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Re: Connecting Nietzsche's Fundamental Concepts.

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  • Ian
    I don t think people would actually have to *believe* in the eternal recurrence for it to be a valuable means to breeding and selection, as Nietzche seems to
    Message 1 of 6 , Sep 7, 2010
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      I don't think people would actually have to *believe* in the eternal recurrence for it to be a valuable means to breeding and selection, as Nietzche seems to imply in e.g. TGS that one would only have to be able to *will* that it be the case in order to truly affirm life. Presumably, a person who wants the eternal recurrence to happen, but just cannot believe that it will (maybe he finds arguments its favor unpersuasive, maybe he sees no evidence in its favor) will still be looked upon favorably by Nietzche.

      ~Ian

      --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "sauwelios" <sauwelios@...> wrote:
      >
      > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "sauwelios" <sauwelios@> wrote: [snipped]
      > >
      > > "Your pride (oh you noble Stoics) wants to prescribe your morality, your ideal, to nature, even to nature, and make the latter incorporate the former[!]"
      > > (BGE 9.)
      > >
      >
      > "Oh you noble Stoics" should be between square, not round, brackets.
      >
      >
      > > And the teaching of the eternal recurrence of the-world-as-will-to-power is the perfect means for the achievement of this end:
      > >
      > > "[T]he theory of eternal recurrence [...] as a means of breeding and selection."
      > > (The Will to Power, section 462. Cf. 1053, 1055-58.)
      > >
      > > And it's fitting that someone who belongs to the Overman type should have that very type, the sprouting and flourishing of individuals belonging to that very type, as his ideal: see Twilight of the Idols, 'Forays of an Untimely Man', section 20: Dionysus there represents the superhuman type, Ariadne the human type.
      >
      > I meant section 19 here, though section 20 is indeed also of note: it implies that where the value judgment "beautiful" arises, there arises a *love* (the German word for "ugly" is *hässlich*, "hately"):
      >
      > "What does man love there? But there is no doubt: the *ascension of his type*."
      > (section 20, paraphrase.)
      >
      >
      > Also, in regard to what Ian said yesterday about Nietzsche actually arguing for the eternal recurrence in the notebooks: this may be explained by the notion of the theory of eternal recurrence as a means of breeding and selection. In order for it to work as such a means, it---or at least the *possibility* of it---must be believed in by those it is to select and/or those it is to weed out.
      >
    • sauwelios
      Well, I said it---or at least the *possibility* of it---must be believed in . In the notebooks, Nietzsche likens the possibility to the possibility of eternal
      Message 2 of 6 , Sep 7, 2010
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        Well, I said "it---or at least the *possibility* of it---must be believed in". In the notebooks, Nietzsche likens the possibility to the possibility of eternal damnation: what effect the notion of that possibility has had on the course of history.

        Also, to be looked upon favorably by Nietzsche is not to be selected in the sense meant. That selection is rather like *natural* selection: some (genes) survive, others die out.

        As for the possibility of it, I think it is as well possible as eternal novelty, as both are unthinkable (the ER because nothingness is unthinkable, and EN because infinity is unthinkable).

        Of those who believe in the possibility of it, then, those who "cannot bear it stand condemned", whereas "those who find it the greatest benefit are chosen to rule." (WP 1053 (1884).) And those who do *not* believe in the possibility of it?

        "This doctrine is mild against those who do not believe in it, it knows no hells and no threats. Whoever does not believe has a *fleeting* life in his consciousness."
        (Notebooks, 1881-82.)

        Will not those who find it the greatest benefit probably also prevail over those who do *not* believe in the possibility of it? And will there not also be two types among those who don't believe in it? Those who find the idea attractive and those who find it repulsive? So that there arises the following order of the chance to prevail?

        1) Those who believe in the possibility of it and find the idea attractive;
        2) those who do *not* believe in the possibility, but find the idea attractive;
        3) those who do not believe in the possibility and find the idea repulsive;
        4) those who *do* believe in the possibility and find the idea repulsive.


