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Fwd: Spinoza and the Concept

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  • jgbardis@aol.com
    This accidentally missed the group. John ... From: Alan Ponikvar To: jgbardis Sent: Fri, Jul 15, 2011 7:17 pm
    Message 1 of 9 , Jul 16, 2011
      This accidentally missed the group.

      John





      -----Original Message-----
      From: Alan Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@...>
      To: jgbardis <jgbardis@...>
      Sent: Fri, Jul 15, 2011 7:17 pm
      Subject: Re: Spinoza and the Concept


      Hi John,

      I stand corrected.

      However, Hegel is once again saying something about a philosopher that the philosopher would not say about himself. Spinoza has substance, attribute and mode; but he does not as far as I am aware speak of the concept. This is Hegel's contribution.
      It is Hegel's attempt to hijack Spinoza's thought for his own purposes.

      You choose some very useful quotes, but once again say nothing. I am almost certain that you and I see these very differently. That is why it would help if you would comment on your chosen quotes. This failing contributes to what I find breezy.

      So let's take one of your quotes:

      "Spinoza has thus all three moments of the Concept, or they are essential to him. But the mode, under which head falls individuality, he does not recognize as essential, or as constituting a moment of true existence in that existence; for it disappears in existence, or it is not raised into the Concept."

      Individuality is not raised to the concept. This phrase either is totally obscure or points to the missing speculative moment, the moment which means to express the identity in difference of the absolute form. Now I may be wrong about this, but what this shows is how Hegel's text does not speak for itself. In fact, it seems to be the last text that one would think really speaks for itself. That is why Hegel is taken to be notoriously obscure. And that is why I remain perplexed by your inability to recognize this most distinctive feature of Hegel's writings.

      You then quote Hegel as saying:

      "these three are only enumerated one after the other, without the inner chain of development, and the third is not negation as negation, not the negatively self-referring negation by virtue of which it would explicitly be the turning back to the first identity and this identity be in turn truly identity."

      "Negatively self-referring negation" does not wear its meaning on its sleave. Again, it is a reference to absolute form and infinite activity, two other expressions in need of being explicated. Simply teasing out the meaning of such phrases is the heavy lifting that needs to be done. I can only think that you believe that these passages have some general understandable sense that somehow is evident. In this passage Hegel is drawing the distinction between the understanding's way of enumerating moments and speculative reason's supposed alternative way. But again, the nature of this way is what perplexes most Hegelians.

      Your final sentence notes that the modes is inessential for Spinoza but absolutely essential for Hegel. First, what is the essential/inessential distinction about? It is not as you seem to suggest a matter of a simple contrast. What is absolute for Hegel involves the mutual implication of two essential moments which were previously viewed as divided, one being essential and the other inessential. In other words, these words are not just tags. When Hegel speaks of the 'absolutely essential' he is speaking about the speculative identity in difference. He is speaking of what he call a second negative relation and not the simple first negative relation that only functions to conceal the true nature of what Hegel means to convey.

      regards, Alan



      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • greuterb
      ... John, No, Hegel has overcome the triadic nature of the concept and this you can see from your own quotation in your previous post ( SL of the Essence ,
      Message 2 of 9 , Jul 17, 2011
        Am 16.07.2011 16:24, John writes:

        > And this one missed the group as well.
        >
        > -----Original Message-----
        > From: jgbardis <jgbardis@... <mailto:jgbardis%40aol.com>>
        > To: ponikvaraj <ponikvaraj@... <mailto:ponikvaraj%40gmail.com>>
        > Sent: Sat, Jul 16, 2011 3:42 am
        > Subject: Re: Spinoza and the Concept
        >
        > Dear Alan,
        >
        > I don't know why you sent this to me rather than to the group.
        >
        > There are several "problems" with the medium in which we are engaged
        > at the group. There is always a desire to try to say everything in a
        > single post. But this generally doesn't work. So I try to limit myself
        > to saying just one thing per post. So this makes any given post
        > incomplete and, of necessity, false.
        >
        > Then, also, I'm more interested in what Hegel says than in how you or
        > I or anyone else may see things. So I do like to enter some of the
        > text into the mix for anyone who might be interested. But, again, one
        > can enter only so much. One could hope that, aside from the texts that
        > I highlight, others would on their own be reading the text more fully.
        > Sometimes, though, one gets the impression that that necessary work of
        > actually reading Hegel isn't really happening.
        >
        > Then there's the necessity that a given post not be too long. So I
        > make a good deal of effort to restrain myself and try to keep things
        > not much longer than a page or so.
        >
        > The point you raised interested me--that Hegel was more or less the
        > first philosopher to see the triadic nature of the concept.
        >



