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Re: [hegel] Re: Plato's cave: Heidegger and Hegel

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  • greuterb
    ... Bob, Because it expresses precisely the finite being in its limitation and restriction. This limitation and restriction requires necessarily a going beyond
    Message 1 of 74 , Jul 25, 2011
      Am 20.07.2011 16:50, Robert Wallace writes:

      > (Sorry, I accidentally sent an incomplete "reply." The following is
      > complete.)
      >
      > Hi Beat,
      >
      > I apologize again for not answering your earlier email. My comments
      > are below.
      >
      >>>> He rejects it as a subjective absolute opposite to a non-
      >>>> conceptional reality.
      >>>>
      >>> I agree.
      >>>
      >>>> If so, why has he
      >>>>> introduced it into his discussion at all?
      >>>> Since he wants to show the role of the 'Ought' in the philosophy
      >> of
      >>>> his time. This role he criticizes since it does not develop far
      >>>> enough the conceptual relation between 'reality, 'limit' and
      >> 'ought'.
      >>> But why is it appropriate for him to address "the philosophy of his
      >>> time" _at this particular point_ in the SL? Why does this apparently
      >>> "practical" issue of the "Ought" intrude into what seemed previously
      >>> like a pretty much "theoretical" train of thought?
      >> As examples of the Concept in its total other and as a warning not
      >> to think and judge without considering all the logical implications.
      >>
      >> Why doesn't Hegel
      >>> just proceed directly from the finite to the (spurious) infinite,
      >>> without mentioning this "Ought"?
      >> Because it belongs to the real and its limitation. Without the
      >> 'Ought' 'limitation' cannot be really understood and vice vers
      > Beat, let me try to make my question clearer (as I've also been doing
      > in my correspondence with Alan). My question is, why does Hegel choose
      > to call this new category "the Ought"? Why does he give it this
      > particular name?



      Bob,

      Because it expresses precisely the finite being in its limitation and
      restriction. This limitation and restriction requires necessarily a
      going beyond it and therefore a sublation of the mere 'Dasein'. For this
      the term 'Ought' is accurate but has nothing to do with normativity
      (ideal) but only with positing 'Dasein' as 'IDEELL' or (what is the
      same) as a moment. But within this first relation of the limitation and
      'Ought' in the Logic of Being the 'Ought' itself remains within the
      realm of the finite. And for remaining on this standpoint Hegel accuses
      Kant wherever this relation appears in his philosophy. The reason for
      this is that the two (finite being and the 'Ought') are still in an
      opposing relationship and not yet truly sublated or posited as 'IDEELL'
      in a new unity - the being-for-itself (which as well cannot really solve
      the problem of the relation of infinity and finitude since the
      un-difference of the two moments in this unity falls into 'One' and with
      this becomes merely formal leading to the quantitative categories).



      > You say earlier in your reply that what Hegel is
      > discussing corresponds to Kant's theoretical philosophy (in the
      > Critique of Pure Reason) rather than to his practical philosophy. This
      > suggestion makes my question all the more pressing. Why does Hegel use
      > a term from Kant's practical philosophy to designate something that
      > (according to you) is essentially theoretical?



      From where do you know this? He does not take the term from Kant's
      practical philosophy. He shows the consequences of finite being within
      its limit and restriction and the categorical development associated
      with it. From there he can criticize Kant's standpoint and can go above
      this standpoint. Perhaps it would be a good idea to do some philological
      work about the 'Ought' going through the history of philosophy.



      > You write:
      >> 'Ought' is 'merely' a logical category in case the Qualitiy of Being
      >> as such is thought. Hegel introduces it for discussing the
      >> limitation of what is and its exceeding. 'Ought' is alway bound to
      >> the limitation of the something exceeding itself. Even the stone for
      >> which no limitation yet is includes the 'Ought'. And a stone you
      >> will admit has not yet moral attitude:
      >>
      >> "But even the stone, as a something, contains the distinction of its
      >> determination or in-itself and its determinate being, and to that
      >> extent it, too, transcends its limitation; the Notion which is
      >> implicit in it contains the identity of the stone with its
      >> other." (para 265, Remarks for 'Limitation and the Ought')
      >>
      >> So, this 'Ought' belongs to the theoretical philosophy as Kant's
      >> First Critique (B 106, A 80).
      > Kant's Table of Categories, on the page to which you refer, precisely
      > does not contain any "Ought." It contains only "Reality, Negation,
      > Limitation."



      Yes, of course not. I said this before. Kant's remains in his
      Transcendental Logic within the functions of the judgements of the
      understanding. For Hegel the Something has only a Limitation as 'Ought'.
      So, Hegel shows the logical implication of the limitation of the finite
      being.

      "Hence as the ought, something is raised above its limitation, but
      conversely, it is only as the ought that it has its limitation. The two
      are inseparable. Something has a limitation in so far as it has negation
      in its determination, and the determination is also the accomplished
      sublation of the limitation." (SL, 'The Restriction and the Ought', para
      261))

      With this Hegel goes above Kant remaining within the realm of the
      logical. There is no place and no need for a practical philosophy here
      though of course Hegel's Concept in the Logic includes both dimensions,
      otherwise it would be one-sided and abstract.



      > Hegel is expanding this list to include something that
      > Kant discusses only in his practical philosophy (Critique of Practical
      > Reason, etc.). Thus Hegel is deliberately combining what, for Kant,
      > were two distinct and separate domains. Why does he do this?



      Do you really mean that Hegel's Logic (or part of it) is a combination
      of Kant's practical and theoretical philosophy? For me this is a very
      mechanistic argumentation and certainly with such a procedure Hegel
      would never have been able to overcome Kant's separation of the two
      sides of philosophy and dualism. For this he had to elaborate a critical
      development of the categories of thought which - on a mere logical level
      - shows the interrelation of being and thought, of ontology and
      epistemology. One of these thoughts is the finite thing with its
      limitation as 'Ought'.



