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Re: [hegel] Re: Plato's cave: Heidegger and Hegel

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  • greuterb
    ... Bob, I think this is a very good short overview on the use of the ought in the German Idealism including Kant. I ought to read again the early Jena works
    Message 1 of 74 , Aug 11, 2011
      Am 08.08.2011 01:32, Robert Wallace writes:

      > Hi Beat,
      >
      > Thanks for these stimulating objections. I'll begin with the
      > historical question:
      >
      > I had asked:
      >
      > >> > You say earlier in your reply that what Hegel is
      > >> > discussing corresponds to Kant's theoretical philosophy (in the
      > >> > Critique of Pure Reason) rather than to his practical philosophy.
      > >> This
      > >> > suggestion makes my question all the more pressing. Why does
      > >> Hegel use
      > >> > a term from Kant's practical philosophy to designate something that
      > >> > (according to you) is essentially theoretical?
      > >>
      > >>
      > and you replied:
      >
      > >> From where do you know this? He does not take the term from Kant's
      > >> practical philosophy. He shows the consequences of finite being
      > >> within
      > >> its limit and restriction and the categorical development associated
      > >> with it. From there he can criticize Kant's standpoint and can go
      > >> above
      > >> this standpoint. Perhaps it would be a good idea to do some
      > >> philological
      > >> work about the 'Ought' going through the history of philosophy.
      > >>
      > My reply is:
      >
      > > A useful starting point for this philological work, which I agree
      > > can be helpful here, is Hegel's _Differenzschrift_ (1801) and _Faith
      > > and Knowledge_ (1802). Here, in his earliest publications, Hegel
      > > describes Fichte's philosophy as centering on an Ought (Sollen).
      > > "The highest synthesis revealed in the system [Fichte's] is an
      > > _ought_. 'Ego equals Ego' turns into 'Ego _ought_ to equal
      > > Ego'" (Diff., Harris & Cerf p. 132, STW 2:68). Hegel's alternative
      > > to Fichte's Ought here already is a "true infinity" (146; STW 5:84).
      > > And in _Faith and Knowledge_: "Because formal thought does not ever
      > > truly give itself up, the Ought is perennial" (p. 165, Cerf and
      > > Harris; STW 2:406). Fichte himself presents the Ought as the key to
      > > his version of Kantian thinking: "Only through this medium of the
      > > moral law do I behold _myself_"... "I _ought_ in my thinking to set
      > > out from the pure self"... (Wissenschaftslehre, second introduction,
      > > I, 466-7); "our idealism is not dogmatic but practical; does not
      > > determine what is, but what ought to be" (I, 156). In his Remark on
      > > the Ought in SL, Hegel says "the philosophy of Kant and Fichte sets
      > > up the ought as the highest point of the resolution of the
      > > contradictions of Reason" (Miller trans. p. 136; STW 5:148). So in
      > > the SL as in the Differenzschrift and _Faith and Knowledge_, Hegel
      > > clearly associates the Ought with Kantian and Fichtean thought.
      > > Rather than saying that Hegel took the term "from Kant's practical
      > > philosophy," I should have said that he took it from Fichte, who
      > > sought by means of it (together with "intellectual intuition") to
      > > deal with the duality of theoretical and practical that he inherited
      > > from Kant. So when it reaches Hegel, the "Ought" is no longer
      > > exclusively a practical concept. But as my first quotation from
      > > Fichte makes clear, and it's obvious in any case, _Fichte_ derives
      > > the Ought from Kant's practical philosophy, specifically, the
      > > Categorical Imperative. If you can come up with texts prior to Kant
      > > in which the "ought" plays an important role, great. But it's
      > > abundantly clear that the predecessor texts that Hegel himself has
      > > in mind, in connection with this term, starting in 1801 in Jena, are
      > > Kant's practical philosophy and Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre.
      >



      Bob,

      I think this is a very good short overview on the use of the 'ought' in
      the German Idealism including Kant. I ought to read again the early Jena
      works 'Differenzschrift' and 'Faith and Knowledge' and also Fichte's
      'Wissenschaftslehre' which I have somewhat neglected in the last years.

