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Re: The Alpha of Nietzsche's Philosophy.

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  • Moody
    Nietzsche made a very important statement about inspiration in that most crucial work for Nietzsche-interpretation, Ecce Homo. Here Nietzsche was reviewing his
    Message 1 of 22 , Feb 1, 2010
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      Nietzsche made a very important statement about inspiration in that most crucial work for Nietzsche-interpretation, Ecce Homo.

      Here Nietzsche was reviewing his own postic masterpiece, Thus Spake Zarathustra:

       

      Has anyone at the end of the 19th century a distinct conception of what poets of strong ages called inspiration? If not, I will describe it. - If one had the slightest residue of superstition left in one, one would be hardly able to set aside the idea that one is merely incarnation, merely mouthpiece, merely medium of overwhelming forces. The concept of revelation, in the sense that something suddenly, with unspeakable certainty and subtlety, becomes visible, audible, something that shakes and overturns one to the depths, simply describes the fact. One hears, one does not seek; one takes, one does not ask who gives; a thought flashes up like lightning, with necessity, unfalteringly formed - I have never had any choice. An ecstasy whose tremendous tension sometimes discharges itself in a flood of tears, while one's steps now involuntarily rush along, now involuntarily lag; a complete being outside of oneself with the distinct consciousness of a multitude of subtle shudders and trickles down to one's toes; a depth of happiness in which the most painful and gloomy things appear, not as antithesis, but as conditioned, demanded, as a necessry colour within such a superfluity of light ... [...] Everything is in the highest degree involuntary but takes place as in a tempest of a feeling of freedom, of absoluteness, of power, of divinity ... The involuntary nature of image, of metaphor is the most remarkable thing of all ... [...] It really does seem, to allude to a saying of Zarathustra's, as if the things themselves appraoched and offered themselves as metaphors ... [...] This is my experience of inspiration; I do not doubt that one has to go back thousands of years to find anyone who could say to me 'it is mine also'. - [Nietzsche, EH, TSZ 3 (Hollingdale translation, Penguin 1979 pp. 72-3)]

      Clearly this is a brilliantly lucid description of the non-perspectival aspects of poetic inspiration.

      --------------------------------------------

      --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@...> wrote:
      > Nietzsche was most skeptical about 'inspiration', of course.

       

    • Sauwelios
      ... This is essential: superstition is an indispensable ingredient if one is to have the idea that follows. one would ... This is interpretation, of course:
      Message 2 of 22 , Feb 1, 2010
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        --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" <moodylawless@...> wrote:
        >
        >
        > Nietzsche made a very important statement about inspiration in that most
        > crucial work for Nietzsche-interpretation, Ecce Homo.
        >
        > Here Nietzsche was reviewing his own postic masterpiece, Thus Spake
        > Zarathustra:
        >
        >
        > Has anyone at the end of the 19th century a distinct conception of what
        > poets of strong ages called inspiration? If not, I will describe it. -
        > If one had the slightest residue of superstition left in one,

        This is essential: superstition is an indispensable ingredient if one is to have the idea that follows.


        one would
        > be hardly able to set aside the idea that one is merely incarnation,
        > merely mouthpiece, merely medium of overwhelming forces.

        This is interpretation, of course: who says there is anything *behind* these impressions?


        > The concept of
        > revelation, in the sense that something suddenly, with unspeakable
        > certainty and subtlety, becomes visible, audible,

        Here we have the implication of visual and aural *sensations* (which Mach called "elements"). And indeed, sense impressions are a kind of revelations (but *not* necessarily of something beyond them).


        > something that shakes
        > and overturns one to the depths, simply describes the fact. One hears,
        > one does not seek; one takes, one does not ask who gives; a thought
        > flashes up like lightning, with necessity, unfalteringly formed - I have
        > never had any choice. An ecstasy whose tremendous tension sometimes
        > discharges itself in a flood of tears, while one's steps now
        > involuntarily rush along, now involuntarily lag; a complete being
        > outside of oneself with the distinct consciousness of a multitude of
        > subtle shudders and trickles down to one's toes; a depth of happiness in
        > which the most painful and gloomy things appear, not as antithesis, but
        > as conditioned, demanded, as a necessry colour within such a superfluity
        > of light ... [...] Everything is in the highest degree involuntary but
        > takes place as in a tempest of a feeling of freedom, of absoluteness, of
        > power, of divinity ... The involuntary nature of image, of metaphor is
        > the most remarkable thing of all ... [...] It really does seem, to
        > allude to a saying of Zarathustra's, as if the things themselves
        > appraoched and offered themselves as metaphors ...

        But the idea of 'things' is already an *interpretation* (of clusters of 'sensations').


