Re: [hegel] Idealism and Realism?
- Am 30.07.2011 19:19, Bruce writes:
> Dear Beat,Bruce,
> This will be brief since I'm off for two weeks (vacation), and further
> communication will be occasional.
> But, in regard to "independent," I'm beginning with the standard
> *problem* of subjectivity, whereby our judgments are limited and
> distorted by the individual situation /orientation /inclinations of a
> one single mortal subject. Hence with objectivity, we seek a
> universal, stable, independent (i.e. independent of the contingencies
> of the subject) point of view /basis /ground, to rescue us from our
> The question then is: What is the basis /source /ground of this
> independence? (Then I list 3 different and competing bases.)
Precisely, "........ we seek a universal, stable, independent (i.e.
independent of the contingencies of the subject) point of view /basis
/ground, to rescue us from our partialities." Hegel could agree with
this without any restriction. But I think the problem is how this
universal ..... point of view ..... does arrive. Already Kant wrote:
"Thought (concepts) without content (finite intuitions) are void,
intuitions without concepts are blind." (B 74, 75 / A 50, 51). These two
moments, therefore, are in a mutual relationship: "Therefore it is as
necessary to make one's concept sensible as one's intuition
intelligible." (B 74, 75 / A 50, 51). This is also Hegel's project but
with him the content is not always primarily empirical but a
being-in-itself (experience which already has some conceptual processing
being over) which has to be raised (one moment of 'sublate') to a
being-for-itself. So, the first two 'bases' are certainly not
"competing" each other as 'bases'. As far as the third 'base' is
concerned I can only repeat that with Hegel this is the 'historical'
(taken conceptually) moment which belongs to this conceptual processing
taken as a process of experience and which certainly (as Ludwik Fleck
shows) depends on some coherence or solidarity (Rorty) or constructivism
which has no eternal truth but is subjected to the conceptual
processing. So, also the third 'base' is not an independent base while
finding and achieving the universal .... point of view .... .
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