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The Alpha of Nietzsche's Philosophy.

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  • Sauwelios
    When I created this Group, I thought the great human being---under whatever monicker, whether genius or Overman ---was the Alpha and Omega of Nietzsche s
    Message 1 of 22 , Jan 20, 2010
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      When I created this Group, I thought the great human being---under whatever monicker, whether "genius" or "Overman"---was the Alpha and Omega of Nietzsche's thought. I no longer think he is the Alpha, however: *chronologically* perhaps, but not structurally. I now think, and have thought for some time, that the *will to power* is the Alpha of Nietzsche's philosophy. The Overman remains the Omega---understood as the man who wants the eternal recurrence. But the will to power is the *archê*. If this world would be something else, e.g., *the prevailing of Good over Evil* and nothing besides, then the eternal recurrence, and thereby the Overman, would have a totally different value (seen from a Nietzschean, i.e., an *'evil'*, perspective).

      The will-to-power teaching is the key to the victory of master morality over herd morality---in other words, the key to the *revaluation of all values*, which is basically a conceiving-anew of the world as will-to-power and nothing besides.

      The most valuable discussion I have had on my forum site, The Nietzsche Pyramid, was a discussion with *Moody Lawless*, who is also a member of this group. It was held in the "Far Advanced Nietzsche Forum", however, so it is only visible to members with the rank of at least 'Adept'. My idea was that 'Adepts' would discuss the discussion between 'Masters' (such as Moody and I) in the "Advanced Nietzsche Forum", and that 'Learners' could then discuss those discussion in the "Basic Nietzsche Forum". That hasn't happened yet, though in almost every case (with the exception of a few nut-cases) I raised people I knew to the rank of Adept.

      Anyway, the discussion. The discussion in question followed from Moody's opening post, which read in full:

      "Does *Perspectivism* rule out *the will to power* in Nietzsche's philosophy?
      Give reasons either way."

      In my most important contribution to that discussion, I (who thought, and still think, that the answer to Moody's question is a resounding "No; to the contrary") quoted *WP* 566-69, and wrote about the latter:

      "Could it be, Moody, that by what was formerly called "the apparent world", you understand "the adapted world which we feel to be real"; whereas by your 'beyond the true and the apparent world', you understand "the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations"? Then there are *two* "apparent" worlds, one known to (namely, adapted by) us, and one unknown and unknowable to us (unadapted by us). And then perhaps the adapted world is Apollinian, and the formless world Dionysian?"

      I came back to this post due to my very recently begun study of *Ernst Mach* (the one from the sound barriers). For thanks to a Mr. Nadeem Hussain, I have come to see that certain problematical passages from Nietzsche's works (e.g., *BGE* 15 and *TI* 'Reason' 2) can be explained with the help of Mach.

      Rereading *WP* 569 from a Machian perspective, then, I found in it *another argument for the will-to-power teaching*:

      "4. questions, what things "in-themselves" may be like, apart from our sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be rebutted with the question: how could we know *that things exist*? "Thingness" was first created by us. The question is whether there could not be many other ways of creating such an *apparent* world---and whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying is not itself the best-guaranteed *reality*: in short, whether that which "posits things" is not the sole reality; and whether the "effect of the external world upon us" is not also the result of such active subjects... The other "entities" act upon us; our *adapted* apparent world is an adaptation and *overpowering* of their actions; a kind of *defensive* measure."

      This is an entire paragraph in the manuscript: what follows, the end of the section, is a new paragraph.

      Our way of creating 'thingness' ("the activity of our understanding") is a way of creating an apparent world; but there may be *many* ways of creating such a world---many ways of logicising, adapting, falsifying "the chaos of sensations" (ibid.) into a workable form.

      The activity of our understanding, the logicising, adapting, falsifying by means of which we create our 'world' (our world of 'things') is, to speak with Leo Strauss (see this group's Description) "an act of the will-to-power". And there may be many *other* ways of thusly "*overpowering*" "other 'entities'"! Compare *BGE* 36:

      "Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our world of desires and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other "reality" besides the reality of our drives---for thinking is merely a relations of these drives to each other---: is it not permitted to make the experiment and to ask the question whether this 'given' would not be *sufficient* for also understanding on the basis of this kind of thing the so-called mechanistic (or "material") world? I, mean, not as a deception, as "mere appearance," an "idea" (in the sense of Berkeley and Schopenhauer) but as holding the same rank of reality as our affect---as a more primitive form of the world of affects[?]"

      The so-called mechanistic world understood as a more primitive form of "that which 'posits things'"---i.e., of the *will to power*...
    • Sauwelios
      I forgot to mention my most telling discovery regarding *WP* 569. Before I mention it, however, let me first qualify my remark about the manuscript. I have not
      Message 2 of 22 , Jan 20, 2010
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        I forgot to mention my most telling discovery regarding *WP* 569. Before I mention it, however, let me first qualify my remark about the manuscript. I have not studied the manuscript itself. I base my claim on the German edition I have (Kröner 1996. I also tend to follow that edition's punctuation, as opposed to Kaufmann's, who as Harry Neumann put it "often substitutes gentle liberal democratic question marks or periods for Nietzsche's desperate, protofascist exclamation points.")

        Now in that edition, the phrase rendered by Kaufmann as "active subjects" is *wollenden Subjekte*, "willing subjects" in the sense of "subjects that *will*" (i.e., not in the sense that a woman can be 'willing' to have sex with you---which would be passive, weak-willed: hence Kaufmann's choice of the word "active")...


        --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@...> wrote:
        >
        > When I created this Group, I thought the great human being---under whatever monicker, whether "genius" or "Overman"---was the Alpha and Omega of Nietzsche's thought. I no longer think he is the Alpha, however: *chronologically* perhaps, but not structurally. I now think, and have thought for some time, that the *will to power* is the Alpha of Nietzsche's philosophy. The Overman remains the Omega---understood as the man who wants the eternal recurrence. But the will to power is the *archê*. If this world would be something else, e.g., *the prevailing of Good over Evil* and nothing besides, then the eternal recurrence, and thereby the Overman, would have a totally different value (seen from a Nietzschean, i.e., an *'evil'*, perspective).
        >
        > The will-to-power teaching is the key to the victory of master morality over herd morality---in other words, the key to the *revaluation of all values*, which is basically a conceiving-anew of the world as will-to-power and nothing besides.
        >
        > The most valuable discussion I have had on my forum site, The Nietzsche Pyramid, was a discussion with *Moody Lawless*, who is also a member of this group. It was held in the "Far Advanced Nietzsche Forum", however, so it is only visible to members with the rank of at least 'Adept'. My idea was that 'Adepts' would discuss the discussion between 'Masters' (such as Moody and I) in the "Advanced Nietzsche Forum", and that 'Learners' could then discuss those discussion in the "Basic Nietzsche Forum". That hasn't happened yet, though in almost every case (with the exception of a few nut-cases) I raised people I knew to the rank of Adept.
        >
        > Anyway, the discussion. The discussion in question followed from Moody's opening post, which read in full:
        >
        > "Does *Perspectivism* rule out *the will to power* in Nietzsche's philosophy?
        > Give reasons either way."
        >
        > In my most important contribution to that discussion, I (who thought, and still think, that the answer to Moody's question is a resounding "No; to the contrary") quoted *WP* 566-69, and wrote about the latter:
        >
        > "Could it be, Moody, that by what was formerly called "the apparent world", you understand "the adapted world which we feel to be real"; whereas by your 'beyond the true and the apparent world', you understand "the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations"? Then there are *two* "apparent" worlds, one known to (namely, adapted by) us, and one unknown and unknowable to us (unadapted by us). And then perhaps the adapted world is Apollinian, and the formless world Dionysian?"
        >
        > I came back to this post due to my very recently begun study of *Ernst Mach* (the one from the sound barriers). For thanks to a Mr. Nadeem Hussain, I have come to see that certain problematical passages from Nietzsche's works (e.g., *BGE* 15 and *TI* 'Reason' 2) can be explained with the help of Mach.
        >
        > Rereading *WP* 569 from a Machian perspective, then, I found in it *another argument for the will-to-power teaching*:
        >
        > "4. questions, what things "in-themselves" may be like, apart from our sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be rebutted with the question: how could we know *that things exist*? "Thingness" was first created by us. The question is whether there could not be many other ways of creating such an *apparent* world---and whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying is not itself the best-guaranteed *reality*: in short, whether that which "posits things" is not the sole reality; and whether the "effect of the external world upon us" is not also the result of such active subjects... The other "entities" act upon us; our *adapted* apparent world is an adaptation and *overpowering* of their actions; a kind of *defensive* measure."
        >
        > This is an entire paragraph in the manuscript: what follows, the end of the section, is a new paragraph.
        >
        > Our way of creating 'thingness' ("the activity of our understanding") is a way of creating an apparent world; but there may be *many* ways of creating such a world---many ways of logicising, adapting, falsifying "the chaos of sensations" (ibid.) into a workable form.
        >
        > The activity of our understanding, the logicising, adapting, falsifying by means of which we create our 'world' (our world of 'things') is, to speak with Leo Strauss (see this group's Description) "an act of the will-to-power". And there may be many *other* ways of thusly "*overpowering*" "other 'entities'"! Compare *BGE* 36:
        >
        > "Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our world of desires and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other "reality" besides the reality of our drives---for thinking is merely a relations of these drives to each other---: is it not permitted to make the experiment and to ask the question whether this 'given' would not be *sufficient* for also understanding on the basis of this kind of thing the so-called mechanistic (or "material") world? I, mean, not as a deception, as "mere appearance," an "idea" (in the sense of Berkeley and Schopenhauer) but as holding the same rank of reality as our affect---as a more primitive form of the world of affects[?]"
        >
        > The so-called mechanistic world understood as a more primitive form of "that which 'posits things'"---i.e., of the *will to power*...
        >
      • Sauwelios
        In *TSZ*, the Overman is the Alpha (taught already in the Prologue), the Eternal Recurrence the Omega ( officially embraced in the final seven of the book s
        Message 3 of 22 , Jan 24, 2010
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          In *TSZ*, the Overman is the Alpha (taught already in the Prologue), the Eternal Recurrence the Omega ('officially' embraced in the final seven of the book's sixty-six chapters (counting "The Seven Seals" as seven chapters)), and the Will to Power is the Mu or Nu (discovered in the thirty-third chapter and presented to the "wisest" in the thirthy-fourth). (Part IV of *TSZ* is not part of the book as Nietzsche intended it to be published, but is an "interlude".)

          --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@...> wrote:
          >
          > I forgot to mention my most telling discovery regarding *WP* 569. Before I mention it, however, let me first qualify my remark about the manuscript. I have not studied the manuscript itself. I base my claim on the German edition I have (Kröner 1996. I also tend to follow that edition's punctuation, as opposed to Kaufmann's, who as Harry Neumann put it "often substitutes gentle liberal democratic question marks or periods for Nietzsche's desperate, protofascist exclamation points.")
          >
          > Now in that edition, the phrase rendered by Kaufmann as "active subjects" is *wollenden Subjekte*, "willing subjects" in the sense of "subjects that *will*" (i.e., not in the sense that a woman can be 'willing' to have sex with you---which would be passive, weak-willed: hence Kaufmann's choice of the word "active")...
          >
          >
          > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@> wrote:
          > >
          > > When I created this Group, I thought the great human being---under whatever monicker, whether "genius" or "Overman"---was the Alpha and Omega of Nietzsche's thought. I no longer think he is the Alpha, however: *chronologically* perhaps, but not structurally. I now think, and have thought for some time, that the *will to power* is the Alpha of Nietzsche's philosophy. The Overman remains the Omega---understood as the man who wants the eternal recurrence. But the will to power is the *archê*. If this world would be something else, e.g., *the prevailing of Good over Evil* and nothing besides, then the eternal recurrence, and thereby the Overman, would have a totally different value (seen from a Nietzschean, i.e., an *'evil'*, perspective).
          > >
          > > The will-to-power teaching is the key to the victory of master morality over herd morality---in other words, the key to the *revaluation of all values*, which is basically a conceiving-anew of the world as will-to-power and nothing besides.
          > >
          > > The most valuable discussion I have had on my forum site, The Nietzsche Pyramid, was a discussion with *Moody Lawless*, who is also a member of this group. It was held in the "Far Advanced Nietzsche Forum", however, so it is only visible to members with the rank of at least 'Adept'. My idea was that 'Adepts' would discuss the discussion between 'Masters' (such as Moody and I) in the "Advanced Nietzsche Forum", and that 'Learners' could then discuss those discussion in the "Basic Nietzsche Forum". That hasn't happened yet, though in almost every case (with the exception of a few nut-cases) I raised people I knew to the rank of Adept.
          > >
          > > Anyway, the discussion. The discussion in question followed from Moody's opening post, which read in full:
          > >
          > > "Does *Perspectivism* rule out *the will to power* in Nietzsche's philosophy?
          > > Give reasons either way."
          > >
          > > In my most important contribution to that discussion, I (who thought, and still think, that the answer to Moody's question is a resounding "No; to the contrary") quoted *WP* 566-69, and wrote about the latter:
          > >
          > > "Could it be, Moody, that by what was formerly called "the apparent world", you understand "the adapted world which we feel to be real"; whereas by your 'beyond the true and the apparent world', you understand "the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations"? Then there are *two* "apparent" worlds, one known to (namely, adapted by) us, and one unknown and unknowable to us (unadapted by us). And then perhaps the adapted world is Apollinian, and the formless world Dionysian?"
          > >
          > > I came back to this post due to my very recently begun study of *Ernst Mach* (the one from the sound barriers). For thanks to a Mr. Nadeem Hussain, I have come to see that certain problematical passages from Nietzsche's works (e.g., *BGE* 15 and *TI* 'Reason' 2) can be explained with the help of Mach.
          > >
          > > Rereading *WP* 569 from a Machian perspective, then, I found in it *another argument for the will-to-power teaching*:
          > >
          > > "4. questions, what things "in-themselves" may be like, apart from our sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be rebutted with the question: how could we know *that things exist*? "Thingness" was first created by us. The question is whether there could not be many other ways of creating such an *apparent* world---and whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying is not itself the best-guaranteed *reality*: in short, whether that which "posits things" is not the sole reality; and whether the "effect of the external world upon us" is not also the result of such active subjects... The other "entities" act upon us; our *adapted* apparent world is an adaptation and *overpowering* of their actions; a kind of *defensive* measure."
          > >
          > > This is an entire paragraph in the manuscript: what follows, the end of the section, is a new paragraph.
          > >
          > > Our way of creating 'thingness' ("the activity of our understanding") is a way of creating an apparent world; but there may be *many* ways of creating such a world---many ways of logicising, adapting, falsifying "the chaos of sensations" (ibid.) into a workable form.
          > >
          > > The activity of our understanding, the logicising, adapting, falsifying by means of which we create our 'world' (our world of 'things') is, to speak with Leo Strauss (see this group's Description) "an act of the will-to-power". And there may be many *other* ways of thusly "*overpowering*" "other 'entities'"! Compare *BGE* 36:
          > >
          > > "Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our world of desires and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other "reality" besides the reality of our drives---for thinking is merely a relations of these drives to each other---: is it not permitted to make the experiment and to ask the question whether this 'given' would not be *sufficient* for also understanding on the basis of this kind of thing the so-called mechanistic (or "material") world? I, mean, not as a deception, as "mere appearance," an "idea" (in the sense of Berkeley and Schopenhauer) but as holding the same rank of reality as our affect---as a more primitive form of the world of affects[?]"
          > >
          > > The so-called mechanistic world understood as a more primitive form of "that which 'posits things'"---i.e., of the *will to power*...
          > >
          >
        • Moody
          Thanks for raising this again. For me, a Perspective [P] always suggests that there is something else besides the P. There must be other Ps, just as there
          Message 4 of 22 , Jan 26, 2010
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            Thanks for raising this again.

            For me, a Perspective [P] always suggests that there is 'something else besides' the P.

            There must be other Ps, just as there must be the ability to alter/adjust/reverse, etc.,  Ps.

            The world then exceeds a single P which latter could just be a 'narrow chink'; as Blake says:

             "If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would appear to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things through narrow chinks of his cavern."

            So a P always suggests a part-icular and part-ial view-point.

            An arche though has more in common with Blake's 'infinite everything'. It says that this, and only this, is the world, "and nothing else besides." In other words, it is the totality of which partial view-points can be made, but which cannot be encompassed by such Ps.

            If that is so, then can an arche be known purely by Perspectival seeing? No, because by definition P is a narrow chink and cannot view the infinite everything.

            An arche cannot be known by Per-spective; it requires - at the very least - a Pan-spective, or an Omni-spective.

            So if "the world is will to power and nothing else besides", as Nietzsche says it is, then this cannot be known by Perspectivism.

            Of course, if the will to power is not an arche, but merely a P, then the will to power cannot be the infinite everything, the world and nothing else besides. But my question involves the assumption that the will to power is an arche.

            So by this line of argument, the will to power and P are not resolvable.

             


            --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@...> wrote:
            The discussion in question followed from Moody's opening post, which read in full:
            >
            > "Does *Perspectivism* rule out *the will to power* in Nietzsche's philosophy?
            > Give reasons either way."
            >
            > In my most important contribution to that discussion, I (who thought, and still think, that the answer to Moody's question is a resounding "No; to the contrary") quoted *WP* 566-69, and wrote about the latter:
            >
            > "Could it be, Moody, that by what was formerly called "the apparent world", you understand "the adapted world which we feel to be real"; whereas by your 'beyond the true and the apparent world', you understand "the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations"? Then there are *two* "apparent" worlds, one known to (namely, adapted by) us, and one unknown and unknowable to us (unadapted by us). And then perhaps the adapted world is Apollinian, and the formless world Dionysian?"
            >
            > I came back to this post due to my very recently begun study of *Ernst Mach* (the one from the sound barriers). For thanks to a Mr. Nadeem Hussain, I have come to see that certain problematical passages from Nietzsche's works (e.g., *BGE* 15 and *TI* 'Reason' 2) can be explained with the help of Mach.
            >
            > Rereading *WP* 569 from a Machian perspective, then, I found in it *another argument for the will-to-power teaching*:
            >
            > "4. questions, what things "in-themselves" may be like, apart from our sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be rebutted with the question: how could we know *that things exist*? "Thingness" was first created by us. The question is whether there could not be many other ways of creating such an *apparent* world---and whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying is not itself the best-guaranteed *reality*: in short, whether that which "posits things" is not the sole reality; and whether the "effect of the external world upon us" is not also the result of such active subjects... The other "entities" act upon us; our *adapted* apparent world is an adaptation and *overpowering* of their actions; a kind of *defensive* measure."
            >
            > This is an entire paragraph in the manuscript: what follows, the end of the section, is a new paragraph.
            >
            > Our way of creating 'thingness' ("the activity of our understanding") is a way of creating an apparent world; but there may be *many* ways of creating such a world---many ways of logicising, adapting, falsifying "the chaos of sensations" (ibid.) into a workable form.
            >
            > The activity of our understanding, the logicising, adapting, falsifying by means of which we create our 'world' (our world of 'things') is, to speak with Leo Strauss (see this group's Description) "an act of the will-to-power". And there may be many *other* ways of thusly "*overpowering*" "other 'entities'"! Compare *BGE* 36:
            >
            > "Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our world of desires and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other "reality" besides the reality of our drives---for thinking is merely a relations of these drives to each other---: is it not permitted to make the experiment and to ask the question whether this 'given' would not be *sufficient* for also understanding on the basis of this kind of thing the so-called mechanistic (or "material") world? I, mean, not as a deception, as "mere appearance," an "idea" (in the sense of Berkeley and Schopenhauer) but as holding the same rank of reality as our affect---as a more primitive form of the world of affects[?]"
            >
            > The so-called mechanistic world understood as a more primitive form of "that which 'posits things'"---i.e., of the *will to power*...
            >

          • Sauwelios
            I agree, but I think what you say about archai only applies to *dogmatic* archê-claims. As Lampert emphasises (see the new Group Description), the
            Message 5 of 22 , Jan 26, 2010
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              I agree, but I think what you say about archai only applies to *dogmatic* archê-claims. As Lampert emphasises (see the new Group Description), the (hypo)thesis that the world be the will to power and nothing besides remains a self-proclaimed *claim*: it does not claim certainty, but appeals to scientific method in general and Occam's Razor in particular to present itself as the supreme interpretation.

              --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" <moodylawless@...> wrote:
              >
              >
              > Thanks for raising this again.
              >
              > For me, a Perspective [P] always suggests that there is 'something else
              > besides' the P.
              >
              > There must be other Ps, just as there must be the ability to
              > alter/adjust/reverse, etc., Ps.
              >
              > The world then exceeds a single P which latter could just be a 'narrow
              > chink'; as Blake says:
              >
              > "If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would appear
              > to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed himself up, till he sees
              > all things through narrow chinks of his cavern."
              >
              > So a P always suggests a part-icular and part-ial view-point.
              >
              > An arche though has more in common with Blake's 'infinite everything'.
              > It says that this, and only this, is the world, "and nothing else
              > besides." In other words, it is the totality of which partial
              > view-points can be made, but which cannot be encompassed by such Ps.
              >
              > If that is so, then can an arche be known purely by Perspectival seeing?
              > No, because by definition P is a narrow chink and cannot view the
              > infinite everything.
              >
              > An arche cannot be known by Per-spective; it requires - at the very
              > least - a Pan-spective, or an Omni-spective.
              >
              > So if "the world is will to power and nothing else besides", as
              > Nietzsche says it is, then this cannot be known by Perspectivism.
              >
              > Of course, if the will to power is not an arche, but merely a P, then
              > the will to power cannot be the infinite everything, the world and
              > nothing else besides. But my question involves the assumption that the
              > will to power is an arche.
              >
              > So by this line of argument, the will to power and P are not resolvable.
              >
              >
              >
              >
              > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
              > wrote:
              > The discussion in question followed from Moody's opening post, which
              > read in full:
              > >
              > > "Does *Perspectivism* rule out *the will to power* in Nietzsche's
              > philosophy?
              > > Give reasons either way."
              > >
              > > In my most important contribution to that discussion, I (who thought,
              > and still think, that the answer to Moody's question is a resounding
              > "No; to the contrary") quoted *WP* 566-69, and wrote about the latter:
              > >
              > > "Could it be, Moody, that by what was formerly called "the apparent
              > world", you understand "the adapted world which we feel to be real";
              > whereas by your 'beyond the true and the apparent world', you understand
              > "the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations"? Then there
              > are *two* "apparent" worlds, one known to (namely, adapted by) us, and
              > one unknown and unknowable to us (unadapted by us). And then perhaps the
              > adapted world is Apollinian, and the formless world Dionysian?"
              > >
              > > I came back to this post due to my very recently begun study of *Ernst
              > Mach* (the one from the sound barriers). For thanks to a Mr. Nadeem
              > Hussain, I have come to see that certain problematical passages from
              > Nietzsche's works (e.g., *BGE* 15 and *TI* 'Reason' 2) can be explained
              > with the help of Mach.
              > >
              > > Rereading *WP* 569 from a Machian perspective, then, I found in it
              > *another argument for the will-to-power teaching*:
              > >
              > > "4. questions, what things "in-themselves" may be like, apart from our
              > sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be
              > rebutted with the question: how could we know *that things exist*?
              > "Thingness" was first created by us. The question is whether there could
              > not be many other ways of creating such an *apparent* world---and
              > whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying is not itself
              > the best-guaranteed *reality*: in short, whether that which "posits
              > things" is not the sole reality; and whether the "effect of the external
              > world upon us" is not also the result of such active subjects... The
              > other "entities" act upon us; our *adapted* apparent world is an
              > adaptation and *overpowering* of their actions; a kind of *defensive*
              > measure."
              > >
              > > This is an entire paragraph in the manuscript: what follows, the end
              > of the section, is a new paragraph.
              > >
              > > Our way of creating 'thingness' ("the activity of our understanding")
              > is a way of creating an apparent world; but there may be *many* ways of
              > creating such a world---many ways of logicising, adapting, falsifying
              > "the chaos of sensations" (ibid.) into a workable form.
              > >
              > > The activity of our understanding, the logicising, adapting,
              > falsifying by means of which we create our 'world' (our world of
              > 'things') is, to speak with Leo Strauss (see this group's Description)
              > "an act of the will-to-power". And there may be many *other* ways of
              > thusly "*overpowering*" "other 'entities'"! Compare *BGE* 36:
              > >
              > > "Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our world of desires
              > and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other "reality"
              > besides the reality of our drives---for thinking is merely a relations
              > of these drives to each other---: is it not permitted to make the
              > experiment and to ask the question whether this 'given' would not be
              > *sufficient* for also understanding on the basis of this kind of thing
              > the so-called mechanistic (or "material") world? I, mean, not as a
              > deception, as "mere appearance," an "idea" (in the sense of Berkeley and
              > Schopenhauer) but as holding the same rank of reality as our affect---as
              > a more primitive form of the world of affects[?]"
              > >
              > > The so-called mechanistic world understood as a more primitive form of
              > "that which 'posits things'"---i.e., of the *will to power*...
              > >
              >
            • Moody
              Even if the claim that the world is will to power and nothing else besides is considered to be an undogmatic, uncertain hypothesis, it still cannot be
              Message 6 of 22 , Jan 26, 2010
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                Even if the claim that "the world is will to power and nothing else besides"  is considered to be an undogmatic, uncertain hypothesis, it still cannot be considered a Perspectival claim for the reasons I state below.

