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The Indonesian Nationalists and the Japanese "Liberation" of Indonesia: Visions

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  • John MacDougall
    The Indonesian Nationalists and the Japanese Liberation of Indonesia: Visions and Reactions Journal article by Elly Touwen-Bouwsma; Journal of Southeast
    Message 1 of 1 , Aug 17, 2007
      The Indonesian Nationalists and the Japanese "Liberation" of
      Indonesia: Visions and Reactions

      Journal article by Elly Touwen-Bouwsma; Journal of Southeast Asian
      Studies, Vol. 27, 1996

      The Indonesian nationalists and the Japanese "liberation" of
      Indonesia: visions and reactions

      by Elly Touwen-Bouwsma


      It is generally assumed that most of the Indonesian population,
      including the nationalists, resigned themselves passively to the
      threat of an imminent war with Japan. There were no large-scale
      preparations on the side of the Indonesians either to help the
      Japanese army of invasion find its way or to sabotage the Dutch.(1)
      This is especially true of Java, the political heartland of Indonesia,
      where the evidence would seem to point to the fact that no
      pro-Japanese underground movement existed.(2) Only in Aceh among the
      Minangkabau in Sumatra had the Japanese found Indonesian allies
      willing to organize anti-Dutch activities.(3) In Palembang in South
      Sumatra there was also an espionage organization established by the
      Japanese themselves probably in order to prevent the destruction of
      the oil refineries at Playu and Sungai Gerong.(4) In the strongly
      Islamic region of Gorontalo in North Sulawesi, the local nationalists
      actually succeeded in taking over the European administration. They
      arrested the Dutch and proclaimed the Republik Gorontalo on 23 January
      1942, just before the Japanese reached their area.(5)

      In Java, where the repressive policy adopted by the Dutch government
      towards the nationalists was most severe, the Dutch seem to have had
      everything under control on the eve of the outbreak of the war with
      Japan. Nevertheless, there is some information available which
      suggests that there could have been an anti-Dutch oriented underground
      organization in Java. In this context George Kanahele(6) mentions the
      Sumatran Jusuf Hasan who returned to Java early in 1941 as a Japanese
      agent.(7) He collaborated with several Japanese, including Nishijima
      Shigetada,(8) Ishii Taro, Maeda and Machida. Kanahele claims that
      their specific assignment was to collect information on Dutch military
      and defence installations and to set up a fifth column. In the summer
      of 1941, Jusuf Hasan and his Japanese accomplices organized a group of
      Indonesian nationalists in a conspiracy to sabotage the Dutch defence
      efforts in the event of a war with Japan. Among those whom he names as
      belonging to Jusuf's fifth column group are Achmad Subardjo,(9)
      Maramis, a close friend of Subardjo and of Jusuf Hasan himself,
      Tadjuddin Noor (member of the People's Council) and Dr. Samsi
      Sastrowidagdo, a prominent nationalist. The others are unnamed.
      Kanahele treats seriously the possibility that there was indeed a real
      attempt made by Jusuf Hasan to set up a fifth column. He concludes,
      however, that as events turned out the group had no real opportunity
      to operate against the Dutch because of the sudden collapse of the
      colonial defence forces a week after the Japanese landed in Java.

      The NEFIS collection, held by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
      The Hague, contains some documents classified under different headings
      which seem to support George Kanahele's presumption that there was a
      kind of underground organization operating in Java some months before
      the Japanese landed there. The documents, written in Indonesian, were
      found in December 1945 by the Dutch in the former building of the
      Gunseikanbu in Jakarta, where they were part of the archive of
      Sudjono,(10) who worked during the war with the Japanese Ministry of
      General Affairs. Most of these documents are classified under the
      heading "Organization Subardjo", even though most of the reports do
      not actually refer to this organization. Some of the 30 or so reports
      are dated March, April and May 1942, but the bulk of them are dated
      July 1942. All give an overview of the local situation and the
      activities of the members involved in the organization just before and
      just after the arrival of the Japanese Army. During the eight-day
      battle for Java they were among the first to form Merdeka committees
      to welcome the victorious Japanese army and offer their help.(11)
      Achmad Subardjo is named as one of the leaders of the Central
      Committee in Jakarta which co-ordinated the activities of the local
      Merdeka committees.(12)

      In the first part of this paper I will pay attention to an underground
      organization directed by nationalists in Java which prepared
      anti-Dutch activities before and during the war, examining what
      preparations they made and what activities they undertook. Going one
      step further, another question is what were the motives of the local
      nationalists who set up Merdeka committees for becoming supporters of
      the Japanese, rather than striving for independence for Indonesia? In
      order to gain an insight into the activities of the nationalists,
      including the preparations they made and the actions they carried out,
      these must be analyzed against the background of the continuously
      changing political context: the Dutch colonial regime, which was in
      full control before the outbreak of the war on 8 December 1941; the
      brief interregnum when the battle for Java was waged; the vacuum of
      authority in the first week after the invasion of Java by the Japanese
      army; and the policy of the Japanese military regime towards the
      nationalists in the first four months of the occupation.

      Japan: The Liberator of Indonesia

      One crucial point which caused many nationalists to look to Japan as
      the power that could help them to gain their Indonesia Merdeka was the
      introduction of the Native Militia Bill by the Dutch government in
      July 1941. Although they had been requesting the setting up of an
      Indonesian Militia for years, the nationalists in the People's Council
      unanimously rejected the bill. They did so because he Dutch, thus far,
      had refused to recognize the right of the Indonesian people to defend
      their own country and, moreover, no concessions for any political
      reforms were being granted.(13) Another point which influenced some
      nationalists was the failure of the economic negotiations between the
      Dutch and the Japanese governments in June 1941. They supported Japan
      100 per cent because it represented a source of cheap commodities for
      the Indonesian people and could change the economic structure.(14)

      The Dutch refusal to grant any political reforms strengthened
      solidarity among the nationalists and led to the establishment of the
      Council of the Indonesian People, Madjalis Rakyat Indonesia, in
      September 1941, as a representative body of the people whose aim was
      to strive together for an Indonesian parliament.(15) Quite apart from
      these disappointments, there were signs that nationalist sympathy for
      Japan was also gaining ground in the same period. The Japanese
      propaganda "Asia for the Asians" was increasingly seen as an ideal
      solution to a political situation which seemed to have reached an
      impasse. Only the Gerindo (Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia/the Indonesian
      People's Movement), the left-wing of the nationalist movement, still
      saw the straggle for national independence as dependent upon the
      outcome of the world-wide straggle between the forces of Facism and
      anti-Facism. The Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raya/the Greater Indonesia
      Party), the largest nationalist party, was becoming steadily more
      pro-Japan minded. The popularity of Japan intensified as one aspect of
      the growing anti-Dutch animus, which was a projection of the
      frustrated desire for freedom. The idea took hold that the liberation
      of Indonesia would begin with the expulsion of the Dutch by the
      Japanese. According to the Jayabaya myth, the Dutch would be driven
      out of Indonesia by a yellow race which would come from the north and
      the ordinary people interpreted this to refer to the Japanese. After a
      hundred days of occupation, the promised days of freedom would be at
      hand.(16) The Japanese propaganda made very good use of this material.
      Since 1939 Radio Tokyo had been broadcasting daily programmes to the
      Indies in Malay,(17) but from September 1941 the tone of the Japanese
      broadcasts changed, growing more anti-Dutch, and stressing that Japan
      would liberate the Indonesians and bring prosperity. Each transmission
      ended with the national anthem, Indonesia Raya.(18) The independence
      of Indonesia was, so to speak, just around the corner.