      > I've
      > been suggesting from the beginning of this discussion that Hegel's
      > thought-development combines apparently "practical" and apparently
      > "theoretical" issues, just as Plato combines them in his _Republic_,
      > precisely in order to avoid the dualism that Hegel deplores in Kant's
      > philosophy as a whole! Hegel does this from the beginning of his
      > discussion because he knows that this is the only way he can
      > effectively overcome something that's as deeply entrenched as the
      > Kantian dualisms are.



      Plato's 'Republic' is not a critical logic of thought but a mere
      combination of metaphysical, political, psychological and moral
      thoughts. This exactly Hegel wants to overcome in his Logic and for
      that Kant is his (still inadequate) example. With your argumentation you
      make Hegel again a pre-Kantian metaphysician.



      > If I'm right that Hegel is combining the "practical" and the
      > "theoretical" in this way, then it's no surprise that he discusses not
      > only human beings, in connection with the Ought, but the "stone." What
      > he's doing is showing how the realm of the "normative" extends far
      > below humans. There are ways in which animals and plants "ought" to
      > develop. They "ought" to fulfil the essence of their species. Even on
      > the mineral level, such an "ought" exists.



      With this you fall into a formalism of possibility (as Kant) since you
      take the limitation as 'Ought' one-sided. Hegel writes in the Remark of
      'Limitation and the Ought' (para 263):

      "'You can, because you ought' — this expression, which is supposed to
      mean a great deal, is implied in the notion of ought. For the ought
      implies that one is superior to the limitation; in it the limit is
      sublated and the in-itself of the ought is thus an identical
      self-relation, and hence the abstraction of 'can'. But conversely, it is
      equally correct that: 'you cannot, just because you ought.' For in the
      ought, the limitation as limitation is equally implied; the said
      formalism of possibility has, in the limitation, a reality, a
      qualitative otherness opposed to it and the relation of each to the
      other is a contradiction, and thus a 'cannot', or rather an impossibility."

      The several levels of natural being (the anorganic, the plant, the
      animal and the human being) have different relationships to their
      limitation as 'Ought', that is, different quality of mediation with
      their other. Their concept of mediation is the essence of their being.
      However, this concept will only be thematized later in the Logic of the
      Concpet '(Life' which as also the 'Ought' may not be confound with their
      actualization in nature or in spirit (morality, normativity etc)). Here,
      only the logical dialectic of the limitation of finite being and the
      implied 'Ought' is at stake. That Hegel's movement of the Concept is a
      conceptual theory of evolution does not contradict this but in fact
      sustains it if you do not take this movement as teleological.



      > Hegel's Philosophy of
      > Nature is a development (among other things) of this normative
      > dimension of nature as a whole. In this, he follows not only Plato but
      > (perhaps better known) Aristotle's De Anima and his biological works.
      > Aristotle is known, of course, for his "teleological" view of nature
      > as a whole. Hegel endorses this view, as opposed to a mechanistic one.
      > Teleological views identify normativity, or an "ought," in nature in
      > general. That "ought" is the telos or purpose. This is what Aristotle
      > and Hegel are concerned with. Kant as you probably know sought to
      > understand nature as normative (teleological) in his Critique of
      > Judgment; but because he had conceived nature in the Critique of Pure
      > Reason essentially mechanistically (it's not an accident that there is
      > no "Ought" in the first Critique, which is dominated by Newtonian
      > mechanism), the teleology in the Critique of Judgment has an "as if"
      > character. Hegel eliminates the "as if" part. This passage that we're
      > looking at in the Science of Logic is the first hint (in the Logic and
      > the system) of this elimination; it is spelled out in detail in the
      > Doctrine of the Concept.



      It is not the question of details but the question of the level of
      argumentation. In the Logic of Being 'purpose', 'teleology',
      'normativity' etc. are not yet thematized and therfore cannot be taken
      for explaining what happens in the dialectic of finite being, limitation
      and 'Ought' in the Logic of Being. It has to be explained out of the
      mentioned dialectic of the finite with the result of their sublation as
      moments in a 'Third' (being-for-itself). With this one remains within a
      critical theory of the categories of conceived being.



      > You point out that
      >> Hegel writes in the SL, para 304. 'Affirmative Infinity':
      >>
      >> The negation is thus determined as ideality; ideal being [das
      >> Ideelle] is the finite as it is in the true infinite � as a
      >> determination, a content, which is distinct but is not an
      >> independent, self-subsistent being, but only a moment.
      >>
      >> ['Das Ideale' has a more precise meaning (of the beautiful and its
      >> associations) than 'das Ideelle'; the former is not yet appropriate
      >> here and for this reason we have used the expression 'ideell'. We do
      >> not make this distinction though when speaking of reality; the
      >> expressions 'reell' and 'real' are used practically synonymously and
      >> no interest is served by giving the words different shades of
      >> meaning. - Author's note.]
      >>
      >> It is important to make a distinction between 'das Ideale' and 'das
      >> Ideelle' " 'Das Ideale' is not yet appropriate here .... ."
      > Yes, Hegel doesn't want to use the term "ideal" here yet, because it's
      > associated with the beautiful, which will come on the scene in his
      > development only in the context of Absolute Spirit and art. So why
      > does he use the term "Ought," here, which one would think should come
      > on the scene only in connection with Objective Spirit and ethics? My
      > suggestion, again, is that "Ought" serves, here, to designate the
      > normative aspect of reality, its goal of being fully "itself" ("in
      > itself," as opposed to "for another"), which Hegel thinks is
      > preeminently expressed (in his own historical environment) by Kant's
      > and Fichte's dualism of the "ought" versus the "is." I took the
      > liberty of using the word "ideal," for this purpose, in much the same
      > way that Hegel takes the liberty of using the word, "Ought." Neither
      > word as it's ordinarily understood belongs in a discussion of "Dasein"
      > or determinate being as such.



      There is nothing to be ordinarily understood here. The 'Ought' belongs
      necessarily (logically) to the discussion of 'Dasein'. It is its
      inherent 'essence' and its inherent power to go beyond itself and to
      posit itself 'ideell' or as moment in a 'third'. Hegel's concept of the
      'ideell' is quite the opposite of you concept of the 'ideal'. It does
      not express what is beyond the 'Dasein' but the 'Dasein' itself is
      posited or sublated as 'ideell' and with this it is no longer an
      abstract real but becomes a concrete real with the negation within itself.



