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AW: Re: [hegel] "Idealism"

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  • greuterb@bluewin.ch
    ... Von: bob@robertmwallace.com Datum: 02.06.2011 15:38 An: Betreff: Re: [hegel] Idealism Hello Alan, ... way. Your theological ...
    Message 1 of 7 , Jun 3, 2011
      ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
      Von: bob@...
      Datum: 02.06.2011 15:38
      An: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>

      Betreff: Re: [hegel] "Idealism"

      Hello Alan,

      On Jun 1, 2011, at 10:35 PM, Alan Ponikvar wrote:

      > Hi Bob,
      >

      > To call God the true infinite is to me meaningless speech. There is no
      > reason to label the true infinite in this
      way. Your theological
      > enthusiasm
      > is without reason.

      Alan, is it meaningless speech to you to call _Absolute
      Spirit_ "God"?
      Yes or no, please. If Yes, then I give up. I have explained this
      enough times. You don't have to
      agree that Absolute Spirit is God, in
      order to see how how someone might think this, and thus how the
      suggestion
      has meaning. If No--if you _can_ see how the suggestion
      that Absolute Spirit is God has meaning--then you should be
      able to
      see the connection to true infinity. Absolute Spirit is the ultimate
      iteration of true infinity: as the
      finite goes beyond itself and thus
      constitutes true infinity, so Nature goes beyond itself and thus
      constitutes
      Spirit. Thus the pattern of transcendence that we first
      see clearly in true infinity, is the pattern by which God is,
      as
      Spirit. True infinity contains the germ of the idea of Spirit, and
      thus the germ of the idea of God.

      > What the
      true infinite is most like in Hegel's universe
      > is spirit in that what is before us is not merely present but
      >
      signifies.
      > But spirit is not a transcendent entity.

      Of course Spirit is not a transcendent entity. It's not an
      entity!! If
      it were an entity, it would a spurious infinity; it wouldn't transcend
      anything, because entities as
      such are finite. Because it's _not_ an
      entity, it's able to transcend nature. It transcends nature by being

      nature's going beyond itself [über sich selbst hinausgehen] and thus
      being nature's achievement of being.

      > If there
      is one thing that is
      > true about Hegel's philosophy it is that it is a philosophy of
      > immanence.

      Yeah, I know this
      is your fundamental dogma. I don't think you've
      given me any reason to accept it. I also have yet to see you
      comment
      on the Hegelian notion of transcendence, transcendence as true
      infinity, that I explained on p. 100 of my
      book (relying on my account
      of true infinity on p. 77). Because Hegel is a thinker of Aufhebung,
      of sublation (and
      consequently of "going beyond oneself" [über sich
      selbst hinausgehen]), Hegel is a thinker of transcendence.

      Transcendence is the vertical dimension that's expressed by the "auf"
      and the "über."

      >
      > As for Eckhart chew on
      this:
      >
      > "motionless detachment makes a man superlatively godlike. For God is
      > God
      > because of his motionless
      detachment; he gets his purity and his
      > simplicity and his unchangeableness from his detachment. If, then, a
      > man
      >
      is going to be like God, so far as any creature can resemble God, it
      > will
      > be by detachment. This leads to purity,
      and from purity to
      > simplicity, and
      > from simplicity to immovablility."
      >
      > From the "Best of Meister Echart" pg.
      91.
      >
      > It seems that Eckhart has done nothing more than meditate on the
      > notion of
      > transcendence, coming up with
      this.

      Absolutely. In this discussion, you're the one who believes that to
      meditate on transcendence is ipso facto to
      be committed to a spurious
      infinity. You need to show me why I should agree with you on this! As
      I see it, _Hegel_
      meditates on the notion of transcendence, and comes
      up with Aufhebung/sublation and true infinity. So transcendence

      doesn't need to be a spurious infinity.