      This was the political climate in which an anti-Dutch underground
      organization took shape. The first information available about the
      existence of such a kind of organization dates from September 1941. In
      that month, Achmad Subardjo proposed to the writer of the relevant
      report that he join the underground movement active against the Dutch
      government in Batavia. The aims of the organization were to stimulate
      the population to help the Japanese in their landings in Java, to
      prevent the Dutch from pursuing a scorched-earth policy, to maintain
      order among the population and to stockpile food supplies. The
      contacts in Japan mentioned were Jusuf Hasan and one of his
      fellow-workers. They worked for Radio Tokyo and would give
      instructions. Much later, the writer of this report heard that he was
      supposed to co-operate with Subardjo, Maramis, Tadjuddin Noor and
      Hindromartono.(19) Other nationalists named as members of this
      organization were Sartono (Buitenzorg), Dr Boentaran (Semarang), Dr
      Samsi (Surabaya),(20) Latuharhary and Soenarko (Malang).(21) Most of
      the above-mentioned people were friends of Achmad Subardjo. Dr Samsi
      and Dr Boentaran knew Subardjo from their university days in the
      Netherlands, where they used to meet each other at the Indonesian
      Student Association (Perhimpunan Indonesia). This was also the case
      with Maramis and Latuharhary. Tadjuddin Noor was a friend of Subardjo
      whom he had met in Malang when he was gravely ill.(22) Subardjo
      probably met Jusuf Hasan during his visit to Japan in 1935. Jusuf
      Hasan is also mentioned as one of the people who sought contact with
      nationalists in Blitar in October 1941, declaring that they were
      prepared to work in the interests of Japan. He is only mentioned once,
      probably because he returned to Tokyo to support the organization by
      means of Radio Tokyo in November 1941. It was, however, not Subardjo
      himself who travelled through Java to recruit supporters for
      anti-Dutch underground activities, but one of his fellow-workers,
      Ismangoenwonoto spent October and November 1941 on the road in Java,
      visiting nationalists in Yogyakarta, Kertosono and Semarang.(23)
      Ismangoenwonoto instructed the nationalists to incite anti-Dutch
      feelings among the Indonesian people, in particular among Indonesian
      members of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army and the police, and
      advise them not to fight against the Japanese. Further instructions
      would be given by Radio Tokyo.(24) In Semarang, he co-ordinated the
      activities of three small groups of nationalists already established
      there to undermine Dutch authority. The tasks were shared out, with
      one group responsible for propaganda among the Indonesian soldiers,
      one for work among the common people and the third for infiltration of
      the upper echelons of society - intellectuals and government
      officials.(25) These local nationalists, in their turn, sought contact
      with like-minded people in their neighbourhoods and passed on
      instructions from Batavia. In places as far apart as Tuban, Demak and
      Jember local nationalists joined the underground organization.(26)
      Some of these nationalists were members of various political parties
      like Parindra, Gerindo and Partindo, but others had not aligned
      themselves with any political party.

      The motive spurring most of the local nationalists to join the
      underground movement and support the Japanese was a conviction that
      the Indonesian people would never achieve prosperity as long as the
      Dutch were in power. They also believed that the Indonesians did not
      themselves possess the power to unseat the Dutch and that only changes
      in international politics could help them to reach their goal for
      their homeland: a free Indonesia.(27) This mixture of left and right
      wing ideologies among the nationalists is characteristic of their
      hitherto forlorn attempts to gain independence and freedom for
      Indonesia. The hope of changes in the international political arena
      was a mainstay of Gerindo, while support for the Japanese as a direct
      means of helping the Indonesians was more in line with the thinking of
      the Parindra. However, according to Nishijima, Achmad Subardjo was
      convinced that independence would be achieved once the Japanese landed
      in Java.(28)

      The actual activities undertaken by the local nationalists in the
      period just before the outbreak of the war with Japan remain fairly
      obscure. Probably they did no more than encourage and stimulate
      anti-Dutch feelings, trying to convince the people that the Japanese
      would liberate them from the Dutch. They had to tread very warily
      because the police and the Political Intelligence Service (PID) kept a
      watchful eye on the nationalists, in particular on those who were
      suspected of having contacts in Japan. Even a prominent nationalist
      and member of the People's Council like Thamrin was suspected of
      pro-Japanese activities, and was put under house arrest shortly before
      he died of heart failure and malaria in January 1941.(29) The chances
      of being able to meet one another were very few and far between.
      Following the outbreak of the war in the Netherlands in May 1940, all
      political meetings had been banned by the Dutch government. Some
      nationalists involved in the underground organization managed to meet
      each other at the Gerindo Congress held in Batavia in October
      1941,(30) but more often they met informally as friends to discuss
      their activities pending the advent of the Great East Asian War that
      would liberate them from the yoke of the Dutch.

      After the declaration of war with Japan, on 8 December 1941, the first
      thing the Dutch government did was to arrest all the Japanese in Java,
      about 2,000 persons in all,(31) and to place Indonesians known to have
      relations with Japanese under strict police surveillance. One of
      Achmad Subardjo's sisters(32) and her family, who lived in Batavia,
      were put under house arrest, accused of harbouring sympathy for the
      Japanese because they had a son in Formosa and a son-in-law in Japan.
      Sometime later the family was taken to a camp at Cibadak, a hill
      station in the interior.(33) Even Indonesians who had been friendly
      with Japanese living in their neighbourhoods ran the risk of being
      arrested by the PID. The Indonesians taken into custody by the Dutch
      were transported to Garut on 15 January 1942, where they were
      liberated by the Japanese army on 11 March 1942. In all, about 600
      persons accused of being pro-Japan were interned there, including 100

      The strained political climate prevailing after the outbreak of the
      war made it virtually impossible for the local nationalists involved
      in underground activities to contact each other. Their only source of
      information seems to have been Radio Tokyo, and this was crucial
      because it had been impressed on them that Radio Tokyo would issue
      instructions. Although the Dutch had placed a ban on listening to
      Radio Tokyo, they waited daily for messages from Tokyo. It was Jusuf
      Hasan who broadcast appeals to the people back home. He would sing
      Indonesia Raya and speak passionately about the country's imminent
      liberation by Japan.(35)

      Preparations and Mounting Expectations

      Once the war began, the Dutch government created facilities to help
      eventual victims of war among the people in the Indies. Several civil
      front organizations were set up by and for the Europeans, and other
      population groups like the Indonesians and the Chinese were given
      permission to form their own civil front organizations. The
      Indonesians set up the Penolong Korban Perang (Pekope) to help
      potential Indonesian victims of war.(36) Strangely enough, rather than
      entrust the task of forming Pekope to the Indonesian civil service,
      the Dutch turned to local nationalists. Enthusiasm for the civil front
      organization waxed strong and the Indonesian press fervently supported
      it.(37) This organization gave local nationalists a perfect instrument
      to carry out underground activities. It seems that Parindra, by far
      the largest party of the time with 20,000 members,(38) was especially
      active in setting up local Pekope branches.(39) All over the country
      Parindra endeavoured to organize Pekope in the kampongs, and
      instructed the people in what they should do if the war reached their
      villages. Wherever possible nationalists involved in underground
      activities infiltrated Pekope and sometimes, as in Semarang, succeeded
      in taking it over completely.(40) Although Pekope was meant for
      Indonesians only, in some localities Chinese seem to have joined as
      well. For instance, in Godong and in Salatiga Chinese are mentioned as
      members of this organization.(41) A Dutch civil servant in Batavia,
      however, saw the Pekope as nothing more than a front organization. He
      believed that the Indonesians were apparently already counting upon
      the capitulation of the Netherlands Indies, after which they would be
      able to take over control.(42)

