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Re: [hegel] Re: Is consciousness necessarily "knowing" or/and knowledge?

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  • greuterb
    ... Joao, But is there a knowledge of the immediate ? Knowledge always includes a mediation, that is, there is a conceptual comprehension within it whereas
    Message 1 of 50 , Aug 28, 2011
      Am 28.08.2011 17:25, Joao writes:

      > Hi all,
      >
      > Just going back to the issue Alan opened with his remark.
      >
      > Sense-certainty opens with:
      >
      > "THE knowledge, which is at the start or immediately our object, can
      > be nothing else than just that which is immediate knowledge, knowledge
      > of the immediate, of what is. We have, in dealing with it, to proceed,
      > too, in an immediate way, to accept what is given, not altering
      > anything in it as it is presented before us, and keeping mere
      > apprehension (Auffassen) free from conceptual comprehension (Begreifen)."
      >



      Joao,

      But is there a "knowledge of the immediate"? Knowledge always includes a
      mediation, that is, there is a "conceptual comprehension" within it
      whereas the immediate cannot be known since it is a not yet mediated.
      So, as you write, it is a false statement. Or, has this initial
      immediate already a kind of mediation within it? Otherwise, a dualism
      between an (immediate) intuition and a given outer empirical reality
      must be assumed.

      Regards,
      Beat Greuter



      > And I think we can say that this is a false statement. There is no
      > such "mere aprehension". This is, i think, the conclusion we come
      > about with the opening of Perception:
      >
      > "Immediate certainty does not make the truth its own, for its truth is
      > something universal, whereas certainty wants to deal with the This.
      > Perception, on the other hand, takes what exists for it to be a
      > universal. Universality being its principle in general, its moments
      > immediately distinguished within it are also universal; I is a
      > universal, and the object is a universal."
      >
      > It seems to me that Hegel is saying that phenomenal consciousness
      > appears only in so far as it is perception, that with sense-certainty
      > consciousness in its phenomenal concept, as aprehending or knowing
      > something, can not emerge as it goes under with its object.
      > Sense-certainty mediates for us this emergence, but and this is what i
      > am saying, it doesn't mediate the appearance of perception from the
      > consciousness being observed in the exposition so that if it comes to
      > be that us and the consciousness observed in the exposition become one
      > and the same we still have the necessity of perception in and for
      > itself to be asserted - i mean, no longer from the contingency of the
      > aprehensions of sense-certainty but from the concept of consciousness
      > in its necessity.
      >
      > Regards,
      > João.
      >
      > PS: the above quotes of the PhG are from Baillie's translation.
      >
      > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>,
      > "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@...> wrote:
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Alan
      > Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@> wrote:
      > > >
      > > > A clue as to the 'necessity' of beginning with sense-certainty:
      > read the
      > > > first two sentences of sense-certainty and see what you find.
      > >
      > > I find that it comes from the outside. The exposition takes the
      > immediate to be sense-certainty but just to show that it is perception.
      > >
      > > João.
      > > >
      > > > - Alan
      > > >
      > > > From: vascojoao2003 <vascojoao2003@>
      > > > Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
      > > > Date: Sun, 28 Aug 2011 04:30:44 -0000
      > > > To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
      > > > Subject: [hegel] Is consciousness necessarily "knowing" or/and
      > knowledge?
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > > Dear Group,
      > > >
      > > > I came to notice one thing, at least from the standpoint of my
      > study of the
      > > > PhG and what i have grasped so far, that is: it is not yet
      > established that
      > > > Self-consciousness is necessarily "knowing" or "knowledge"(1)
      > which either
      > > > way having one we have the other. If this has any bearing on the
      > actual
