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Re: [hegel] Re: Is consciousness necessarily "knowing" or/and knowledge?

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  • greuterb
    ... Joao, I think that sense-certainty is a limit-consciousness. It does not yet accept any limitation (determination) in its pure apprehension ( Auffassen
    Message 1 of 50 , Aug 29, 2011
      Am 28.08.2011 21:26, Joao writes:

      > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>,
      > greuterb <greuterb@...> wrote:
      > >
      > > Am 28.08.2011 17:25, Joao writes:
      > >
      > > > Hi all,
      > > >
      > > > Just going back to the issue Alan opened with his remark.
      > > >
      > > > Sense-certainty opens with:
      > > >
      > > > "THE knowledge, which is at the start or immediately our object, can
      > > > be nothing else than just that which is immediate knowledge,
      > knowledge
      > > > of the immediate, of what is. We have, in dealing with it, to
      > proceed,
      > > > too, in an immediate way, to accept what is given, not altering
      > > > anything in it as it is presented before us, and keeping mere
      > > > apprehension (Auffassen) free from conceptual comprehension
      > (Begreifen)."
      > > >
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > > Joao,
      > >
      > > But is there a "knowledge of the immediate"? Knowledge always
      > includes a
      > > mediation, that is, there is a "conceptual comprehension" within it
      > > whereas the immediate cannot be known since it is a not yet mediated.
      > > So, as you write, it is a false statement. Or, has this initial
      > > immediate already a kind of mediation within it? Otherwise, a dualism
      > > between an (immediate) intuition and a given outer empirical reality
      > > must be assumed.
      > >
      > > Regards,
      > > Beat Greuter
      >
      > Hi Beat,
      >
      > Yes, you ask the right questions. It seems necessary that this initial
      > immediate has already a kind of mediation within it. I think in my
      > first post about this issue i called sense-certainty an artifice
      > introduced by Hegel to posit the necessity of perception as appearance
      > of phenomenal consciousness, but now i see that "artifice" is a
      > superficial way of considering it.
      >


      Joao,

      I think that sense-certainty is a limit-consciousness. It does not yet
      accept any limitation (determination) in its pure apprehension
      ('Auffassen' without conceptual modification) since for it this would
      distort the immediate truth of apprehension. Only the consciousness of
      perception recognizes the limitation of being and thinks about it. The
      same we have in the Logic with the transition from being - nothing -
      becoming into 'Dasein' and 'quality'. So, your characterization as 'an
      artifice' is not totally wrong. I would call it rather a limit-concept
      of consciousness - a unity in which both sides which constitute
      knowledge (the particular and the universal) are included but still in a
      not yet mediated opposition. The attempt in sense-certainty to mediate
      the two sides ends in a running 'becoming' without achieving any
      determination.



      > Then i also called in an externality, but know it seems to me that
      > such a point is only half of it - and half a point is no point. But i
      > think we can still pick up this notion of "externality" and take it
      > from the standpoint of consciousness in actuality which is first of
      > all the consciousness that is unfolding the exposition: meaning, by
      > falling in this consciousness it falls in consciousness in general, if
      > i may put it this way, so that it is an externality which isn't an
      > externality.
      >



      As a consciousness already sense-certainty makes a distinction between
      itself (I) and its other (the outer world). Therefore we can take it as
      an externality, it is no longer a soul which is immediately one with
      itself and its world. However, since it is a limit-concept of
      consciousness as described above the externality is not yet really
      posited by this consciousness, this happens only in the transition into
      perception.



