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Re: paragraph 213

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  • vascojoao2003
    Dear John and Group, Trying to ilustrate the point i am trying to make: If we take the grave as an ultimately wrong positioning of the unchangeabe, this
    Message 1 of 14 , Jul 15, 2011
      Dear John and Group,

      Trying to ilustrate the point i am trying to make:

      If we take the "grave" as an ultimately wrong positioning of the unchangeabe, this wrong positioning would belong on one side to the unhappy consciousness as having the wrong assumption about the unchangeable, but on another side to the unchangeable as having a wrong assumption about itself, so that the sublation of this moment of positing the unchangeable as "Grave" is as much operated by the unhappy consciousness on its assumption of the unchangeable as it is a sublation operated by the unchangeable on itself - a self-sublation we could say.

      This self-sublation as it posits the changeable, then changes itself and appears not as a fall in absolute negativity as what self-sublation appears to be in-itself, but, as i mentioned, by positing the changeable as a moment of itself, the unchangeable changes its self-sublation into a new position.

      Regards,
      João.

      --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@...> wrote:
      >
      >
      >
      > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "john" <jgbardis@> wrote:
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
      > > >
      > > > Hi John,
      > > >
      > > > Thanks for the posts.
      > > >
      > > > What i find strange is the complete absense of these historical-religious references in the actual exposition, although one supposes they are there. I wonder why wasn't Hegel more explicit?
      > > >
      > > > Regads,
      > > > João.
      > > >
      > > > I just wonder why Hegel wasn't explicit about it.
      > >
      > >
      > > That is definitely a good question, Joao.
      > >
      > > Hegel deals with this same material two more times in the Phenomenology. He deals with it in the sub-section "Faith and pure insight" in the Culture section of the Spirit chapter. Then he deals with it in the Revealed Religion section of the Religion chapter.
      > >
      > > Then, also, in the third part of his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, on Revealed Religion, he deals with it quite explicitly and at great lenght.
      > >
      > > So, then, a second question would be: Why does he present this same material three times in the Phenomenology?
      > >
      > > This second question might be the answer to the first question. Perhaps this first telling of the story, as first, is immediate. The second telling is the negative moment of the telling (in its relation to the pure insight of the Enlightenment). And the third telling, then, would be the second, fully mediated, immediate.
      > >
      > > The immediate is always obscure. It is always unclear and lacking in explicitness. If it were clear and explicit it wouldn't be the immediate. It would be already mediated.
      >
      > Hi John,
      >
      > This is a good point.
      >
      > It seems to me as well, although at this time as an exploratory interpretation, that we are facing a point of view where is not only the view of an interpretation of consciousness of the historial-religious appearance or manifestation, but a making of it, so to say, the making of this historical-religious manifestation, so that it isn't an event that descends upon consciousness but an event, to put it this way, that appears by the relation fn the finite consciousness and the infinite, or the changeable and the unchangeable, where the truth of it then would be the whole, being the finite consciousness as fundamental to the infinite as the infinite to the finite, or the changeable to the unchangeable as the unchangeable to the changeable.
      >
      > In a way these movements or moments of unhappy consciousness are movements or moments of the unchangeable in its making explicit to itself, but facing and acting, in this making, the necessity of its finite moments, so that the unchangeable is not absoutely free from the changeable as to just descend upon it but responds to the necessary moments of the changeable by which it not only descentds upon it, but also becomes what it is that appears to finte consciousness.
      >
      >
      > Regards,
      > João.
      >
      > > As I've mentioned before in other contexts, there is what might almost be called a certain artistry involved on Hegel's part whenever he presents the immediate. This was the case with his little presentation about life and desire at the beginning of the Self-consciousness chapter. He creates a certain mood, if you like, where the reader just doesn't know WHAT is going on. What he is trying to say does vaguely come through. To understand what is going on, though, for things to be expressed clearly, mediation is required.
      > >
      > > John
      > >
      >
    • greuterb
      ... João, This is a true philosophical wonder. And, as in the Socratic Dialogues this wonder leads us perhaps to the real meaning of the question leaving
      Message 2 of 14 , Jul 15, 2011
        Am 15.07.2011 16:16, João writes:

        > Hi John,
        >
        > Thanks for the posts.
        >
        > What i find strange is the complete absense of these
        > historical-religious references in the actual exposition, although one
        > supposes they are there. I wonder why wasn't Hegel more explicit?
        >
        > Regads,
        > João.
        >
        > I just wonder whay Hegel wasn't explicit about it.
        >



        João,

        This is a true philosophical wonder. And, as in the Socratic Dialogues
        this wonder leads us perhaps to the real meaning of the question leaving
        behind picture thinking which distorts Hegel's thought. At the beginning
        of Chapter IV.B. on Self-consciousness we find the question Hegel wants
        to develop through the consciousnesses of stoicism, scepticism and
        unhappy consciousness in which this question was realized historically
        but not yet thematized logically:

