Re: The Plato-Nietzsche Cycle: Introduction.
- I don't believe I've mentioned here that I found a solution to the problem of (unconditional) truthfulness. Before I divulge it, let me first summarise the problem.
I think of Christianity as a scorpion: like the scorpion, it has a body (its God) and ten extremes (the Ten Commandments). The "tail" is the commandment to truthfulness, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour". With Nietzsche, the stinger which is part of the tail has stung the scorpion itself, in its "trunk", i.e., the Christian God, killing that God.
Now logically, the ten extremes (Christian morality) must die too, sooner or later. This was the problem I saw: for if the commandment to truthfulness dies, there will no longer be an objection to a new slave-moral God.
The solution is that the tail may be *transplanted* to a different kind of God. Leo Strauss has called the doctrine of will to power "a vindication of God". And if we look at BGE 36-37, we see that Nietzsche suggests that the doctrine of will to power is so to say a refutation of the Devil (the Christian "God"), but not of God (the Christian "Devil"). Compare the following:
"[We have] to *overcome* everything Christian through something supra-Christian, and not merely to put it aside---for the Christian doctrine was the counterdoctrine to the Dionysian[.]"
It's not completely clear to me yet just what the Nietzschean "God" is: is "He" the world as will-to-power , or the "supreme power" mentioned in WP 1037?
"God the *supreme power*---that suffices! Everything follows from it, "the world" follows from it!"
Is He the world, or is He *beyond* the world? It doesn't really matter for my solution, though, for the crucial point is that, in order to preserve unconditional truthfulness in the teeth of the "immorality" (as judged from the perspective of slave morality) of Nature, one must experience the nature of Nature "as good, valuable---with pleasure" [WP 55]. Unconditional truthfulness, then, is still possible, but only for those who are unconditionally well-disposed toward existence---who want its eternal recurrence.
--- In firstname.lastname@example.org, Toni Ciopa <Hyperborean@...> wrote:
> If there were a reason to be truthful, then truthfulness would not arise from my Will, but from something external to it. A man is truthful only because he can will it and few men are capable of that.
> From: Sauwelios <sauwelios@...>
> To: email@example.com
> Sent: Friday, February 6, 2009 8:28:32 AM
> Subject: [human_superhuman] The Plato-Nietzsche Cycle: Introduction.
> The first idea I need to introduce is the death of Christian morality.
> "The end of Christianity- --at the hands of its own morality (which
> cannot be replaced), which turns against the Christian God (the sense
> of truthfulness, developed highly by Christianity, is nauseated by the
> falseness and mendaciousness of all Christian interpretations of the
> world and of history; rebound from "God is truth" to the fanatical
> faith "All is false"; Buddhism of *action*---) ."
> [The Will to Power, section 1.]
> I tend to see Christianity as a scorpion. A scorpion has a body and
> ten extremities (eight legs, of which two have claws; a head; and a
> tail); Christianity has a God and ten commandments.
> The tail is the commandment to truthfulness: "Thou shalt not bear
> false witness against thy neighbour". This tail has now stung the body
> (the Christian God) to death. The extremities (Christian morality)
> cannot survive long now, because they are henceforth groundless.
> There is now no more reason to be unconditionally truthful. As
> Nietzsche says in section 344 of the Gay Science, there are two
> possible reasons to be truthful: a utilitarian reason and a moral
> reason. Utility demands that one be truthful where truthfulness is
> beneficial to one. But because truth is not even beneficial *most* of
> the time, there is no utilitarian ground for unconditional
> truthfulness. The only ground for that is a *moral* ground.
> Now that the ground for that morality---the Christian God---has fallen
> away, there is no more reason to be unconditionally truthful. And yet
> Nietzsche still is:
> "The conditions under which I am understood, and then of
> *necessity*- --I know them only too well. [...] One must have become
> indifferent; one must never ask if the truth is useful or if it may
> prove our undoing..."
> [The Antichrist(ian) , Preface.]
> To be sure, Nietzsche is not talking of himself here, but of his
> "right readers", his "predestined readers":
> "Such men alone are my readers, my right readers, my predestined
> readers: what matter the *rest*? The rest---that is merely mankind.
> One must be above mankind in strength, in *loftiness* of soul---in
> Does Nietzsche then mean that he himself belongs to the "rest"? I
> think not. But then he himself, too, "must never ask if the truth is
> useful or if it may prove [his] undoing". And indeed, in the Gay
> Science, he says:
> "[To not have the intellectual conscience]- --that is what I experience
> as *despicable* , and this experience is the first thing for which I
> look in a person:---some folly persuades me time and again that every
> man, as man, has this experience. It is my kind of injustice."
> [GS 2.]
> An injustice! For its sole justification, the Christian God, *is no
- --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "Sauwelios" <sauwelios@...> wrote:
>The difference is that in the latter case, one seeks to forge "what is most personal" in one's suffering on all things, whereas in the former case, it is enough *that* all suffer---that is the first priority; whether they suffer in exactly the same way as oneself is secondary.
'The difference is that in the latter case, one seeks to STAMP "what is most personal" in one's suffering on all things, whereas in the former case, it is enough *that* THEY all suffer---that is the first priority; whether they suffer in exactly the same way as oneself is secondary.'