Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.
 

Re: Plato's cave: Heidegger and Hegel

Expand Messages
  • Beat
    ... Bob, Ought does not go beyond finite determiantion but is a moment of it which has to be developed. Only in the Logic of the Concept this development
    Message 1 of 74 , Jul 12, 2011
      --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Robert Wallace <bob@...> wrote:
      >
      > Hi Alan,
      >
      > On Jul 11, 2011, at 3:07 PM, ponikvaraj wrote:
      >
      > > Hi Bob,
      > >
      > > Here is what you said:
      > >
      > > "As I pointed out a month or so back, the discussion up to
      > > determinate being
      > > might seem to be about the
      > > "theoretical" issue of being, nothing, etc. But then after considering
      > > finite being, we suddenly are talking
      > > about the Ought as exemplary for the infinite."
      > >
      > > Now you want to claim that the ought functions as an ideal for the
      > > finite.
      > >
      > "Exemplary" or "an ideal." Amounts to the same thing, I think.
      >
      > >
      > > In either case, there is nothing in the text that suggests either
      > > your first
      > > or your second attempt to make the ought into an ideal.
      > >
      > > As Hegel says:
      > >
      > > "The restriction of the finite is not anything external, but the
      > > finite's
      > > own determination is rather also its restricition; and this
      > > restricition is
      > > both itself and the ought; it is that which is common to both, or
      > > rather
      > > that in which the two are identical.... As ought something is thus
      > > elevated
      > > above its restriction, but conversely it has its restriction only as
      > > ought.
      > > The two are indivisible. Something has a restriction in so far as it
      > > has
      > > negation in its determination, and the determination is also the being
      > > sublated of the restriction."
      > >
      >
      > This corresponds to SL Miller translation p. 133. I didn't say that
      > the something's or the finite's "ideal" is anything "external" to it.
      > It had better not be merely external if it's going to emerge from a
      > Hegelian movement of thought. What makes the Ought "ideal" is that it
      > goes beyond finite determinations.



      Bob,

      'Ought' does not go beyond finite determiantion but is a moment of it which has to be developed. Only in the Logic of the Concept this development will be possible in-and-for-itself. Here in the Logic of Being the two moments (determination and ought) cannot be hold together and 'determination' falls into the abstract 'One' losing thereby any quality which then only has to be recovered on a higher level (the measure).



      Would you acknowledge that the
      > Categorical Imperative, as Kant describes it, serves as an "ideal" for
      > human beings? It's "ideal" in that it goes beyond our "inclinations."



      It is precisely this what Hegel rejects. The 'Ought' is not beyond the finite but belongs to its limit both, in the theoretical philosophy (Thing-in-itself) and in the practical philosophy (the Categorical Imperative). This is Hegel's turn.