      It is not known if local nationalists involved in underground
      activities actually received any instructions from Radio Tokyo.(43)
      Most of their activities during the early days of the war had to do
      with preventing the implementation of a scorched-earth policy by the
      Dutch. The Dutch had formed a demolition corps to destroy vital
      objects like oil refineries, factories, bridges and rice-mills. The
      nationalists saw the scorched-earth policy as being directed more
      against the Indonesian people than against the Japanese. In the words
      of an upper middle class Indonesian woman in Batavia: "It seems that
      the Dutch begrudge our having their factories and bridges. Why do they
      want to destroy them? Those who will suffer most are the Indonesians,
      because the people on those burnt out estates will be without
      employment and will starve."(44) To spread propaganda among those
      Indonesians who participated in the demolition corps urging them to
      sabotage the orders of the Dutch was one of the priorities of the
      local nationalists active in the underground organization,(45)
      alongside the guarding of such vital targets to prevent their
      destruction.(46) Nationalists also urged the Indonesian soldiers
      serving in the local Dutch forces, the KNIL, not to fight against the
      Japanese. The Japanese were not fighting the Indonesians, so why
      should Indonesians retaliate against them? Some went so far as to
      exhort the soldiers to kill their commanders first.(47)

      By the time Japanese troops landed in Java, a frantic atmosphere of
      welcome had overwhelmed the island, arising from the expectation on
      the part of the Indonesians that prosperity and independence, about
      which they had been dreaming for so many years, would soon be achieved
      with the help and assistance of Japan. During the landing of the
      Japanese army in Java on the night of 1 March 1942, all over the
      island planes dropped leaflets bearing the slogan, "One colour, one
      race", with the two flags (Japanese and Indonesian) printed on the
      reverse sides.(48) Members of the underground organization were given
      instructions to make the mark of Hinomaru, a red ball on the left palm
      of their hands. Should they meet Japanese soldiers, they would only
      have to show the symbol of the sun to let them know that they were
      friends.(49) But, to their disappointment, the Japanese soldiers
      seemed to be unaware of the meaning of the sign.(50)

      In the chaotic days between the Japanese invasion of Java and the
      capitulation of the Dutch on 9 March 1942, local nationalists seized
      the opportunity to set up so-called Merdeka committees. They
      instructed the people to greet the Japanese with cries of "Banzai!"
      and to carry a handkerchief in the likeness of the Japanese flag with
      them. In Magelang and Jember thousands of people did indeed welcome
      the Japanese with cries of "Banzai", "Hidup Indonesia" and "Selamat
      Nippon datang".(51) Among the first to set up such committees were the
      nationalists involved in the underground network. As mentioned above,
      some committees like those in Semarang had already been formed before
      the Japanese invasion under the guise of Pekope. Now they lost no time
      in changing their designation from Pekope to Komite Indonesia Merdeka.
      In Blitar, Madiun, Batavia, Magelang, Semarang, Yogyakarta(52), Kroya,
      Kendal, Salatiga, Jember and Ambarawa committees were formed under
      different names, such as Komite Nasional Indonesia, Komite Indonesia
      Merdeka and Komite Barisan Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People's Army
      Committee). In Magelang a prominent Chinese was also asked to sit on
      the committee, but as a rule committee members were Indonesian.(53)
      Although the names differed the aims of the committees were virtually
      the same, to support the Japanese in order to achieve the East-Asian
      Co-prosperity Sphere; to destroy the power of Western nations; to
      maintain law and order until there was a new administration; and to
      recognize Dai Nippon as the leader and protector of Asia. Lurking
      behind these aims lay the expectation that the committees would be
      given a say in the local administration and the economy.

      The newly-formed committees often tried in vain to maintain order
      among the population pending the arrival of the glorious Japanese
      army. They were powerless to prevent the chain of banditry, looting
      and arson which welled up in the wake of the Dutch scorched-earth
      policy and the subsequent invasion of the Japanese army. On 28
      February the Dutch government gave orders to the demolition corps to
      do their job. All over Java bands of robbers plundered stores of food,
      pawn shops and depots at railway stations. They regarded Dutch and
      Indonesian civil servants, not to mention the Chinese as their
      legitimate targets. In Jombang, according to a Dutch police report,
      the Parindrists stirred up anti-Dutch feelings. "The natives must have
      no sympathy for the Dutch. They had tyrannized and exploited the
      Indonesian people. The Indonesians should help the Japanese to murder
      the Dutch."(54) In Yogyakarta the house of the Assistant Resident was
      attacked,(55) while in Pare the wedana had to hand over control to the
      local Parindrists,(56) and in Kendal, the members of the newly-formed
      committee also tried to seize control of the administration.(57) Even
      more extreme measures were taken at Kesamben, near Blitar, where men
      armed with cudgels and knives attacked the home of the Assistant
      Wedana planning to murder him, but he escaped.(58)

      However, the main target of the bands were Chinese living in rural
      areas. In East Java all the rice mills in the vicinity of Jombang were
      ransacked, and Chinese men were forcibly circumcised by the Nahdatul
      Ulama. Chinese shops were looted and some of their owners were
      killed.(59) The plundering of Chinese property, factories and
      rice-mills also occurred in Central Java. In Demak the looting began
      in the Chinese kampong. One report says that the Indonesians were shot
      at by the Chinese who had been armed by the Dutch. Thereupon members
      of the underground organization arrested all the Chinese and threw
      them into the local prison.(60) It is striking that several
      nationalists involved in underground activities claimed that they had
      prevented the murder of hundreds of Chinese. In Ambarawa the Komite
      Indonesia Merdeka succeeded in preventing a clash between Indonesians
      and Chinese. In Godong, where about 900 Chinese were locked up in the
      local pawnshop, Pekope took care of them, giving them food and
      protection. The members of the committee of Kendal district,
      originally nationalists attached to the underground organization who
      included Parindrists and young people from the Surya Wiryawan,
      Parindra's Youth Association, were able to evacuate the Chinese before
      the looting began. This pattern was repeated in Boja where Chinese
      shops were plundered, but the Chinese had been evacuated to Semarang
      and escaped personal harm. Around Semarang as well the committee
      evacuated the Chinese from rural areas into the city.(61)

      On 7 March 1942, 18 Japanese officers, representing the army, arrived
      in Semarang where they were received by the Dutch Resident and the
      mayor of the city. Members of the Komite Indonesia Merdeka tried in
      vain to join in the welcome.(62) Nor were they the only ones who
      complained that they were obstructed in their activities by Dutch and
      Indonesian civil servants, who were then still at their posts. In the
      eyes of the Dutch and Indonesian civil servants, these elements were
      not the upholders of law and order but were in fact perpetrators of
      the plundering and looting. Eight members of committees were arrested
      by the Assistant Wedana in Wates in East Java.(63) There were also
      arrests in Kertosono. The supporters and helpers of the Japanese army
      were branded robber-chiefs by the Indonesian civil servants and held
      responsible for the looting and arson, for which they were
      imprisoned.(64) The nationalists, in their turn, were convinced that
      the looting of Dutch and Chinese property was the consequence of the
      centuries of exploitation of the people. It was clear that the people
      hated both the Dutch government and their alleged accomplices, the
      Chinese. It was also obvious to them that the Indonesian civil
      servants, the representatives of the Dutch, did not want to submit to
      the Japanese, but were pretending to do so for the time being.(65)