        John,

        No, Hegel has overcome the triadic nature of the concept and this you
        can see from your own quotation in your previous post ("SL of the
        Essence", "The Actuality", Remarks for "C. The Mode of the Absolute"):

        "It is only in the mode [in Spinoza's system], therefore, that the
        determination of the attribute is truly posited. Further, this third
        element remains mere mode; on the one hand, it is immediately given; on
        the other hand, its nothingness is not recognized as reflection into
        itself. - Consequently, Spinoza's exposition of the absolute is indeed
        complete in so far as it begins with the absolute, lets the attribute
        follow there from, and ends with the mode. But these three are only
        enumerated one after the other, without the inner chain of development,
        and the third is not negation as negation, not the negatively
        self-referring negation by virtue of which it would explicitly be the
        turning back to the first identity and this identity be in turn truly
        identity. What is lacking, therefore, is the necessity of the
        progression of the absolute to inessentiality, as well as the
        dissolution in and for itself of the latter into identity; or again,
        missing are both the becoming of identity and its determinations."

        "In dem Modus ist daher erst eigentlich die Bestimmung des Attributs
        gesetzt. Dies Dritte bleibt ferner bloßer Modus; einerseits ist er
        unmittelbar Gegebenes, andererseits wird seine Nichtigkeit nicht als
        Reflexion-in-sich erkannt. - Die spinozistische Auslegung des Absoluten
        ist daher insofern wohl /vollständig/, als sie von dem Absoluten
        anfängt, hierauf das Attribut folgen läßt und mit dem Modus endigt; aber
        diese drei werden nur /nacheinander/ ohne innere Folge der Entwicklung
        aufgezählt, und das Dritte ist nicht die Negation/////als/ Negation,
        nicht sich negativ auf sich beziehende Negation, wodurch sie /an/ /ihr/
        /selbst/ die Rückkehr in die erste Identität und diese wahrhafte
        Identität wäre. Es fehlt daher die Notwendigkeit des Fortgangs des
        Absoluten zur Unwesentlichkeit sowie ihre Auflösung an und für sich
        selbst in die Identität; oder es mangelt sowohl das Werden der Identität
        als ihrer Bestimmungen. ("Die Lehre vom Wesen", "Die Wirklichkeit", "C.
        Der Modus des Absoluten", TWA 6, 197-198)

        The triadic representation of the concept is a mere enumeration of the
        understanding which is before the absolute and has the absolute outside
        itself. It is a static view of the absolute which not yet has its
        reflection as an own negative moment within itself returning to its own
        identity. This view is typical for the theological view in Christian
        religion and for the quasi-theological view of reason in Spinoza's
        philosophy. Both are overcome in Hegel's concept of the concept: the
        first with the transition from 'Religion' to 'Absolute Knowing' in the
        PhdG, the latter with the transiton from 'Actuality' (necessity and
        contingency separated) to 'Subjectivity' as the
        Concept-in-and-for-itself. In Hegel's dynamic view of the Concept there
        are only two moments: the identity and its determination as its
        negation. So, there is "the becoming of identity and its
        determinations". You could reject this with help of the passage in
        Hegel's Logic where the true (subjective) Concept is first thematized
        (last paragraph of the Doctrine of the Essence). Here Hegel makes a
        distinction between the Universal, the Individual and the Particular.
        But read carefully the last sentence of this paragraph:

        "This their simple identity (of the Universal and Individual) is
        particularity, which contains in immediate unity the moment of
        determinateness of the individual and the moment of reflection-into-self
        of the universal. These three totalities are, therefore, one and the
        same reflection, which, as negative self-relation, differentiates itself
        into these two, but into a perfectly transparent difference, namely,
        into a determinate simplicity or simple determinateness which is their
        one and the same identity. - This is the Concept, the realm of
        subjectivity or of freedom." (translated by A.V. Miller, George Allen &
        Unwin, 1969)