      Nevertheless, we should be aware that Hegel's 'ought' in the Logic has
      passed through a shift of meaning. It is now bound to the finite being
      and its limitation and restriction. It is no longer 'ought to be' as
      something beyond the finite being - as something 'ideal' of a moral 'I'
      as practical - but has become a thought moment of the finite being
      itself which with this is posited as 'ideell'. So, Hegel's critique on
      Kant and Fichte is at the same time a shift in meaning of the concept of
      the 'ought' what in the 'Differenzschrift' and in 'Faith and Knowledge'
      - as far as I can remember - has not yet been realized. With this a
      presupposition for actualizing freedom is shown bounding the infinite to
      the finite. This can also be seen as the transition from a subjective
      idealism to an absolute idealism in which the concept itself moves and
      does solve its contradiction - the contradiction has become a moment of
      the concept itself. So, Hegel writes in your quotation: "In his Remark
      on the Ought in SL, Hegel says "the philosophy of Kant and Fichte sets
      up the ought as the highest point of the resolution of the
      contradictions of Reason" (Miller trans. p. 136; STW 5:148)." This means
      also that in Hegel's Logic the 'ought' has lost 'the highest point of
      the resolution', it is no longer an absolute but becomes a moment in the
      concept of 'being-for-self' and its further movement.

      If this is true then we should look indeed at texts prior to Kant and
      Fichte for finding further and more adequate references to the 'ought'.
      One candidate for this would be Nikolaus von Kues who wrote a trialogue
      on the 'Possest' (Können-Ist, Potential-Is). Another reference would be
      the neoplatonism. Perhaps there is aready a book that gives a critical
      historical insight on the use of the 'ought' in Hegel's Logic of Being.
      I am certainly not the right man for doing this.

      Regards,
      Beat



      > ..................
      >



      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • greuterb
      ... Bob, I think this is a very good short overview on the use of the ought in the German Idealism including Kant. I ought to read again the early Jena works
      Message 74 of 74 , Aug 11, 2011
        Am 08.08.2011 01:32, Robert Wallace writes:

        > Hi Beat,
        >
        > Thanks for these stimulating objections. I'll begin with the
        > historical question:
        >
        > I had asked:
        >
        > >> > You say earlier in your reply that what Hegel is
        > >> > discussing corresponds to Kant's theoretical philosophy (in the
        > >> > Critique of Pure Reason) rather than to his practical philosophy.
        > >> This
        > >> > suggestion makes my question all the more pressing. Why does
        > >> Hegel use
        > >> > a term from Kant's practical philosophy to designate something that
        > >> > (according to you) is essentially theoretical?
        > >>
        > >>
        > and you replied:
        >
        > >> From where do you know this? He does not take the term from Kant's
        > >> practical philosophy. He shows the consequences of finite being
        > >> within
        > >> its limit and restriction and the categorical development associated
        > >> with it. From there he can criticize Kant's standpoint and can go
        > >> above
        > >> this standpoint. Perhaps it would be a good idea to do some
        > >> philological
        > >> work about the 'Ought' going through the history of philosophy.
        > >>
        > My reply is:
        >
        > > A useful starting point for this philological work, which I agree
        > > can be helpful here, is Hegel's _Differenzschrift_ (1801) and _Faith
        > > and Knowledge_ (1802). Here, in his earliest publications, Hegel
        > > describes Fichte's philosophy as centering on an Ought (Sollen).
        > > "The highest synthesis revealed in the system [Fichte's] is an
        > > _ought_. 'Ego equals Ego' turns into 'Ego _ought_ to equal
        > > Ego'" (Diff., Harris & Cerf p. 132, STW 2:68). Hegel's alternative
        > > to Fichte's Ought here already is a "true infinity" (146; STW 5:84).
        > > And in _Faith and Knowledge_: "Because formal thought does not ever
        > > truly give itself up, the Ought is perennial" (p. 165, Cerf and
        > > Harris; STW 2:406). Fichte himself presents the Ought as the key to
        > > his version of Kantian thinking: "Only through this medium of the
        > > moral law do I behold _myself_"... "I _ought_ in my thinking to set
        > > out from the pure self"... (Wissenschaftslehre, second introduction,
        > > I, 466-7); "our idealism is not dogmatic but practical; does not
        > > determine what is, but what ought to be" (I, 156). In his Remark on
        > > the Ought in SL, Hegel says "the philosophy of Kant and Fichte sets
        > > up the ought as the highest point of the resolution of the
        > > contradictions of Reason" (Miller trans. p. 136; STW 5:148). So in
        > > the SL as in the Differenzschrift and _Faith and Knowledge_, Hegel
        > > clearly associates the Ought with Kantian and Fichtean thought.
        > > Rather than saying that Hegel took the term "from Kant's practical
        > > philosophy," I should have said that he took it from Fichte, who
        > > sought by means of it (together with "intellectual intuition") to
        > > deal with the duality of theoretical and practical that he inherited
        > > from Kant. So when it reaches Hegel, the "Ought" is no longer
        > > exclusively a practical concept. But as my first quotation from
        > > Fichte makes clear, and it's obvious in any case, _Fichte_ derives
        > > the Ought from Kant's practical philosophy, specifically, the
        > > Categorical Imperative. If you can come up with texts prior to Kant
        > > in which the "ought" plays an important role, great. But it's
        > > abundantly clear that the predecessor texts that Hegel himself has
        > > in mind, in connection with this term, starting in 1801 in Jena, are
        > > Kant's practical philosophy and Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre.
        >



        Bob,

        I think this is a very good short overview on the use of the 'ought' in
        the German Idealism including Kant. I ought to read again the early Jena
        works 'Differenzschrift' and 'Faith and Knowledge' and also Fichte's
        'Wissenschaftslehre' which I have somewhat neglected in the last years.

        Nevertheless, we should be aware that Hegel's 'ought' in the Logic has
        passed through a shift of meaning. It is now bound to the finite being
        and its limitation and restriction. It is no longer 'ought to be' as
        something beyond the finite being - as something 'ideal' of a moral 'I'
        as practical - but has become a thought moment of the finite being
        itself which with this is posited as 'ideell'. So, Hegel's critique on
        Kant and Fichte is at the same time a shift in meaning of the concept of
        the 'ought' what in the 'Differenzschrift' and in 'Faith and Knowledge'
        - as far as I can remember - has not yet been realized. With this a
        presupposition for actualizing freedom is shown bounding the infinite to
        the finite. This can also be seen as the transition from a subjective
        idealism to an absolute idealism in which the concept itself moves and
        does solve its contradiction - the contradiction has become a moment of
        the concept itself. So, Hegel writes in your quotation: "In his Remark
        on the Ought in SL, Hegel says "the philosophy of Kant and Fichte sets
        up the ought as the highest point of the resolution of the
        contradictions of Reason" (Miller trans. p. 136; STW 5:148)." This means
        also that in Hegel's Logic the 'ought' has lost 'the highest point of
        the resolution', it is no longer an absolute but becomes a moment in the
        concept of 'being-for-self' and its further movement.

        If this is true then we should look indeed at texts prior to Kant and
        Fichte for finding further and more adequate references to the 'ought'.
        One candidate for this would be Nikolaus von Kues who wrote a trialogue
        on the 'Possest' (Können-Ist, Potential-Is). Another reference would be
        the neoplatonism. Perhaps there is aready a book that gives a critical
        historical insight on the use of the 'ought' in Hegel's Logic of Being.
        I am certainly not the right man for doing this.

        Regards,
        Beat



        > ..................
        >



        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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