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Re: [hegel] post Hegel philosophy

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  • greuterb
    ... Bruce, Yes, in most cases free in free-thinkers means a lack of logical thinking and dogmatism. It is Hegel s solitary freedom which since it cannot gain
    Message 1 of 13 , Aug 26, 2011
      Am 26.08.2011 14:03, Bruce Merrill writes:

      > In regard to the topic of philosophy post-Hegel, the following
      > argument from F Beiser (in a hostile review of a collection of essay
      > on 19C phil, recent posted at the Notre Dame cite) is very
      > stimulating. When John B. and I were discussing this topic a while
      > back we were (in the manner that Beiser disapproves of) pointing to
      > post-Hegel "standard" non-academic "anti-philosophers," Marx,
      > Kierkegard, Nietzsche.
      >
      > Beiser's argument is self-serving insofar as the academic philosophy
      > that he wants to see revealed is German, i.e. his own field.
      > Presumably there is also the academic philosophy in England and
      > France, which is similarly neglected.
      >
      > BTW, I should add that the only great post-Hegel philosopher (as
      > opposed to anti-philosopher) that I would put forward is Charles
      > Peirce. I can't come up with anyone else who is comparably original
      > and important. This probably has more to do with my ignorance than
      > with the fate of philosophy.
      >
      > Bruce
      >
      > Beiser:
      >
      > "Behind the editors' theme of "revolutionary responses to the existing
      > order" there lies an old myth, one that the editors have scarcely
      > articulated yet tacitly adopted: namely, that the important philosophy
      > of the nineteenth century came not from "academic philosophers" but
      > from the radical individual thinkers outside the university, viz.,
      > from such solitary thinkers as Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche and
      > Schopenhauer. This myth was very much advocated by these thinkers
      > themselves, who declared that they, unlike their academic
      > counterparts, were not in thrall to the governments who employed them,
      > and who claimed that they alone were free-thinkers ready to challenge
      > the moral, religious and social status quo.
      >


      Bruce,

      Yes, in most cases 'free' in free-thinkers means a lack of logical
      thinking and dogmatism. It is Hegel's solitary freedom which since it
      cannot gain any objectivity changes to the opposite.



      > Since the academic
      > philosophers only defended that status quo, so the story goes, they
      > have little to say to anyone today, for whom the moral, religious and
      > social values of the nineteenth century have lost all credibility. It
      > is indeed largely because of this myth that the standard curriculum
      > has become what it is today, and that it continues to prescribe our
      > conception of nineteenth century philosophy.
      >
      > The editors' tacit faith in this myth would explain why they give such
      > importance to Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky in their volume,
      > and why they omit academic philosophers like Trendelenburg, Lotze and
      > the neo-Kantians. Yet it should be evident that this myth is a
      > self-serving stereotype having little basis in fact. Some of these
      > academic philosophers were indeed conservative in their moral,
      > political and social views (viz., Lotze and Windelband), but others
      > were very liberal and progressive (viz., Trendelenburg, Rickert and
      > Cassirer), and still others on the far left as champions of socialism
      > (viz., Cohen, Natorp).
      >



      Yes, and many of these neo-Kantians were hidden Hegelians, i.e. Hermann
      Cohen, "Religion of Reason" (1919):

      "The religion of reason makes the religion to a universal function of
      the human consciousness, the consciousness as a human. The universal
      human consciousness unfolds in the manifold which is represented in the
      people's consciousness; but no consciousness of a people does amount to
      the religion of reason. All human as it is produced in all people
      contributes to reason in general as well as to the religion of reason.
      This is the sound heart in the thought of the history of religion. All
      people, also in the most primitive culture, participate in religion.
      And, for philanthropy as well as for the knowledge of human nature there
      is not only a justified but also a beneficial and necessary interest to
      trace all turns and transformations in which the spirit of religion
      takes root and grows up. Nevertheless, the landmark of reason is the
      methodical criterion." (Introduction, point 6., my translation)



      > The source of this myth is Hegel's, Schelling's
      > and Ranke's defense of Prussia, but this cannot be generalized for
      > every academic philosopher. Not the least troublesome aspect of this
      > myth is that some of these so-called revolutionary thinkers were
      > themselves deeply reactionary. It is only by turning a blind eye to
      > Nietzsche's reactionary politics and to Kierkegaard's and
      > Dostoyevsky's fundamentalist Christianity that it is possible to make
      > them relevant to us today. Any impartial contemporary student of
      > nineteenth-century philosophy who knows the movement in all its
      > breadth will find Cohen, Simmel and Weber more sympathetic company
      > than Kierkegaard, Nietzsche or Dostoyevsky.
      >



      Quite right, but Dostoyevsky was at least a great poet.

      Regards,
      Beat



      > But even if we accept this myth, it still does not give us a good
      > history of nineteenth-century philosophy. The absence of any coverage
      > of the materialism controversy, historicism and neo-Kantianism are
      > major lapses for any book claiming to cover all the major developments
      > of nineteenth-century philosophy. The only excuse for such omissions
      > must be that the editors wanted to provide introductions and surveys
      > for those who follow the standard curriculum, for those who want to
      > know about what is now taught in Anglophone universities and what is
      > now discussed in contemporary journals. If they had limited their
      > ambitions to such a pedagogic task, which is worthwhile in itself,
      > there would be no reason to complain. But they have accepted the
      > standard curriculum as if it provided a complete account of the
      > philosophical history of the period, so that their volume, in the
      > editors' words, "charts the most influential trends and developments
      > in European philosophy in the tumultuous period 1840-1900". Again, it
      > is this claim that cannot be sustained in any accurate assessment of
      > the philosophically important developments of the nineteenth century.
      >
      > One would have hoped that the purpose of a volume like this one would
      > be to get beyond the standard figures, cliches and steretotypes about
      > the nineteenth century, that it would broaden our historical and
      > philosophical horizons, and introduce us to the new, extraordinary and
      > unfamiliar. The blurb for this series indeed claims that it does just
      > that. But it really does nothing of the kind, keeping its readers
      > firmly in the grip of the standard curriculum.
      >
      > There is an important methodological lesson to be learned here. Any
      > historian of philosophy who wants to provide a survey and introduction
      > to a broad historical phenomenon like the nineteenth century must
      > learn to think outside and beyond the standard curriculum. Who and
      > what is intellectually important in that century is not something
      > given for the scholar; it cannot be the starting point of his
      > investigation; rather, it is precisely the goal and object of all his
      > research, the final fruits and ultimate result. To get there, the
      > scholar must go beyond contemporary interests and concerns, delve into
      > the past in all its breadth, depth and strangeness, reading unheard of
      > texts and studying strange and forgotten controversies. It is only
      > after a thorough study of the past for its own sake that the scholar
      > is in a position to know who and what in the past is still of
      > importance for us today.
      >
      > Let me put the point this way. There are two kinds of philosophical
      > historians: derivative and original. While the derivative follow the
      > standard curriculum, the original have the powers to reform and create
      > a new curriculum. It is the ideal and obligation of every genuine
      > philosophical historian to be original, to get beyond the standard
      > curriculum, to resist the pressure of pedagogical interests and
      > intellectual fashions, so that he can give an accurate account of the
      > depth and breadth of an historical period. No period of the
      > philosophical past stands in more need of an original historian than
      > nineteenth century philosophy. The standard tropes and figures do no
      > justice to its depths, riches and powers. The ultimate purpose of this
      > review is to give the reader some indication of how we must strive to
      > get beyond them."
      >



