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Re: [hegel] Re: a metaphysics of nature

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  • greuterb
    ... Joao, I do not understand these two extreme perspectives. What we have to examine is the achieved position of consciousness in the Reason chapter: first,
    Message 1 of 50 , Aug 24, 2011
      Am 23.08.2011 23:21, Joao writes:

      > Dear Alan, John and all,
      >
      > Just pursuing this a bit more I would like to forward a perspective
      > which relates to an extrapolation from some points Pippin is making in
      > the text, "On Hegel's Claim that Self-Consciousness is `Desire Itself
      > (`Begierde überhaupt')"
      >
      > At some point Pippin says:
      >
      > "But Hegel wants to claim that as soon as we properly see the error of
      > holding that the self in any self-awareness is immediately present to
      > an inspecting mind, his own interpretation is just thereby implied.
      > (If the self's relation to itself cannot be immediate or direct, the
      > conclusion that it is some sort of to-be-achieved follows for him
      > straightforwardly."
      >
      > >From this and what followed I am lead to posit that the speculative
      > goes so far as the present, meaning, that the certainty which it
      > achieves, the Self-certainty, falls within the determinateness of the
      > present, so that what we are to become certain is of our present
      > determinateness by means of the recollection of the movements which,
      > in this case, Reason, fulfilled to bring us to where we stand. This
      > means, I think, that we stand when it comes to the notional firstly in
      > a metaphysical position, meaning, to take our thoughts as pertaining
      > to something, to something which is being given by these thoughts or
      > reflections -- it is, so to say, our positions as to whatever may be
      > that calls our atention - for instance about the essence of nature.
      >
      > The natural way of proceeding would be to measure up our thoughts
      > against the object of which they are thoughts, but the problem is that
      > the object is already thought, even if we measure it against technical
      > or statistical data, technology and statistics are already products of
      > our thoughts, they are already notional in their substratum - so that
      > it is ultimately a measure of thoughts by thought.
      >
      > >From the perspective of natural consciousness which aims for the
      > certainty of the object this position is ridden with the seeds of
      > skepticism, but as it stands Hegel already showed before how the
      > object's certainty is to be found, in first instance, in
      > self-consciousness, so that what the measure of thought against
      > thought seems to come up to is satisfaction, meaning, its truth is in
      > being able to be inhabited by self-consciousness or in this case by
      > reason -as long as reason is satisfied, a determinate thesis about
      > something holds and it stops holding as long as reason in unable to
      > inhabit it, which comes about by disruption, I think, e.g. Khun.
      >
      > But is is not only objects, even if ultimately notional, that we
      > inhabit. We also inhabit the shape of consciousness by which these
      > objects came about and which is reflected in them, so that true
      > satisfaction has to be of the inhabiting of these same shapes, so that
      > the recollection of the shape which is acting is on the one hand what
      > is to be achieved in terms of Self-certainty and on the other hand in
      > terms of the truth of this Self-certainty, meaning - once we come to
      > it can we inhabit it?
      >
      > And this is always a present matter, the Self can only be certain of
      > itself in its actuality, it can not -- and this I am taking from
      > interpreting Pippin -- forward this certainty into the future, and by
      > this and what followed I would come back to the present chapter and
      > the thesis I would like to forward -- that what I called metaphysical
      > thinking, namely the quote I pasted, is the actual position about the
      > essence of nature from the standpoint of the present in which the
      > Phenomenology was written, so that, when it comes to nature the
      > exposition should be able to show how did consciousness came to the
      > standpoint where it is at, so that, finally, what Hegel might be doing
      > is positing the actual present against what was present to that shape
      > of consciousness which is for the actuality in play a past object and
      > shape.
      >
      > I mean, that Hegel is positing two extremes, on the one hand nature's
      > essence from the standpoint of observing reason and on the other hand
      > nature's essence from the standpoint of the reader of Hegel's time.
      > And this may be serving two purposes: one to show how the reader in
      > its immediate relation to its time came to its time's position about
      > nature and another to show him what shape of consciousness he is at
      > and from what movements and shapes did it came to where it stands - so
      > that this might be one of those moments where the reader is actualized
      > -- one would think not to lose track of itself.