        "Since, however, the form and the self-existence are for us, or
        objectively in themselves, one and the same, and since in the notion of
        independent consciousness the inherent reality is consciousness, the
        phase of inherent existence (Ansichsein) or thinghood, which received
        its shape and form through labour, is no other substance than
        consciousness. In this way we have a new attitude or mode of
        consciousness brought about: a type of consciousness which takes on the
        form of infinitude, or one whose essence consists in unimpeded movement
        of consciousness. It is one which thinks or is free self-consciousness.
        For thinking does not mean being an abstract ego, but an ego which has
        at the same time the significance of inherently existing in itself; it
        means being object to itself or relating itself to objective reality in
        such a way that this connotes the self-existence of that consciousness
        for which it is an object. The object does not for thinking proceed by
        way of presentations or figures, but of notions, conceptions, i.e. of a
        differentiated reality or essence, which, being an immediate content of
        consciousness, is nothing distinct from it. What is presented, shaped
        and constructed, and existent as such, has the form of being something
        other than consciousness. A notion, however, is at the same time an
        existent, and this distinction, so far as it falls in consciousness
        itself, is its determinate content. But in that this content is, at the
        same time, a conceptually constituted, a comprehended (begriffener)
        content, consciousness remains immediately aware within itself of its
        unity with this determinate existent so distinguished; not as in the
        case of a presentation, where consciousness from the first has to take
        special note that this is its idea; on the contrary, the notion is for
        me eo ipso and at once my notion. In thinking I am free, because I am
        not in an other, but remain simply and solely in touch with myself; and
        the object which for me is my essential reality, is in undivided unity
        my self-existence; and my procedure in dealing with notions is a process
        within myself. - It is essential, however, in this determination of the
        above attitude of self-consciousness to keep hold of the fact that this
        attitude is thinking consciousness in general, that its object is
        immediate unity of the self's implicit, inherent existence, and of its
        existence explicitly for self. The self-same consciousness which repels
        itself from itself, becomes aware of being an element existing in
        itself. But to itself it is this element to begin with only as universal
        reality in general, and not as this essential reality appears when
        developed in all the manifold details it contains, when the process of
        its being brings out all its fullness of content." (PhdG, para 197,
        translated by J. B. Baillie)

        Starting from this point: that the object of thought of the first shape
        of self-consciousness is immediate unity of the being-in-itself and the
        being-for-itself (thought only as universal reality in general), you can
        follow the dialectic development of the concept of thought through the
        other two shapes of consciousnes until in Reason you will achieve a new
        immediacy in which consciousness has found its truth in the real world
        leaving behind the discrepancy between the universal reality in general
        and the reality developed in al the manifold details it contains.

        Regards,
        Beat Greuter



        > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, "john"
        > <jgbardis@...> wrote:
        > >
        > > I guess I will continue on to the next paragraph, para. 213.
        > >
        > > In the Phenomenology Hegel sees Christianity as an advance on and
        > out of Greek thought. Christianity's relation to Judaism is of no
        > concern here for Hegel. In the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion
        > Hegel corrects this one-sided view and sees Christianity as having a
        > dual origin in both Greece and Judaism.
        > >
        > > So Hegel writes:
        > >
        > > "If, at the beginning, [in Platonic thought, for instance], the bare
        > concept of the sundered consciousness involved the characteristic of
        > seeking to cancel it, qua particular consciousness, and become the
        > unchangeable consciousness, the direction its effort henceforth takes
        > [after the Incarnation] is rather that of cancelling its relation to
        > the pure unchangeable, without shape or embodied form [the Platonic
        > Idea of the Good], and of adopting only the relation to the
        > unchangeable which has form and shape. ['The historic Christ as
        > worshipped, e.g. in the mediaeval church'--Baillie's note]."
        > >
        > > Hegel continues:
        > >
        > > "For the oneness of the particular consciousness [Christ's
        > consciousness] with the unchangeable is henceforth its object and the
        > essential reality for it, just as in the mere concept of it [in
        > Platonism] the essential object was merely the formless abstract
        > unchangeable [the Idea of the Good]."
        > >
        > > So, then, if the Concept in Greek thought was "the pure formless
        > Unchangeable", now, in Christianity, an "absolute disruption" is
        > "characteristic of its Concept". And so
        > >
        > > "the relation of this absolute disruption of the Concept [the
        > relation of Christ's consciousness with the Unchangeable] is now what
        > it [this consciousness] has to turn away from. The initially external
        > relation to the incarnate Unchangeable as an alien reality has to be
        > transformed into a relation in which it becomes absolutely one with it
        > [in the spiritual community]."
        > >
        >




        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      • ponikvaraj
        Hi João, The grave is not only a religious reference. More importantly it is a formal reference. It refers to sense-certainty. regards, Alan From:
        Message 3 of 14 , Jul 19, 2011
          Hi João,



          The grave is not only a religious reference. More importantly it is a formal
          reference. It refers to sense-certainty.



          regards, Alan



          From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of
          vascojoao2003
          Sent: Friday, July 15, 2011 12:56 PM
          To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
          Subject: [hegel] Re: paragraph 213





          Dear John and Group,

          Trying to ilustrate the point i am trying to make:

          If we take the "grave" as an ultimately wrong positioning of the
          unchangeabe, this wrong positioning would belong on one side to the unhappy
          consciousness as having the wrong assumption about the unchangeable, but on
          another side to the unchangeable as having a wrong assumption about itself,
          so that the sublation of this moment of positing the unchangeable as "Grave"
          is as much operated by the unhappy consciousness on its assumption of the
          unchangeable as it is a sublation operated by the unchangeable on itself - a
          self-sublation we could say.

          This self-sublation as it posits the changeable, then changes itself and
          appears not as a fall in absolute negativity as what self-sublation appears
          to be in-itself, but, as i mentioned, by positing the changeable as a moment
          of itself, the unchangeable changes its self-sublation into a new position.

          Regards,
          João.

