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Re: [hegel] Idealism and Realism?

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  • greuterb
    ... Bruce, Thank you very much for this book reference. It seems to be indeed an important contribution to understand the relevance of Hegel s Absolute (Pure)
    Message 1 of 28 , Jul 28, 2011
      Am 27.07.2011 16:28, Bruce Merrill writes:

      > Hello Beat,
      >
      > It receives major praise, but I'm still agnostic.
      > No significant reference to Hegel.
      >
      > However, while looking around for books on Objectivity, I did find
      > this, which looks very strong, and might be of interest to you as
      > well:
      >
      > Idealism Without Limits: Hegel and the Problem of Objectivity,
      > by Klaus Brinkmann
      > Springer; 1st Edition. edition (November 1, 2010)



      Bruce,

      Thank you very much for this book reference. It seems to be indeed an
      important contribution to understand the relevance of Hegel's Absolute
      (Pure) Knowledge at the end of the Phenomenology and the beginning of
      the Logic without accusing him of making unsustainable metaphysical
      assumptions. If Brinkmann can show that 'Objectivity' is neither a mere
      fact beyond thinking nor an illusion of subjective thinking (which would
      be a consequence of the former) then this would be very helpful to
      undersand scientific thinking and objectivity really. Also, that he
      refers to Kant's transcendental project is useful for understanding
      Hegel's philosophy. However, here he would have to work out also the
      difference to Hegel's project. At the moment I read a book by the
      physician, microbiologist and philosopher of science Ludwik Fleck on the
      "Emergence and Deveolpment of a Scientific Fact, Introduction into the
      Doctrine of the Way of Thinking and Collective of Thought" (1935). In
      this book he writes: "Kant's firm belief in a timeless, entirely
      invariant logical structure of our reason, a belief which since has
      become commons of all aprioristic scientists and also is advocated by
      the recent agent of this school of thought with vast force couldn't be
      confirmed by the results of the modern ethnology and even has proved to
      be downright mistaken." (Chapter 2., part 4., my translation)

      Regards,
      Beat



      > In this study of Hegel's philosophy, Brinkmann undertakes to defend
      > Hegel's claim to objective knowledge by bringing out the
      > transcendental strategy underlying Hegel's argument in the
      > Phenomenology of Spirit and the Logic. Hegel's metaphysical
      > commitments are shown to become moot through this transcendental
      > reading. Starting with a survey of current debates about the
      > possibility of objective knowledge, the book next turns to the
      > original formulation of the transcendental argument in favor of a
      > priori knowledge in Kant's First Critique. Through a close reading of
      > Kant's Transcendental Deduction and Hegel's critique of it, Brinkmann
      > tries to show that Hegel develops an immanent critique of Kant's
      > position that informs his reformulation of the transcendental project
      > in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit and the formulation
      > of the position of 'objective thought' in the Science of Logic and the
      > Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Brinkmann takes the reader
      > through the strategic junctures of the argument of the Phenomenology
      > that establishes the position of objective thinking with which the
      > Logic begins. A critical examination of the Introduction to the
      > Lectures on the History of Philosophy shows that Hegel's metaphysical
      > doctrine of the self-externalization of spirit need not compromise the
      > ontological project of the Logic and thus does not burden the position
      > of objective thought with pre-critical metaphysical claims.
      >
      > "Brinkmann's book is a remarkable achievement. He has given us what
      > may be the definitive version of the transcendental, categorial
      > interpretation of Hegel. He does this in a clear approachable style
      > punctuated with a dry wit, and he fearlessly takes on the arguments
      > and texts that are the most problematic for this interpretation.
      > Throughout the book, he situates Hegel firmly in his own context and
      > that of contemporary discussion." -Terry P. Pinkard, University
      > Professor, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C, USA
      >
      > "Klaus Brinkmann’s important Hegel study reads the Phenomenology and
      > the Logic as aspects of a single sustained effort, in turning from
      > categories to concepts, to carry Kant’s Copernican turn beyond the
      > critical philosophy in what constitutes a major challenge to
      > contemporary Cartesianism." - Tom Rockmore, McAnulty College
      > Distinguished Professor, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh,
      > Pennsylvania, USA
      >
      > "In this compelling reconstruction of the theme of objective thought,
      > Klaus Brinkmann takes the reader through Hegel’s dialectic with
      > exceptional philosophical acumen.... Many aspects of this book are
      > striking: the complete mastery of the central tenets of Kant’s and
      > Hegel’s philosophy, the admirable clarity in treating obscure texts
      > and very difficult problems, and how Brinkmann uses his expertise for
      > a discussion of the problems of truth, objectivity and normativity
      > relevant to the contemporary philosophical debate. This will prove to
      > be a very important book, one that every serious student of Kant and
      > Hegel will have to read." - Alfredo Ferrarin, Professor, Department of
      > Philosophy, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
      >
      >
      > On 7/23/11,greuterb@... <greuterb@...> wrote:
      >> ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
      >> Von:merrillbp@...
      >> Datum: 22.07.2011 13:57
      >> An:<hegel@yahoogroups.com>
      >> Betreff:
      >> Re: [hegel] Idealism and Realism?
      >>
      >> Beat,
      >>
      >> In regard to the topic of objectivity, I believe that you made
      >> reference to
      >> Datson and Galison's _Objectivity_. Do I have that right?
      >> If so, I'd appreciate hearing more about what you make of
      >> their
      >> sequential three-stage history of objectivity, and whether it is
      >> congruent with your understanding of Hegel. As
      >> it stands, I'm only
      >> about 50 pages into it.
      >>
      >> -- thanks,
      >>
      >> Bruce
      >>
      >>
      >>
      >> Bruce,
      >>
      >> Unfortunately I do not know Datson and
      >> Galison's _Objectivity_. Is it an important book and do they explicitly
      >> refer to Hegel's philosophy?
      >>
      >> Regards,
      >> Beat
    • Bruce Merrill
      Beat, I haven t read Fleck, but have heard about him (as discussed by Mario Bunge). I take it that he is very important in the history of collective
      Message 2 of 28 , Jul 29, 2011
        Beat,