        "Diese ihre einfache Identität [des Allgemeinen und Einzelnen] ist die
        Besonderheit, welche vom Einzelnen das Moment der Bestimmtheit, vom
        Allgemeinen das Moment der Reflexion-in-sich in unmittelbarer Einheit
        enthält. Diese drei Totalitäten sind daher eine und dieselbe Reflexion,
        welche als negative Beziehung auf sich in jene beiden sich
        unterscheidet, aber als in einen vollkommen durchsichtigen Unterschied,
        nämlich in die bestimmte Einfachheit oder in die einfache Bestimmtheit,
        welche ihre eine und dieselbe Identität ist. - Dies ist der Begriff,
        das Reich der Subjektivität oder der Freiheit." (TWA 6, 240)

        Regards,
        Beat Greuter



        > Of course there is the present problem on the group that there are a
        > few new people who are unfamiliar with Hegel's doctrine of the
        > concept. To some extent my motivation for typing in the business about
        > Spinoza was to give them some small "taste" of what the Hegelian
        > concept was all about--just a brief glimpse at what is going on.
        >
        > But to get back to the point, that is "interesting" that Hegel is the
        > only philosopher to see the triadic nature of the concept. Just for
        > the fun of it I brought up the Spinoza thing. I could perhaps have
        > also mentioned Plotinus. But it is odd, in Kant and Schelling for
        > instance, that there are some places where the triadic nature of the
        > concept almost comes to the surface. But to a large extent this was a
        > big breakthrough for Hegel.
        >
        > So if Hegel didn't get this idea of the triadic nature of the concept
        > from philosophy, well then, where did he get it from? Believe me, he
        > didn't make it up. There are very well defined precedents in
        > intellectual history for this. So this brings up two problems. On the
        > one hand, this brings us to a great deal of intellectual material that
        > is of much interest to me and about which I could go on at length,
        > except for the fact that I believe just on "principle", perhaps, you
        > very much dislike all this material and are absolutely opposed to it.
        > So that ends that conversation.
        >
        > Then there is the other problem that this little letter has already
        > gone on much to long--and I do apologize for taking up too much of
        > your time.
        >
        > At any rate, obviously the triadic nature of the concept has two very
        > well defined sources. The first, of course, would be trinitarian
        > theology. The second, oddly enough, would be alchemy and the Hermetic
        > tradition. But those are, of course, two completely taboo subjects.
        >
        > Sincerely,
        > John
        >
        > -----Original Message-----
        > From: Alan Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@... <mailto:ponikvaraj%40gmail.com>>
        > To: jgbardis <jgbardis@... <mailto:jgbardis%40aol.com>>
        > Sent: Fri, Jul 15, 2011 7:17 pm
        > Subject: Re: Spinoza and the Concept
        >
        > Hi John,
        >
        > I stand corrected.
        >
        > However, Hegel is once again saying something about a philosopher that
        > the philosopher would not say about himself. Spinoza has substance,
        > attribute and mode; but he does not as far as I am aware speak of the
        > concept. This is Hegel's contribution.
        > It is Hegel's attempt to hijack Spinoza's thought for his own purposes.
        >
        > You choose some very useful quotes, but once again say nothing. I am
        > almost certain that you and I see these very differently. That is why
        > it would help if you would comment on your chosen quotes. This failing
        > contributes to what I find breezy.
        >
        > So let's take one of your quotes:
        >
        > "Spinoza has thus all three moments of the Concept, or they are
        > essential to him. But the mode, under which head falls individuality,
        > he does not recognize as essential, or as constituting a moment of
        > true existence in that existence; for it disappears in existence, or
        > it is not raised into the Concept."
        >
        > Individuality is not raised to the concept. This phrase either is
        > totally obscure or points to the missing speculative moment, the
        > moment which means to express the identity in difference of the
        > absolute form. Now I may be wrong about this, but what this shows is
        > how Hegel's text does not speak for itself. In fact, it seems to be
        > the last text that one would think really speaks for itself. That is
        > why Hegel is taken to be notoriously obscure. And that is why I remain
        > perplexed by your inability to recognize this most distinctive feature
        > of Hegel's writings.
        >
        > You then quote Hegel as saying:
        >
        > "these three are only enumerated one after the other, without the
        > inner chain of development, and the third is not negation as negation,
        > not the negatively self-referring negation by virtue of which it would
        > explicitly be the turning back to the first identity and this identity
        > be in turn truly identity."
        >
        > "Negatively self-referring negation" does not wear its meaning on its
        > sleave. Again, it is a reference to absolute form and infinite
        > activity, two other expressions in need of being explicated. Simply
        > teasing out the meaning of such phrases is the heavy lifting that
        > needs to be done. I can only think that you believe that these
        > passages have some general understandable sense that somehow is
        > evident. In this passage Hegel is drawing the distinction between the
        > understanding's way of enumerating moments and speculative reason's
        > supposed alternative way. But again, the nature of this way is what
        > perplexes most Hegelians.
        >
        > Your final sentence notes that the modes is inessential for Spinoza
        > but absolutely essential for Hegel. First, what is the
        > essential/inessential distinction about? It is not as you seem to
        > suggest a matter of a simple contrast. What is absolute for Hegel
        > involves the mutual implication of two essential moments which were
        > previously viewed as divided, one being essential and the other
        > inessential. In other words, these words are not just tags. When Hegel
        > speaks of the 'absolutely essential' he is speaking about the
        > speculative identity in difference. He is speaking of what he call a
        > second negative relation and not the simple first negative relation
        > that only functions to conceal the true nature of what Hegel means to
        > convey.
        >
        > regards, Alan
        >