                So the only way to get around this is to suggest that the will to power is a Perspectival claim - but this meets the objections I have already made.

                Therefore the problem  remains unresolvable in my view; - but then Nietzsche's philosophy is full of such contradictions.


                --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@...> wrote:
                >
                > I agree, but I think what you say about archai only applies to *dogmatic* archê-claims. As Lampert emphasises (see the new Group Description), the (hypo)thesis that the world be the will to power and nothing besides remains a self-proclaimed *claim*: it does not claim certainty, but appeals to scientific method in general and Occam's Razor in particular to present itself as the supreme interpretation.
                >
                > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@ wrote:
                > >
                > >
                > > Thanks for raising this again.
                > >
                > > For me, a Perspective [P] always suggests that there is 'something else
                > > besides' the P.
                > >
                > > There must be other Ps, just as there must be the ability to
                > > alter/adjust/reverse, etc., Ps.
                > >
                > > The world then exceeds a single P which latter could just be a 'narrow
                > > chink'; as Blake says:
                > >
                > > "If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would appear
                > > to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed himself up, till he sees
                > > all things through narrow chinks of his cavern."
                > >
                > > So a P always suggests a part-icular and part-ial view-point.
                > >
                > > An arche though has more in common with Blake's 'infinite everything'.
                > > It says that this, and only this, is the world, "and nothing else
                > > besides." In other words, it is the totality of which partial
                > > view-points can be made, but which cannot be encompassed by such Ps.
                > >
                > > If that is so, then can an arche be known purely by Perspectival seeing?
                > > No, because by definition P is a narrow chink and cannot view the
                > > infinite everything.
                > >
                > > An arche cannot be known by Per-spective; it requires - at the very
                > > least - a Pan-spective, or an Omni-spective.
                > >
                > > So if "the world is will to power and nothing else besides", as
                > > Nietzsche says it is, then this cannot be known by Perspectivism.
                > >
                > > Of course, if the will to power is not an arche, but merely a P, then
                > > the will to power cannot be the infinite everything, the world and
                > > nothing else besides. But my question involves the assumption that the
                > > will to power is an arche.
                > >
                > > So by this line of argument, the will to power and P are not resolvable.
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                > > wrote:
                > > The discussion in question followed from Moody's opening post, which
                > > read in full:
                > > >
                > > > "Does *Perspectivism* rule out *the will to power* in Nietzsche's
                > > philosophy?
                > > > Give reasons either way."
                > > >
                > > > In my most important contribution to that discussion, I (who thought,
                > > and still think, that the answer to Moody's question is a resounding
                > > "No; to the contrary") quoted *WP* 566-69, and wrote about the latter:
                > > >
                > > > "Could it be, Moody, that by what was formerly called "the apparent
                > > world", you understand "the adapted world which we feel to be real";
                > > whereas by your 'beyond the true and the apparent world', you understand
                > > "the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations"? Then there
                > > are *two* "apparent" worlds, one known to (namely, adapted by) us, and
                > > one unknown and unknowable to us (unadapted by us). And then perhaps the
                > > adapted world is Apollinian, and the formless world Dionysian?"
                > > >
                > > > I came back to this post due to my very recently begun study of *Ernst
                > > Mach* (the one from the sound barriers). For thanks to a Mr. Nadeem
                > > Hussain, I have come to see that certain problematical passages from
                > > Nietzsche's works (e.g., *BGE* 15 and *TI* 'Reason' 2) can be explained
                > > with the help of Mach.
                > > >
                > > > Rereading *WP* 569 from a Machian perspective, then, I found in it
                > > *another argument for the will-to-power teaching*:
                > > >
                > > > "4. questions, what things "in-themselves" may be like, apart from our
                > > sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be
                > > rebutted with the question: how could we know *that things exist*?
                > > "Thingness" was first created by us. The question is whether there could
                > > not be many other ways of creating such an *apparent* world---and
                > > whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying is not itself
                > > the best-guaranteed *reality*: in short, whether that which "posits
                > > things" is not the sole reality; and whether the "effect of the external
                > > world upon us" is not also the result of such active subjects... The
                > > other "entities" act upon us; our *adapted* apparent world is an
                > > adaptation and *overpowering* of their actions; a kind of *defensive*
                > > measure."
                > > >
                > > > This is an entire paragraph in the manuscript: what follows, the end
                > > of the section, is a new paragraph.
                > > >
                > > > Our way of creating 'thingness' ("the activity of our understanding")
                > > is a way of creating an apparent world; but there may be *many* ways of
                > > creating such a world---many ways of logicising, adapting, falsifying
                > > "the chaos of sensations" (ibid.) into a workable form.
                > > >
                > > > The activity of our understanding, the logicising, adapting,
                > > falsifying by means of which we create our 'world' (our world of
                > > 'things') is, to speak with Leo Strauss (see this group's Description)
                > > "an act of the will-to-power". And there may be many *other* ways of
                > > thusly "*overpowering*" "other 'entities'"! Compare *BGE* 36:
                > > >
                > > > "Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our world of desires
                > > and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other "reality"
                > > besides the reality of our drives---for thinking is merely a relations
                > > of these drives to each other---: is it not permitted to make the
                > > experiment and to ask the question whether this 'given' would not be
                > > *sufficient* for also understanding on the basis of this kind of thing
                > > the so-called mechanistic (or "material") world? I, mean, not as a
                > > deception, as "mere appearance," an "idea" (in the sense of Berkeley and
                > > Schopenhauer) but as holding the same rank of reality as our affect---as
                > > a more primitive form of the world of affects[?]"
                > > >
                > > > The so-called mechanistic world understood as a more primitive form of
                > > "that which 'posits things'"---i.e., of the *will to power*...
                > > >
                > >
                >

              • Sauwelios
                Frankly, I find such remarks about contradictions in Nietzsche s philosophy sledge-hammer arguments (and I don t think one can philosophise with a
                Message 7 of 22 , Jan 27, 2010
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                  Frankly, I find such remarks about contradictions in Nietzsche's philosophy sledge-hammer arguments (and I don't think one can philosophise with a sledge-hammer). Contrary to popular opinion, I don't think Nietzsche's philosophy's contradictory *at all* (he may contradict himself over time, or in the Nachlass, but not from any inconsistency). For years now, my approach to Nietzsche has been to resolve the seeming contradictions in his work, either by confirming their actual contradictoriness and rejecting, say, the less developed member of the 'equation', or by finding an explanation that may plausibly account for both at the same time.

                  I will now respond piece by piece to a passage from your previous post here.

                  "An arche cannot be known by Per-spective; it requires - at the very least - a Pan-spective, or an Omni-spective."

                  Yes. As I said, I agree with this. It cannot be *known* by P. But what distinguishes 'our' nineteenth century (Nietzsche's present) is not the victory of *science* (*scientia*, knowledge), but the victory of scientific *method over* science (*WP* 466). In my view, Nietzsche's will-to-power claim, rightly understood, makes no claim at *knowledge* but only at methodicality. What it does is: *given* that we cannot attain to a 'Pan-spective' or 'Omni-spective', but only have a Per-spective, it infers *methodologically* from that Per-spective to what is beyond its view: it postulates that beyond it, there is also nothing but such 'narrow chinks'.


                  "So if "the world is will to power and nothing else besides", as Nietzsche says it is, then this cannot be known by Perspectivism."

                  Right, it cannot be *known*, but then this claim, this formulation (from *WP* 1067), is only what the world looks like in Nietzsche's *'mirror'*, i.e., it's only his communication of his view.


                  "Of course, if the will to power is not an arche, but merely a P, then the will to power cannot be the infinite everything, the world and nothing else besides."

                  If it *is* not an arche. But we do not know that it is *nor that it isn't.* If the will to power is a P, that does not necessarily make it *merely* a P: it can still be the 'infinite everything'. There is no absolute difference from, say, a *Christian* claim: only a *relative* difference, a difference in *plausibility*. It is based only on one's own experience and reasoning, not on any *belief*, any 'revelation'.



                  --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" <moodylawless@...> wrote:
                  >
                  >
                  > Even if the claim that "the world is will to power and nothing else
                  > besides" is considered to be an undogmatic, uncertain hypothesis, it
                  > still cannot be considered a Perspectival claim for the reasons I state
                  > below.
                  >
                  > So the only way to get around this is to suggest that the will to power
                  > is a Perspectival claim - but this meets the objections I have already
                  > made.
                  >
                  > Therefore the problem remains unresolvable in my view; - but then
                  > Nietzsche's philosophy is full of such contradictions.
                  >
                  >
                  > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                  > wrote:
                  > >
                  > > I agree, but I think what you say about archai only applies to
                  > *dogmatic* archê-claims. As Lampert emphasises (see the new Group
                  > Description), the (hypo)thesis that the world be the will to power and
                  > nothing besides remains a self-proclaimed *claim*: it does not claim
                  > certainty, but appeals to scientific method in general and Occam's Razor
                  > in particular to present itself as the supreme interpretation.
                  > >
                  > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@ wrote:
                  > > >
                  > > >
                  > > > Thanks for raising this again.
                  > > >
                  > > > For me, a Perspective [P] always suggests that there is 'something
                  > else
                  > > > besides' the P.
                  > > >
                  > > > There must be other Ps, just as there must be the ability to
                  > > > alter/adjust/reverse, etc., Ps.
                  > > >
                  > > > The world then exceeds a single P which latter could just be a
                  > 'narrow
                  > > > chink'; as Blake says:
                  > > >
                  > > > "If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would appear
                  > > > to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed himself up, till he
                  > sees
                  > > > all things through narrow chinks of his cavern."
                  > > >
                  > > > So a P always suggests a part-icular and part-ial view-point.
                  > > >
                  > > > An arche though has more in common with Blake's 'infinite
                  > everything'.
                  > > > It says that this, and only this, is the world, "and nothing else
                  > > > besides." In other words, it is the totality of which partial
                  > > > view-points can be made, but which cannot be encompassed by such Ps.
                  > > >
                  > > > If that is so, then can an arche be known purely by Perspectival
                  > seeing?
                  > > > No, because by definition P is a narrow chink and cannot view the
                  > > > infinite everything.
                  > > >
                  > > > An arche cannot be known by Per-spective; it requires - at the very
                  > > > least - a Pan-spective, or an Omni-spective.
                  > > >
                  > > > So if "the world is will to power and nothing else besides", as
                  > > > Nietzsche says it is, then this cannot be known by Perspectivism.
                  > > >
                  > > > Of course, if the will to power is not an arche, but merely a P,
                  > then
                  > > > the will to power cannot be the infinite everything, the world and
                  > > > nothing else besides. But my question involves the assumption that
                  > the
                  > > > will to power is an arche.
                  > > >
                  > > > So by this line of argument, the will to power and P are not
                  > resolvable.
                  > > >
                  > > >
                  > > >
                  > > >
                  > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                  > > > wrote:
                  > > > The discussion in question followed from Moody's opening post, which
                  > > > read in full:
                  > > > >
                  > > > > "Does *Perspectivism* rule out *the will to power* in Nietzsche's
                  > > > philosophy?
                  > > > > Give reasons either way."
                  > > > >
                  > > > > In my most important contribution to that discussion, I (who
                  > thought,
                  > > > and still think, that the answer to Moody's question is a resounding
                  > > > "No; to the contrary") quoted *WP* 566-69, and wrote about the
                  > latter:
                  > > > >
                  > > > > "Could it be, Moody, that by what was formerly called "the
                  > apparent
                  > > > world", you understand "the adapted world which we feel to be real";
                  > > > whereas by your 'beyond the true and the apparent world', you
                  > understand
                  > > > "the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations"? Then
                  > there
                  > > > are *two* "apparent" worlds, one known to (namely, adapted by) us,
                  > and
                  > > > one unknown and unknowable to us (unadapted by us). And then perhaps
                  > the
                  > > > adapted world is Apollinian, and the formless world Dionysian?"
                  > > > >
                  > > > > I came back to this post due to my very recently begun study of
                  > *Ernst
                  > > > Mach* (the one from the sound barriers). For thanks to a Mr. Nadeem
                  > > > Hussain, I have come to see that certain problematical passages from
                  > > > Nietzsche's works (e.g., *BGE* 15 and *TI* 'Reason' 2) can be
                  > explained
                  > > > with the help of Mach.
                  > > > >
                  > > > > Rereading *WP* 569 from a Machian perspective, then, I found in it
                  > > > *another argument for the will-to-power teaching*:
                  > > > >
                  > > > > "4. questions, what things "in-themselves" may be like, apart from
                  > our
                  > > > sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be
                  > > > rebutted with the question: how could we know *that things exist*?
                  > > > "Thingness" was first created by us. The question is whether there
                  > could
                  > > > not be many other ways of creating such an *apparent* world---and
                  > > > whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying is not
                  > itself
                  > > > the best-guaranteed *reality*: in short, whether that which "posits
                  > > > things" is not the sole reality; and whether the "effect of the
                  > external
                  > > > world upon us" is not also the result of such active subjects... The
                  > > > other "entities" act upon us; our *adapted* apparent world is an
                  > > > adaptation and *overpowering* of their actions; a kind of
                  > *defensive*
                  > > > measure."
                  > > > >
                  > > > > This is an entire paragraph in the manuscript: what follows, the
                  > end
                  > > > of the section, is a new paragraph.
                  > > > >
                  > > > > Our way of creating 'thingness' ("the activity of our
                  > understanding")
                  > > > is a way of creating an apparent world; but there may be *many* ways
                  > of
                  > > > creating such a world---many ways of logicising, adapting,
                  > falsifying
                  > > > "the chaos of sensations" (ibid.) into a workable form.
                  > > > >
                  > > > > The activity of our understanding, the logicising, adapting,
                  > > > falsifying by means of which we create our 'world' (our world of
                  > > > 'things') is, to speak with Leo Strauss (see this group's
                  > Description)
                  > > > "an act of the will-to-power". And there may be many *other* ways of
                  > > > thusly "*overpowering*" "other 'entities'"! Compare *BGE* 36:
                  > > > >
                  > > > > "Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our world of
                  > desires
                  > > > and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other
                  > "reality"
                  > > > besides the reality of our drives---for thinking is merely a
                  > relations
                  > > > of these drives to each other---: is it not permitted to make the
                  > > > experiment and to ask the question whether this 'given' would not be
                  > > > *sufficient* for also understanding on the basis of this kind of
                  > thing
                  > > > the so-called mechanistic (or "material") world? I, mean, not as a
                  > > > deception, as "mere appearance," an "idea" (in the sense of Berkeley
                  > and
                  > > > Schopenhauer) but as holding the same rank of reality as our
                  > affect---as
                  > > > a more primitive form of the world of affects[?]"
                  > > > >
                  > > > > The so-called mechanistic world understood as a more primitive
                  > form of
                  > > > "that which 'posits things'"---i.e., of the *will to power*...
                  > > > >
                  > > >
                  > >
                  >
                • Moody
                  I think that Nietzsche actively phiolosophised via contradictions. This is not just apparent across the development of his work but even in single works - nay,
                  Message 8 of 22 , Jan 28, 2010
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                    I think that Nietzsche actively phiolosophised via contradictions.

                    This is not just apparent across the development of his work but even in single works - nay, in single sentences [I needn't quote examples at this level, surely?].

                    Indeed, the most unpopular interpretation of his thought [Bertram's Attempt at a Mythology] dwells on this very notion.

                    It is this very contradictionism that makes him the greatest philosopher of all time.

                    Most other philosophers have too often failed in trying to make themselves champions of Aristotle's 'Law of Non-Contradiction'.

                    To attempt to 'explain away' Nietzsche's mighty contradictory-nature reeks of systematisation.

                    Going back to the question. Nietzsche's Perspectivism is not the be-all and end-all of his philosophy. It is one of his experiments- attempts - in thought . And therefore must be thought in terms of what a P is - i.e. a particular and partial viewpoint.

                    P is by definition too limited to make arche-like claims.

                    Rather, the arche-like claim of the will to power suggests that there are other ways of knowing which are beyond Perspectives and are certainly beyond scientific method(s).

                    Indeed, there is a mystical [and therefore non-rational] element to Nietzsche's philosophy which was pointed out very early by his one time friend - and near intellectual equal, Lou von Salome.

                    It is here that non-P forms of knowing occur in Nietzsche's thought - forms of knowing which necessarily contradict P type knowledge.