      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • Robert Wallace
      Hi Bruce, Thanks for tipping us off to this interesting review, which I hadn t seen:
      Message 2 of 13 , Aug 26, 2011
        Hi Bruce,

        Thanks for tipping us off to this interesting review, which I hadn't
        seen:
        http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/25677-nineteenth-century-philosophy-revolutionary-responses-to-the-existing-order/


        which is a review of Alan D. Schrift and Daniel Conway (eds.),
        Nineteenth Century Philosophy: Revolutionary Responses to the Existing
        Order, 317pp., vol. 2 of Alan D. Schrift (ed.), The History of
        Continental Philosophy (8 vols.), University of Chicago Press, 2010,
        2700pp., $800.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780226740461.

        We can count on Fred Beiser for a stimulating polemic.

        best, Bob W

        On Aug 26, 2011, at 5:03 AM, Bruce Merrill wrote:

        > In regard to the topic of philosophy post-Hegel, the following
        > argument from F Beiser (in a hostile review of a collection of essay
        > on 19C phil, recent posted at the Notre Dame cite) is very
        > stimulating. When John B. and I were discussing this topic a while
        > back we were (in the manner that Beiser disapproves of) pointing to
        > post-Hegel "standard" non-academic "anti-philosophers," Marx,
        > Kierkegard, Nietzsche.
        >
        > Beiser's argument is self-serving insofar as the academic philosophy
        > that he wants to see revealed is German, i.e. his own field.
        > Presumably there is also the academic philosophy in England and
        > France, which is similarly neglected.
        >
        > BTW, I should add that the only great post-Hegel philosopher (as
        > opposed to anti-philosopher) that I would put forward is Charles
        > Peirce. I can't come up with anyone else who is comparably original
        > and important. This probably has more to do with my ignorance than
        > with the fate of philosophy.
        >
        > Bruce
        >
        > Beiser:
        >
        > "Behind the editors' theme of "revolutionary responses to the existing
        > order" there lies an old myth, one that the editors have scarcely
        > articulated yet tacitly adopted: namely, that the important philosophy
        > of the nineteenth century came not from "academic philosophers" but
        > from the radical individual thinkers outside the university, viz.,
        > from such solitary thinkers as Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche and
        > Schopenhauer. This myth was very much advocated by these thinkers
        > themselves, who declared that they, unlike their academic
        > counterparts, were not in thrall to the governments who employed them,
        > and who claimed that they alone were free-thinkers ready to challenge
        > the moral, religious and social status quo. Since the academic
        > philosophers only defended that status quo, so the story goes, they
        > have little to say to anyone today, for whom the moral, religious and
        > social values of the nineteenth century have lost all credibility. It
        > is indeed largely because of this myth that the standard curriculum
        > has become what it is today, and that it continues to prescribe our
        > conception of nineteenth century philosophy.
        >
        > The editors' tacit faith in this myth would explain why they give such
        > importance to Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky in their volume,
        > and why they omit academic philosophers like Trendelenburg, Lotze and
        > the neo-Kantians. Yet it should be evident that this myth is a
        > self-serving stereotype having little basis in fact. Some of these
        > academic philosophers were indeed conservative in their moral,
        > political and social views (viz., Lotze and Windelband), but others
        > were very liberal and progressive (viz., Trendelenburg, Rickert and
        > Cassirer), and still others on the far left as champions of socialism
        > (viz., Cohen, Natorp). The source of this myth is Hegel's, Schelling's
        > and Ranke's defense of Prussia, but this cannot be generalized for
        > every academic philosopher. Not the least troublesome aspect of this
        > myth is that some of these so-called revolutionary thinkers were
        > themselves deeply reactionary. It is only by turning a blind eye to
        > Nietzsche's reactionary politics and to Kierkegaard's and
        > Dostoyevsky's fundamentalist Christianity that it is possible to make
        > them relevant to us today. Any impartial contemporary student of
        > nineteenth-century philosophy who knows the movement in all its
        > breadth will find Cohen, Simmel and Weber more sympathetic company
        > than Kierkegaard, Nietzsche or Dostoyevsky.
        >
        > But even if we accept this myth, it still does not give us a good
        > history of nineteenth-century philosophy. The absence of any coverage
        > of the materialism controversy, historicism and neo-Kantianism are
        > major lapses for any book claiming to cover all the major developments
        > of nineteenth-century philosophy. The only excuse for such omissions
        > must be that the editors wanted to provide introductions and surveys
        > for those who follow the standard curriculum, for those who want to
        > know about what is now taught in Anglophone universities and what is
        > now discussed in contemporary journals. If they had limited their
        > ambitions to such a pedagogic task, which is worthwhile in itself,
        > there would be no reason to complain. But they have accepted the
        > standard curriculum as if it provided a complete account of the
        > philosophical history of the period, so that their volume, in the
        > editors' words, "charts the most influential trends and developments
        > in European philosophy in the tumultuous period 1840-1900". Again, it
        > is this claim that cannot be sustained in any accurate assessment of
        > the philosophically important developments of the nineteenth century.
        >
        > One would have hoped that the purpose of a volume like this one would
        > be to get beyond the standard figures, cliches and steretotypes about
        > the nineteenth century, that it would broaden our historical and
        > philosophical horizons, and introduce us to the new, extraordinary and
        > unfamiliar. The blurb for this series indeed claims that it does just
        > that. But it really does nothing of the kind, keeping its readers
        > firmly in the grip of the standard curriculum.
        >
        > There is an important methodological lesson to be learned here. Any
        > historian of philosophy who wants to provide a survey and introduction
        > to a broad historical phenomenon like the nineteenth century must
        > learn to think outside and beyond the standard curriculum. Who and
        > what is intellectually important in that century is not something
        > given for the scholar; it cannot be the starting point of his
        > investigation; rather, it is precisely the goal and object of all his
        > research, the final fruits and ultimate result. To get there, the
        > scholar must go beyond contemporary interests and concerns, delve into
        > the past in all its breadth, depth and strangeness, reading unheard of
        > texts and studying strange and forgotten controversies. It is only
        > after a thorough study of the past for its own sake that the scholar
        > is in a position to know who and what in the past is still of
        > importance for us today.
        >
        > Let me put the point this way. There are two kinds of philosophical
        > historians: derivative and original. While the derivative follow the
        > standard curriculum, the original have the powers to reform and create
        > a new curriculum. It is the ideal and obligation of every genuine
        > philosophical historian to be original, to get beyond the standard
        > curriculum, to resist the pressure of pedagogical interests and
        > intellectual fashions, so that he can give an accurate account of the
        > depth and breadth of an historical period. No period of the
        > philosophical past stands in more need of an original historian than
        > nineteenth century philosophy. The standard tropes and figures do no
        > justice to its depths, riches and powers. The ultimate purpose of this
        > review is to give the reader some indication of how we must strive to
        > get beyond them."
        >
        >