        I haven't read Fleck, but have heard about him (as discussed by Mario
        Bunge). I take it that he is very important in the history of
        collective constructionism, the notion that truth /fact /objectivity
        in science are established on a collective basis. This is the position
        that he is advocating contra Kant, correct?

        Bunge identifies Fleck as proto-Kuhn, tho I gather that Kuhn was very
        uncomfortable when put into the constructionist - relativist camp. As
        he was by the Popperians.

        As for objectivity, i.e. the underlying, independent, reliable order
        that rescues us from individualist subjectivism, this can be
        attributed to:

        1) Subsistent nature (to which we enjoy substantial empirical access)

        2) Universal and Necessary categories of thought (Kant)

        3) a collective (Fleck, Kuhn, Rorty et al)

        But I haven't grasped what Hegel's position is on this topic. It's not
        clear to me how the move from Kant's subjective idealism to Hegel's
        objective idealism pertains to objectivity qua an independent order,
        as defined above. There's no doubt that Brinkmann considers Hegel's
        philosophy to be an advance upon Kant, in this regard.

        Do you have Beiser's _German Idealism_? It does not extend to Hegel
        (!), but it's very useful at p553-564 on how Schelling's "objective
        idealism" breaks with Kant & Fichte's "subjective idealism" and points
        forward to Hegel.

        cheers,

        Bruce
      • john
        ... Dear Bruce, The problem with subsistent nature on the whole is that it only contains the universal and particular moments. The individual moment, the
        Message 3 of 28 , Jul 29, 2011
          --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Bruce Merrill <merrillbp@...> wrote:
          >
          > Beat,
          >
          > I haven't read Fleck, but have heard about him (as discussed by Mario
          > Bunge). I take it that he is very important in the history of
          > collective constructionism, the notion that truth /fact /objectivity
          > in science are established on a collective basis. This is the position
          > that he is advocating contra Kant, correct?
          >
          > Bunge identifies Fleck as proto-Kuhn, tho I gather that Kuhn was very
          > uncomfortable when put into the constructionist - relativist camp. As
          > he was by the Popperians.
          >
          > As for objectivity, i.e. the underlying, independent, reliable order
          > that rescues us from individualist subjectivism, this can be
          > attributed to:
          >
          > 1) Subsistent nature (to which we enjoy substantial empirical access)
          >
          > 2) Universal and Necessary categories of thought (Kant)
          >
          > 3) a collective (Fleck, Kuhn, Rorty et al)
          >
          > But I haven't grasped what Hegel's position is on this topic. It's not
          > clear to me how the move from Kant's subjective idealism to Hegel's
          > objective idealism pertains to objectivity qua an independent order,
          > as defined above. There's no doubt that Brinkmann considers Hegel's
          > philosophy to be an advance upon Kant, in this regard.
          >
          > Do you have Beiser's _German Idealism_? It does not extend to Hegel
          > (!), but it's very useful at p553-564 on how Schelling's "objective
          > idealism" breaks with Kant & Fichte's "subjective idealism" and points
          > forward to Hegel.
          >
          > cheers,
          >
          > Bruce


          Dear Bruce,

          The problem with "subsistent nature" on the whole is that it only contains the universal and particular moments. The individual moment, the observation of the scientist, lies outside it.

