Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.
 

Re: [hegel] Idealism and Realism?

Expand Messages
  • greuterb
    ... Bruce, Precisely, ........ we seek a universal, stable, independent (i.e. independent of the contingencies of the subject) point of view /basis /ground,
    Message 1 of 28 , Aug 1, 2011
      Am 30.07.2011 19:19, Bruce writes:

      > Dear Beat,
      >
      > This will be brief since I'm off for two weeks (vacation), and further
      > communication will be occasional.
      >
      > But, in regard to "independent," I'm beginning with the standard
      > *problem* of subjectivity, whereby our judgments are limited and
      > distorted by the individual situation /orientation /inclinations of a
      > one single mortal subject. Hence with objectivity, we seek a
      > universal, stable, independent (i.e. independent of the contingencies
      > of the subject) point of view /basis /ground, to rescue us from our
      > partialities.
      >
      > The question then is: What is the basis /source /ground of this
      > independence? (Then I list 3 different and competing bases.)
      >
      > Bruce
      >



      Bruce,

      Precisely, "........ we seek a universal, stable, independent (i.e.
      independent of the contingencies of the subject) point of view /basis
      /ground, to rescue us from our partialities." Hegel could agree with
      this without any restriction. But I think the problem is how this
      universal ..... point of view ..... does arrive. Already Kant wrote:
      "Thought (concepts) without content (finite intuitions) are void,
      intuitions without concepts are blind." (B 74, 75 / A 50, 51). These two
      moments, therefore, are in a mutual relationship: "Therefore it is as
      necessary to make one's concept sensible as one's intuition
      intelligible." (B 74, 75 / A 50, 51). This is also Hegel's project but
      with him the content is not always primarily empirical but a
      being-in-itself (experience which already has some conceptual processing
      being over) which has to be raised (one moment of 'sublate') to a
      being-for-itself. So, the first two 'bases' are certainly not
      "competing" each other as 'bases'. As far as the third 'base' is
      concerned I can only repeat that with Hegel this is the 'historical'
      (taken conceptually) moment which belongs to this conceptual processing
      taken as a process of experience and which certainly (as Ludwik Fleck
      shows) depends on some coherence or solidarity (Rorty) or constructivism
      which has no eternal truth but is subjected to the conceptual
      processing. So, also the third 'base' is not an independent base while
      finding and achieving the universal .... point of view .... .

      Regards,
      Beat


      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.