        Robert Wallace
        website: www.robertmwallace.com
        email: bob@...
        phone: 414-617-3914











        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      • Bruce Merrill
        ... I didn t quote the whole review. If you follow the link that Robert provided then you ll see that he does refer to an essay in this volume on Marx. ... But
        Message 3 of 13 , Aug 26, 2011
          > You will notice that Beiser doesn't mention Marx.

          I didn't quote the whole review. If you follow the link that Robert
          provided then you'll see that he does refer to an essay in this volume
          on Marx.

          > Schopenhauer, by the way, is not a post-Hegelian philosopher. He is very much a contemporary of Schelling and Hegel. He was, really, a follower of Schelling.

          But he presents himself as a follower of Kant, right? So, does he
          mis-represent himself?

          > One can almost see the debate between Heidegger and Cassier as a debate between the two schools of neo-Kantianism.

          I'm pretty sure that there's a recent book that focuses on this face-off.

          >Through all this period it was simply unacceptable to refer favorably to Hegel. To call someone a Hegelian was to insult them. I've read some Cassier. One gets the immpression that what he is doing is just redoing the work of Hegel and Schelling, but without giving them any credit or even referring to them. One gets the impression that the back to Kant movement wasn't so much about some great love of Kant. It was more like starting over again from Kant and redoing all the work that Fichte, Schelling and Hegel had done.

          I have no knowledge of Cassirer's own philosophy-- and the greatest
          respect for him as a historian of philosophy.

          > I have to say, though, that I like Neitzsche and Kierkegaard (and Dostoevski, too, for that matter) very much.

          Was Dostoevki covered in this volume? I really don't think he's part
          of "standard" history of philosophy, that Beiser decries.

          The proof of the pudding for Beiser has to be the point > that it's
          not merely that all this academic tradition is neglected... but that
          this is important philosophy... which deserves as much attention and
          Marx & Nietzsche et al, which can and should speak to us now.
          If Beiser is vindicated... then that will mean that scores of
          philosophers will plunge into this cornucopia of lost philosophy... to
          their great edification. And ours as well. Bring on the Phd's, grants
          and monographs. We shall see.

          Bruce
        • john
          ... Not really. There are two things that are particularly characteristic of early Schelling. First, he originally became famous for his philosophy of nature
          Message 4 of 13 , Aug 26, 2011
            --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Bruce Merrill <merrillbp@...> wrote:


            > > Schopenhauer, by the way, is not a post-Hegelian philosopher. He is very much a contemporary of Schelling and Hegel. He was, really, a follower of Schelling.
            >

            > But he presents himself as a follower of Kant, right? So, does he
            > mis-represent himself?


            Not really. There are two things that are particularly characteristic of early Schelling. First, he originally became famous for his philosophy of nature which came out in the last few years of the 18th century. And second, he ends his _System of Transcendental Idealism_ of 1800, which otherwise closely follows Fichte, with his philosophy of art.

            Schopenhauer presents both a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of art in his _The World as Will and Representation_, which came out in 1819. I don't think Schopenhauer refers at all to Hegel in the first edition of the book. I don't know that Hegel would have been very well known in 1919. He speaks in a generally favorable way, though, of Schelling's philosophy of nature in 1819. He writes:

            "To discover this fundamental type has been the main concern, or certainly at any rate the most laudable endeavor, of the natural philosophers of Schelling's school. In this respect they have much merit, although in many cases their hunting for analogies in nature degenerates into mere facetiousness. However, they have rightly shown the universal relationship and family likeness even in the Ideas of inorganic nature, for instance between electricity and magnetism, the identity of which was established later; between chemical attraction and gravitation, and so on.

            "They drew special attention to the fact that polarity, that is to say, the sundering of a force into two qualitatively different and opposite activities striving for reunion, a sundering which also frequently reveals itself spatially by a dispersion in opposite directions, is a fundamental type of almost all the phenomena of nature, from the magnet and the crystal up to man...

            "Also in the school of Schelling we find, among their many efforts to bring to light the analogy between all the phenomena of nature, many attempts, although unfortunate ones, to derive laws of nature from the mere laws of space and time. However, we cannot know how far the mind of a genius will one day realize both endeavors."

            (vol. 1, 143f)

            Hegel, in his philosophy of nature begins with space and time and derives all the laws of nature from them. Is Schopenhauer referring to Hegel here? Could he have known something about Hegel's philosophy of nature in 1919? Certainly, insofar as he knew anything about Hegel at all in 1919, he would very likely have supposed him to be a member of the school of Schelling.

            I believe all the other references to Schelling, and all the references to Hegel, were addded to the second edition of 1844.

            But even in 1844 he still continued to speak not unfavorably about Schelling. So, for instance, he writes:

            "The "One and all", in other words, that the inner essence in all things is absolutely one and the same, has by my time already been grasped and understood, after the Eleatics, Scotus Erigena, Giordano Bruno, and Spinoza had taught it in detail, and Schelling had revived this doctrine."