          But with Life subsistent nature truly embodies the concept. Here all three moments of the concept are embodied.

          Hegel deals with Life as the immediate, naturally arising Idea, in three places: first, in the Observing Reason sub-section of the Phenomenology; second, in the section on Life in the SL; and finally, obviously, in his Philosophy of Nature.

          The three moments of life Hegel takes from Schelling, although I believe this was a widely prevalent view of the matter pre-dating Schelling. These are the universal which is sensibility--just the basic fact that the animal can see the world outside it; The particular moment is irritability, or the "susceptibility to external stimulation and the receiving subject's subsequent outward reaction to the stimulation"; and the individual moment is reproduction, which includes "reproducing" its own form through eating and reproducing the species, or as Hegel says: "the animal subject's negative return to itself from external relationship, and the consequent singularity of its engendering and positing itself."

          This view of life as the Idea in its immediate form comes from Kant's Critique of Judgment. There Kant deals with the idea of internal teleology. This is teleology where the final cause is the same as the formal cause. And this is life. Because everything the animal does has the purpose, quite simply, of maintaining its form, or maintaining the form of the species. So the animal is its own end.

          As for the "collective", that, of course, takes you out of nature and into spirit.

          At any rate, I believe it is only with life that you get objectivity as an independent order.

          Of course I have tried here to just very briefly indicate what is going on in a quite extensive literature: Kant's third Critique, Schelling's Philosophy of Nature, and Hegel's Phenomenology, SL and Philosophy of Nature.

          Perhaps soon we might get into the Observing Reason sub-section of the Phenomenology here, and then all this could be dealt with at greater length.

          John
        • Bruce Merrill
          Dear John, Thanks for your participation, as always. Here I m using objectivity in the standard contemporary sense: a supposed universal fixed framework,
          Message 4 of 28 , Jul 29, 2011
            Dear John,

            Thanks for your participation, as always.

            Here I'm using "objectivity" in the standard contemporary sense: a
            supposed universal fixed framework, which serves to stabilize
            (hopefully) our particular judgments, be they

            a) cognitive judgments re the empirical

            b) moral principles or ideals (which can be applied to motives/
            intentions /actions /results)

            c) aesthetic judgments re works of art

            With regard to the last, the first half of Kant's third Critique is
            certainly relevant, as he is out to distinguish between aesthetic
            judgments which are merely personal and those which we take to be
            universal and objective. But I don't see how such objectivity pertains
            to his notion of life, his philosophy of biology, viz., the second
            half of that critique.

            Nor do I see how this topic pertains to Hegel's notion of life. How do
            we get from "life" to a stable framework for our individual judgments?
            (Are we talking about the same thing?)

            Is the notion that Hegel's theory of objectivity grounds in life a
            mainstream position amongst Hegelian, or exotic?

            I wonder if Brinkmann upholds this position as well? Not that he is
            the last word on the topic, but someone who has put much thought into
            the matter.

            Bruce
          • john
            ... That is confusing, Bruce. You are referring to being objective as opposed to being subjective. I thought you were talking about Idealism. Does what exists
            Message 5 of 28 , Jul 29, 2011
              --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Bruce Merrill <merrillbp@...> wrote:
              >
              > Dear John,
              >
              > Thanks for your participation, as always.
              >
              > Here I'm using "objectivity" in the standard contemporary sense: a
              > supposed universal fixed framework, which serves to stabilize
              > (hopefully) our particular judgments, be they
              >
              > a) cognitive judgments re the empirical
              >
              > b) moral principles or ideals (which can be applied to motives/
              > intentions /actions /results)
              >
              > c) aesthetic judgments re works of art
              >
              > With regard to the last, the first half of Kant's third Critique is
              > certainly relevant, as he is out to distinguish between aesthetic
              > judgments which are merely personal and those which we take to be
              > universal and objective. But I don't see how such objectivity pertains
              > to his notion of life, his philosophy of biology, viz., the second
              > half of that critique.
              >
              > Nor do I see how this topic pertains to Hegel's notion of life. How do
              > we get from "life" to a stable framework for our individual judgments?
              > (Are we talking about the same thing?)
              >
              > Is the notion that Hegel's theory of objectivity grounds in life a
              > mainstream position amongst Hegelian, or exotic?
              >
              > I wonder if Brinkmann upholds this position as well? Not that he is
              > the last word on the topic, but someone who has put much thought into
              > the matter.
              >
              > Bruce



              That is confusing, Bruce. You are referring to being objective as opposed to being subjective.

