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Re: [hegel] Schopenhauer on Schelling

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  • greuterb
    ... John, Yes, and this philosophy of identity is exactly what Hegel rejects and for which Schelling (and Schopenhauer) attacks Hegel in reverse as an
    Message 1 of 13 , Aug 27, 2011
      Am 27.08.2011 00:37, John writes:

      > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Bruce
      > Merrill <merrillbp@...> wrote:
      >
      > > > Schopenhauer, by the way, is not a post-Hegelian philosopher. He
      > is very much a contemporary of Schelling and Hegel. He was, really, a
      > follower of Schelling.
      > >
      >
      > > But he presents himself as a follower of Kant, right? So, does he
      > > mis-represent himself?
      >
      > Not really. There are two things that are particularly characteristic
      > of early Schelling. First, he originally became famous for his
      > philosophy of nature which came out in the last few years of the 18th
      > century. And second, he ends his _System of Transcendental Idealism_
      > of 1800, which otherwise closely follows Fichte, with his philosophy
      > of art.
      >
      > Schopenhauer presents both a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of
      > art in his _The World as Will and Representation_, which came out in
      > 1819. I don't think Schopenhauer refers at all to Hegel in the first
      > edition of the book. I don't know that Hegel would have been very well
      > known in 1919. He speaks in a generally favorable way, though, of
      > Schelling's philosophy of nature in 1819. He writes:
      >
      > "To discover this fundamental type has been the main concern, or
      > certainly at any rate the most laudable endeavor, of the natural
      > philosophers of Schelling's school. In this respect they have much
      > merit, although in many cases their hunting for analogies in nature
      > degenerates into mere facetiousness. However, they have rightly shown
      > the universal relationship and family likeness even in the Ideas of
      > inorganic nature, for instance between electricity and magnetism, the
      > identity of which was established later; between chemical attraction
      > and gravitation, and so on.
      >
      > "They drew special attention to the fact that polarity, that is to
      > say, the sundering of a force into two qualitatively different and
      > opposite activities striving for reunion, a sundering which also
      > frequently reveals itself spatially by a dispersion in opposite
      > directions, is a fundamental type of almost all the phenomena of
      > nature, from the magnet and the crystal up to man...
      >
      > "Also in the school of Schelling we find, among their many efforts to
      > bring to light the analogy between all the phenomena of nature, many
      > attempts, although unfortunate ones, to derive laws of nature from the
      > mere laws of space and time. However, we cannot know how far the mind
      > of a genius will one day realize both endeavors."
      >
      > (vol. 1, 143f)
      >
      > Hegel, in his philosophy of nature begins with space and time and
      > derives all the laws of nature from them. Is Schopenhauer referring to
      > Hegel here? Could he have known something about Hegel's philosophy of
      > nature in 1919? Certainly, insofar as he knew anything about Hegel at
      > all in 1919, he would very likely have supposed him to be a member of
      > the school of Schelling.
      >
      > I believe all the other references to Schelling, and all the
      > references to Hegel, were addded to the second edition of 1844.
      >
      > But even in 1844 he still continued to speak not unfavorably about
      > Schelling. So, for instance, he writes:
      >
      > "The "One and all", in other words, that the inner essence in all
      > things is absolutely one and the same, has by my time already been
      > grasped and understood, after the Eleatics, Scotus Erigena, Giordano
      > Bruno, and Spinoza had taught it in detail, and Schelling had revived
      > this doctrine."
      >
      > (vol 2, 642)
      >



      John,

      Yes, and this philosophy of identity is exactly what Hegel rejects and
      for which Schelling (and Schopenhauer) attacks Hegel in reverse as an
      apparently undermining of Kant's dualism, i.e. the opposition of
      consciousness. Klaus Brinkmann in his book on "Idealism without Limits"
      (Springer, 2011, p. 144f) does point on this very clear:

      "The unity, therefore, is "already divided" as it always already has
      "superseded itself as an otherness". In other words, there is no need to
      posit an abtract totality apart from the unity of the two opposites.
      Each opposite is in and of itself united with its opposite both
      internally and externally. The unity is not something beyond the two
      opposites but contains them and is contained by them from the start. The
      unity of essential opposites is an original unity that is originally
      self-differentiating, or the original unity contains difference
      originally. Instead of trying to derive this unity form something
      simpler and less differentiated we start with it - and essentially
      remain with and in it throughout its unfolding and development.