            (vol 2, 642)
          • greuterb
            ... John, Yes, and this philosophy of identity is exactly what Hegel rejects and for which Schelling (and Schopenhauer) attacks Hegel in reverse as an
            Message 5 of 13 , Aug 27, 2011
              Am 27.08.2011 00:37, John writes:

              > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Bruce
              > Merrill <merrillbp@...> wrote:
              >
              > > > Schopenhauer, by the way, is not a post-Hegelian philosopher. He
              > is very much a contemporary of Schelling and Hegel. He was, really, a
              > follower of Schelling.
              > >
              >
              > > But he presents himself as a follower of Kant, right? So, does he
              > > mis-represent himself?
              >
              > Not really. There are two things that are particularly characteristic
              > of early Schelling. First, he originally became famous for his
              > philosophy of nature which came out in the last few years of the 18th
              > century. And second, he ends his _System of Transcendental Idealism_
              > of 1800, which otherwise closely follows Fichte, with his philosophy
              > of art.
              >
              > Schopenhauer presents both a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of
              > art in his _The World as Will and Representation_, which came out in
              > 1819. I don't think Schopenhauer refers at all to Hegel in the first
              > edition of the book. I don't know that Hegel would have been very well
              > known in 1919. He speaks in a generally favorable way, though, of
              > Schelling's philosophy of nature in 1819. He writes:
              >
              > "To discover this fundamental type has been the main concern, or
              > certainly at any rate the most laudable endeavor, of the natural
              > philosophers of Schelling's school. In this respect they have much
              > merit, although in many cases their hunting for analogies in nature
              > degenerates into mere facetiousness. However, they have rightly shown
              > the universal relationship and family likeness even in the Ideas of
              > inorganic nature, for instance between electricity and magnetism, the
              > identity of which was established later; between chemical attraction
              > and gravitation, and so on.
              >
              > "They drew special attention to the fact that polarity, that is to
              > say, the sundering of a force into two qualitatively different and
              > opposite activities striving for reunion, a sundering which also
              > frequently reveals itself spatially by a dispersion in opposite
              > directions, is a fundamental type of almost all the phenomena of
              > nature, from the magnet and the crystal up to man...
              >
              > "Also in the school of Schelling we find, among their many efforts to
              > bring to light the analogy between all the phenomena of nature, many
              > attempts, although unfortunate ones, to derive laws of nature from the
              > mere laws of space and time. However, we cannot know how far the mind
              > of a genius will one day realize both endeavors."
              >
              > (vol. 1, 143f)
              >
              > Hegel, in his philosophy of nature begins with space and time and
              > derives all the laws of nature from them. Is Schopenhauer referring to
              > Hegel here? Could he have known something about Hegel's philosophy of
              > nature in 1919? Certainly, insofar as he knew anything about Hegel at
              > all in 1919, he would very likely have supposed him to be a member of
              > the school of Schelling.
              >
              > I believe all the other references to Schelling, and all the
              > references to Hegel, were addded to the second edition of 1844.
              >
              > But even in 1844 he still continued to speak not unfavorably about
              > Schelling. So, for instance, he writes:
              >
              > "The "One and all", in other words, that the inner essence in all
              > things is absolutely one and the same, has by my time already been
              > grasped and understood, after the Eleatics, Scotus Erigena, Giordano
              > Bruno, and Spinoza had taught it in detail, and Schelling had revived
              > this doctrine."
              >
              > (vol 2, 642)
              >



              John,

              Yes, and this philosophy of identity is exactly what Hegel rejects and
              for which Schelling (and Schopenhauer) attacks Hegel in reverse as an
              apparently undermining of Kant's dualism, i.e. the opposition of
              consciousness. Klaus Brinkmann in his book on "Idealism without Limits"
              (Springer, 2011, p. 144f) does point on this very clear:

              "The unity, therefore, is "already divided" as it always already has
              "superseded itself as an otherness". In other words, there is no need to
              posit an abtract totality apart from the unity of the two opposites.
              Each opposite is in and of itself united with its opposite both
              internally and externally. The unity is not something beyond the two
              opposites but contains them and is contained by them from the start. The
              unity of essential opposites is an original unity that is originally
              self-differentiating, or the original unity contains difference
              originally. Instead of trying to derive this unity form something
              simpler and less differentiated we start with it - and essentially
              remain with and in it throughout its unfolding and development.

              It is thus apparent that in Hegel's view Schelling's positing of an
              unknowable - because undifferentiated - ground of reality results from a
              lingering commitment to the opposition of consciousness and an
              unwillingness to abondon the standpoint of the understanding. The fact
              that (absolute) reason remains an enigma for (human) reason indicates
              that (human) reason continues to be identified with the understanding.
              For what Schelling has in effect done is to eliminate the inner
              opposition from one of the opposites. He did not follow the logic of the
              concept as an inner difference but instead let himself be guided by the
              concept of an external difference. Following the principle of
              non-contradiction as Spinoza had done he treated the opposite as
              "predicates, whose essence is an inert substance" (PS § 164/3, 134),
              i.e., as being only accidentally attached to their totality. This,
              however, makes the ground a mere "Verstandes-Identität", i.e. a
              tautology unity ("A=A") from which nothing can be derived. To try to do
              so is to belabor a pseudo-problem. This suggests again that Hegel saw in
              Schelling's philosophy essentially an impasse. Like Fichte's
              Wissenschaftslehre this was not the way to complete the Copernican
              revolution. The original synthetic unity of self-consciousness could not
              be transformed into an inifinite principle in this way. As we saw
              earlier, neither Fichte's nor Schelling's approach went "beyond the
              Kantian results" (SL 62, footnote/WdL I 44 footnote). Therefore, if real
              progress was to be made, one had once again to "turn to that preceding
              [Kantian] exposition". Force and Understanding thus appropriately ends
              with the evocation of that genuine starting-point of speculative
              philosophy as Hegel understood it, viz. self-consciousness as the
              original unity of subject and object which is no longer opposed by an
              other outside it. Schelling's philosophy of identity is not a foundation
              on which to build. In Hegel's view, the true foundation REMAINS KANT'S
              TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION, albeit in its Fichtean version of
              the I intuiting itself."

              Regards,
              Beat Greuter


              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
            • Bruce Merrill
              Dear John, Thanks for this, which is quite unknown to me./ My recollection (and this is many years ago) was that Schopenhauer presented himself as pointedly
              Message 6 of 13 , Aug 27, 2011
                Dear John,

                Thanks for this, which is quite unknown to me./

                My recollection (and this is many years ago) was that Schopenhauer
                presented himself as pointedly contra-Hegel, esp: his pessimism
                /dualism was set against Hegel's optimism /monism,
                and that his "back to Kant" motto /exhortation was launched in
                opposition to Hegel.
                Am I completely wrong in this?

                I think that I first learned of this interpretation reading Lowith's
                _From Hegel to Nietzsche_.
                Which I can't find this morn, in my messy office.

                BTW Kant's entire system (of 3 Critiques) begins with his theory of
                space and time (the "aesthetic" in the first Critique) and concludes
                with his philosophy or art (also biology /history) in the third
                Critique.

                Bruce

                PS In regard to post-Hegelian philosophy I should add that I'm also a
                big admirer of JS Mill.
                I don't think of him as Post-H re his philosophy, tho he is chronologically.