        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      • john
        ... In Hegel s dynamic view of the Concept there ... Dear Beat, To say that Hegel has overcome the triadic nature of the concept could very well be said. I
        Message 3 of 9 , Jul 17, 2011
          --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, greuterb <greuterb@...> wrote:
          >

          > John,
          >
          > No, Hegel has overcome the triadic nature of the concept....


          In Hegel's dynamic view of the Concept there
          > are only two moments: the identity and its determination as its
          > negation. So, there is "the becoming of identity and its
          > determinations". You could reject this with help of the passage in
          > Hegel's Logic where the true (subjective) Concept is first thematized
          > (last paragraph of the Doctrine of the Essence). Here Hegel makes a
          > distinction between the Universal, the Individual and the Particular.
          > But read carefully the last sentence of this paragraph:
          >
          > "This their simple identity (of the Universal and Individual) is
          > particularity, which contains in immediate unity the moment of
          > determinateness of the individual and the moment of reflection-into-self
          > of the universal. These three totalities are, therefore, one and the
          > same reflection, which, as negative self-relation, differentiates itself
          > into these two, but into a perfectly transparent difference, namely,
          > into a determinate simplicity or simple determinateness which is their
          > one and the same identity. - This is the Concept, the realm of
          > subjectivity or of freedom." (translated by A.V. Miller, George Allen &
          > Unwin, 1969)


          Dear Beat,

          To say that Hegel has "overcome" the triadic nature of the concept could very well be said.

          I hate to bring Christian theology into it, as it doesn't make much sense to waste our time talking about things we know nothing about. But even a cursory knowledge of this subject would allow one to know that there are not three gods. There is only one God. And you could consider the world to be a fourth term. But even this is ultimately taken up into the oneness of God.

          But that Hegel's "overcoming" of the triadic nature of the concept leads to a concept with only two terms strikes me as a downright odd idea. Here, for instance, is the famous final paragraph of the Encyclopedia where the triadic nature of the concept is "overcome":

          "The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy, which has self-knowing reason, the absolutely universal, for its middle term: a middle, which divides itself into Spirit and Nature, making the former its presupposition, as process of the Idea's subjective activity, and the latter its universal extreme, as process of the objectively and implicitly existing Idea. The self-judging of the Idea into its two appearances [very much as with Spinoza] characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason's) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects:--it is the nature of the fact, the concept, which causes the movement and development, yet this same movement is equally the action of cognition. The eternal Idea, in full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself to work, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Spirit."

          I believe this quote says pretty much the same thing as the quote that you provide from the final page of the doctrine of essence. So, yes, you are quite right to say that Hegel "overcomes" the triadic nature of the concept. But I believe this "overcoming" results in an ultimate unity--not an ultimate dyad.