        --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Ian" <ianmathwiz7@...> wrote:
        >
        > I don't think people would actually have to *believe* in the eternal recurrence for it to be a valuable means to breeding and selection, as Nietzche seems to imply in e.g. TGS that one would only have to be able to *will* that it be the case in order to truly affirm life. Presumably, a person who wants the eternal recurrence to happen, but just cannot believe that it will (maybe he finds arguments its favor unpersuasive, maybe he sees no evidence in its favor) will still be looked upon favorably by Nietzche.
        >
        > ~Ian
        >
        > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "sauwelios" <sauwelios@> wrote:
        > >
        > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "sauwelios" <sauwelios@> wrote: [snipped]
        > > >
        > > > "Your pride (oh you noble Stoics) wants to prescribe your morality, your ideal, to nature, even to nature, and make the latter incorporate the former[!]"
        > > > (BGE 9.)
        > > >
        > >
        > > "Oh you noble Stoics" should be between square, not round, brackets.
        > >
        > >
        > > > And the teaching of the eternal recurrence of the-world-as-will-to-power is the perfect means for the achievement of this end:
        > > >
        > > > "[T]he theory of eternal recurrence [...] as a means of breeding and selection."
        > > > (The Will to Power, section 462. Cf. 1053, 1055-58.)
        > > >
        > > > And it's fitting that someone who belongs to the Overman type should have that very type, the sprouting and flourishing of individuals belonging to that very type, as his ideal: see Twilight of the Idols, 'Forays of an Untimely Man', section 20: Dionysus there represents the superhuman type, Ariadne the human type.
        > >
        > > I meant section 19 here, though section 20 is indeed also of note: it implies that where the value judgment "beautiful" arises, there arises a *love* (the German word for "ugly" is *hässlich*, "hately"):
        > >
        > > "What does man love there? But there is no doubt: the *ascension of his type*."
        > > (section 20, paraphrase.)
        > >
        > >
        > > Also, in regard to what Ian said yesterday about Nietzsche actually arguing for the eternal recurrence in the notebooks: this may be explained by the notion of the theory of eternal recurrence as a means of breeding and selection. In order for it to work as such a means, it---or at least the *possibility* of it---must be believed in by those it is to select and/or those it is to weed out.
        > >
        >
      • sauwelios
        But if those who do *not* believe in the possibility, but do find the idea attractive, have a better chance to prevail than those who do not believe in the
        Message 3 of 6 , Sep 8, 2010
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          But if those who do *not* believe in the possibility, but do find the idea attractive, have a better chance to prevail than those who do not believe in the possibility and find the idea repulsive, *anyway*, why teach the eternal recurrence at all? In fact, I think the former necessarily have a better chance to prevail than the latter only if the doctrine of the *will to power* holds sway. Thus Nietzsche writes:

          "It was morality that protected life against despair and the leap into nothing, among men and classes who were violated and oppressed by *men*: for it is the experience of being powerless against men, not against nature, that generates the most desperate embitterment against existence. Morality treated the violent despots, the doers of violence, the 'masters' in general as the enemies against whom the common man must be protected, which means first of all encouraged and strengthened. Morality consequently taught men to hate and despise most profoundly what is the basic character trait of those who rule: their will to power. To abolish, deny, and dissolve this morality---that would mean looking at the best-hated drive with an opposite feeling and valuation. If the suffering and oppressed lost the faith that they have the right to despise the will to power, they would enter the phase of hopeless despair. This would be the case if this trait were essential to life and it could be shown that even in this will to morality this very 'will to power' were hidden, and even this hatred and contempt were still a will to power. The oppressed would come to see that they were on the same plain with the oppressors, without prerogative, without higher rank.

          "Rather the opposite! There is nothing to life that has value, except the degree of power---assuming that life itself is the will to power. Morality guarded the underprivileged against nihilism by assigning to each an infinite value, a metaphysical value, and by placing each in an order that did not agree with the worldly order of rank and power: it taught resignation, meekness, etc. Supposing that the faith in this morality would perish, then the underprivileged would no longer have their comfort--and they would perish."

          (WP 55 (June 10, 1887).)


          The eternal recurrence *is* the eternal recurrence of the-world-as-will-to-power. If it would be the eternal recurrence of the-world-as-mechanistic-nonsensicality, for instance (cf. GM II.12), the effect of the idea would be a completely different one; not to mention any still *less* herd-unfriendly examples.