      It is thus apparent that in Hegel's view Schelling's positing of an
      unknowable - because undifferentiated - ground of reality results from a
      lingering commitment to the opposition of consciousness and an
      unwillingness to abondon the standpoint of the understanding. The fact
      that (absolute) reason remains an enigma for (human) reason indicates
      that (human) reason continues to be identified with the understanding.
      For what Schelling has in effect done is to eliminate the inner
      opposition from one of the opposites. He did not follow the logic of the
      concept as an inner difference but instead let himself be guided by the
      concept of an external difference. Following the principle of
      non-contradiction as Spinoza had done he treated the opposite as
      "predicates, whose essence is an inert substance" (PS § 164/3, 134),
      i.e., as being only accidentally attached to their totality. This,
      however, makes the ground a mere "Verstandes-Identität", i.e. a
      tautology unity ("A=A") from which nothing can be derived. To try to do
      so is to belabor a pseudo-problem. This suggests again that Hegel saw in
      Schelling's philosophy essentially an impasse. Like Fichte's
      Wissenschaftslehre this was not the way to complete the Copernican
      revolution. The original synthetic unity of self-consciousness could not
      be transformed into an inifinite principle in this way. As we saw
      earlier, neither Fichte's nor Schelling's approach went "beyond the
      Kantian results" (SL 62, footnote/WdL I 44 footnote). Therefore, if real
      progress was to be made, one had once again to "turn to that preceding
      [Kantian] exposition". Force and Understanding thus appropriately ends
      with the evocation of that genuine starting-point of speculative
      philosophy as Hegel understood it, viz. self-consciousness as the
      original unity of subject and object which is no longer opposed by an
      other outside it. Schelling's philosophy of identity is not a foundation
      on which to build. In Hegel's view, the true foundation REMAINS KANT'S
      TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION, albeit in its Fichtean version of
      the I intuiting itself."

      Regards,
      Beat Greuter


      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • Bruce Merrill
      Dear John, Thanks for this, which is quite unknown to me./ My recollection (and this is many years ago) was that Schopenhauer presented himself as pointedly
      Message 2 of 13 , Aug 27, 2011
        Dear John,

        Thanks for this, which is quite unknown to me./

        My recollection (and this is many years ago) was that Schopenhauer
        presented himself as pointedly contra-Hegel, esp: his pessimism
        /dualism was set against Hegel's optimism /monism,
        and that his "back to Kant" motto /exhortation was launched in
        opposition to Hegel.
        Am I completely wrong in this?

        I think that I first learned of this interpretation reading Lowith's
        _From Hegel to Nietzsche_.
        Which I can't find this morn, in my messy office.

        BTW Kant's entire system (of 3 Critiques) begins with his theory of
        space and time (the "aesthetic" in the first Critique) and concludes
        with his philosophy or art (also biology /history) in the third
        Critique.

        Bruce

        PS In regard to post-Hegelian philosophy I should add that I'm also a
        big admirer of JS Mill.
        I don't think of him as Post-H re his philosophy, tho he is chronologically.