                    --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@...> wrote:
                    >
                    > Frankly, I find such remarks about contradictions in Nietzsche's philosophy sledge-hammer arguments (and I don't think one can philosophise with a sledge-hammer). Contrary to popular opinion, I don't think Nietzsche's philosophy's contradictory *at all* (he may contradict himself over time, or in the Nachlass, but not from any inconsistency). For years now, my approach to Nietzsche has been to resolve the seeming contradictions in his work, either by confirming their actual contradictoriness and rejecting, say, the less developed member of the 'equation', or by finding an explanation that may plausibly account for both at the same time.
                    >
                    > I will now respond piece by piece to a passage from your previous post here.
                    >
                    > "An arche cannot be known by Per-spective; it requires - at the very least - a Pan-spective, or an Omni-spective."
                    >
                    > Yes. As I said, I agree with this. It cannot be *known* by P. But what distinguishes 'our' nineteenth century (Nietzsche's present) is not the victory of *science* (*scientia*, knowledge), but the victory of scientific *method over* science (*WP* 466). In my view, Nietzsche's will-to-power claim, rightly understood, makes no claim at *knowledge* but only at methodicality. What it does is: *given* that we cannot attain to a 'Pan-spective' or 'Omni-spective', but only have a Per-spective, it infers *methodologically* from that Per-spective to what is beyond its view: it postulates that beyond it, there is also nothing but such 'narrow chinks'.
                    >
                    >
                    > "So if "the world is will to power and nothing else besides", as Nietzsche says it is, then this cannot be known by Perspectivism."
                    >
                    > Right, it cannot be *known*, but then this claim, this formulation (from *WP* 1067), is only what the world looks like in Nietzsche's *'mirror'*, i.e., it's only his communication of his view.
                    >
                    >
                    > "Of course, if the will to power is not an arche, but merely a P, then the will to power cannot be the infinite everything, the world and nothing else besides."
                    >
                    > If it *is* not an arche. But we do not know that it is *nor that it isn't.* If the will to power is a P, that does not necessarily make it *merely* a P: it can still be the 'infinite everything'. There is no absolute difference from, say, a *Christian* claim: only a *relative* difference, a difference in *plausibility*. It is based only on one's own experience and reasoning, not on any *belief*, any 'revelation'.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@ wrote:
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > Even if the claim that "the world is will to power and nothing else
                    > > besides" is considered to be an undogmatic, uncertain hypothesis, it
                    > > still cannot be considered a Perspectival claim for the reasons I state
                    > > below.
                    > >
                    > > So the only way to get around this is to suggest that the will to power
                    > > is a Perspectival claim - but this meets the objections I have already
                    > > made.
                    > >
                    > > Therefore the problem remains unresolvable in my view; - but then
                    > > Nietzsche's philosophy is full of such contradictions.
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                    > > wrote:
                    > > >
                    > > > I agree, but I think what you say about archai only applies to
                    > > *dogmatic* archê-claims. As Lampert emphasises (see the new Group
                    > > Description), the (hypo)thesis that the world be the will to power and
                    > > nothing besides remains a self-proclaimed *claim*: it does not claim
                    > > certainty, but appeals to scientific method in general and Occam's Razor
                    > > in particular to present itself as the supreme interpretation.
                    > > >
                    > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@ wrote:
                    > > > >
                    > > > >
                    > > > > Thanks for raising this again.
                    > > > >
                    > > > > For me, a Perspective [P] always suggests that there is 'something
                    > > else
                    > > > > besides' the P.
                    > > > >
                    > > > > There must be other Ps, just as there must be the ability to
                    > > > > alter/adjust/reverse, etc., Ps.
                    > > > >
                    > > > > The world then exceeds a single P which latter could just be a
                    > > 'narrow
                    > > > > chink'; as Blake says:
                    > > > >
                    > > > > "If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would appear
                    > > > > to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed himself up, till he
                    > > sees
                    > > > > all things through narrow chinks of his cavern."
                    > > > >
                    > > > > So a P always suggests a part-icular and part-ial view-point.
                    > > > >
                    > > > > An arche though has more in common with Blake's 'infinite
                    > > everything'.
                    > > > > It says that this, and only this, is the world, "and nothing else
                    > > > > besides." In other words, it is the totality of which partial
                    > > > > view-points can be made, but which cannot be encompassed by such Ps.
                    > > > >
                    > > > > If that is so, then can an arche be known purely by Perspectival
                    > > seeing?
                    > > > > No, because by definition P is a narrow chink and cannot view the
                    > > > > infinite everything.
                    > > > >
                    > > > > An arche cannot be known by Per-spective; it requires - at the very
                    > > > > least - a Pan-spective, or an Omni-spective.
                    > > > >
                    > > > > So if "the world is will to power and nothing else besides", as
                    > > > > Nietzsche says it is, then this cannot be known by Perspectivism.
                    > > > >
                    > > > > Of course, if the will to power is not an arche, but merely a P,
                    > > then
                    > > > > the will to power cannot be the infinite everything, the world and
                    > > > > nothing else besides. But my question involves the assumption that
                    > > the
                    > > > > will to power is an arche.
                    > > > >
                    > > > > So by this line of argument, the will to power and P are not
                    > > resolvable.
                    > > > >
                    > > > >
                    > > > >
                    > > > >
                    > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                    > > > > wrote:
                    > > > > The discussion in question followed from Moody's opening post, which
                    > > > > read in full:
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > "Does *Perspectivism* rule out *the will to power* in Nietzsche's
                    > > > > philosophy?
                    > > > > > Give reasons either way."
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > In my most important contribution to that discussion, I (who
                    > > thought,
                    > > > > and still think, that the answer to Moody's question is a resounding
                    > > > > "No; to the contrary") quoted *WP* 566-69, and wrote about the
                    > > latter:
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > "Could it be, Moody, that by what was formerly called "the
                    > > apparent
                    > > > > world", you understand "the adapted world which we feel to be real";
                    > > > > whereas by your 'beyond the true and the apparent world', you
                    > > understand
                    > > > > "the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations"? Then
                    > > there
                    > > > > are *two* "apparent" worlds, one known to (namely, adapted by) us,
                    > > and
                    > > > > one unknown and unknowable to us (unadapted by us). And then perhaps
                    > > the
                    > > > > adapted world is Apollinian, and the formless world Dionysian?"
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > I came back to this post due to my very recently begun study of
                    > > *Ernst
                    > > > > Mach* (the one from the sound barriers). For thanks to a Mr. Nadeem
                    > > > > Hussain, I have come to see that certain problematical passages from
                    > > > > Nietzsche's works (e.g., *BGE* 15 and *TI* 'Reason' 2) can be
                    > > explained
                    > > > > with the help of Mach.
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > Rereading *WP* 569 from a Machian perspective, then, I found in it
                    > > > > *another argument for the will-to-power teaching*:
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > "4. questions, what things "in-themselves" may be like, apart from
                    > > our
                    > > > > sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be
                    > > > > rebutted with the question: how could we know *that things exist*?
                    > > > > "Thingness" was first created by us. The question is whether there
                    > > could
                    > > > > not be many other ways of creating such an *apparent* world---and
                    > > > > whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying is not
                    > > itself
                    > > > > the best-guaranteed *reality*: in short, whether that which "posits
                    > > > > things" is not the sole reality; and whether the "effect of the
                    > > external
                    > > > > world upon us" is not also the result of such active subjects... The
                    > > > > other "entities" act upon us; our *adapted* apparent world is an
                    > > > > adaptation and *overpowering* of their actions; a kind of
                    > > *defensive*
                    > > > > measure."
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > This is an entire paragraph in the manuscript: what follows, the
                    > > end
                    > > > > of the section, is a new paragraph.
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > Our way of creating 'thingness' ("the activity of our
                    > > understanding")
                    > > > > is a way of creating an apparent world; but there may be *many* ways
                    > > of
                    > > > > creating such a world---many ways of logicising, adapting,
                    > > falsifying
                    > > > > "the chaos of sensations" (ibid.) into a workable form.
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > The activity of our understanding, the logicising, adapting,
                    > > > > falsifying by means of which we create our 'world' (our world of
                    > > > > 'things') is, to speak with Leo Strauss (see this group's
                    > > Description)
                    > > > > "an act of the will-to-power". And there may be many *other* ways of
                    > > > > thusly "*overpowering*" "other 'entities'"! Compare *BGE* 36:
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > "Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our world of
                    > > desires
                    > > > > and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other
                    > > "reality"
                    > > > > besides the reality of our drives---for thinking is merely a
                    > > relations
                    > > > > of these drives to each other---: is it not permitted to make the
                    > > > > experiment and to ask the question whether this 'given' would not be
                    > > > > *sufficient* for also understanding on the basis of this kind of
                    > > thing
                    > > > > the so-called mechanistic (or "material") world? I, mean, not as a
                    > > > > deception, as "mere appearance," an "idea" (in the sense of Berkeley
                    > > and
                    > > > > Schopenhauer) but as holding the same rank of reality as our
                    > > affect---as
                    > > > > a more primitive form of the world of affects[?]"
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > The so-called mechanistic world understood as a more primitive
                    > > form of
                    > > > > "that which 'posits things'"---i.e., of the *will to power*...
                    > > > > >
                    > > > >
                    > > >
                    > >
                    >

                  • Sauwelios
                    My comments below. ... Yes, please do. For what is revealed ( apparent ) to you isn t revealed to *me*, apparently. ... I *do* seek to get a good picture of
                    Message 9 of 22 , Jan 28, 2010
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                      My comments below.

                      --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" <moodylawless@...> wrote:
                      >
                      >
                      > I think that Nietzsche actively phiolosophised via contradictions.
                      >
                      > This is not just apparent across the development of his work but even in
                      > single works - nay, in single sentences [I needn't quote examples at
                      > this level, surely?].
                      >

                      Yes, please do. For what is revealed ("apparent") to you isn't revealed to *me*, apparently.


                      > Indeed, the most unpopular interpretation of his thought [Bertram's
                      > Attempt at a Mythology] dwells on this very notion.
                      >
                      > It is this very contradictionism that makes him the greatest philosopher
                      > of all time.
                      >
                      > Most other philosophers have too often failed in trying to make
                      > themselves champions of Aristotle's 'Law of Non-Contradiction'.
                      >
                      > To attempt to 'explain away' Nietzsche's mighty contradictory-nature
                      > reeks of systematisation.
                      >

                      I *do* seek to get a good picture of Nietzsche's system. By "system", however, I here do *not* mean the systemisations on his part (if any), but the systemisation on the part of *Nature* in creating him, so to say.

                      "Every nation is put to shame if one points out such a wonderfully idealised company of philosophers as that of the early Greek masters, Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Democritus and Socrates. All those men are integral, entire and self­contained, and hewn out of one stone."
                      [Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*.]

                      I think Nietzsche, too, was such a man.


                      > Going back to the question. Nietzsche's Perspectivism is not the be-all
                      > and end-all of his philosophy. It is one of his experiments- attempts -
                      > in thought . And therefore must be thought in terms of what a P is -
                      > i.e. a particular and partial viewpoint.
                      >
                      > P is by definition too limited to make arche-like claims.
                      >
                      > Rather, the arche-like claim of the will to power suggests that there
                      > are other ways of knowing which are beyond Perspectives and are
                      > certainly beyond scientific method(s).
                      >
                      > Indeed, there is a mystical [and therefore non-rational] element to
                      > Nietzsche's philosophy which was pointed out very early by his one time
                      > friend - and near intellectual equal, Lou von Salome.
                      >
                      > It is here that non-P forms of knowing occur in Nietzsche's thought -
                      > forms of knowing which necessarily contradict P type knowledge.
                      >

                      I appreciate your approach to Nietzsche, which is becoming especially evident now is very different from mine. I seek to make do with a single 'element' (the rational) before I assume *several* elements, and indeed, to speak with *BGE* 36, I may be taking this experiment to the point of nonsense, from certain perspectives at least.


                      >
                      > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                      > wrote:
                      > >
                      > > Frankly, I find such remarks about contradictions in Nietzsche's
                      > philosophy sledge-hammer arguments (and I don't think one can
                      > philosophise with a sledge-hammer). Contrary to popular opinion, I don't
                      > think Nietzsche's philosophy's contradictory *at all* (he may contradict
                      > himself over time, or in the Nachlass, but not from any inconsistency).
                      > For years now, my approach to Nietzsche has been to resolve the seeming
                      > contradictions in his work, either by confirming their actual
                      > contradictoriness and rejecting, say, the less developed member of the
                      > 'equation', or by finding an explanation that may plausibly account for
                      > both at the same time.
                      > >
                      > > I will now respond piece by piece to a passage from your previous post
                      > here.
                      > >
                      > > "An arche cannot be known by Per-spective; it requires - at the very
                      > least - a Pan-spective, or an Omni-spective."
                      > >
                      > > Yes. As I said, I agree with this. It cannot be *known* by P. But what
                      > distinguishes 'our' nineteenth century (Nietzsche's present) is not the
                      > victory of *science* (*scientia*, knowledge), but the victory of
                      > scientific *method over* science (*WP* 466). In my view, Nietzsche's
                      > will-to-power claim, rightly understood, makes no claim at *knowledge*
                      > but only at methodicality. What it does is: *given* that we cannot
                      > attain to a 'Pan-spective' or 'Omni-spective', but only have a
                      > Per-spective, it infers *methodologically* from that Per-spective to
                      > what is beyond its view: it postulates that beyond it, there is also
                      > nothing but such 'narrow chinks'.
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > "So if "the world is will to power and nothing else besides", as
                      > Nietzsche says it is, then this cannot be known by Perspectivism."
                      > >
                      > > Right, it cannot be *known*, but then this claim, this formulation
                      > (from *WP* 1067), is only what the world looks like in Nietzsche's
                      > *'mirror'*, i.e., it's only his communication of his view.
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > "Of course, if the will to power is not an arche, but merely a P, then
                      > the will to power cannot be the infinite everything, the world and
                      > nothing else besides."
                      > >
                      > > If it *is* not an arche. But we do not know that it is *nor that it
                      > isn't.* If the will to power is a P, that does not necessarily make it
                      > *merely* a P: it can still be the 'infinite everything'. There is no
                      > absolute difference from, say, a *Christian* claim: only a *relative*
                      > difference, a difference in *plausibility*. It is based only on one's
                      > own experience and reasoning, not on any *belief*, any 'revelation'.
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@ wrote:
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > > Even if the claim that "the world is will to power and nothing else
                      > > > besides" is considered to be an undogmatic, uncertain hypothesis, it
                      > > > still cannot be considered a Perspectival claim for the reasons I
                      > state
                      > > > below.
                      > > >
                      > > > So the only way to get around this is to suggest that the will to
                      > power
                      > > > is a Perspectival claim - but this meets the objections I have
                      > already
                      > > > made.
                      > > >
                      > > > Therefore the problem remains unresolvable in my view; - but then
                      > > > Nietzsche's philosophy is full of such contradictions.
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                      > > > wrote:
                      > > > >
                      > > > > I agree, but I think what you say about archai only applies to
                      > > > *dogmatic* archê-claims. As Lampert emphasises (see the new Group
                      > > > Description), the (hypo)thesis that the world be the will to power
                      > and
                      > > > nothing besides remains a self-proclaimed *claim*: it does not claim
                      > > > certainty, but appeals to scientific method in general and Occam's
                      > Razor
                      > > > in particular to present itself as the supreme interpretation.
                      > > > >
                      > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@
                      > wrote:
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > Thanks for raising this again.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > For me, a Perspective [P] always suggests that there is
                      > 'something
                      > > > else
                      > > > > > besides' the P.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > There must be other Ps, just as there must be the ability to
                      > > > > > alter/adjust/reverse, etc., Ps.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > The world then exceeds a single P which latter could just be a
                      > > > 'narrow
                      > > > > > chink'; as Blake says:
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > "If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would
                      > appear
                      > > > > > to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed himself up, till
                      > he
                      > > > sees
                      > > > > > all things through narrow chinks of his cavern."
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > So a P always suggests a part-icular and part-ial view-point.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > An arche though has more in common with Blake's 'infinite
                      > > > everything'.
                      > > > > > It says that this, and only this, is the world, "and nothing
                      > else
                      > > > > > besides." In other words, it is the totality of which partial
                      > > > > > view-points can be made, but which cannot be encompassed by such
                      > Ps.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > If that is so, then can an arche be known purely by Perspectival
                      > > > seeing?
                      > > > > > No, because by definition P is a narrow chink and cannot view
                      > the
                      > > > > > infinite everything.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > An arche cannot be known by Per-spective; it requires - at the
                      > very
                      > > > > > least - a Pan-spective, or an Omni-spective.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > So if "the world is will to power and nothing else besides", as
                      > > > > > Nietzsche says it is, then this cannot be known by
                      > Perspectivism.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > Of course, if the will to power is not an arche, but merely a P,
                      > > > then
                      > > > > > the will to power cannot be the infinite everything, the world
                      > and
                      > > > > > nothing else besides. But my question involves the assumption
                      > that
                      > > > the
                      > > > > > will to power is an arche.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > So by this line of argument, the will to power and P are not
                      > > > resolvable.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios"
                      > <sauwelios@>
                      > > > > > wrote:
                      > > > > > The discussion in question followed from Moody's opening post,
                      > which
                      > > > > > read in full:
                      > > > > > >
                      > > > > > > "Does *Perspectivism* rule out *the will to power* in
                      > Nietzsche's
                      > > > > > philosophy?
                      > > > > > > Give reasons either way."
                      > > > > > >
                      > > > > > > In my most important contribution to that discussion, I (who
                      > > > thought,
                      > > > > > and still think, that the answer to Moody's question is a
                      > resounding
                      > > > > > "No; to the contrary") quoted *WP* 566-69, and wrote about the
                      > > > latter:
                      > > > > > >
                      > > > > > > "Could it be, Moody, that by what was formerly called "the
                      > > > apparent
                      > > > > > world", you understand "the adapted world which we feel to be
                      > real";
                      > > > > > whereas by your 'beyond the true and the apparent world', you
                      > > > understand
                      > > > > > "the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations"?
                      > Then
                      > > > there
                      > > > > > are *two* "apparent" worlds, one known to (namely, adapted by)
                      > us,
                      > > > and
                      > > > > > one unknown and unknowable to us (unadapted by us). And then
                      > perhaps
                      > > > the
                      > > > > > adapted world is Apollinian, and the formless world Dionysian?"
                      > > > > > >
                      > > > > > > I came back to this post due to my very recently begun study
                      > of
                      > > > *Ernst
                      > > > > > Mach* (the one from the sound barriers). For thanks to a Mr.
                      > Nadeem
                      > > > > > Hussain, I have come to see that certain problematical passages
                      > from
                      > > > > > Nietzsche's works (e.g., *BGE* 15 and *TI* 'Reason' 2) can be
                      > > > explained
                      > > > > > with the help of Mach.
                      > > > > > >
                      > > > > > > Rereading *WP* 569 from a Machian perspective, then, I found
                      > in it
                      > > > > > *another argument for the will-to-power teaching*:
                      > > > > > >
                      > > > > > > "4. questions, what things "in-themselves" may be like, apart
                      > from
                      > > > our
                      > > > > > sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be
                      > > > > > rebutted with the question: how could we know *that things
                      > exist*?
                      > > > > > "Thingness" was first created by us. The question is whether
                      > there
                      > > > could
                      > > > > > not be many other ways of creating such an *apparent*
                      > world---and
                      > > > > > whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying is not
                      > > > itself
                      > > > > > the best-guaranteed *reality*: in short, whether that which
                      > "posits
                      > > > > > things" is not the sole reality; and whether the "effect of the
                      > > > external
                      > > > > > world upon us" is not also the result of such active subjects...
                      > The
                      > > > > > other "entities" act upon us; our *adapted* apparent world is an
                      > > > > > adaptation and *overpowering* of their actions; a kind of
                      > > > *defensive*
                      > > > > > measure."
                      > > > > > >
                      > > > > > > This is an entire paragraph in the manuscript: what follows,
                      > the
                      > > > end
                      > > > > > of the section, is a new paragraph.
                      > > > > > >
                      > > > > > > Our way of creating 'thingness' ("the activity of our
                      > > > understanding")
                      > > > > > is a way of creating an apparent world; but there may be *many*
                      > ways
                      > > > of
                      > > > > > creating such a world---many ways of logicising, adapting,
                      > > > falsifying
                      > > > > > "the chaos of sensations" (ibid.) into a workable form.
                      > > > > > >
                      > > > > > > The activity of our understanding, the logicising, adapting,
                      > > > > > falsifying by means of which we create our 'world' (our world of
                      > > > > > 'things') is, to speak with Leo Strauss (see this group's
                      > > > Description)
                      > > > > > "an act of the will-to-power". And there may be many *other*
                      > ways of
                      > > > > > thusly "*overpowering*" "other 'entities'"! Compare *BGE* 36:
                      > > > > > >
                      > > > > > > "Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our world of
                      > > > desires
                      > > > > > and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other
                      > > > "reality"
                      > > > > > besides the reality of our drives---for thinking is merely a
                      > > > relations
                      > > > > > of these drives to each other---: is it not permitted to make
                      > the
                      > > > > > experiment and to ask the question whether this 'given' would
                      > not be
                      > > > > > *sufficient* for also understanding on the basis of this kind of
                      > > > thing
                      > > > > > the so-called mechanistic (or "material") world? I, mean, not as
                      > a
                      > > > > > deception, as "mere appearance," an "idea" (in the sense of
                      > Berkeley
                      > > > and
                      > > > > > Schopenhauer) but as holding the same rank of reality as our
                      > > > affect---as
                      > > > > > a more primitive form of the world of affects[?]"
                      > > > > > >
                      > > > > > > The so-called mechanistic world understood as a more primitive
                      > > > form of
                      > > > > > "that which 'posits things'"---i.e., of the *will to power*...
                      > > > > > >
                      > > > > >
                      > > > >
                      > > >
                      > >
                      >
                    • Moody
                      Agreed that I am a decadent, I am also the very reverse. [Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, Why I Am So Wise , 2] I think your latest Lampertian trend is a
                      Message 10 of 22 , Jan 29, 2010
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                        "Agreed that I am a decadent, I am also the very reverse."

                        [Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 'Why I Am So Wise', 2]

                         

                        I think your latest 'Lampertian' trend is a mistake.

                        Indeed, all such trends are a mistake. 

                        As Ecce Homo shows, Nietzsche was the best interpreter of Nietzsche.

                         
                         