                On 8/26/11, john <jgbardis@...> wrote:
                >
                >
                > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Bruce Merrill <merrillbp@...> wrote:
                >
                >
                >> > Schopenhauer, by the way, is not a post-Hegelian philosopher. He is very
                >> > much a contemporary of Schelling and Hegel. He was, really, a follower
                >> > of Schelling.
                >>
                >
                >> But he presents himself as a follower of Kant, right? So, does he
                >> mis-represent himself?
                >
                >
                > Not really. There are two things that are particularly characteristic of
                > early Schelling. First, he originally became famous for his philosophy of
                > nature which came out in the last few years of the 18th century. And second,
                > he ends his _System of Transcendental Idealism_ of 1800, which otherwise
                > closely follows Fichte, with his philosophy of art.
                >
                > Schopenhauer presents both a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of art in
                > his _The World as Will and Representation_, which came out in 1819. I don't
                > think Schopenhauer refers at all to Hegel in the first edition of the book.
                > I don't know that Hegel would have been very well known in 1919. He speaks
                > in a generally favorable way, though, of Schelling's philosophy of nature in
                > 1819. He writes:
                >
                > "To discover this fundamental type has been the main concern, or certainly
                > at any rate the most laudable endeavor, of the natural philosophers of
                > Schelling's school. In this respect they have much merit, although in many
                > cases their hunting for analogies in nature degenerates into mere
                > facetiousness. However, they have rightly shown the universal relationship
                > and family likeness even in the Ideas of inorganic nature, for instance
                > between electricity and magnetism, the identity of which was established
                > later; between chemical attraction and gravitation, and so on.
                >
                > "They drew special attention to the fact that polarity, that is to say, the
                > sundering of a force into two qualitatively different and opposite
                > activities striving for reunion, a sundering which also frequently reveals
                > itself spatially by a dispersion in opposite directions, is a fundamental
                > type of almost all the phenomena of nature, from the magnet and the crystal
                > up to man...
                >
                > "Also in the school of Schelling we find, among their many efforts to bring
                > to light the analogy between all the phenomena of nature, many attempts,
                > although unfortunate ones, to derive laws of nature from the mere laws of
                > space and time. However, we cannot know how far the mind of a genius will
                > one day realize both endeavors."
                >
                > (vol. 1, 143f)
                >
                > Hegel, in his philosophy of nature begins with space and time and derives
                > all the laws of nature from them. Is Schopenhauer referring to Hegel here?
                > Could he have known something about Hegel's philosophy of nature in 1919?
                > Certainly, insofar as he knew anything about Hegel at all in 1919, he would
                > very likely have supposed him to be a member of the school of Schelling.
                >
                > I believe all the other references to Schelling, and all the references to
                > Hegel, were addded to the second edition of 1844.
                >
                > But even in 1844 he still continued to speak not unfavorably about
                > Schelling. So, for instance, he writes:
                >
                > "The "One and all", in other words, that the inner essence in all things is
                > absolutely one and the same, has by my time already been grasped and
                > understood, after the Eleatics, Scotus Erigena, Giordano Bruno, and Spinoza
                > had taught it in detail, and Schelling had revived this doctrine."
                >
                > (vol 2, 642)
              • john
                ... The first volume of Schopenhauer s book actually came out in 1819. Fichte and Schelling were famous and well-known then, but not Hegel. It is interesting,
                Message 7 of 13 , Aug 27, 2011
                  --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Bruce Merrill <merrillbp@...> wrote:
                  >
                  > Dear John,
                  >
                  > Thanks for this, which is quite unknown to me./
                  >
                  > My recollection (and this is many years ago) was that Schopenhauer
                  > presented himself as pointedly contra-Hegel, esp: his pessimism
                  > /dualism was set against Hegel's optimism /monism,
                  > and that his "back to Kant" motto /exhortation was launched in
                  > opposition to Hegel.
                  > Am I completely wrong in this?


                  The first volume of Schopenhauer's book actually came out in 1819. Fichte and Schelling were famous and well-known then, but not Hegel.

                  It is interesting, by the way, that, like Schelling and Hegel, Schopenhauer was also a protege of Goethe. Although Fichte and Goethe knew each other, because Fichte did not share Goethe's great interest in Nature, Goethe had no interest in Fichte. But one thing Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer had in common was that they were all advocates of Goethe's color theory and Goethe's general conception of Nature, in opposition to a Newtonian, mechanical conception of Nature.

                  Schopenhauer actually arrived at Weimar, a few miles from Jena, just a few months after Hegel left in 1807. Schopenhauer was, perhaps, about 19, and became closely involved with Goethe through his mother. Goethe had one of the copies of the Phenomenology. So it is possible that Schopenhauer might have seen the book there. And it is possible that he may have heard Goethe talking about his two earlier proteges.

                  A few years later Schopenhauer went back to school to study philosophy. He studied with Fichte at Berlin. He then returned to Weimar and colaborated for awhile with Goethe. At any rate, it would mainly have been Fichte's interpretation of Kant, I suppose, to which Schopenhauer would have been objecting.

                  John
                • Bruce Merrill
                  Beat, Thank you for this useful exposition. Where does the phrase turn to that preceding ... Does Hegel say in the PG that our insight into force and
                  Message 8 of 13 , Aug 29, 2011
                    Beat,

                    Thank you for this useful exposition.

                    Where does the phrase "turn to that preceding
                    > [Kantian] exposition" come from? I can't find it, as I skim over SL p61f.

                    Does Hegel say in the PG that our insight into force and understanding
                    brings us back to Kant's trans. unity of apperception? Could you
                    direct me to this, please.

                    Also, what do you mean by the "Fichtean version" of "KANT'S
                    > TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION"? As in: "KANT'S
                    > TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION, albeit in its Fichtean version of
                    > the I intuiting itself."

                    As I see it,
                    and in regard to "Fichte's contribution" to subsequent idealism, I
                    take it that his most important contribution lies in his
                    identification of the triadic structure of Kant's unity of
                    apperception:

                    original empty synthesis > synthesis of the object > circuit of
                    self-consciousness.

                    (This triadic structure is already in Kant, but not identified as triadic.)

                    Fichte then transposes this triad on to the triad found with Kant's
                    categories of quality, as applied to the I's self-positing:

                    affirmative /I > negative /not-I > infinite.

                    So that you end up with this pregnant triad:

                    1) original empty synthesis /affirmative of the I >
                    2) synthesis of the object /negation by the not-I >
                    3) circuit of self-consciousness /infinite

                    Thus identifying an original triadic starting point for logic
                    /philosophy. Voila!

                    Any comment on that supposed "contribution."?