          John
        • Beat
          ... John, I do not know what you mean with an ultimate unity . But for sustaining your view you would have to tell us what Hegel s text in your given
          Message 4 of 9 , Jul 18, 2011
            --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "john" <jgbardis@...> wrote:
            >
            >
            >
            > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, greuterb <greuterb@> wrote:
            > >
            >
            > > John,
            > >
            > > No, Hegel has overcome the triadic nature of the concept....
            >
            >
            > In Hegel's dynamic view of the Concept there
            > > are only two moments: the identity and its determination as its
            > > negation. So, there is "the becoming of identity and its
            > > determinations". You could reject this with help of the passage in
            > > Hegel's Logic where the true (subjective) Concept is first thematized
            > > (last paragraph of the Doctrine of the Essence). Here Hegel makes a
            > > distinction between the Universal, the Individual and the Particular.
            > > But read carefully the last sentence of this paragraph:
            > >
            > > "This their simple identity (of the Universal and Individual) is
            > > particularity, which contains in immediate unity the moment of
            > > determinateness of the individual and the moment of reflection-into-self
            > > of the universal. These three totalities are, therefore, one and the
            > > same reflection, which, as negative self-relation, differentiates itself
            > > into these two, but into a perfectly transparent difference, namely,
            > > into a determinate simplicity or simple determinateness which is their
            > > one and the same identity. - This is the Concept, the realm of
            > > subjectivity or of freedom." (translated by A.V. Miller, George Allen &
            > > Unwin, 1969)
            >
            >
            > Dear Beat,
            >
            > To say that Hegel has "overcome" the triadic nature of the concept could very well be said.
            >
            > I hate to bring Christian theology into it, as it doesn't make much sense to waste our time talking about things we know nothing about. But even a cursory knowledge of this subject would allow one to know that there are not three gods. There is only one God. And you could consider the world to be a fourth term. But even this is ultimately taken up into the oneness of God.
            >
            > But that Hegel's "overcoming" of the triadic nature of the concept leads to a concept with only two terms strikes me as a downright odd idea. Here, for instance, is the famous final paragraph of the Encyclopedia where the triadic nature of the concept is "overcome":
            >
            > "The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy, which has self-knowing reason, the absolutely universal, for its middle term: a middle, which divides itself into Spirit and Nature, making the former its presupposition, as process of the Idea's subjective activity, and the latter its universal extreme, as process of the objectively and implicitly existing Idea. The self-judging of the Idea into its two appearances [very much as with Spinoza] characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason's) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects:--it is the nature of the fact, the concept, which causes the movement and development, yet this same movement is equally the action of cognition. The eternal Idea, in full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself to work, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Spirit."
            >
            > I believe this quote says pretty much the same thing as the quote that you provide from the final page of the doctrine of essence. So, yes, you are quite right to say that Hegel "overcomes" the triadic nature of the concept. But I believe this "overcoming" results in an ultimate unity--not an ultimate dyad.
            >
            > John
            >



            John,

            I do not know what you mean with "an ultimate unity". But for sustaining your view you would have to tell us what Hegel's text in your given quotation from "SL of the Essence", "The Actuality", Remarks for "C. The Mode of the Absolute" means:


            "..... What is lacking, therefore, is the necessity of the
            progression of the absolute to inessentiality, as well as the
            dissolution in and for itself of the latter into identity; or again,
            missing are both the becoming of identity and its determinations."


            Identity is a becoming only if the absolute is driven into inessentiality and back into identity. If 'identity' is taken as "an ultimate unity" then this unity will have the inessentiality outside itself. But this cannot be since then the absolute is no longer an absolute.