        > [...] This is my
        > experience of inspiration; I do not doubt that one has to go back
        > thousands of years to find anyone who could say to me 'it is mine also'.
        > - [Nietzsche, EH, TSZ 3 (Hollingdale translation, Penguin 1979 pp.
        > 72-3)]
        > Clearly this is a brilliantly lucid description of the non-perspectival
        > aspects of poetic inspiration.
        >
        > --------------------------------------------
        >
        > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
        > wrote:
        > > Nietzsche was most skeptical about 'inspiration', of course.
        >
      • Sauwelios
        ... most ... what ... - ... is to have the idea that follows. ... these impressions? ... Mach called elements ). And indeed, sense impressions are a kind of
        Message 3 of 22 , Feb 10, 2010
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          --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@...> wrote:
          >
          >
          >
          > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@ wrote:
          > >
          > >
          > > Nietzsche made a very important statement about inspiration in that most
          > > crucial work for Nietzsche-interpretation, Ecce Homo.
          > >
          > > Here Nietzsche was reviewing his own postic masterpiece, Thus Spake
          > > Zarathustra:
          > >
          > >
          > > Has anyone at the end of the 19th century a distinct conception of what
          > > poets of strong ages called inspiration? If not, I will describe it. -
          > > If one had the slightest residue of superstition left in one,
          >
          > This is essential: superstition is an indispensable ingredient if one is to have the idea that follows.
          >
          >
          > one would
          > > be hardly able to set aside the idea that one is merely incarnation,
          > > merely mouthpiece, merely medium of overwhelming forces.
          >
          > This is interpretation, of course: who says there is anything *behind* these impressions?
          >
          >
          > > The concept of
          > > revelation, in the sense that something suddenly, with unspeakable
          > > certainty and subtlety, becomes visible, audible,
          >
          > Here we have the implication of visual and aural *sensations* (which Mach called "elements"). And indeed, sense impressions are a kind of revelations (but *not* necessarily of something beyond them).
          >
          >
          > > something that shakes
          > > and overturns one to the depths, simply describes the fact. One hears,
          > > one does not seek; one takes, one does not ask who gives; a thought
          > > flashes up like lightning, with necessity, unfalteringly formed - I have
          > > never had any choice. An ecstasy whose tremendous tension sometimes
          > > discharges itself in a flood of tears, while one's steps now
          > > involuntarily rush along, now involuntarily lag; a complete being
          > > outside of oneself with the distinct consciousness of a multitude of
          > > subtle shudders and trickles down to one's toes; a depth of happiness in
          > > which the most painful and gloomy things appear, not as antithesis, but
          > > as conditioned, demanded, as a necessry colour within such a superfluity
          > > of light ... [...] Everything is in the highest degree involuntary but
          > > takes place as in a tempest of a feeling of freedom, of absoluteness, of
          > > power, of divinity ... The involuntary nature of image, of metaphor is
          > > the most remarkable thing of all ... [...] It really does seem, to
          > > allude to a saying of Zarathustra's, as if the things themselves
          > > appraoched and offered themselves as metaphors ...
          >
          > But the idea of 'things' is already an *interpretation* (of clusters of 'sensations').
          >
          >
          > > [...] This is my
          > > experience of inspiration; I do not doubt that one has to go back
          > > thousands of years to find anyone who could say to me 'it is mine also'.
          > > - [Nietzsche, EH, TSZ 3 (Hollingdale translation, Penguin 1979 pp.
          > > 72-3)]
          > > Clearly this is a brilliantly lucid description of the non-perspectival
          > > aspects of poetic inspiration.
          > >
          > > --------------------------------------------
          > >
          > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
          > > wrote:
          > > > Nietzsche was most skeptical about 'inspiration', of course.
          > >
          >

          I received a reply to this post by email. I will reproduce it here, together with the response I sent back, though without identifying the sender.

          His email:

          The crucial thing here is that Nietzsche says that this 'superstitious' view is "my experience of inspiration".

          And so it is not among the non-superstitious reductionists of  the 19th century (or today) that one will find such a view (although all ages look superstitious in retrospect, just as no age will admit to being superstitious in its present) ; you will have to go back 'thousands of years' to find it.

          Perspectivism relies on the principle of individuation, and so is Apollonian.

          The Dionysian meanwhile is akin to Blake's infitie everything and so is beyond all perspectivism and individualism.

          Poets are able to comprehend the Dionysian through the poetic inspiration Nietzsche describes above - no matter how 'superstitious' materialists etc., may regard it.

          Mach's 'philosophy' has more in common with logical positivism etc., and does not apply well to Nietzsche's philosophy in my view.


          My reply:

          Dear [name withheld],

          Thank you for your mail.

          Note that I don't regard Nietzsche's description of inspiration in EH as a superstitious view. Nietzsche distances himself from such superstition. He just describes what it's like.

          I think Nietzsche was both non-superstitious and reductionist, as he 'reduced' all existence to the will to power.

          The idea that poets can somehow attain to a non-perspectival view through the 'revelations' of 'inspiration' is ironically, paradoxically Platonic: the 'pure mind' of the poet experiences the 'in-itself' of existence!

          The point of Nietzsche's 'Machianism', which was possibly avant-la-lettre, is that it goes beyond such distinctions of an 'apparent world' and a 'true world', even that between the 'apparent world' of individuation and the 'true world' of oneness: there are only what Mach first called "sensations" (http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Empfindung) and later "elements" [Elemente] or "experiences" (http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Befunde). However, clusters of such elements are falsified into 'objects', 'things', etc. This falsification is the work of the will to power according to Nietzsche.

          Ironically, Mach referred to a 'mystical experience' of his in introducing his idea:

          On a bright summer day in the open air, the world with my ego suddenly appeared to me as one coherent mass of sensations, only more strongly coherent in the ego.
          [Mach, Analysis of Sensations I.13.]

          This must have been a relative decrease in falsification, though, as without the illusion of 'objects', there can be no consciousness.

          Did you, by the way, mean to send this mail only to me? If you want I will post your message and my reply in the group.

          Sincerely,

          Sauwelios


          As I never got a reply, and its now about a week ago, I decided to post them in the group anyway.

          I think Mach's 'revelation' can also be said to have been Nietzsche's, though Nietzsche seems to have been struck even more by the concealment than by the 'revelation'. His 'revelation' of the will to power can be said to be his insight that the 'chaos of sensations' is concealed by the interpretation of clusters of those sensations as 'things'.
        • Moody
          This mysterious correspondent has certainly imbibed from my well. As s/he has not replied, I think I understand their argument enough to add some thoughts and
          Message 4 of 22 , Feb 15, 2010
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            This mysterious correspondent has certainly imbibed from my well.