                        --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@...> wrote:
                        >
                        > My comments below.
                        >
                        > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@ wrote:
                        > >
                        > >
                        > > I think that Nietzsche actively phiolosophised via contradictions.
                        > >
                        > > This is not just apparent across the development of his work but even in
                        > > single works - nay, in single sentences [I needn't quote examples at
                        > > this level, surely?].
                        > >
                        >
                        > Yes, please do. For what is revealed ("apparent") to you isn't revealed to *me*, apparently.
                        >
                        >
                        > > Indeed, the most unpopular interpretation of his thought [Bertram's
                        > > Attempt at a Mythology] dwells on this very notion.
                        > >
                        > > It is this very contradictionism that makes him the greatest philosopher
                        > > of all time.
                        > >
                        > > Most other philosophers have too often failed in trying to make
                        > > themselves champions of Aristotle's 'Law of Non-Contradiction'.
                        > >
                        > > To attempt to 'explain away' Nietzsche's mighty contradictory-nature
                        > > reeks of systematisation.
                        > >
                        >
                        > I *do* seek to get a good picture of Nietzsche's system. By "system", however, I here do *not* mean the systemisations on his part (if any), but the systemisation on the part of *Nature* in creating him, so to say.
                        >
                        > "Every nation is put to shame if one points out such a wonderfully idealised company of philosophers as that of the early Greek masters, Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Democritus and Socrates. All those men are integral, entire and self­contained, and hewn out of one stone."
                        > [Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*.]
                        >
                        > I think Nietzsche, too, was such a man.
                        >
                        >
                        > > Going back to the question. Nietzsche's Perspectivism is not the be-all
                        > > and end-all of his philosophy. It is one of his experiments- attempts -
                        > > in thought . And therefore must be thought in terms of what a P is -
                        > > i.e. a particular and partial viewpoint.
                        > >
                        > > P is by definition too limited to make arche-like claims.
                        > >
                        > > Rather, the arche-like claim of the will to power suggests that there
                        > > are other ways of knowing which are beyond Perspectives and are
                        > > certainly beyond scientific method(s).
                        > >
                        > > Indeed, there is a mystical [and therefore non-rational] element to
                        > > Nietzsche's philosophy which was pointed out very early by his one time
                        > > friend - and near intellectual equal, Lou von Salome.
                        > >
                        > > It is here that non-P forms of knowing occur in Nietzsche's thought -
                        > > forms of knowing which necessarily contradict P type knowledge.
                        > >
                        >
                        > I appreciate your approach to Nietzsche, which is becoming especially evident now is very different from mine. I seek to make do with a single 'element' (the rational) before I assume *several* elements, and indeed, to speak with *BGE* 36, I may be taking this experiment to the point of nonsense, from certain perspectives at least.
                        >
                        >
                        > >
                        > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                        > > wrote:
                        > > >
                        > > > Frankly, I find such remarks about contradictions in Nietzsche's
                        > > philosophy sledge-hammer arguments (and I don't think one can
                        > > philosophise with a sledge-hammer). Contrary to popular opinion, I don't
                        > > think Nietzsche's philosophy's contradictory *at all* (he may contradict
                        > > himself over time, or in the Nachlass, but not from any inconsistency).
                        > > For years now, my approach to Nietzsche has been to resolve the seeming
                        > > contradictions in his work, either by confirming their actual
                        > > contradictoriness and rejecting, say, the less developed member of the
                        > > 'equation', or by finding an explanation that may plausibly account for
                        > > both at the same time.
                        > > >
                        > > > I will now respond piece by piece to a passage from your previous post
                        > > here.
                        > > >
                        > > > "An arche cannot be known by Per-spective; it requires - at the very
                        > > least - a Pan-spective, or an Omni-spective."
                        > > >
                        > > > Yes. As I said, I agree with this. It cannot be *known* by P. But what
                        > > distinguishes 'our' nineteenth century (Nietzsche's present) is not the
                        > > victory of *science* (*scientia*, knowledge), but the victory of
                        > > scientific *method over* science (*WP* 466). In my view, Nietzsche's
                        > > will-to-power claim, rightly understood, makes no claim at *knowledge*
                        > > but only at methodicality. What it does is: *given* that we cannot
                        > > attain to a 'Pan-spective' or 'Omni-spective', but only have a
                        > > Per-spective, it infers *methodologically* from that Per-spective to
                        > > what is beyond its view: it postulates that beyond it, there is also
                        > > nothing but such 'narrow chinks'.
                        > > >
                        > > >
                        > > > "So if "the world is will to power and nothing else besides", as
                        > > Nietzsche says it is, then this cannot be known by Perspectivism."
                        > > >
                        > > > Right, it cannot be *known*, but then this claim, this formulation
                        > > (from *WP* 1067), is only what the world looks like in Nietzsche's
                        > > *'mirror'*, i.e., it's only his communication of his view.
                        > > >
                        > > >
                        > > > "Of course, if the will to power is not an arche, but merely a P, then
                        > > the will to power cannot be the infinite everything, the world and
                        > > nothing else besides."
                        > > >
                        > > > If it *is* not an arche. But we do not know that it is *nor that it
                        > > isn't.* If the will to power is a P, that does not necessarily make it
                        > > *merely* a P: it can still be the 'infinite everything'. There is no
                        > > absolute difference from, say, a *Christian* claim: only a *relative*
                        > > difference, a difference in *plausibility*. It is based only on one's
                        > > own experience and reasoning, not on any *belief*, any 'revelation'.
                        > > >
                        > > >
                        > > >
                        > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@ wrote:
                        > > > >
                        > > > >
                        > > > > Even if the claim that "the world is will to power and nothing else
                        > > > > besides" is considered to be an undogmatic, uncertain hypothesis, it
                        > > > > still cannot be considered a Perspectival claim for the reasons I
                        > > state
                        > > > > below.
                        > > > >
                        > > > > So the only way to get around this is to suggest that the will to
                        > > power
                        > > > > is a Perspectival claim - but this meets the objections I have
                        > > already
                        > > > > made.
                        > > > >
                        > > > > Therefore the problem remains unresolvable in my view; - but then
                        > > > > Nietzsche's philosophy is full of such contradictions.
                        > > > >
                        > > > >
                        > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                        > > > > wrote:
                        > > > > >
                        > > > > > I agree, but I think what you say about archai only applies to
                        > > > > *dogmatic* archê-claims. As Lampert emphasises (see the new Group
                        > > > > Description), the (hypo)thesis that the world be the will to power
                        > > and
                        > > > > nothing besides remains a self-proclaimed *claim*: it does not claim
                        > > > > certainty, but appeals to scientific method in general and Occam's
                        > > Razor
                        > > > > in particular to present itself as the supreme interpretation.
                        > > > > >
                        > > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@
                        > > wrote:
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > Thanks for raising this again.
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > For me, a Perspective [P] always suggests that there is
                        > > 'something
                        > > > > else
                        > > > > > > besides' the P.
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > There must be other Ps, just as there must be the ability to
                        > > > > > > alter/adjust/reverse, etc., Ps.
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > The world then exceeds a single P which latter could just be a
                        > > > > 'narrow
                        > > > > > > chink'; as Blake says:
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > "If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would
                        > > appear
                        > > > > > > to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed himself up, till
                        > > he
                        > > > > sees
                        > > > > > > all things through narrow chinks of his cavern."
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > So a P always suggests a part-icular and part-ial view-point.
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > An arche though has more in common with Blake's 'infinite
                        > > > > everything'.
                        > > > > > > It says that this, and only this, is the world, "and nothing
                        > > else
                        > > > > > > besides." In other words, it is the totality of which partial
                        > > > > > > view-points can be made, but which cannot be encompassed by such
                        > > Ps.
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > If that is so, then can an arche be known purely by Perspectival
                        > > > > seeing?
                        > > > > > > No, because by definition P is a narrow chink and cannot view
                        > > the
                        > > > > > > infinite everything.
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > An arche cannot be known by Per-spective; it requires - at the
                        > > very
                        > > > > > > least - a Pan-spective, or an Omni-spective.
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > So if "the world is will to power and nothing else besides", as
                        > > > > > > Nietzsche says it is, then this cannot be known by
                        > > Perspectivism.
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > Of course, if the will to power is not an arche, but merely a P,
                        > > > > then
                        > > > > > > the will to power cannot be the infinite everything, the world
                        > > and
                        > > > > > > nothing else besides. But my question involves the assumption
                        > > that
                        > > > > the
                        > > > > > > will to power is an arche.
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > So by this line of argument, the will to power and P are not
                        > > > > resolvable.
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios"
                        > > <sauwelios@>
                        > > > > > > wrote:
                        > > > > > > The discussion in question followed from Moody's opening post,
                        > > which
                        > > > > > > read in full:
                        > > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > > "Does *Perspectivism* rule out *the will to power* in
                        > > Nietzsche's
                        > > > > > > philosophy?
                        > > > > > > > Give reasons either way."
                        > > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > > In my most important contribution to that discussion, I (who
                        > > > > thought,
                        > > > > > > and still think, that the answer to Moody's question is a
                        > > resounding
                        > > > > > > "No; to the contrary") quoted *WP* 566-69, and wrote about the
                        > > > > latter:
                        > > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > > "Could it be, Moody, that by what was formerly called "the
                        > > > > apparent
                        > > > > > > world", you understand "the adapted world which we feel to be
                        > > real";
                        > > > > > > whereas by your 'beyond the true and the apparent world', you
                        > > > > understand
                        > > > > > > "the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations"?
                        > > Then
                        > > > > there
                        > > > > > > are *two* "apparent" worlds, one known to (namely, adapted by)
                        > > us,
                        > > > > and
                        > > > > > > one unknown and unknowable to us (unadapted by us). And then
                        > > perhaps
                        > > > > the
                        > > > > > > adapted world is Apollinian, and the formless world Dionysian?"
                        > > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > > I came back to this post due to my very recently begun study
                        > > of
                        > > > > *Ernst
                        > > > > > > Mach* (the one from the sound barriers). For thanks to a Mr.
                        > > Nadeem
                        > > > > > > Hussain, I have come to see that certain problematical passages
                        > > from
                        > > > > > > Nietzsche's works (e.g., *BGE* 15 and *TI* 'Reason' 2) can be
                        > > > > explained
                        > > > > > > with the help of Mach.
                        > > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > > Rereading *WP* 569 from a Machian perspective, then, I found
                        > > in it
                        > > > > > > *another argument for the will-to-power teaching*:
                        > > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > > "4. questions, what things "in-themselves" may be like, apart
                        > > from
                        > > > > our
                        > > > > > > sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be
                        > > > > > > rebutted with the question: how could we know *that things
                        > > exist*?
                        > > > > > > "Thingness" was first created by us. The question is whether
                        > > there
                        > > > > could
                        > > > > > > not be many other ways of creating such an *apparent*
                        > > world---and
                        > > > > > > whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying is not
                        > > > > itself
                        > > > > > > the best-guaranteed *reality*: in short, whether that which
                        > > "posits
                        > > > > > > things" is not the sole reality; and whether the "effect of the
                        > > > > external
                        > > > > > > world upon us" is not also the result of such active subjects...
                        > > The
                        > > > > > > other "entities" act upon us; our *adapted* apparent world is an
                        > > > > > > adaptation and *overpowering* of their actions; a kind of
                        > > > > *defensive*
                        > > > > > > measure."
                        > > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > > This is an entire paragraph in the manuscript: what follows,
                        > > the
                        > > > > end
                        > > > > > > of the section, is a new paragraph.
                        > > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > > Our way of creating 'thingness' ("the activity of our
                        > > > > understanding")
                        > > > > > > is a way of creating an apparent world; but there may be *many*
                        > > ways
                        > > > > of
                        > > > > > > creating such a world---many ways of logicising, adapting,
                        > > > > falsifying
                        > > > > > > "the chaos of sensations" (ibid.) into a workable form.
                        > > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > > The activity of our understanding, the logicising, adapting,
                        > > > > > > falsifying by means of which we create our 'world' (our world of
                        > > > > > > 'things') is, to speak with Leo Strauss (see this group's
                        > > > > Description)
                        > > > > > > "an act of the will-to-power". And there may be many *other*
                        > > ways of
                        > > > > > > thusly "*overpowering*" "other 'entities'"! Compare *BGE* 36:
                        > > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > > "Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our world of
                        > > > > desires
                        > > > > > > and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other
                        > > > > "reality"
                        > > > > > > besides the reality of our drives---for thinking is merely a
                        > > > > relations
                        > > > > > > of these drives to each other---: is it not permitted to make
                        > > the
                        > > > > > > experiment and to ask the question whether this 'given' would
                        > > not be
                        > > > > > > *sufficient* for also understanding on the basis of this kind of
                        > > > > thing
                        > > > > > > the so-called mechanistic (or "material") world? I, mean, not as
                        > > a
                        > > > > > > deception, as "mere appearance," an "idea" (in the sense of
                        > > Berkeley
                        > > > > and
                        > > > > > > Schopenhauer) but as holding the same rank of reality as our
                        > > > > affect---as
                        > > > > > > a more primitive form of the world of affects[?]"
                        > > > > > > >
                        > > > > > > > The so-called mechanistic world understood as a more primitive
                        > > > > form of
                        > > > > > > "that which 'posits things'"---i.e., of the *will to power*...
                        > > > > > > >
                        > > > > > >
                        > > > > >
                        > > > >
                        > > >
                        > >
                        >

                      • Sauwelios
                        ... That is the opening sentence of section 2, in which he immediately goes on to explain this seeming contradiction away , i.e., to resolve it: Agreed that
                        Message 11 of 22 , Jan 29, 2010
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                          --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" <moodylawless@...> wrote:
                          >
                          >
                          > "Agreed that I am a decadent, I am also the very reverse."
                          > [Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 'Why I Am So Wise', 2]
                          >

                          That is the opening sentence of section 2, in which he immediately goes on to explain this seeming contradiction 'away', i.e., to resolve it:

                          "Agreed that I am a decadent, I am also the very reverse. My proof for this is, among other things, that I instinctively always choose the *right* remedies against bad conditions: whereas a decadent as such [an sich] always chooses remedies that are disadvantageous to him. As summa summarum [i.e., overall] I was healthy [gesund], as a nook, as a specialty I was decadent. [...] I took control of myself, I made myself whole [gesund] again: the precondition for this---every physiologist will admit this---is, *that one is at bottom healthy*. A typically morbid creature cannot become healthy, even less make itself healthy; for a typical healthy person, conversely, illness can even be an energetic *stimulant* to life, to staying-alive. Indeed, thus appears that long period of illness to me *now*[.]"
                          [ibid.]


                          >
                          >
                          > I think your latest 'Lampertian' trend is a mistake.
                          >
                          > Indeed, all such trends are a mistake.
                          >
                          > As Ecce Homo shows, Nietzsche was the best interpreter of Nietzsche.
                          >

                          Then your and my readings of Nietzsche are also mistakes. But this is of course another sledge-hammer argument. If interpretation is an act of the will to power, then one practices Nietzsche's philosophy by interpreting him.

                          Nietzsche's philosophy---the philosophy of will to power---is an interpretation of the world, which, that philosophy argues, is interpretation and nothing besides. *Ecce Homo*, you imply, is an interpretation of that world-interpretation. That book's readers, however, can only *interpret* it. My Lampertian 'trend' is an interpretation of Lampert's interpretation of Nietzsche. Funnily, the first book I read by Lampert was his *Leo Strauss and Nietzsche*, a major part of which is his interpretation of Strauss's interpretation of Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil*, which interprets the world as will to power and nothing besides (sections 22 and 36). In reading *LSN*, then, I was interpreting (1) an interpretation (2) of an interpretation (3) of an interpretation (4) of the world (5). But at the same time, I was a) interpreting (1) an interpretation (2) of an interpretation (3) of the world (4) (namely, in reading Strauss' essay myself, which was included as an appendix), b) interpreting (1) an interpretation (2) of the world (3) (namely, in reading *BGE*), and c) interpreting (1) the world (2) (which, like *BGE*, I had with me almost every time I read Lampert's book). And all the time, I was myself a part of the world (1), of course.


                          > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                          > wrote:
                          > >
                          > > My comments below.
                          > >
                          > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@ wrote:
                          > > >
                          > > >
                          > > > I think that Nietzsche actively phiolosophised via contradictions.
                          > > >
                          > > > This is not just apparent across the development of his work but
                          > even in
                          > > > single works - nay, in single sentences [I needn't quote examples at
                          > > > this level, surely?].
                          > > >
                          > >
                          > > Yes, please do. For what is revealed ("apparent") to you isn't
                          > revealed to *me*, apparently.
                          > >
                          > >
                          > > > Indeed, the most unpopular interpretation of his thought [Bertram's
                          > > > Attempt at a Mythology] dwells on this very notion.
                          > > >
                          > > > It is this very contradictionism that makes him the greatest
                          > philosopher
                          > > > of all time.
                          > > >
                          > > > Most other philosophers have too often failed in trying to make
                          > > > themselves champions of Aristotle's 'Law of Non-Contradiction'.
                          > > >
                          > > > To attempt to 'explain away' Nietzsche's mighty contradictory-nature
                          > > > reeks of systematisation.
                          > > >
                          > >
                          > > I *do* seek to get a good picture of Nietzsche's system. By "system",
                          > however, I here do *not* mean the systemisations on his part (if any),
                          > but the systemisation on the part of *Nature* in creating him, so to
                          > say.
                          > >
                          > > "Every nation is put to shame if one points out such a wonderfully
                          > idealised company of philosophers as that of the early Greek masters,
                          > Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles,
                          > Democritus and Socrates. All those men are integral, entire and
                          > self­contained, and hewn out of one stone."
                          > > [Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*.]
                          > >
                          > > I think Nietzsche, too, was such a man.
                          > >
                          > >
                          > > > Going back to the question. Nietzsche's Perspectivism is not the
                          > be-all
                          > > > and end-all of his philosophy. It is one of his experiments-
                          > attempts -
                          > > > in thought . And therefore must be thought in terms of what a P is -
                          > > > i.e. a particular and partial viewpoint.
                          > > >
                          > > > P is by definition too limited to make arche-like claims.
                          > > >
                          > > > Rather, the arche-like claim of the will to power suggests that
                          > there
                          > > > are other ways of knowing which are beyond Perspectives and are
                          > > > certainly beyond scientific method(s).
                          > > >
                          > > > Indeed, there is a mystical [and therefore non-rational] element to
                          > > > Nietzsche's philosophy which was pointed out very early by his one
                          > time
                          > > > friend - and near intellectual equal, Lou von Salome.
                          > > >
                          > > > It is here that non-P forms of knowing occur in Nietzsche's thought
                          > -
                          > > > forms of knowing which necessarily contradict P type knowledge.
                          > > >
                          > >
                          > > I appreciate your approach to Nietzsche, which is becoming especially
                          > evident now is very different from mine. I seek to make do with a single
                          > 'element' (the rational) before I assume *several* elements, and indeed,
                          > to speak with *BGE* 36, I may be taking this experiment to the point of
                          > nonsense, from certain perspectives at least.
                          > >
                          > >
                          > > >
                          > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                          > > > wrote:
                          > > > >
                          > > > > Frankly, I find such remarks about contradictions in Nietzsche's
                          > > > philosophy sledge-hammer arguments (and I don't think one can
                          > > > philosophise with a sledge-hammer). Contrary to popular opinion, I
                          > don't
                          > > > think Nietzsche's philosophy's contradictory *at all* (he may
                          > contradict
                          > > > himself over time, or in the Nachlass, but not from any
                          > inconsistency).
                          > > > For years now, my approach to Nietzsche has been to resolve the
                          > seeming
                          > > > contradictions in his work, either by confirming their actual
                          > > > contradictoriness and rejecting, say, the less developed member of
                          > the
                          > > > 'equation', or by finding an explanation that may plausibly account
                          > for
                          > > > both at the same time.
                          > > > >
                          > > > > I will now respond piece by piece to a passage from your previous
                          > post
                          > > > here.
                          > > > >
                          > > > > "An arche cannot be known by Per-spective; it requires - at the
                          > very
                          > > > least - a Pan-spective, or an Omni-spective."
                          > > > >
                          > > > > Yes. As I said, I agree with this. It cannot be *known* by P. But
                          > what
                          > > > distinguishes 'our' nineteenth century (Nietzsche's present) is not
                          > the
                          > > > victory of *science* (*scientia*, knowledge), but the victory of
                          > > > scientific *method over* science (*WP* 466). In my view, Nietzsche's
                          > > > will-to-power claim, rightly understood, makes no claim at
                          > *knowledge*
                          > > > but only at methodicality. What it does is: *given* that we cannot
                          > > > attain to a 'Pan-spective' or 'Omni-spective', but only have a
                          > > > Per-spective, it infers *methodologically* from that Per-spective to
                          > > > what is beyond its view: it postulates that beyond it, there is also
                          > > > nothing but such 'narrow chinks'.
                          > > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > > > "So if "the world is will to power and nothing else besides", as
                          > > > Nietzsche says it is, then this cannot be known by Perspectivism."
                          > > > >
                          > > > > Right, it cannot be *known*, but then this claim, this formulation
                          > > > (from *WP* 1067), is only what the world looks like in Nietzsche's
                          > > > *'mirror'*, i.e., it's only his communication of his view.
                          > > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > > > "Of course, if the will to power is not an arche, but merely a P,
                          > then
                          > > > the will to power cannot be the infinite everything, the world and
                          > > > nothing else besides."
                          > > > >
                          > > > > If it *is* not an arche. But we do not know that it is *nor that
                          > it
                          > > > isn't.* If the will to power is a P, that does not necessarily make
                          > it
                          > > > *merely* a P: it can still be the 'infinite everything'. There is no
                          > > > absolute difference from, say, a *Christian* claim: only a
                          > *relative*
                          > > > difference, a difference in *plausibility*. It is based only on
                          > one's
                          > > > own experience and reasoning, not on any *belief*, any 'revelation'.
                          > > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@
                          > wrote:
                          > > > > >
                          > > > > >
                          > > > > > Even if the claim that "the world is will to power and nothing
                          > else
                          > > > > > besides" is considered to be an undogmatic, uncertain
                          > hypothesis, it
                          > > > > > still cannot be considered a Perspectival claim for the reasons
                          > I
                          > > > state
                          > > > > > below.
                          > > > > >
                          > > > > > So the only way to get around this is to suggest that the will
                          > to
                          > > > power
                          > > > > > is a Perspectival claim - but this meets the objections I have
                          > > > already
                          > > > > > made.
                          > > > > >
                          > > > > > Therefore the problem remains unresolvable in my view; - but
                          > then
                          > > > > > Nietzsche's philosophy is full of such contradictions.
                          > > > > >
                          > > > > >
                          > > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios"
                          > <sauwelios@>
                          > > > > > wrote:
                          > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > I agree, but I think what you say about archai only applies to
                          > > > > > *dogmatic* archê-claims. As Lampert emphasises (see the new
                          > Group
                          > > > > > Description), the (hypo)thesis that the world be the will to
                          > power
                          > > > and
                          > > > > > nothing besides remains a self-proclaimed *claim*: it does not
                          > claim
                          > > > > > certainty, but appeals to scientific method in general and
                          > Occam's
                          > > > Razor
                          > > > > > in particular to present itself as the supreme interpretation.
                          > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@
                          > > > wrote:
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > Thanks for raising this again.
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > For me, a Perspective [P] always suggests that there is
                          > > > 'something
                          > > > > > else
                          > > > > > > > besides' the P.
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > There must be other Ps, just as there must be the ability to
                          > > > > > > > alter/adjust/reverse, etc., Ps.
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > The world then exceeds a single P which latter could just be
                          > a
                          > > > > > 'narrow
                          > > > > > > > chink'; as Blake says:
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > "If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would
                          > > > appear
                          > > > > > > > to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed himself up,
                          > till
                          > > > he
                          > > > > > sees
                          > > > > > > > all things through narrow chinks of his cavern."
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > So a P always suggests a part-icular and part-ial
                          > view-point.
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > An arche though has more in common with Blake's 'infinite
                          > > > > > everything'.
                          > > > > > > > It says that this, and only this, is the world, "and nothing
                          > > > else
                          > > > > > > > besides." In other words, it is the totality of which
                          > partial
                          > > > > > > > view-points can be made, but which cannot be encompassed by
                          > such
                          > > > Ps.
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > If that is so, then can an arche be known purely by
                          > Perspectival
                          > > > > > seeing?
                          > > > > > > > No, because by definition P is a narrow chink and cannot
                          > view
                          > > > the
                          > > > > > > > infinite everything.
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > An arche cannot be known by Per-spective; it requires - at
                          > the
                          > > > very
                          > > > > > > > least - a Pan-spective, or an Omni-spective.
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > So if "the world is will to power and nothing else besides",
                          > as
                          > > > > > > > Nietzsche says it is, then this cannot be known by
                          > > > Perspectivism.
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > Of course, if the will to power is not an arche, but merely
                          > a P,
                          > > > > > then
                          > > > > > > > the will to power cannot be the infinite everything, the
                          > world
                          > > > and
                          > > > > > > > nothing else besides. But my question involves the
                          > assumption
                          > > > that
                          > > > > > the
                          > > > > > > > will to power is an arche.
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > So by this line of argument, the will to power and P are not
                          > > > > > resolvable.
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios"
                          > > > <sauwelios@>
                          > > > > > > > wrote:
                          > > > > > > > The discussion in question followed from Moody's opening
                          > post,
                          > > > which
                          > > > > > > > read in full:
                          > > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > > "Does *Perspectivism* rule out *the will to power* in
                          > > > Nietzsche's
                          > > > > > > > philosophy?
                          > > > > > > > > Give reasons either way."
                          > > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > > In my most important contribution to that discussion, I
                          > (who
                          > > > > > thought,
                          > > > > > > > and still think, that the answer to Moody's question is a
                          > > > resounding
                          > > > > > > > "No; to the contrary") quoted *WP* 566-69, and wrote about
                          > the
                          > > > > > latter:
                          > > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > > "Could it be, Moody, that by what was formerly called "the
                          > > > > > apparent
                          > > > > > > > world", you understand "the adapted world which we feel to
                          > be
                          > > > real";
                          > > > > > > > whereas by your 'beyond the true and the apparent world',
                          > you
                          > > > > > understand
                          > > > > > > > "the formless unformulable world of the chaos of
                          > sensations"?
                          > > > Then
                          > > > > > there
                          > > > > > > > are *two* "apparent" worlds, one known to (namely, adapted
                          > by)
                          > > > us,
                          > > > > > and
                          > > > > > > > one unknown and unknowable to us (unadapted by us). And then
                          > > > perhaps
                          > > > > > the
                          > > > > > > > adapted world is Apollinian, and the formless world
                          > Dionysian?"
                          > > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > > I came back to this post due to my very recently begun
                          > study
                          > > > of
                          > > > > > *Ernst
                          > > > > > > > Mach* (the one from the sound barriers). For thanks to a Mr.
                          > > > Nadeem
                          > > > > > > > Hussain, I have come to see that certain problematical
                          > passages
                          > > > from
                          > > > > > > > Nietzsche's works (e.g., *BGE* 15 and *TI* 'Reason' 2) can
                          > be
                          > > > > > explained
                          > > > > > > > with the help of Mach.
                          > > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > > Rereading *WP* 569 from a Machian perspective, then, I
                          > found
                          > > > in it
                          > > > > > > > *another argument for the will-to-power teaching*:
                          > > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > > "4. questions, what things "in-themselves" may be like,
                          > apart
                          > > > from
                          > > > > > our
                          > > > > > > > sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding,
                          > must be
                          > > > > > > > rebutted with the question: how could we know *that things
                          > > > exist*?
                          > > > > > > > "Thingness" was first created by us. The question is whether
                          > > > there
                          > > > > > could
                          > > > > > > > not be many other ways of creating such an *apparent*
                          > > > world---and
                          > > > > > > > whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying is
                          > not
                          > > > > > itself
                          > > > > > > > the best-guaranteed *reality*: in short, whether that which
                          > > > "posits
                          > > > > > > > things" is not the sole reality; and whether the "effect of
                          > the
                          > > > > > external
                          > > > > > > > world upon us" is not also the result of such active
                          > subjects...
                          > > > The
                          > > > > > > > other "entities" act upon us; our *adapted* apparent world
                          > is an
                          > > > > > > > adaptation and *overpowering* of their actions; a kind of
                          > > > > > *defensive*
                          > > > > > > > measure."
                          > > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > > This is an entire paragraph in the manuscript: what
                          > follows,
                          > > > the
                          > > > > > end
                          > > > > > > > of the section, is a new paragraph.
                          > > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > > Our way of creating 'thingness' ("the activity of our
                          > > > > > understanding")
                          > > > > > > > is a way of creating an apparent world; but there may be
                          > *many*
                          > > > ways
                          > > > > > of
                          > > > > > > > creating such a world---many ways of logicising, adapting,
                          > > > > > falsifying
                          > > > > > > > "the chaos of sensations" (ibid.) into a workable form.
                          > > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > > The activity of our understanding, the logicising,
                          > adapting,
                          > > > > > > > falsifying by means of which we create our 'world' (our
                          > world of
                          > > > > > > > 'things') is, to speak with Leo Strauss (see this group's
                          > > > > > Description)
                          > > > > > > > "an act of the will-to-power". And there may be many *other*
                          > > > ways of
                          > > > > > > > thusly "*overpowering*" "other 'entities'"! Compare *BGE*
                          > 36:
                          > > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > > "Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our
                          > world of
                          > > > > > desires
                          > > > > > > > and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other
                          > > > > > "reality"
                          > > > > > > > besides the reality of our drives---for thinking is merely a
                          > > > > > relations
                          > > > > > > > of these drives to each other---: is it not permitted to
                          > make
                          > > > the
                          > > > > > > > experiment and to ask the question whether this 'given'
                          > would
                          > > > not be
                          > > > > > > > *sufficient* for also understanding on the basis of this
                          > kind of
                          > > > > > thing
                          > > > > > > > the so-called mechanistic (or "material") world? I, mean,
                          > not as
                          > > > a
                          > > > > > > > deception, as "mere appearance," an "idea" (in the sense of
                          > > > Berkeley
                          > > > > > and
                          > > > > > > > Schopenhauer) but as holding the same rank of reality as our
                          > > > > > affect---as
                          > > > > > > > a more primitive form of the world of affects[?]"
                          > > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > > > The so-called mechanistic world understood as a more
                          > primitive
                          > > > > > form of
                          > > > > > > > "that which 'posits things'"---i.e., of the *will to
                          > power*...
                          > > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > > >
                          > > > > > >
                          > > > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > >
                          > >
                          >
                        • Moody
                          Nietzsche s own succumbing to a chronic illness shows that he did not resolve this contradiction; he was - and remained - ill/healthy. The passage you quote
                          Message 12 of 22 , Jan 30, 2010
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                            Nietzsche's own succumbing to a chronic illness shows that he did not 'resolve' this contradiction; he was - and remained - ill/healthy. 