      > > > development so far and it is not merely the case of I having missed
      > > > something then there is this huge question yet to be answered and
      > which
      > > > reflects back on the exposition so far (I'm arrived at P.259).
      > > >
      > > > We have come to know that Perception is a necessary position from the
      > > > development of Sense-certainty and as such one might say the the
      > necessity
      > > > of knowing is assured, but the necessity of perception is posited
      > by the
      > > > development of a contingency [of sense-certainty] - as Hegel
      > states so in
      > > > the opening of II:
      > > >
      > > > "(...)our process of apprehending what perception is, therefore, is no
      > > > longer a contingent series of acts of apprehension, as is the case
      > with the
      > > > apprehension of sense-certainty; it is a logically necessitated
      > > > process."(Baillie's)
      > > >
      > > > If Sense-certainty does not posit consciousness as necessarily
      > knowing, or
      > > > knowledge, Perception, even if it arises necessarily from
      > sense-certainty,
      > > > it doesn't arise from consciousness as necessarily knowing or
      > knowledge.
      > > > This transition from sense-certainty to perception seems to be saying
      > > > fundamentaly this: if we posit sense-certainty we come up to
      > perception. The
      > > > problem is that sense-certainty is not itself posited by a previous
      > > > necessity by which it posits itself as necessary - it seems even
      > an artifice
      > > > from Hegel and it seems, from the result, that Hegel might be
      > saying that
      > > > phenomenal consciousness appears as perception and not as
      > sense-certainty.
      > > >
      > > > If it appears necessarily as perception then, in so far as the
      > exposition
      > > > follows from consciousness and knowledge as it appears, it makes
      > sense that
      > > > it proceeds from perception, but it nonetheless remains to be
      > shown from
      > > > consciousness itself, which appears as perception, if it does so
      > by its own
      > > > necessity, posited by its own concept or not - which comes to be the
      > > > question about if consciousness is necessarily "knowing"?
      > > >
      > > > Why is this important? As far as I can tell it is important
      > because having
      > > > appeared from a contingency, perception, as necessary knowing, has
      > to posit
      > > > back the contingence from where it arose as its necessity.
      > > >
      > > > Conceptually, this movement appears to have the nature of the
      > notional,
      > > > meaning, to be for itself in another, meaning, necessity being for
      > itself in
      > > > or through contingency, but contingency as far as it remains in
      > itself is
      > > > external to necessity so that consciousness, or phenomenal
      > consciousness,
      > > > having risen to its necessity from an externality, posits back that
      > > > externality, it is for that externality. This externality must be,
      > then, its
      > > > blind spot and, thus, a contender for the inabillity of phenomenal
      > > > consciousness to perceive what is behind its back - it is its
      > original sin,
      > > > so to say.
      > > >
      > > > But is all this makes sense then it is still to be understood the
      > movement
      > > > by which consciousness sublates (if this is correct to say in
      > here) this
      > > > externality and becomes true certainty of itself - or better said,
      > > > self-possession, as knowing or/and knowledge.
      > > >
      > > > Does this make sense to any of you? Does any of you see this as a real
      > > > problem yet to be resolved?
      > > >
      > > > Regards,
      > > > João.
      > > >
      > > > (1)This is a question that Aristotle also took as fundamental to
      > his major
      > > > work, as he opens it with his position about it:
      > > >
      > > > "ALL men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the
      > delight we
      > > > take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are
      > loved for
      > > > themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only
      > with a
      > > > view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we
      > prefer
      > > > seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that
      > this, most of
      > > > all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences
      > between
      > > > things."
      >