      > They are at home (as they're ordinarily
      > understood) only in the much more complex environment of _human_
      > functioning. And yet Plato, Aristotle and Hegel all locate the roots
      > of what these words refer to at a much more elementary level, in
      > reality as such. That's how they propose to avoid the sort of dualism
      > that Kant falls into--but without neglecting the reality of
      > normativity, as materialism and Kant's first Critique neglect it.
      >
      > Best, Bob



      But Hegel's dialectic is precisely the outcome of dualism being thought
      consequently.

      Regards,
      Beat



      > On Jul 13, 2011, at 8:39 AM, Beat wrote:
      >
      >> --- Inhegel@yahoogroups.com, Robert Wallace<bob@...> wrote:
      >>> Hi Beat,
      >>>
      >>> On Jul 12, 2011, at 11:31 AM, Beat wrote:
      >>>
      >>>>>>> This corresponds to SL Miller translation p. 133. I didn't
      >> say
      >>>> that
      >>>>>>> the something's or the finite's "ideal" is anything
      >> "external"
      >>>> to
      >>>>>> it.
      >>>>>>> It had better not be merely external if it's going to emerge
      >>>> from a
      >>>>>>> Hegelian movement of thought. What makes the Ought "ideal"
      >> is
      >>>> that
      >>>>>> it
      >>>>>>> goes beyond finite determinations.
      >>>>>> Bob,
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>> 'Ought' does not go beyond finite determiantion but is a
      >> moment of
      >>>>>> it which has to be developed. Only in the Logic of the Concept
      >>>> this
      >>>>>> development will be possible in-and-for-itself. Here in the
      >>>> Logic of
      >>>>>> Being the two moments (determination and ought) cannot be hold
      >>>>>> together and 'determination' falls into the abstract 'One'
      >> losing
      >>>>>> thereby any quality which then only has to be recovered on a
      >>>> higher
      >>>>>> level (the measure).
      >>>>>>
      >>>>> I acknowledged this a day or so back. More precisely: "What
      >> makes
      >>>> the
      >>>>> ought 'ideal' in comparison to the finite is that it seeks to go
      >>>>> beyond finite determinations."
      >>>> But with this the '0ught' itself turns finite as an opposite to
      >> the
      >>>> real. Only as a moment in a higher or more objective reality it
      >>>> becomes 'ideal' and thereby loses its furious (finite)
      >> absoluteness.
      >>>> For Hegel (as for Kant) the finiteness of the 'ought' is important
      >>>> for human activity, however, has to be sublated as a moment in a
      >>>> more comprehensive rationality (see also the Phil of Right).
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>> Yes, I don't disagree with any of this. All I claim is that the
      >> Ought
      >>> that Hegel reconceives in this way, is the same Ought that Kant and
      >>> Plato present in the Categorical Imperative and the Cave allegory.
      >> Bob,
      >>
      >> 'Ought' is 'merely' a logical category in case the Qualitiy of Being
      >> as such is thought. Hegel introduces it for discussing the
      >> limitation of what is and its exceeding. 'Ought' is alway bound to
      >> the limitation of the something exceeding itself. Even the stone for
      >> which no limitation yet is includes the 'Ought'. And a stone you
      >> will admit has not yet moral attitude:
      >>
      >> "But even the stone, as a something, contains the distinction of its
      >> determination or in-itself and its determinate being, and to that
      >> extent it, too, transcends its limitation; the Notion which is
      >> implicit in it contains the identity of the stone with its
      >> other." (para 265, Remarks for 'Limitation and the Ought')
      >>
      >> So, this 'Ought' belongs to the theoretical philosophy as Kant's
      >> First Critique (B 106, A 80). But unlike Kant Hegel includes the
      >> 'Ought' since it belongs logically to the limitation and is
      >> important for discussing the implication and dynamics of the
      >> limitation. Hegel develops his categories from the 'What is' -
      >> Question (as Plato did in other form) and does not derive it from
      >> the functions of the understanding in judgements as Kant did in his
      >> static approach.
      >>
      >> It is important to see that Hegel's Remarks in his SL (and also in
      >> other works) do not belong to the development of the categories but
      >> only are examples of its application in its total other (nature,
      >> morality, objective spirit etc.).
      >>
      >>> That is, what Hegel is doing is reconceptualizing what is going on
      >> in
      >>> Kant and in Plato.
      >> You can call it 'reconceptualization'. I would call it the critcal
      >> logical implication of the categories of Being for avoiding such
      >> absolutes as the 'Categorical Imperative'.
      >>
      >> He is trying to do justice to the pattern of
      >>> seeking-an-ideal, to which they draw attention, and to its
      >> ontological
      >>> consequences to which they likewise draw attention (namely, the
      >> unity
      >>> of the Soul, and the reality of the rational self), but without
      >>> falling into the spurious infinity that both Kant and Plato
      >> sometimes
      >>> fall into with regard to that soul and that rational self.
      >> Yes, but this is not the subject of the Logic of Being though it
      >> will help us to take properly 'the unity of the soul' etc.
      >>
      >>>>>> Would you acknowledge that the
      >>>>>>> Categorical Imperative, as Kant describes it, serves as an
      >>>> "ideal"
      >>>>>> for
      >>>>>>> human beings? It's "ideal" in that it goes beyond our
      >>>>>> "inclinations."
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>> It is precisely this what Hegel rejects. The 'Ought' is not
      >> beyond
      >>>>>> the finite but belongs to its limit both, in the theoretical
      >>>>>> philosophy (Thing-in-itself) and in the practical philosophy
      >> (the
      >>>>>> Categorical Imperative). This is Hegel's turn.
      >>>>>>
      >>>>> Like Alan, you assert that Hegel "rejects" Kant's conception
      >> of the
      >>>>> Ought. Do you think he _simply_ rejects it?
      >>>> He rejects it as a subjective absolute opposite to a non-
      >>>> conceptional reality.
      >>>>
      >>> I agree.
      >>>
      >>>> If so, why has he
      >>>>> introduced it into his discussion at all?
      >>>> Since he wants to show the role of the 'Ought' in the philosophy
      >> of
      >>>> his time. This role he criticizes since it does not develop far
      >>>> enough the conceptual relation between 'reality, 'limit' and
      >> 'ought'.
      >>> But why is it appropriate for him to address "the philosophy of his
      >>> time" _at this particular point_ in the SL? Why does this apparently
      >>> "practical" issue of the "Ought" intrude into what seemed previously
      >>> like a pretty much "theoretical" train of thought?
      >> As examples of the Concept in its total other and as a warning not
      >> to think and judge without considering all the logical implications.
      >>
      >> Why doesn't Hegel
      >>> just proceed directly from the finite to the (spurious) infinite,
      >>> without mentioning this "Ought"?
      >> Because it belongs to the real and its limitation. Without the
      >> 'Ought' 'limitation' cannot be really understood and vice versa.
      >>
      >>> The explanation, I believe, is the one I've offered: that Hegel sees
      >>> in Kant's and Fichte's moral theories an ontological pattern, namely
      >>> the attempt to surpass the finite via something like an "ideal",
      >> which
      >>> corresponds to what results, at this point in his thought-
      >> development,
      >>> from the failure of the finite.
      >>>
      >>> Until someone offers an alternative explanation of why the Ought
      >> comes
      >>> in at this point, I'll stand by mine.
      >>>
      >>> Best, Bob
      >> Hegel writes in the SL, para 304. 'Affirmative Infinity':
      >>