                            The passage you quote itself  reflects this.

                            Nietzsche's philosophy was made out of a 'will to health', most certainly.

                            And Nietzsche himself was congentially ill; he was also super-abundantly healthy.

                            He couldn't resolve this contradiction - he wouldn't have wanted to.

                            Just as he didn't resolve the duality of Apollo/Dionysos.

                            The facetthat Health and Dionysos remain open questions to Nietzscheans show that they were not resolved - nor were they meant to be resolved.

                            If Nietzsche had 'explained away' all these aporiai then there would be nothing left to do.

                            Anyway, I have always maintained that Ecce Homo was the best way to approach Nietzsche and find most books 'about' Nietzsche to be a waste of time.

                            One must at times break out of the hermeneutical viscious circle of interpretation.

                            Poetry [and poetic inspiration]  is one example of such non-Perspectival knowledge which does just this.

                            The poetry of the sledge-hammer, no doubt.

                             


                            --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@...> wrote:
                            >
                            >
                            >
                            > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@ wrote:
                            > >
                            > >
                            > > "Agreed that I am a decadent, I am also the very reverse."
                            > > [Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 'Why I Am So Wise', 2]
                            > >
                            >
                            > That is the opening sentence of section 2, in which he immediately goes on to explain this seeming contradiction 'away', i.e., to resolve it:
                            >
                            > "Agreed that I am a decadent, I am also the very reverse. My proof for this is, among other things, that I instinctively always choose the *right* remedies against bad conditions: whereas a decadent as such [an sich] always chooses remedies that are disadvantageous to him. As summa summarum [i.e., overall] I was healthy [gesund], as a nook, as a specialty I was decadent. [...] I took control of myself, I made myself whole [gesund] again: the precondition for this---every physiologist will admit this---is, *that one is at bottom healthy*. A typically morbid creature cannot become healthy, even less make itself healthy; for a typical healthy person, conversely, illness can even be an energetic *stimulant* to life, to staying-alive. Indeed, thus appears that long period of illness to me *now*[.]"
                            > [ibid.]
                            >
                            >
                            > >
                            > >
                            > > I think your latest 'Lampertian' trend is a mistake.
                            > >
                            > > Indeed, all such trends are a mistake.
                            > >
                            > > As Ecce Homo shows, Nietzsche was the best interpreter of Nietzsche.
                            > >
                            >
                            > Then your and my readings of Nietzsche are also mistakes. But this is of course another sledge-hammer argument. If interpretation is an act of the will to power, then one practices Nietzsche's philosophy by interpreting him.
                            >
                            > Nietzsche's philosophy---the philosophy of will to power---is an interpretation of the world, which, that philosophy argues, is interpretation and nothing besides. *Ecce Homo*, you imply, is an interpretation of that world-interpretation. That book's readers, however, can only *interpret* it. My Lampertian 'trend' is an interpretation of Lampert's interpretation of Nietzsche. Funnily, the first book I read by Lampert was his *Leo Strauss and Nietzsche*, a major part of which is his interpretation of Strauss's interpretation of Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil*, which interprets the world as will to power and nothing besides (sections 22 and 36). In reading *LSN*, then, I was interpreting (1) an interpretation (2) of an interpretation (3) of an interpretation (4) of the world (5). But at the same time, I was a) interpreting (1) an interpretation (2) of an interpretation (3) of the world (4) (namely, in reading Strauss' essay myself, which was included as an appendix), b) interpreting (1) an interpretation (2) of the world (3) (namely, in reading *BGE*), and c) interpreting (1) the world (2) (which, like *BGE*, I had with me almost every time I read Lampert's book). And all the time, I was myself a part of the world (1), of course.
                            >
                            >
                            > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                            > > wrote:
                            > > >
                            > > > My comments below.
                            > > >
                            > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@ wrote:
                            > > > >
                            > > > >
                            > > > > I think that Nietzsche actively phiolosophised via contradictions.
                            > > > >
                            > > > > This is not just apparent across the development of his work but
                            > > even in
                            > > > > single works - nay, in single sentences [I needn't quote examples at
                            > > > > this level, surely?].
                            > > > >
                            > > >
                            > > > Yes, please do. For what is revealed ("apparent") to you isn't
                            > > revealed to *me*, apparently.
                            > > >
                            > > >
                            > > > > Indeed, the most unpopular interpretation of his thought [Bertram's
                            > > > > Attempt at a Mythology] dwells on this very notion.
                            > > > >
                            > > > > It is this very contradictionism that makes him the greatest
                            > > philosopher
                            > > > > of all time.
                            > > > >
                            > > > > Most other philosophers have too often failed in trying to make
                            > > > > themselves champions of Aristotle's 'Law of Non-Contradiction'.
                            > > > >
                            > > > > To attempt to 'explain away' Nietzsche's mighty contradictory-nature
                            > > > > reeks of systematisation.
                            > > > >
                            > > >
                            > > > I *do* seek to get a good picture of Nietzsche's system. By "system",
                            > > however, I here do *not* mean the systemisations on his part (if any),
                            > > but the systemisation on the part of *Nature* in creating him, so to
                            > > say.
                            > > >
                            > > > "Every nation is put to shame if one points out such a wonderfully
                            > > idealised company of philosophers as that of the early Greek masters,
                            > > Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles,
                            > > Democritus and Socrates. All those men are integral, entire and
                            > > self­contained, and hewn out of one stone."
                            > > > [Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*.]
                            > > >
                            > > > I think Nietzsche, too, was such a man.
                            > > >
                            > > >
                            > > > > Going back to the question. Nietzsche's Perspectivism is not the
                            > > be-all
                            > > > > and end-all of his philosophy. It is one of his experiments-
                            > > attempts -
                            > > > > in thought . And therefore must be thought in terms of what a P is -
                            > > > > i.e. a particular and partial viewpoint.
                            > > > >
                            > > > > P is by definition too limited to make arche-like claims.
                            > > > >
                            > > > > Rather, the arche-like claim of the will to power suggests that
                            > > there
                            > > > > are other ways of knowing which are beyond Perspectives and are
                            > > > > certainly beyond scientific method(s).
                            > > > >
                            > > > > Indeed, there is a mystical [and therefore non-rational] element to
                            > > > > Nietzsche's philosophy which was pointed out very early by his one
                            > > time
                            > > > > friend - and near intellectual equal, Lou von Salome.
                            > > > >
                            > > > > It is here that non-P forms of knowing occur in Nietzsche's thought
                            > > -
                            > > > > forms of knowing which necessarily contradict P type knowledge.
                            > > > >
                            > > >
                            > > > I appreciate your approach to Nietzsche, which is becoming especially
                            > > evident now is very different from mine. I seek to make do with a single
                            > > 'element' (the rational) before I assume *several* elements, and indeed,
                            > > to speak with *BGE* 36, I may be taking this experiment to the point of
                            > > nonsense, from certain perspectives at least.
                            > > >
                            > > >
                            > > > >
                            > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                            > > > > wrote:
                            > > > > >
                            > > > > > Frankly, I find such remarks about contradictions in Nietzsche's
                            > > > > philosophy sledge-hammer arguments (and I don't think one can
                            > > > > philosophise with a sledge-hammer). Contrary to popular opinion, I
                            > > don't
                            > > > > think Nietzsche's philosophy's contradictory *at all* (he may
                            > > contradict
                            > > > > himself over time, or in the Nachlass, but not from any
                            > > inconsistency).
                            > > > > For years now, my approach to Nietzsche has been to resolve the
                            > > seeming
                            > > > > contradictions in his work, either by confirming their actual
                            > > > > contradictoriness and rejecting, say, the less developed member of
                            > > the
                            > > > > 'equation', or by finding an explanation that may plausibly account
                            > > for
                            > > > > both at the same time.
                            > > > > >
                            > > > > > I will now respond piece by piece to a passage from your previous
                            > > post
                            > > > > here.
                            > > > > >
                            > > > > > "An arche cannot be known by Per-spective; it requires - at the
                            > > very
                            > > > > least - a Pan-spective, or an Omni-spective."
                            > > > > >
                            > > > > > Yes. As I said, I agree with this. It cannot be *known* by P. But
                            > > what
                            > > > > distinguishes 'our' nineteenth century (Nietzsche's present) is not
                            > > the
                            > > > > victory of *science* (*scientia*, knowledge), but the victory of
                            > > > > scientific *method over* science (*WP* 466). In my view, Nietzsche's
                            > > > > will-to-power claim, rightly understood, makes no claim at
                            > > *knowledge*
                            > > > > but only at methodicality. What it does is: *given* that we cannot
                            > > > > attain to a 'Pan-spective' or 'Omni-spective', but only have a
                            > > > > Per-spective, it infers *methodologically* from that Per-spective to
                            > > > > what is beyond its view: it postulates that beyond it, there is also
                            > > > > nothing but such 'narrow chinks'.
                            > > > > >
                            > > > > >
                            > > > > > "So if "the world is will to power and nothing else besides", as
                            > > > > Nietzsche says it is, then this cannot be known by Perspectivism."
                            > > > > >
                            > > > > > Right, it cannot be *known*, but then this claim, this formulation
                            > > > > (from *WP* 1067), is only what the world looks like in Nietzsche's
                            > > > > *'mirror'*, i.e., it's only his communication of his view.
                            > > > > >
                            > > > > >
                            > > > > > "Of course, if the will to power is not an arche, but merely a P,
                            > > then
                            > > > > the will to power cannot be the infinite everything, the world and
                            > > > > nothing else besides."
                            > > > > >
                            > > > > > If it *is* not an arche. But we do not know that it is *nor that
                            > > it
                            > > > > isn't.* If the will to power is a P, that does not necessarily make
                            > > it
                            > > > > *merely* a P: it can still be the 'infinite everything'. There is no
                            > > > > absolute difference from, say, a *Christian* claim: only a
                            > > *relative*
                            > > > > difference, a difference in *plausibility*. It is based only on
                            > > one's
                            > > > > own experience and reasoning, not on any *belief*, any 'revelation'.
                            > > > > >
                            > > > > >
                            > > > > >
                            > > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@
                            > > wrote:
                            > > > > > >
                            > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > Even if the claim that "the world is will to power and nothing
                            > > else
                            > > > > > > besides" is considered to be an undogmatic, uncertain
                            > > hypothesis, it
                            > > > > > > still cannot be considered a Perspectival claim for the reasons
                            > > I
                            > > > > state
                            > > > > > > below.
                            > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > So the only way to get around this is to suggest that the will
                            > > to
                            > > > > power
                            > > > > > > is a Perspectival claim - but this meets the objections I have
                            > > > > already
                            > > > > > > made.
                            > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > Therefore the problem remains unresolvable in my view; - but
                            > > then
                            > > > > > > Nietzsche's philosophy is full of such contradictions.
                            > > > > > >
                            > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios"
                            > > <sauwelios@>
                            > > > > > > wrote:
                            > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > I agree, but I think what you say about archai only applies to
                            > > > > > > *dogmatic* archê-claims. As Lampert emphasises (see the new
                            > > Group
                            > > > > > > Description), the (hypo)thesis that the world be the will to
                            > > power
                            > > > > and
                            > > > > > > nothing besides remains a self-proclaimed *claim*: it does not
                            > > claim
                            > > > > > > certainty, but appeals to scientific method in general and
                            > > Occam's
                            > > > > Razor
                            > > > > > > in particular to present itself as the supreme interpretation.
                            > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@
                            > > > > wrote:
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > Thanks for raising this again.
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > For me, a Perspective [P] always suggests that there is
                            > > > > 'something
                            > > > > > > else
                            > > > > > > > > besides' the P.
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > There must be other Ps, just as there must be the ability to
                            > > > > > > > > alter/adjust/reverse, etc., Ps.
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > The world then exceeds a single P which latter could just be
                            > > a
                            > > > > > > 'narrow
                            > > > > > > > > chink'; as Blake says:
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > "If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would
                            > > > > appear
                            > > > > > > > > to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed himself up,
                            > > till
                            > > > > he
                            > > > > > > sees
                            > > > > > > > > all things through narrow chinks of his cavern."
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > So a P always suggests a part-icular and part-ial
                            > > view-point.
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > An arche though has more in common with Blake's 'infinite
                            > > > > > > everything'.
                            > > > > > > > > It says that this, and only this, is the world, "and nothing
                            > > > > else
                            > > > > > > > > besides." In other words, it is the totality of which
                            > > partial
                            > > > > > > > > view-points can be made, but which cannot be encompassed by
                            > > such
                            > > > > Ps.
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > If that is so, then can an arche be known purely by
                            > > Perspectival
                            > > > > > > seeing?
                            > > > > > > > > No, because by definition P is a narrow chink and cannot
                            > > view
                            > > > > the
                            > > > > > > > > infinite everything.
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > An arche cannot be known by Per-spective; it requires - at
                            > > the
                            > > > > very
                            > > > > > > > > least - a Pan-spective, or an Omni-spective.
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > So if "the world is will to power and nothing else besides",
                            > > as
                            > > > > > > > > Nietzsche says it is, then this cannot be known by
                            > > > > Perspectivism.
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > Of course, if the will to power is not an arche, but merely
                            > > a P,
                            > > > > > > then
                            > > > > > > > > the will to power cannot be the infinite everything, the
                            > > world
                            > > > > and
                            > > > > > > > > nothing else besides. But my question involves the
                            > > assumption
                            > > > > that
                            > > > > > > the
                            > > > > > > > > will to power is an arche.
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > So by this line of argument, the will to power and P are not
                            > > > > > > resolvable.
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios"
                            > > > > <sauwelios@>
                            > > > > > > > > wrote:
                            > > > > > > > > The discussion in question followed from Moody's opening
                            > > post,
                            > > > > which
                            > > > > > > > > read in full:
                            > > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > > "Does *Perspectivism* rule out *the will to power* in
                            > > > > Nietzsche's
                            > > > > > > > > philosophy?
                            > > > > > > > > > Give reasons either way."
                            > > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > > In my most important contribution to that discussion, I
                            > > (who
                            > > > > > > thought,
                            > > > > > > > > and still think, that the answer to Moody's question is a
                            > > > > resounding
                            > > > > > > > > "No; to the contrary") quoted *WP* 566-69, and wrote about
                            > > the
                            > > > > > > latter:
                            > > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > > "Could it be, Moody, that by what was formerly called "the
                            > > > > > > apparent
                            > > > > > > > > world", you understand "the adapted world which we feel to
                            > > be
                            > > > > real";
                            > > > > > > > > whereas by your 'beyond the true and the apparent world',
                            > > you
                            > > > > > > understand
                            > > > > > > > > "the formless unformulable world of the chaos of
                            > > sensations"?
                            > > > > Then
                            > > > > > > there
                            > > > > > > > > are *two* "apparent" worlds, one known to (namely, adapted
                            > > by)
                            > > > > us,
                            > > > > > > and
                            > > > > > > > > one unknown and unknowable to us (unadapted by us). And then
                            > > > > perhaps
                            > > > > > > the
                            > > > > > > > > adapted world is Apollinian, and the formless world
                            > > Dionysian?"
                            > > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > > I came back to this post due to my very recently begun
                            > > study
                            > > > > of
                            > > > > > > *Ernst
                            > > > > > > > > Mach* (the one from the sound barriers). For thanks to a Mr.
                            > > > > Nadeem
                            > > > > > > > > Hussain, I have come to see that certain problematical
                            > > passages
                            > > > > from
                            > > > > > > > > Nietzsche's works (e.g., *BGE* 15 and *TI* 'Reason' 2) can
                            > > be
                            > > > > > > explained
                            > > > > > > > > with the help of Mach.
                            > > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > > Rereading *WP* 569 from a Machian perspective, then, I
                            > > found
                            > > > > in it
                            > > > > > > > > *another argument for the will-to-power teaching*:
                            > > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > > "4. questions, what things "in-themselves" may be like,
                            > > apart
                            > > > > from
                            > > > > > > our
                            > > > > > > > > sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding,
                            > > must be
                            > > > > > > > > rebutted with the question: how could we know *that things
                            > > > > exist*?
                            > > > > > > > > "Thingness" was first created by us. The question is whether
                            > > > > there
                            > > > > > > could
                            > > > > > > > > not be many other ways of creating such an *apparent*
                            > > > > world---and
                            > > > > > > > > whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying is
                            > > not
                            > > > > > > itself
                            > > > > > > > > the best-guaranteed *reality*: in short, whether that which
                            > > > > "posits
                            > > > > > > > > things" is not the sole reality; and whether the "effect of
                            > > the
                            > > > > > > external
                            > > > > > > > > world upon us" is not also the result of such active
                            > > subjects...
                            > > > > The
                            > > > > > > > > other "entities" act upon us; our *adapted* apparent world
                            > > is an
                            > > > > > > > > adaptation and *overpowering* of their actions; a kind of
                            > > > > > > *defensive*
                            > > > > > > > > measure."
                            > > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > > This is an entire paragraph in the manuscript: what
                            > > follows,
                            > > > > the
                            > > > > > > end
                            > > > > > > > > of the section, is a new paragraph.
                            > > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > > Our way of creating 'thingness' ("the activity of our
                            > > > > > > understanding")
                            > > > > > > > > is a way of creating an apparent world; but there may be
                            > > *many*
                            > > > > ways
                            > > > > > > of
                            > > > > > > > > creating such a world---many ways of logicising, adapting,
                            > > > > > > falsifying
                            > > > > > > > > "the chaos of sensations" (ibid.) into a workable form.
                            > > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > > The activity of our understanding, the logicising,
                            > > adapting,
                            > > > > > > > > falsifying by means of which we create our 'world' (our
                            > > world of
                            > > > > > > > > 'things') is, to speak with Leo Strauss (see this group's
                            > > > > > > Description)
                            > > > > > > > > "an act of the will-to-power". And there may be many *other*
                            > > > > ways of
                            > > > > > > > > thusly "*overpowering*" "other 'entities'"! Compare *BGE*
                            > > 36:
                            > > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > > "Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our
                            > > world of
                            > > > > > > desires
                            > > > > > > > > and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other
                            > > > > > > "reality"
                            > > > > > > > > besides the reality of our drives---for thinking is merely a
                            > > > > > > relations
                            > > > > > > > > of these drives to each other---: is it not permitted to
                            > > make
                            > > > > the
                            > > > > > > > > experiment and to ask the question whether this 'given'
                            > > would
                            > > > > not be
                            > > > > > > > > *sufficient* for also understanding on the basis of this
                            > > kind of
                            > > > > > > thing
                            > > > > > > > > the so-called mechanistic (or "material") world? I, mean,
                            > > not as
                            > > > > a
                            > > > > > > > > deception, as "mere appearance," an "idea" (in the sense of
                            > > > > Berkeley
                            > > > > > > and
                            > > > > > > > > Schopenhauer) but as holding the same rank of reality as our
                            > > > > > > affect---as
                            > > > > > > > > a more primitive form of the world of affects[?]"
                            > > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > > > The so-called mechanistic world understood as a more
                            > > primitive
                            > > > > > > form of
                            > > > > > > > > "that which 'posits things'"---i.e., of the *will to
                            > > power*...
                            > > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > > >
                            > > > > > >
                            > > > > >
                            > > > >
                            > > >
                            > >
                            >

                          • Sauwelios
                            ... Of course, we do not have to *believe* Nietzsche when he says he is at bottom healthy. He does, however, strictly distinguish between healthy and decadent:
                            Message 13 of 22 , Jan 30, 2010
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                              --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" <moodylawless@...> wrote:
                              >
                              >
                              > Nietzsche's own succumbing to a chronic illness shows that he did not
                              > 'resolve' this contradiction; he was - and remained - ill/healthy.
                              >

                              Of course, we do not have to *believe* Nietzsche when he says he is at bottom healthy. He does, however, strictly distinguish between healthy and decadent: one is at bottom either the one or the other.