            As s/he has not replied, I think I understand their argument enough to add some thoughts and encouragement.

            Note that Nietzsche describes his view of poetic inspiration as belonging to 'strong ages'.

            That alone shows his affirmation of the position.

            I would like to invite this person [and other refugees from the 'mad god'], if I may, to look at my new Yahoo Group [ON-E] the Order of Nietzsche-England;

            http://uk.groups.yahoo.com/group/ON-E/

            This will focus on the other side of the coin - the religio-mystic-spiritual Nietzsche:

             The Nietzsche of the Wagner period, the Nietzsche of Zarathustra and of the late works.

            In a word, the Dionysian Nietzsche.

            And when the will to power is thought of as the Dionysian it cannot be thought of as a 'reduction'.

            Quite the opposite.

            It is rather about expanding consciousness and what not.

            My essay 'The Nietzschean Jim Morrison' is so important here;

            http://m-o-o-dy-l-a-w-l-e-s-s.blogspot.com/2009/07/nietzschean-jim-morrison.html

            That essay itself has moments of inspiration where a non-perspectival knowing flowed through me. I reference it here for our anonymous friend, although I suspect that they may have read it already.

            Of course, Sauwelios, Nietzsche had a positivistic phase.

            But this was only a phase and a means to an end - to kill the father.

            It was his Oedipal moment.

            It was his metamorphosis of the camel.

            Once he had got this out of his system he could return to the Dionysianism with which he began - which he was ... become what you are.

            Most of all, to return to the Mystery that is Music.

            Music is your special friend, dance on fire as it intends.

            For those who are not trapped purely in the Mystical, or purely in the Material Nietzsche; for thise who have surpassed the camel and the lion and are to become childe-like, I recommend Bertram's book [so unjustly traduced by the braggart Kaufmann] 'An Attempt at a Mythology'.

            However, I think it undeniable that the Dionysian is Nietzsche's greatest achievement, his greatest teaching.

            Moody Lawless intends to speak at length on the Dionysian in the future in an essay that will be comparable to his Morrison one.

            He needs to meditate further.

            He thanks the spirit of the Mojo for guiding him.

            Dionysos, the thunderbolt that guides all things.

            Hail to the gods of the blood.


            > > >
            > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
            > > > wrote:
            > > > > Nietzsche was most skeptical about 'inspiration', of course.
            > > >
            > >
            >
            > I received a reply to this post by email. I will reproduce it here,
            > together with the response I sent back, though without identifying the
            > sender.
            >
            > His email:
            >
            >
            > The crucial thing here is that Nietzsche says that this 'superstitious'
            > view is "my experience of inspiration".
            >
            > And so it is not among the non-superstitious reductionists of the 19th
            > century (or today) that one will find such a view (although all ages
            > look superstitious in retrospect, just as no age will admit to being
            > superstitious in its present) ; you will have to go back 'thousands of
            > years' to find it.
            >
            > Perspectivism relies on the principle of individuation, and so is
            > Apollonian.
            >
            > The Dionysian meanwhile is akin to Blake's infitie everything and so is
            > beyond all perspectivism and individualism.
            >
            > Poets are able to comprehend the Dionysian through the poetic
            > inspiration Nietzsche describes above - no matter how 'superstitious'
            > materialists etc., may regard it.
            >
            > Mach's 'philosophy' has more in common with logical positivism etc., and
            > does not apply well to Nietzsche's philosophy in my view.
            >
            > My reply:
            >
            > Dear [name withheld],
            >
            > Thank you for your mail.
            >
            > Note that I don't regard Nietzsche's description of inspiration in EH as
            > a superstitious view. Nietzsche distances himself from such
            > superstition. He just describes what it's like.
            >
            > I think Nietzsche was both non-superstitious and reductionist, as he
            > 'reduced' all existence to the will to power.
            >
            > The idea that poets can somehow attain to a non-perspectival view
            > through the 'revelations' of 'inspiration' is ironically, paradoxically
            > Platonic: the 'pure mind' of the poet experiences the 'in-itself' of
            > existence!
            >
            > The point of Nietzsche's 'Machianism', which was possibly
            > avant-la-lettre, is that it goes beyond such distinctions of an
            > 'apparent world' and a 'true world', even that between the 'apparent
            > world' of individuation and the 'true world' of oneness: there are only
            > what Mach first called "sensations"
            > (http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Empfindung
            > <http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Empfindung> ) and
            > later "elements" [Elemente] or "experiences"
            > (http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Befunde
            > <http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Befunde> ). However,
            > clusters of such elements are falsified into 'objects', 'things', etc.
            > This falsification is the work of the will to power according to
            > Nietzsche.
            >
            > Ironically, Mach referred to a 'mystical experience' of his in
            > introducing his idea:
            >
            > On a bright summer day in the open air, the world with my ego suddenly
            > appeared to me as one coherent mass of sensations, only more strongly
            > coherent in the ego.
            > [Mach, Analysis of Sensations I.13.]
            >
            > This must have been a relative decrease in falsification, though, as
            > without the illusion of 'objects', there can be no consciousness.
            >
            > Did you, by the way, mean to send this mail only to me? If you want I
            > will post your message and my reply in the group.
            >
            > Sincerely,
            >
            > Sauwelios
            >
            >
            > As I never got a reply, and its now about a week ago, I decided to post
            > them in the group anyway.
            >
            > I think Mach's 'revelation' can also be said to have been Nietzsche's,
            > though Nietzsche seems to have been struck even more by the concealment
            > than by the 'revelation'. His 'revelation' of the will to power can be
            > said to be his insight that the 'chaos of sensations' is concealed by
            > the interpretation of clusters of those sensations as 'things'.
            >