          --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> ,
          "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@...> wrote:
          >
          >
          >
          > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , "john"
          <jgbardis@> wrote:
          > >
          > >
          > >
          > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> ,
          "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
          > > >
          > > > Hi John,
          > > >
          > > > Thanks for the posts.
          > > >
          > > > What i find strange is the complete absense of these
          historical-religious references in the actual exposition, although one
          supposes they are there. I wonder why wasn't Hegel more explicit?
          > > >
          > > > Regads,
          > > > João.
          > > >
          > > > I just wonder why Hegel wasn't explicit about it.
          > >
          > >
          > > That is definitely a good question, Joao.
          > >
          > > Hegel deals with this same material two more times in the Phenomenology.
          He deals with it in the sub-section "Faith and pure insight" in the Culture
          section of the Spirit chapter. Then he deals with it in the Revealed
          Religion section of the Religion chapter.
          > >
          > > Then, also, in the third part of his Lectures on the Philosophy of
          Religion, on Revealed Religion, he deals with it quite explicitly and at
          great lenght.
          > >
          > > So, then, a second question would be: Why does he present this same
          material three times in the Phenomenology?
          > >
          > > This second question might be the answer to the first question. Perhaps
          this first telling of the story, as first, is immediate. The second telling
          is the negative moment of the telling (in its relation to the pure insight
          of the Enlightenment). And the third telling, then, would be the second,
          fully mediated, immediate.
          > >
          > > The immediate is always obscure. It is always unclear and lacking in
          explicitness. If it were clear and explicit it wouldn't be the immediate. It
          would be already mediated.
          >
          > Hi John,
          >
          > This is a good point.
          >
          > It seems to me as well, although at this time as an exploratory
          interpretation, that we are facing a point of view where is not only the
          view of an interpretation of consciousness of the historial-religious
          appearance or manifestation, but a making of it, so to say, the making of
          this historical-religious manifestation, so that it isn't an event that
          descends upon consciousness but an event, to put it this way, that appears
          by the relation fn the finite consciousness and the infinite, or the
          changeable and the unchangeable, where the truth of it then would be the
          whole, being the finite consciousness as fundamental to the infinite as the
          infinite to the finite, or the changeable to the unchangeable as the
          unchangeable to the changeable.
          >
          > In a way these movements or moments of unhappy consciousness are movements
          or moments of the unchangeable in its making explicit to itself, but facing
          and acting, in this making, the necessity of its finite moments, so that the
          unchangeable is not absoutely free from the changeable as to just descend
          upon it but responds to the necessary moments of the changeable by which it
          not only descentds upon it, but also becomes what it is that appears to
          finte consciousness.
          >
          >
          > Regards,
          > João.
          >
          > > As I've mentioned before in other contexts, there is what might almost
          be called a certain artistry involved on Hegel's part whenever he presents
          the immediate. This was the case with his little presentation about life and
          desire at the beginning of the Self-consciousness chapter. He creates a
          certain mood, if you like, where the reader just doesn't know WHAT is going
          on. What he is trying to say does vaguely come through. To understand what
          is going on, though, for things to be expressed clearly, mediation is
          required.
          > >
          > > John
          > >
          >





          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        • vascojoao2003
          Hi Alan, Yes, i suspected that it was not only a religious reference, but, and that s the thing with this section, Hegel s formal reference including still the
          Message 4 of 14 , Jul 19, 2011
            Hi Alan,

            Yes, i suspected that it was not only a religious reference, but, and that's the thing with this section, Hegel's formal reference including still the reference to sense-certainty, which he makes, are, then, punctuated with expressions as "the Grave", which hardly are innocent.

            So, on one side he is not being explicit about christian religion as he was in regard to stoicism and skepticism and he brings back the problem of sense-certainty, but on another side he is referring back to sense-certainty through expressions like "the Grave", which, when thus related*, end up pointing back to christian references, but just to remain once again ambiguous about them.

            Why all this ambiguity? One of the hyppothesis with which i am labouring is of the idea of a concept in formation, the concept of christian consciousness, which, then, at this point, is not yet explicit. But this is just an hyppothesis.



            *"when thus related": is this proper english?


            Regards,
            João.

            --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "ponikvaraj" <ponikvaraj@...> wrote:
            >
            > Hi João,
            >
            >
            >
            > The grave is not only a religious reference. More importantly it is a formal
            > reference. It refers to sense-certainty.
            >
            >
            >
            > regards, Alan
            >
            >
            >
            > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of
            > vascojoao2003
            > Sent: Friday, July 15, 2011 12:56 PM
            > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
            > Subject: [hegel] Re: paragraph 213
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > Dear John and Group,
            >
            > Trying to ilustrate the point i am trying to make:
            >
            > If we take the "grave" as an ultimately wrong positioning of the
            > unchangeabe, this wrong positioning would belong on one side to the unhappy
            > consciousness as having the wrong assumption about the unchangeable, but on
            > another side to the unchangeable as having a wrong assumption about itself,
            > so that the sublation of this moment of positing the unchangeable as "Grave"
            > is as much operated by the unhappy consciousness on its assumption of the
            > unchangeable as it is a sublation operated by the unchangeable on itself - a
            > self-sublation we could say.
            >
            > This self-sublation as it posits the changeable, then changes itself and
            > appears not as a fall in absolute negativity as what self-sublation appears
            > to be in-itself, but, as i mentioned, by positing the changeable as a moment
            > of itself, the unchangeable changes its self-sublation into a new position.
            >
            > Regards,
            > João.
            >
            >
          • ponikvaraj
            Hi João, The entire text is ambigous. This is rooted in a distinction that prior to Hegel is not recognized: the distinction between speculative and common
            Message 5 of 14 , Jul 20, 2011
              Hi João,



              The entire text is ambigous. This is rooted in a distinction that prior to
              Hegel is not recognized: the distinction between speculative and common
              reason. Within the exposition itself each shape can be viewed on its own or
              in relation to its place within the entire exposition, hence an ambiguity.
              Natural consciousness itself is split and relates to its own concerns and
              its role as the expression of the self-alienation of the reader. And so it
              goes.



              regards, Alan



              From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of
              vascojoao2003
              Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2011 11:33 PM
              To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
              Subject: [hegel] Re: paragraph 213





              Hi Alan,

              Yes, i suspected that it was not only a religious reference, but, and that's
              the thing with this section, Hegel's formal reference including still the
              reference to sense-certainty, which he makes, are, then, punctuated with
              expressions as "the Grave", which hardly are innocent.

              So, on one side he is not being explicit about christian religion as he was
              in regard to stoicism and skepticism and he brings back the problem of
              sense-certainty, but on another side he is referring back to sense-certainty
              through expressions like "the Grave", which, when thus related*, end up
              pointing back to christian references, but just to remain once again
              ambiguous about them.