                              > The passage you quote itself reflects this.
                              >
                              > Nietzsche's philosophy was made out of a 'will to health', most
                              > certainly.
                              >
                              > And Nietzsche himself was congentially ill; he was also super-abundantly
                              > healthy.
                              >

                              Do you mean "congenitally"? If so, are you suggesting he had congenital syphilis?


                              > He couldn't resolve this contradiction - he wouldn't have wanted to.
                              >
                              > Just as he didn't resolve the duality of Apollo/Dionysos.
                              >

                              Though I can't say with certainty what he would and would not have wanted, as that has not been revealed to me, I do think he resolved the duality of Apollo/Dionysus. I don't think it was a 'duality' to him---i.e., an actual antithesis, a diametrical opposition. We have discussed the 'line' which the Apollinian may not cross in the past already, and reached an impasse. That was from the *BT*. But in *WP* 799, he marks two *relative* differences: implicitly, a *gradual* difference in sexuality/voluptuousness (the German refers to this as *one* item, hence the slash); explicitly, a difference in *tempo*. It seems that at most, then, they are *poles*---limits between which there is a whole scale of greys.


                              > The facetthat Health and Dionysos remain open questions to Nietzscheans
                              > show that they were not resolved - nor were they meant to be resolved.
                              >

                              That depends on whom you define as 'Nietzscheans'.


                              > If Nietzsche had 'explained away' all these aporiai then there would be
                              > nothing left to do.
                              >

                              So if he had *not*, what would have to be done would be to 'explain them away' *ourselves*?


                              > Anyway, I have always maintained that Ecce Homo was the best way to
                              > approach Nietzsche and find most books 'about' Nietzsche to be a waste
                              > of time.
                              >
                              > One must at times break out of the hermeneutical viscious circle of
                              > interpretation.
                              >
                              > Poetry [and poetic inspiration] is one example of such non-Perspectival
                              > knowledge which does just this.
                              >
                              > The poetry of the sledge-hammer, no doubt.
                              >

                              Nietzsche was most skeptical about 'inspiration', of course.


                              >
                              >
                              >
                              > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                              > wrote:
                              > >
                              > >
                              > >
                              > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@ wrote:
                              > > >
                              > > >
                              > > > "Agreed that I am a decadent, I am also the very reverse."
                              > > > [Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 'Why I Am So Wise', 2]
                              > > >
                              > >
                              > > That is the opening sentence of section 2, in which he immediately
                              > goes on to explain this seeming contradiction 'away', i.e., to resolve
                              > it:
                              > >
                              > > "Agreed that I am a decadent, I am also the very reverse. My proof for
                              > this is, among other things, that I instinctively always choose the
                              > *right* remedies against bad conditions: whereas a decadent as such [an
                              > sich] always chooses remedies that are disadvantageous to him. As summa
                              > summarum [i.e., overall] I was healthy [gesund], as a nook, as a
                              > specialty I was decadent. [...] I took control of myself, I made myself
                              > whole [gesund] again: the precondition for this---every physiologist
                              > will admit this---is, *that one is at bottom healthy*. A typically
                              > morbid creature cannot become healthy, even less make itself healthy;
                              > for a typical healthy person, conversely, illness can even be an
                              > energetic *stimulant* to life, to staying-alive. Indeed, thus appears
                              > that long period of illness to me *now*[.]"
                              > > [ibid.]
                              > >
                              > >
                              > > >
                              > > >
                              > > > I think your latest 'Lampertian' trend is a mistake.
                              > > >
                              > > > Indeed, all such trends are a mistake.
                              > > >
                              > > > As Ecce Homo shows, Nietzsche was the best interpreter of Nietzsche.
                              > > >
                              > >
                              > > Then your and my readings of Nietzsche are also mistakes. But this is
                              > of course another sledge-hammer argument. If interpretation is an act of
                              > the will to power, then one practices Nietzsche's philosophy by
                              > interpreting him.
                              > >
                              > > Nietzsche's philosophy---the philosophy of will to power---is an
                              > interpretation of the world, which, that philosophy argues, is
                              > interpretation and nothing besides. *Ecce Homo*, you imply, is an
                              > interpretation of that world-interpretation. That book's readers,
                              > however, can only *interpret* it. My Lampertian 'trend' is an
                              > interpretation of Lampert's interpretation of Nietzsche. Funnily, the
                              > first book I read by Lampert was his *Leo Strauss and Nietzsche*, a
                              > major part of which is his interpretation of Strauss's interpretation of
                              > Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil*, which interprets the world as will
                              > to power and nothing besides (sections 22 and 36). In reading *LSN*,
                              > then, I was interpreting (1) an interpretation (2) of an interpretation
                              > (3) of an interpretation (4) of the world (5). But at the same time, I
                              > was a) interpreting (1) an interpretation (2) of an interpretation (3)
                              > of the world (4) (namely, in reading Strauss' essay myself, which was
                              > included as an appendix), b) interpreting (1) an interpretation (2) of
                              > the world (3) (namely, in reading *BGE*), and c) interpreting (1) the
                              > world (2) (which, like *BGE*, I had with me almost every time I read
                              > Lampert's book). And all the time, I was myself a part of the world (1),
                              > of course.
                              > >
                              > >
                              > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                              > > > wrote:
                              > > > >
                              > > > > My comments below.
                              > > > >
                              > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@
                              > wrote:
                              > > > > >
                              > > > > >
                              > > > > > I think that Nietzsche actively phiolosophised via
                              > contradictions.
                              > > > > >
                              > > > > > This is not just apparent across the development of his work but
                              > > > even in
                              > > > > > single works - nay, in single sentences [I needn't quote
                              > examples at
                              > > > > > this level, surely?].
                              > > > > >
                              > > > >
                              > > > > Yes, please do. For what is revealed ("apparent") to you isn't
                              > > > revealed to *me*, apparently.
                              > > > >
                              > > > >
                              > > > > > Indeed, the most unpopular interpretation of his thought
                              > [Bertram's
                              > > > > > Attempt at a Mythology] dwells on this very notion.
                              > > > > >
                              > > > > > It is this very contradictionism that makes him the greatest
                              > > > philosopher
                              > > > > > of all time.
                              > > > > >
                              > > > > > Most other philosophers have too often failed in trying to make
                              > > > > > themselves champions of Aristotle's 'Law of Non-Contradiction'.
                              > > > > >
                              > > > > > To attempt to 'explain away' Nietzsche's mighty
                              > contradictory-nature
                              > > > > > reeks of systematisation.
                              > > > > >
                              > > > >
                              > > > > I *do* seek to get a good picture of Nietzsche's system. By
                              > "system",
                              > > > however, I here do *not* mean the systemisations on his part (if
                              > any),
                              > > > but the systemisation on the part of *Nature* in creating him, so to
                              > > > say.
                              > > > >
                              > > > > "Every nation is put to shame if one points out such a wonderfully
                              > > > idealised company of philosophers as that of the early Greek
                              > masters,
                              > > > Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles,
                              > > > Democritus and Socrates. All those men are integral, entire and
                              > > > self­contained, and hewn out of one stone."
                              > > > > [Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*.]
                              > > > >
                              > > > > I think Nietzsche, too, was such a man.
                              > > > >
                              > > > >
                              > > > > > Going back to the question. Nietzsche's Perspectivism is not the
                              > > > be-all
                              > > > > > and end-all of his philosophy. It is one of his experiments-
                              > > > attempts -
                              > > > > > in thought . And therefore must be thought in terms of what a P
                              > is -
                              > > > > > i.e. a particular and partial viewpoint.
                              > > > > >
                              > > > > > P is by definition too limited to make arche-like claims.
                              > > > > >
                              > > > > > Rather, the arche-like claim of the will to power suggests that
                              > > > there
                              > > > > > are other ways of knowing which are beyond Perspectives and are
                              > > > > > certainly beyond scientific method(s).
                              > > > > >
                              > > > > > Indeed, there is a mystical [and therefore non-rational] element
                              > to
                              > > > > > Nietzsche's philosophy which was pointed out very early by his
                              > one
                              > > > time
                              > > > > > friend - and near intellectual equal, Lou von Salome.
                              > > > > >
                              > > > > > It is here that non-P forms of knowing occur in Nietzsche's
                              > thought
                              > > > -
                              > > > > > forms of knowing which necessarily contradict P type knowledge.
                              > > > > >
                              > > > >
                              > > > > I appreciate your approach to Nietzsche, which is becoming
                              > especially
                              > > > evident now is very different from mine. I seek to make do with a
                              > single
                              > > > 'element' (the rational) before I assume *several* elements, and
                              > indeed,
                              > > > to speak with *BGE* 36, I may be taking this experiment to the point
                              > of
                              > > > nonsense, from certain perspectives at least.
                              > > > >
                              > > > >
                              > > > > >
                              > > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios"
                              > <sauwelios@>
                              > > > > > wrote:
                              > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > Frankly, I find such remarks about contradictions in
                              > Nietzsche's
                              > > > > > philosophy sledge-hammer arguments (and I don't think one can
                              > > > > > philosophise with a sledge-hammer). Contrary to popular opinion,
                              > I
                              > > > don't
                              > > > > > think Nietzsche's philosophy's contradictory *at all* (he may
                              > > > contradict
                              > > > > > himself over time, or in the Nachlass, but not from any
                              > > > inconsistency).
                              > > > > > For years now, my approach to Nietzsche has been to resolve the
                              > > > seeming
                              > > > > > contradictions in his work, either by confirming their actual
                              > > > > > contradictoriness and rejecting, say, the less developed member
                              > of
                              > > > the
                              > > > > > 'equation', or by finding an explanation that may plausibly
                              > account
                              > > > for
                              > > > > > both at the same time.
                              > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > I will now respond piece by piece to a passage from your
                              > previous
                              > > > post
                              > > > > > here.
                              > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > "An arche cannot be known by Per-spective; it requires - at
                              > the
                              > > > very
                              > > > > > least - a Pan-spective, or an Omni-spective."
                              > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > Yes. As I said, I agree with this. It cannot be *known* by P.
                              > But
                              > > > what
                              > > > > > distinguishes 'our' nineteenth century (Nietzsche's present) is
                              > not
                              > > > the
                              > > > > > victory of *science* (*scientia*, knowledge), but the victory of
                              > > > > > scientific *method over* science (*WP* 466). In my view,
                              > Nietzsche's
                              > > > > > will-to-power claim, rightly understood, makes no claim at
                              > > > *knowledge*
                              > > > > > but only at methodicality. What it does is: *given* that we
                              > cannot
                              > > > > > attain to a 'Pan-spective' or 'Omni-spective', but only have a
                              > > > > > Per-spective, it infers *methodologically* from that
                              > Per-spective to
                              > > > > > what is beyond its view: it postulates that beyond it, there is
                              > also
                              > > > > > nothing but such 'narrow chinks'.
                              > > > > > >
                              > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > "So if "the world is will to power and nothing else besides",
                              > as
                              > > > > > Nietzsche says it is, then this cannot be known by
                              > Perspectivism."
                              > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > Right, it cannot be *known*, but then this claim, this
                              > formulation
                              > > > > > (from *WP* 1067), is only what the world looks like in
                              > Nietzsche's
                              > > > > > *'mirror'*, i.e., it's only his communication of his view.
                              > > > > > >
                              > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > "Of course, if the will to power is not an arche, but merely a
                              > P,
                              > > > then
                              > > > > > the will to power cannot be the infinite everything, the world
                              > and
                              > > > > > nothing else besides."
                              > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > If it *is* not an arche. But we do not know that it is *nor
                              > that
                              > > > it
                              > > > > > isn't.* If the will to power is a P, that does not necessarily
                              > make
                              > > > it
                              > > > > > *merely* a P: it can still be the 'infinite everything'. There
                              > is no
                              > > > > > absolute difference from, say, a *Christian* claim: only a
                              > > > *relative*
                              > > > > > difference, a difference in *plausibility*. It is based only on
                              > > > one's
                              > > > > > own experience and reasoning, not on any *belief*, any
                              > 'revelation'.
                              > > > > > >
                              > > > > > >
                              > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@
                              > > > wrote:
                              > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > Even if the claim that "the world is will to power and
                              > nothing
                              > > > else
                              > > > > > > > besides" is considered to be an undogmatic, uncertain
                              > > > hypothesis, it
                              > > > > > > > still cannot be considered a Perspectival claim for the
                              > reasons
                              > > > I
                              > > > > > state
                              > > > > > > > below.
                              > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > So the only way to get around this is to suggest that the
                              > will
                              > > > to
                              > > > > > power
                              > > > > > > > is a Perspectival claim - but this meets the objections I
                              > have
                              > > > > > already
                              > > > > > > > made.
                              > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > Therefore the problem remains unresolvable in my view; - but
                              > > > then
                              > > > > > > > Nietzsche's philosophy is full of such contradictions.
                              > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios"
                              > > > <sauwelios@>
                              > > > > > > > wrote:
                              > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > I agree, but I think what you say about archai only
                              > applies to
                              > > > > > > > *dogmatic* archê-claims. As Lampert emphasises (see the
                              > new
                              > > > Group
                              > > > > > > > Description), the (hypo)thesis that the world be the will to
                              > > > power
                              > > > > > and
                              > > > > > > > nothing besides remains a self-proclaimed *claim*: it does
                              > not
                              > > > claim
                              > > > > > > > certainty, but appeals to scientific method in general and
                              > > > Occam's
                              > > > > > Razor
                              > > > > > > > in particular to present itself as the supreme
                              > interpretation.
                              > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody"
                              > moodylawless@
                              > > > > > wrote:
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > Thanks for raising this again.
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > For me, a Perspective [P] always suggests that there is
                              > > > > > 'something
                              > > > > > > > else
                              > > > > > > > > > besides' the P.
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > There must be other Ps, just as there must be the
                              > ability to
                              > > > > > > > > > alter/adjust/reverse, etc., Ps.
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > The world then exceeds a single P which latter could
                              > just be
                              > > > a
                              > > > > > > > 'narrow
                              > > > > > > > > > chink'; as Blake says:
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > "If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything
                              > would
                              > > > > > appear
                              > > > > > > > > > to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed himself
                              > up,
                              > > > till
                              > > > > > he
                              > > > > > > > sees
                              > > > > > > > > > all things through narrow chinks of his cavern."
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > So a P always suggests a part-icular and part-ial
                              > > > view-point.
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > An arche though has more in common with Blake's
                              > 'infinite
                              > > > > > > > everything'.
                              > > > > > > > > > It says that this, and only this, is the world, "and
                              > nothing
                              > > > > > else
                              > > > > > > > > > besides." In other words, it is the totality of which
                              > > > partial
                              > > > > > > > > > view-points can be made, but which cannot be encompassed
                              > by
                              > > > such
                              > > > > > Ps.
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > If that is so, then can an arche be known purely by
                              > > > Perspectival
                              > > > > > > > seeing?
                              > > > > > > > > > No, because by definition P is a narrow chink and cannot
                              > > > view
                              > > > > > the
                              > > > > > > > > > infinite everything.
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > An arche cannot be known by Per-spective; it requires -
                              > at
                              > > > the
                              > > > > > very
                              > > > > > > > > > least - a Pan-spective, or an Omni-spective.
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > So if "the world is will to power and nothing else
                              > besides",
                              > > > as
                              > > > > > > > > > Nietzsche says it is, then this cannot be known by
                              > > > > > Perspectivism.
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > Of course, if the will to power is not an arche, but
                              > merely
                              > > > a P,
                              > > > > > > > then
                              > > > > > > > > > the will to power cannot be the infinite everything, the
                              > > > world
                              > > > > > and
                              > > > > > > > > > nothing else besides. But my question involves the
                              > > > assumption
                              > > > > > that
                              > > > > > > > the
                              > > > > > > > > > will to power is an arche.
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > So by this line of argument, the will to power and P are
                              > not
                              > > > > > > > resolvable.
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios"
                              > > > > > <sauwelios@>
                              > > > > > > > > > wrote:
                              > > > > > > > > > The discussion in question followed from Moody's opening
                              > > > post,
                              > > > > > which
                              > > > > > > > > > read in full:
                              > > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > > "Does *Perspectivism* rule out *the will to power* in
                              > > > > > Nietzsche's
                              > > > > > > > > > philosophy?
                              > > > > > > > > > > Give reasons either way."
                              > > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > > In my most important contribution to that discussion,
                              > I
                              > > > (who
                              > > > > > > > thought,
                              > > > > > > > > > and still think, that the answer to Moody's question is
                              > a
                              > > > > > resounding
                              > > > > > > > > > "No; to the contrary") quoted *WP* 566-69, and wrote
                              > about
                              > > > the
                              > > > > > > > latter:
                              > > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > > "Could it be, Moody, that by what was formerly called
                              > "the
                              > > > > > > > apparent
                              > > > > > > > > > world", you understand "the adapted world which we feel
                              > to
                              > > > be
                              > > > > > real";
                              > > > > > > > > > whereas by your 'beyond the true and the apparent
                              > world',
                              > > > you
                              > > > > > > > understand
                              > > > > > > > > > "the formless unformulable world of the chaos of
                              > > > sensations"?
                              > > > > > Then
                              > > > > > > > there
                              > > > > > > > > > are *two* "apparent" worlds, one known to (namely,
                              > adapted
                              > > > by)
                              > > > > > us,
                              > > > > > > > and
                              > > > > > > > > > one unknown and unknowable to us (unadapted by us). And
                              > then
                              > > > > > perhaps
                              > > > > > > > the
                              > > > > > > > > > adapted world is Apollinian, and the formless world
                              > > > Dionysian?"
                              > > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > > I came back to this post due to my very recently begun
                              > > > study
                              > > > > > of
                              > > > > > > > *Ernst
                              > > > > > > > > > Mach* (the one from the sound barriers). For thanks to a
                              > Mr.
                              > > > > > Nadeem
                              > > > > > > > > > Hussain, I have come to see that certain problematical
                              > > > passages
                              > > > > > from
                              > > > > > > > > > Nietzsche's works (e.g., *BGE* 15 and *TI* 'Reason' 2)
                              > can
                              > > > be
                              > > > > > > > explained
                              > > > > > > > > > with the help of Mach.
                              > > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > > Rereading *WP* 569 from a Machian perspective, then, I
                              > > > found
                              > > > > > in it
                              > > > > > > > > > *another argument for the will-to-power teaching*:
                              > > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > > "4. questions, what things "in-themselves" may be
                              > like,
                              > > > apart
                              > > > > > from
                              > > > > > > > our
                              > > > > > > > > > sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding,
                              > > > must be
                              > > > > > > > > > rebutted with the question: how could we know *that
                              > things
                              > > > > > exist*?
                              > > > > > > > > > "Thingness" was first created by us. The question is
                              > whether
                              > > > > > there
                              > > > > > > > could
                              > > > > > > > > > not be many other ways of creating such an *apparent*
                              > > > > > world---and
                              > > > > > > > > > whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying
                              > is
                              > > > not
                              > > > > > > > itself
                              > > > > > > > > > the best-guaranteed *reality*: in short, whether that
                              > which
                              > > > > > "posits
                              > > > > > > > > > things" is not the sole reality; and whether the "effect
                              > of
                              > > > the
                              > > > > > > > external
                              > > > > > > > > > world upon us" is not also the result of such active
                              > > > subjects...
                              > > > > > The
                              > > > > > > > > > other "entities" act upon us; our *adapted* apparent
                              > world
                              > > > is an
                              > > > > > > > > > adaptation and *overpowering* of their actions; a kind
                              > of
                              > > > > > > > *defensive*
                              > > > > > > > > > measure."
                              > > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > > This is an entire paragraph in the manuscript: what
                              > > > follows,
                              > > > > > the
                              > > > > > > > end
                              > > > > > > > > > of the section, is a new paragraph.
                              > > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > > Our way of creating 'thingness' ("the activity of our
                              > > > > > > > understanding")
                              > > > > > > > > > is a way of creating an apparent world; but there may be
                              > > > *many*
                              > > > > > ways
                              > > > > > > > of
                              > > > > > > > > > creating such a world---many ways of logicising,
                              > adapting,
                              > > > > > > > falsifying
                              > > > > > > > > > "the chaos of sensations" (ibid.) into a workable form.
                              > > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > > The activity of our understanding, the logicising,
                              > > > adapting,
                              > > > > > > > > > falsifying by means of which we create our 'world' (our
                              > > > world of
                              > > > > > > > > > 'things') is, to speak with Leo Strauss (see this
                              > group's
                              > > > > > > > Description)
                              > > > > > > > > > "an act of the will-to-power". And there may be many
                              > *other*
                              > > > > > ways of
                              > > > > > > > > > thusly "*overpowering*" "other 'entities'"! Compare
                              > *BGE*
                              > > > 36:
                              > > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > > "Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our
                              > > > world of
                              > > > > > > > desires
                              > > > > > > > > > and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any
                              > other
                              > > > > > > > "reality"
                              > > > > > > > > > besides the reality of our drives---for thinking is
                              > merely a
                              > > > > > > > relations
                              > > > > > > > > > of these drives to each other---: is it not permitted to
                              > > > make
                              > > > > > the
                              > > > > > > > > > experiment and to ask the question whether this 'given'
                              > > > would
                              > > > > > not be
                              > > > > > > > > > *sufficient* for also understanding on the basis of this
                              > > > kind of
                              > > > > > > > thing
                              > > > > > > > > > the so-called mechanistic (or "material") world? I,
                              > mean,
                              > > > not as
                              > > > > > a
                              > > > > > > > > > deception, as "mere appearance," an "idea" (in the sense
                              > of
                              > > > > > Berkeley
                              > > > > > > > and
                              > > > > > > > > > Schopenhauer) but as holding the same rank of reality as
                              > our
                              > > > > > > > affect---as
                              > > > > > > > > > a more primitive form of the world of affects[?]"
                              > > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > > > The so-called mechanistic world understood as a more
                              > > > primitive
                              > > > > > > > form of
                              > > > > > > > > > "that which 'posits things'"---i.e., of the *will to
                              > > > power*...
                              > > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > > >
                              > > > > > >
                              > > > > >
                              > > > >
                              > > >
                              > >
                              >
                            • Moody
                              Nietzsche made a very important statement about inspiration in that most crucial work for Nietzsche-interpretation, Ecce Homo. Here Nietzsche was reviewing his
                              Message 14 of 22 , Feb 1, 2010
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                                Nietzsche made a very important statement about inspiration in that most crucial work for Nietzsche-interpretation, Ecce Homo.