          • Sauwelios
            ... To understand his position, we have to read well---especially this bit: If one had the slightest residue of superstition left in one, one would be hardly
            Message 5 of 22 , Feb 16, 2010
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              --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" <moodylawless@...> wrote:
              >
              >
              > This mysterious correspondent has certainly imbibed from my well.
              >
              > As s/he has not replied, I think I understand their argument enough to
              > add some thoughts and encouragement.
              >
              > Note that Nietzsche describes his view of poetic inspiration as
              > belonging to 'strong ages'.
              >
              > That alone shows his affirmation of the position.
              >

              To understand his position, we have to read well---especially this bit:

              "If one had the slightest residue of superstition left in one, one would be hardly able to set aside the idea that one is merely incarnation, merely mouthpiece, merely medium of overwhelming forces."

              This means: if one has more than just the slightest residue of superstition left in one, one will not be able to set that idea aside; if one has only the slightest residue left, one may still set it aside, though it will be hard; and if one does not have any superstition left in one, it will not be hard.

              Now as for revelation. Revelation describes the fact, that is, it describes what inspiration *feels* like, how it *appears*. This does not mean that it really is the way it seems or feels, of course.


              > I would like to invite this person [and other refugees from the 'mad
              > god'], if I may, to look at my new Yahoo Group [ON-E] the Order of
              > Nietzsche-England;
              >
              > http://uk.groups.yahoo.com/group/ON-E/
              > <http://uk.groups.yahoo.com/group/ON-E/>
              >
              > This will focus on the other side of the coin - the
              > religio-mystic-spiritual Nietzsche:
              >
              > The Nietzsche of the Wagner period, the Nietzsche of Zarathustra and of
              > the late works.
              >
              > In a word, the Dionysian Nietzsche.
              >

              It may not surprise you that I have no intention of becoming a member of your new group. In fact, I had already unsubscribed from the daily digests of your old group, the reason being your tolerance of the fool Scott. Perhaps you see something promising in him, just as you saw in me in the beginning (I then quickly disappointed you, but some years later I managed to win your approval again. Perhaps I have recently come to disappoint you again with my 'mistaken' being taken over by Lampert).

              If anyone worked to understand and explain the Nietzsche of the Wagner period, it has been I, with my studies here of Nietzsche's early metaphysics in general and The Greek State in particular.

              Unlike what you suggest below, Zarathustra begins (incipit) at the height of Nietzsche's 'Machian' positivism (Twilight, 'True World'). And the late works, too, exemplify this last stage of positivism (all his works from TSZ on do).


              > And when the will to power is thought of as the Dionysian it cannot be
              > thought of as a 'reduction'.
              >

              I never said the will to power *was* a reduction, but that Nietzsche re-duced everything *to* the will to power.



              > Quite the opposite.
              >
              > It is rather about expanding consciousness and what not.
              >
              > My essay 'The Nietzschean Jim Morrison' is so important here;
              >
              > http://m-o-o-dy-l-a-w-l-e-s-s.blogspot.com/2009/07/nietzschean-jim-morri\
              > son.html
              > <http://m-o-o-dy-l-a-w-l-e-s-s.blogspot.com/2009/07/nietzschean-jim-morr\
              > ison.html>
              >
              > That essay itself has moments of inspiration where a non-perspectival
              > knowing flowed through me.

              Or at least it seemed that way to you (you interpreted it that way). It's funny, because it was the Jew Leo Strauss who gave rise to the following notion:

              "Careful attention paid to the dialogue throughout the development of Western culture between its two points of departure: Athens and Jerusalem [is a distinguishing aspect of a Straussian approach to political philosophy]. The recognition that Reason and Revelation, originating from these two points respectively, are the two distinct sources of knowledge in the Western tradition, and can be used neither to support nor refute the other, since neither claims to be based on the other's terms."
              http://sauwelios.blogspot.com/2006/07/gevonden-op-straussiannet.html

              Even if Jerusalem does not signify the *epitome* of claiming knowledge acquired by revelation, it is clearly of a kind with 'Aryan' traditions of 'religio-mystic-spiritual' 'knowledge'. Indeed, according to Nietzsche it was *Aryan*, not Semitic, influence which had "corrupted all the world" (WP 142). And in one of his latest works, The Antichrist, he deliberately contrasts himself and his spiritual/intellectual kin from such Aryanism: see sections 12 and 13.

              In the next section of the same book, by the way, he gives another example of the fact that he, Nietzsche, *got a great many things wrong*:

              "We regard him [man] as the strongest of the beasts because he is the craftiest; one of the results thereof is his intellectuality."
              [AC 14.]

              This is probably nonsense: his intellectuality is probably a biological adaptation that has no survival value, but has evolved for its *reproductive* value (as a 'wasteful' display of fitness, like the peacock's tail---wasteful from the perspective of efficiency for survival). In The Will to Power he imagines man in nature as "the weakest and shrewdest creature making himself master"; but man in nature was far from being the physically weakest creature: he did not need to compensate for his physical weakness with mental strength.

              In fact, ironically Nietzsche understood so little of Darwin (whom he never read) that he was basically in agreement with him precisely where he thought he was diametrically opposed to him (WP 684-685).

              Another example: Nietzsche took "adaptation", in the Darwinian sense, to mean the adaptation of the *individual*; what it means, however, is the adaptation of the *species*...