      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • vascojoao2003
      ... Hi Beat, Yes, I agree with your points. I also think, continuing what i wrotte earlier, that the position of sense-certainty is to open a divide where
      Message 50 of 50 , Aug 29, 2011
        --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, greuterb <greuterb@...> wrote:
        >
        > Am 28.08.2011 21:26, Joao writes:
        >
        > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>,
        > > greuterb <greuterb@> wrote:
        > > >
        > > > Am 28.08.2011 17:25, Joao writes:
        > > >
        > > > > Hi all,
        > > > >
        > > > > Just going back to the issue Alan opened with his remark.
        > > > >
        > > > > Sense-certainty opens with:
        > > > >
        > > > > "THE knowledge, which is at the start or immediately our object, can
        > > > > be nothing else than just that which is immediate knowledge,
        > > knowledge
        > > > > of the immediate, of what is. We have, in dealing with it, to
        > > proceed,
        > > > > too, in an immediate way, to accept what is given, not altering
        > > > > anything in it as it is presented before us, and keeping mere
        > > > > apprehension (Auffassen) free from conceptual comprehension
        > > (Begreifen)."
        > > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > Joao,
        > > >
        > > > But is there a "knowledge of the immediate"? Knowledge always
        > > includes a
        > > > mediation, that is, there is a "conceptual comprehension" within it
        > > > whereas the immediate cannot be known since it is a not yet mediated.
        > > > So, as you write, it is a false statement. Or, has this initial
        > > > immediate already a kind of mediation within it? Otherwise, a dualism
        > > > between an (immediate) intuition and a given outer empirical reality
        > > > must be assumed.
        > > >
        > > > Regards,
        > > > Beat Greuter
        > >
        > > Hi Beat,
        > >
        > > Yes, you ask the right questions. It seems necessary that this initial
        > > immediate has already a kind of mediation within it. I think in my
        > > first post about this issue i called sense-certainty an artifice
        > > introduced by Hegel to posit the necessity of perception as appearance
        > > of phenomenal consciousness, but now i see that "artifice" is a
        > > superficial way of considering it.
        > >
        >
        >
        > Joao,
        >
        > I think that sense-certainty is a limit-consciousness. It does not yet
        > accept any limitation (determination) in its pure apprehension
        > ('Auffassen' without conceptual modification) since for it this would
        > distort the immediate truth of apprehension. Only the consciousness of
        > perception recognizes the limitation of being and thinks about it. The
        > same we have in the Logic with the transition from being - nothing -
        > becoming into 'Dasein' and 'quality'. So, your characterization as 'an
        > artifice' is not totally wrong. I would call it rather a limit-concept
        > of consciousness - a unity in which both sides which constitute
        > knowledge (the particular and the universal) are included but still in a
        > not yet mediated opposition. The attempt in sense-certainty to mediate
        > the two sides ends in a running 'becoming' without achieving any
        > determination.

        Hi Beat,

        Yes, I agree with your points. I also think, continuing what i wrotte earlier, that the position of sense-certainty is to open a divide where consciousness in actuality, us, differentiates itself from itself aiming to become for itself in this difference. This limit-consciousness, thus, might be what is necessary to free the consciousness observed from the consciousness observing.