      Bob,

      You are right. However, the problem is that the sublation in the Logic
      of Being - and here 'true infinity' is thematic - is always accompanied by the loss of the Other. So, 'true infinity'
      falls back into the One. It is this aporia in the Logic of Being we also find in Plato's Socrates' dialogues. So, the
      Logic of Being has to be abandoned. This already Aristotles tried in his metaphysics. But since he did not really
      abandoned the immediate truth of Being in thought his procedure is uncritical. Only with Kant Being get only
      appearance. But with this he abandons also the ontological question, that is, he leaves behind the aporia as a
      philosophically unappealing contradiction. Now, Hegel shows in his Logic of the Essence that the relations of
      reflection dialectically observed (and not left behind as an unsolvable contradiction) leads to the absolute necessity
      of the substance without any freedom. Only the jump into the unity of Being and Essence as the Concept in its own
      IMMANENT movement brings back the freedom of thought. But this immanence is not the immanence of consciousness and not
      the immanence of substance but the immanence of thought. So, the immanence of thought is at the same time the
      transcendency of consiousness and substance. But with this it is also said that true infinity as true freedom is no
      longer a mere objective in-itself (God) but the movement of the concept in its own objectification. So, as you write:
      'transcendence doesn't need to be a spurious infinity". However, taken as 'true infinity' from the Logic of Being it
      is.

      Regards,
      Beat


      > On 6/1/11 10:22 PM, "Robert Wallace" <bob@...> wrote:
      >
      > >Hi Alan,
      > >
      > >On
      Jun 1, 2011, at 7:53 PM, Alan Ponikvar wrote:
      > >
      > >> Hi Bob,
      > >>
      > >> You still seem to want to have it both ways.
      God is transcendent
      > and
      > >> yet
      > >> what is in front of us.
      > >
      > >God is in front of us in the sense that God
      (meaning True Infinity,
      > >Absolute Idea, Absolute Spirit) is what is true in the finite,
      > Nature,
      > >etc.--things
      that are commonly said to be in front of us ("manifest,"
      > >as you put it). God is transcendent in the sense that God
      is the
      > >finite's _going beyond_ itself (which it has to do in order to "be":
      > >"finitude _is_ only as a going beyond
      itself" [über sich selbst
      > >hinausgehen]; SL 145, quoted on my p.97), and Nature's going beyond
      > >itself, and so
      forth. These two propositions are perfectly
      > compatible.
      > >This is how Hegel goes beyond the conventional,
      spuriously infinite
      > >way of thinking about the relation between us and God, with its
      > >contrast between what is
      supposedly manifest (nature, etc.) and what
      > >is supposedly veiled (God).
      > >
      > >> On my reading, what is in front of
      us as the truth
      > >> of the dialectic of the finite and infinite is what was behind us
      > as
      > >> our
      > >> own
      thinking of the paradoxical relation of the two. What this
      > might
      > >> have
      > >> to do with god truly transcends
      what I am able to comprehend. As
      > for
      > >> Eckhart, he strikes me as a bad infinite theologian. I have not
      > read