            Regards,
            Beat Greuter
          • ponikvaraj
            Hi John, I think your final paragraph is the key. Hegel s contribution has yet to be adequately comprehended. It is entirely original (excepting what I view to
            Message 5 of 9 , Jul 18, 2011
              Hi John,



              I think your final paragraph is the key. Hegel's contribution has yet to be
              adequately comprehended. It is entirely original (excepting what I view to
              be the true teaching of Plato) and has no proper predecessor, and has not
              been the ground for further philosophical thinking. All triadic thought
              fudges the third. Hegel's speculative philosophy offers the promise of
              speaking of thought beyond simple opposition.



              regards, Alan



              From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of john
              Sent: Sunday, July 17, 2011 5:58 AM
              To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
              Subject: [hegel] Re: Fwd: Spinoza and the Concept







              --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , "ponikvaraj"
              <ponikvaraj@...> wrote:
              >
              > Hi John,
              >
              >
              >
              > Actually, Spinoza is not talking about the concept or any concept for that
              > matter. He is talking about substance. The trinity is an admittedly
              > incomprehensible formulation. So I want to restate my claim: Hegel's
              triadic
              > concept is original with him. Most talk of the concept as a concept is
              about
              > the relation between concept and instance. This still trips up Hegelians
              as
              > Winfield makes evident in his discussion of the concept in "From Concept
              to
              > Objectivity". What is original is how one of the three moments - not
              always
              > the same moment - only arises as a reflection on what is made evident by
              the
              > other two. Hegel plays with this when he talks about the moments of the
              > concept. But the important point is that Hegel is not collecting three
              > distinct thoughts and relating them. Two thought always serve as moments
              of
              > the third.
              >
              >
              >
              > regards, Alan

              Dear Alan,

              That two thoughts always serve as moments of the third is how Trinitarian
              theology works as well. That's how it works in the Hermetic tradition and
              alchemy as well. There you have an active moment, a passive or negating
              moment, and then the third, which is the reconciling moment.

              I have to say, though, that my knowledge of Trinitarian theology and the
              Hermetic tradition is based, in both cases, on post-Hegelian material. It is
              generally difficult to read, or even to find, relevant books that are more
              than 200 years old. So it might be questionable to say that things that came
              after Hegel were the source of Hegel's philosophy. Hegel's influence on
              modern trinitarian theology is explicit. And it has been a major interest of
              mine in studying Hegel to see how he might have also been an influence on
              the modern Hermetic tradition (whatever that might be).

              But nonetheless there is enough information about these things prior to
              Hegel, Augustine's book on the Trinity would be the major example in the
              case of Trinitarian theology, to make it clear that Hegel didn't invent all
              this stff, but rather that he stands within the tradition--as a great
              Master, of course, in the Tradition.

              In regard to Spinoza, you will see that Hegel gives him credit for having
              the three moments of the concept, but he finds fault with him for not having
              a proper understanding of the third moment. This is the reason Spinoza was a
              pantheist--while Schelling and Hegel, who were both very much influenced by
              him, were not pantheists.

              But Hegel scholars do realize that Hegel's philosophy didn't just pop up out
              of nowhere. And I might imagine that you know this too. They realize that he
              was greatly influenced by Spinoza, Kant, Fichte and Schelling. But the point
              you make, that Hegel's triadic concept goes beyond anything to be found in
              these four sources, suggests the necessity of looking for other sources.
              But, again, the taboos in this regard are very strict.

              It strikes me as odd, by the way, that Hegel went to such great efforts to
              establish the triadic nature of the concept in philosophy--and then from the
              day he died, philosophy promptly forgot everything Hegel had tried to teach
              it. So not only must the sources of Hegel's thought be looked for outside
              the accepted boundaries of philosophy, but even the continuation of Hegel's
              thought, in so far as there was a continuation, must, to a large extent,
              also be looked for outside the accepted boundaries of philosophy.

              John





              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
            • ponikvaraj
              Hi Beat, I think one way of speaking of Hegel s third is that it is related to what Hegel calls double negation or the truth of a dialectical movement. As for
              Message 6 of 9 , Jul 18, 2011
                Hi Beat,



                I think one way of speaking of Hegel's third is that it is related to what
                Hegel calls double negation or the truth of a dialectical movement. As for
                the absolute, being an achieved result it is a third with respect to the
                dialectical movement between two moments. It is the truth of this movement.
                But as such it is immediately divided within itself. It is the truth and it
                is the movement. This divide - this self-alienation of the absolute -
                becomes the bais for whatever comes next. What does come next reclaims what
                has been left behind as the forgotten origin of each absolute as it emerges.