                    Thanks again,

                    Bruce


                    On 8/27/11, greuterb <greuterb@...> wrote:
                    > Am 27.08.2011 00:37, John writes:
                    >
                    >> --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Bruce
                    >> Merrill <merrillbp@...> wrote:
                    >>
                    >> > > Schopenhauer, by the way, is not a post-Hegelian philosopher. He
                    >> is very much a contemporary of Schelling and Hegel. He was, really, a
                    >> follower of Schelling.
                    >> >
                    >>
                    >> > But he presents himself as a follower of Kant, right? So, does he
                    >> > mis-represent himself?
                    >>
                    >> Not really. There are two things that are particularly characteristic
                    >> of early Schelling. First, he originally became famous for his
                    >> philosophy of nature which came out in the last few years of the 18th
                    >> century. And second, he ends his _System of Transcendental Idealism_
                    >> of 1800, which otherwise closely follows Fichte, with his philosophy
                    >> of art.
                    >>
                    >> Schopenhauer presents both a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of
                    >> art in his _The World as Will and Representation_, which came out in
                    >> 1819. I don't think Schopenhauer refers at all to Hegel in the first
                    >> edition of the book. I don't know that Hegel would have been very well
                    >> known in 1919. He speaks in a generally favorable way, though, of
                    >> Schelling's philosophy of nature in 1819. He writes:
                    >>
                    >> "To discover this fundamental type has been the main concern, or
                    >> certainly at any rate the most laudable endeavor, of the natural
                    >> philosophers of Schelling's school. In this respect they have much
                    >> merit, although in many cases their hunting for analogies in nature
                    >> degenerates into mere facetiousness. However, they have rightly shown
                    >> the universal relationship and family likeness even in the Ideas of
                    >> inorganic nature, for instance between electricity and magnetism, the
                    >> identity of which was established later; between chemical attraction
                    >> and gravitation, and so on.
                    >>
                    >> "They drew special attention to the fact that polarity, that is to
                    >> say, the sundering of a force into two qualitatively different and
                    >> opposite activities striving for reunion, a sundering which also
                    >> frequently reveals itself spatially by a dispersion in opposite
                    >> directions, is a fundamental type of almost all the phenomena of
                    >> nature, from the magnet and the crystal up to man...
                    >>
                    >> "Also in the school of Schelling we find, among their many efforts to
                    >> bring to light the analogy between all the phenomena of nature, many
                    >> attempts, although unfortunate ones, to derive laws of nature from the
                    >> mere laws of space and time. However, we cannot know how far the mind
                    >> of a genius will one day realize both endeavors."
                    >>
                    >> (vol. 1, 143f)
                    >>
                    >> Hegel, in his philosophy of nature begins with space and time and
                    >> derives all the laws of nature from them. Is Schopenhauer referring to
                    >> Hegel here? Could he have known something about Hegel's philosophy of
                    >> nature in 1919? Certainly, insofar as he knew anything about Hegel at
                    >> all in 1919, he would very likely have supposed him to be a member of
                    >> the school of Schelling.
                    >>
                    >> I believe all the other references to Schelling, and all the
                    >> references to Hegel, were addded to the second edition of 1844.
                    >>
                    >> But even in 1844 he still continued to speak not unfavorably about
                    >> Schelling. So, for instance, he writes:
                    >>
                    >> "The "One and all", in other words, that the inner essence in all
                    >> things is absolutely one and the same, has by my time already been
                    >> grasped and understood, after the Eleatics, Scotus Erigena, Giordano
                    >> Bruno, and Spinoza had taught it in detail, and Schelling had revived
                    >> this doctrine."
                    >>
                    >> (vol 2, 642)
                    >>
                    > John,
                    >
                    > Yes, and this philosophy of identity is exactly what Hegel rejects and
                    > for which Schelling (and Schopenhauer) attacks Hegel in reverse as an
                    > apparently undermining of Kant's dualism, i.e. the opposition of
                    > consciousness. Klaus Brinkmann in his book on "Idealism without Limits"
                    > (Springer, 2011, p. 144f) does point on this very clear:
                    >
                    > "The unity, therefore, is "already divided" as it always already has
                    > "superseded itself as an otherness". In other words, there is no need to
                    > posit an abtract totality apart from the unity of the two opposites.
                    > Each opposite is in and of itself united with its opposite both
                    > internally and externally. The unity is not something beyond the two
                    > opposites but contains them and is contained by them from the start. The
                    > unity of essential opposites is an original unity that is originally
                    > self-differentiating, or the original unity contains difference
                    > originally. Instead of trying to derive this unity form something
                    > simpler and less differentiated we start with it - and essentially
                    > remain with and in it throughout its unfolding and development.
                    >
                    > It is thus apparent that in Hegel's view Schelling's positing of an
                    > unknowable - because undifferentiated - ground of reality results from a
                    > lingering commitment to the opposition of consciousness and an
                    > unwillingness to abondon the standpoint of the understanding. The fact
                    > that (absolute) reason remains an enigma for (human) reason indicates
                    > that (human) reason continues to be identified with the understanding.
                    > For what Schelling has in effect done is to eliminate the inner
                    > opposition from one of the opposites. He did not follow the logic of the
                    > concept as an inner difference but instead let himself be guided by the
                    > concept of an external difference. Following the principle of
                    > non-contradiction as Spinoza had done he treated the opposite as
                    > "predicates, whose essence is an inert substance" (PS § 164/3, 134),
                    > i.e., as being only accidentally attached to their totality. This,
                    > however, makes the ground a mere "Verstandes-Identität", i.e. a
                    > tautology unity ("A=A") from which nothing can be derived. To try to do
                    > so is to belabor a pseudo-problem. This suggests again that Hegel saw in
                    > Schelling's philosophy essentially an impasse. Like Fichte's
                    > Wissenschaftslehre this was not the way to complete the Copernican
                    > revolution. The original synthetic unity of self-consciousness could not
                    > be transformed into an inifinite principle in this way. As we saw
                    > earlier, neither Fichte's nor Schelling's approach went "beyond the
                    > Kantian results" (SL 62, footnote/WdL I 44 footnote). Therefore, if real
                    > progress was to be made, one had once again to "turn to that preceding
                    > [Kantian] exposition". Force and Understanding thus appropriately ends
                    > with the evocation of that genuine starting-point of speculative
                    > philosophy as Hegel understood it, viz. self-consciousness as the
                    > original unity of subject and object which is no longer opposed by an
                    > other outside it. Schelling's philosophy of identity is not a foundation
                    > on which to build. In Hegel's view, the true foundation REMAINS KANT'S
                    > TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION, albeit in its Fichtean version of
                    > the I intuiting itself."
                    >
                    > Regards,
                    > Beat Greuter
                  • Bruce Merrill
                    PS I see that you ve acquired Brinkmann s book on Hegel & Objectivity. Are you enjoying it?
                    Message 9 of 13 , Aug 29, 2011
                      PS I see that you've acquired Brinkmann's book on Hegel & Objectivity.
                      Are you enjoying it?
                    • greuterb
                      ... Bruce, It is not my contribution. It is a quotation from Brinkmann s book on Idealism without Limits, Hegel and the Problem of Objectivity . ... Yes, I
                      Message 10 of 13 , Aug 29, 2011
                        Am 29.08.2011 12:46, Bruce writes:

                        > Beat,
                        >
                        > Thank you for this useful exposition.
                        >



                        Bruce,

                        It is not my contribution. It is a quotation from Brinkmann's book on
                        "Idealism without Limits, Hegel and the Problem of Objectivity".