          --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "sauwelios" <sauwelios@...> wrote:
          >
          > Well, I said "it---or at least the *possibility* of it---must be believed in". In the notebooks, Nietzsche likens the possibility to the possibility of eternal damnation: what effect the notion of that possibility has had on the course of history.
          >
          > Also, to be looked upon favorably by Nietzsche is not to be selected in the sense meant. That selection is rather like *natural* selection: some (genes) survive, others die out.
          >
          > As for the possibility of it, I think it is as well possible as eternal novelty, as both are unthinkable (the ER because nothingness is unthinkable, and EN because infinity is unthinkable).
          >
          > Of those who believe in the possibility of it, then, those who "cannot bear it stand condemned", whereas "those who find it the greatest benefit are chosen to rule." (WP 1053 (1884).) And those who do *not* believe in the possibility of it?
          >
          > "This doctrine is mild against those who do not believe in it, it knows no hells and no threats. Whoever does not believe has a *fleeting* life in his consciousness."
          > (Notebooks, 1881-82.)
          >
          > Will not those who find it the greatest benefit probably also prevail over those who do *not* believe in the possibility of it? And will there not also be two types among those who don't believe in it? Those who find the idea attractive and those who find it repulsive? So that there arises the following order of the chance to prevail?
          >
          > 1) Those who believe in the possibility of it and find the idea attractive;
          > 2) those who do *not* believe in the possibility, but find the idea attractive;
          > 3) those who do not believe in the possibility and find the idea repulsive;
          > 4) those who *do* believe in the possibility and find the idea repulsive.
          >
          >
          > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Ian" <ianmathwiz7@> wrote:
          > >
          > > I don't think people would actually have to *believe* in the eternal recurrence for it to be a valuable means to breeding and selection, as Nietzche seems to imply in e.g. TGS that one would only have to be able to *will* that it be the case in order to truly affirm life. Presumably, a person who wants the eternal recurrence to happen, but just cannot believe that it will (maybe he finds arguments its favor unpersuasive, maybe he sees no evidence in its favor) will still be looked upon favorably by Nietzche.
          > >
          > > ~Ian
          > >
          > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "sauwelios" <sauwelios@> wrote:
          > > >
          > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "sauwelios" <sauwelios@> wrote: [snipped]
          > > > >
          > > > > "Your pride (oh you noble Stoics) wants to prescribe your morality, your ideal, to nature, even to nature, and make the latter incorporate the former[!]"
          > > > > (BGE 9.)
          > > > >
          > > >
          > > > "Oh you noble Stoics" should be between square, not round, brackets.
          > > >
          > > >
          > > > > And the teaching of the eternal recurrence of the-world-as-will-to-power is the perfect means for the achievement of this end:
          > > > >
          > > > > "[T]he theory of eternal recurrence [...] as a means of breeding and selection."
          > > > > (The Will to Power, section 462. Cf. 1053, 1055-58.)
          > > > >
          > > > > And it's fitting that someone who belongs to the Overman type should have that very type, the sprouting and flourishing of individuals belonging to that very type, as his ideal: see Twilight of the Idols, 'Forays of an Untimely Man', section 20: Dionysus there represents the superhuman type, Ariadne the human type.
          > > >
          > > > I meant section 19 here, though section 20 is indeed also of note: it implies that where the value judgment "beautiful" arises, there arises a *love* (the German word for "ugly" is *hässlich*, "hately"):
          > > >
          > > > "What does man love there? But there is no doubt: the *ascension of his type*."
          > > > (section 20, paraphrase.)
          > > >
          > > >
          > > > Also, in regard to what Ian said yesterday about Nietzsche actually arguing for the eternal recurrence in the notebooks: this may be explained by the notion of the theory of eternal recurrence as a means of breeding and selection. In order for it to work as such a means, it---or at least the *possibility* of it---must be believed in by those it is to select and/or those it is to weed out.
          > > >
          > >
          >
        • sauwelios
          We might say Nietzsche describes the world as *prescription* and nothing besides. And to those who would object, but then that description , too, is really a
          Message 4 of 6 , Sep 9, 2010
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            We might say Nietzsche describes the world as *prescription* and nothing besides. And to those who would object, "but then that 'description', too, is really a prescription", we could reply, with Nietzsche: "Well, so much the better." (BGE 22.) As Leo Strauss says in this group's description (no pun intended), "the doctrine of the will to power is at the same time an interpretation and the most fundamental fact". In other words, it is at the same time a *pre*-scription and the most accurate *de*-scription.