              But for all his flaws, I think Nietzsche also got a great many things *right*, including the most important thing: his (mature) metaphysics. I see Nietzsche's value first and foremost in his being a metaphysician in the Heideggerian sense of the word. With his doctrine of the will to power, he accomplishes the task of science on the meta-level, even thought its task will probably never be accomplished on its proper level. Nietzsche answers the question as to being-as-a-whole, saying that it is the will to power, and nothing besides---and he even does so wholly in accord with scientific *method*, the method of 'knowledge' acquisition proper to Reason as opposed to Revelation.


              > I reference it here for our anonymous friend,
              > although I suspect that they may have read it already.
              >
              > Of course, Sauwelios, Nietzsche had a positivistic phase.
              >
              > But this was only a phase and a means to an end - to kill the father.
              >

              The 'father' then being the 'true world', I take it. But positivism does not stop at abolishing the 'true world', but goes on to abolish the 'apparent world' as well. If 'mystical union' is the union with the true world, then this positivistic reasoning leads, to speak with a passage from the Nachlass, to the mystical condition: for the 'apparent' world, being thenceforth understood to be the *only* world, is thenceforth understood to be the *true* world---the only reservation being that the fruit of Reason is not the fruit of Revelation: it is *probability*, the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, not truth, the fruit of the Tree of Life. Perhaps what distinguishes the new Dionysian is then letting go of this reservation, and taking this probability (the the world be the will to power and nothing besides) to be the truth until we hit a wall in that darkness.


              > It was his Oedipal moment.
              >
              > It was his metamorphosis of the camel.
              >
              > Once he had got this out of his system he could return to the
              > Dionysianism with which he began - which he was ... become what you are.
              >
              > Most of all, to return to the Mystery that is Music.
              >
              > Music is your special friend, dance on fire as it intends.
              >
              > For those who are not trapped purely in the Mystical, or purely in the
              > Material Nietzsche; for thise who have surpassed the camel and the lion
              > and are to become childe-like, I recommend Bertram's book [so unjustly
              > traduced by the braggart Kaufmann] 'An Attempt at a Mythology'.
              >
              > However, I think it undeniable that the Dionysian is Nietzsche's
              > greatest achievement, his greatest teaching.
              >
              > Moody Lawless intends to speak at length on the Dionysian in the future
              > in an essay that will be comparable to his Morrison one.
              >
              > He needs to meditate further.
              >
              > He thanks the spirit of the Mojo for guiding him.
              >
              > Dionysos, the thunderbolt that guides all things.
              >
              > Hail to the gods of the blood.
              >

              I *do* recommend studying Moody to those to whom he appeals. He's certainly had a great impact on *my* life. But though I won't say "never", at the moment I'm driven to study others instead. Seeking *probable* truth by scientific method, not seeking believed *certain* truth by *mystical* methods: that is what I do.


              >
              > > > >
              > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
              > > > > wrote:
              > > > > > Nietzsche was most skeptical about 'inspiration', of course.
              > > > >
              > > >
              > >
              > > I received a reply to this post by email. I will reproduce it here,
              > > together with the response I sent back, though without identifying the
              > > sender.
              > >
              > > His email:
              > >
              > >
              > > The crucial thing here is that Nietzsche says that this
              > 'superstitious'
              > > view is "my experience of inspiration".
              > >
              > > And so it is not among the non-superstitious reductionists of the 19th
              > > century (or today) that one will find such a view (although all ages
              > > look superstitious in retrospect, just as no age will admit to being
              > > superstitious in its present) ; you will have to go back 'thousands of
              > > years' to find it.
              > >
              > > Perspectivism relies on the principle of individuation, and so is
              > > Apollonian.
              > >
              > > The Dionysian meanwhile is akin to Blake's infitie everything and so
              > is
              > > beyond all perspectivism and individualism.
              > >
              > > Poets are able to comprehend the Dionysian through the poetic
              > > inspiration Nietzsche describes above - no matter how 'superstitious'
              > > materialists etc., may regard it.
              > >
              > > Mach's 'philosophy' has more in common with logical positivism etc.,
              > and
              > > does not apply well to Nietzsche's philosophy in my view.
              > >
              > > My reply:
              > >
              > > Dear [name withheld],
              > >
              > > Thank you for your mail.
              > >
              > > Note that I don't regard Nietzsche's description of inspiration in EH
              > as
              > > a superstitious view. Nietzsche distances himself from such
              > > superstition. He just describes what it's like.
              > >
              > > I think Nietzsche was both non-superstitious and reductionist, as he
              > > 'reduced' all existence to the will to power.
              > >
              > > The idea that poets can somehow attain to a non-perspectival view
              > > through the 'revelations' of 'inspiration' is ironically,
              > paradoxically
              > > Platonic: the 'pure mind' of the poet experiences the 'in-itself' of
              > > existence!
              > >
              > > The point of Nietzsche's 'Machianism', which was possibly
              > > avant-la-lettre, is that it goes beyond such distinctions of an
              > > 'apparent world' and a 'true world', even that between the 'apparent
              > > world' of individuation and the 'true world' of oneness: there are
              > only
              > > what Mach first called "sensations"
              > > (http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Empfindung
              > > <http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Empfindung> ) and
              > > later "elements" [Elemente] or "experiences"
              > > (http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Befunde
              > > <http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Befunde> ). However,
              > > clusters of such elements are falsified into 'objects', 'things', etc.
              > > This falsification is the work of the will to power according to
              > > Nietzsche.
              > >
              > > Ironically, Mach referred to a 'mystical experience' of his in
              > > introducing his idea:
              > >
              > > On a bright summer day in the open air, the world with my ego suddenly
              > > appeared to me as one coherent mass of sensations, only more strongly
              > > coherent in the ego.
              > > [Mach, Analysis of Sensations I.13.]
              > >
              > > This must have been a relative decrease in falsification, though, as
              > > without the illusion of 'objects', there can be no consciousness.
              > >
              > > Did you, by the way, mean to send this mail only to me? If you want I
              > > will post your message and my reply in the group.
              > >
              > > Sincerely,
              > >
              > > Sauwelios
              > >
              > >
              > > As I never got a reply, and its now about a week ago, I decided to
              > post
              > > them in the group anyway.
              > >
              > > I think Mach's 'revelation' can also be said to have been Nietzsche's,
              > > though Nietzsche seems to have been struck even more by the
              > concealment
              > > than by the 'revelation'. His 'revelation' of the will to power can be
              > > said to be his insight that the 'chaos of sensations' is concealed by
              > > the interpretation of clusters of those sensations as 'things'.
              > >
              >
            • Moody Lawless
              And poets of strong ages believed super-stitiously in in-spir-ation.   Strong ages and strong individuals were always super-stitious. Look at the ancient
              Message 6 of 22 , Feb 17, 2010
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                And poets of "strong ages" believed super-stitiously in in-spir-ation.
                 
