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Re: The Plato-Nietzsche Cycle: Introduction.

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  • Sauwelios
    ... I think both the urge beyond oneself and the urge back to oneself (eros and thanatos, Shiva and Vishnu, art and truth) are at bottom the will to power: the
    Message 1 of 40 , Nov 1, 2009
      --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@...> wrote:
      >
      >
      > I've abandoned my project of reading Brown's book. Then, after a
      > while, I started a new one: namely, to read Brown's book again. This
      > time, however, I started with the introduction featured in my edition.
      > I found it very good. Apparently, Brown confuses Eros and the death
      > instinct a couple of times. I now think the two correspond to Savitri
      > Devi's views of Shiva and Vishnu, respectively, as well as to
      > Heidegger's two aspects of the will to power (I'd entertained the idea
      > that Eros and the death instinct were both the will to power from the
      > beginning):
      >
      > "Every living being, and especially man, is surrounded, oppressed, and
      > penetrated by chaos, the unmastered, overpowering element that tears
      > everything away in its stream. Thus it might seem that precisely the
      > vitality of life as this pure streaming of drives and pulsions,
      > proclivities and inclinations, needs and demands, impressions and
      > views, wishes and commands pulls and sucks the living itself into its
      > own stream, there to exhaust its surge and flow. Life would then be
      > sheer dissolution and annihilation.
      > However, "life" is the name for *Being*, and Being means presencing,
      > subsistence, permanence, withstanding disappearance and atrophy. If
      > life therefore *is* this chaotic bodying and oppressive urging, if it
      > is supposed to *be* what properly is, it must at the same time and
      > just as originally be the concern of the living to withstand the urge
      > and the excessive urge, lest this urge propel toward mere
      > annihilation. This cannot happen because the urge would thus remove
      > itself and hence could never *be* an urge. In the essence of this
      > excessive urge lies a kind of urge that is suited to its nature, that
      > urges life *not* to submit to the urgent onslaught but to stand fast
      > in it, if only in order to be able to *be* urged and to urge beyond
      > *itself*. Only what stands can fall. But withstanding the urgent
      > onslaught urges toward permanence and stability. Permanence and the
      > urge toward it are thus nothing alien or *contradictory* to the
      > life-urge, but *correspond* to the essence of bodying life. In order
      > to live, the living must for its own sake *be propelled toward the
      > permanent*."
      > [Heidegger, 'Nietzsche', Vol. III, chap. 13.]
      >

      I think both the urge beyond oneself and the urge back to oneself (eros and thanatos, Shiva and Vishnu, art and truth) are at bottom the will to power: the will to power cannot be analysed into them as if they were its elements; the will to power is the most elemental fact. The will to power is always a will to *Being* (cf. http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/phpbb/viewtopic.php?f=9&t=159843&start=0):

      "*My first solution: Dionysian wisdom.* Joy in the destruction of the most noble and at the sight of its progressive ruin: IN REALITY JOY IN WHAT IS COMING AND LIES IN THE FUTURE, which triumphs over existing things, however good."
      [The Will to Power, section 417, with added emphasis.]

      The urge beyond oneself is the will to a *future* Being; the urge back to oneself is the will to a present Being. Perhaps we may here find the difference between decadence and ascendence: the will to the present Being of the will to a future Being (i.e., of the will to the destruction of present Being and the creation of a future Being) represents ascendence; the will to the future Being of---the *will* to a present Being represents decadence.

      The will to a present Being is really the will that the (near) future be like the present. Is the will to a future Being then the will that the future be *unlike* the present---(quite) a lot *better* than the present? But Nietzsche says that "it is only in the Dionysian mysteries, in the psychology of the Dionysian state, that the basic fact of the Hellenic instinct finds expression---its "will to life." What was it that the Hellene guaranteed himself by means of these mysteries? Eternal life, the eternal return of life, the future promised and hallowed in the past; the triumphant Yes to life beyond all death and change; true life as the overall continuation of life through procreation, through the mysteries of sexuality. [Twilight of the Idols, Ancients, 4.] And the eternal return, not just of life, but of *this* life, our *personal* life, was of course Nietzsche's highest ideal. Thus he says:

      "In regard to all aesthetic values, I now employ this fundamental distinction: I ask in each case "has hunger or superabundance become creative here?" At first sight, another distinction might seem more plausible---it is far more obvious---namely the distinction whether the desire for rigidity, eternity, *"Being"* has been the cause of creation, or rather the desire for destruction, for change, for *Becoming*. But both kinds of desire prove, when examined more closely, to be ambiguous and interpretable according to the scheme mentioned above, which, I think, is to be preferred."
      [WtP 846.]

      He then gives examples of both 'hungry' and 'superabundant' desires for both Becoming and and Being. But when read closely, the two hungry and the two superabundant desires appear to be basically the *same*: the desire for Becoming that springs from 'hunger' is a desire to destroy all existence---that is, to make it "ill-constituted" [ibid.], like the one having this desire himself! Thus it is basically a desire to stamp one's own suffering "on all things". [ibid.] The difference is that in the latter case, one seeks to forge "what is most personal" in one's suffering on all things, whereas in the former case, it is enough *that* all suffer---that is the first priority; whether they suffer in exactly the same way as oneself is secondary.

      Likewise, then, may we suppose that the desire for Becoming that springs from *superabundance* be simply the desire to 'create' all existence---that is, to make it well-constituted, like oneself---, whereas the desire for Being that springs from superabundance be the desire to stamp what is "most idiosyncratic" [ibid.] in one's own well-being on all existence---"shedding a Homeric aureole over all things"? [ibid.]
    • Sauwelios
      ... Correction: The difference is that in the latter case, one seeks to STAMP what is most personal in one s suffering on all things, whereas in the former
      Message 40 of 40 , Nov 1, 2009
        --- In human_superhuman@yahoogroups.com, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@...> wrote:
        >
        >
        >The difference is that in the latter case, one seeks to forge "what is most personal" in one's suffering on all things, whereas in the former case, it is enough *that* all suffer---that is the first priority; whether they suffer in exactly the same way as oneself is secondary.
        >

        Correction:

        'The difference is that in the latter case, one seeks to STAMP "what is most personal" in one's suffering on all things, whereas in the former case, it is enough *that* THEY all suffer---that is the first priority; whether they suffer in exactly the same way as oneself is secondary.'
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