      >



      Joao,

      I do not understand these two extreme perspectives. What we have to
      examine is the achieved position of consciousness in the Reason chapter:
      first, there is a reconciliation of self-consciousness and consciousness
      in a new unity called 'Reason'. This is a reconciliation of
      self-consciousness which has now its other within itself and in
      principle there is no longer an outer world beyond consciousness.
      However, this is at the beginning only a formal reconciliation since
      reason in-itself is universal but consciousness is still particular. So,
      for a real reconciliation consciousness has to make itself universal
      within a built objective reality as its own spirit. The Observing Reason
      merging in its other as the manifold is the first step for achieving
      this aim, a necessarily alienating step since self-consciousness is at
      the beginning of this process only a formal universal but substantially
      still particular. In the further chapters of the PhdG the universality
      of consciousness will be gradually strived after. Only in Pure Knowing
      the unity of reason and consciousness in their universality is achieved.
      Thought and being are now really reconciled and can develop their
      opposition from their unity itself.

      Regards,
      Beat Greuter



      > By all this I would change my point and instead of calling it a
      > metaphysical drift I would forward the hypothesis that this intrusion
      > is methodological, it pertains to what Hegel wants to achieve from the
      > reader.
      >
      > Regards,
      > João.
      >
      > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>,
      > "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@...> wrote:
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Alan
      > Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@> wrote:
      > > >
      > > > There is a tendency to mistaken meaning for being in Hegel. Of
      > course, to
      > > > say this is to suggest that the supposed 'metaphysical' reading can be
      > > > challenged. Every posited realm of being is really nothing more
      > here in the
      > > > Phenomenology than a one-sided manifestation of absolute knowing.
      > It is
      > > > being detached from its speculative origins out of the meaning of a
      > > > preceding dialectic.
      > >
      > > Hi Alan,
      > >
      > > Well, it is true that by isolating one paragraph, as i did, i may
      > incur in a unilateral perspective, as the exposition is, in fact,
      > still moving.
      > >
      > > Anyway, perhaps insisting on my misreading, my interpretation of
      > metaphysical thinking comes from the difference which i thought
      > possible to grasp, in this paragraph, between what is the position of
      > the shape of observing reason and what seems to be a position outside
      > of it, in relation to which the former seems to be positing a mistaken
      > perspective. Meaning, while observing reason posits the telos as an
      > externality Hegel seems to be saying that the truth is that this
      > "telos" is to be taken as a inner of the organism - although, as such,
      > it is a "telos" that doesn't posit the notion of progress. It is from
      > this point that i said it to be a drift into a metaphysics of nature -
      > this because the shape of consciousness which posits this last notion
      > of "telos" is not yet in play, a shape one could maybe say to be that
      > from the standpoint of Hegel himself.
      > >
      > > More concretely the passage in the text in which i based what
      > followed is:
      > >
      > > "Yet looking at how the organic being was previously characterized,
      > the organic is in point of fact just realized concrete purpose. For
      > since itself maintains itself in relation to another, it is just that
      > kind of natural existence in which nature reflects itself into the
      > notion, and the moments of necessity separated out [by
      > Understanding]-a cause and an effect, an active and a passive-are here
      > brought together and combined into a single unity. In this way we have
      > here not only something appearing as a result of necessity, but,
      > because it has returned to itself, the last or the result is just as
      > much the first which starts the process, and is to itself the purpose
      > which it realizes. What is organic does not produce something, it
      > merely conserves itself, or what is produced is as much there already
      > as produced."
      > >
      > > Regards,
      > > João.
      > >
      > > >
      > > > More to the point, there is no need to refer to unwritten books to
      > > > understand what is going on in the Phenomenology. Hegel supplies
      > his reader
      > > > with all that he needs to grasp the exposition. That this grasping
      > in the
      > > > form of a coherent interpretation has yet to be offered is as much
      > due to
      > > > our failing to adhere to Hegel's warnings about importing our own
      > bright
      > > > ideas as it has with anything else. The text either reads
      > immanently or it
      > > > does not really read at all.