      Regards,
      Beat



      > And thus it challenges us. The fact that this challenge comes from our
      > own inner rational nature, does not make it any less of a challenge.
      > This is Kant's whole point in contrasting the Categorical Imperative
      > to hypothetical imperatives that derive their force from our
      > inclinations. The "ought" that Hegel describes is "ideal" in just the
      > same way. It's necessary to the something that it should give itself
      > such a challenge, but that doesn't make it any less of a challenge.
      > Hegel's Remark (Miller trans. pp. 133-136), with its allusions to Kant
      > and Fichte, of course makes it clear that what Hegel has in mind in
      > connection with the Ought is precisely Kantian moral thinking. (Though
      > as I suggested earlier it's not the narrowly "moral" quality of Kant's
      > Ought that interests Hegel here; rather, it's the Ought's
      > "categorical" quality, which could in principle be a feature of a
      > prudential Ought as well.)
      >
      > Does this make it clearer what I have in mind with "exemplary" and
      > "ideal"? I do not have in mind a separately existing Form or other
      > "external" challenge. I do have in mind the challenge that's posed to
      > a something by its project of being truly "in itself" and not merely
      > "for another," as the finite turned out to be. Which is the analogue,
      > in Hegel's movement of thought here, to the challenge that's posed to
      > a human agent by his or her project of being autonomous, and not
      > merely heteronomous.
      >
      > Best, Bob
      >
      >
      >
      >
      > >
      >
      >
      > >
      > > This is a difficult passage to interpret. But there is no hint here or
      > > elsewhere in the entire section that the ought functions as an ideal.
      > >
      > > You are free to defend your radical view. But you at least have to
      > > begin by
      > > recognizing that what you assert is not in the least an obvious
      > > implication
      > > of the text. It is not to be found anywhere in the text.
      > >
      > > regards, Alan
      > >
      > > -----Original Message-----
      > > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf
      > > Of
      > > Robert Wallace
      > > Sent: Monday, July 11, 2011 5:16 PM
      > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      > > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Plato's cave: Heidegger and Hegel
      > >
      > > Hi Alan,
      > >
      > > On Jul 11, 2011, at 1:55 PM, ponikvaraj wrote:
      > >
      > > > Hi Bob,
      > > >
      > > > I am not speaking about Plato which would complicate matters. I am
      > > > just speaking about Hegel. If Hegel's true infinite were to function
      > > > as an ideal for thought then it would stand apart from thought as
      > > > something we might strive to attain.
      > > >
      > > Yes. I didn't in fact say that Hegel's infinite functions as an
      > > ideal for
      > > thought; I said it functions as an ideal. It functions as an ideal
      > > for the
      > > finite. It's by virtue of having this ideal (to which Hegel also
      > > refers as
      > > the Ought) that the finite goes beyond itself as the infinite.
      > >
      > > > For Hegel's infinite there is a one-sided conception. This is the
      > > one
      > > > which becomes the portal to indifferent or quantitative being.
      > > > So, although there is an abstract conception of the infinite it is
      > > not
      > > > as an ideal. It is the other face of being-for-self.
      > > >
      > > Of course Hegel finds the true infinite as being-for-self has an inner
      > > problem, which leads to its "collapse." This doesn't affect what I
      > > described.
      > >
      > > Best, Bob
      > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > > regards, Alan
      > > >
      > > > -----Original Message-----
      > > > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf
      > > > Of Robert Wallace
      > > > Sent: Monday, July 11, 2011 9:30 AM
      > > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      > > > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Plato's cave: Heidegger and Hegel
      > > >
      > > > Hello Alan,
      > > >
      > > > On Jul 11, 2011, at 4:47 AM, ponikvaraj wrote:
      > > >
      > > > > Hi Bob,
      > > > >
      > > > > This is a radical reading of the ought. First, there is no
      > > > > identifiable moral subject in the Logic of Being. Second, ought is
      > > > not
      > > > > limited in ordinary discourse to moral situations.
      > > > >
      > > > My account doesn't assume that Hegel's "Ought" is narrowly moral. In
      > > > Kant, no doubt, it is, but I think Hegel is taking the Kantian Ought
      > > > as an instance of transcendence in general, which can be either
      > > > prudential or moral.
      > > >
      > > > > And third, the ought is situated
      > > > > within the discussion of something and its limit. This all relates
      > > > to
      > > > > the infinite as the movement of thought and not the infinite as an
      > > > > ideal for thought.
      > > > >
      > > > You seem to be suggesting that Plato's "Good" is an ideal for
      > > thought,
      > > > whereas Hegel's infinite has to do with the movement of thought. I
      > > > think both of them function as ideals (that's how they are able to
      > > go
      > > > beyond
      > > > finitude) and both of them are instances of the movement of thought.
      > > >
      > > > Best, Bob
      > > >
      > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > > regards, Alan
      > > > >
      > > > > -----Original Message-----
      > > > > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On
      > > Behalf
      > > > > Of Robert Wallace
      > > > > Sent: Sunday, July 10, 2011 9:04 PM
      > > > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      > > > > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Plato's cave: Heidegger and Hegel