      The rivalry between the local nationalists on the one hand and the
      Indonesian civil service and the Chinese on the other now emerged as a
      leading point of friction. Under the pretext of helping to maintain
      law and order, nationalists staged takeovers of local administrative
      functions and, ostensibly to take care of the welfare of the people,
      Pekope and the committees attempted to get a grip on the food
      distribution system, which was mainly in Chinese hands. They were
      convinced that as soon as the Japanese controlled Indonesia they, as
      leaders of the people, would be chosen to improve the welfare of the
      people, who were still suffering from abuses under the former Dutch

      Illusions and Disenchantments

      The Japanese invasion evoked tremendous excitement not only in the
      countryside of Java but also in the political centre of the island,
      Batavia. Here, as elsewhere, the nationalists expected not only to be
      liberated from Dutch imperialism but to be able to achieve
      independence as a consequence of the invasion. There were rumours from
      Semarang that in their first contacts with nationalists the Japanese
      officers, who arrived in Demak between 2 and 4 March, had given voice
      to such ideas as "We shall drive out the Dutch. You try to govern your
      own country".(66) Expectations that the nationalists would gain
      control of the administration of their country were rising high.
      Directly after the capitulation of the Dutch, the Japanese authorities
      in Batavia sought contact with some prominent nationalists in order,
      so it was said, to consult with them on the organization of the new
      administration. However, the rivalry among the nationalists increased
      apace with the steadily rising expectations of an Indonesia Merdeka.
      In the course of five days, three different blueprints for the
      composition of an Indonesian cabinet were proposed by the
      nationalists. Subardjo's name was mentioned in one of the lists as
      deputy-minister for Foreign Affairs, with Sudjono as secretary of
      state and Tadjuddin Noor as deputy-minister.(67) The Japanese
      authorities speedily rejected the proposals and made it quite clear
      that any political concessions were out of the question.(68) In his
      autobiography Subardjo states that, even before the landing of the
      Japanese, he had written a blueprint for a provisional constitution
      for Indonesia in conjunction with Maramis and Supomo. The blunt
      rejection of the proposals for a transitional Indonesian government by
      the Japanese army authorities made this completely irrelevant.(69)
      Moreover, by Ordinance no. 3, dated 20 March 1942, the Japanese
      authorities in Java prohibited any kind of discussion, suggestions or
      propaganda about the political organization of the country. Within a
      fortnight the disillusioned nationalists were forced to give up their
      dreams. Even the word Indonesia in a political sense was no longer
      permitted. On the same day, in Ordinance no. 4, displaying the
      Indonesian flag, was banned.(70) In Batavia the Japanese authorities
      were quick to smash the hopes and expectations of the nationalists in
      the centre, but it took more time to make it clear to the local
      nationalists in the countryside that there could not be any talk of
      independence and freedom for Indonesia. Ordinance no. 3 does not seem
      to have affected the local committees in Java directly. In the course
      of March and April 1942 in several other places, especially in Central
      Java, local nationalists freely continued to set up committees, for
      example, in Surakarta, Kebumen, Karanganyar, Sumpiuyuh, Probolinggo
      and Purworejo.(71) These committees were managed by nationalists from
      different nationalist parties and unions who were eager to offer their
      services to the Japanese. In several localities members of the
      Parindra took the initiative in forming committees, for instance in
      Bangil, where a Komite Keamanan Rakyat (People's Security Committee)
      was set up,(72) but elsewhere Gerindo and Partindo members were in the
      forefront. There were also places, such as Surakarta, where the
      Barisan Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People's Army) worked alongside
      the Komite Nasional Indonesia helping to maintain law and order.(73)

      The Komite Indonesia Merdeka in Semarang functioned as the central
      organization for most of the local committees in Central Java.(74) It
      was subordinate to the Central Committee in Batavia, which was run by
      Subardjo and others. The members of the Semarang committee believed
      that the ban issued by the Japanese commander on the holding of
      meetings and the undertaking of political action did not apply to
      them, because the Komite Indonesia Merdeka was a working committee and
      not a political party or association.(75) The committee in Semarang
      continued its activities and even organized a conference on 21 March
      1942 at which representatives from Surakarta and Yogyakarta were
      present. At this conference the aims of the committees were laid down:
      first, an independent Indonesia and second, the realization of a
      Greater Asia under the leadership of Japan. Moreover, the delegation
      decided that the Central Committee in Batavia should try to establish
      close contacts with the Japanese authorities there, but on the
      condition that the local committees would retain the right to keep in
      touch with the local Japanese administration. Subardjo and his
      committee in Batavia would be asked to set up a mediation committee,
      which would maintain direct contact with the supreme Japanese

      The working programmes of the local committees reveal a large degree
      of similarity. All of them recognized Dai Nippon as the leader and
      protector of Asia and formed contact committees to inform the Japanese
      commander and the civil service about their activities. Besides this,
      propaganda and information sections were set up in order to inform the
      people about the changes in the administration. Most of the committees
      also had an intelligence section which gathered information about
      arms, oil and petrol stores, Dutch soldiers who were in hiding, and
      the subversive activities of foreign nationals, as well as a section
      whose aim was to liberate the Indonesian economy from the hands of
      foreigners and plan a new system of economic organization.(77)

      In the city of Surabaya the Parindrists arranged a meeting with a
      representative of the Japanese army commander during which they
      discussed the redivision of the provincial administration and the
      police, and presented an economic plan which would give Parindra the
      opportunity to help villagers by means of consumer co-operative
      societies, such as Rukung Tani, Lumbung and credit banks.(78) The
      Komite Nasional Indonesia in Magelang took on a security function,
      obtaining authorization from the Japanese Army authorities to impound
      goods, conduct house-searches and call on the police for help. The
      chairman of this committee was a member of the former Communist Party
      of Indonesia (PKI) who had been interned for four years at Digul.
      Members collected arms from the town guard and searched the Dutch
      barracks as well as those of the military and police for arms, which
      they then handed over to the local Japanese army authorities.(79)

      The most important aims of the nationalists, however, seem to have
      been to wrest local administrative authority from Indonesian civil
      servants and to pry the local economy out of the hands of the Chinese.
      Committee representatives generally operated as follows: men - usually
      young and sometimes armed - would use force or the threat of force to
      try to remove administrative officials. These takeovers were carded
      out under the pretext of helping to maintain law and order.(80) The
      same argument was used to gain control of food storage and
      distribution. Chinese were locked up in jails or other secure
      buildings, ostensibly to protect them from the fury of the people. In
      the meantime, committee members used their own organizations to
      appropriate the distribution of food and set up co-operatives. In
      Magelang and Semarang, the local Pekope co-ordinated the rice
      supply,(81) while in Krawang rice was distributed among the population
      and the essential components of the rice-mills, all owned by the
      Chinese, were removed and hidden.(82) In Blitar the Rukun Penduduk
      Indonesia Blitar (United Indonesian Citizens of Blitar), helped the
      people to organize the local economy.(83)