                Strong ages and strong individuals were always super-stitious. Look at the ancient Greeks of Homer's times, the Romans of the Imperium, the Vikings, the Troubadours et al, or at Napoleon for instance.
                 
                Of course the word super-stition has attained a pejorative air, but this really means a sense of spirit-ual awe when viewed super-morally.
                 
                In the extract in question - which is a super-human description of this super-stition - Nietzsche clearly affirms it.
                 
                And as to reveal-ation; leaving aside Xtian connotations, this again means - super-morally - a non-perspectival reavealing of something to one.
                 
                As Nietzsche said, a philosopher - like a poet, and a musician - receives his thoughts "as if they came from without."
                 
                This was always Nietzsche's experience, whether it be his earliest reveal-ations on a stormy hillside, his Zarathustra and eternal recurrence or the Dionysian.
                 
                And the Dionysian itself is this non-perspectivism.
                Indeed, Moody is at the forefront of this line of thought as regards Nietzscheanism.
                Perhaps Moody alone of living beings understands what the Dionysian is.
                 
                Of course, reveal-ation was not alien to the ancient Greeks; even the "absurdly rational" Socrates had his daimon.
                 
                As you highlight [unintentionally?] Nietzsche constantly existed in contradictions. And that was my original point. Those contradiction are not to be explained away by you, Mach or even Lampert. Courage means existing in those contradictions - that is initself a mystical position. That does disappoint me in you; but then we have never agreed - even so, I have always loved you as a brother [see my recent blog essay on Friendship or fiend-ship].
                 
                 
                I banned Scott from the Moody Lawless Group before Xmas. I deleted many of his posts first, and then put him on Moderation. Some of his early posts were fine, but he then almost became a different person [he leavened these stupid posts by some arse-licking towards Moody which made me instantly distrustful]. I moved fairly swiftly, and when he was on Moderation he showed his true nature by making lurid and perverse threats against me for which he was banned.
                 
                I believe it was I that pioneered the rehabilitation of the Wagner-period Nietzsche in the first years of this past decade on the Nietzsche Campfire. It was I who brought forth the Greek State essay as prime evidence.
                 
                Nietzsche's positivist period begins with Human and starts to dissolve with Daybreak, and its end is announced in the Joyful Wisdom with its announcement of Zarathustra. The late Nietzsche is imbued with the music of Zarathustra and the philosophy of Dionysos. The final act being his inscribing of his Fionysos dithyrambs to the occultist and Wagnerian poet Mendes.
                 
                 
                As I said, the positivistic period was necessary, and he carried forward some of its useful methods.
                But these methods were just means to an end, the end being A god that can Dance.
                 
                As always, I wish thee well.
                 
                Nietzsche above all - and Nietzsche is always above being right and wrong.
                 
                There is no right or wrong in philosophy.
                 
                Moody
                 
                 


                 


                --- On Tue, 16/2/10, Sauwelios <sauwelios@...> wrote:

                From: Sauwelios <sauwelios@...>
                Subject: [human_superhuman] Re: The Alpha of Nietzsche's Philosophy.
                To: human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com
                Date: Tuesday, 16 February, 2010, 22:46


                This means: if one has more than just the slightest residue of superstition left in one, one will not be able to set that idea aside; if one has only the slightest residue left, one may still set it aside, though it will be hard; and if one does not have any superstition left in one, it will not be hard.

                Now as for revelation. Revelation describes the fact, that is, it describes what inspiration *feels* like, how it *appears*. This does not mean that it really is the way it seems or feels, of course.

                It may not surprise you that I have no intention of becoming a member of your new group. In fact, I had already unsubscribed from the daily digests of your old group, the reason being your tolerance of the fool Scott. Perhaps you see something promising in him, just as you saw in me in the beginning (I then quickly disappointed you, but some years later I managed to win your approval again. Perhaps I have recently come to disappoint you again with my 'mistaken' being taken over by Lampert).

                If anyone worked to understand and explain the Nietzsche of the Wagner period, it has been I, with my studies here of Nietzsche's early metaphysics in general and The Greek State in particular.

                Unlike what you suggest below, Zarathustra begins (incipit) at the height of Nietzsche's 'Machian' positivism (Twilight, 'True World'). And the late works, too, exemplify this last stage of positivism (all his works from TSZ on do).


                I never said the will to power *was* a reduction, but that Nietzsche re-duced everything *to* the will to power.