            Now, being in effect a *de*-scription, Nietzsche's prescription that the world be will to power and nothing besides cannot be what makes him a philosopher---his manifestation of the most spiritual will to power, his creating the world in his image (BGE 9);

            "[T]he most spiritual will to power consists in prescribing to nature what or how it ought to be (aph. 9)."
            (Leo Strauss, 'Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's [i]Beyond Good and Evil[/i]'.)

            In the case of *Nietzsche*, the most spiritual will to power cannot consist in prescribing to nature *what* it ought to be, namely will to power and nothing besides, as that *is* probably the case: it is an *insight* reached by scientific method (see BGE 36). Therefore, in the case of Nietzsche the most spiritual will to power must consist in prescribing to nature *how* it ought to be:

            "To say that being as a whole 'is' will to power means that being as such possesses the constitution of what Nietzsche defines as will to power. And to say that being as a whole 'is' eternal recurrence of the same means that being as a whole *is*, as being, in the manner of eternal recurrence of the same. The determination "will to power" replies to the question of being *with respect to the latter's constitution*; the determination "eternal recurrence of the same" replies to the question of being *with respect to its way to be*.
            (Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. II, Chap. 26, trans. Krell.)

            Nietzsche/Zarathustra is a Dionysus (EH 'TSZ' 7). His Ariadne is ultimately Life (existence) in general, i.e., the world as will to power. And he says to her: "Thou shalt eternally recur!"---or, in other words, "I will that thou eternally recur". And whereas *his* happiness, as a man, is "I will", *her* happiness is "he wills" (TSZ, 'Old and Young Women'). Therefore she accepts the name he gives her---"Eternity". This then replaces her maiden name "Life". Eternity, in TSZ, *is* Eternity-Life; the eternal recurrence *is* the eternal recurrence of the-world-as-will-to-power. And whereas the will to power is the most fundamental, i.e., the deepest, fact, the eternal recurrence is the highest value.