      Within a month, however, the local Japanese authorities forced the
      nationalists to surrender local control of the administration to them
      and reinstated both Dutch and Indonesian civil servants.(84) The
      Indonesian civil servants and police, now supported by the Japanese,
      struck back at the committees, branding members as leaders of robber
      gangs and arresting them for disturbing the peace.(85) Parindra also
      found itself in deep trouble. Some of its local members in East and
      Central Java were arrested by the Kempeitai, accused of robbery and
      sowing discord in wartime. After the reinstatement of Dutch civil
      servants on 3 April, members of the local board of the Parindra in
      Malang were arrested by the Kempeitai. In all about 85 persons were
      taken, among them 11 Parindrists including Latuharhary who had joined
      the underground organization in Malang.(86) Other arrests took place
      in Bangil, when nine people, including prominent Parindrists and the
      local leader of the Arab minority, were jailed for looting Dutch and
      Chinese properties. In June, most of those arrested were released, but
      18 people, including 15 Parindrists, remained in detention.(87)

      In Surakarta, where the Komite Nasional Indonesia and the Barisan
      Rakyat Indonesia were embroiled in fierce competition with the Chinese
      civil front organization, the chairmen of both groups were arrested
      along with 55 youths. To the dismay of the nationalists, the Chinese
      civil front worked for the Japanese and guarded their offices,
      whereupon the nationalists accused the Chinese of manufacturing
      weapons and of being involved in black marketeering. To their
      disappointment, the Japanese did not take any notice of their
      accusations, and one night when a Chinese guard spied some members of
      the Barisan Rakyat guarding the residential neighbourhood in the city,
      they were arrested on suspicion of being involved in looting. They
      were set free some days later, with the exception of the committee
      chairmen who were still in jail at the beginning of May.(88)

      Meanwhile, the nationalists in the political centre in Batavia, who
      were still confused by the measures taken by the Japanese authorities,
      tried to find out what was going on elsewhere in Java. Under the guise
      of visiting their families in Central Java, Sukarto, deputy-secretary
      of the GASPI (Gabungan Sarekat Sekerdja Partikulir
      Indonesia/Federation of Private Workers) and Hindromartono, a
      prominent member of the PVPN (Persatoean Vakbonden Pegawai
      Negeri/League of Civil Servants' Unions)(89) left Batavia at the end
      of March and visited several branches of the GASPI and local
      committees during April 1942. Afterwards Sukarto reported his findings
      to Subardjo. He hoped that the report would stimulate the Japanese
      authorities to take appropriate action and that they would gain
      confidence in the committees set up by the Indonesian people.(90) In
      this he was disappointed, for the measures taken by the Japanese
      authorities were quite different from those anticipated by the
      nationalists. The Indonesian civil service and the Indonesian police
      continued to be used by the Japanese, while prominent members of local
      committees and Parindrists remained in jail. In the eyes of the
      nationalists, nothing had changed since these elements were the same
      people who had oppressed them and the public at large before the
      outbreak of war.

      In May 1942 the deeply chagrined committee in Semarang adjusted its
      objectives. Under pressure from the local Japanese authorities it
      admitted that Indonesia was now subject to the power of Japan, and
      that gaining independence did not mean winning it (that would have
      meant fighting), but receiving it which implied acquiescing to the
      wishes of Japan. The Indonesians had to prove that they possessed the
      necessary competence to undertake the job, otherwise they had no right
      to be independent. Japan wanted Indonesia to become independent under
      the leadership of Japan. In the opinion of the committee, however, to
      be independent implied first the existence of a Greater Indonesia, as
      expressed in the anthem Indonesia Raya, and second the right to raise
      the Indonesian flag. But the Japanese army decreed otherwise. The red
      and white Indonesian flag was banned, Indonesia Raya could not to be
      sung and the words Indonesia Merdeka could not be uttered. Instead,
      there had to be an Asia Raya (Greater Asia) under the leadership of
      Japan and once the goal of Indonesia Merdeka was no longer a
      possibility, it became obvious that the committee had to be dispensed

      It is not known when the other local committees were abolished, but it
      is almost certain that all surviving committees were eliminated in
      July 1942, when Ordinance no. 23 required all political parties and
      other associations to disband. One of the reasons behind this ban on
      committees was probably that the Japanese authorities were no longer
      prepared to tolerate any interference in the economic sphere. In
      particular, they wanted to prevent the nationalists from leading any
      agrarian resistance to their measures.(92) In June, the Japanese
      authorities had ordered the reopening of the rice-mills, and forced
      the rice co-operatives set up by the local committees to stop their
      work. Farmers had to sell their rice to the Chinese mill-owners for a
      fixed price. To ensure that all the rice went to the rice-mills, even
      the traditional pounding of rice was forbidden.(93)

      Parindra was also ordered to desist from its economic activities.
      During the first months of the Occupation Parindra had set up shops in
      almost every town in Java which sold food and other related articles
      but only to Parindra members. After several months, when food
      shortages began to occur everywhere, the people could buy food in the
      Parindra shops but only on condition that they join the
      association.(94) The Japanese authorities, however, wanted to have
      complete control of both the food supply and the food distribution,
      and at the same time to disembarrass themselves of the Parindra, their
      most fervent supporter.

      In July the Japanese authorities put Parindra under severe pressure to
      cease its activities immediately. At that point Parindra had still not
      succeeded in freeing its members arrested in April, although it had
      made representations about this several times. On 26 June 1942 a
      member from Malang went to Batavia to speak to Subardjo, who was then
      working in Hatta's office in the Department of Economic Affairs of the
      Gunseikanbu, concerning the Parindra members who were still in jail in
      Malang.(95) The Parindra board in Surabaya also sent representatives
      to Batavia for consultation with the Japanese authorities.(96) The
      Japanese announced that they were willing to release Parindra members
      on condition that the party be dissolved, and the Parindrists
      concerned affirm under oath ten conditions imposed by the Japanese.
      Besides the dissolution of the Parindra, most of these conditions
      referred to general matters such as submission to Dai Nippon and the
      ban on any kind of discussion or organization, and only two applied
      specifically to Parindra: namely, that the name Parindra on buildings
      had to be taken down and, probably the most remarkable, that in future
      only the Indonesian language would be permitted.(97) In view of the
      relatively high educational level of prominent nationalists, it is
      likely they used to communicate with each other in Dutch, a language
      that most Indonesians and Japanese had not mastered. The Parindra was
      dissolved as from the end of July. In August 1942 the last Parindrists
      still imprisoned were released.(98) By then the Japanese had the local
      administration and the economy completely under their control, and the
      influence of the nationalists in the rural areas of Java had been
      definitively curbed. The best that remained for them was membership of
      one of the many advisory councils which the Japanese authorities were
      to set up during the occupation.


      Have we sufficient evidence to conclude that there was a kind of
      underground organization in Java before and during the initial stages
      of the war? The reports provide a picture of a loosely knit
      underground group, based in the first instance on the network of
      personal relations of Subardjo and his friends. They belonged to the
      upper echelons of the nationalist elite who were aspiring to gain
      freedom and independence for Indonesia, directly below Sukarno, Hatta
      and Sjahrir. Pertinently, these three prominent nationalists had been
      interned by the Dutch in Bengkulen and on the island of Banda
      respectively and were not available to lead the nationalist movement.
      In the eyes of the local nationalists, Subardjo and his friends were
      obviously the most appropriate leaders to set them on the road to
      freedom with the aid of Japan, being preferable to those nationalists
      who were involved in the Madjalis Rakyat Indonesia and other large
      political federations endeavouring to negotiate their freedom from the
      Dutch. The fact that Subardjo had been in Japan and had contacts and
      friends there, as did Jusuf Hasan, strengthened their position.