      > But nonetheless appears in relation to perception as coming from
      > outside phenomenal consciousness but as it falls within consciousness
      > it must appear from explicit self-consciousness as it recollects its
      > own development and wants to assert itself that its immediate
      > apearence as perception is a logical necessity of consciousness as
      > knowing. This to say that it seems that Hegel is leaving something
      > behind our backs as readers, precisely the mediation by which the
      > position of sense-certainty is posited before us. That consciousness
      > posits a point - sense-certainty - from within which it can't appear
      > as consciousness, although appearing because it posits it, is
      > something that at this point i can't quite comprehend.
      >
      > Regards,
      > João.
      >



      We should not yet speak of self-consciousness. This will be constituted
      only by the two worlds in "Force and the Understanding" and their
      resulting unity in self-certainty. However, from a methodological point
      of view there is a unity of the two sides of knowledge from the very
      beginning but only as a concept in-itself. This means that from the very
      beginning the empirical side is not detached from the conceptualizing
      side since in this case they could never convene: how can the blind
      convene with the void if they belong to two separate worlds? With this
      Hegel transcends the mere philosophy of the understanding (identity,
      intuition - heterogeneity) which he perceives in the philosophies from
      Descartes to Schelling and which implies necessarily a dualism from
      which the development of real knowledge cannot be followed without
      making unproved assumptions (i.e. intrinsic ideas). For Hegel one
      opposite always include the other.