        On 8/26/11, john <jgbardis@...> wrote:
        >
        >
        > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Bruce Merrill <merrillbp@...> wrote:
        >
        >
        >> > Schopenhauer, by the way, is not a post-Hegelian philosopher. He is very
        >> > much a contemporary of Schelling and Hegel. He was, really, a follower
        >> > of Schelling.
        >>
        >
        >> But he presents himself as a follower of Kant, right? So, does he
        >> mis-represent himself?
        >
        >
        > Not really. There are two things that are particularly characteristic of
        > early Schelling. First, he originally became famous for his philosophy of
        > nature which came out in the last few years of the 18th century. And second,
        > he ends his _System of Transcendental Idealism_ of 1800, which otherwise
        > closely follows Fichte, with his philosophy of art.
        >
        > Schopenhauer presents both a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of art in
        > his _The World as Will and Representation_, which came out in 1819. I don't
        > think Schopenhauer refers at all to Hegel in the first edition of the book.
        > I don't know that Hegel would have been very well known in 1919. He speaks
        > in a generally favorable way, though, of Schelling's philosophy of nature in
        > 1819. He writes:
        >
        > "To discover this fundamental type has been the main concern, or certainly
        > at any rate the most laudable endeavor, of the natural philosophers of
        > Schelling's school. In this respect they have much merit, although in many
        > cases their hunting for analogies in nature degenerates into mere
        > facetiousness. However, they have rightly shown the universal relationship
        > and family likeness even in the Ideas of inorganic nature, for instance
        > between electricity and magnetism, the identity of which was established
        > later; between chemical attraction and gravitation, and so on.
        >
        > "They drew special attention to the fact that polarity, that is to say, the
        > sundering of a force into two qualitatively different and opposite
        > activities striving for reunion, a sundering which also frequently reveals
        > itself spatially by a dispersion in opposite directions, is a fundamental
        > type of almost all the phenomena of nature, from the magnet and the crystal
        > up to man...
        >
        > "Also in the school of Schelling we find, among their many efforts to bring
        > to light the analogy between all the phenomena of nature, many attempts,
        > although unfortunate ones, to derive laws of nature from the mere laws of
        > space and time. However, we cannot know how far the mind of a genius will
        > one day realize both endeavors."
        >
        > (vol. 1, 143f)
        >
        > Hegel, in his philosophy of nature begins with space and time and derives
        > all the laws of nature from them. Is Schopenhauer referring to Hegel here?
        > Could he have known something about Hegel's philosophy of nature in 1919?
        > Certainly, insofar as he knew anything about Hegel at all in 1919, he would
        > very likely have supposed him to be a member of the school of Schelling.
        >
        > I believe all the other references to Schelling, and all the references to
        > Hegel, were addded to the second edition of 1844.
        >
        > But even in 1844 he still continued to speak not unfavorably about
        > Schelling. So, for instance, he writes:
        >
        > "The "One and all", in other words, that the inner essence in all things is
        > absolutely one and the same, has by my time already been grasped and
        > understood, after the Eleatics, Scotus Erigena, Giordano Bruno, and Spinoza
        > had taught it in detail, and Schelling had revived this doctrine."
        >
        > (vol 2, 642)
      • john
        ... The first volume of Schopenhauer s book actually came out in 1819. Fichte and Schelling were famous and well-known then, but not Hegel. It is interesting,
        Message 3 of 13 , Aug 27, 2011
          --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Bruce Merrill <merrillbp@...> wrote:
          >
          > Dear John,
          >
          > Thanks for this, which is quite unknown to me./
          >
          > My recollection (and this is many years ago) was that Schopenhauer
          > presented himself as pointedly contra-Hegel, esp: his pessimism
          > /dualism was set against Hegel's optimism /monism,
          > and that his "back to Kant" motto /exhortation was launched in
          > opposition to Hegel.
          > Am I completely wrong in this?


          The first volume of Schopenhauer's book actually came out in 1819. Fichte and Schelling were famous and well-known then, but not Hegel.

          It is interesting, by the way, that, like Schelling and Hegel, Schopenhauer was also a protege of Goethe. Although Fichte and Goethe knew each other, because Fichte did not share Goethe's great interest in Nature, Goethe had no interest in Fichte. But one thing Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer had in common was that they were all advocates of Goethe's color theory and Goethe's general conception of Nature, in opposition to a Newtonian, mechanical conception of Nature.

          Schopenhauer actually arrived at Weimar, a few miles from Jena, just a few months after Hegel left in 1807. Schopenhauer was, perhaps, about 19, and became closely involved with Goethe through his mother. Goethe had one of the copies of the Phenomenology. So it is possible that Schopenhauer might have seen the book there. And it is possible that he may have heard Goethe talking about his two earlier proteges.

          A few years later Schopenhauer went back to school to study philosophy. He studied with Fichte at Berlin. He then returned to Weimar and colaborated for awhile with Goethe. At any rate, it would mainly have been Fichte's interpretation of Kant, I suppose, to which Schopenhauer would have been objecting.

          John
        • Bruce Merrill
          Beat, Thank you for this useful exposition. Where does the phrase turn to that preceding ... Does Hegel say in the PG that our insight into force and
          Message 4 of 13 , Aug 29, 2011
            Beat,

            Thank you for this useful exposition.