      Under the influence of Japanese propaganda, groups of nationalists
      whose aim was to support Japan as a way of gaining independence for
      Indonesia were set up here and there. They made contact with one of
      Subardjo's fellow-workers who visited several of his friends in
      October and November 1941. There was, however, no direct contact
      between the members, and the different groups were unacquainted with
      each other before the outbreak of the war with Japan. All these small
      groups were looking for leaders who could give guidance in the
      imminent independence of Indonesia, and such leaders were Subardjo and
      his friends. The activities the different groups, consisting of two or
      at most four people, claimed to have undertaken before the war were so
      general - to propagate anti-Dutch sentiments and listen to Radio Tokyo
      - that everyone who was expecting the war could be said to have taken
      part. One very important instrument in making preparations for the new
      Indonesia was Pekope. This civil front organization provided the local
      nationalists with the means to make close contact with the people.
      Under the pretext of organizing aid to civilian war victims, they set
      up provisional networks to take over the local administration and
      economy. The bitterness of the local nationalists about the
      scorched-earth policy of the Dutch must be seen against this background.

      During the invasion of the Japanese these different groups came to the
      fore and set up Merdeka committees. From that point on a kind of
      organization began to take shape with Subardjo as the
      behind-the-scenes organizer. Convinced of the imminent independence of
      Indonesia once the Japanese had arrived, Subardjo in collaboration
      with Maramis and Supomo drew up a blueprint for a provisional
      constitution for Indonesia. There is no evidence that Subardjo's other
      friends knew about this blueprint. Whatever the case may be, Subardjo
      and Maramis became the leaders of the Central Committee in Batavia,
      which functioned as a mediation group between the Japanese authorities
      and the local committees, at least in Central Java. Moreover, Subardjo
      was well-informed about the activities the local committees had
      undertaken in the first two months after the capitulation of the
      Dutch, thanks to Sukarto's report.(99) Under the pretext of supporting
      the Japanese, the committees then started a social revolution in order
      to realize their idea of a free Indonesia in which they would be the
      leaders assigned to guide the people to a prosperous future. In their
      vision there was no place in the new Indonesia for collaborators with
      the Dutch or for capitalists like the Chinese who had exploited the
      people for so long. Pending the arrival of their liberators, they took
      over the local administration and tried to implement their plans to
      control the food production and distribution.

      However, within a month, the Japanese had restored the Indonesian
      civil servants to their posts, and thrust aside the local
      nationalists, who were branded as agitators and accused of disturbing
      the peace. Arrests followed and the bewildered nationalists, who could
      not believe that the former oppressors of the people had been put back
      in power by their putative liberators, directed their energy towards
      the development of food and other production co-operatives.
      Momentarily, the Japanese authorities turned a blind eye to
      nationalist activities in the agrarian sector. In view of the
      destruction of the estates and rice-mills by the Dutch and by
      plundering bands, the Japanese needed some support at least from the
      local nationalists to be able to secure the production and
      distribution of food. Besides the committees, the Japanese depended in
      particular on Parindra, although they did not trust it completely, and
      as soon as the Japanese had restored the damage to the factories and
      rice-mills, they ordered the Chinese to resume operations. The
      committees and Parindra were forced to abandon their activities in
      this sphere as well.

      The local Merdeka committees set in motion the first social revolution
      in Java, a forerunner of the large-scale social revolution which
      erupted directly after the capitulation of Japan in August 1945. In
      the frantic atmosphere of freedom that seized them during the first
      weeks after the arrival of their assumed liberators, they gave no
      thought to the possibility that their revolution might be stillborn.
      They believed that their liberators intended to grant them political
      independence. After all, had the prophecy of Jayabaya not foretold
      that their liberators would remain for only three months? Japan's
      attitude to the demands of the nationalists, however, was governed by
      immediate plans for the exploitation of the resources and manpower of
      Java. The nationalists found themselves involved in a serious conflict
      with the Japanese authorities and the social revolution they set in
      motion rebounded on them.

      Within four months the nationalists' aspirations had been completely
      crushed. The local nationalists felt badly betrayed by the Japanese
      refusal to grant Indonesia its independence. They had co-operated with
      the Japanese, having taken the latter's claim that they would grant
      independence to Indonesia at face value. The nationalists were
      expelled from the rural areas in Java and the Japanese kept a close
      eye on them to make sure that they did not have a chance to maintain
      contact with the common people. The organizations the Japanese set up
      during the occupation to mobilize the manpower in Java such as the
      Seinandan, the Keibodan, PETA and the Jawa Hokokai were put
      unequivocally under the control of the Indonesian civil servants,
      which was tantamount to being under the control of the Japanese. The
      nationalists were co-opted into countless advisory councils, where
      they bided their time waiting for the moment when they could seize
      freedom and independence for Indonesia.

      1 An overview of anti-Dutch activities in the Netherlands East Indies
      before the invasion of Japan is given in E. Touwen-Bouwsma, "De
      Indonesische nationalisten en de oorlog met Japan: houding en
      reacties", in Nederlands-Indie 1942. Illusie en ontgoocheling, ed. P.
      Groen and E. Touwen-Bouwsma (Den Haag, SDU Uitgeverij, 1992), pp. 57-75.

      2 H.J. Benda, "The Beginning of the Japanese Occupation of Java", The
      Far Eastern Quarterly 15 (1956): 544; B. Bouman, "Een veelzijdige
      waarneming. Japan in Indonesische ogen in het tijdvak 1930-1942", in
      Beelden van Japan in her vooroorlogse Nederlands-Indie, ed. E.
      Locher-Scholten (Leiden: Werkgroep Europese Expansie, State University
      of Leiden, 1987), p. 230.

      3 See for anti-Dutch activities in Aceh, A.J. Piekaar, Atjeh en de
      oorlog met Japan (Den Haag: Van Hoeve, 1949). For an detailed account
      of the role the Japanese played in the so-called F-organization in
      Aceh see Fujiwara Iwaichi, "Fifth Column Work in Sumatra", in The
      Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-1945, ed.
      Anthony Reid and Oki Akira (Athens: Ohio University Monographs in
      International Studies, Southeast Asia Series No. 72, 1986), pp. 9-31.
      Benda states that among the Minangkabau there were two groups who
      fought against the Dutch: Indonesia Bergerak and Islam Raja. See "The
      Beginning of the Japanese Occupation of Java", p. 544.

      4 M. Zed, Kepialangan Politik dan Revolusi: Palembang 1900-1950
      (Amsterdam: Centrale Huisdrukkerij VU, 1991).

      5 For more information on the Republik Gorontalo, see Republik
      Indonesia, Propinsi Sulawesi (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1953),
      pp. 202-207.

      6 G.S. Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to
      Independence" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1967), pp. 17-18, 35.