              Why all this ambiguity? One of the hyppothesis with which i am labouring is
              of the idea of a concept in formation, the concept of christian
              consciousness, which, then, at this point, is not yet explicit. But this is
              just an hyppothesis.

              *"when thus related": is this proper english?

              Regards,
              João.

              --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , "ponikvaraj"
              <ponikvaraj@...> wrote:
              >
              > Hi João,
              >
              >
              >
              > The grave is not only a religious reference. More importantly it is a
              formal
              > reference. It refers to sense-certainty.
              >
              >
              >
              > regards, Alan
              >
              >
              >
              > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
              [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> ] On Behalf
              Of
              > vascojoao2003
              > Sent: Friday, July 15, 2011 12:56 PM
              > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
              > Subject: [hegel] Re: paragraph 213
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              > Dear John and Group,
              >
              > Trying to ilustrate the point i am trying to make:
              >
              > If we take the "grave" as an ultimately wrong positioning of the
              > unchangeabe, this wrong positioning would belong on one side to the
              unhappy
              > consciousness as having the wrong assumption about the unchangeable, but
              on
              > another side to the unchangeable as having a wrong assumption about
              itself,
              > so that the sublation of this moment of positing the unchangeable as
              "Grave"
              > is as much operated by the unhappy consciousness on its assumption of the
              > unchangeable as it is a sublation operated by the unchangeable on itself -
              a
              > self-sublation we could say.
              >
              > This self-sublation as it posits the changeable, then changes itself and
              > appears not as a fall in absolute negativity as what self-sublation
              appears
              > to be in-itself, but, as i mentioned, by positing the changeable as a
              moment
              > of itself, the unchangeable changes its self-sublation into a new
              position.
              >
              > Regards,
              > João.
              >
              >





              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
            • vascojoao2003
              Hi Alan, Yes, from what i experience the intere text is ambiguous. Anyway, as an exploratory position, meaning, in need of textual evidence, it seems that
              Message 6 of 14 , Jul 20, 2011
                Hi Alan,

                Yes, from what i experience the intere text is ambiguous.
                Anyway, as an exploratory position, meaning, in need of textual evidence, it seems that insofar as reason's essence can be taken as a drive to sublate natural consciousness rigid positing of oppositions -such as changeable/unchangeable - explicit references to christian religion should wait for the development, in consciousness, of reason. This because, insofar as the center of christian consciousness as religious is Jesus Christ and insofar as J.Christ appears as the unity of those opposites (changeable/unchangeable), reason must already be present positively in consciousness knowing.

                Maybe the fact that the positing of Christ's essence, in one of its main features, as that unity, was subject to much debate between several currents of christianity in the old days, its appearence to consciousness as that unity must itself be made explicit as an appearence involving the standpoint of reason.

                Of course Hegel is not debating this struggle between those currents, but the one that finally became central, this one of that unity, wasn't allways so dominant, so that it wasn't allways so evident as it might seem to today's christians. As such, then, christian consciousness, if i may put it this way, as it is formed having at its center Christ as that unity of opposites, wasn't immediately formed - it had in its development many struggles to get at where it stands today in regard to Christ's essence and nature.

                Regards,
                João.

                --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "ponikvaraj" <ponikvaraj@...> wrote:
                >
                > Hi João,
                >
                >
                >
                > The entire text is ambigous. This is rooted in a distinction that prior to
                > Hegel is not recognized: the distinction between speculative and common
                > reason. Within the exposition itself each shape can be viewed on its own or
                > in relation to its place within the entire exposition, hence an ambiguity.
                > Natural consciousness itself is split and relates to its own concerns and
                > its role as the expression of the self-alienation of the reader. And so it
                > goes.
                >
                >
                >
                > regards, Alan
                >
                >
                >
                > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of
                > vascojoao2003
                > Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2011 11:33 PM
                > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                > Subject: [hegel] Re: paragraph 213
                >
                >
                >
                >
                >
                > Hi Alan,
                >
                > Yes, i suspected that it was not only a religious reference, but, and that's
                > the thing with this section, Hegel's formal reference including still the
                > reference to sense-certainty, which he makes, are, then, punctuated with
                > expressions as "the Grave", which hardly are innocent.
                >
                > So, on one side he is not being explicit about christian religion as he was
                > in regard to stoicism and skepticism and he brings back the problem of
                > sense-certainty, but on another side he is referring back to sense-certainty
                > through expressions like "the Grave", which, when thus related*, end up
                > pointing back to christian references, but just to remain once again
                > ambiguous about them.
                >
                > Why all this ambiguity? One of the hyppothesis with which i am labouring is
                > of the idea of a concept in formation, the concept of christian
                > consciousness, which, then, at this point, is not yet explicit. But this is
                > just an hyppothesis.
                >
                > *"when thus related": is this proper english?
                >
                > Regards,
                > João.
                >
                > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , "ponikvaraj"
                > <ponikvaraj@> wrote:
                > >
                > > Hi João,
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > > The grave is not only a religious reference. More importantly it is a
                > formal
                > > reference. It refers to sense-certainty.
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > > regards, Alan
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                > [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> ] On Behalf
                > Of
                > > vascojoao2003
                > > Sent: Friday, July 15, 2011 12:56 PM
                > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                > > Subject: [hegel] Re: paragraph 213
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > > Dear John and Group,
                > >
                > > Trying to ilustrate the point i am trying to make:
                > >
                > > If we take the "grave" as an ultimately wrong positioning of the
                > > unchangeabe, this wrong positioning would belong on one side to the
                > unhappy
                > > consciousness as having the wrong assumption about the unchangeable, but
                > on
                > > another side to the unchangeable as having a wrong assumption about
                > itself,
                > > so that the sublation of this moment of positing the unchangeable as
                > "Grave"
                > > is as much operated by the unhappy consciousness on its assumption of the
                > > unchangeable as it is a sublation operated by the unchangeable on itself -
                > a
                > > self-sublation we could say.
                > >
                > > This self-sublation as it posits the changeable, then changes itself and
                > > appears not as a fall in absolute negativity as what self-sublation
                > appears
                > > to be in-itself, but, as i mentioned, by positing the changeable as a
                > moment
                > > of itself, the unchangeable changes its self-sublation into a new
                > position.
                > >
                > > Regards,
                > > João.
                > >
                > >
                >
                >
                >
                >
                >
                > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                >
              • ponikvaraj
                Hi João, I would like to make a related point about what Hegel is doing in the Phenomenology. It is commonly accepted that he is offering a series of
                Message 7 of 14 , Jul 20, 2011
                  Hi João,