            Where does the phrase "turn to that preceding
            > [Kantian] exposition" come from? I can't find it, as I skim over SL p61f.

            Does Hegel say in the PG that our insight into force and understanding
            brings us back to Kant's trans. unity of apperception? Could you
            direct me to this, please.

            Also, what do you mean by the "Fichtean version" of "KANT'S
            > TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION"? As in: "KANT'S
            > TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION, albeit in its Fichtean version of
            > the I intuiting itself."

            As I see it,
            and in regard to "Fichte's contribution" to subsequent idealism, I
            take it that his most important contribution lies in his
            identification of the triadic structure of Kant's unity of
            apperception:

            original empty synthesis > synthesis of the object > circuit of
            self-consciousness.

            (This triadic structure is already in Kant, but not identified as triadic.)

            Fichte then transposes this triad on to the triad found with Kant's
            categories of quality, as applied to the I's self-positing:

            affirmative /I > negative /not-I > infinite.

            So that you end up with this pregnant triad:

            1) original empty synthesis /affirmative of the I >
            2) synthesis of the object /negation by the not-I >
            3) circuit of self-consciousness /infinite

            Thus identifying an original triadic starting point for logic
            /philosophy. Voila!

            Any comment on that supposed "contribution."?

            Thanks again,

            Bruce


            On 8/27/11, greuterb <greuterb@...> wrote:
            > Am 27.08.2011 00:37, John writes:
            >
            >> --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Bruce
            >> Merrill <merrillbp@...> wrote:
            >>
            >> > > Schopenhauer, by the way, is not a post-Hegelian philosopher. He
            >> is very much a contemporary of Schelling and Hegel. He was, really, a
            >> follower of Schelling.
            >> >
            >>
            >> > But he presents himself as a follower of Kant, right? So, does he
            >> > mis-represent himself?
            >>
            >> Not really. There are two things that are particularly characteristic
            >> of early Schelling. First, he originally became famous for his
            >> philosophy of nature which came out in the last few years of the 18th
            >> century. And second, he ends his _System of Transcendental Idealism_
            >> of 1800, which otherwise closely follows Fichte, with his philosophy
            >> of art.
            >>
            >> Schopenhauer presents both a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of
            >> art in his _The World as Will and Representation_, which came out in
            >> 1819. I don't think Schopenhauer refers at all to Hegel in the first
            >> edition of the book. I don't know that Hegel would have been very well
            >> known in 1919. He speaks in a generally favorable way, though, of
            >> Schelling's philosophy of nature in 1819. He writes:
            >>
            >> "To discover this fundamental type has been the main concern, or
            >> certainly at any rate the most laudable endeavor, of the natural
            >> philosophers of Schelling's school. In this respect they have much
            >> merit, although in many cases their hunting for analogies in nature
            >> degenerates into mere facetiousness. However, they have rightly shown
            >> the universal relationship and family likeness even in the Ideas of
            >> inorganic nature, for instance between electricity and magnetism, the
            >> identity of which was established later; between chemical attraction
            >> and gravitation, and so on.
            >>
            >> "They drew special attention to the fact that polarity, that is to
            >> say, the sundering of a force into two qualitatively different and
            >> opposite activities striving for reunion, a sundering which also
            >> frequently reveals itself spatially by a dispersion in opposite
            >> directions, is a fundamental type of almost all the phenomena of
            >> nature, from the magnet and the crystal up to man...
            >>
            >> "Also in the school of Schelling we find, among their many efforts to
            >> bring to light the analogy between all the phenomena of nature, many
            >> attempts, although unfortunate ones, to derive laws of nature from the
            >> mere laws of space and time. However, we cannot know how far the mind
            >> of a genius will one day realize both endeavors."
            >>
            >> (vol. 1, 143f)
            >>
            >> Hegel, in his philosophy of nature begins with space and time and
            >> derives all the laws of nature from them. Is Schopenhauer referring to
            >> Hegel here? Could he have known something about Hegel's philosophy of
            >> nature in 1919? Certainly, insofar as he knew anything about Hegel at
            >> all in 1919, he would very likely have supposed him to be a member of
            >> the school of Schelling.
            >>