      > > > >
      > > > > Dear John, Joao, and all,
      > > > >
      > > > > Your earlier discussion about the Divided Line in the Republic
      > > came
      > > > > closer to why I and others consider the Republic a major work of
      > > > > philosophy.
      > > > > Contrary to what its title suggests, the book is not primarily
      > > about
      > > > > politics. It's about whether or not it's rational for an
      > > > individual to
      > > > > act justly toward others. This agenda is set out in books i and
      > > ii,
      > > > > and the discussion of politics in later books is essentially a
      > > > detour
      > > > > from the primary agenda. Plato pursues the question whether
      > > > justice is
      > > > > rational for the individual by analyzing the individual soul,
      > > which
      > > > > then leads him to the question of what is truly Good (i.e., the
      > > > > rational soul's goal), which he analyzes in books vi and vii, with
      > > > the
      > > > > Sun, Line and Cave analogies.
      > > > >
      > > > > You (John) were wondering why Plato doesn't appear to have
      > > separate
      > > > > discussions of theoretical and practical philosophy, as Kant and
      > > > > Fichte and others do. The answer is that like Hegel, Plato thinks
      > > > the
      > > > > two sets of issues are inseparable. Plato's key statement on this
      > > > > subject is Republic 508d, "what gives _truth_ to the things known
      > > > and
      > > > > the power to know to the knower is the form of the _Good_." I
      > > think
      > > > > the best explicit account of why this is the case is Hegel's
      > > Science
      > > > > of Logic. The counterpart to the form of the Good, in the SL, is
      > > the
      > > > > Ought, in the Quality chapter. As I pointed out a month or so
      > > back,
      > > > > the discussion up to determinate being might seem to be about the
      > > > > "theoretical" issue of being, nothing, etc. But then after
      > > > considering
      > > > > finite being, we suddenly are talking about the Ought as exemplary
      > > > for
      > > > > the infinite. That is, Hegel is saying that (in Plato's
      > > > > language) the Good gives truth to being. We talked at the time
      > > about
      > > > > the parallels to this in the SL's Doctrine of the Concept and the
      > > > > Phenomenology, and we could have added the Encyclopedia Philosophy
      > > > of
      > > > > Spirit.
      > > > >
      > > > > Best, Bob
      > > > >
      > > > > On Jul 10, 2011, at 2:59 PM, john wrote:
      > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003"
      > > <vascojoao2003@>
      > > > > > wrote:
      > > > > >
      > > > > > > In Plato's time it wouldn't be as outrageous to proppose
      > > having
      > > > > > children taken from their mothers to be educated by the
      > > community,
      > > > > or
      > > > > > even to have child birth in such a way as to have mothers not
      > > > > knowing
      > > > > > who their children were. Well, today having someone propposing
      > > > such
      > > > > > practices is unthinkable, but the Republic can be read
      > > > separating a
      > > > > > bit what were Plato's institutional visions from what were the
      > > > > > problems or questions we was adressing.
      > > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Oh, right. Plato allowed the merchant class to lead perfectly
      > > > lovely
      > > > > > bourgeois lives. But he expected a great deal out of the
      > > military
      > > > > > class.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > My great-grandfather came to America when my grandfather was a
      > > > small
      > > > > > child. They came from a small village in the mountains about
      > > half
      > > > > way
      > > > > > between Athens and Sparta.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > One would expect people from a small mountain village to be
      > > > backward
      > > > > > and stupid. But the first generation born in America went to
      > > > places
      > > > > > like Harvard and West Point. They got law degrees and other
      > > > advanced
      > > > > > degrees. Although my father only went to the U. of New
      > > Hampshire,
      > > > > > still he was one of the early members of the American Special
      > > > Forces
      > > > > > in 1962.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > The reason they lived in that small mountain village was because
      > > > > > Greece was ruled by the Ottoman Turks for close to 400 years.
      > > The
      > > > > > Turks would collect promising young Greek boys to be trained as
      > > > > > Janissaries. The training for this was so rigourous that it
      > > wasn't
      > > > > > thought appropriate to expect a Muslim to go through it. And
      > > > > promising
      > > > > > young Greek girls were collected to be trained for the harems.
      > > > So in
      > > > > > Greece, even as late as Hegel's lifetime, small children were
      > > > > > routinely taken from their families.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Pictures of the little mountain village in Greece where my
      > > great-
      > > > > > gradfather came from are hanging here on the wall. All I have to
      > > > > do is
      > > > > > look at them to know what might be required to avoid all, excuse
      > > > my
      > > > > > blunt language, all of Plato's crazy nonsense.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > And yet, as I mentioned, I do come from a military family. In
      > > fact
      > > > > my
      > > > > > son has been to Iraq twice. So we actually do kind of like
      > > Plato's
      > > > > > crazy nonsense. That's (more or less) how we live, and that's
      > > what
      > > > > we
      > > > > > believe. And my great-grandfather's great-grandfather happily
      > > > killed