      Regards,
      Beat Greuter



      > >
      > > > And I think we can say that this is a false statement. There is no
      > > > such "mere aprehension". This is, i think, the conclusion we come
      > > > about with the opening of Perception:
      > > >
      > > > "Immediate certainty does not make the truth its own, for its
      > truth is
      > > > something universal, whereas certainty wants to deal with the This.
      > > > Perception, on the other hand, takes what exists for it to be a
      > > > universal. Universality being its principle in general, its moments
      > > > immediately distinguished within it are also universal; I is a
      > > > universal, and the object is a universal."
      > > >
      > > > It seems to me that Hegel is saying that phenomenal consciousness
      > > > appears only in so far as it is perception, that with sense-certainty
      > > > consciousness in its phenomenal concept, as aprehending or knowing
      > > > something, can not emerge as it goes under with its object.
      > > > Sense-certainty mediates for us this emergence, but and this is
      > what i
      > > > am saying, it doesn't mediate the appearance of perception from the
      > > > consciousness being observed in the exposition so that if it comes to
      > > > be that us and the consciousness observed in the exposition become
      > one
      > > > and the same we still have the necessity of perception in and for
      > > > itself to be asserted - i mean, no longer from the contingency of the
      > > > aprehensions of sense-certainty but from the concept of consciousness
      > > > in its necessity.
      > > >
      > > > Regards,
      > > > João.
      > > >
      > > > PS: the above quotes of the PhG are from Baillie's translation.
      > > >
      > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>,
      > > > "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
      > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Alan
      > > > Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@> wrote:
      > > > > >
      > > > > > A clue as to the 'necessity' of beginning with sense-certainty:
      > > > read the
      > > > > > first two sentences of sense-certainty and see what you find.
      > > > >
      > > > > I find that it comes from the outside. The exposition takes the
      > > > immediate to be sense-certainty but just to show that it is
      > perception.
      > > > >
      > > > > João.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > - Alan
      > > > > >
      > > > > > From: vascojoao2003 <vascojoao2003@>
      > > > > > Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com
      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
      > > > > > Date: Sun, 28 Aug 2011 04:30:44 -0000
      > > > > > To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
      > > > > > Subject: [hegel] Is consciousness necessarily "knowing" or/and
      > > > knowledge?
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Dear Group,
      > > > > >
      > > > > > I came to notice one thing, at least from the standpoint of my
      > > > study of the
      > > > > > PhG and what i have grasped so far, that is: it is not yet
      > > > established that
      > > > > > Self-consciousness is necessarily "knowing" or "knowledge"(1)
      > > > which either
      > > > > > way having one we have the other. If this has any bearing on the
      > > > actual
      > > > > > development so far and it is not merely the case of I having
      > missed
      > > > > > something then there is this huge question yet to be answered and
      > > > which
      > > > > > reflects back on the exposition so far (I'm arrived at P.259).
      > > > > >
      > > > > > We have come to know that Perception is a necessary position
      > from the
      > > > > > development of Sense-certainty and as such one might say the the
      > > > necessity
      > > > > > of knowing is assured, but the necessity of perception is posited
      > > > by the
      > > > > > development of a contingency [of sense-certainty] - as Hegel
      > > > states so in
      > > > > > the opening of II:
      > > > > >
      > > > > > "(...)our process of apprehending what perception is,
      > therefore, is no
      > > > > > longer a contingent series of acts of apprehension, as is the
      > case
      > > > with the
      > > > > > apprehension of sense-certainty; it is a logically necessitated
      > > > > > process."(Baillie's)
      > > > > >
      > > > > > If Sense-certainty does not posit consciousness as necessarily
      > > > knowing, or
      > > > > > knowledge, Perception, even if it arises necessarily from
      > > > sense-certainty,
      > > > > > it doesn't arise from consciousness as necessarily knowing or
      > > > knowledge.
      > > > > > This transition from sense-certainty to perception seems to be
      > saying
      > > > > > fundamentaly this: if we posit sense-certainty we come up to
      > > > perception. The
      > > > > > problem is that sense-certainty is not itself posited by a
      > previous
      > > > > > necessity by which it posits itself as necessary - it seems even
      > > > an artifice
      > > > > > from Hegel and it seems, from the result, that Hegel might be
      > > > saying that
      > > > > > phenomenal consciousness appears as perception and not as
      > > > sense-certainty.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > If it appears necessarily as perception then, in so far as the
      > > > exposition
      > > > > > follows from consciousness and knowledge as it appears, it makes
      > > > sense that
      > > > > > it proceeds from perception, but it nonetheless remains to be
      > > > shown from
      > > > > > consciousness itself, which appears as perception, if it does so
      > > > by its own
      > > > > > necessity, posited by its own concept or not - which comes to
      > be the
      > > > > > question about if consciousness is necessarily "knowing"?
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Why is this important? As far as I can tell it is important
      > > > because having
      > > > > > appeared from a contingency, perception, as necessary knowing,
      > has
      > > > to posit
      > > > > > back the contingence from where it arose as its necessity.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Conceptually, this movement appears to have the nature of the
      > > > notional,
      > > > > > meaning, to be for itself in another, meaning, necessity being
      > for
      > > > itself in
      > > > > > or through contingency, but contingency as far as it remains in
      > > > itself is
      > > > > > external to necessity so that consciousness, or phenomenal
      > > > consciousness,
      > > > > > having risen to its necessity from an externality, posits back
      > that
      > > > > > externality, it is for that externality. This externality must
      > be,
      > > > then, its
      > > > > > blind spot and, thus, a contender for the inabillity of phenomenal
      > > > > > consciousness to perceive what is behind its back - it is its
      > > > original sin,
      > > > > > so to say.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > But is all this makes sense then it is still to be understood the
      > > > movement
      > > > > > by which consciousness sublates (if this is correct to say in
      > > > here) this
      > > > > > externality and becomes true certainty of itself - or better said,
      > > > > > self-possession, as knowing or/and knowledge.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Does this make sense to any of you? Does any of you see this
      > as a real
      > > > > > problem yet to be resolved?
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Regards,
      > > > > > João.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > (1)This is a question that Aristotle also took as fundamental to
      > > > his major
      > > > > > work, as he opens it with his position about it:
      > > > > >
      > > > > > "ALL men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the
      > > > delight we
      > > > > > take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are
      > > > loved for
      > > > > > themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only
      > > > with a
      > > > > > view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we
      > > > prefer
      > > > > > seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that
      > > > this, most of
      > > > > > all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many
      > differences
      > > > between
      > > > > > things."
      >