              I thought you were talking about Idealism. Does what exists out there have an independent reality?

              So I was talking about Hegel's theory of the independent existence of the outer world, the world of objectivity.

              Hegel doesn't really consider mechanical and chemical processes as such to have independent reality. Life has independent reality. Mechanical and chemical processes only have independent reality in their relationship to life, as abstractions from life.

              Life is its own end. So it is the immediate form, the embodied, natural form of the Idea. For Hegel it is the ultimate "acheivement" of nature. It is the place from which nature as a whole can be understood.

              But then there is the transition from nature to spirit. I won't go into that, except to say that then in spirit you get such things as art, moral principles, etc.

              Just to touch on all that, Hegel's philosophy of spirit is, of course, made up of subjective spirit, objective spirit, and absolute spirit.

              Subjective spirit would correspond to Kant's first Critique; objective spirit, having to do with moral and social philosophy, would correspond to the second critique; and absolute spirit which deals, first of all, with art, would correspond to some extent with the third critique.

              John
            • Bruce Merrill
              John, Sorry for the confusion, which is the common problems of emails straying from their ostensible subject. Yes, we were talking about ideal and realism but
              Message 6 of 28 , Jul 29, 2011
                John,

                Sorry for the confusion, which is the common problems of emails
                straying from their ostensible subject. Yes, we were talking about
                ideal and realism but then, on a tangent I asked Beat about a book on
                the topic of objectivity, then mentioned another book (Brinkmann's)
                about objectivity re Kant and Hegel, then replied to him re Fleck &
                objectivity, and then you arrived.

                It's all easy to jumble up since in the standard contemporary usage,
                objectivity is opposed to subjectivity (subjectivity is the problem,
                objectivity is the solution), whereas Kant grounds objectivity
                (paradoxically?) in subjectivity (viz., the unity of apperception and
                the categories).

                But I am interested in the notion that Life claims independent reality
                whereas mechanical & chemical processes are dependent... upon life?
                But chemical and mechanical processes take place completely apart from
                life. So it seems to me that life is emergent, in relation to
                pre-existing chemistry. So, life depends upon chemistry, and not the
                other way around. Alas, I don't have a copy of H's phil of nature...

                Thanks for your alignment of subjective /objective /absolute spirit
                with the 3 critiques!

                Bruce
              • john
                ... Well certainly, Bruce, animal life does seem to have an independent reality. Animals are always eating and screwing and making all sorts of noises. There s
                Message 7 of 28 , Jul 29, 2011
                  --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Bruce Merrill <merrillbp@...> wrote:

                  > But I am interested in the notion that Life claims independent reality
                  > whereas mechanical & chemical processes are dependent... upon life?
                  > But chemical and mechanical processes take place completely apart from
                  > life. So it seems to me that life is emergent, in relation to
                  > pre-existing chemistry. So, life depends upon chemistry, and not the
                  > other way around. Alas, I don't have a copy of H's phil of nature...
                  >
                  > Thanks for your alignment of subjective /objective /absolute spirit
                  > with the 3 critiques!
                  >
                  > Bruce
                  >


                  Well certainly, Bruce, animal life does seem to have an independent reality. Animals are always eating and screwing and making all sorts of noises. There's no end to the things they do.

                  Of course mechanical and chemical processes also have an indepedent existence. And they are, of course, related somehow or another, to life. But they just aren't really understandable in themselves. As I mentioned, they don't embody the concept. A scientist can understand them. But they certainly don't understand themselves. They are pretty meaningless except in so far as they make life possible.

                  The final volume of the SL, the doctrine of the concept, is in three parts: subjectivity, objectivity, and the Idea. Objectivity is in three parts: mechanism, chemism, teleology.

                  The teleology section mainly is about external teleology. So then God created the cork tree so that we could have corks for our wine bottles--very thoughtful of Him. As ridiculous as all this is, still, the idea of purposiveness is important. And in fact it leads to life with its internal teleology. The purpose of all an animal's activities is to maintain its form.

                  So then the final section on the Idea is in three sections: Life, the immediate form of the Idea; the idea of cognition: the true and the good (corresponding to subjective and objective spirit); and the absolute idea. Whatever else one may say about the absolute idea, at very least it has to do with the fact that here "the science of logic has apprehended its own concept."