                                Here Nietzsche was reviewing his own postic masterpiece, Thus Spake Zarathustra:

                                 

                                Has anyone at the end of the 19th century a distinct conception of what poets of strong ages called inspiration? If not, I will describe it. - If one had the slightest residue of superstition left in one, one would be hardly able to set aside the idea that one is merely incarnation, merely mouthpiece, merely medium of overwhelming forces. The concept of revelation, in the sense that something suddenly, with unspeakable certainty and subtlety, becomes visible, audible, something that shakes and overturns one to the depths, simply describes the fact. One hears, one does not seek; one takes, one does not ask who gives; a thought flashes up like lightning, with necessity, unfalteringly formed - I have never had any choice. An ecstasy whose tremendous tension sometimes discharges itself in a flood of tears, while one's steps now involuntarily rush along, now involuntarily lag; a complete being outside of oneself with the distinct consciousness of a multitude of subtle shudders and trickles down to one's toes; a depth of happiness in which the most painful and gloomy things appear, not as antithesis, but as conditioned, demanded, as a necessry colour within such a superfluity of light ... [...] Everything is in the highest degree involuntary but takes place as in a tempest of a feeling of freedom, of absoluteness, of power, of divinity ... The involuntary nature of image, of metaphor is the most remarkable thing of all ... [...] It really does seem, to allude to a saying of Zarathustra's, as if the things themselves appraoched and offered themselves as metaphors ... [...] This is my experience of inspiration; I do not doubt that one has to go back thousands of years to find anyone who could say to me 'it is mine also'. - [Nietzsche, EH, TSZ 3 (Hollingdale translation, Penguin 1979 pp. 72-3)]

                                Clearly this is a brilliantly lucid description of the non-perspectival aspects of poetic inspiration.

                                --------------------------------------------

                                --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@...> wrote:
                                > Nietzsche was most skeptical about 'inspiration', of course.

                                 

                              • Sauwelios
                                ... This is essential: superstition is an indispensable ingredient if one is to have the idea that follows. one would ... This is interpretation, of course:
                                Message 15 of 22 , Feb 1, 2010
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                                  --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" <moodylawless@...> wrote:
                                  >
                                  >
                                  > Nietzsche made a very important statement about inspiration in that most
                                  > crucial work for Nietzsche-interpretation, Ecce Homo.
                                  >
                                  > Here Nietzsche was reviewing his own postic masterpiece, Thus Spake
                                  > Zarathustra:
                                  >
                                  >
                                  > Has anyone at the end of the 19th century a distinct conception of what
                                  > poets of strong ages called inspiration? If not, I will describe it. -
                                  > If one had the slightest residue of superstition left in one,

                                  This is essential: superstition is an indispensable ingredient if one is to have the idea that follows.


                                  one would
                                  > be hardly able to set aside the idea that one is merely incarnation,
                                  > merely mouthpiece, merely medium of overwhelming forces.

                                  This is interpretation, of course: who says there is anything *behind* these impressions?


                                  > The concept of
                                  > revelation, in the sense that something suddenly, with unspeakable
                                  > certainty and subtlety, becomes visible, audible,

                                  Here we have the implication of visual and aural *sensations* (which Mach called "elements"). And indeed, sense impressions are a kind of revelations (but *not* necessarily of something beyond them).


                                  > something that shakes
                                  > and overturns one to the depths, simply describes the fact. One hears,
                                  > one does not seek; one takes, one does not ask who gives; a thought
                                  > flashes up like lightning, with necessity, unfalteringly formed - I have
                                  > never had any choice. An ecstasy whose tremendous tension sometimes
                                  > discharges itself in a flood of tears, while one's steps now
                                  > involuntarily rush along, now involuntarily lag; a complete being
                                  > outside of oneself with the distinct consciousness of a multitude of
                                  > subtle shudders and trickles down to one's toes; a depth of happiness in
                                  > which the most painful and gloomy things appear, not as antithesis, but
                                  > as conditioned, demanded, as a necessry colour within such a superfluity
                                  > of light ... [...] Everything is in the highest degree involuntary but
                                  > takes place as in a tempest of a feeling of freedom, of absoluteness, of
                                  > power, of divinity ... The involuntary nature of image, of metaphor is
                                  > the most remarkable thing of all ... [...] It really does seem, to
                                  > allude to a saying of Zarathustra's, as if the things themselves
                                  > appraoched and offered themselves as metaphors ...

                                  But the idea of 'things' is already an *interpretation* (of clusters of 'sensations').


                                  > [...] This is my
                                  > experience of inspiration; I do not doubt that one has to go back
                                  > thousands of years to find anyone who could say to me 'it is mine also'.
                                  > - [Nietzsche, EH, TSZ 3 (Hollingdale translation, Penguin 1979 pp.
                                  > 72-3)]
                                  > Clearly this is a brilliantly lucid description of the non-perspectival
                                  > aspects of poetic inspiration.
                                  >
                                  > --------------------------------------------
                                  >
                                  > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                                  > wrote:
                                  > > Nietzsche was most skeptical about 'inspiration', of course.
                                  >
                                • Sauwelios
                                  ... most ... what ... - ... is to have the idea that follows. ... these impressions? ... Mach called elements ). And indeed, sense impressions are a kind of
                                  Message 16 of 22 , Feb 10, 2010
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                                    --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@...> wrote:
                                    >
                                    >
                                    >
                                    > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" moodylawless@ wrote:
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > > Nietzsche made a very important statement about inspiration in that most
                                    > > crucial work for Nietzsche-interpretation, Ecce Homo.
                                    > >
                                    > > Here Nietzsche was reviewing his own postic masterpiece, Thus Spake
                                    > > Zarathustra:
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > > Has anyone at the end of the 19th century a distinct conception of what
                                    > > poets of strong ages called inspiration? If not, I will describe it. -
                                    > > If one had the slightest residue of superstition left in one,
                                    >
                                    > This is essential: superstition is an indispensable ingredient if one is to have the idea that follows.
                                    >
                                    >
                                    > one would
                                    > > be hardly able to set aside the idea that one is merely incarnation,
                                    > > merely mouthpiece, merely medium of overwhelming forces.
                                    >
                                    > This is interpretation, of course: who says there is anything *behind* these impressions?
                                    >
                                    >
                                    > > The concept of
                                    > > revelation, in the sense that something suddenly, with unspeakable
                                    > > certainty and subtlety, becomes visible, audible,
                                    >
                                    > Here we have the implication of visual and aural *sensations* (which Mach called "elements"). And indeed, sense impressions are a kind of revelations (but *not* necessarily of something beyond them).
                                    >
                                    >
                                    > > something that shakes
                                    > > and overturns one to the depths, simply describes the fact. One hears,
                                    > > one does not seek; one takes, one does not ask who gives; a thought
                                    > > flashes up like lightning, with necessity, unfalteringly formed - I have
                                    > > never had any choice. An ecstasy whose tremendous tension sometimes
                                    > > discharges itself in a flood of tears, while one's steps now
                                    > > involuntarily rush along, now involuntarily lag; a complete being
                                    > > outside of oneself with the distinct consciousness of a multitude of
                                    > > subtle shudders and trickles down to one's toes; a depth of happiness in
                                    > > which the most painful and gloomy things appear, not as antithesis, but
                                    > > as conditioned, demanded, as a necessry colour within such a superfluity
                                    > > of light ... [...] Everything is in the highest degree involuntary but
                                    > > takes place as in a tempest of a feeling of freedom, of absoluteness, of
                                    > > power, of divinity ... The involuntary nature of image, of metaphor is
                                    > > the most remarkable thing of all ... [...] It really does seem, to
                                    > > allude to a saying of Zarathustra's, as if the things themselves
                                    > > appraoched and offered themselves as metaphors ...
                                    >
                                    > But the idea of 'things' is already an *interpretation* (of clusters of 'sensations').
                                    >
                                    >
                                    > > [...] This is my
                                    > > experience of inspiration; I do not doubt that one has to go back
                                    > > thousands of years to find anyone who could say to me 'it is mine also'.
                                    > > - [Nietzsche, EH, TSZ 3 (Hollingdale translation, Penguin 1979 pp.
                                    > > 72-3)]
                                    > > Clearly this is a brilliantly lucid description of the non-perspectival
                                    > > aspects of poetic inspiration.
                                    > >
                                    > > --------------------------------------------
                                    > >
                                    > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                                    > > wrote:
                                    > > > Nietzsche was most skeptical about 'inspiration', of course.
                                    > >
                                    >

                                    I received a reply to this post by email. I will reproduce it here, together with the response I sent back, though without identifying the sender.

                                    His email:

                                    The crucial thing here is that Nietzsche says that this 'superstitious' view is "my experience of inspiration".

                                    And so it is not among the non-superstitious reductionists of  the 19th century (or today) that one will find such a view (although all ages look superstitious in retrospect, just as no age will admit to being superstitious in its present) ; you will have to go back 'thousands of years' to find it.

                                    Perspectivism relies on the principle of individuation, and so is Apollonian.

                                    The Dionysian meanwhile is akin to Blake's infitie everything and so is beyond all perspectivism and individualism.

                                    Poets are able to comprehend the Dionysian through the poetic inspiration Nietzsche describes above - no matter how 'superstitious' materialists etc., may regard it.

                                    Mach's 'philosophy' has more in common with logical positivism etc., and does not apply well to Nietzsche's philosophy in my view.


                                    My reply:

                                    Dear [name withheld],

                                    Thank you for your mail.

                                    Note that I don't regard Nietzsche's description of inspiration in EH as a superstitious view. Nietzsche distances himself from such superstition. He just describes what it's like.

                                    I think Nietzsche was both non-superstitious and reductionist, as he 'reduced' all existence to the will to power.

                                    The idea that poets can somehow attain to a non-perspectival view through the 'revelations' of 'inspiration' is ironically, paradoxically Platonic: the 'pure mind' of the poet experiences the 'in-itself' of existence!

                                    The point of Nietzsche's 'Machianism', which was possibly avant-la-lettre, is that it goes beyond such distinctions of an 'apparent world' and a 'true world', even that between the 'apparent world' of individuation and the 'true world' of oneness: there are only what Mach first called "sensations" (http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Empfindung) and later "elements" [Elemente] or "experiences" (http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Befunde). However, clusters of such elements are falsified into 'objects', 'things', etc. This falsification is the work of the will to power according to Nietzsche.

                                    Ironically, Mach referred to a 'mystical experience' of his in introducing his idea:

                                    On a bright summer day in the open air, the world with my ego suddenly appeared to me as one coherent mass of sensations, only more strongly coherent in the ego.
                                    [Mach, Analysis of Sensations I.13.]

                                    This must have been a relative decrease in falsification, though, as without the illusion of 'objects', there can be no consciousness.

                                    Did you, by the way, mean to send this mail only to me? If you want I will post your message and my reply in the group.

                                    Sincerely,

                                    Sauwelios


                                    As I never got a reply, and its now about a week ago, I decided to post them in the group anyway.

                                    I think Mach's 'revelation' can also be said to have been Nietzsche's, though Nietzsche seems to have been struck even more by the concealment than by the 'revelation'. His 'revelation' of the will to power can be said to be his insight that the 'chaos of sensations' is concealed by the interpretation of clusters of those sensations as 'things'.
                                  • Moody
                                    This mysterious correspondent has certainly imbibed from my well. As s/he has not replied, I think I understand their argument enough to add some thoughts and
                                    Message 17 of 22 , Feb 15, 2010
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                                      This mysterious correspondent has certainly imbibed from my well.

                                      As s/he has not replied, I think I understand their argument enough to add some thoughts and encouragement.

                                      Note that Nietzsche describes his view of poetic inspiration as belonging to 'strong ages'.

                                      That alone shows his affirmation of the position.

                                      I would like to invite this person [and other refugees from the 'mad god'], if I may, to look at my new Yahoo Group [ON-E] the Order of Nietzsche-England;

                                      http://uk.groups.yahoo.com/group/ON-E/

                                      This will focus on the other side of the coin - the religio-mystic-spiritual Nietzsche:

                                       The Nietzsche of the Wagner period, the Nietzsche of Zarathustra and of the late works.

                                      In a word, the Dionysian Nietzsche.

                                      And when the will to power is thought of as the Dionysian it cannot be thought of as a 'reduction'.

                                      Quite the opposite.

                                      It is rather about expanding consciousness and what not.

                                      My essay 'The Nietzschean Jim Morrison' is so important here;

                                      http://m-o-o-dy-l-a-w-l-e-s-s.blogspot.com/2009/07/nietzschean-jim-morrison.html

                                      That essay itself has moments of inspiration where a non-perspectival knowing flowed through me. I reference it here for our anonymous friend, although I suspect that they may have read it already.

                                      Of course, Sauwelios, Nietzsche had a positivistic phase.

                                      But this was only a phase and a means to an end - to kill the father.

                                      It was his Oedipal moment.

                                      It was his metamorphosis of the camel.

                                      Once he had got this out of his system he could return to the Dionysianism with which he began - which he was ... become what you are.

                                      Most of all, to return to the Mystery that is Music.

                                      Music is your special friend, dance on fire as it intends.

                                      For those who are not trapped purely in the Mystical, or purely in the Material Nietzsche; for thise who have surpassed the camel and the lion and are to become childe-like, I recommend Bertram's book [so unjustly traduced by the braggart Kaufmann] 'An Attempt at a Mythology'.

                                      However, I think it undeniable that the Dionysian is Nietzsche's greatest achievement, his greatest teaching.

                                      Moody Lawless intends to speak at length on the Dionysian in the future in an essay that will be comparable to his Morrison one.

                                      He needs to meditate further.

                                      He thanks the spirit of the Mojo for guiding him.

                                      Dionysos, the thunderbolt that guides all things.

                                      Hail to the gods of the blood.


                                      > > >
                                      > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                                      > > > wrote:
                                      > > > > Nietzsche was most skeptical about 'inspiration', of course.
                                      > > >
                                      > >
                                      >
                                      > I received a reply to this post by email. I will reproduce it here,
                                      > together with the response I sent back, though without identifying the
                                      > sender.
                                      >
                                      > His email:
                                      >
                                      >
                                      > The crucial thing here is that Nietzsche says that this 'superstitious'
                                      > view is "my experience of inspiration".
                                      >
                                      > And so it is not among the non-superstitious reductionists of the 19th
                                      > century (or today) that one will find such a view (although all ages
                                      > look superstitious in retrospect, just as no age will admit to being
                                      > superstitious in its present) ; you will have to go back 'thousands of
                                      > years' to find it.
                                      >
                                      > Perspectivism relies on the principle of individuation, and so is
                                      > Apollonian.
                                      >
                                      > The Dionysian meanwhile is akin to Blake's infitie everything and so is
                                      > beyond all perspectivism and individualism.
                                      >
                                      > Poets are able to comprehend the Dionysian through the poetic
                                      > inspiration Nietzsche describes above - no matter how 'superstitious'
                                      > materialists etc., may regard it.
                                      >
                                      > Mach's 'philosophy' has more in common with logical positivism etc., and
                                      > does not apply well to Nietzsche's philosophy in my view.
                                      >
                                      > My reply:
                                      >
                                      > Dear [name withheld],
                                      >
                                      > Thank you for your mail.
                                      >
                                      > Note that I don't regard Nietzsche's description of inspiration in EH as
                                      > a superstitious view. Nietzsche distances himself from such
                                      > superstition. He just describes what it's like.
                                      >
                                      > I think Nietzsche was both non-superstitious and reductionist, as he
                                      > 'reduced' all existence to the will to power.
                                      >
                                      > The idea that poets can somehow attain to a non-perspectival view
                                      > through the 'revelations' of 'inspiration' is ironically, paradoxically
                                      > Platonic: the 'pure mind' of the poet experiences the 'in-itself' of
                                      > existence!
                                      >
                                      > The point of Nietzsche's 'Machianism', which was possibly
                                      > avant-la-lettre, is that it goes beyond such distinctions of an
                                      > 'apparent world' and a 'true world', even that between the 'apparent
                                      > world' of individuation and the 'true world' of oneness: there are only
                                      > what Mach first called "sensations"
                                      > (http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Empfindung
                                      > <http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Empfindung> ) and
                                      > later "elements" [Elemente] or "experiences"
                                      > (http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Befunde
                                      > <http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Befunde> ). However,
                                      > clusters of such elements are falsified into 'objects', 'things', etc.
                                      > This falsification is the work of the will to power according to
                                      > Nietzsche.
                                      >
                                      > Ironically, Mach referred to a 'mystical experience' of his in
                                      > introducing his idea:
                                      >
                                      > On a bright summer day in the open air, the world with my ego suddenly
                                      > appeared to me as one coherent mass of sensations, only more strongly
                                      > coherent in the ego.
                                      > [Mach, Analysis of Sensations I.13.]
                                      >
                                      > This must have been a relative decrease in falsification, though, as
                                      > without the illusion of 'objects', there can be no consciousness.
                                      >
                                      > Did you, by the way, mean to send this mail only to me? If you want I
                                      > will post your message and my reply in the group.
                                      >
                                      > Sincerely,
                                      >
                                      > Sauwelios
                                      >
                                      >
                                      > As I never got a reply, and its now about a week ago, I decided to post
                                      > them in the group anyway.
                                      >
                                      > I think Mach's 'revelation' can also be said to have been Nietzsche's,
                                      > though Nietzsche seems to have been struck even more by the concealment
                                      > than by the 'revelation'. His 'revelation' of the will to power can be
                                      > said to be his insight that the 'chaos of sensations' is concealed by
                                      > the interpretation of clusters of those sensations as 'things'.
                                      >

                                    • Sauwelios
                                      ... To understand his position, we have to read well---especially this bit: If one had the slightest residue of superstition left in one, one would be hardly
                                      Message 18 of 22 , Feb 16, 2010
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                                        --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" <moodylawless@...> wrote:
                                        >
                                        >
                                        > This mysterious correspondent has certainly imbibed from my well.
                                        >
                                        > As s/he has not replied, I think I understand their argument enough to
                                        > add some thoughts and encouragement.
                                        >
                                        > Note that Nietzsche describes his view of poetic inspiration as
                                        > belonging to 'strong ages'.
                                        >
                                        > That alone shows his affirmation of the position.
                                        >

                                        To understand his position, we have to read well---especially this bit:

                                        "If one had the slightest residue of superstition left in one, one would be hardly able to set aside the idea that one is merely incarnation, merely mouthpiece, merely medium of overwhelming forces."

                                        This means: if one has more than just the slightest residue of superstition left in one, one will not be able to set that idea aside; if one has only the slightest residue left, one may still set it aside, though it will be hard; and if one does not have any superstition left in one, it will not be hard.

                                        Now as for revelation. Revelation describes the fact, that is, it describes what inspiration *feels* like, how it *appears*. This does not mean that it really is the way it seems or feels, of course.


                                        > I would like to invite this person [and other refugees from the 'mad
                                        > god'], if I may, to look at my new Yahoo Group [ON-E] the Order of
                                        > Nietzsche-England;
                                        >
                                        > http://uk.groups.yahoo.com/group/ON-E/
                                        > <http://uk.groups.yahoo.com/group/ON-E/>
                                        >
                                        > This will focus on the other side of the coin - the
                                        > religio-mystic-spiritual Nietzsche:
                                        >
                                        > The Nietzsche of the Wagner period, the Nietzsche of Zarathustra and of
                                        > the late works.
                                        >
                                        > In a word, the Dionysian Nietzsche.
                                        >

                                        It may not surprise you that I have no intention of becoming a member of your new group. In fact, I had already unsubscribed from the daily digests of your old group, the reason being your tolerance of the fool Scott. Perhaps you see something promising in him, just as you saw in me in the beginning (I then quickly disappointed you, but some years later I managed to win your approval again. Perhaps I have recently come to disappoint you again with my 'mistaken' being taken over by Lampert).

                                        If anyone worked to understand and explain the Nietzsche of the Wagner period, it has been I, with my studies here of Nietzsche's early metaphysics in general and The Greek State in particular.

                                        Unlike what you suggest below, Zarathustra begins (incipit) at the height of Nietzsche's 'Machian' positivism (Twilight, 'True World'). And the late works, too, exemplify this last stage of positivism (all his works from TSZ on do).


                                        > And when the will to power is thought of as the Dionysian it cannot be
                                        > thought of as a 'reduction'.
                                        >

                                        I never said the will to power *was* a reduction, but that Nietzsche re-duced everything *to* the will to power.



                                        > Quite the opposite.
                                        >
                                        > It is rather about expanding consciousness and what not.
                                        >
                                        > My essay 'The Nietzschean Jim Morrison' is so important here;
                                        >
                                        > http://m-o-o-dy-l-a-w-l-e-s-s.blogspot.com/2009/07/nietzschean-jim-morri\
                                        > son.html
                                        > <http://m-o-o-dy-l-a-w-l-e-s-s.blogspot.com/2009/07/nietzschean-jim-morr\
                                        > ison.html>
                                        >
                                        > That essay itself has moments of inspiration where a non-perspectival
                                        > knowing flowed through me.

                                        Or at least it seemed that way to you (you interpreted it that way). It's funny, because it was the Jew Leo Strauss who gave rise to the following notion:

                                        "Careful attention paid to the dialogue throughout the development of Western culture between its two points of departure: Athens and Jerusalem [is a distinguishing aspect of a Straussian approach to political philosophy]. The recognition that Reason and Revelation, originating from these two points respectively, are the two distinct sources of knowledge in the Western tradition, and can be used neither to support nor refute the other, since neither claims to be based on the other's terms."
                                        http://sauwelios.blogspot.com/2006/07/gevonden-op-straussiannet.html

                                        Even if Jerusalem does not signify the *epitome* of claiming knowledge acquired by revelation, it is clearly of a kind with 'Aryan' traditions of 'religio-mystic-spiritual' 'knowledge'. Indeed, according to Nietzsche it was *Aryan*, not Semitic, influence which had "corrupted all the world" (WP 142). And in one of his latest works, The Antichrist, he deliberately contrasts himself and his spiritual/intellectual kin from such Aryanism: see sections 12 and 13.

                                        In the next section of the same book, by the way, he gives another example of the fact that he, Nietzsche, *got a great many things wrong*:

                                        "We regard him [man] as the strongest of the beasts because he is the craftiest; one of the results thereof is his intellectuality."
                                        [AC 14.]

                                        This is probably nonsense: his intellectuality is probably a biological adaptation that has no survival value, but has evolved for its *reproductive* value (as a 'wasteful' display of fitness, like the peacock's tail---wasteful from the perspective of efficiency for survival). In The Will to Power he imagines man in nature as "the weakest and shrewdest creature making himself master"; but man in nature was far from being the physically weakest creature: he did not need to compensate for his physical weakness with mental strength.

                                        In fact, ironically Nietzsche understood so little of Darwin (whom he never read) that he was basically in agreement with him precisely where he thought he was diametrically opposed to him (WP 684-685).

                                        Another example: Nietzsche took "adaptation", in the Darwinian sense, to mean the adaptation of the *individual*; what it means, however, is the adaptation of the *species*...

                                        But for all his flaws, I think Nietzsche also got a great many things *right*, including the most important thing: his (mature) metaphysics. I see Nietzsche's value first and foremost in his being a metaphysician in the Heideggerian sense of the word. With his doctrine of the will to power, he accomplishes the task of science on the meta-level, even thought its task will probably never be accomplished on its proper level. Nietzsche answers the question as to being-as-a-whole, saying that it is the will to power, and nothing besides---and he even does so wholly in accord with scientific *method*, the method of 'knowledge' acquisition proper to Reason as opposed to Revelation.