      > > >
      > > > - Alan
      > > >
      > > > From: john <jgbardis@>
      > > > Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
      > > > Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 13:13:18 -0000
      > > > To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
      > > > Subject: [hegel] a metaphysics of nature
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> ,
      > > > "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
      > > > >
      > > > > Dear Group,
      > > > >
      > > > > Just some of my notes on P. 256:
      > > > >
      > > > > (Hegel seems to be engaging in some sort of methaphysics of
      > nature, although
      > > > this is merely how i understood it so far)
      > > > >
      > > >
      > > > Dear Joao,
      > > >
      > > > It is really only in the Logic that Hegel engages in a metaphysics of
      > > > nature. Life is one of the final categories of the Logic. Hegel
      > writes:
      > > >
      > > > "A comment may be in order here to differentiate the logical view
      > of life as
      > > > idea from natural life as treated in the philosophy of nature [as
      > it is in
      > > > the Observing Reason section], and from life in so far as it is
      > bound to
      > > > spirit...
      > > >
      > > > "In both cases, as natural life and as referring to spirit, life
      > obtains a
      > > > determinateness from its externality, in one case through its
      > > > presuppositions, such as are other formations of nature, and in
      > the other
      > > > case through the purposes and activity of spirit. The idea of life
      > by itself
      > > > is free from both the conditioning objectivity in the first case
      > and the
      > > > reference to subjectivity of the second case."
      > > >
      > > > [pages 762f]
      > > >
      > > > One thing that makes the Observing Reason section difficult to
      > understand is
      > > > that the idea of life is developed with regard to its
      > determinateness by
      > > > externality. In the Logic there is no externality. So in the Logic
      > the idea
      > > > of life is, basically, the life of God. In the passage that
      > immediately
      > > > follows the above, Hegel deals with life as "omnipresent".
      > Omnipresence is,
      > > > of course, generally supposed to be an attribute of God. So if the
      > reference
      > > > to metaphysics is somewhat obscure in the Observing Reason
      > section, here it
      > > > is quite unmistakable. Hegel writes:
      > > >
      > > > "Life, considered now more closely in its idea, is in and for itself
      > > > absolute universality; the objectivity which it possesses is
      > throughout
      > > > permeated by the concept, and this concept alone it has as substance.
      > > >
      > > > "Whatever is distinguished as part, or by some otherwise external
      > > > reflection, has the whole concept within it; the concept is the soul
      > > > _omnipresent_ in it, a soul which is simple self-reference and
      > remains one
      > > > in the manifoldness that accrues to the objective being.
      > > >
      > > > "This manifoldness, as self-external objectivity, has an indifferent
      > > > subsistence which in space and time, if these could already be
      > mentioned
      > > > here, is a mutual externality of entirely diverse and atomistic
      > matters.
      > > >
      > > > "But externality is in life at the same time as the simple
      > determinateness
      > > > of its concept; thus the soul flows omnipresently in this manifold but
      > > > remains at the same time the simple oneness of the concrete
      > concept with
      > > > itself.
      > > >
      > > > "That way of thinking that clings to the determinations of reflective
      > > > relations and of the formal concept [Observing Reason], when it
      > comes to
      > > > consider life, the unity of its concept in the externality of
      > objectivity,
      > > > the absolute multiplicity of atomistic matter, finds that all its
      > thoughts
      > > > are absolutely of no avail; the omnipresence of the simple in the
      > manifold
      > > > externality is for reflection an absolute contradiction and also,
      > since it
      > > > cannot at the same time avoid witnessing this omnipresence in the
      > perception
      > > > of life and must therefore grant the actuality of this idea, an
      > > > incomprehensible mystery--for reflection does not grasp the
      > concept, nor
      > > > does it grasp it as the substance of life.
      > > >
      > > > "But this simple life is not only omnipresent; it is the one and only
      > > > subsistence and immanent substance of its objectivity.
      > > >
      > > > But as subjective substance it is impulse, more precisely the specific
      > > > impulse of particular difference, and no less essentially the one and
      > > > universal impulse of the specific that leads its particularization
      > back to
      > > > unity and holds it there.
      > > >
      > > > "Only as this negative unity of its objectivity and
      > particularization is
      > > > life self-referring, life that exists for itself, a soul.
      > > >
      > > > "As such, it is essentially a singular that refers to objectivity
      > as to an
      > > > other, an inanimate nature. The originative judgment of life consists
      > > > therefore in this, that it separates itself off as individual
      > subject from
      > > > the objective and, since it constitutes itself as the negative
      > unity of the
      > > > concept, posits in advance an immediate objectivity."