                        > PS I see that you've acquired Brinkmann's book on Hegel & Objectivity.
                        > Are you enjoying it?



                        Yes, I enjoy it much. It is written in a modest English language and I
                        can understand it very well without consulting too often my dictionary.
                        The argumentation is sometimes a little lengthy and you have to keep in
                        mind earlier discussions for following the thread. BTW, Brinkmann also
                        wrote the preface for Klaus Hartmann's "Hegels Logik" (de Gruyter, 1999)
                        which is an important source of my Hegel interpretation. As far as I
                        know Brinkmann was as student in Hartmann's lectures in the United
                        States. I do not know if Hartmann's book (published from his legacy) was
                        also translated in English.



                        > Where does the phrase "turn to that preceding
                        > > [Kantian] exposition" come from? I can't find it, as I skim over SL
                        > p61f.
                        >



                        From "The "Objective Logic" (I), "Introduction: General Division of Logic":

                        "Recently Kant *) has opposed to what has usually been called logic
                        another, namely, a transcendental logic. What has here been called
                        objective logic would correspond in part to what with him is
                        transcendental logic. He distinguishes it from what he calls general
                        logic in this way, [a] that it treats of the notions which refer a
                        priori to objects, and consequently does not abstract from the whole
                        content of objective cognition, or, in other words, it contains the
                        rules of the pure thinking of an object, and [b] at the same time it
                        treats of the origin of our cognition so far as this cognition cannot be
                        ascribed to the objects. It is to this second aspect that Kant's
                        philosophical interest is exclusively directed.

                        *) I would mention that in this work I frequently refer to the Kantian
                        philosophy (which to many may seem superfluous) because whatever may be
                        said, both in this work and elsewhere, about the precise character of
                        this philosophy and about particular parts of its exposition, it
                        constitutes the base and the starting point of recent German philosophy
                        and that its merit remains unaffected by whatever faults may be found in
                        it. The reason too why reference must often be made to it in the
                        objective logic is that it enters into detailed consideration of
                        important, more specific aspects of logic, whereas later philosophical
                        works have paid little attention to these and in some instances have
                        only displayed a crude --- not unavenged --- contempt for them. The
                        philosophising which is most widespread among us does not go beyond the
                        Kantian results, that Reason cannot acquire knowledge of any true
                        content or subject matter and in regard to absolute truth must be
                        directed to faith. But what with Kant is a result, forms the immediate
                        starting-point in this philosophising, so that the preceding exposition
                        from which that result issued and which is a philosophical cognition, is
                        cut away beforehand. The Kantian philosophy thus serves as a cushion for
                        intellectual indolence which soothes itself with the conviction that
                        everything is already proved and settled. Consequently for genuine
                        knowledge, for a specific content of thought which is not to be found in
                        such barren and arid complacency, one must _turn to that preceding
                        exposition_."


                        It is this "preceding exposition" which is important for Brinkmann and
                        Hegel's going back to Kant's First Critique and his Copernican turn: the
                        transcendental unity of apperception as the concept of the concept.
                        Brinkmann shows now that the unity of pure intuition and the categories,
                        that is, the transcendental unity of apperception, has to be the true
                        starting point of a objective transcendental logic instead of Kant's
                        double dualism of the empirical content and form as well as of pure
                        intuition and categories which undermines Kant's first idea of the
                        transcendental unity of apperception. With this he claims to be the true
                        follower of Kant whereas Schelling and also Fichte in his
                        Wissenschaftslehre (and of course Schopenhauer who always claimed that
                        he were the true follower of Kant and not Schelling and Hegel who would
                        have betrayed Kant's philosophy) did only dublicate Kant's dualism and
                        with this do "not go beyond the Kantian _results_, that Reason cannot
                        acquire knowledge of any true content or subject matter and in regard to
                        absolute truth must be directed to faith." Hegel put forward this
                        already in "Faith and Knowledge" (1802).



                        > Does Hegel say in the PG that our insight into force and understanding
                        > brings us back to Kant's trans. unity of apperception? Could you
                        > direct me to this, please.
                        >


                        The opposition of the two worlds in 'Force and Understanding' constitute
                        the unity of self-consciousness as the concept in and for itself. This
                        is shown in the transition to the chapter on 'Self-Certainty'.



                        > Also, what do you mean by the "Fichtean version" of "KANT'S
                        > > TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION"? As in: "KANT'S
                        > > TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION, albeit in its Fichtean version of
                        > > the I intuiting itself."
                        >



                        This is from my quotation from Brinkmann's book.



                        > As I see it,
                        > and in regard to "Fichte's contribution" to subsequent idealism, I
                        > take it that his most important contribution lies in his
                        > identification of the triadic structure of Kant's unity of
                        > apperception:
                        >
                        > original empty synthesis > synthesis of the object > circuit of
                        > self-consciousness.
                        >
                        > (This triadic structure is already in Kant, but not identified as
                        > triadic.)
                        >
                        > Fichte then transposes this triad on to the triad found with Kant's
                        > categories of quality, as applied to the I's self-positing:
                        >
                        > affirmative /I > negative /not-I > infinite.
                        >
                        > So that you end up with this pregnant triad:
                        >
                        > 1) original empty synthesis /affirmative of the I >
                        > 2) synthesis of the object /negation by the not-I >
                        > 3) circuit of self-consciousness /infinite
                        >
                        > Thus identifying an original triadic starting point for logic
                        > /philosophy. Voila!
                        >
                        > Any comment on that supposed "contribution."?
                        >
                        > Thanks again,
                        >
                        > Bruce
                        >



                        I do not think that Hegel has in mind the triadic structure of Kant's
                        transcendental unity of apperception as the foundation of his own
                        Logic. What he has in mind is the opposed moments in their original
                        unity or the original unity as the unity of opposed moments. Brinkmann's
                        mention of Fichte's "I intuiting itself" refers to self-consciousness
                        which first has to be 'derived' from the starting point of the original
                        unity of apperception as the foundation of Hegel's concept of knowledge.