                  I would like to make a related point about what Hegel is doing in the
                  Phenomenology. It is commonly accepted that he is offering a series of
                  critiques of various ways of knowing. I would like to suggest that this
                  cannot be true for one simple reason: he would then have to defend his
                  conception of each way of knowing against contending conceptions. He would
                  have to descend to the level of the understanding and argue for his
                  conceptions. What I think he is doing is employing various tropes to his own
                  purposes. He situates his problematic within common conceptions for the
                  purpose of revealing a dialectic appropriate to his broader concern about
                  educating his reader to the standpoint of science.



                  So if we just take the master/servant dialectic it is evident that Hegel's
                  way of discussing these two characters is limited. Much more could be said
                  if it were a proper account of this relationship that truly interested us.
                  Hegel is only interested in this relationship when pushed to its limits or
                  when pushed to the point of conceptual breakdown.



                  So my point is that we should not be surprised to find Hegel's account to be
                  less than adequate. He is not interested in giving such an account. He is
                  not interested in explaining Christianity to Christians or anyone else. He
                  is simply finding what in Christian thought has a speculative potential.



                  regards, Alan





                  From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of
                  vascojoao2003
                  Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2011 4:17 PM
                  To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                  Subject: [hegel] Re: paragraph 213





                  Hi Alan,

                  Yes, from what i experience the intere text is ambiguous.
                  Anyway, as an exploratory position, meaning, in need of textual evidence, it
                  seems that insofar as reason's essence can be taken as a drive to sublate
                  natural consciousness rigid positing of oppositions -such as
                  changeable/unchangeable - explicit references to christian religion should
                  wait for the development, in consciousness, of reason. This because, insofar
                  as the center of christian consciousness as religious is Jesus Christ and
                  insofar as J.Christ appears as the unity of those opposites
                  (changeable/unchangeable), reason must already be present positively in
                  consciousness knowing.

                  Maybe the fact that the positing of Christ's essence, in one of its main
                  features, as that unity, was subject to much debate between several currents
                  of christianity in the old days, its appearence to consciousness as that
                  unity must itself be made explicit as an appearence involving the standpoint
                  of reason.

                  Of course Hegel is not debating this struggle between those currents, but
                  the one that finally became central, this one of that unity, wasn't allways
                  so dominant, so that it wasn't allways so evident as it might seem to
                  today's christians. As such, then, christian consciousness, if i may put it
                  this way, as it is formed having at its center Christ as that unity of
                  opposites, wasn't immediately formed - it had in its development many
                  struggles to get at where it stands today in regard to Christ's essence and
                  nature.

                  Regards,
                  João.

                  --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , "ponikvaraj"
                  <ponikvaraj@...> wrote:
                  >
                  > Hi João,
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  > The entire text is ambigous. This is rooted in a distinction that prior to
                  > Hegel is not recognized: the distinction between speculative and common
                  > reason. Within the exposition itself each shape can be viewed on its own
                  or
                  > in relation to its place within the entire exposition, hence an ambiguity.
                  > Natural consciousness itself is split and relates to its own concerns and
                  > its role as the expression of the self-alienation of the reader. And so it
                  > goes.
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  > regards, Alan
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                  [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> ] On Behalf
                  Of
                  > vascojoao2003
                  > Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2011 11:33 PM
                  > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                  > Subject: [hegel] Re: paragraph 213
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  > Hi Alan,
                  >
                  > Yes, i suspected that it was not only a religious reference, but, and
                  that's
                  > the thing with this section, Hegel's formal reference including still the
                  > reference to sense-certainty, which he makes, are, then, punctuated with
                  > expressions as "the Grave", which hardly are innocent.
                  >
                  > So, on one side he is not being explicit about christian religion as he
                  was
                  > in regard to stoicism and skepticism and he brings back the problem of
                  > sense-certainty, but on another side he is referring back to
                  sense-certainty
                  > through expressions like "the Grave", which, when thus related*, end up
                  > pointing back to christian references, but just to remain once again
                  > ambiguous about them.
                  >
                  > Why all this ambiguity? One of the hyppothesis with which i am labouring
                  is
                  > of the idea of a concept in formation, the concept of christian
                  > consciousness, which, then, at this point, is not yet explicit. But this
                  is
                  > just an hyppothesis.
                  >
                  > *"when thus related": is this proper english?
                  >
                  > Regards,
                  > João.
                  >
                  > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                  <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , "ponikvaraj"
                  > <ponikvaraj@> wrote:
                  > >
                  > > Hi João,
                  > >
                  > >
                  > >
                  > > The grave is not only a religious reference. More importantly it is a
                  > formal
                  > > reference. It refers to sense-certainty.
                  > >
                  > >
                  > >
                  > > regards, Alan
                  > >
                  > >
                  > >
                  > > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                  <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                  > [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                  <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> ] On Behalf
                  > Of
                  > > vascojoao2003
                  > > Sent: Friday, July 15, 2011 12:56 PM
                  > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                  <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                  > > Subject: [hegel] Re: paragraph 213
                  > >
                  > >
                  > >
                  > >
                  > >
                  > > Dear John and Group,
                  > >
                  > > Trying to ilustrate the point i am trying to make:
                  > >
                  > > If we take the "grave" as an ultimately wrong positioning of the
                  > > unchangeabe, this wrong positioning would belong on one side to the
                  > unhappy
                  > > consciousness as having the wrong assumption about the unchangeable, but
                  > on
                  > > another side to the unchangeable as having a wrong assumption about
                  > itself,
                  > > so that the sublation of this moment of positing the unchangeable as
                  > "Grave"
                  > > is as much operated by the unhappy consciousness on its assumption of
                  the
                  > > unchangeable as it is a sublation operated by the unchangeable on itself
                  -
                  > a
                  > > self-sublation we could say.
                  > >
                  > > This self-sublation as it posits the changeable, then changes itself and
                  > > appears not as a fall in absolute negativity as what self-sublation
                  > appears
                  > > to be in-itself, but, as i mentioned, by positing the changeable as a
                  > moment
                  > > of itself, the unchangeable changes its self-sublation into a new
                  > position.
                  > >
                  > > Regards,
                  > > João.
                  > >
                  > >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                  >