      > > >
      > > > [page 763f]
      > > >
      > > > I aplogize for the length of the quote, but I hope you will see
      > that this
      > > > REALLY is metaphysical. This metaphysical view of life is ever in the
      > > > background of the Observing Reason section but never quite comes
      > to the
      > > > fore.
      > > >
      > > > John
      >



      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • vascojoao2003
      ... Hi Beat, Yes, I agree with your points. I also think, continuing what i wrotte earlier, that the position of sense-certainty is to open a divide where
      Message 50 of 50 , Aug 29, 2011
        --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, greuterb <greuterb@...> wrote:
        >
        > Am 28.08.2011 21:26, Joao writes:
        >
        > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>,
        > > greuterb <greuterb@> wrote:
        > > >
        > > > Am 28.08.2011 17:25, Joao writes:
        > > >
        > > > > Hi all,
        > > > >
        > > > > Just going back to the issue Alan opened with his remark.
        > > > >
        > > > > Sense-certainty opens with:
        > > > >
        > > > > "THE knowledge, which is at the start or immediately our object, can
        > > > > be nothing else than just that which is immediate knowledge,
        > > knowledge
        > > > > of the immediate, of what is. We have, in dealing with it, to
        > > proceed,
        > > > > too, in an immediate way, to accept what is given, not altering
        > > > > anything in it as it is presented before us, and keeping mere
        > > > > apprehension (Auffassen) free from conceptual comprehension
        > > (Begreifen)."
        > > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > Joao,
        > > >
        > > > But is there a "knowledge of the immediate"? Knowledge always
        > > includes a
        > > > mediation, that is, there is a "conceptual comprehension" within it
        > > > whereas the immediate cannot be known since it is a not yet mediated.
        > > > So, as you write, it is a false statement. Or, has this initial
        > > > immediate already a kind of mediation within it? Otherwise, a dualism
        > > > between an (immediate) intuition and a given outer empirical reality
        > > > must be assumed.
        > > >
        > > > Regards,
        > > > Beat Greuter
        > >
        > > Hi Beat,
        > >
        > > Yes, you ask the right questions. It seems necessary that this initial
        > > immediate has already a kind of mediation within it. I think in my
        > > first post about this issue i called sense-certainty an artifice
        > > introduced by Hegel to posit the necessity of perception as appearance
        > > of phenomenal consciousness, but now i see that "artifice" is a
        > > superficial way of considering it.
        > >
        >
        >
        > Joao,
        >
        > I think that sense-certainty is a limit-consciousness. It does not yet
        > accept any limitation (determination) in its pure apprehension
        > ('Auffassen' without conceptual modification) since for it this would
        > distort the immediate truth of apprehension. Only the consciousness of
        > perception recognizes the limitation of being and thinks about it. The
        > same we have in the Logic with the transition from being - nothing -
        > becoming into 'Dasein' and 'quality'. So, your characterization as 'an
        > artifice' is not totally wrong. I would call it rather a limit-concept
        > of consciousness - a unity in which both sides which constitute
        > knowledge (the particular and the universal) are included but still in a
        > not yet mediated opposition. The attempt in sense-certainty to mediate
        > the two sides ends in a running 'becoming' without achieving any
        > determination.

        Hi Beat,

        Yes, I agree with your points. I also think, continuing what i wrotte earlier, that the position of sense-certainty is to open a divide where consciousness in actuality, us, differentiates itself from itself aiming to become for itself in this difference. This limit-consciousness, thus, might be what is necessary to free the consciousness observed from the consciousness observing.

        Regards,
        João.
        >
        >
        >
        > > Then i also called in an externality, but know it seems to me that
        > > such a point is only half of it - and half a point is no point. But i
        > > think we can still pick up this notion of "externality" and take it
        > > from the standpoint of consciousness in actuality which is first of
        > > all the consciousness that is unfolding the exposition: meaning, by
        > > falling in this consciousness it falls in consciousness in general, if
        > > i may put it this way, so that it is an externality which isn't an
        > > externality.
        > >
        >
        >
        >
        > As a consciousness already sense-certainty makes a distinction between
        > itself (I) and its other (the outer world). Therefore we can take it as
        > an externality, it is no longer a soul which is immediately one with
        > itself and its world. However, since it is a limit-concept of
        > consciousness as described above the externality is not yet really
        > posited by this consciousness, this happens only in the transition into
        > perception.