                  John
                • Bruce Merrill
                  John, who wrote: So then the final section on the Idea is in three sections: Life, the immediate form of the Idea; the idea of cognition: the true and the
                  Message 8 of 28 , Jul 30, 2011
                    John,

                    who wrote:
                    "So then the final section on the Idea is in three sections: Life, the
                    immediate form of the Idea; the idea of cognition: the true and the
                    good (corresponding to subjective and objective spirit); and the
                    absolute idea."

                    Does this mean that the absolute idea arrives within two different (or
                    at least distinguishable) triads:

                    life > cognition > absolute

                    as well as

                    [within cognition] true > good > absolute (which is also the global
                    triad of Spirit)
                    ?

                    I get why Hegel aligns the good with the objective, (e.g. the first
                    sentence in #235 of the En Logic) but where/why does he align the true
                    with the subjective? Can you please direct me to a relevant passage.

                    (I'm puzzled because this is contrary to our common sense usage
                    wherein errors are merely subjective and the truth, by contrast, is
                    objective.)

                    thanks again,

                    Bruce
                  • john
                    ... Dear Bruce, The true has to do with theory. The good with practice. So you can see that the question of the true relates to Kant s first critique. And the
                    Message 9 of 28 , Jul 30, 2011
                      --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Bruce Merrill <merrillbp@...> wrote:
                      >
                      > John,
                      >
                      > who wrote:
                      > "So then the final section on the Idea is in three sections: Life, the
                      > immediate form of the Idea; the idea of cognition: the true and the
                      > good (corresponding to subjective and objective spirit); and the
                      > absolute idea."
                      >
                      > Does this mean that the absolute idea arrives within two different (or
                      > at least distinguishable) triads:
                      >
                      > life > cognition > absolute
                      >
                      > as well as
                      >
                      > [within cognition] true > good > absolute (which is also the global
                      > triad of Spirit)
                      > ?
                      >
                      > I get why Hegel aligns the good with the objective, (e.g. the first
                      > sentence in #235 of the En Logic) but where/why does he align the true
                      > with the subjective? Can you please direct me to a relevant passage.
                      >
                      > (I'm puzzled because this is contrary to our common sense usage
                      > wherein errors are merely subjective and the truth, by contrast, is
                      > objective.)
                      >
                      > thanks again,
                      >
                      > Bruce
                      >


                      Dear Bruce,

                      The true has to do with theory. The good with practice.

                      So you can see that the question of the true relates to Kant's first critique. And the question of the good has to do with the second critique.

                      And the first critique has to do with the subject trying to figure out what is true.

                      As Kant makes clear this subject of his in the first critique really isn't able to get at the truth. The thing-in-itself forever alludes him. It is only in practice that any valid objectivity can be arrived at. And even this is somewhat questionable. Perhaps in the third critique, and this is the view of those who followed him, some access to true objectivity finally becomes possible.

                      John
                    • Bruce Merrill
                      Dear John, With all due respect, but I don t see how this answer bears upon what I wrote. I wasn t discussing Kant, or his relation to Hegel. Rather my query
                      Message 10 of 28 , Jul 30, 2011
                        Dear John,

                        With all due respect,
                        but I don't see how this answer bears upon what I wrote. I wasn't
                        discussing Kant, or his relation to Hegel. Rather my query pertains to
                        two embedded triads (are they embedded?) and why /how Hegel aligns
                        truth with the subjective. What I said was, to repeat:

                        John,
                        >
                        > who wrote:
                        > "So then the final section on the Idea is in three sections: Life, the
                        > immediate form of the Idea; the idea of cognition: the true and the
                        > good (corresponding to subjective and objective spirit); and the
                        > absolute idea."
                        >
                        > Does this mean that the absolute idea arrives within two different (or
                        > at least distinguishable) triads:
                        >
                        > life > cognition > absolute
                        >
                        > as well as
                        >
                        > [within cognition] true > good > absolute (which is also the global
                        > triad of Spirit)
                        > ?
                        >
                        > I get why Hegel aligns the good with the objective, (e.g. the first
                        > sentence in #235 of the En Logic) but where/why does he align the true
                        > with the subjective? Can you please direct me to a relevant passage.
                        >
                        > (I'm puzzled because this is contrary to our common sense usage
                        > wherein errors are merely subjective and the truth, by contrast, is
                        > objective.)
                        >
                        > thanks again,
                        >
                        > Bruce