                  [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                • vascojoao2003
                  ... Hi Alan, Good point. I was reading it, though, in another way, which isn t contradictory to yours, as far as i can see it, specially the Consciousness
                  Message 8 of 14 , Jul 20, 2011
                    --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "ponikvaraj" <ponikvaraj@...> wrote:
                    >
                    > Hi João,
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > I would like to make a related point about what Hegel is doing in the
                    > Phenomenology. It is commonly accepted that he is offering a series of
                    > critiques of various ways of knowing. I would like to suggest that this
                    > cannot be true for one simple reason: he would then have to defend his
                    > conception of each way of knowing against contending conceptions. He would
                    > have to descend to the level of the understanding and argue for his
                    > conceptions. What I think he is doing is employing various tropes to his own
                    > purposes. He situates his problematic within common conceptions for the
                    > purpose of revealing a dialectic appropriate to his broader concern about
                    > educating his reader to the standpoint of science.

                    Hi Alan,

                    Good point.

                    I was reading it, though, in another way, which isn't contradictory to yours, as far as i can see it, specially the Consciousness Section, meaning, that it isn't indeed, as you say, a debate with every single gnosiological proposition but more with their essencial objects, or to what might be posited as their essential objects in the sense of trying to capture the many of the several propositions of knowing by the few essential objects which they actually forward.

                    For instance, the unconditioned universal, could it not be related to Kant as well as to Plato? And even the "inner" can we not relate it to Aristotle form/matter question, as well as with Newton? These are just a couple of random examples, but do you think it not viable to put this interpretation in play, meaning, that the history of knowledge when focussed on its objects can be brought down from its variety to a few essential positions, being these, their objects in their utmost basic and undeniable position?

                    Regards,
                    João.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > So if we just take the master/servant dialectic it is evident that Hegel's
                    > way of discussing these two characters is limited. Much more could be said
                    > if it were a proper account of this relationship that truly interested us.
                    > Hegel is only interested in this relationship when pushed to its limits or
                    > when pushed to the point of conceptual breakdown.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > So my point is that we should not be surprised to find Hegel's account to be
                    > less than adequate. He is not interested in giving such an account. He is
                    > not interested in explaining Christianity to Christians or anyone else. He
                    > is simply finding what in Christian thought has a speculative potential.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > regards, Alan
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of
                    > vascojoao2003
                    > Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2011 4:17 PM
                    > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                    > Subject: [hegel] Re: paragraph 213
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Hi Alan,
                    >
                    > Yes, from what i experience the intere text is ambiguous.
                    > Anyway, as an exploratory position, meaning, in need of textual evidence, it
                    > seems that insofar as reason's essence can be taken as a drive to sublate
                    > natural consciousness rigid positing of oppositions -such as
                    > changeable/unchangeable - explicit references to christian religion should
                    > wait for the development, in consciousness, of reason. This because, insofar
                    > as the center of christian consciousness as religious is Jesus Christ and
                    > insofar as J.Christ appears as the unity of those opposites
                    > (changeable/unchangeable), reason must already be present positively in
                    > consciousness knowing.
                    >
                    > Maybe the fact that the positing of Christ's essence, in one of its main
                    > features, as that unity, was subject to much debate between several currents
                    > of christianity in the old days, its appearence to consciousness as that
                    > unity must itself be made explicit as an appearence involving the standpoint
                    > of reason.
                    >
                    > Of course Hegel is not debating this struggle between those currents, but
                    > the one that finally became central, this one of that unity, wasn't allways
                    > so dominant, so that it wasn't allways so evident as it might seem to
                    > today's christians. As such, then, christian consciousness, if i may put it
                    > this way, as it is formed having at its center Christ as that unity of
                    > opposites, wasn't immediately formed - it had in its development many
                    > struggles to get at where it stands today in regard to Christ's essence and
                    > nature.
                    >
                    > Regards,
                    > João.
                    >
                    > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , "ponikvaraj"
                    > <ponikvaraj@> wrote:
                    > >
                    > > Hi João,
                    > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > The entire text is ambigous. This is rooted in a distinction that prior to
                    > > Hegel is not recognized: the distinction between speculative and common
                    > > reason. Within the exposition itself each shape can be viewed on its own
                    > or
                    > > in relation to its place within the entire exposition, hence an ambiguity.
                    > > Natural consciousness itself is split and relates to its own concerns and
                    > > its role as the expression of the self-alienation of the reader. And so it
                    > > goes.
                    > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > regards, Alan
                    > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                    > [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> ] On Behalf
                    > Of
                    > > vascojoao2003
                    > > Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2011 11:33 PM
                    > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                    > > Subject: [hegel] Re: paragraph 213
                    > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > Hi Alan,
                    > >
                    > > Yes, i suspected that it was not only a religious reference, but, and
                    > that's
                    > > the thing with this section, Hegel's formal reference including still the
                    > > reference to sense-certainty, which he makes, are, then, punctuated with
                    > > expressions as "the Grave", which hardly are innocent.
                    > >
                    > > So, on one side he is not being explicit about christian religion as he
                    > was
                    > > in regard to stoicism and skepticism and he brings back the problem of
                    > > sense-certainty, but on another side he is referring back to
                    > sense-certainty
                    > > through expressions like "the Grave", which, when thus related*, end up
                    > > pointing back to christian references, but just to remain once again
                    > > ambiguous about them.
                    > >
                    > > Why all this ambiguity? One of the hyppothesis with which i am labouring
                    > is
                    > > of the idea of a concept in formation, the concept of christian
                    > > consciousness, which, then, at this point, is not yet explicit. But this
                    > is
                    > > just an hyppothesis.
                    > >
                    > > *"when thus related": is this proper english?
                    > >
                    > > Regards,
                    > > João.
                    > >
                    > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                    > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , "ponikvaraj"
                    > > <ponikvaraj@> wrote:
                    > > >
                    > > > Hi João,
                    > > >
                    > > >
                    > > >
                    > > > The grave is not only a religious reference. More importantly it is a
                    > > formal
                    > > > reference. It refers to sense-certainty.
                    > > >
                    > > >
                    > > >
                    > > > regards, Alan
                    > > >
                    > > >
                    > > >
                    > > > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                    > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                    > > [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                    > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> ] On Behalf
                    > > Of
                    > > > vascojoao2003
                    > > > Sent: Friday, July 15, 2011 12:56 PM
                    > > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                    > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                    > > > Subject: [hegel] Re: paragraph 213
                    > > >
                    > > >
                    > > >
                    > > >
                    > > >
                    > > > Dear John and Group,
                    > > >
                    > > > Trying to ilustrate the point i am trying to make:
                    > > >
                    > > > If we take the "grave" as an ultimately wrong positioning of the
                    > > > unchangeabe, this wrong positioning would belong on one side to the
                    > > unhappy
                    > > > consciousness as having the wrong assumption about the unchangeable, but
                    > > on
                    > > > another side to the unchangeable as having a wrong assumption about
                    > > itself,
                    > > > so that the sublation of this moment of positing the unchangeable as
                    > > "Grave"
                    > > > is as much operated by the unhappy consciousness on its assumption of
                    > the
                    > > > unchangeable as it is a sublation operated by the unchangeable on itself
                    > -
                    > > a
                    > > > self-sublation we could say.
                    > > >
                    > > > This self-sublation as it posits the changeable, then changes itself and
                    > > > appears not as a fall in absolute negativity as what self-sublation
                    > > appears
                    > > > to be in-itself, but, as i mentioned, by positing the changeable as a
                    > > moment
                    > > > of itself, the unchangeable changes its self-sublation into a new
                    > > position.
                    > > >
                    > > > Regards,
                    > > > João.
                    > > >
                    > > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                    > >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                    >
                  • ponikvaraj
                    Hi João, Yes, we cannot help but relate Hegel s exposition to other philosophical accounts. Hegel himself does so. But it is curious to see how he does so. At
                    Message 9 of 14 , Jul 21, 2011
                      Hi João,