      >> The negation is thus determined as ideality; ideal being [das
      >> Ideelle] is the finite as it is in the true infinite � as a
      >> determination, a content, which is distinct but is not an
      >> independent, self-subsistent being, but only a moment.
      >>
      >> ['Das Ideale' has a more precise meaning (of the beautiful and its
      >> associations) than 'das Ideelle'; the former is not yet appropriate
      >> here and for this reason we have used the expression 'ideell'. We do
      >> not make this distinction though when speaking of reality; the
      >> expressions 'reell' and 'real' are used practically synonymously and
      >> no interest is served by giving the words different shades of
      >> meaning. - Author's note.]
      >>
      >> It is important to make a distinction between 'das Ideale' and 'das
      >> Ideelle' " 'Das Ideale' is not yet appropriate here .... ."
      >>
      >> Regards,
      >> Beat
      >>
      >>>> To do this is the task of his Logic of Being:
      >>>>
      >>>> "The ought has recently played a great part in philosophy,
      >>>> especially in connection with morality and also in metaphysics
      >>>> generally, as the ultimate and absolute concept of the identity of
      >>>> the in-itself or self-relation, and of the determinateness or
      >> limit.
      >>>> (SL, para 262 of the Remarks of "Limitation and the Ought")
      >>>>
      >>>>> I agree of course that Hegel isn't _satisfied with_ Kant's
      >>>> conception
      >>>>> of the Ought. He makes this abundantly clear.
      >>>> Yes, I think he does! But I think that we draw from this different
      >>>> conclusions.
      >>>>
      >>>> Regards,
      >>>> Beat
      >>>>
      >>>>> Best, Bob
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>> Regards,
      >>>>>> Beat
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>> And thus it challenges us. The fact that this challenge
      >> comes
      >>>> from
      >>>>>> our
      >>>>>>> own inner rational nature, does not make it any less of a
      >>>> challenge.
      >>>>>>> This is Kant's whole point in contrasting the Categorical
      >>>> Imperative
      >>>>>>> to hypothetical imperatives that derive their force from our
      >>>>>>> inclinations. The "ought" that Hegel describes is "ideal" in
      >>>> just
      >>>>>> the
      >>>>>>> same way. It's necessary to the something that it should
      >> give
      >>>> itself
      >>>>>>> such a challenge, but that doesn't make it any less of a
      >>>> challenge.
      >>>>>>> Hegel's Remark (Miller trans. pp. 133-136), with its
      >> allusions
      >>>> to
      >>>>>> Kant
      >>>>>>> and Fichte, of course makes it clear that what Hegel has in
      >>>> mind in
      >>>>>>> connection with the Ought is precisely Kantian moral
      >> thinking.
      >>>>>> (Though
      >>>>>>> as I suggested earlier it's not the narrowly "moral"
      >> quality of
      >>>>>> Kant's
      >>>>>>> Ought that interests Hegel here; rather, it's the Ought's
      >>>>>>> "categorical" quality, which could in principle be a feature
      >>>> of a
      >>>>>>> prudential Ought as well.)
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>> Does this make it clearer what I have in mind with
      >> "exemplary"
      >>>> and
      >>>>>>> "ideal"? I do not have in mind a separately existing Form or
      >>>> other
      >>>>>>> "external" challenge. I do have in mind the challenge that's
      >>>> posed
      >>>>>> to
      >>>>>>> a something by its project of being truly "in itself" and
      >> not
      >>>> merely
      >>>>>>> "for another," as the finite turned out to be. Which is the
      >>>>>> analogue,
      >>>>>>> in Hegel's movement of thought here, to the challenge that's
      >>>> posed
      >>>>>> to
      >>>>>>> a human agent by his or her project of being autonomous,
      >> and not
      >>>>>>> merely heteronomous.
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>> Best, Bob
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>> This is a difficult passage to interpret. But there is
      >> no hint
      >>>>>> here or
      >>>>>>>> elsewhere in the entire section that the ought functions
      >> as an
      >>>>>> ideal.
      >>>>>>>> You are free to defend your radical view. But you at least
      >>>> have to
      >>>>>>>> begin by
      >>>>>>>> recognizing that what you assert is not in the least an
      >>>> obvious
      >>>>>>>> implication
      >>>>>>>> of the text. It is not to be found anywhere in the text.
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>> regards, Alan
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
      >>>>>>>> From:hegel@yahoogroups.com
      >> [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On
      >>>>>> Behalf
      >>>>>>>> Of
      >>>>>>>> Robert Wallace
      >>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, July 11, 2011 5:16 PM
      >>>>>>>> To:hegel@yahoogroups.com
      >>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Plato's cave: Heidegger and Hegel
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>> Hi Alan,
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>> On Jul 11, 2011, at 1:55 PM, ponikvaraj wrote:
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>> Hi Bob,
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>> I am not speaking about Plato which would complicate
      >>>> matters.
      >>>>>> I am
      >>>>>>>>> just speaking about Hegel. If Hegel's true infinite
      >> were to
      >>>>>> function
      >>>>>>>>> as an ideal for thought then it would stand apart from
      >>>> thought
      >>>>>> as
      >>>>>>>>> something we might strive to attain.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>> Yes. I didn't in fact say that Hegel's infinite
      >> functions as
      >>>> an
      >>>>>>>> ideal for
      >>>>>>>> thought; I said it functions as an ideal. It functions
      >> as an
      >>>> ideal
      >>>>>>>> for the
      >>>>>>>> finite. It's by virtue of having this ideal (to which
      >> Hegel
      >>>> also
      >>>>>>>> refers as
      >>>>>>>> the Ought) that the finite goes beyond itself as the
      >> infinite.
      >>>>>>>>> For Hegel's infinite there is a one-sided conception.
      >> This
      >>>> is
      >>>>>> the
      >>>>>>>> one
      >>>>>>>>> which becomes the portal to indifferent or quantitative
      >>>> being.
      >>>>>>>>> So, although there is an abstract conception of the
      >> infinite
      >>>>>> it is
      >>>>>>>> not
      >>>>>>>>> as an ideal. It is the other face of being-for-self.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>> Of course Hegel finds the true infinite as being-for-self
      >>>> has an
      >>>>>> inner
      >>>>>>>> problem, which leads to its "collapse." This doesn't
      >> affect
      >>>> what I
      >>>>>>>> described.
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>> Best, Bob
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>> regards, Alan
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
      >>>>>>>>> From:hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com
      >> ]
      >>>> On
      >>>>>> Behalf
      >>>>>>>>> Of Robert Wallace
      >>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, July 11, 2011 9:30 AM
      >>>>>>>>> To:hegel@yahoogroups.com
      >>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Plato's cave: Heidegger and
      >> Hegel
      >>>>>>>>> Hello Alan,
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>> On Jul 11, 2011, at 4:47 AM, ponikvaraj wrote:
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>> Hi Bob,
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>> This is a radical reading of the ought. First, there
      >> is no
      >>>>>>>>>> identifiable moral subject in the Logic of Being.
      >> Second,
      >>>>>> ought is
      >>>>>>>>> not
      >>>>>>>>>> limited in ordinary discourse to moral situations.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>> My account doesn't assume that Hegel's "Ought" is
      >> narrowly
      >>>>>> moral. In