            >> I believe all the other references to Schelling, and all the
            >> references to Hegel, were addded to the second edition of 1844.
            >>
            >> But even in 1844 he still continued to speak not unfavorably about
            >> Schelling. So, for instance, he writes:
            >>
            >> "The "One and all", in other words, that the inner essence in all
            >> things is absolutely one and the same, has by my time already been
            >> grasped and understood, after the Eleatics, Scotus Erigena, Giordano
            >> Bruno, and Spinoza had taught it in detail, and Schelling had revived
            >> this doctrine."
            >>
            >> (vol 2, 642)
            >>
            > John,
            >
            > Yes, and this philosophy of identity is exactly what Hegel rejects and
            > for which Schelling (and Schopenhauer) attacks Hegel in reverse as an
            > apparently undermining of Kant's dualism, i.e. the opposition of
            > consciousness. Klaus Brinkmann in his book on "Idealism without Limits"
            > (Springer, 2011, p. 144f) does point on this very clear:
            >
            > "The unity, therefore, is "already divided" as it always already has
            > "superseded itself as an otherness". In other words, there is no need to
            > posit an abtract totality apart from the unity of the two opposites.
            > Each opposite is in and of itself united with its opposite both
            > internally and externally. The unity is not something beyond the two
            > opposites but contains them and is contained by them from the start. The
            > unity of essential opposites is an original unity that is originally
            > self-differentiating, or the original unity contains difference
            > originally. Instead of trying to derive this unity form something
            > simpler and less differentiated we start with it - and essentially
            > remain with and in it throughout its unfolding and development.
            >
            > It is thus apparent that in Hegel's view Schelling's positing of an
            > unknowable - because undifferentiated - ground of reality results from a
            > lingering commitment to the opposition of consciousness and an
            > unwillingness to abondon the standpoint of the understanding. The fact
            > that (absolute) reason remains an enigma for (human) reason indicates
            > that (human) reason continues to be identified with the understanding.
            > For what Schelling has in effect done is to eliminate the inner
            > opposition from one of the opposites. He did not follow the logic of the
            > concept as an inner difference but instead let himself be guided by the
            > concept of an external difference. Following the principle of
            > non-contradiction as Spinoza had done he treated the opposite as
            > "predicates, whose essence is an inert substance" (PS § 164/3, 134),
            > i.e., as being only accidentally attached to their totality. This,
            > however, makes the ground a mere "Verstandes-Identität", i.e. a
            > tautology unity ("A=A") from which nothing can be derived. To try to do
            > so is to belabor a pseudo-problem. This suggests again that Hegel saw in
            > Schelling's philosophy essentially an impasse. Like Fichte's
            > Wissenschaftslehre this was not the way to complete the Copernican
            > revolution. The original synthetic unity of self-consciousness could not
            > be transformed into an inifinite principle in this way. As we saw
            > earlier, neither Fichte's nor Schelling's approach went "beyond the
            > Kantian results" (SL 62, footnote/WdL I 44 footnote). Therefore, if real
            > progress was to be made, one had once again to "turn to that preceding
            > [Kantian] exposition". Force and Understanding thus appropriately ends
            > with the evocation of that genuine starting-point of speculative
            > philosophy as Hegel understood it, viz. self-consciousness as the
            > original unity of subject and object which is no longer opposed by an
            > other outside it. Schelling's philosophy of identity is not a foundation
            > on which to build. In Hegel's view, the true foundation REMAINS KANT'S
            > TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION, albeit in its Fichtean version of
            > the I intuiting itself."
            >
            > Regards,
            > Beat Greuter
          • Bruce Merrill
            PS I see that you ve acquired Brinkmann s book on Hegel & Objectivity. Are you enjoying it?
            Message 5 of 13 , Aug 29, 2011
              PS I see that you've acquired Brinkmann's book on Hegel & Objectivity.
              Are you enjoying it?
            • greuterb
              ... Bruce, It is not my contribution. It is a quotation from Brinkmann s book on Idealism without Limits, Hegel and the Problem of Objectivity . ... Yes, I
              Message 6 of 13 , Aug 29, 2011
                Am 29.08.2011 12:46, Bruce writes:

                > Beat,
                >
                > Thank you for this useful exposition.
                >



                Bruce,

                It is not my contribution. It is a quotation from Brinkmann's book on
                "Idealism without Limits, Hegel and the Problem of Objectivity".