            --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "sauwelios" <sauwelios@...> wrote:
            >
            > But if those who do *not* believe in the possibility, but do find the idea attractive, have a better chance to prevail than those who do not believe in the possibility and find the idea repulsive, *anyway*, why teach the eternal recurrence at all? In fact, I think the former necessarily have a better chance to prevail than the latter only if the doctrine of the *will to power* holds sway. Thus Nietzsche writes:
            >
            > "It was morality that protected life against despair and the leap into nothing, among men and classes who were violated and oppressed by *men*: for it is the experience of being powerless against men, not against nature, that generates the most desperate embitterment against existence. Morality treated the violent despots, the doers of violence, the 'masters' in general as the enemies against whom the common man must be protected, which means first of all encouraged and strengthened. Morality consequently taught men to hate and despise most profoundly what is the basic character trait of those who rule: their will to power. To abolish, deny, and dissolve this morality---that would mean looking at the best-hated drive with an opposite feeling and valuation. If the suffering and oppressed lost the faith that they have the right to despise the will to power, they would enter the phase of hopeless despair. This would be the case if this trait were essential to life and it could be shown that even in this will to morality this very 'will to power' were hidden, and even this hatred and contempt were still a will to power. The oppressed would come to see that they were on the same plain with the oppressors, without prerogative, without higher rank.
            >
            > "Rather the opposite! There is nothing to life that has value, except the degree of power---assuming that life itself is the will to power. Morality guarded the underprivileged against nihilism by assigning to each an infinite value, a metaphysical value, and by placing each in an order that did not agree with the worldly order of rank and power: it taught resignation, meekness, etc. Supposing that the faith in this morality would perish, then the underprivileged would no longer have their comfort--and they would perish."
            >
            > (WP 55 (June 10, 1887).)
            >
            >
            > The eternal recurrence *is* the eternal recurrence of the-world-as-will-to-power. If it would be the eternal recurrence of the-world-as-mechanistic-nonsensicality, for instance (cf. GM II.12), the effect of the idea would be a completely different one; not to mention any still *less* herd-unfriendly examples.
            >
            >
            >
            > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "sauwelios" <sauwelios@> wrote:
            > >
            > > Well, I said "it---or at least the *possibility* of it---must be believed in". In the notebooks, Nietzsche likens the possibility to the possibility of eternal damnation: what effect the notion of that possibility has had on the course of history.
            > >
            > > Also, to be looked upon favorably by Nietzsche is not to be selected in the sense meant. That selection is rather like *natural* selection: some (genes) survive, others die out.
            > >
            > > As for the possibility of it, I think it is as well possible as eternal novelty, as both are unthinkable (the ER because nothingness is unthinkable, and EN because infinity is unthinkable).
            > >
            > > Of those who believe in the possibility of it, then, those who "cannot bear it stand condemned", whereas "those who find it the greatest benefit are chosen to rule." (WP 1053 (1884).) And those who do *not* believe in the possibility of it?
            > >
            > > "This doctrine is mild against those who do not believe in it, it knows no hells and no threats. Whoever does not believe has a *fleeting* life in his consciousness."
            > > (Notebooks, 1881-82.)
            > >
            > > Will not those who find it the greatest benefit probably also prevail over those who do *not* believe in the possibility of it? And will there not also be two types among those who don't believe in it? Those who find the idea attractive and those who find it repulsive? So that there arises the following order of the chance to prevail?
            > >
            > > 1) Those who believe in the possibility of it and find the idea attractive;
            > > 2) those who do *not* believe in the possibility, but find the idea attractive;
            > > 3) those who do not believe in the possibility and find the idea repulsive;
            > > 4) those who *do* believe in the possibility and find the idea repulsive.
            > >
            > >
            > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Ian" <ianmathwiz7@> wrote:
            > > >
            > > > I don't think people would actually have to *believe* in the eternal recurrence for it to be a valuable means to breeding and selection, as Nietzche seems to imply in e.g. TGS that one would only have to be able to *will* that it be the case in order to truly affirm life. Presumably, a person who wants the eternal recurrence to happen, but just cannot believe that it will (maybe he finds arguments its favor unpersuasive, maybe he sees no evidence in its favor) will still be looked upon favorably by Nietzche.
            > > >
            > > > ~Ian
            > > >
            > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "sauwelios" <sauwelios@> wrote:
            > > > >
            > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "sauwelios" <sauwelios@> wrote: [snipped]
            > > > > >
            > > > > > "Your pride (oh you noble Stoics) wants to prescribe your morality, your ideal, to nature, even to nature, and make the latter incorporate the former[!]"
            > > > > > (BGE 9.)
            > > > > >
            > > > >
            > > > > "Oh you noble Stoics" should be between square, not round, brackets.
            > > > >
            > > > >
            > > > > > And the teaching of the eternal recurrence of the-world-as-will-to-power is the perfect means for the achievement of this end:
            > > > > >
            > > > > > "[T]he theory of eternal recurrence [...] as a means of breeding and selection."
            > > > > > (The Will to Power, section 462. Cf. 1053, 1055-58.)
            > > > > >
            > > > > > And it's fitting that someone who belongs to the Overman type should have that very type, the sprouting and flourishing of individuals belonging to that very type, as his ideal: see Twilight of the Idols, 'Forays of an Untimely Man', section 20: Dionysus there represents the superhuman type, Ariadne the human type.
            > > > >
            > > > > I meant section 19 here, though section 20 is indeed also of note: it implies that where the value judgment "beautiful" arises, there arises a *love* (the German word for "ugly" is *hässlich*, "hately"):
            > > > >
            > > > > "What does man love there? But there is no doubt: the *ascension of his type*."
            > > > > (section 20, paraphrase.)
            > > > >
            > > > >
            > > > > Also, in regard to what Ian said yesterday about Nietzsche actually arguing for the eternal recurrence in the notebooks: this may be explained by the notion of the theory of eternal recurrence as a means of breeding and selection. In order for it to work as such a means, it---or at least the *possibility* of it---must be believed in by those it is to select and/or those it is to weed out.
            > > > >
            > > >
            > >
            >
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