      >>>>>>>>> Kant, no doubt, it is, but I think Hegel is taking the
      >>>> Kantian
      >>>>>> Ought
      >>>>>>>>> as an instance of transcendence in general, which can be
      >>>> either
      >>>>>>>>> prudential or moral.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>> And third, the ought is situated
      >>>>>>>>>> within the discussion of something and its limit.
      >> This all
      >>>>>> relates
      >>>>>>>>> to
      >>>>>>>>>> the infinite as the movement of thought and not the
      >>>> infinite
      >>>>>> as an
      >>>>>>>>>> ideal for thought.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>> You seem to be suggesting that Plato's "Good" is an
      >> ideal
      >>>> for
      >>>>>>>> thought,
      >>>>>>>>> whereas Hegel's infinite has to do with the movement of
      >>>>>> thought. I
      >>>>>>>>> think both of them function as ideals (that's how they
      >> are
      >>>>>> able to
      >>>>>>>> go
      >>>>>>>>> beyond
      >>>>>>>>> finitude) and both of them are instances of the
      >> movement of
      >>>>>> thought.
      >>>>>>>>> Best, Bob
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>> regards, Alan
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
      >>>>>>>>>> From:hegel@yahoogroups.com
      >>>> [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On
      >>>>>>>> Behalf
      >>>>>>>>>> Of Robert Wallace
      >>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, July 10, 2011 9:04 PM
      >>>>>>>>>> To:hegel@yahoogroups.com
      >>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Plato's cave: Heidegger and
      >> Hegel
      >>>>>>>>>> Dear John, Joao, and all,
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>> Your earlier discussion about the Divided Line in the
      >>>> Republic
      >>>>>>>> came
      >>>>>>>>>> closer to why I and others consider the Republic a
      >> major
      >>>>>> work of
      >>>>>>>>>> philosophy.
      >>>>>>>>>> Contrary to what its title suggests, the book is not
      >>>> primarily
      >>>>>>>> about
      >>>>>>>>>> politics. It's about whether or not it's rational
      >> for an
      >>>>>>>>> individual to
      >>>>>>>>>> act justly toward others. This agenda is set out in
      >>>> books i
      >>>>>> and
      >>>>>>>> ii,
      >>>>>>>>>> and the discussion of politics in later books is
      >>>> essentially a
      >>>>>>>>> detour
      >>>>>>>>>> from the primary agenda. Plato pursues the question
      >>>> whether
      >>>>>>>>> justice is
      >>>>>>>>>> rational for the individual by analyzing the
      >> individual
      >>>> soul,
      >>>>>>>> which
      >>>>>>>>>> then leads him to the question of what is truly Good
      >>>> (i.e.,
      >>>>>> the
      >>>>>>>>>> rational soul's goal), which he analyzes in books vi
      >> and
      >>>>>> vii, with
      >>>>>>>>> the
      >>>>>>>>>> Sun, Line and Cave analogies.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>> You (John) were wondering why Plato doesn't appear
      >> to have
      >>>>>>>> separate
      >>>>>>>>>> discussions of theoretical and practical philosophy,
      >> as
      >>>> Kant
      >>>>>> and
      >>>>>>>>>> Fichte and others do. The answer is that like Hegel,
      >> Plato
      >>>>>> thinks
      >>>>>>>>> the
      >>>>>>>>>> two sets of issues are inseparable. Plato's key
      >>>> statement on
      >>>>>> this
      >>>>>>>>>> subject is Republic 508d, "what gives _truth_ to the
      >>>> things
      >>>>>> known
      >>>>>>>>> and
      >>>>>>>>>> the power to know to the knower is the form of the
      >>>> _Good_." I
      >>>>>>>> think
      >>>>>>>>>> the best explicit account of why this is the case is
      >>>> Hegel's
      >>>>>>>> Science
      >>>>>>>>>> of Logic. The counterpart to the form of the Good,
      >> in the
      >>>>>> SL, is
      >>>>>>>> the
      >>>>>>>>>> Ought, in the Quality chapter. As I pointed out a
      >> month
      >>>> or so
      >>>>>>>> back,
      >>>>>>>>>> the discussion up to determinate being might seem to
      >> be
      >>>>>> about the
      >>>>>>>>>> "theoretical" issue of being, nothing, etc. But then
      >> after
      >>>>>>>>> considering
      >>>>>>>>>> finite being, we suddenly are talking about the
      >> Ought as
      >>>>>> exemplary
      >>>>>>>>> for
      >>>>>>>>>> the infinite. That is, Hegel is saying that (in
      >> Plato's
      >>>>>>>>>> language) the Good gives truth to being. We talked at
      >>>> the time
      >>>>>>>> about
      >>>>>>>>>> the parallels to this in the SL's Doctrine of the
      >> Concept
      >>>>>> and the
      >>>>>>>>>> Phenomenology, and we could have added the
      >> Encyclopedia
      >>>>>> Philosophy
      >>>>>>>>> of
      >>>>>>>>>> Spirit.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>> Best, Bob
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>> On Jul 10, 2011, at 2:59 PM, john wrote:
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>> --- Inhegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003"
      >>>>>>>> <vascojoao2003@>
      >>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>> In Plato's time it wouldn't be as outrageous to
      >>>> proppose
      >>>>>>>> having
      >>>>>>>>>>> children taken from their mothers to be educated
      >> by the
      >>>>>>>> community,
      >>>>>>>>>> or
      >>>>>>>>>>> even to have child birth in such a way as to have
      >>>> mothers
      >>>>>> not
      >>>>>>>>>> knowing
      >>>>>>>>>>> who their children were. Well, today having someone
      >>>>>> propposing
      >>>>>>>>> such
      >>>>>>>>>>> practices is unthinkable, but the Republic can be
      >> read
      >>>>>>>>> separating a
      >>>>>>>>>>> bit what were Plato's institutional visions from
      >> what
      >>>> were
      >>>>>> the
      >>>>>>>>>>> problems or questions we was adressing.
      >>>>>>>>>>> Oh, right. Plato allowed the merchant class to lead
      >>>>>> perfectly
      >>>>>>>>> lovely
      >>>>>>>>>>> bourgeois lives. But he expected a great deal out
      >> of the
      >>>>>>>> military
      >>>>>>>>>>> class.
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>> My great-grandfather came to America when my
      >> grandfather
      >>>>>> was a
      >>>>>>>>> small
      >>>>>>>>>>> child. They came from a small village in the
      >> mountains
      >>>> about
      >>>>>>>> half
      >>>>>>>>>> way
      >>>>>>>>>>> between Athens and Sparta.
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>> One would expect people from a small mountain
      >> village
      >>>> to be
      >>>>>>>>> backward
      >>>>>>>>>>> and stupid. But the first generation born in America
      >>>> went to
      >>>>>>>>> places
      >>>>>>>>>>> like Harvard and West Point. They got law degrees
      >> and
      >>>> other
      >>>>>>>>> advanced
      >>>>>>>>>>> degrees. Although my father only went to the U. of
      >> New
      >>>>>>>> Hampshire,
      >>>>>>>>>>> still he was one of the early members of the
      >> American
      >>>>>> Special
      >>>>>>>>> Forces
      >>>>>>>>>>> in 1962.
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>> The reason they lived in that small mountain
      >> village was
      >>>>>> because
      >>>>>>>>>>> Greece was ruled by the Ottoman Turks for close to
      >> 400
      >>>>>> years.
      >>>>>>>> The
      >>>>>>>>>>> Turks would collect promising young Greek boys to be
      >>>>>> trained as
      >>>>>>>>>>> Janissaries. The training for this was so rigourous
      >>>> that it
      >>>>>>>> wasn't
      >>>>>>>>>>> thought appropriate to expect a Muslim to go through
      >>>> it. And
      >>>>>>>>>> promising
      >>>>>>>>>>> young Greek girls were collected to be trained for
      >> the
      >>>>>> harems.
      >>>>>>>>> So in
      >>>>>>>>>>> Greece, even as late as Hegel's lifetime, small
      >> children
      >>>>>> were
      >>>>>>>>>>> routinely taken from their families.
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>> Pictures of the little mountain village in Greece