      7 Jusuf Hasan was a Sumatran who went to Japan in 1930 to study
      economics at the Meiji University, where he joined the
      ultra-nationalist Black Dragon Society. He was probably the most
      active Indonesian propagandist in Tokyo, taking part in establishing
      the Kainan Ryo Centre for overseas students. In 1941 he returned to
      Indonesia as a secret Japanese agent. See Nisjihima, "The Nationalists
      in Java, 1943-1945", in The Japanese Experience in Indonesia, ed. Reid
      and Oki, p. 262. At the end of November 1941, just before the outbreak
      of the war with Japan, he returned to Tokyo, where he worked with the
      shortwave radio transmitter of the Japanese navy to broadcast appeals
      to his people back home. See K. Goto, "Life and death of 'Abdul
      Rachman' (1906-49): One Aspect of Japanese-Indonesian Relationships",
      Indonesia 22 (1976): 66.

      8 Nishijima had lived in Java before the war and was sympathetic to
      the nationalists cause. He was close friends with outstanding
      nationalists and spoke Malay fluently. He was one of the Japanese who
      had been interned by the Dutch at the outbreak of the war with Japan
      and was transported to Australia. In August 1942, he returned to Java
      where he remained in close contact with his nationalist friends.

      9 Achmad Subardjo had studied at the Universities of Utrecht and
      Leiden. In the Netherlands, he had been an active member of the
      Indonesian Student Association/Perhimpunan Indonesia. He returned to
      Java in 1934, and earned his living as a self-employed lawyer, as he
      did not want to work for the Dutch government. He went to Japan in
      September 1935 as a correspondent for the Indonesian journal Matahari,
      issued in Semarang. After returning to Java in 1936, he earned a
      living in Bandung. In 1939 he moved to Jakarta where he arranged
      programmes for Radio Ketimuran, a branch of the Netherlands Indies
      Radio Network Company/NIROM. He also worked with Sam Ratulangi writing
      a newspaper column called "National Comments". He was a
      non-co-operative nationalist and apparently not a member of one of the
      nationalists parties. See A. Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo, Kesadaran
      Nasional, Sebuah Otobiografi (Jakarta, 1978), and Orang Indonesia yang
      Terkemuka di Jawa (Jogjakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1986), p.

      10 Sudjono had been in Japan teaching Indonesian. He returned to Java
      with the Japanese army of invasion in Bantam. Sudjono was married to a
      niece of Subardjo, the daughter of one of his sisters. It was Sudjono
      who invited Subardjo to come to Japan in 1935. Subardjo, Kesadaran
      Nasional, p. 191.

      11 Nishijima claims there were committees set up by Indonesians who
      hoped to achieve independence for Indonesia by cooperating with the
      Japanese. See Nishijima, "The Nationalists in Java, 1943-1945", in The
      Japanese Experience in Indonesia, ed. Reid and Oki, p. 262.

      12 Sukarto Report, Journey through East Java, 4 May 1942.
      Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie [henceforth RIOD] IC:
      031605-031630. See also BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2407. Strangely enough,
      Subardjo does not mention this organization in his autobiography,
      Kesadaran Nasional.

      13 For a detailed overview of the attempts of the nationalists to
      co-operate with the Dutch government in the last year before the
      outbreak of the Pacific War, see S. Abeyasekere, One Hand Clapping:
      Indonesian Nationalists and the Dutch, 1939-1942 (Clayton, Vic: Monash
      Papers on Southeast Asia Number Five, 1976).

      14 Report on the activities before and during the Japanese invasion in
      Java. BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2717.

      15 The Madjalis Rakyat Indonesia (M.R.I.) included the Federation of
      Political Parties, Gabungan Politik Indonesia (GAPI); the Federation
      of Islamic Unions, Madjlisoel Islamil A'laa Indonesia (M.I.A.I.); and
      the Trade Union for civil servants, Persatoean Vakbonden Pegawai
      Negeri (P.V.P.N.).

      16 S. Sjahrir, Out of Exile (New York: John Day, 1949), pp. 219, 233.

      17 According to a Dutch publication the effect of these broadcasts was
      negligible. See A Decade of Japanese Underground Activities in the
      Netherlands East Indies (London: HMSO, 1942), p. 15.

      18 For the impact of the transmissions from Radio Tokyo, see B.
      Bouman, "Een veelzijdige waarneming. Japan in Indonesische ogen in het
      tijdvak 1930-1942", in Beelden van Japan in het vooroorlogse
      Nederlands-Indie, ed. E. Locher-Scholten and G.S. Kanahele, "The
      Japanese Occupation of Indonesia".

      19 Two of them, Maramis and Tadjuddin Noor, were also mentioned by
      Kanahele as belonging to the fifth column in Java ("The Japanese
      Occupation of Indonesia", pp. 17-18). It is known that Hindromartono,
      a prominent member of the Persatuan Vakbonden Pegawai Negeri
      (P.V.P.N.), the trade union for civil servants, made a tour through
      Central Java in April 1942 with Sukarto, who reported to Subardjo
      about how the Committees Indonesia Merdeka established by then were
      doing (RIOD. IC: 031605-30).

      20 Dr Samsi is also named by Kanahele as a member of the fifth column
      in Java. See "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia", pp. 17-18.

      21 Report on activities before and during the Japanese invasion of
      Java. BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2717.

      22 Subardjo, Kesadaran Nasional, p. 189.

      23 See the following reports on Subardjo's organization.
      BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2775 (Jogyakarta), 2727 (Kertosono), 2739 (Semarang).

      24 Report on Subardjo's organization. BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2729.

      25 Report of the Komite Indonesia Merdeka for Semarang.

      26 See the reports of Subardjo's organization. BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2773
      (Toeban), 2762 and 2769 (Djember), 2726 (Demak).

      27 Report of Subardjo's organization about activities in Feb./Mar.
      1942. BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2769.

      28 Nishijima, "The Nationalists in Java", p. 259.

      29 Thamrin's funeral was attended by more than 20,000 people and
      became a great mass manifestation of Indonesian nationalism, which
      bore a clearly anti-Dutch character. See Abeyasekere, One Hand
      Clapping, pp. 77-78.

      30 Report of Subardjo's organization in Magelang, Feb./Mar. 1942.

      31 A Decade of Japanese Underground Activities, p. 30. The interned
      Japanese were transported to Australia before the capitulation of the
      Royal Netherlands Indies Army, the KNIL, on 9 Mar. 1942.

      32 One of Subardjo's sisters was married to Dr Latip (see Subardjo,
      Kesadaran Nasional, p. 195). It was this family which was interned in
      Cibadak by the Dutch.

      33 S. Suleiman, "The last days of Batavia", Indonesia 28 (1979): 56.

      34 Report of Subardjo's organization in Tegal, Mar. 1942.

      35 Goto, "Life and Death of 'Abdul Rachman'", p. 66. See also
      Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia", p. 253 n. 22.

      36 R. de Bruin, Indonesie. De laatste etappe naar de vrijheid
      1942-1945 (Ph.D. diss., Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1982), p. 58.

      37 The Pesat of 28 January 1942 made an urgent appeal to the
      nationalists to join the Pekope (Persoverzichten, Januari, 1942:
      1312). The journal Pesat was Gerindo oriented.

      38 Review of the Indonesian political parties in 1942.

      39 Hering, "Het afscheidswoord van bet dagelijks bestuur van
      Parindra", Kabar Seberang 38 (1992): 58.

      40 The Head of the Pekope in Semarang was Dr Boentaran, later on the
      chairman of the Komite Indonesia Merdeka, taking over this function
      from his wife. See report of the Komite Indonesia Merdeka for
      Semarang. BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2739.