                        On 7/30/11, john <jgbardis@...> wrote:
                        >
                        >
                        > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Bruce Merrill <merrillbp@...> wrote:
                        >>
                        >> John,
                        >>
                        >> who wrote:
                        >> "So then the final section on the Idea is in three sections: Life, the
                        >> immediate form of the Idea; the idea of cognition: the true and the
                        >> good (corresponding to subjective and objective spirit); and the
                        >> absolute idea."
                        >>
                        >> Does this mean that the absolute idea arrives within two different (or
                        >> at least distinguishable) triads:
                        >>
                        >> life > cognition > absolute
                        >>
                        >> as well as
                        >>
                        >> [within cognition] true > good > absolute (which is also the global
                        >> triad of Spirit)
                        >> ?
                        >>
                        >> I get why Hegel aligns the good with the objective, (e.g. the first
                        >> sentence in #235 of the En Logic) but where/why does he align the true
                        >> with the subjective? Can you please direct me to a relevant passage.
                        >>
                        >> (I'm puzzled because this is contrary to our common sense usage
                        >> wherein errors are merely subjective and the truth, by contrast, is
                        >> objective.)
                        >>
                        >> thanks again,
                        >>
                        >> Bruce
                        >>
                        >
                        >
                        > Dear Bruce,
                        >
                        > The true has to do with theory. The good with practice.
                        >
                        > So you can see that the question of the true relates to Kant's first
                        > critique. And the question of the good has to do with the second critique.
                        >
                        > And the first critique has to do with the subject trying to figure out what
                        > is true.
                        >
                        > As Kant makes clear this subject of his in the first critique really isn't
                        > able to get at the truth. The thing-in-itself forever alludes him. It is
                        > only in practice that any valid objectivity can be arrived at. And even this
                        > is somewhat questionable. Perhaps in the third critique, and this is the
                        > view of those who followed him, some access to true objectivity finally
                        > becomes possible.
                        >
                        > John
                        >
                        >
                      • john
                        Dear Bruce, I was replying to your last remark about how the truth might be related to subjectivity. An example that I hoped might make that clear was Kant s
                        Message 11 of 28 , Jul 30, 2011
                          Dear Bruce,

                          I was replying to your last remark about how the truth might be related to subjectivity. An example that I hoped might make that clear was Kant's first critique, which is all about subjectivity and the problem of truth. So this is an example of how truth is aligned with subjectivity.

                          As to the three forms of the Idea: life, cognition (the true and the good), and the absolute idea:

                          The immediate form of the Idea is life. This is the culmination of Hegel's philosophy of nature. Here the Idea takes a form that can be seen and tasted and kicked. This is always an important moment for Hegel. Everything for Hegel is rooted in what can be seen and tasted and kicked.

                          So what you have here is a quadraplicity.