      > > > > > many a Turk (or were they Greeks taken as small children?).
      > > > > >
      > > > > > If we can safely read Plato's Republic and find it to be
      > > > significant
      > > > > > and meaningful and important, that is really just because we
      > > don't
      > > > > > ultimately take it seriously as a viable political agenda. But
      > > > > that's
      > > > > > just us. Very likely large parts of the world, perhaps a
      > > > majority of
      > > > > > the world's population, would consider something along the lines
      > > > of
      > > > > > Plato's Republic to be an ideal worth striving and fighting for.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > For "us" it would be something like Hegel's Philosophy of Right
      > > > that
      > > > > > we can take seriously.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > John
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > > Robert Wallace
      > > > > website: www.robertmwallace.com
      > > > > email: bob@...
      > > > > phone: 414-617-3914
      > > > >
      > > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      > > > >
      > > > > ------------------------------------
      > > > >
      > > > > Homepage: http://hegel.net
      > > > > Hegel mailing lists: http://Hegel.net/en/ml.htm Listowners
      > > Homepage:
      > > > > http://kai.in Group policy:
      > > > > slightly moderated, only plain Text (no HTML/RTF), no attachments,
      > > > > only Hegel related mails, scientific level intended.
      > > > >
      > > > > Particpants are expected to show a respectfull and scientific
      > > > attitude
      > > > > both to Hegel and to each other. The usual "netiquette" as well as
      > > > > scientific standards apply.
      > > > >
      > > > > The copyright policy for mails sent to this list is same as for
      > > > > Hegel.Net, that is the copyright of the mails belongs to the
      > > author
      > > > > and hegel.net.
      > > > > Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify the
      > > mails of
      > > > > this list under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License,
      > > > > Version
      > > > > 1.2 or
      > > > > any later version, published by the Free Software Foundation. The
      > > > > mails are also licensed under a Creative Commons License and under
      > > > the
      > > > > Creative Commons Developing Nations license (see footer of
      > > > > http://hegel.net/en/e0.htm
      > > > > ) Yahoo! Groups Links
      > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > >
      > > >
      > > > Robert Wallace
      > > > website: www.robertmwallace.com
      > > > email: bob@...
      > > > phone: 414-617-3914
      > > >
      > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      > > >
      > > > ------------------------------------
      > > >
      > > > Homepage: http://hegel.net
      > > > Hegel mailing lists: http://Hegel.net/en/ml.htm Listowners Homepage:
      > > > http://kai.in Group policy:
      > > > slightly moderated, only plain Text (no HTML/RTF), no attachments,
      > > > only Hegel related mails, scientific level intended.
      > > >
      > > > Particpants are expected to show a respectfull and scientific
      > > attitude
      > > > both to Hegel and to each other. The usual "netiquette" as well as
      > > > scientific standards apply.
      > > >
      > > > The copyright policy for mails sent to this list is same as for
      > > > Hegel.Net, that is the copyright of the mails belongs to the author
      > > > and hegel.net.
      > > > Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify the mails of
      > > > this list under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License,
      > > > Version
      > > > 1.2 or
      > > > any later version, published by the Free Software Foundation. The
      > > > mails are also licensed under a Creative Commons License and under
      > > the
      > > > Creative Commons Developing Nations license (see footer of
      > > > http://hegel.net/en/e0.htm
      > > > ) Yahoo! Groups Links
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > >
      > > Robert Wallace
      > > website: www.robertmwallace.com
      > > email: bob@...
      > > phone: 414-617-3914
      > >
      > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      > >
      > > ------------------------------------
      > >
      > > Homepage: http://hegel.net
      > > Hegel mailing lists: http://Hegel.net/en/ml.htm Listowners Homepage:
      > > http://kai.in Group policy:
      > > slightly moderated, only plain Text (no HTML/RTF), no attachments,
      > > only
      > > Hegel related mails, scientific level intended.
      > >
      > > Particpants are expected to show a respectfull and scientific
      > > attitude both
      > > to Hegel and to each other. The usual "netiquette" as well as
      > > scientific
      > > standards apply.
      > >
      > > The copyright policy for mails sent to this list is same as for
      > > Hegel.Net,
      > > that is the copyright of the mails belongs to the author and
      > > hegel.net.
      > > Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify the mails of
      > > this
      > > list under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version
      > > 1.2 or
      > > any later version, published by the Free Software Foundation. The
      > > mails are
      > > also licensed under a Creative Commons License and under the Creative
      > > Commons Developing Nations license (see footer of http://hegel.net/en/e0.htm
      > > ) Yahoo! Groups Links
      > >
      > >
      > >
      >
      > Robert Wallace
      > website: www.robertmwallace.com
      > email: bob@...
      > phone: 414-617-3914
    • greuterb
      ... Bob, I think this is a very good short overview on the use of the ought in the German Idealism including Kant. I ought to read again the early Jena works
      Message 74 of 74 , Aug 11, 2011
        Am 08.08.2011 01:32, Robert Wallace writes:

        > Hi Beat,
        >
        > Thanks for these stimulating objections. I'll begin with the
        > historical question:
        >
        > I had asked:
        >
        > >> > You say earlier in your reply that what Hegel is
        > >> > discussing corresponds to Kant's theoretical philosophy (in the
        > >> > Critique of Pure Reason) rather than to his practical philosophy.
        > >> This
        > >> > suggestion makes my question all the more pressing. Why does
        > >> Hegel use
        > >> > a term from Kant's practical philosophy to designate something that
        > >> > (according to you) is essentially theoretical?
        > >>
        > >>
        > and you replied:
        >
        > >> From where do you know this? He does not take the term from Kant's
        > >> practical philosophy. He shows the consequences of finite being
        > >> within
        > >> its limit and restriction and the categorical development associated
        > >> with it. From there he can criticize Kant's standpoint and can go
        > >> above
        > >> this standpoint. Perhaps it would be a good idea to do some
        > >> philological
        > >> work about the 'Ought' going through the history of philosophy.
        > >>
        > My reply is:
        >
        > > A useful starting point for this philological work, which I agree
        > > can be helpful here, is Hegel's _Differenzschrift_ (1801) and _Faith
        > > and Knowledge_ (1802). Here, in his earliest publications, Hegel
        > > describes Fichte's philosophy as centering on an Ought (Sollen).
        > > "The highest synthesis revealed in the system [Fichte's] is an
        > > _ought_. 'Ego equals Ego' turns into 'Ego _ought_ to equal
        > > Ego'" (Diff., Harris & Cerf p. 132, STW 2:68). Hegel's alternative
        > > to Fichte's Ought here already is a "true infinity" (146; STW 5:84).
        > > And in _Faith and Knowledge_: "Because formal thought does not ever
        > > truly give itself up, the Ought is perennial" (p. 165, Cerf and
        > > Harris; STW 2:406). Fichte himself presents the Ought as the key to
        > > his version of Kantian thinking: "Only through this medium of the
        > > moral law do I behold _myself_"... "I _ought_ in my thinking to set
        > > out from the pure self"... (Wissenschaftslehre, second introduction,
        > > I, 466-7); "our idealism is not dogmatic but practical; does not
        > > determine what is, but what ought to be" (I, 156). In his Remark on
        > > the Ought in SL, Hegel says "the philosophy of Kant and Fichte sets
        > > up the ought as the highest point of the resolution of the
        > > contradictions of Reason" (Miller trans. p. 136; STW 5:148). So in
        > > the SL as in the Differenzschrift and _Faith and Knowledge_, Hegel
        > > clearly associates the Ought with Kantian and Fichtean thought.
        > > Rather than saying that Hegel took the term "from Kant's practical
        > > philosophy," I should have said that he took it from Fichte, who
        > > sought by means of it (together with "intellectual intuition") to
        > > deal with the duality of theoretical and practical that he inherited
        > > from Kant. So when it reaches Hegel, the "Ought" is no longer
        > > exclusively a practical concept. But as my first quotation from
        > > Fichte makes clear, and it's obvious in any case, _Fichte_ derives
        > > the Ought from Kant's practical philosophy, specifically, the
        > > Categorical Imperative. If you can come up with texts prior to Kant
        > > in which the "ought" plays an important role, great. But it's
        > > abundantly clear that the predecessor texts that Hegel himself has
        > > in mind, in connection with this term, starting in 1801 in Jena, are
        > > Kant's practical philosophy and Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre.
        >