                      Yes, we cannot help but relate Hegel's exposition to other philosophical
                      accounts. Hegel himself does so. But it is curious to see how he does so. At
                      the beginning of the Logic of the Concept there is an extended discussion of
                      Kant's unity of apperception as if it is a precurser to Hegel's concept.
                      Complimentary remarks are soon followed be criticisms. But the overall sense
                      is that Hegel is either talking past Kant or using Kant to his own purposes.
                      In fact, I would suggest that any point in the Phenomenology where an
                      encounter with another thinker or way of thinking is suggested what we get
                      is a skewed and unfair representation. This begins with sense certainty and
                      continues throughout the exposition.



                      Again, the reason I believe Hegel suggestively engages with ways of knowing
                      is not to refute them even though he uses this language himself. A
                      refutation not only fails for the reason I mentioned but also due to the odd
                      consequence that 'refuting' sense knowing, perception and the understanding
                      would leave us unable to have a knowing encounter with the world of objects.
                      One might say that objects are really highly mediated artifacts, but all the
                      ways of mediating the object are 'refuted' in turn leaving us with absolute
                      knowing which is no knowing at all.



                      In the literature the refutational reading is prominent. I just think it is
                      difficult to defend.



                      regards, Alan



                      From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of
                      vascojoao2003
                      Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2011 10:42 PM
                      To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                      Subject: [hegel] Re: paragraph 213







                      --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , "ponikvaraj"
                      <ponikvaraj@...> wrote:
                      >
                      > Hi João,
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      > I would like to make a related point about what Hegel is doing in the
                      > Phenomenology. It is commonly accepted that he is offering a series of
                      > critiques of various ways of knowing. I would like to suggest that this
                      > cannot be true for one simple reason: he would then have to defend his
                      > conception of each way of knowing against contending conceptions. He would
                      > have to descend to the level of the understanding and argue for his
                      > conceptions. What I think he is doing is employing various tropes to his
                      own
                      > purposes. He situates his problematic within common conceptions for the
                      > purpose of revealing a dialectic appropriate to his broader concern about
                      > educating his reader to the standpoint of science.

                      Hi Alan,

                      Good point.

                      I was reading it, though, in another way, which isn't contradictory to
                      yours, as far as i can see it, specially the Consciousness Section, meaning,
                      that it isn't indeed, as you say, a debate with every single gnosiological
                      proposition but more with their essencial objects, or to what might be
                      posited as their essential objects in the sense of trying to capture the
                      many of the several propositions of knowing by the few essential objects
                      which they actually forward.

                      For instance, the unconditioned universal, could it not be related to Kant
                      as well as to Plato? And even the "inner" can we not relate it to Aristotle
                      form/matter question, as well as with Newton? These are just a couple of
                      random examples, but do you think it not viable to put this interpretation
                      in play, meaning, that the history of knowledge when focussed on its objects
                      can be brought down from its variety to a few essential positions, being
                      these, their objects in their utmost basic and undeniable position?