      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • vascojoao2003
      ... Hi Beat, Yes, I agree with your points. I also think, continuing what i wrotte earlier, that the position of sense-certainty is to open a divide where
      Message 50 of 50 , Aug 29, 2011
        --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, greuterb <greuterb@...> wrote:
        >
        > Am 28.08.2011 21:26, Joao writes:
        >
        > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>,
        > > greuterb <greuterb@> wrote:
        > > >
        > > > Am 28.08.2011 17:25, Joao writes:
        > > >
        > > > > Hi all,
        > > > >
        > > > > Just going back to the issue Alan opened with his remark.
        > > > >
        > > > > Sense-certainty opens with:
        > > > >
        > > > > "THE knowledge, which is at the start or immediately our object, can
        > > > > be nothing else than just that which is immediate knowledge,
        > > knowledge
        > > > > of the immediate, of what is. We have, in dealing with it, to
        > > proceed,
        > > > > too, in an immediate way, to accept what is given, not altering
        > > > > anything in it as it is presented before us, and keeping mere
        > > > > apprehension (Auffassen) free from conceptual comprehension
        > > (Begreifen)."
        > > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > Joao,
        > > >
        > > > But is there a "knowledge of the immediate"? Knowledge always
        > > includes a
        > > > mediation, that is, there is a "conceptual comprehension" within it
        > > > whereas the immediate cannot be known since it is a not yet mediated.
        > > > So, as you write, it is a false statement. Or, has this initial
        > > > immediate already a kind of mediation within it? Otherwise, a dualism
        > > > between an (immediate) intuition and a given outer empirical reality
        > > > must be assumed.
        > > >
        > > > Regards,
        > > > Beat Greuter
        > >
        > > Hi Beat,
        > >
        > > Yes, you ask the right questions. It seems necessary that this initial
        > > immediate has already a kind of mediation within it. I think in my
        > > first post about this issue i called sense-certainty an artifice
        > > introduced by Hegel to posit the necessity of perception as appearance
        > > of phenomenal consciousness, but now i see that "artifice" is a
        > > superficial way of considering it.
        > >
        >
        >
        > Joao,
        >
        > I think that sense-certainty is a limit-consciousness. It does not yet
        > accept any limitation (determination) in its pure apprehension
        > ('Auffassen' without conceptual modification) since for it this would
        > distort the immediate truth of apprehension. Only the consciousness of
        > perception recognizes the limitation of being and thinks about it. The
        > same we have in the Logic with the transition from being - nothing -
        > becoming into 'Dasein' and 'quality'. So, your characterization as 'an
        > artifice' is not totally wrong. I would call it rather a limit-concept
        > of consciousness - a unity in which both sides which constitute
        > knowledge (the particular and the universal) are included but still in a
        > not yet mediated opposition. The attempt in sense-certainty to mediate
        > the two sides ends in a running 'becoming' without achieving any
        > determination.

        Hi Beat,

        Yes, I agree with your points. I also think, continuing what i wrotte earlier, that the position of sense-certainty is to open a divide where consciousness in actuality, us, differentiates itself from itself aiming to become for itself in this difference. This limit-consciousness, thus, might be what is necessary to free the consciousness observed from the consciousness observing.