        Bob,

        I think this is a very good short overview on the use of the 'ought' in
        the German Idealism including Kant. I ought to read again the early Jena
        works 'Differenzschrift' and 'Faith and Knowledge' and also Fichte's
        'Wissenschaftslehre' which I have somewhat neglected in the last years.

        Nevertheless, we should be aware that Hegel's 'ought' in the Logic has
        passed through a shift of meaning. It is now bound to the finite being
        and its limitation and restriction. It is no longer 'ought to be' as
        something beyond the finite being - as something 'ideal' of a moral 'I'
        as practical - but has become a thought moment of the finite being
        itself which with this is posited as 'ideell'. So, Hegel's critique on
        Kant and Fichte is at the same time a shift in meaning of the concept of
        the 'ought' what in the 'Differenzschrift' and in 'Faith and Knowledge'
        - as far as I can remember - has not yet been realized. With this a
        presupposition for actualizing freedom is shown bounding the infinite to
        the finite. This can also be seen as the transition from a subjective
        idealism to an absolute idealism in which the concept itself moves and
        does solve its contradiction - the contradiction has become a moment of
        the concept itself. So, Hegel writes in your quotation: "In his Remark
        on the Ought in SL, Hegel says "the philosophy of Kant and Fichte sets
        up the ought as the highest point of the resolution of the
        contradictions of Reason" (Miller trans. p. 136; STW 5:148)." This means
        also that in Hegel's Logic the 'ought' has lost 'the highest point of
        the resolution', it is no longer an absolute but becomes a moment in the
        concept of 'being-for-self' and its further movement.

        If this is true then we should look indeed at texts prior to Kant and
        Fichte for finding further and more adequate references to the 'ought'.
        One candidate for this would be Nikolaus von Kues who wrote a trialogue
        on the 'Possest' (K├Ânnen-Ist, Potential-Is). Another reference would be
        the neoplatonism. Perhaps there is aready a book that gives a critical
        historical insight on the use of the 'ought' in Hegel's Logic of Being.
        I am certainly not the right man for doing this.

        Regards,
        Beat



        > ..................
        >



        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.