        Regards,
        João.
        >
        >
        >
        > > Then i also called in an externality, but know it seems to me that
        > > such a point is only half of it - and half a point is no point. But i
        > > think we can still pick up this notion of "externality" and take it
        > > from the standpoint of consciousness in actuality which is first of
        > > all the consciousness that is unfolding the exposition: meaning, by
        > > falling in this consciousness it falls in consciousness in general, if
        > > i may put it this way, so that it is an externality which isn't an
        > > externality.
        > >
        >
        >
        >
        > As a consciousness already sense-certainty makes a distinction between
        > itself (I) and its other (the outer world). Therefore we can take it as
        > an externality, it is no longer a soul which is immediately one with
        > itself and its world. However, since it is a limit-concept of
        > consciousness as described above the externality is not yet really
        > posited by this consciousness, this happens only in the transition into
        > perception.
        >
        >
        >
        > > But nonetheless appears in relation to perception as coming from
        > > outside phenomenal consciousness but as it falls within consciousness
        > > it must appear from explicit self-consciousness as it recollects its
        > > own development and wants to assert itself that its immediate
        > > apearence as perception is a logical necessity of consciousness as
        > > knowing. This to say that it seems that Hegel is leaving something
        > > behind our backs as readers, precisely the mediation by which the
        > > position of sense-certainty is posited before us. That consciousness
        > > posits a point - sense-certainty - from within which it can't appear
        > > as consciousness, although appearing because it posits it, is
        > > something that at this point i can't quite comprehend.
        > >
        > > Regards,
        > > João.
        > >
        >
        >
        >
        > We should not yet speak of self-consciousness. This will be constituted
        > only by the two worlds in "Force and the Understanding" and their
        > resulting unity in self-certainty. However, from a methodological point
        > of view there is a unity of the two sides of knowledge from the very
        > beginning but only as a concept in-itself. This means that from the very
        > beginning the empirical side is not detached from the conceptualizing
        > side since in this case they could never convene: how can the blind
        > convene with the void if they belong to two separate worlds? With this
        > Hegel transcends the mere philosophy of the understanding (identity,
        > intuition - heterogeneity) which he perceives in the philosophies from
        > Descartes to Schelling and which implies necessarily a dualism from
        > which the development of real knowledge cannot be followed without
        > making unproved assumptions (i.e. intrinsic ideas). For Hegel one
        > opposite always include the other.
        >
        > Regards,
        > Beat Greuter
        >
        >
        >
        > > >
        > > > > And I think we can say that this is a false statement. There is no
        > > > > such "mere aprehension". This is, i think, the conclusion we come
        > > > > about with the opening of Perception:
        > > > >
        > > > > "Immediate certainty does not make the truth its own, for its
        > > truth is
        > > > > something universal, whereas certainty wants to deal with the This.
        > > > > Perception, on the other hand, takes what exists for it to be a
        > > > > universal. Universality being its principle in general, its moments
        > > > > immediately distinguished within it are also universal; I is a
        > > > > universal, and the object is a universal."
        > > > >
        > > > > It seems to me that Hegel is saying that phenomenal consciousness
        > > > > appears only in so far as it is perception, that with sense-certainty
        > > > > consciousness in its phenomenal concept, as aprehending or knowing
        > > > > something, can not emerge as it goes under with its object.
        > > > > Sense-certainty mediates for us this emergence, but and this is
        > > what i
        > > > > am saying, it doesn't mediate the appearance of perception from the
        > > > > consciousness being observed in the exposition so that if it comes to
        > > > > be that us and the consciousness observed in the exposition become
        > > one
        > > > > and the same we still have the necessity of perception in and for
        > > > > itself to be asserted - i mean, no longer from the contingency of the
        > > > > aprehensions of sense-certainty but from the concept of consciousness
        > > > > in its necessity.
        > > > >
        > > > > Regards,
        > > > > João.
        > > > >
        > > > > PS: the above quotes of the PhG are from Baillie's translation.
        > > > >
        > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>,
        > > > > "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
        > > > > >
        > > > > >
        > > > > >
        > > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Alan
        > > > > Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@> wrote:
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > A clue as to the 'necessity' of beginning with sense-certainty:
        > > > > read the
        > > > > > > first two sentences of sense-certainty and see what you find.
        > > > > >
        > > > > > I find that it comes from the outside. The exposition takes the
        > > > > immediate to be sense-certainty but just to show that it is
        > > perception.
        > > > > >
        > > > > > João.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > - Alan
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > From: vascojoao2003 <vascojoao2003@>
        > > > > > > Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
        > > > > > > Date: Sun, 28 Aug 2011 04:30:44 -0000
        > > > > > > To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
        > > > > > > Subject: [hegel] Is consciousness necessarily "knowing" or/and