                > PS I see that you've acquired Brinkmann's book on Hegel & Objectivity.
                > Are you enjoying it?



                Yes, I enjoy it much. It is written in a modest English language and I
                can understand it very well without consulting too often my dictionary.
                The argumentation is sometimes a little lengthy and you have to keep in
                mind earlier discussions for following the thread. BTW, Brinkmann also
                wrote the preface for Klaus Hartmann's "Hegels Logik" (de Gruyter, 1999)
                which is an important source of my Hegel interpretation. As far as I
                know Brinkmann was as student in Hartmann's lectures in the United
                States. I do not know if Hartmann's book (published from his legacy) was
                also translated in English.



                > Where does the phrase "turn to that preceding
                > > [Kantian] exposition" come from? I can't find it, as I skim over SL
                > p61f.
                >



                From "The "Objective Logic" (I), "Introduction: General Division of Logic":

                "Recently Kant *) has opposed to what has usually been called logic
                another, namely, a transcendental logic. What has here been called
                objective logic would correspond in part to what with him is
                transcendental logic. He distinguishes it from what he calls general
                logic in this way, [a] that it treats of the notions which refer a
                priori to objects, and consequently does not abstract from the whole
                content of objective cognition, or, in other words, it contains the
                rules of the pure thinking of an object, and [b] at the same time it
                treats of the origin of our cognition so far as this cognition cannot be
                ascribed to the objects. It is to this second aspect that Kant's
                philosophical interest is exclusively directed.

                *) I would mention that in this work I frequently refer to the Kantian
                philosophy (which to many may seem superfluous) because whatever may be
                said, both in this work and elsewhere, about the precise character of
                this philosophy and about particular parts of its exposition, it
                constitutes the base and the starting point of recent German philosophy
                and that its merit remains unaffected by whatever faults may be found in
                it. The reason too why reference must often be made to it in the
                objective logic is that it enters into detailed consideration of
                important, more specific aspects of logic, whereas later philosophical
                works have paid little attention to these and in some instances have
                only displayed a crude --- not unavenged --- contempt for them. The
                philosophising which is most widespread among us does not go beyond the
                Kantian results, that Reason cannot acquire knowledge of any true
                content or subject matter and in regard to absolute truth must be
                directed to faith. But what with Kant is a result, forms the immediate
                starting-point in this philosophising, so that the preceding exposition
                from which that result issued and which is a philosophical cognition, is
                cut away beforehand. The Kantian philosophy thus serves as a cushion for
                intellectual indolence which soothes itself with the conviction that
                everything is already proved and settled. Consequently for genuine
                knowledge, for a specific content of thought which is not to be found in
                such barren and arid complacency, one must _turn to that preceding
                exposition_."


                It is this "preceding exposition" which is important for Brinkmann and
                Hegel's going back to Kant's First Critique and his Copernican turn: the
                transcendental unity of apperception as the concept of the concept.
                Brinkmann shows now that the unity of pure intuition and the categories,
                that is, the transcendental unity of apperception, has to be the true
                starting point of a objective transcendental logic instead of Kant's
                double dualism of the empirical content and form as well as of pure
                intuition and categories which undermines Kant's first idea of the
                transcendental unity of apperception. With this he claims to be the true
                follower of Kant whereas Schelling and also Fichte in his
                Wissenschaftslehre (and of course Schopenhauer who always claimed that
                he were the true follower of Kant and not Schelling and Hegel who would
                have betrayed Kant's philosophy) did only dublicate Kant's dualism and
                with this do "not go beyond the Kantian _results_, that Reason cannot
                acquire knowledge of any true content or subject matter and in regard to
                absolute truth must be directed to faith." Hegel put forward this
                already in "Faith and Knowledge" (1802).



                > Does Hegel say in the PG that our insight into force and understanding
                > brings us back to Kant's trans. unity of apperception? Could you
                > direct me to this, please.
                >


                The opposition of the two worlds in 'Force and Understanding' constitute
                the unity of self-consciousness as the concept in and for itself. This
                is shown in the transition to the chapter on 'Self-Certainty'.