                      Regards,
                      João.
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      > So if we just take the master/servant dialectic it is evident that Hegel's
                      > way of discussing these two characters is limited. Much more could be said
                      > if it were a proper account of this relationship that truly interested us.
                      > Hegel is only interested in this relationship when pushed to its limits or
                      > when pushed to the point of conceptual breakdown.
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      > So my point is that we should not be surprised to find Hegel's account to
                      be
                      > less than adequate. He is not interested in giving such an account. He is
                      > not interested in explaining Christianity to Christians or anyone else. He
                      > is simply finding what in Christian thought has a speculative potential.
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      > regards, Alan
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> ] On Behalf
                      Of
                      > vascojoao2003
                      > Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2011 4:17 PM
                      > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      > Subject: [hegel] Re: paragraph 213
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      > Hi Alan,
                      >
                      > Yes, from what i experience the intere text is ambiguous.
                      > Anyway, as an exploratory position, meaning, in need of textual evidence,
                      it
                      > seems that insofar as reason's essence can be taken as a drive to sublate
                      > natural consciousness rigid positing of oppositions -such as
                      > changeable/unchangeable - explicit references to christian religion should
                      > wait for the development, in consciousness, of reason. This because,
                      insofar
                      > as the center of christian consciousness as religious is Jesus Christ and
                      > insofar as J.Christ appears as the unity of those opposites
                      > (changeable/unchangeable), reason must already be present positively in
                      > consciousness knowing.
                      >
                      > Maybe the fact that the positing of Christ's essence, in one of its main
                      > features, as that unity, was subject to much debate between several
                      currents
                      > of christianity in the old days, its appearence to consciousness as that
                      > unity must itself be made explicit as an appearence involving the
                      standpoint
                      > of reason.
                      >
                      > Of course Hegel is not debating this struggle between those currents, but
                      > the one that finally became central, this one of that unity, wasn't
                      allways
                      > so dominant, so that it wasn't allways so evident as it might seem to
                      > today's christians. As such, then, christian consciousness, if i may put
                      it
                      > this way, as it is formed having at its center Christ as that unity of
                      > opposites, wasn't immediately formed - it had in its development many
                      > struggles to get at where it stands today in regard to Christ's essence
                      and
                      > nature.
                      >
                      > Regards,
                      > João.
                      >
                      > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , "ponikvaraj"
                      > <ponikvaraj@> wrote:
                      > >
                      > > Hi João,
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > The entire text is ambigous. This is rooted in a distinction that prior
                      to
                      > > Hegel is not recognized: the distinction between speculative and common
                      > > reason. Within the exposition itself each shape can be viewed on its own
                      > or
                      > > in relation to its place within the entire exposition, hence an
                      ambiguity.
                      > > Natural consciousness itself is split and relates to its own concerns
                      and
                      > > its role as the expression of the self-alienation of the reader. And so
                      it
                      > > goes.
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > regards, Alan
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      > [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> ] On Behalf
                      > Of
                      > > vascojoao2003
                      > > Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2011 11:33 PM
                      > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      > > Subject: [hegel] Re: paragraph 213
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > Hi Alan,
                      > >
                      > > Yes, i suspected that it was not only a religious reference, but, and
                      > that's
                      > > the thing with this section, Hegel's formal reference including still
                      the
                      > > reference to sense-certainty, which he makes, are, then, punctuated with
                      > > expressions as "the Grave", which hardly are innocent.
                      > >
                      > > So, on one side he is not being explicit about christian religion as he
                      > was
                      > > in regard to stoicism and skepticism and he brings back the problem of
                      > > sense-certainty, but on another side he is referring back to
                      > sense-certainty
                      > > through expressions like "the Grave", which, when thus related*, end up
                      > > pointing back to christian references, but just to remain once again
                      > > ambiguous about them.
                      > >
                      > > Why all this ambiguity? One of the hyppothesis with which i am labouring
                      > is
                      > > of the idea of a concept in formation, the concept of christian
                      > > consciousness, which, then, at this point, is not yet explicit. But this
                      > is
                      > > just an hyppothesis.
                      > >
                      > > *"when thus related": is this proper english?
                      > >
                      > > Regards,
                      > > João.
                      > >
                      > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , "ponikvaraj"
                      > > <ponikvaraj@> wrote:
                      > > >
                      > > > Hi João,
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > > The grave is not only a religious reference. More importantly it is a
                      > > formal
                      > > > reference. It refers to sense-certainty.
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > > regards, Alan
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      > > [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> ] On Behalf
                      > > Of
                      > > > vascojoao2003
                      > > > Sent: Friday, July 15, 2011 12:56 PM
                      > > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      > > > Subject: [hegel] Re: paragraph 213
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > > Dear John and Group,
                      > > >
                      > > > Trying to ilustrate the point i am trying to make:
                      > > >
                      > > > If we take the "grave" as an ultimately wrong positioning of the
                      > > > unchangeabe, this wrong positioning would belong on one side to the
                      > > unhappy
                      > > > consciousness as having the wrong assumption about the unchangeable,
                      but
                      > > on
                      > > > another side to the unchangeable as having a wrong assumption about
                      > > itself,
                      > > > so that the sublation of this moment of positing the unchangeable as
                      > > "Grave"
                      > > > is as much operated by the unhappy consciousness on its assumption of
                      > the
                      > > > unchangeable as it is a sublation operated by the unchangeable on
                      itself
                      > -
                      > > a
                      > > > self-sublation we could say.
                      > > >
                      > > > This self-sublation as it posits the changeable, then changes itself
                      and
                      > > > appears not as a fall in absolute negativity as what self-sublation
                      > > appears
                      > > > to be in-itself, but, as i mentioned, by positing the changeable as a
                      > > moment
                      > > > of itself, the unchangeable changes its self-sublation into a new
                      > > position.
                      > > >
                      > > > Regards,
                      > > > João.
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                      > >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                      >





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