us@...>
              >>
              >> >Hackers with Chinese Internet addresses launched coordinated
              >> >cyberattacks against the United States and allied forces during
              >> >the air war against Yugoslavia this spring
              >>
              >> Okay, I'll ask an obvious question. Did DISA at least block all
              >> IANA-assigned Chinese IP addresses so they couldn't visit .mil sites? Did
              >> DISA's civilian counterpart do the same for .gov sites? Or does our
              >> government pursue an "allow unless denied" policy with adversaries?
              >>
              >> We restrict Chinese nationals from visiting U.S. government installations
              >> except under specific circumstances, so why can't we restrict Chinese IPs
              >> from visiting U.S. government computers except under specific
              >> circumstances?
              >>
              >> Rob Rosenberger, webmaster
              >> Computer Virus Myths home page
              >> http://www.kumite.com/myths
              >>
              >>
              >> --------------------------- ONElist Sponsor ----------------------------
              >>
              >> ATTENTION ONElist MEMBERS! Are you getting your ONElist news?
              >> If not, join our MEMBER NEWSLETTER here:
              >> <a href=" http://clickme.onelist.com/ad/newsletter1 ">Click Here</a>
              >>
              >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
              >> ------------------
              >> http://all.net/
              >
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              >

              Tony Bartoletti LL
              IOWA Center LL LL
              Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory LL LL LL
              PO Box 808, L - 089 LL LL LL
              Livermore, CA 94551-9900 LL LL LLLLLLLL
              phone: 925-422-3881 fax: 925-423-8081 LL LLLLLLLL
              email: azb@... LLLLLLLL
            • Tony Bartoletti
              Introductions all around! I ve worked INFOSEC since 1990 here at LLNL, doing software development (inspection tools, crypto, etc.) The best conference I have
              Message 6 of 6 , Sep 2, 1999
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                Introductions all around!

                I've worked INFOSEC since 1990 here at LLNL, doing software development
                (inspection tools, crypto, etc.) The best conference I have ever attended
                was the CFP (1 or 2?) held in SF around 91/92. At the lavish luncheons,
                tables would seat ten, and each table it seemed had its mix of lawyers,
                law enforcement, spooks, hacker/cracker/activists and civil libertarians
                that would debate policy and methods in the most lively fashion. It was
                most exhilarating (wish I could get paid to do that!)

                ___tony___



                Tony Bartoletti LL
                IOWA Center LL LL
                Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory LL LL LL
                PO Box 808, L - 089 LL LL LL
                Livermore, CA 94551-9900 LL LL LLLLLLLL
                phone: 925-422-3881 fax: 925-423-8081 LL LLLLLLLL
                email: azb@... LLLLLLLL
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