AW: Re: [hegel] "Idealism"
- ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
Datum: 03.06.2011 22:58
In your message to Bob you draw a distinction between consciousness, substance, and thought,
specifically: "the immanence of thought is at the same time the transcendency of consiousness and substance." But
isn't thought, conceptual thought, itself a mode or shape of consciousness? Doesn't Hegel make (or suggest) a
distinction between the natural consciousness and (what I will call) the speculative consciousness?
You are right. Transcendeny may not be taken as an own realm beyond consciousness. The Concept expresses the
mediating world relation of consciousness (and more general of what is) or, as you say, 'a mode of consciousness' and
is not an abstraction of the understanding. So, Hegel indeed makes a distinction between natural and appearing
consciousness. The latter appears as shapes which are unfolded speculatively in their necessary sequence - reason or
the Concept in its other. But in the Logic he shows this mediation as such. This I think is a transcendental
perspective: 'God before the creation of the world'. However, one certainly cannot take this metaphor as a
chronological sequence. So, what is it? I think it is pure thought showing its inherent principles and levels of
mediation in their universality thereby the logical content (level) and form (principles) taken as related to each
other. A separating hyposatization of the content or of a moment of the content would lead to a misinterpretation of
Hegel's Logic. Perhaps we could call it the immanent transcendency.
> Bob,However, the problem is that the sublation in the Logic
> You are right.
> of Being - and here 'true infinity' is thematic - is alwaysaccompanied by the loss of the Other. So, 'true infinity'
> falls back into the One. It is this aporia in the Logic ofBeing we also find in Plato's Socrates' dialogues. So, the
> Logic of Being has to be abandoned. This alreadyAristotles tried in his metaphysics. But since he did not really
> abandoned the immediate truth of Being in thoughthis procedure is uncritical. Only with Kant Being get only
> appearance. But with this he abandons also theontological question, that is, he leaves behind the aporia as a
> philosophically unappealing contradiction. Now,Hegel shows in his Logic of the Essence that the relations of
> reflection dialectically observed (and not left behindas an unsolvable contradiction) leads to the absolute necessity
> of the substance without any freedom. Only the jumpinto the unity of Being and Essence as the Concept in its own
> IMMANENT movement brings back the freedom of thought.But this immanence is not the immanence of consciousness and not
> the immanence of substance but the immanence ofthought. So, the immanence of thought is at the same time the
> transcendency of consiousness and substance. But withthis it is also said that true infinity as true freedom is no
> longer a mere objective in-itself (God) but themovement of the concept in its own objectification. So, as you write:
> 'transcendence doesn't need to be a spuriousinfinity". However, taken as 'true infinity' from the Logic of Being it