      >>>> where my
      >>>>>>>> great-
      >>>>>>>>>>> gradfather came from are hanging here on the wall.
      >> All I
      >>>>>> have to
      >>>>>>>>>> do is
      >>>>>>>>>>> look at them to know what might be required to avoid
      >>>> all,
      >>>>>> excuse
      >>>>>>>>> my
      >>>>>>>>>>> blunt language, all of Plato's crazy nonsense.
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>> And yet, as I mentioned, I do come from a military
      >>>> family.
      >>>>>> In
      >>>>>>>> fact
      >>>>>>>>>> my
      >>>>>>>>>>> son has been to Iraq twice. So we actually do kind
      >> of
      >>>> like
      >>>>>>>> Plato's
      >>>>>>>>>>> crazy nonsense. That's (more or less) how we live,
      >> and
      >>>>>> that's
      >>>>>>>> what
      >>>>>>>>>> we
      >>>>>>>>>>> believe. And my great-grandfather's great-
      >> grandfather
      >>>>>> happily
      >>>>>>>>> killed
      >>>>>>>>>>> many a Turk (or were they Greeks taken as small
      >>>> children?).
      >>>>>>>>>>> If we can safely read Plato's Republic and find it
      >> to be
      >>>>>>>>> significant
      >>>>>>>>>>> and meaningful and important, that is really just
      >>>> because we
      >>>>>>>> don't
      >>>>>>>>>>> ultimately take it seriously as a viable political
      >>>> agenda.
      >>>>>> But
      >>>>>>>>>> that's
      >>>>>>>>>>> just us. Very likely large parts of the world,
      >> perhaps a
      >>>>>>>>> majority of
      >>>>>>>>>>> the world's population, would consider something
      >> along
      >>>> the
      >>>>>> lines
      >>>>>>>>> of
      >>>>>>>>>>> Plato's Republic to be an ideal worth striving and
      >>>>>> fighting for.
      >>>>>>>>>>> For "us" it would be something like Hegel's
      >> Philosophy
      >>>> of
      >>>>>> Right
      >>>>>>>>> that
      >>>>>>>>>>> we can take seriously.
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>> John
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>> Robert Wallace
      >>>>>>>>>> website:www.robertmwallace.com
      >>>>>>>>>> email: bob@
      >>>>>>>>>> phone: 414-617-3914
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>> Homepage:http://hegel.net
      >>>>>>>>>> Hegel mailing lists:http://Hegel.net/en/ml.htm
      >> Listowners
      >>>>>>>> Homepage:
      >>>>>>>>>> http://kai.in Group policy:
      >>>>>>>>>> slightly moderated, only plain Text (no HTML/RTF), no
      >>>>>> attachments,
      >>>>>>>>>> only Hegel related mails, scientific level intended.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>> Particpants are expected to show a respectfull and
      >>>> scientific
      >>>>>>>>> attitude
      >>>>>>>>>> both to Hegel and to each other. The usual
      >> "netiquette" as
      >>>>>> well as
      >>>>>>>>>> scientific standards apply.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>> The copyright policy for mails sent to this list is
      >> same
      >>>> as
      >>>>>> for
      >>>>>>>>>> Hegel.Net, that is the copyright of the mails
      >> belongs to
      >>>> the
      >>>>>>>> author
      >>>>>>>>>> and hegel.net.
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      >> modify
      >>>> the
      >>>>>>>> mails of
      >>>>>>>>>> this list under the terms of the GNU Free
      >> Documentation
      >>>>>> License,
      >>>>>>>>>> Version
      >>>>>>>>>> 1.2 or
      >>>>>>>>>> any later version, published by the Free Software
      >>>>>> Foundation. The
      >>>>>>>>>> mails are also licensed under a Creative Commons
      >> License
      >>>> and
      >>>>>> under
      >>>>>>>>> the
      >>>>>>>>>> Creative Commons Developing Nations license (see
      >> footer of
      >>>>>>>>>> http://hegel.net/en/e0.htm
      >>>>>>>>>> ) Yahoo! Groups Links
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>> Robert Wallace
      >>>>>>>>> website:www.robertmwallace.com
      >>>>>>>>> email: bob@
      >>>>>>>>> phone: 414-617-3914
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>> Homepage:http://hegel.net
      >>>>>>>>> Hegel mailing lists:http://Hegel.net/en/ml.htm
      >> Listowners
      >>>>>> Homepage:
      >>>>>>>>> http://kai.in Group policy:
      >>>>>>>>> slightly moderated, only plain Text (no HTML/RTF), no
      >>>>>> attachments,
      >>>>>>>>> only Hegel related mails, scientific level intended.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>> Particpants are expected to show a respectfull and
      >>>> scientific
      >>>>>>>> attitude
      >>>>>>>>> both to Hegel and to each other. The usual
      >> "netiquette" as
      >>>>>> well as
      >>>>>>>>> scientific standards apply.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>> The copyright policy for mails sent to this list is same
      >>>> as for
      >>>>>>>>> Hegel.Net, that is the copyright of the mails belongs
      >> to the
      >>>>>> author
      >>>>>>>>> and hegel.net.
      >>>>>>>>> Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or
      >> modify the
      >>>>>> mails of
      >>>>>>>>> this list under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation
      >>>> License,
      >>>>>>>>> Version
      >>>>>>>>> 1.2 or
      >>>>>>>>> any later version, published by the Free Software
      >>>> Foundation.
      >>>>>> The
      >>>>>>>>> mails are also licensed under a Creative Commons
      >> License and
      >>>>>> under
      >>>>>>>> the
      >>>>>>>>> Creative Commons Developing Nations license (see
      >> footer of
      >>>>>>>>> http://hegel.net/en/e0.htm
      >>>>>>>>> ) Yahoo! Groups Links
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>> Robert Wallace
      >>>>>>>> website:www.robertmwallace.com
      >>>>>>>> email: bob@
      >>>>>>>> phone: 414-617-3914
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>> Homepage:http://hegel.net
      >>>>>>>> Hegel mailing lists:http://Hegel.net/en/ml.htm Listowners
      >>>>>> Homepage:
      >>>>>>>> http://kai.in Group policy:
      >>>>>>>> slightly moderated, only plain Text (no HTML/RTF), no
      >>>> attachments,
      >>>>>>>> only
      >>>>>>>> Hegel related mails, scientific level intended.
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>> Particpants are expected to show a respectfull and
      >> scientific
      >>>>>>>> attitude both
      >>>>>>>> to Hegel and to each other. The usual "netiquette" as
      >> well as
      >>>>>>>> scientific
      >>>>>>>> standards apply.
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>> The copyright policy for mails sent to this list is same
      >> as
      >>>> for
      >>>>>>>> Hegel.Net,
      >>>>>>>> that is the copyright of the mails belongs to the author
      >> and
      >>>>>>>> hegel.net.
      >>>>>>>> Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify
      >> the
      >>>>>> mails of
      >>>>>>>> this
      >>>>>>>> list under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation
      >> License,
      >>>>>> Version
      >>>>>>>> 1.2 or
      >>>>>>>> any later version, published by the Free Software
      >>>> Foundation. The
      >>>>>>>> mails are
      >>>>>>>> also licensed under a Creative Commons License and under
      >> the
      >>>>>> Creative
      >>>>>>>> Commons Developing Nations license (see footer ofhttp://hegel.net/en/e0.htm
      >>>>>>>> ) Yahoo! Groups Links
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>> Robert Wallace
      >>>>>>> website:www.robertmwallace.com
      >>>>>>> email: bob@
      >>>>>>> phone: 414-617-3914
      >>>>> Robert Wallace
      >>>>> website:www.robertmwallace.com
      >>>>> email: bob@
      >>>>> phone: 414-617-3914
      >>> Robert Wallace
      >>> website:www.robertmwallace.com
      >>> email: bob@...
      >>> phone: 414-617-3914
      > Robert Wallace
      > website:www.robertmwallace.com
      > email:bob@...
      > phone: 414-617-3914
    • greuterb
      ... Bob, I think this is a very good short overview on the use of the ought in the German Idealism including Kant. I ought to read again the early Jena works
      Message 74 of 74 , Aug 11, 2011
        Am 08.08.2011 01:32, Robert Wallace writes:

        > Hi Beat,
        >
        > Thanks for these stimulating objections. I'll begin with the
        > historical question:
        >
        > I had asked:
        >
        > >> > You say earlier in your reply that what Hegel is
        > >> > discussing corresponds to Kant's theoretical philosophy (in the
        > >> > Critique of Pure Reason) rather than to his practical philosophy.
        > >> This
        > >> > suggestion makes my question all the more pressing. Why does
        > >> Hegel use
        > >> > a term from Kant's practical philosophy to designate something that
        > >> > (according to you) is essentially theoretical?
        > >>
        > >>
        > and you replied:
        >
        > >> From where do you know this? He does not take the term from Kant's
        > >> practical philosophy. He shows the consequences of finite being
        > >> within
        > >> its limit and restriction and the categorical development associated
        > >> with it. From there he can criticize Kant's standpoint and can go
        > >> above
        > >> this standpoint. Perhaps it would be a good idea to do some
        > >> philological
        > >> work about the 'Ought' going through the history of philosophy.
        > >>
        > My reply is:
        >
        > > A useful starting point for this philological work, which I agree
        > > can be helpful here, is Hegel's _Differenzschrift_ (1801) and _Faith
        > > and Knowledge_ (1802). Here, in his earliest publications, Hegel
        > > describes Fichte's philosophy as centering on an Ought (Sollen).
        > > "The highest synthesis revealed in the system [Fichte's] is an
        > > _ought_. 'Ego equals Ego' turns into 'Ego _ought_ to equal
        > > Ego'" (Diff., Harris & Cerf p. 132, STW 2:68). Hegel's alternative
        > > to Fichte's Ought here already is a "true infinity" (146; STW 5:84).
        > > And in _Faith and Knowledge_: "Because formal thought does not ever
        > > truly give itself up, the Ought is perennial" (p. 165, Cerf and
        > > Harris; STW 2:406). Fichte himself presents the Ought as the key to
        > > his version of Kantian thinking: "Only through this medium of the
        > > moral law do I behold _myself_"... "I _ought_ in my thinking to set
        > > out from the pure self"... (Wissenschaftslehre, second introduction,
        > > I, 466-7); "our idealism is not dogmatic but practical; does not
        > > determine what is, but what ought to be" (I, 156). In his Remark on
        > > the Ought in SL, Hegel says "the philosophy of Kant and Fichte sets
        > > up the ought as the highest point of the resolution of the
        > > contradictions of Reason" (Miller trans. p. 136; STW 5:148). So in
        > > the SL as in the Differenzschrift and _Faith and Knowledge_, Hegel
        > > clearly associates the Ought with Kantian and Fichtean thought.
        > > Rather than saying that Hegel took the term "from Kant's practical
        > > philosophy," I should have said that he took it from Fichte, who
        > > sought by means of it (together with "intellectual intuition") to
        > > deal with the duality of theoretical and practical that he inherited
        > > from Kant. So when it reaches Hegel, the "Ought" is no longer
        > > exclusively a practical concept. But as my first quotation from
        > > Fichte makes clear, and it's obvious in any case, _Fichte_ derives
        > > the Ought from Kant's practical philosophy, specifically, the
        > > Categorical Imperative. If you can come up with texts prior to Kant
        > > in which the "ought" plays an important role, great. But it's
        > > abundantly clear that the predecessor texts that Hegel himself has
        > > in mind, in connection with this term, starting in 1801 in Jena, are
        > > Kant's practical philosophy and Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre.
        >