                Or at least it seemed that way to you (you interpreted it that way). It's funny, because it was the Jew Leo Strauss who gave rise to the following notion:

                http://sauwelios. blogspot. com/2006/ 07/gevonden- op-straussiannet .html

                Even if Jerusalem does not signify the *epitome* of claiming knowledge acquired by revelation, it is clearly of a kind with 'Aryan' traditions of 'religio-mystic- spiritual' 'knowledge'. Indeed, according to Nietzsche it was *Aryan*, not Semitic, influence which had "corrupted all the world" (WP 142). And in one of his latest works, The Antichrist, he deliberately contrasts himself and his spiritual/intellect ual kin from such Aryanism: see sections 12 and 13.

                In the next section of the same book, by the way, he gives another example of the fact that he, Nietzsche, *got a great many things wrong*:

                "We regard him [man] as the strongest of the beasts because he is the craftiest; one of the results thereof is his intellectuality. "
                [AC 14.]

                This is probably nonsense: his intellectuality is probably a biological adaptation that has no survival value, but has evolved for its *reproductive* value (as a 'wasteful' display of fitness, like the peacock's tail---wasteful from the perspective of efficiency for survival). In The Will to Power he imagines man in nature as "the weakest and shrewdest creature making himself master"; but man in nature was far from being the physically weakest creature: he did not need to compensate for his physical weakness with mental strength.

                In fact, ironically Nietzsche understood so little of Darwin (whom he never read) that he was basically in agreement with him precisely where he thought he was diametrically opposed to him (WP 684-685).

                Another example: Nietzsche took "adaptation" , in the Darwinian sense, to mean the adaptation of the *individual* ; what it means, however, is the adaptation of the *species*...

                But for all his flaws, I think Nietzsche also got a great many things *right*, including the most important thing: his (mature) metaphysics. I see Nietzsche's value first and foremost in his being a metaphysician in the Heideggerian sense of the word. With his doctrine of the will to power, he accomplishes the task of science on the meta-level, even thought its task will probably never be accomplished on its proper level. Nietzsche answers the question as to being-as-a-whole, saying that it is the will to power, and nothing besides---and he even does so wholly in accord with scientific *method*, the method of 'knowledge' acquisition proper to Reason as opposed to Revelation.

                The 'father' then being the 'true world', I take it. But positivism does not stop at abolishing the 'true world', but goes on to abolish the 'apparent world' as well. If 'mystical union' is the union with the true world, then this positivistic reasoning leads, to speak with a passage from the Nachlass, to the mystical condition: for the 'apparent' world, being thenceforth understood to be the *only* world, is thenceforth understood to be the *true* world---the only reservation being that the fruit of Reason is not the fruit of Revelation: it is *probability* , the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, not truth, the fruit of the Tree of Life. Perhaps what distinguishes the new Dionysian is then letting go of this reservation, and taking this probability (the the world be the will to power and nothing besides) to be the truth until we hit a wall in that darkness.

              • perpetualburn52
                The father then being the true world , I take it. But positivism does not stop at abolishing the true world , but goes on to abolish the apparent world
                Message 7 of 22 , Feb 17, 2010
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                  "
                  The 'father' then being the 'true world', I take it. But positivism does not
                  stop at abolishing the 'true world', but goes on to abolish the 'apparent world'
                  as well. If 'mystical union' is the union with the true world, then this
                  positivistic reasoning leads, to speak with a passage from the Nachlass, to the
                  mystical condition: for the 'apparent' world, being thenceforth understood to be
                  the *only* world, is thenceforth understood to be the *true* world---the only
                  reservation being that the fruit of Reason is not the fruit of Revelation: it is
                  *probability*, the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, not truth, the fruit of the
                  Tree of Life. Perhaps what distinguishes the new Dionysian is then letting go of
                  this reservation, and taking this probability (the the world be the will to
                  power and nothing besides) to be the truth until we hit a wall in that darkness."


                  "I *do* recommend studying Moody to those to whom he appeals. He's certainly had
                  a great impact on *my* life. But though I won't say "never", at the moment I'm
                  driven to study others instead. Seeking *probable* truth by scientific method,
                  not seeking believed *certain* truth by *mystical* methods: that is what I do."



                  Do you see "taking this probability... to be the truth until we hit a wall" to be related to Nietzsche's sense of "solace" or "consolation?"

                  The moment of letting go(or maybe "letting be") of reservations being the "moment" of consolation. One is then intoxicated once again by the mystical in the midst of the scientific method while never actually being "certain" of the inspiration... I suppose it's more of an intoxication with life.. life convincing us to give back by way of the scientific method(which is an expression of WTP/life)... but inspiration never becomes religious.
                • Sauwelios
                  ... The distinction between solace and consolation was made by Moody in my thread on The Consolations of Nietzsche s Philosophy,
                  Message 8 of 22 , Feb 18, 2010
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                    --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "perpetualburn52" <perpetualburn52@...> wrote:
                    >
                    > "
                    > The 'father' then being the 'true world', I take it. But positivism does not
                    > stop at abolishing the 'true world', but goes on to abolish the 'apparent world'
                    > as well. If 'mystical union' is the union with the true world, then this
                    > positivistic reasoning leads, to speak with a passage from the Nachlass, to the
                    > mystical condition: for the 'apparent' world, being thenceforth understood to be
                    > the *only* world, is thenceforth understood to be the *true* world---the only
                    > reservation being that the fruit of Reason is not the fruit of Revelation: it is
                    > *probability*, the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, not truth, the fruit of the
                    > Tree of Life. Perhaps what distinguishes the new Dionysian is then letting go of
                    > this reservation, and taking this probability (the the world be the will to
                    > power and nothing besides) to be the truth until we hit a wall in that darkness."
                    >
                    >
                    > "I *do* recommend studying Moody to those to whom he appeals. He's certainly had
                    > a great impact on *my* life. But though I won't say "never", at the moment I'm
                    > driven to study others instead. Seeking *probable* truth by scientific method,
                    > not seeking believed *certain* truth by *mystical* methods: that is what I do."
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Do you see "taking this probability... to be the truth until we hit a wall" to be related to Nietzsche's sense of "solace" or "consolation?"
                    >