                          John

                          --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Bruce Merrill <merrillbp@...> wrote:
                          >
                          > Dear John,
                          >
                          > With all due respect,
                          > but I don't see how this answer bears upon what I wrote. I wasn't
                          > discussing Kant, or his relation to Hegel. Rather my query pertains to
                          > two embedded triads (are they embedded?) and why /how Hegel aligns
                          > truth with the subjective. What I said was, to repeat:
                          >
                          > John,
                          > >
                          > > who wrote:
                          > > "So then the final section on the Idea is in three sections: Life, the
                          > > immediate form of the Idea; the idea of cognition: the true and the
                          > > good (corresponding to subjective and objective spirit); and the
                          > > absolute idea."
                          > >
                          > > Does this mean that the absolute idea arrives within two different (or
                          > > at least distinguishable) triads:
                          > >
                          > > life > cognition > absolute
                          > >
                          > > as well as
                          > >
                          > > [within cognition] true > good > absolute (which is also the global
                          > > triad of Spirit)
                          > > ?
                          > >
                          > > I get why Hegel aligns the good with the objective, (e.g. the first
                          > > sentence in #235 of the En Logic) but where/why does he align the true
                          > > with the subjective? Can you please direct me to a relevant passage.
                          > >
                          > > (I'm puzzled because this is contrary to our common sense usage
                          > > wherein errors are merely subjective and the truth, by contrast, is
                          > > objective.)
                          > >
                          > > thanks again,
                          > >
                          > > Bruce
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          > On 7/30/11, john <jgbardis@...> wrote:
                          > >
                          > >
                          > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Bruce Merrill <merrillbp@> wrote:
                          > >>
                          > >> John,
                          > >>
                          > >> who wrote:
                          > >> "So then the final section on the Idea is in three sections: Life, the
                          > >> immediate form of the Idea; the idea of cognition: the true and the
                          > >> good (corresponding to subjective and objective spirit); and the
                          > >> absolute idea."
                          > >>
                          > >> Does this mean that the absolute idea arrives within two different (or
                          > >> at least distinguishable) triads:
                          > >>
                          > >> life > cognition > absolute
                          > >>
                          > >> as well as
                          > >>
                          > >> [within cognition] true > good > absolute (which is also the global
                          > >> triad of Spirit)
                          > >> ?
                          > >>
                          > >> I get why Hegel aligns the good with the objective, (e.g. the first
                          > >> sentence in #235 of the En Logic) but where/why does he align the true
                          > >> with the subjective? Can you please direct me to a relevant passage.
                          > >>
                          > >> (I'm puzzled because this is contrary to our common sense usage
                          > >> wherein errors are merely subjective and the truth, by contrast, is
                          > >> objective.)
                          > >>
                          > >> thanks again,
                          > >>
                          > >> Bruce
                          > >>
                          > >
                          > >
                          > > Dear Bruce,
                          > >
                          > > The true has to do with theory. The good with practice.
                          > >
                          > > So you can see that the question of the true relates to Kant's first
                          > > critique. And the question of the good has to do with the second critique.
                          > >
                          > > And the first critique has to do with the subject trying to figure out what
                          > > is true.
                          > >
                          > > As Kant makes clear this subject of his in the first critique really isn't
                          > > able to get at the truth. The thing-in-itself forever alludes him. It is
                          > > only in practice that any valid objectivity can be arrived at. And even this
                          > > is somewhat questionable. Perhaps in the third critique, and this is the
                          > > view of those who followed him, some access to true objectivity finally
                          > > becomes possible.
                          > >
                          > > John
                          > >
                          > >
                          >
                        • greuterb
                          ... Bruce, Yes, I think Fleck advocates a kind of coherence theory of truth. Such a theory runs always into danger of relativism and pragmatism. But I think
                          Message 12 of 28 , Jul 30, 2011
                            Am 29.07.2011 15:20, Bruce Merrill writes:

                            > Beat,
                            >
                            > I haven't read Fleck, but have heard about him (as discussed by Mario
                            > Bunge). I take it that he is very important in the history of
                            > collective constructionism, the notion that truth /fact /objectivity
                            > in science are established on a collective basis. This is the position
                            > that he is advocating contra Kant, correct?
                            >



                            Bruce,

                            Yes, I think Fleck advocates a kind of coherence theory of truth. Such a
                            theory runs always into danger of relativism and pragmatism. But I think
                            that Rorty in his philosophical essays on "Solidarity or Objectivity?"
                            has shown that this danger is not inevitable. BTW, in these essays Rorty
                            takes Kant for an advocate of 'objectivity' (correspondence) and Hegel
                            for 'solidarity' (coherence) and he claims that for balancing after a
                            Kant necessarily a Hegel had to appear. But I think that Hegel did more
                            than a mere balancing since in his philosophy he unites both, the
                            coherence and the correspondence theory of truth. This is evident from
                            the Phenomenology which shows a movement connecting absolute and
                            relative truth.



                            > Bunge identifies Fleck as proto-Kuhn, tho I gather that Kuhn was very
                            > uncomfortable when put into the constructionist - relativist camp. As
                            > he was by the Popperians.
                            >



                            As far as I know Kuhn himself refers to Fleck's book and writes that he
                            owes much to him. I do not like much Kuhn's popularization of Flecks
                            findings. It has an inclination to a bad ideology. Fleck has shown his
                            epistemological findings based on the historical development of the
                            syphilis-concept and the subjective ability of vivid concept formations
                            and reformations.



                            > As for objectivity, i.e. the underlying, independent, reliable order
                            > that rescues us from individualist subjectivism, this can be
                            > attributed to:
                            >
                            > 1) Subsistent nature (to which we enjoy substantial empirical access)
                            >
                            > 2) Universal and Necessary categories of thought (Kant)
                            >
                            > 3) a collective (Fleck, Kuhn, Rorty et al)
                            >
                            > But I haven't grasped what Hegel's position is on this topic. It's not
                            > clear to me how the move from Kant's subjective idealism to Hegel's
                            > objective idealism pertains to objectivity qua an independent order,
                            > as defined above.
                            >



                            I think your shown order is quite appropriate. But what does
                            'independent' mean here and why do you claim an INDEPENDENT order for
                            objectivity? The first point - as far as I understand you - shows the
                            source of cognition, the second one the assessment of the source. This
                            is Kantian but as well Hegelian. The difference is only that Hegel's
                            view on the relationship of these two moments is not fixed on the
                            dichotomy between an empirical source and given categories for
                            assessement but the two are in a dialectical relationship whose movement
                            generates objective truth. The third point then is the historical moment
                            in Hegel's philosophy which is not only to be taken as temporal but as
                            inherent to the mentioned dialectical process of source and assessment.
                            So, what does this 'independent' mean?