        Regards,
        João.
        >
        >
        >
        > > Then i also called in an externality, but know it seems to me that
        > > such a point is only half of it - and half a point is no point. But i
        > > think we can still pick up this notion of "externality" and take it
        > > from the standpoint of consciousness in actuality which is first of
        > > all the consciousness that is unfolding the exposition: meaning, by
        > > falling in this consciousness it falls in consciousness in general, if
        > > i may put it this way, so that it is an externality which isn't an
        > > externality.
        > >
        >
        >
        >
        > As a consciousness already sense-certainty makes a distinction between
        > itself (I) and its other (the outer world). Therefore we can take it as
        > an externality, it is no longer a soul which is immediately one with
        > itself and its world. However, since it is a limit-concept of
        > consciousness as described above the externality is not yet really
        > posited by this consciousness, this happens only in the transition into
        > perception.
        >
        >
        >
        > > But nonetheless appears in relation to perception as coming from
        > > outside phenomenal consciousness but as it falls within consciousness
        > > it must appear from explicit self-consciousness as it recollects its
        > > own development and wants to assert itself that its immediate
        > > apearence as perception is a logical necessity of consciousness as
        > > knowing. This to say that it seems that Hegel is leaving something
        > > behind our backs as readers, precisely the mediation by which the
        > > position of sense-certainty is posited before us. That consciousness
        > > posits a point - sense-certainty - from within which it can't appear
        > > as consciousness, although appearing because it posits it, is
        > > something that at this point i can't quite comprehend.
        > >
        > > Regards,
        > > João.
        > >
        >
        >
        >
        > We should not yet speak of self-consciousness. This will be constituted
        > only by the two worlds in "Force and the Understanding" and their
        > resulting unity in self-certainty. However, from a methodological point
        > of view there is a unity of the two sides of knowledge from the very
        > beginning but only as a concept in-itself. This means that from the very
        > beginning the empirical side is not detached from the conceptualizing
        > side since in this case they could never convene: how can the blind
        > convene with the void if they belong to two separate worlds? With this
        > Hegel transcends the mere philosophy of the understanding (identity,
        > intuition - heterogeneity) which he perceives in the philosophies from
        > Descartes to Schelling and which implies necessarily a dualism from
        > which the development of real knowledge cannot be followed without
        > making unproved assumptions (i.e. intrinsic ideas). For Hegel one
        > opposite always include the other.
        >
        > Regards,
        > Beat Greuter
        >
        >
        >
        > > >
        > > > > And I think we can say that this is a false statement. There is no
        > > > > such "mere aprehension". This is, i think, the conclusion we come
        > > > > about with the opening of Perception:
        > > > >
        > > > > "Immediate certainty does not make the truth its own, for its
        > > truth is
        > > > > something universal, whereas certainty wants to deal with the This.
        > > > > Perception, on the other hand, takes what exists for it to be a
        > > > > universal. Universality being its principle in general, its moments
        > > > > immediately distinguished within it are also universal; I is a
        > > > > universal, and the object is a universal."
        > > > >
        > > > > It seems to me that Hegel is saying that phenomenal consciousness
        > > > > appears only in so far as it is perception, that with sense-certainty
        > > > > consciousness in its phenomenal concept, as aprehending or knowing
        > > > > something, can not emerge as it goes under with its object.
        > > > > Sense-certainty mediates for us this emergence, but and this is
        > > what i
        > > > > am saying, it doesn't mediate the appearance of perception from the
        > > > > consciousness being observed in the exposition so that if it comes to
        > > > > be that us and the consciousness observed in the exposition become
        > > one
        > > > > and the same we still have the necessity of perception in and for
        > > > > itself to be asserted - i mean, no longer from the contingency of the
        > > > > aprehensions of sense-certainty but from the concept of consciousness
        > > > > in its necessity.
        > > > >
        > > > > Regards,
        > > > > João.
        > > > >
        > > > > PS: the above quotes of the PhG are from Baillie's translation.
        > > > >
        > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>,
        > > > > "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
        > > > > >
        > > > > >
        > > > > >
        > > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Alan
        > > > > Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@> wrote:
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > A clue as to the 'necessity' of beginning with sense-certainty:
        > > > > read the
        > > > > > > first two sentences of sense-certainty and see what you find.
        > > > > >
        > > > > > I find that it comes from the outside. The exposition takes the
        > > > > immediate to be sense-certainty but just to show that it is
        > > perception.
        > > > > >
        > > > > > João.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > - Alan
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > From: vascojoao2003 <vascojoao2003@>
        > > > > > > Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
        > > > > > > Date: Sun, 28 Aug 2011 04:30:44 -0000
        > > > > > > To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
        > > > > > > Subject: [hegel] Is consciousness necessarily "knowing" or/and