        > > > > knowledge?
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Dear Group,
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > I came to notice one thing, at least from the standpoint of my
        > > > > study of the
        > > > > > > PhG and what i have grasped so far, that is: it is not yet
        > > > > established that
        > > > > > > Self-consciousness is necessarily "knowing" or "knowledge"(1)
        > > > > which either
        > > > > > > way having one we have the other. If this has any bearing on the
        > > > > actual
        > > > > > > development so far and it is not merely the case of I having
        > > missed
        > > > > > > something then there is this huge question yet to be answered and
        > > > > which
        > > > > > > reflects back on the exposition so far (I'm arrived at P.259).
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > We have come to know that Perception is a necessary position
        > > from the
        > > > > > > development of Sense-certainty and as such one might say the the
        > > > > necessity
        > > > > > > of knowing is assured, but the necessity of perception is posited
        > > > > by the
        > > > > > > development of a contingency [of sense-certainty] - as Hegel
        > > > > states so in
        > > > > > > the opening of II:
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > "(...)our process of apprehending what perception is,
        > > therefore, is no
        > > > > > > longer a contingent series of acts of apprehension, as is the
        > > case
        > > > > with the
        > > > > > > apprehension of sense-certainty; it is a logically necessitated
        > > > > > > process."(Baillie's)
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > If Sense-certainty does not posit consciousness as necessarily
        > > > > knowing, or
        > > > > > > knowledge, Perception, even if it arises necessarily from
        > > > > sense-certainty,
        > > > > > > it doesn't arise from consciousness as necessarily knowing or
        > > > > knowledge.
        > > > > > > This transition from sense-certainty to perception seems to be
        > > saying
        > > > > > > fundamentaly this: if we posit sense-certainty we come up to
        > > > > perception. The
        > > > > > > problem is that sense-certainty is not itself posited by a
        > > previous
        > > > > > > necessity by which it posits itself as necessary - it seems even
        > > > > an artifice
        > > > > > > from Hegel and it seems, from the result, that Hegel might be
        > > > > saying that
        > > > > > > phenomenal consciousness appears as perception and not as
        > > > > sense-certainty.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > If it appears necessarily as perception then, in so far as the
        > > > > exposition
        > > > > > > follows from consciousness and knowledge as it appears, it makes
        > > > > sense that
        > > > > > > it proceeds from perception, but it nonetheless remains to be
        > > > > shown from
        > > > > > > consciousness itself, which appears as perception, if it does so
        > > > > by its own
        > > > > > > necessity, posited by its own concept or not - which comes to
        > > be the
        > > > > > > question about if consciousness is necessarily "knowing"?
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Why is this important? As far as I can tell it is important
        > > > > because having
        > > > > > > appeared from a contingency, perception, as necessary knowing,
        > > has
        > > > > to posit
        > > > > > > back the contingence from where it arose as its necessity.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Conceptually, this movement appears to have the nature of the
        > > > > notional,
        > > > > > > meaning, to be for itself in another, meaning, necessity being
        > > for
        > > > > itself in
        > > > > > > or through contingency, but contingency as far as it remains in
        > > > > itself is
        > > > > > > external to necessity so that consciousness, or phenomenal
        > > > > consciousness,
        > > > > > > having risen to its necessity from an externality, posits back
        > > that
        > > > > > > externality, it is for that externality. This externality must
        > > be,
        > > > > then, its
        > > > > > > blind spot and, thus, a contender for the inabillity of phenomenal
        > > > > > > consciousness to perceive what is behind its back - it is its
        > > > > original sin,
        > > > > > > so to say.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > But is all this makes sense then it is still to be understood the
        > > > > movement
        > > > > > > by which consciousness sublates (if this is correct to say in
        > > > > here) this
        > > > > > > externality and becomes true certainty of itself - or better said,
        > > > > > > self-possession, as knowing or/and knowledge.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Does this make sense to any of you? Does any of you see this
        > > as a real
        > > > > > > problem yet to be resolved?
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Regards,
        > > > > > > João.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > (1)This is a question that Aristotle also took as fundamental to
        > > > > his major
        > > > > > > work, as he opens it with his position about it:
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > "ALL men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the
        > > > > delight we
        > > > > > > take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are
        > > > > loved for
        > > > > > > themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only
        > > > > with a
        > > > > > > view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we
        > > > > prefer
        > > > > > > seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that
        > > > > this, most of
        > > > > > > all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many
        > > differences
        > > > > between
        > > > > > > things."
        > >
        >
        >
        >
        > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        >
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