                > Also, what do you mean by the "Fichtean version" of "KANT'S
                > > TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION"? As in: "KANT'S
                > > TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION, albeit in its Fichtean version of
                > > the I intuiting itself."
                >



                This is from my quotation from Brinkmann's book.



                > As I see it,
                > and in regard to "Fichte's contribution" to subsequent idealism, I
                > take it that his most important contribution lies in his
                > identification of the triadic structure of Kant's unity of
                > apperception:
                >
                > original empty synthesis > synthesis of the object > circuit of
                > self-consciousness.
                >
                > (This triadic structure is already in Kant, but not identified as
                > triadic.)
                >
                > Fichte then transposes this triad on to the triad found with Kant's
                > categories of quality, as applied to the I's self-positing:
                >
                > affirmative /I > negative /not-I > infinite.
                >
                > So that you end up with this pregnant triad:
                >
                > 1) original empty synthesis /affirmative of the I >
                > 2) synthesis of the object /negation by the not-I >
                > 3) circuit of self-consciousness /infinite
                >
                > Thus identifying an original triadic starting point for logic
                > /philosophy. Voila!
                >
                > Any comment on that supposed "contribution."?
                >
                > Thanks again,
                >
                > Bruce
                >



                I do not think that Hegel has in mind the triadic structure of Kant's
                transcendental unity of apperception as the foundation of his own
                Logic. What he has in mind is the opposed moments in their original
                unity or the original unity as the unity of opposed moments. Brinkmann's
                mention of Fichte's "I intuiting itself" refers to self-consciousness
                which first has to be 'derived' from the starting point of the original
                unity of apperception as the foundation of Hegel's concept of knowledge.