                            > There's no doubt that Brinkmann considers Hegel's
                            > philosophy to be an advance upon Kant, in this regard.
                            >
                            > Do you have Beiser's _German Idealism_? It does not extend to Hegel
                            > (!), but it's very useful at p553-564 on how Schelling's "objective
                            > idealism" breaks with Kant & Fichte's "subjective idealism" and points
                            > forward to Hegel.
                            >
                            > cheers,
                            >
                            > Bruce
                            >



                            No, I only know Beiser's book on Hegel's philosophy. In my opinion this
                            is a good book. However, I do not like his characterization of Hegel's
                            thought as monistic. Hegel knows both, the unity and the difference, and
                            both are unseparable from each other

                            Regards,
                            Beat


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                          • Bruce Merrill
                            Dear Beat, This will be brief since I m off for two weeks (vacation), and further communication will be occasional. But, in regard to independent, I m
                            Message 13 of 28 , Jul 30, 2011
                              Dear Beat,

                              This will be brief since I'm off for two weeks (vacation), and further
                              communication will be occasional.

                              But, in regard to "independent," I'm beginning with the standard
                              *problem* of subjectivity, whereby our judgments are limited and
                              distorted by the individual situation /orientation /inclinations of a
                              one single mortal subject. Hence with objectivity, we seek a
                              universal, stable, independent (i.e. independent of the contingencies
                              of the subject) point of view /basis /ground, to rescue us from our
                              partialities.

                              The question then is: What is the basis /source /ground of this
                              independence? (Then I list 3 different and competing bases.)

                              Bruce
                            • greuterb
                              ... Bruce, Precisely, ........ we seek a universal, stable, independent (i.e. independent of the contingencies of the subject) point of view /basis /ground,
                              Message 14 of 28 , Aug 1, 2011
                                Am 30.07.2011 19:19, Bruce writes:

                                > Dear Beat,
                                >
                                > This will be brief since I'm off for two weeks (vacation), and further
                                > communication will be occasional.
                                >
                                > But, in regard to "independent," I'm beginning with the standard
                                > *problem* of subjectivity, whereby our judgments are limited and
                                > distorted by the individual situation /orientation /inclinations of a
                                > one single mortal subject. Hence with objectivity, we seek a
                                > universal, stable, independent (i.e. independent of the contingencies
                                > of the subject) point of view /basis /ground, to rescue us from our
                                > partialities.
                                >
                                > The question then is: What is the basis /source /ground of this
                                > independence? (Then I list 3 different and competing bases.)
                                >
                                > Bruce
                                >



                                Bruce,

                                Precisely, "........ we seek a universal, stable, independent (i.e.
                                independent of the contingencies of the subject) point of view /basis
                                /ground, to rescue us from our partialities." Hegel could agree with
                                this without any restriction. But I think the problem is how this
                                universal ..... point of view ..... does arrive. Already Kant wrote:
                                "Thought (concepts) without content (finite intuitions) are void,
                                intuitions without concepts are blind." (B 74, 75 / A 50, 51). These two
                                moments, therefore, are in a mutual relationship: "Therefore it is as
                                necessary to make one's concept sensible as one's intuition
                                intelligible." (B 74, 75 / A 50, 51). This is also Hegel's project but
                                with him the content is not always primarily empirical but a
                                being-in-itself (experience which already has some conceptual processing
                                being over) which has to be raised (one moment of 'sublate') to a
                                being-for-itself. So, the first two 'bases' are certainly not
                                "competing" each other as 'bases'. As far as the third 'base' is
                                concerned I can only repeat that with Hegel this is the 'historical'
                                (taken conceptually) moment which belongs to this conceptual processing
                                taken as a process of experience and which certainly (as Ludwik Fleck
                                shows) depends on some coherence or solidarity (Rorty) or constructivism
                                which has no eternal truth but is subjected to the conceptual
                                processing. So, also the third 'base' is not an independent base while
                                finding and achieving the universal .... point of view .... .

                                Regards,
                                Beat


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