                        Regards,
                        Beat



                        > On 8/27/11, greuterb <greuterb@...
                        > <mailto:greuterb%40bluewin.ch>> wrote:
                        > > Am 27.08.2011 00:37, John writes:
                        > >
                        > >> --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Bruce
                        > >> Merrill <merrillbp@...> wrote:
                        > >>
                        > >> > > Schopenhauer, by the way, is not a post-Hegelian philosopher. He
                        > >> is very much a contemporary of Schelling and Hegel. He was, really, a
                        > >> follower of Schelling.
                        > >> >
                        > >>
                        > >> > But he presents himself as a follower of Kant, right? So, does he
                        > >> > mis-represent himself?
                        > >>
                        > >> Not really. There are two things that are particularly characteristic
                        > >> of early Schelling. First, he originally became famous for his
                        > >> philosophy of nature which came out in the last few years of the 18th
                        > >> century. And second, he ends his _System of Transcendental Idealism_
                        > >> of 1800, which otherwise closely follows Fichte, with his philosophy
                        > >> of art.
                        > >>
                        > >> Schopenhauer presents both a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of
                        > >> art in his _The World as Will and Representation_, which came out in
                        > >> 1819. I don't think Schopenhauer refers at all to Hegel in the first
                        > >> edition of the book. I don't know that Hegel would have been very well
                        > >> known in 1919. He speaks in a generally favorable way, though, of
                        > >> Schelling's philosophy of nature in 1819. He writes:
                        > >>
                        > >> "To discover this fundamental type has been the main concern, or
                        > >> certainly at any rate the most laudable endeavor, of the natural
                        > >> philosophers of Schelling's school. In this respect they have much
                        > >> merit, although in many cases their hunting for analogies in nature
                        > >> degenerates into mere facetiousness. However, they have rightly shown
                        > >> the universal relationship and family likeness even in the Ideas of
                        > >> inorganic nature, for instance between electricity and magnetism, the
                        > >> identity of which was established later; between chemical attraction
                        > >> and gravitation, and so on.
                        > >>
                        > >> "They drew special attention to the fact that polarity, that is to
                        > >> say, the sundering of a force into two qualitatively different and
                        > >> opposite activities striving for reunion, a sundering which also
                        > >> frequently reveals itself spatially by a dispersion in opposite
                        > >> directions, is a fundamental type of almost all the phenomena of
                        > >> nature, from the magnet and the crystal up to man...
                        > >>
                        > >> "Also in the school of Schelling we find, among their many efforts to
                        > >> bring to light the analogy between all the phenomena of nature, many
                        > >> attempts, although unfortunate ones, to derive laws of nature from the
                        > >> mere laws of space and time. However, we cannot know how far the mind
                        > >> of a genius will one day realize both endeavors."
                        > >>
                        > >> (vol. 1, 143f)
                        > >>
                        > >> Hegel, in his philosophy of nature begins with space and time and
                        > >> derives all the laws of nature from them. Is Schopenhauer referring to
                        > >> Hegel here? Could he have known something about Hegel's philosophy of
                        > >> nature in 1919? Certainly, insofar as he knew anything about Hegel at
                        > >> all in 1919, he would very likely have supposed him to be a member of
                        > >> the school of Schelling.
                        > >>
                        > >> I believe all the other references to Schelling, and all the
                        > >> references to Hegel, were addded to the second edition of 1844.
                        > >>
                        > >> But even in 1844 he still continued to speak not unfavorably about
                        > >> Schelling. So, for instance, he writes:
                        > >>
                        > >> "The "One and all", in other words, that the inner essence in all
                        > >> things is absolutely one and the same, has by my time already been
                        > >> grasped and understood, after the Eleatics, Scotus Erigena, Giordano
                        > >> Bruno, and Spinoza had taught it in detail, and Schelling had revived
                        > >> this doctrine."
                        > >>
                        > >> (vol 2, 642)
                        > >>
                        > > John,
                        > >
                        > > Yes, and this philosophy of identity is exactly what Hegel rejects and
                        > > for which Schelling (and Schopenhauer) attacks Hegel in reverse as an
                        > > apparently undermining of Kant's dualism, i.e. the opposition of
                        > > consciousness. Klaus Brinkmann in his book on "Idealism without Limits"
                        > > (Springer, 2011, p. 144f) does point on this very clear:
                        > >
                        > > "The unity, therefore, is "already divided" as it always already has
                        > > "superseded itself as an otherness". In other words, there is no need to
                        > > posit an abtract totality apart from the unity of the two opposites.
                        > > Each opposite is in and of itself united with its opposite both
                        > > internally and externally. The unity is not something beyond the two
                        > > opposites but contains them and is contained by them from the start. The
                        > > unity of essential opposites is an original unity that is originally
                        > > self-differentiating, or the original unity contains difference
                        > > originally. Instead of trying to derive this unity form something
                        > > simpler and less differentiated we start with it - and essentially
                        > > remain with and in it throughout its unfolding and development.
                        > >
                        > > It is thus apparent that in Hegel's view Schelling's positing of an
                        > > unknowable - because undifferentiated - ground of reality results from a
                        > > lingering commitment to the opposition of consciousness and an
                        > > unwillingness to abondon the standpoint of the understanding. The fact
                        > > that (absolute) reason remains an enigma for (human) reason indicates
                        > > that (human) reason continues to be identified with the understanding.
                        > > For what Schelling has in effect done is to eliminate the inner
                        > > opposition from one of the opposites. He did not follow the logic of the
                        > > concept as an inner difference but instead let himself be guided by the
                        > > concept of an external difference. Following the principle of
                        > > non-contradiction as Spinoza had done he treated the opposite as
                        > > "predicates, whose essence is an inert substance" (PS § 164/3, 134),
                        > > i.e., as being only accidentally attached to their totality. This,
                        > > however, makes the ground a mere "Verstandes-Identität", i.e. a
                        > > tautology unity ("A=A") from which nothing can be derived. To try to do
                        > > so is to belabor a pseudo-problem. This suggests again that Hegel saw in
                        > > Schelling's philosophy essentially an impasse. Like Fichte's
                        > > Wissenschaftslehre this was not the way to complete the Copernican
                        > > revolution. The original synthetic unity of self-consciousness could not
                        > > be transformed into an inifinite principle in this way. As we saw
                        > > earlier, neither Fichte's nor Schelling's approach went "beyond the
                        > > Kantian results" (SL 62, footnote/WdL I 44 footnote). Therefore, if real
                        > > progress was to be made, one had once again to "turn to that preceding
                        > > [Kantian] exposition". Force and Understanding thus appropriately ends
                        > > with the evocation of that genuine starting-point of speculative
                        > > philosophy as Hegel understood it, viz. self-consciousness as the
                        > > original unity of subject and object which is no longer opposed by an
                        > > other outside it. Schelling's philosophy of identity is not a foundation
                        > > on which to build. In Hegel's view, the true foundation REMAINS KANT'S
                        > > TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION, albeit in its Fichtean version of
                        > > the I intuiting itself."
                        > >
                        > > Regards,
                        > > Beat Greuter
                        >



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