                Hegel tends to speak of the truth of a dialectic but only occassionally
                relates this to the absolute. But I think it is important to keep in mind
                that for Hegel the true and the absolute are co-extensive. So whenever Hegel
                speaks of the "truth of ." he is speaking about the manifestation of the
                absolute. Because the absolute is with us and because thought moves, this
                movement is a movement internal to the absolute. It is about how the
                absolute manifests itself. This manifestation - if we are counting - is
                always a third in relation to some dialectically linked two.



                regards, Alan



                From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Beat
                Sent: Monday, July 18, 2011 3:09 PM
                To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                Subject: [hegel] Re: Fwd: Spinoza and the Concept







                --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , "john"
                <jgbardis@...> wrote:
                >
                >
                >
                > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , greuterb
                <greuterb@> wrote:
                > >
                >
                > > John,
                > >
                > > No, Hegel has overcome the triadic nature of the concept....
                >
                >
                > In Hegel's dynamic view of the Concept there
                > > are only two moments: the identity and its determination as its
                > > negation. So, there is "the becoming of identity and its
                > > determinations". You could reject this with help of the passage in
                > > Hegel's Logic where the true (subjective) Concept is first thematized
                > > (last paragraph of the Doctrine of the Essence). Here Hegel makes a
                > > distinction between the Universal, the Individual and the Particular.
                > > But read carefully the last sentence of this paragraph:
                > >
                > > "This their simple identity (of the Universal and Individual) is
                > > particularity, which contains in immediate unity the moment of
                > > determinateness of the individual and the moment of reflection-into-self

                > > of the universal. These three totalities are, therefore, one and the
                > > same reflection, which, as negative self-relation, differentiates itself

                > > into these two, but into a perfectly transparent difference, namely,
                > > into a determinate simplicity or simple determinateness which is their
                > > one and the same identity. - This is the Concept, the realm of
                > > subjectivity or of freedom." (translated by A.V. Miller, George Allen &
                > > Unwin, 1969)
                >
                >
                > Dear Beat,
                >
                > To say that Hegel has "overcome" the triadic nature of the concept could
                very well be said.
                >
                > I hate to bring Christian theology into it, as it doesn't make much sense
                to waste our time talking about things we know nothing about. But even a
                cursory knowledge of this subject would allow one to know that there are not
                three gods. There is only one God. And you could consider the world to be a
                fourth term. But even this is ultimately taken up into the oneness of God.
                >
                > But that Hegel's "overcoming" of the triadic nature of the concept leads
                to a concept with only two terms strikes me as a downright odd idea. Here,
                for instance, is the famous final paragraph of the Encyclopedia where the
                triadic nature of the concept is "overcome":
                >
                > "The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy, which has self-knowing
                reason, the absolutely universal, for its middle term: a middle, which
                divides itself into Spirit and Nature, making the former its presupposition,
                as process of the Idea's subjective activity, and the latter its universal
                extreme, as process of the objectively and implicitly existing Idea. The
                self-judging of the Idea into its two appearances [very much as with
                Spinoza] characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason's)
                manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects:--it is
                the nature of the fact, the concept, which causes the movement and
                development, yet this same movement is equally the action of cognition. The
                eternal Idea, in full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself to
                work, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Spirit."
                >
                > I believe this quote says pretty much the same thing as the quote that you
                provide from the final page of the doctrine of essence. So, yes, you are
                quite right to say that Hegel "overcomes" the triadic nature of the concept.
                But I believe this "overcoming" results in an ultimate unity--not an
                ultimate dyad.
                >
                > John
                >

                John,

                I do not know what you mean with "an ultimate unity". But for sustaining
                your view you would have to tell us what Hegel's text in your given
                quotation from "SL of the Essence", "The Actuality", Remarks for "C. The
                Mode of the Absolute" means:

                "..... What is lacking, therefore, is the necessity of the
                progression of the absolute to inessentiality, as well as the
                dissolution in and for itself of the latter into identity; or again,
                missing are both the becoming of identity and its determinations."

                Identity is a becoming only if the absolute is driven into inessentiality
                and back into identity. If 'identity' is taken as "an ultimate unity" then
                this unity will have the inessentiality outside itself. But this cannot be
                since then the absolute is no longer an absolute.

                Regards,
                Beat Greuter





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