        >
        >
        >
        > > But nonetheless appears in relation to perception as coming from
        > > outside phenomenal consciousness but as it falls within consciousness
        > > it must appear from explicit self-consciousness as it recollects its
        > > own development and wants to assert itself that its immediate
        > > apearence as perception is a logical necessity of consciousness as
        > > knowing. This to say that it seems that Hegel is leaving something
        > > behind our backs as readers, precisely the mediation by which the
        > > position of sense-certainty is posited before us. That consciousness
        > > posits a point - sense-certainty - from within which it can't appear
        > > as consciousness, although appearing because it posits it, is
        > > something that at this point i can't quite comprehend.
        > >
        > > Regards,
        > > João.
        > >
        >
        >
        >
        > We should not yet speak of self-consciousness. This will be constituted
        > only by the two worlds in "Force and the Understanding" and their
        > resulting unity in self-certainty. However, from a methodological point
        > of view there is a unity of the two sides of knowledge from the very
        > beginning but only as a concept in-itself. This means that from the very
        > beginning the empirical side is not detached from the conceptualizing
        > side since in this case they could never convene: how can the blind
        > convene with the void if they belong to two separate worlds? With this
        > Hegel transcends the mere philosophy of the understanding (identity,
        > intuition - heterogeneity) which he perceives in the philosophies from
        > Descartes to Schelling and which implies necessarily a dualism from
        > which the development of real knowledge cannot be followed without
        > making unproved assumptions (i.e. intrinsic ideas). For Hegel one
        > opposite always include the other.
        >
        > Regards,
        > Beat Greuter
        >
        >
        >
        > > >
        > > > > And I think we can say that this is a false statement. There is no
        > > > > such "mere aprehension". This is, i think, the conclusion we come
        > > > > about with the opening of Perception:
        > > > >
        > > > > "Immediate certainty does not make the truth its own, for its
        > > truth is
        > > > > something universal, whereas certainty wants to deal with the This.
        > > > > Perception, on the other hand, takes what exists for it to be a
        > > > > universal. Universality being its principle in general, its moments
        > > > > immediately distinguished within it are also universal; I is a
        > > > > universal, and the object is a universal."
        > > > >
        > > > > It seems to me that Hegel is saying that phenomenal consciousness
        > > > > appears only in so far as it is perception, that with sense-certainty
        > > > > consciousness in its phenomenal concept, as aprehending or knowing
        > > > > something, can not emerge as it goes under with its object.
        > > > > Sense-certainty mediates for us this emergence, but and this is
        > > what i
        > > > > am saying, it doesn't mediate the appearance of perception from the
        > > > > consciousness being observed in the exposition so that if it comes to
        > > > > be that us and the consciousness observed in the exposition become
        > > one
        > > > > and the same we still have the necessity of perception in and for
        > > > > itself to be asserted - i mean, no longer from the contingency of the
        > > > > aprehensions of sense-certainty but from the concept of consciousness
        > > > > in its necessity.
        > > > >
        > > > > Regards,
        > > > > João.
        > > > >
        > > > > PS: the above quotes of the PhG are from Baillie's translation.
        > > > >
        > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>,
        > > > > "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
        > > > > >
        > > > > >
        > > > > >
        > > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Alan
        > > > > Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@> wrote:
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > A clue as to the 'necessity' of beginning with sense-certainty:
        > > > > read the
        > > > > > > first two sentences of sense-certainty and see what you find.
        > > > > >
        > > > > > I find that it comes from the outside. The exposition takes the
        > > > > immediate to be sense-certainty but just to show that it is
        > > perception.
        > > > > >
        > > > > > João.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > - Alan
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > From: vascojoao2003 <vascojoao2003@>
        > > > > > > Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
        > > > > > > Date: Sun, 28 Aug 2011 04:30:44 -0000
        > > > > > > To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
        > > > > > > Subject: [hegel] Is consciousness necessarily "knowing" or/and
        > > > > knowledge?