                                        > I reference it here for our anonymous friend,
                                        > although I suspect that they may have read it already.
                                        >
                                        > Of course, Sauwelios, Nietzsche had a positivistic phase.
                                        >
                                        > But this was only a phase and a means to an end - to kill the father.
                                        >

                                        The 'father' then being the 'true world', I take it. But positivism does not stop at abolishing the 'true world', but goes on to abolish the 'apparent world' as well. If 'mystical union' is the union with the true world, then this positivistic reasoning leads, to speak with a passage from the Nachlass, to the mystical condition: for the 'apparent' world, being thenceforth understood to be the *only* world, is thenceforth understood to be the *true* world---the only reservation being that the fruit of Reason is not the fruit of Revelation: it is *probability*, the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, not truth, the fruit of the Tree of Life. Perhaps what distinguishes the new Dionysian is then letting go of this reservation, and taking this probability (the the world be the will to power and nothing besides) to be the truth until we hit a wall in that darkness.


                                        > It was his Oedipal moment.
                                        >
                                        > It was his metamorphosis of the camel.
                                        >
                                        > Once he had got this out of his system he could return to the
                                        > Dionysianism with which he began - which he was ... become what you are.
                                        >
                                        > Most of all, to return to the Mystery that is Music.
                                        >
                                        > Music is your special friend, dance on fire as it intends.
                                        >
                                        > For those who are not trapped purely in the Mystical, or purely in the
                                        > Material Nietzsche; for thise who have surpassed the camel and the lion
                                        > and are to become childe-like, I recommend Bertram's book [so unjustly
                                        > traduced by the braggart Kaufmann] 'An Attempt at a Mythology'.
                                        >
                                        > However, I think it undeniable that the Dionysian is Nietzsche's
                                        > greatest achievement, his greatest teaching.
                                        >
                                        > Moody Lawless intends to speak at length on the Dionysian in the future
                                        > in an essay that will be comparable to his Morrison one.
                                        >
                                        > He needs to meditate further.
                                        >
                                        > He thanks the spirit of the Mojo for guiding him.
                                        >
                                        > Dionysos, the thunderbolt that guides all things.
                                        >
                                        > Hail to the gods of the blood.
                                        >

                                        I *do* recommend studying Moody to those to whom he appeals. He's certainly had a great impact on *my* life. But though I won't say "never", at the moment I'm driven to study others instead. Seeking *probable* truth by scientific method, not seeking believed *certain* truth by *mystical* methods: that is what I do.


                                        >
                                        > > > >
                                        > > > > --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@>
                                        > > > > wrote:
                                        > > > > > Nietzsche was most skeptical about 'inspiration', of course.
                                        > > > >
                                        > > >
                                        > >
                                        > > I received a reply to this post by email. I will reproduce it here,
                                        > > together with the response I sent back, though without identifying the
                                        > > sender.
                                        > >
                                        > > His email:
                                        > >
                                        > >
                                        > > The crucial thing here is that Nietzsche says that this
                                        > 'superstitious'
                                        > > view is "my experience of inspiration".
                                        > >
                                        > > And so it is not among the non-superstitious reductionists of the 19th
                                        > > century (or today) that one will find such a view (although all ages
                                        > > look superstitious in retrospect, just as no age will admit to being
                                        > > superstitious in its present) ; you will have to go back 'thousands of
                                        > > years' to find it.
                                        > >
                                        > > Perspectivism relies on the principle of individuation, and so is
                                        > > Apollonian.
                                        > >
                                        > > The Dionysian meanwhile is akin to Blake's infitie everything and so
                                        > is
                                        > > beyond all perspectivism and individualism.
                                        > >
                                        > > Poets are able to comprehend the Dionysian through the poetic
                                        > > inspiration Nietzsche describes above - no matter how 'superstitious'
                                        > > materialists etc., may regard it.
                                        > >
                                        > > Mach's 'philosophy' has more in common with logical positivism etc.,
                                        > and
                                        > > does not apply well to Nietzsche's philosophy in my view.
                                        > >
                                        > > My reply:
                                        > >
                                        > > Dear [name withheld],
                                        > >
                                        > > Thank you for your mail.
                                        > >
                                        > > Note that I don't regard Nietzsche's description of inspiration in EH
                                        > as
                                        > > a superstitious view. Nietzsche distances himself from such
                                        > > superstition. He just describes what it's like.
                                        > >
                                        > > I think Nietzsche was both non-superstitious and reductionist, as he
                                        > > 'reduced' all existence to the will to power.
                                        > >
                                        > > The idea that poets can somehow attain to a non-perspectival view
                                        > > through the 'revelations' of 'inspiration' is ironically,
                                        > paradoxically
                                        > > Platonic: the 'pure mind' of the poet experiences the 'in-itself' of
                                        > > existence!
                                        > >
                                        > > The point of Nietzsche's 'Machianism', which was possibly
                                        > > avant-la-lettre, is that it goes beyond such distinctions of an
                                        > > 'apparent world' and a 'true world', even that between the 'apparent
                                        > > world' of individuation and the 'true world' of oneness: there are
                                        > only
                                        > > what Mach first called "sensations"
                                        > > (http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Empfindung
                                        > > <http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Empfindung> ) and
                                        > > later "elements" [Elemente] or "experiences"
                                        > > (http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Befunde
                                        > > <http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&p=8x2MgA&search=Befunde> ). However,
                                        > > clusters of such elements are falsified into 'objects', 'things', etc.
                                        > > This falsification is the work of the will to power according to
                                        > > Nietzsche.
                                        > >
                                        > > Ironically, Mach referred to a 'mystical experience' of his in
                                        > > introducing his idea:
                                        > >
                                        > > On a bright summer day in the open air, the world with my ego suddenly
                                        > > appeared to me as one coherent mass of sensations, only more strongly
                                        > > coherent in the ego.
                                        > > [Mach, Analysis of Sensations I.13.]
                                        > >
                                        > > This must have been a relative decrease in falsification, though, as
                                        > > without the illusion of 'objects', there can be no consciousness.
                                        > >
                                        > > Did you, by the way, mean to send this mail only to me? If you want I
                                        > > will post your message and my reply in the group.
                                        > >
                                        > > Sincerely,
                                        > >
                                        > > Sauwelios
                                        > >
                                        > >
                                        > > As I never got a reply, and its now about a week ago, I decided to
                                        > post
                                        > > them in the group anyway.
                                        > >
                                        > > I think Mach's 'revelation' can also be said to have been Nietzsche's,
                                        > > though Nietzsche seems to have been struck even more by the
                                        > concealment
                                        > > than by the 'revelation'. His 'revelation' of the will to power can be
                                        > > said to be his insight that the 'chaos of sensations' is concealed by
                                        > > the interpretation of clusters of those sensations as 'things'.
                                        > >
                                        >
                                      • Moody Lawless
                                        And poets of strong ages believed super-stitiously in in-spir-ation.   Strong ages and strong individuals were always super-stitious. Look at the ancient
                                        Message 19 of 22 , Feb 17, 2010
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                                          And poets of "strong ages" believed super-stitiously in in-spir-ation.
                                           
                                          Strong ages and strong individuals were always super-stitious. Look at the ancient Greeks of Homer's times, the Romans of the Imperium, the Vikings, the Troubadours et al, or at Napoleon for instance.
                                           
                                          Of course the word super-stition has attained a pejorative air, but this really means a sense of spirit-ual awe when viewed super-morally.
                                           
                                          In the extract in question - which is a super-human description of this super-stition - Nietzsche clearly affirms it.
                                           
                                          And as to reveal-ation; leaving aside Xtian connotations, this again means - super-morally - a non-perspectival reavealing of something to one.
                                           
                                          As Nietzsche said, a philosopher - like a poet, and a musician - receives his thoughts "as if they came from without."
                                           
                                          This was always Nietzsche's experience, whether it be his earliest reveal-ations on a stormy hillside, his Zarathustra and eternal recurrence or the Dionysian.
                                           
                                          And the Dionysian itself is this non-perspectivism.
                                          Indeed, Moody is at the forefront of this line of thought as regards Nietzscheanism.
                                          Perhaps Moody alone of living beings understands what the Dionysian is.
                                           
                                          Of course, reveal-ation was not alien to the ancient Greeks; even the "absurdly rational" Socrates had his daimon.
                                           
                                          As you highlight [unintentionally?] Nietzsche constantly existed in contradictions. And that was my original point. Those contradiction are not to be explained away by you, Mach or even Lampert. Courage means existing in those contradictions - that is initself a mystical position. That does disappoint me in you; but then we have never agreed - even so, I have always loved you as a brother [see my recent blog essay on Friendship or fiend-ship].
                                           
                                           
                                          I banned Scott from the Moody Lawless Group before Xmas. I deleted many of his posts first, and then put him on Moderation. Some of his early posts were fine, but he then almost became a different person [he leavened these stupid posts by some arse-licking towards Moody which made me instantly distrustful]. I moved fairly swiftly, and when he was on Moderation he showed his true nature by making lurid and perverse threats against me for which he was banned.
                                           
                                          I believe it was I that pioneered the rehabilitation of the Wagner-period Nietzsche in the first years of this past decade on the Nietzsche Campfire. It was I who brought forth the Greek State essay as prime evidence.
                                           
                                          Nietzsche's positivist period begins with Human and starts to dissolve with Daybreak, and its end is announced in the Joyful Wisdom with its announcement of Zarathustra. The late Nietzsche is imbued with the music of Zarathustra and the philosophy of Dionysos. The final act being his inscribing of his Fionysos dithyrambs to the occultist and Wagnerian poet Mendes.
                                           
                                           
                                          As I said, the positivistic period was necessary, and he carried forward some of its useful methods.
                                          But these methods were just means to an end, the end being A god that can Dance.
                                           
                                          As always, I wish thee well.
                                           
                                          Nietzsche above all - and Nietzsche is always above being right and wrong.
                                           
                                          There is no right or wrong in philosophy.
                                           
                                          Moody
                                           
                                           


                                           


                                          --- On Tue, 16/2/10, Sauwelios <sauwelios@...> wrote:

                                          From: Sauwelios <sauwelios@...>
                                          Subject: [human_superhuman] Re: The Alpha of Nietzsche's Philosophy.
                                          To: human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com
                                          Date: Tuesday, 16 February, 2010, 22:46


                                          This means: if one has more than just the slightest residue of superstition left in one, one will not be able to set that idea aside; if one has only the slightest residue left, one may still set it aside, though it will be hard; and if one does not have any superstition left in one, it will not be hard.

                                          Now as for revelation. Revelation describes the fact, that is, it describes what inspiration *feels* like, how it *appears*. This does not mean that it really is the way it seems or feels, of course.

                                          It may not surprise you that I have no intention of becoming a member of your new group. In fact, I had already unsubscribed from the daily digests of your old group, the reason being your tolerance of the fool Scott. Perhaps you see something promising in him, just as you saw in me in the beginning (I then quickly disappointed you, but some years later I managed to win your approval again. Perhaps I have recently come to disappoint you again with my 'mistaken' being taken over by Lampert).

                                          If anyone worked to understand and explain the Nietzsche of the Wagner period, it has been I, with my studies here of Nietzsche's early metaphysics in general and The Greek State in particular.

                                          Unlike what you suggest below, Zarathustra begins (incipit) at the height of Nietzsche's 'Machian' positivism (Twilight, 'True World'). And the late works, too, exemplify this last stage of positivism (all his works from TSZ on do).


                                          I never said the will to power *was* a reduction, but that Nietzsche re-duced everything *to* the will to power.


                                          Or at least it seemed that way to you (you interpreted it that way). It's funny, because it was the Jew Leo Strauss who gave rise to the following notion:

                                          http://sauwelios. blogspot. com/2006/ 07/gevonden- op-straussiannet .html

                                          Even if Jerusalem does not signify the *epitome* of claiming knowledge acquired by revelation, it is clearly of a kind with 'Aryan' traditions of 'religio-mystic- spiritual' 'knowledge'. Indeed, according to Nietzsche it was *Aryan*, not Semitic, influence which had "corrupted all the world" (WP 142). And in one of his latest works, The Antichrist, he deliberately contrasts himself and his spiritual/intellect ual kin from such Aryanism: see sections 12 and 13.

                                          In the next section of the same book, by the way, he gives another example of the fact that he, Nietzsche, *got a great many things wrong*:

                                          "We regard him [man] as the strongest of the beasts because he is the craftiest; one of the results thereof is his intellectuality. "
                                          [AC 14.]

                                          This is probably nonsense: his intellectuality is probably a biological adaptation that has no survival value, but has evolved for its *reproductive* value (as a 'wasteful' display of fitness, like the peacock's tail---wasteful from the perspective of efficiency for survival). In The Will to Power he imagines man in nature as "the weakest and shrewdest creature making himself master"; but man in nature was far from being the physically weakest creature: he did not need to compensate for his physical weakness with mental strength.

                                          In fact, ironically Nietzsche understood so little of Darwin (whom he never read) that he was basically in agreement with him precisely where he thought he was diametrically opposed to him (WP 684-685).

                                          Another example: Nietzsche took "adaptation" , in the Darwinian sense, to mean the adaptation of the *individual* ; what it means, however, is the adaptation of the *species*...

                                          But for all his flaws, I think Nietzsche also got a great many things *right*, including the most important thing: his (mature) metaphysics. I see Nietzsche's value first and foremost in his being a metaphysician in the Heideggerian sense of the word. With his doctrine of the will to power, he accomplishes the task of science on the meta-level, even thought its task will probably never be accomplished on its proper level. Nietzsche answers the question as to being-as-a-whole, saying that it is the will to power, and nothing besides---and he even does so wholly in accord with scientific *method*, the method of 'knowledge' acquisition proper to Reason as opposed to Revelation.

                                          The 'father' then being the 'true world', I take it. But positivism does not stop at abolishing the 'true world', but goes on to abolish the 'apparent world' as well. If 'mystical union' is the union with the true world, then this positivistic reasoning leads, to speak with a passage from the Nachlass, to the mystical condition: for the 'apparent' world, being thenceforth understood to be the *only* world, is thenceforth understood to be the *true* world---the only reservation being that the fruit of Reason is not the fruit of Revelation: it is *probability* , the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, not truth, the fruit of the Tree of Life. Perhaps what distinguishes the new Dionysian is then letting go of this reservation, and taking this probability (the the world be the will to power and nothing besides) to be the truth until we hit a wall in that darkness.

                                        • perpetualburn52
                                          The father then being the true world , I take it. But positivism does not stop at abolishing the true world , but goes on to abolish the apparent world
                                          Message 20 of 22 , Feb 17, 2010
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                                            "
                                            The 'father' then being the 'true world', I take it. But positivism does not
                                            stop at abolishing the 'true world', but goes on to abolish the 'apparent world'
                                            as well. If 'mystical union' is the union with the true world, then this
                                            positivistic reasoning leads, to speak with a passage from the Nachlass, to the
                                            mystical condition: for the 'apparent' world, being thenceforth understood to be
                                            the *only* world, is thenceforth understood to be the *true* world---the only
                                            reservation being that the fruit of Reason is not the fruit of Revelation: it is
                                            *probability*, the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, not truth, the fruit of the
                                            Tree of Life. Perhaps what distinguishes the new Dionysian is then letting go of
                                            this reservation, and taking this probability (the the world be the will to
                                            power and nothing besides) to be the truth until we hit a wall in that darkness."


                                            "I *do* recommend studying Moody to those to whom he appeals. He's certainly had
                                            a great impact on *my* life. But though I won't say "never", at the moment I'm
                                            driven to study others instead. Seeking *probable* truth by scientific method,
                                            not seeking believed *certain* truth by *mystical* methods: that is what I do."



                                            Do you see "taking this probability... to be the truth until we hit a wall" to be related to Nietzsche's sense of "solace" or "consolation?"

                                            The moment of letting go(or maybe "letting be") of reservations being the "moment" of consolation. One is then intoxicated once again by the mystical in the midst of the scientific method while never actually being "certain" of the inspiration... I suppose it's more of an intoxication with life.. life convincing us to give back by way of the scientific method(which is an expression of WTP/life)... but inspiration never becomes religious.
                                          • Sauwelios
                                            ... The distinction between solace and consolation was made by Moody in my thread on The Consolations of Nietzsche s Philosophy,
                                            Message 21 of 22 , Feb 18, 2010
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                                              --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "perpetualburn52" <perpetualburn52@...> wrote:
                                              >
                                              > "
                                              > The 'father' then being the 'true world', I take it. But positivism does not
                                              > stop at abolishing the 'true world', but goes on to abolish the 'apparent world'
                                              > as well. If 'mystical union' is the union with the true world, then this
                                              > positivistic reasoning leads, to speak with a passage from the Nachlass, to the
                                              > mystical condition: for the 'apparent' world, being thenceforth understood to be
                                              > the *only* world, is thenceforth understood to be the *true* world---the only
                                              > reservation being that the fruit of Reason is not the fruit of Revelation: it is
                                              > *probability*, the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, not truth, the fruit of the
                                              > Tree of Life. Perhaps what distinguishes the new Dionysian is then letting go of
                                              > this reservation, and taking this probability (the the world be the will to
                                              > power and nothing besides) to be the truth until we hit a wall in that darkness."
                                              >
                                              >
                                              > "I *do* recommend studying Moody to those to whom he appeals. He's certainly had
                                              > a great impact on *my* life. But though I won't say "never", at the moment I'm
                                              > driven to study others instead. Seeking *probable* truth by scientific method,
                                              > not seeking believed *certain* truth by *mystical* methods: that is what I do."
                                              >
                                              >
                                              >
                                              > Do you see "taking this probability... to be the truth until we hit a wall" to be related to Nietzsche's sense of "solace" or "consolation?"
                                              >

                                              The distinction between solace and consolation was made by Moody in my thread on The Consolations of Nietzsche's Philosophy, http://nietzsche.21.forumer.com/viewtopic.php?t=51 .I was just talking about *Trost* (the German word Nietzsche uses). Likewise, I was not talking of the word "superstition" above, but of the word Nietzsche uses, *Aberglaube*, which in my reading has no connotation of something 'standing above' one. To be honest, some etymologists relate the "aber" part with *über*, "over or above", cognate with *super*; however, I think it should rather be compared with *Aberwitz*, "folly" in the sense of a wit that is *off*: Aberglaube as a belief that is off, way off---as opposed to justified true belief. Having said that, this 'justified true belief' was usually the *Christian faith*, which we Nietzscheans neither consider justified nor true, of course. In fact, we'd sooner call it *true* than justified, because it may still be true, for all we know. This is what I meant by "until we hit a wall in that darkness": I do not think we will hit such a wall (after all, I think it's *probably* true that the world is the will to power and nothing besides), but I think we should be so wise as to know that we know nothing, and to come out for it. For we must distinguish ourselves from the dogmatists. We are not self-proclaimed sages. We're self-proclaimed philosophers.

                                              The consolations of Nietzsche's philosophy are basically two: 1) that the world is probably the will to power, and nothing besides; 2) that the world as will-to-power will probably never cease, and will possibly even 'loop'.


                                              > The moment of letting go(or maybe "letting be") of reservations being the "moment" of consolation. One is then intoxicated once again by the mystical in the midst of the scientific method while never actually being "certain" of the inspiration... I suppose it's more of an intoxication with life.. life convincing us to give back by way of the scientific method(which is an expression of WTP/life)... but inspiration never becomes religious.
                                              >

                                              The thing is that 'in-spiration' comes from the body and the earth (i.e., the 'material' universe), not from a 'spiritual' plane above and beyond the body and the earth.
                                            • sauwelios
                                              ... I am reminded of William Blake: I [Blake] asked: does a firm perswasion that a thing is so, make it so? He [the prophet Isaiah] replied: All poets
                                              Message 22 of 22 , Apr 17 5:20 AM
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                                                --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Moody" <moodylawless@...> wrote: [snipped]
                                                >
                                                >
                                                > This mysterious correspondent has certainly imbibed from my well.
                                                >
                                                > As s/he has not replied, I think I understand their argument enough to
                                                > add some thoughts and encouragement.
                                                >
                                                > Note that Nietzsche describes his view of poetic inspiration as
                                                > belonging to 'strong ages'.
                                                >
                                                > That alone shows his affirmation of the position.
                                                >

                                                I am reminded of William Blake:

                                                "I [Blake] asked: 'does a firm perswasion that a thing is so, make it so?'
                                                He [the prophet Isaiah] replied: 'All poets believe that it does, & in ages of imagination this firm perswasion removed mountains; but many are not capable of a firm perswasion of any thing.'"
                                                (Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell.)

                                                Around the same time at which he wrote his description of what poets of strong ages called "inspiration", Nietzsche wrote:

                                                "That faith makes blessed under certain circumstances, that blessedness does not make of a fixed idea a *true* idea, that faith moves no mountains but *puts* mountains where there are none: a quick walk through a *madhouse* enlightens one sufficiently about this."
                                                (AC 51.)


                                                > I would like to invite this person [and other refugees from the 'mad
                                                > god'], if I may, to look at my new Yahoo Group [ON-E] the Order of
                                                > Nietzsche-England;
                                                >
                                                > http://uk.groups.yahoo.com/group/ON-E/
                                                > <http://uk.groups.yahoo.com/group/ON-E/>
                                                >
                                                > This will focus on the other side of the coin - the
                                                > religio-mystic-spiritual Nietzsche:
                                                >
                                                > The Nietzsche of the Wagner period, the Nietzsche of Zarathustra and of
                                                > the late works.
                                                >
                                                > In a word, the Dionysian Nietzsche.
                                                >

                                                My focus is of course on the *philosophical* Nietzsche... And the position of the philosophical Nietzsche (henceforth simply "Nietzsche") is that philosophy shall rule religion, not vice versa. It shall be above Dionysus even. In fact, Dionysus, according to Nietzsche, is a philosophising god. Even He does not know the answer to the question, "Why is there something at all, and not rather nothing?".

                                                In Cox's excellent *Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation*, which I'm reading at the moment, Nietzsche is quoted:

                                                "One sort of honesty [*Redlichkeit*] has been alien to all founders of religions and their kind:---they have never made their experiences a matter of conscience for knowledge. "What have I actually experienced? What happened in me and around me at that time? Was my reason bright enough? Was my will opposed to all deceits [*Betrügereien*] of the senses and bold in resisting the fantastic?---none of them has asked such questions, nor do any of our dear religious people ask them even now: rather, they thirst after things that are *contrary to reason*, and they do not wish to make it too hard for themselves to satisfy it,---so they experience "miracles" and "rebirths" and hear the voices of little angels! But we, we others who thirst after reason, are determined to scrutinize our experiences as severely as a scientific experiment, hour after hour, day after day. We ourselves wish to be our own experimenters and guinea pigs. (GS 319)"
                                                (Cox, page 41.)
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