                    The distinction between solace and consolation was made by Moody in my thread on The Consolations of Nietzsche's Philosophy, http://nietzsche.21.forumer.com/viewtopic.php?t=51 .I was just talking about *Trost* (the German word Nietzsche uses). Likewise, I was not talking of the word "superstition" above, but of the word Nietzsche uses, *Aberglaube*, which in my reading has no connotation of something 'standing above' one. To be honest, some etymologists relate the "aber" part with *über*, "over or above", cognate with *super*; however, I think it should rather be compared with *Aberwitz*, "folly" in the sense of a wit that is *off*: Aberglaube as a belief that is off, way off---as opposed to justified true belief. Having said that, this 'justified true belief' was usually the *Christian faith*, which we Nietzscheans neither consider justified nor true, of course. In fact, we'd sooner call it *true* than justified, because it may still be true, for all we know. This is what I meant by "until we hit a wall in that darkness": I do not think we will hit such a wall (after all, I think it's *probably* true that the world is the will to power and nothing besides), but I think we should be so wise as to know that we know nothing, and to come out for it. For we must distinguish ourselves from the dogmatists. We are not self-proclaimed sages. We're self-proclaimed philosophers.

                    The consolations of Nietzsche's philosophy are basically two: 1) that the world is probably the will to power, and nothing besides; 2) that the world as will-to-power will probably never cease, and will possibly even 'loop'.


                    > The moment of letting go(or maybe "letting be") of reservations being the "moment" of consolation. One is then intoxicated once again by the mystical in the midst of the scientific method while never actually being "certain" of the inspiration... I suppose it's more of an intoxication with life.. life convincing us to give back by way of the scientific method(which is an expression of WTP/life)... but inspiration never becomes religious.
                    >

                    The thing is that 'in-spiration' comes from the body and the earth (i.e., the 'material' universe), not from a 'spiritual' plane above and beyond the body and the earth.
                  • sauwelios
                    ... I am reminded of William Blake: I [Blake] asked: does a firm perswasion that a thing is so, make it so? He [the prophet Isaiah] replied: All poets
                    Message 9 of 22 , Apr 17, 2010
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                      --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" <moodylawless@...> wrote: [snipped]
                      >
                      >
                      > This mysterious correspondent has certainly imbibed from my well.
                      >
                      > As s/he has not replied, I think I understand their argument enough to
                      > add some thoughts and encouragement.
                      >
                      > Note that Nietzsche describes his view of poetic inspiration as
                      > belonging to 'strong ages'.
                      >
                      > That alone shows his affirmation of the position.
                      >

                      I am reminded of William Blake:

                      "I [Blake] asked: 'does a firm perswasion that a thing is so, make it so?'
                      He [the prophet Isaiah] replied: 'All poets believe that it does, & in ages of imagination this firm perswasion removed mountains; but many are not capable of a firm perswasion of any thing.'"
                      (Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell.)

                      Around the same time at which he wrote his description of what poets of strong ages called "inspiration", Nietzsche wrote:

                      "That faith makes blessed under certain circumstances, that blessedness does not make of a fixed idea a *true* idea, that faith moves no mountains but *puts* mountains where there are none: a quick walk through a *madhouse* enlightens one sufficiently about this."
                      (AC 51.)


                      > I would like to invite this person [and other refugees from the 'mad
                      > god'], if I may, to look at my new Yahoo Group [ON-E] the Order of
                      > Nietzsche-England;
                      >
                      > http://uk.groups.yahoo.com/group/ON-E/
                      > <http://uk.groups.yahoo.com/group/ON-E/>
                      >
                      > This will focus on the other side of the coin - the
                      > religio-mystic-spiritual Nietzsche:
                      >
                      > The Nietzsche of the Wagner period, the Nietzsche of Zarathustra and of
                      > the late works.
                      >
                      > In a word, the Dionysian Nietzsche.
                      >

                      My focus is of course on the *philosophical* Nietzsche... And the position of the philosophical Nietzsche (henceforth simply "Nietzsche") is that philosophy shall rule religion, not vice versa. It shall be above Dionysus even. In fact, Dionysus, according to Nietzsche, is a philosophising god. Even He does not know the answer to the question, "Why is there something at all, and not rather nothing?".

                      In Cox's excellent *Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation*, which I'm reading at the moment, Nietzsche is quoted:

                      "One sort of honesty [*Redlichkeit*] has been alien to all founders of religions and their kind:---they have never made their experiences a matter of conscience for knowledge. "What have I actually experienced? What happened in me and around me at that time? Was my reason bright enough? Was my will opposed to all deceits [*Betrügereien*] of the senses and bold in resisting the fantastic?---none of them has asked such questions, nor do any of our dear religious people ask them even now: rather, they thirst after things that are *contrary to reason*, and they do not wish to make it too hard for themselves to satisfy it,---so they experience "miracles" and "rebirths" and hear the voices of little angels! But we, we others who thirst after reason, are determined to scrutinize our experiences as severely as a scientific experiment, hour after hour, day after day. We ourselves wish to be our own experimenters and guinea pigs. (GS 319)"
                      (Cox, page 41.)
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