Re: [hegel] Re: something to think about
- Am 11.09.2011 06:46, Joao writes:
> --- In email@example.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, PaulJoao,
> Trejo <petrejo@...> wrote:
> > In response to João,
> > > ...One other question is if religion can, if indeed it wants to,
> > > the determinate content of the notion of God, I mean, if religion can
> > > satisfy all our questions about God? I don't think it can, but
> then this
> > > depends on the notion of religion.
> > It certainly depends on the notion of religion - and in this context, it
> > depends on Hegel's notion of religion.
> > > For me this notion in its most essential position appears in the
> > > unhappy consciousness section as a movement, and effort, an aim,
> > > for unity between actuality and truth and, I think, this is the same
> > > question which animates the PhG.
> > I agree that this question animates Hegel's PhG, however, for Hegel
> > the Unhappy Consciousness is surpassed by higher states of
> > conscoiusness.
> > > I think Philosophy and Religion share this common aim, share this
> > > common drive...
> > Exactly as Hegel explicitly said...
> > > ...but other than the categories with which religion on one hand and
> > > philosophy on the other develop this question, there is the
> question of
> > > conversion, of the experience of the sacred which is very
> different if
> > > thought only conceptually or if actually experienced...
> > Very well worded, João; and I think Hegel expresses this same antithesis
> > with all the seriousness that it merits.
> > > ...and I think it is this difference that remains unbridgeable
> > > God from within the experience of conversion is not the same as the
> > > Philosopher's God...
> > But here you have broken with Hegel, João. For Hegel, the difference
> > is bridgeable. I can show that.
> > >. ..so that ultimately the God of religion is different from the
> God of
> > > Philosophy, meaning by this difference if God is posited in first
> > > from conversion or from reasoning.
> > >
> > > Regards,
> > > João.
> > Well, João, actually Hegel deals with this antithesis, this
> dialectic, in
> > very explicit terms. Allow me first to quote from his Lectures on the
> > Philosophy of Religion (1827). This will get right to the heart of the
> > matter. Hegel was speaking of the build-up of this antithesis between
> > the subjective idea of God and the objective reality of God, and the
> > great chasm between the two. Hegel says:
> > "The third moment is the sublating of the
> > antithesis of the subject and God, of the
> > separation, this remoteness of the subject
> > from God. Its effect is that as a human being
> > one feels and knows God *internally*, in
> > one's own subjectivity. That, as this subject,
> > one elevates oneself to God, gives oneself
> > the certainty, the pleasure and the joy of
> > having God in one's heart -- of being United
> > with God, being 'received by God into grace'
> > as it is phrased in theological parlance."
> > (Hegel, 1824, LPR, trans. Hodgson, 1989,
> > UC Press, vol. 1, p. 180)
> Hi Paul,
> I think we still have a problem, because one thing is to develop this
> position from the standpoint of conversion, lets say, using the words
> of the text, as felling and knowing God *internally* and onother thing
> is to proceed from a standpoint where such conversion wasn't
> experienced. This will bring us to an anthitesis which still looks
> unbridgeable, I mean, on the one hand the standpoint of the presence
> of a numinous experience - referring for instance to R. Otto - and on
> the other hand the standpoint of its absense: this is a difference
> which may posit the antithesis between the reference of Grace to the
> mistery of God's Will on the one hand and on the other hand to mere
> contingency, in the strong sense.
> The question is, once this two opposits are in relation, or facing
> each other, what can possibly bridge them but, essentialy, the modern
> democratic State in which, then, both are preserved - as it is their
Yes, precisely: religion has lost its absolute validity and become a
moment in a more comprenhensive unity. This is what Hegel calls
'sublation', the key element of his philosophy.
> Best reagards,[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
> > That is, the Conceptualization of God reaches the point of
> > extremes in which the Experience of God, in all its Joy, erupts
> > upon the Seeker. It is the Experience that makes the difference,
> > and Hegel uses the term 'Elevation to God' to describe the nature
> > of the Experience.
> > Now to take a step backward to speak of the build-up of the
> > antithesis to this extreme peak, here is a quotation from the same
> > series of Lectures, Hegel says,
> > "The [Pure] Understanding cannot get beyond
> > the fact of the distinction, so it says, 'This
> > cannot be grasped.' For the principle of the
> > [Pure] Understanding is abstract identity with
> > itself, not concrete identity, in accord with
> > which these distinctions are present within
> > a single concept or reality...This is what is
> > called inconceivable." (Hegel, 1824, LPR,
> > trans. Hodgson, 1989, UC Press, vol. 3, p. 283)
> > So, the dualism of subject idea and objective experience
> > with regard to God is not impassible, for Hegel's theory.