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Dear Group,
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > I came to notice one thing, at least from the standpoint of my
        > > > > study of the
        > > > > > > PhG and what i have grasped so far, that is: it is not yet
        > > > > established that
        > > > > > > Self-consciousness is necessarily "knowing" or "knowledge"(1)
        > > > > which either
        > > > > > > way having one we have the other. If this has any bearing on the
        > > > > actual
        > > > > > > development so far and it is not merely the case of I having
        > > missed
        > > > > > > something then there is this huge question yet to be answered and
        > > > > which
        > > > > > > reflects back on the exposition so far (I'm arrived at P.259).
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > We have come to know that Perception is a necessary position
        > > from the
        > > > > > > development of Sense-certainty and as such one might say the the
        > > > > necessity
        > > > > > > of knowing is assured, but the necessity of perception is posited
        > > > > by the
        > > > > > > development of a contingency [of sense-certainty] - as Hegel
        > > > > states so in
        > > > > > > the opening of II:
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > "(...)our process of apprehending what perception is,
        > > therefore, is no
        > > > > > > longer a contingent series of acts of apprehension, as is the
        > > case
        > > > > with the
        > > > > > > apprehension of sense-certainty; it is a logically necessitated
        > > > > > > process."(Baillie's)
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > If Sense-certainty does not posit consciousness as necessarily
        > > > > knowing, or
        > > > > > > knowledge, Perception, even if it arises necessarily from
        > > > > sense-certainty,
        > > > > > > it doesn't arise from consciousness as necessarily knowing or
        > > > > knowledge.
        > > > > > > This transition from sense-certainty to perception seems to be
        > > saying
        > > > > > > fundamentaly this: if we posit sense-certainty we come up to
        > > > > perception. The
        > > > > > > problem is that sense-certainty is not itself posited by a
        > > previous
        > > > > > > necessity by which it posits itself as necessary - it seems even
        > > > > an artifice
        > > > > > > from Hegel and it seems, from the result, that Hegel might be
        > > > > saying that
        > > > > > > phenomenal consciousness appears as perception and not as
        > > > > sense-certainty.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > If it appears necessarily as perception then, in so far as the
        > > > > exposition
        > > > > > > follows from consciousness and knowledge as it appears, it makes
        > > > > sense that
        > > > > > > it proceeds from perception, but it nonetheless remains to be
        > > > > shown from
        > > > > > > consciousness itself, which appears as perception, if it does so
        > > > > by its own
        > > > > > > necessity, posited by its own concept or not - which comes to
        > > be the
        > > > > > > question about if consciousness is necessarily "knowing"?
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Why is this important? As far as I can tell it is important
        > > > > because having
        > > > > > > appeared from a contingency, perception, as necessary knowing,
        > > has
        > > > > to posit
        > > > > > > back the contingence from where it arose as its necessity.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Conceptually, this movement appears to have the nature of the
        > > > > notional,
        > > > > > > meaning, to be for itself in another, meaning, necessity being
        > > for
        > > > > itself in
        > > > > > > or through contingency, but contingency as far as it remains in
        > > > > itself is
        > > > > > > external to necessity so that consciousness, or phenomenal
        > > > > consciousness,
        > > > > > > having risen to its necessity from an externality, posits back
        > > that
        > > > > > > externality, it is for that externality. This externality must
        > > be,
        > > > > then, its
        > > > > > > blind spot and, thus, a contender for the inabillity of phenomenal
        > > > > > > consciousness to perceive what is behind its back - it is its
        > > > > original sin,
        > > > > > > so to say.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > But is all this makes sense then it is still to be understood the
        > > > > movement
        > > > > > > by which consciousness sublates (if this is correct to say in
        > > > > here) this
        > > > > > > externality and becomes true certainty of itself - or better said,
        > > > > > > self-possession, as knowing or/and knowledge.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Does this make sense to any of you? Does any of you see this
        > > as a real
        > > > > > > problem yet to be resolved?
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Regards,
        > > > > > > João.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > (1)This is a question that Aristotle also took as fundamental to
        > > > > his major
        > > > > > > work, as he opens it with his position about it:
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > "ALL men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the
        > > > > delight we
        > > > > > > take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are
        > > > > loved for
        > > > > > > themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only
        > > > > with a
        > > > > > > view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we
        > > > > prefer
        > > > > > > seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that
        > > > > this, most of
        > > > > > > all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many
        > > differences
        > > > > between
        > > > > > > things."
        > >
        >
        >
        >
        > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        >
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