        > > > > knowledge?
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Dear Group,
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > I came to notice one thing, at least from the standpoint of my
        > > > > study of the
        > > > > > > PhG and what i have grasped so far, that is: it is not yet
        > > > > established that
        > > > > > > Self-consciousness is necessarily "knowing" or "knowledge"(1)
        > > > > which either
        > > > > > > way having one we have the other. If this has any bearing on the
        > > > > actual
        > > > > > > development so far and it is not merely the case of I having
        > > missed
        > > > > > > something then there is this huge question yet to be answered and
        > > > > which
        > > > > > > reflects back on the exposition so far (I'm arrived at P.259).
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > We have come to know that Perception is a necessary position
        > > from the
        > > > > > > development of Sense-certainty and as such one might say the the
        > > > > necessity
        > > > > > > of knowing is assured, but the necessity of perception is posited
        > > > > by the
        > > > > > > development of a contingency [of sense-certainty] - as Hegel
        > > > > states so in
        > > > > > > the opening of II:
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > "(...)our process of apprehending what perception is,
        > > therefore, is no
        > > > > > > longer a contingent series of acts of apprehension, as is the
        > > case
        > > > > with the
        > > > > > > apprehension of sense-certainty; it is a logically necessitated
        > > > > > > process."(Baillie's)
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > If Sense-certainty does not posit consciousness as necessarily
        > > > > knowing, or
        > > > > > > knowledge, Perception, even if it arises necessarily from
        > > > > sense-certainty,
        > > > > > > it doesn't arise from consciousness as necessarily knowing or
        > > > > knowledge.
        > > > > > > This transition from sense-certainty to perception seems to be
        > > saying
        > > > > > > fundamentaly this: if we posit sense-certainty we come up to
        > > > > perception. The
        > > > > > > problem is that sense-certainty is not itself posited by a
        > > previous
        > > > > > > necessity by which it posits itself as necessary - it seems even
        > > > > an artifice
        > > > > > > from Hegel and it seems, from the result, that Hegel might be
        > > > > saying that
        > > > > > > phenomenal consciousness appears as perception and not as
        > > > > sense-certainty.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > If it appears necessarily as perception then, in so far as the
        > > > > exposition
        > > > > > > follows from consciousness and knowledge as it appears, it makes
        > > > > sense that
        > > > > > > it proceeds from perception, but it nonetheless remains to be
        > > > > shown from
        > > > > > > consciousness itself, which appears as perception, if it does so
        > > > > by its own
        > > > > > > necessity, posited by its own concept or not - which comes to
        > > be the
        > > > > > > question about if consciousness is necessarily "knowing"?
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Why is this important? As far as I can tell it is important
        > > > > because having
        > > > > > > appeared from a contingency, perception, as necessary knowing,
        > > has
        > > > > to posit
        > > > > > > back the contingence from where it arose as its necessity.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Conceptually, this movement appears to have the nature of the
        > > > > notional,
        > > > > > > meaning, to be for itself in another, meaning, necessity being
        > > for
        > > > > itself in
        > > > > > > or through contingency, but contingency as far as it remains in
        > > > > itself is
        > > > > > > external to necessity so that consciousness, or phenomenal
        > > > > consciousness,
        > > > > > > having risen to its necessity from an externality, posits back
        > > that
        > > > > > > externality, it is for that externality. This externality must
        > > be,
        > > > > then, its
        > > > > > > blind spot and, thus, a contender for the inabillity of phenomenal
        > > > > > > consciousness to perceive what is behind its back - it is its
        > > > > original sin,
        > > > > > > so to say.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > But is all this makes sense then it is still to be understood the
        > > > > movement
        > > > > > > by which consciousness sublates (if this is correct to say in
        > > > > here) this
        > > > > > > externality and becomes true certainty of itself - or better said,
        > > > > > > self-possession, as knowing or/and knowledge.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Does this make sense to any of you? Does any of you see this
        > > as a real
        > > > > > > problem yet to be resolved?
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Regards,
        > > > > > > João.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > (1)This is a question that Aristotle also took as fundamental to
        > > > > his major
        > > > > > > work, as he opens it with his position about it:
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > "ALL men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the
        > > > > delight we
        > > > > > > take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are
        > > > > loved for
        > > > > > > themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only
        > > > > with a
        > > > > > > view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we
        > > > > prefer
        > > > > > > seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that
        > > > > this, most of
        > > > > > > all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many
        > > differences
        > > > > between
        > > > > > > things."
        > >
        >
        >
        >
        > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        >
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