> > One final word on this - if anybody attempts to say that
> > the experience of God is Impersonal, or minimizes the
> > category of Personality in the the Absolute Idea, Hegel
> > would correct that viewpoint as follows. Hegel says,
> > "The richest is therefore the most concrete
> > and most subjective...The highest, most
> > complicated point is the Pure Personality
> > which, solely through the absolute dialectic
> > which is its nature, no less *embraces and
> > holds everything within itself* because it
> > makes itself the Supremely Free -- the
> > simplicity which is the first immediacy and
> > universality." (Hegel, SCIENCE OF LOGIC,
> > 1812, trans. Miller, p. 841)
> > For Hegel, God is the Purest Freedom, and the
> > experience of God is the highest Freedom imaginable,
> > and that is an experience of Personality. It has nothing
> > to do with Impersonalism at all.
> > Best regards,
> > --Paul Trejo, MA
- What is curious about Hegel's discussion of Christianity is that he finds
that he has to go back to its inception point as he does in Revealed
Religion to find an evident but ignored truth: the truth of Christianity is
not Christ, his message, or the promise of his return. The truth is the
living Christian community in that early time poised between the past event
and the future hope. It is this being poised between that most interests
Hegel as he then moves into Absolute Knowing in the Phenomenology.
The Unhappy Consciousness which comes earlier in the exposition actually is
a Christianity that has moved beyond its own communal truth to become about
the divide between a finite individual and the divine as the bad infinite.
So the speculative truth of Christianity is no longer a living truth for
Christians but something that itself has passed. Hegel may have had some
quixotic interest in reinvigorating this original truth or he may more
cynically have been appropriating it for his own philosophic interests. I do
But the appeal of viewing Christianity as a death of god religion is that
such a reading facilitates one of Hegel's main philosophic interests: to
move from the divide between man and a transcendent god to a true infinite
for which the divide freed of its theological setting is inherent to the
true infinite itself as the truth about the human condition. God then is
relegated to being nothing but this divide inherent to the absolute. It does
not name what is normally meant by god. The meant god has died on the cross.
Christianity speculatively comprehended has god die not so that we might
await his return but rather so that we might find the speculative kingdom
within and cease our futile attempt to grasp the void.
From: Paul Trejo <petrejo@...>
Date: Fri, 6 Jan 2012 09:28:46 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Hegel's "mysticism" and Christian doctrine
In response to the Tue13Sep11 post by Beat Greuter:
> John,Beat, the choices you offer are too dualist -- too Either/Or.
> In this sense you should found a secret society which is devoted to
> Hegel as a theologian with its members looking at him as their master.
> With this perhaps you will agree with me you destroy Hegel as a
> philosopher of reason. This is a great pity since after Analytical
> Philosophy has become caught in its cul-de-sac Hegel has become
> (at least for some of its adherents) a kind of anchor for having
> prepared the philosophical resources to overcome its intractable
> contradictions, a light in the history of interpretation of Hegel's
> philosophy, a light which you intend to blow out again as so many
> did before in the history of Hegel reading.
> Beat Greuter
It is not a one-sided matter of: 'Either Theology Or Philosophy
and No Middle Ground', because Hegel offers a Third Way.
The Analytical school, I have found so far, has a fixed idea about
Religion. That fixed idea arrests the concept of Religion at its
lowest and most primitive forms. Yet there is an organic aspect
to Religion - an organic aspect that Hegel attempted to reveal in
his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (1818-1831).
Religion is not all one thing - i.e. the superstitions that circulated in
Europe for so many centuries. There are aspects of Religion that
you evidently have not explored.
For example, as Hegel showed in his theory that Christianity is
the Consummate Religion (volume 3), Christianity is the only
Religion to have grown up alongside Greco-Roman Philosophy,
in particular the Stoic ideology and Neoplatonism.
For the reason, the Early Fathers of the Second Century were
skilled not only in NT dogma, but also in Plato and Aristotle.
These are the beginnings of a movement that carried Western
Civilization along for nearly 20 centuries.
All the European superstitions in the world cannot devalue a
movement so strong and vital as this culture.
--Paul Trejo, MA
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