        Bob,

        I think this is a very good short overview on the use of the 'ought' in
        the German Idealism including Kant. I ought to read again the early Jena
        works 'Differenzschrift' and 'Faith and Knowledge' and also Fichte's
        'Wissenschaftslehre' which I have somewhat neglected in the last years.

        Nevertheless, we should be aware that Hegel's 'ought' in the Logic has
        passed through a shift of meaning. It is now bound to the finite being
        and its limitation and restriction. It is no longer 'ought to be' as
        something beyond the finite being - as something 'ideal' of a moral 'I'
        as practical - but has become a thought moment of the finite being
        itself which with this is posited as 'ideell'. So, Hegel's critique on
        Kant and Fichte is at the same time a shift in meaning of the concept of
        the 'ought' what in the 'Differenzschrift' and in 'Faith and Knowledge'
        - as far as I can remember - has not yet been realized. With this a
        presupposition for actualizing freedom is shown bounding the infinite to
        the finite. This can also be seen as the transition from a subjective
        idealism to an absolute idealism in which the concept itself moves and
        does solve its contradiction - the contradiction has become a moment of
        the concept itself. So, Hegel writes in your quotation: "In his Remark
        on the Ought in SL, Hegel says "the philosophy of Kant and Fichte sets
        up the ought as the highest point of the resolution of the
        contradictions of Reason" (Miller trans. p. 136; STW 5:148)." This means
        also that in Hegel's Logic the 'ought' has lost 'the highest point of
        the resolution', it is no longer an absolute but becomes a moment in the
        concept of 'being-for-self' and its further movement.

        If this is true then we should look indeed at texts prior to Kant and
        Fichte for finding further and more adequate references to the 'ought'.
        One candidate for this would be Nikolaus von Kues who wrote a trialogue
        on the 'Possest' (Können-Ist, Potential-Is). Another reference would be
        the neoplatonism. Perhaps there is aready a book that gives a critical
        historical insight on the use of the 'ought' in Hegel's Logic of Being.
        I am certainly not the right man for doing this.

        Regards,
        Beat



        > ..................
        >



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