      41 See the reports from Godong (BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2768) and Salatiga

      42 Report of the Controleur, A.H.P. Regoort, in Batavia, 10 Mar. 1947.

      43 One source claims that in its pre-invasion propaganda broadcasts
      Radio Tokyo encouraged Indonesian nationalists to form independence
      committees. Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia", p. 258
      n. 63.

      44 Suleiman, "The last days of Batavia", p. 62.

      45 On 28 Feb. 1942 the Dutch government gave orders for the demolition
      corps in Java to get on with their job.

      46 How far the members of Subardjo's group succeeded in their
      anti-sabotage activities is not known. Several claim to have prevented
      the destruction of bridges and rice-mills, but they do not explain how
      this was accomplished.

      47 Report of Subardjo's organization during the Japanese invasion in
      1942. BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2729.

      48 Benda, "The Beginning of the Japanese Occupation of Java", p. 545.

      49 See the following reports of Subardjo's organization.
      BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2715, 2722 and 2717.

      50 There seems to have been a radio message claiming that Indonesians
      would not be killed by Japanese soldiers when they landed if they
      showed the mark of the sun on their palms. See Nishijima, "The
      Nationalists in Java", p. 262.

      51 See reports of Subardjo's organization for Magelang
      (BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2775) and Demak (2726).

      52 In the reports Yogyakarta is consistently called Mataram (2763).
      See also the report of Sukarto, 4 May 1942. RIOD.IC: 031605-031630.
      The name Mataram refers to the glorious days of Sultan Agung (r. 1613-46).

      53 See report of Subardjo's organization in Magelang.
      BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2775. The reason that a Chinese could join the Merdeka
      committee was that the person in question had not been a member of any
      Chinese association under the Dutch. He was more Indonesian than
      Chinese oriented and, moreover, he had been considered dangerous by
      the Dutch.

      54 Report of Police Inspector Van Leeuwen in Djombang, 7 Nov. 1946.
      ARA.Alg. Secr.4956.

      55 Report of Assistant Resident W.C. Schoevers, 7 May 1946.

      56 Report of the Dutch Police in Malang. ARA.Alg. Secr.4955.

      57 Report of Subardjo's organization for Kendal. BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2765.

      58 Report on the activities in Blitar. BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2722.

      59 Report of Police Inspector Van Leeuwen, 7 Nov. 1946. ARA.Alg.Secr.4956.

      60 Report of Subardjo's organization for Demak. BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2726.

      61 See the following reports of Subardjo's organization in Ambarawa
      (BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2721), Godong (2768), Kendal (2765), Semarang (2739).

      62 Report of the Komite Indonesia Merdeka for Semarang.

      63 Report of Subardjo's organization for Kediri. BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2774.

      64 Report of Subardjo's organization in Kertosono. BUZA.NEFIS.CMI:2727.

      65 Sukarto Report, Journey through East Java, 4 May 1942. RIOD. IC:

      66 Report of the Komite Indonesia Merdeka for Semarang,

      67 See the confidential letter from Abikusno, 10 Mar. 1942, concerning
      two lists of candidates for the posts of ministers and
      deputy-ministers in an Indonesian government during the transitional
      period. BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:1972. See also L. Sluimers, "Nieuwe orde op
      Java", Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde 124 (1968): 336-67.
      In an appendix Sluimers gives an overview of the three lists of
      ministerial candidates for the Indonesian government and their assistants.

      68 This was in accordance with the Japanese blueprint for Indonesia
      determined during the Liaison Conference on 20 November 1941 in Tokyo,
      where it was stated that the Greater Indonesia Movement should be
      curbed as much as possible. See H.J. Benda and J.K. Irikura, Japanese
      Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents (New Haven:
      Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), p. 2. See also M.
      Nakamura, "General Imamura and the Early Period of Japanese
      Occupation", Indonesia 10 (1970): 5.

      69 Subardjo, Kesadaran Nasional, pp. 236-37.

      70 K.A. de Weerd, The Japanese Occupation of the Netherlands Indies.
      RIOD. IC: 032759.

      71 These committees are mentioned in Sukarto's report. He visited them
      during his trip through Central Java in April 1942. Some of the
      committees were formed as late as the end of that month. RIOD. IC:

      72 The Parindra at the Beginning of the Japanese Occupation.

      73 Sukarto Report, 4 May 1942. RIOD. IC: 031605-031630.

      74 The chairman of the committee in Semarang was Dr. Boentaran (see
      note 40 above), a member of Subardjo's organization. Besides him there
      were six other board members.

      75 Report of the Komite Indonesia Merdeka for Semarang, 19 May 1942.

      76 Komite Nasional Indonesia in Semarang, 21 Mar. 1942.

      77 Sukarto Report, 4 May 1942. RIOD. IC: 031605-031630.

      78 Hering, "Het afscheidswoord van het dagelijks bestuur van
      Parindra", Kabar Seberang (1992): 60, 63.

      79 Report of Subardjo's organization for Magelang, Feb.-Mar. 1942.

      80 See Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia", pp. 28-29.

      81 For Magelang, see BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2775 and for Semarang,

      82 For Krawang, see BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2711.

      83 For Blitar, see BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2771. After the Japanese had taken
      measures against the activities of the committees and their
      organizations in July 1942, the ROEPIB took care of the support for
      the unemployed Indonesians and set up a committee to organize economic
      requirements of the Japanese.

      84 In Subang the nationalists had to turn over the local
      administration to the Indonesian civil servants within one week. See
      Report on the activities for Subang in March 1942. BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2712.

      85 Many who could not produce a certificate from the Japanese army
      were arrested and put in jail. A member of the committee in Kertosono
      reported that he had been arrested by the Dutch commander of the field
      police at the end of March. Thanks to his friends, who worked with the
      Kempeitai, he was released from prison on 29 April 1942. he had been
      arrested on charges of disturbing peace. See the Report of Subardjo's
      organization in Kertosono. BUZA.NEFIS/CMI:2727. According to Kanahele
      the arrests of nationalists may have been largely due to a
      misunderstanding on the part of the Kempeitai, rather than any hostile
      opposition ("The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia", p. 43). But this
      is only partly correct. It was the Indonesian civil servants in
      conjunction with the former Dutch PID (Political Intelligence
      Service), the opponents of the nationalists, who informed the
      Kempeitai about disturbers of peace.

      86 See Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia", p. 267 n. 18.

      87 Parindra in the beginning of the Japanese occupation.

      88 Sukarto Report, 4 May 1942. RIOD. IC: 031605-031630.

      89 Hindromartono was not in Java during the Japanese invasion. He
      remained in New York, where he was a member of the Dutch delegation
      attending the Labour Conference as technical adviser on the interests
      of the Indonesians. He returned to Java shortly after the surrender of
      the Dutch. So he had good reasons for visiting his family. See Orang
      Indonesia yang Terkemuka di Jawa, p. 10.

      90 Sukarto Report, 4 May 1942. RIOD. IC: 031605-031630.

      91 Report of the Komite Indonesia Merdeka for Semarang, 19 May 1942.

      92 See also L. Sluimers, "De Japanse bezettingspolitiek en de
      Indonesische elites 1942-1943", Bijdragen tot de taal-, Land-en
      Volkenkunde 124 (1968): 364.

      93 Report of Winarno Danoeatmodjo, Semarang, Aug. 1942. RIOD. IC: 039581.

      94 Report of Police Inspector Van Leeuwen in Jombang, Soerabaya, <br/><br/>(Message over 64 KB, truncated)
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