                Regards,
                Beat



                > On 8/27/11, greuterb <greuterb@...
                > <mailto:greuterb%40bluewin.ch>> wrote:
                > > Am 27.08.2011 00:37, John writes:
                > >
                > >> --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Bruce
                > >> Merrill <merrillbp@...> wrote:
                > >>
                > >> > > Schopenhauer, by the way, is not a post-Hegelian philosopher. He
                > >> is very much a contemporary of Schelling and Hegel. He was, really, a
                > >> follower of Schelling.
                > >> >
                > >>
                > >> > But he presents himself as a follower of Kant, right? So, does he
                > >> > mis-represent himself?
                > >>
                > >> Not really. There are two things that are particularly characteristic
                > >> of early Schelling. First, he originally became famous for his
                > >> philosophy of nature which came out in the last few years of the 18th
                > >> century. And second, he ends his _System of Transcendental Idealism_
                > >> of 1800, which otherwise closely follows Fichte, with his philosophy
                > >> of art.
                > >>
                > >> Schopenhauer presents both a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of
                > >> art in his _The World as Will and Representation_, which came out in
                > >> 1819. I don't think Schopenhauer refers at all to Hegel in the first
                > >> edition of the book. I don't know that Hegel would have been very well
                > >> known in 1919. He speaks in a generally favorable way, though, of
                > >> Schelling's philosophy of nature in 1819. He writes:
                > >>
                > >> "To discover this fundamental type has been the main concern, or
                > >> certainly at any rate the most laudable endeavor, of the natural
                > >> philosophers of Schelling's school. In this respect they have much
                > >> merit, although in many cases their hunting for analogies in nature
                > >> degenerates into mere facetiousness. However, they have rightly shown
                > >> the universal relationship and family likeness even in the Ideas of
                > >> inorganic nature, for instance between electricity and magnetism, the
                > >> identity of which was established later; between chemical attraction
                > >> and gravitation, and so on.
                > >>
                > >> "They drew special attention to the fact that polarity, that is to
                > >> say, the sundering of a force into two qualitatively different and
                > >> opposite activities striving for reunion, a sundering which also
                > >> frequently reveals itself spatially by a dispersion in opposite
                > >> directions, is a fundamental type of almost all the phenomena of
                > >> nature, from the magnet and the crystal up to man...
                > >>
                > >> "Also in the school of Schelling we find, among their many efforts to
                > >> bring to light the analogy between all the phenomena of nature, many
                > >> attempts, although unfortunate ones, to derive laws of nature from the
                > >> mere laws of space and time. However, we cannot know how far the mind
                > >> of a genius will one day realize both endeavors."
                > >>
                > >> (vol. 1, 143f)
                > >>
                > >> Hegel, in his philosophy of nature begins with space and time and
                > >> derives all the laws of nature from them. Is Schopenhauer referring to
                > >> Hegel here? Could he have known something about Hegel's philosophy of
                > >> nature in 1919? Certainly, insofar as he knew anything about Hegel at
                > >> all in 1919, he would very likely have supposed him to be a member of
                > >> the school of Schelling.
                > >>
                > >> I believe all the other references to Schelling, and all the
                > >> references to Hegel, were addded to the second edition of 1844.
                > >>
                > >> But even in 1844 he still continued to speak not unfavorably about
                > >> Schelling. So, for instance, he writes:
                > >>
                > >> "The "One and all", in other words, that the inner essence in all
                > >> things is absolutely one and the same, has by my time already been
                > >> grasped and understood, after the Eleatics, Scotus Erigena, Giordano
                > >> Bruno, and Spinoza had taught it in detail, and Schelling had revived
                > >> this doctrine."
                > >>
                > >> (vol 2, 642)
                > >>
                > > John,
                > >
                > > Yes, and this philosophy of identity is exactly what Hegel rejects and
                > > for which Schelling (and Schopenhauer) attacks Hegel in reverse as an
                > > apparently undermining of Kant's dualism, i.e. the opposition of
                > > consciousness. Klaus Brinkmann in his book on "Idealism without Limits"
                > > (Springer, 2011, p. 144f) does point on this very clear:
                > >
                > > "The unity, therefore, is "already divided" as it always already has
                > > "superseded itself as an otherness". In other words, there is no need to
                > > posit an abtract totality apart from the unity of the two opposites.
                > > Each opposite is in and of itself united with its opposite both
                > > internally and externally. The unity is not something beyond the two
                > > opposites but contains them and is contained by them from the start. The
                > > unity of essential opposites is an original unity that is originally
                > > self-differentiating, or the original unity contains difference
                > > originally. Instead of trying to derive this unity form something
                > > simpler and less differentiated we start with it - and essentially
                > > remain with and in it throughout its unfolding and development.
                > >
                > > It is thus apparent that in Hegel's view Schelling's positing of an
                > > unknowable - because undifferentiated - ground of reality results from a
                > > lingering commitment to the opposition of consciousness and an
                > > unwillingness to abondon the standpoint of the understanding. The fact
                > > that (absolute) reason remains an enigma for (human) reason indicates
                > > that (human) reason continues to be identified with the understanding.
                > > For what Schelling has in effect done is to eliminate the inner
                > > opposition from one of the opposites. He did not follow the logic of the
                > > concept as an inner difference but instead let himself be guided by the
                > > concept of an external difference. Following the principle of
                > > non-contradiction as Spinoza had done he treated the opposite as
                > > "predicates, whose essence is an inert substance" (PS § 164/3, 134),
                > > i.e., as being only accidentally attached to their totality. This,
                > > however, makes the ground a mere "Verstandes-Identität", i.e. a
                > > tautology unity ("A=A") from which nothing can be derived. To try to do
                > > so is to belabor a pseudo-problem. This suggests again that Hegel saw in
                > > Schelling's philosophy essentially an impasse. Like Fichte's
                > > Wissenschaftslehre this was not the way to complete the Copernican
                > > revolution. The original synthetic unity of self-consciousness could not
                > > be transformed into an inifinite principle in this way. As we saw
                > > earlier, neither Fichte's nor Schelling's approach went "beyond the
                > > Kantian results" (SL 62, footnote/WdL I 44 footnote). Therefore, if real
                > > progress was to be made, one had once again to "turn to that preceding
                > > [Kantian] exposition". Force and Understanding thus appropriately ends
                > > with the evocation of that genuine starting-point of speculative
                > > philosophy as Hegel understood it, viz. self-consciousness as the
                > > original unity of subject and object which is no longer opposed by an
                > > other outside it. Schelling's philosophy of identity is not a foundation
                > > on which to build. In Hegel's view, the true foundation REMAINS KANT'S
                > > TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION, albeit in its Fichtean version of
                > > the I intuiting itself."
                > >
                > > Regards,
                > > Beat Greuter
                >



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