      > >> what
      > >> Hegel has to say about him and I am too tired to look at this
      > point.
      > >
      > >Hegel is reported to
      have said about Eckhart, "There, indeed, we have
      > >what we want!" (p.256 n22 in my book) As far as I know he made no
      >
      >published comments about Eckhart; he discovered Eckhart only late.
      > >Perhaps you could indicate what doctrine or
      statement of Eckhart's
      > >suggests to you a bad infinity.
      > >
      > >Best, Bob
      > >
      > >> But
      > >> as I mentioned to Oliver,
      Hegel has this curious habit of praising
      > >> thoughts - even calling them speculative achievements - when they
      >
      were
      > >> clearly not meant as such by the original author. Whether he does
      > this
      > >> with Eckhart remains to be
      seen.
      > >>
      > >> Regards, Alan
      > >>
      > >> On 6/1/11 7:22 PM, "Robert Wallace" <bob@...> wrote:
      > >>
      > >>
      >Hi Alan,
      > >> >
      > >> >Responses below.
      > >> >
      > >> >On Jun 1, 2011, at 2:29 PM, Alan Ponikvar wrote:
      > >> >
      > >> >> Hi
      Bob,
      > >> >>
      > >> >> In looking at page 98 my impression is that you want to have it
      > >> both
      > >> >> ways.
      > >> >>
      That is, since you do not offer a speculative reconception of
      > >> >> transcendence - something that you say we need to
      do - you
      > simply
      > >> stay
      > >> >> with the conventional sense and employ it in a contradictory
      > >> fashion.
      > >>
      >> Thus, you use 'false' - never a good idea when we are speaking
      > >> about a
      > >> >> Hegelian exposition - to label
      what Hegel has to say about the
      > >> unhappy
      > >> >> consciousness and yet want to hold on to the notion that true
      > >>
      infinity
      > >> >> might nonetheless refer to a transcendent god.
      > >> >
      > >> >Alan, I use "false" on that page only as
      part of the expression,
      > >> "what
      > >> >is false in," which (as I've explained a couple of times now)
      > implies
      > >>
      >a critique, a sublation, not a flat rejection.
      > >> >
      > >> >> So how is this true
      > >> >> conception different from
      the false? They look pretty much the
      > same
      > >> >> to me.
      > >> >
      > >> >The true-infinity conception of transcendence
      understands it as
      > the
      > >> >self-surpassing of what is transcended. "Infinity is only as a
      > >> >transcending of
      the finite" (SL Miller pp. 145-6; WL Suhrkamp
      > 5:160).
      > >> >I explain this in the long paragraph on p. 100, which
      in turn
      > draws
      > >> on
      > >> >my initial presentation of true infinity on pp. 77-8. This
      > obviously
      > >> >is quite
      different from the conventional conception of
      > transcendence,
      > >> >which makes the transcendent a separate being
      from that which it
      > >> >(supposedly) transcends.
      > >> >
      > >> >>
      > >> >> You go on to speak about transcendence but as
      far as I can see
      > do
      > >> not
      > >> >> really offer a reconception.
      > >> >
      > >> >See the long paragraph on p. 100, as
      above.
      > >> >
      > >> >>
      > >> >>
      > >> >> For Hegel, reconceptions replace conventional dichotomies with
      > >> >> identities

      > >> >> of mutually implicating differences. To transcend the opposition
      > >> >> between
      > >> >> the finite and
      infinite we need simply to recollect or look at
      > what
      > >> >> is in
      > >> >> front of us such that the movement of
      thought between the finite
      > >> and
      > >> >> infinite is not just what we do in trying to grasp these thought
      > >> >>
      items but
      > >> >> is in fact an essential moment of what is in view. Thus to
      > >> transcend
      > >> >> is
      > >> >> not to
      move away from or beyond or above what is in view. It
      > is to
      > >> >> recollect what is in view in view of the
      movement of thought. In
      > >> >> effect,
      > >> >> it is to stay closer to what actually is manifest.
      > >> >>
      > >> >> The
      problem with wanting to find theological references within
      > >> Hegel's
      > >> >> work is that it encourages us to look
      at what is in front of
      > us as
      > >> >> if it
      > >> >> points to a truth that transcends what is manifest. It is to
      >
      >> >> reinstitute
      > >> >> the veil of appearance that separates us from the true.
      > >> >
      > >> >This would be the case
      only if the theological reference
      > proceeded in
      > >> >the spurious-infinity way, contrasting "what is manifest"
      with
      > "what
      > >> >transcends what is manifest." But as I just explained, Hegel's
      > >> revised
      > >> >conception of
      transcendence does not proceed in that way. For
      > Hegel,
      > >> >"what is in front of us" is the infinite, and is God
      (when that
      > term
      > >> >is properly understood), as much as anything else. There is no
      > veil.
      > >> >
      > >> >
      > >>
      >> But this divide
      > >> >> that would place us on one side and the absolute apart on the
      > >> other is
      > >> >>
      according to Hegel the primary error of the understanding. Here
      > >> with
      > >> >> the
      > >> >> divide between the finite
      and infinite we have the divide that
      > >> seems
      > >> >> to
      > >> >> inform theological thinking.
      > >> >
      > >> >Such a
      divide informs only the aspect of theological thinking that
      > >> >Hegel criticizes. It does not inform the aspect that
      he
      > preserves. He
      > >> >clearly believes that such theologians as Meister Eckhart are
      > free of
      > >> >the errors
      that he criticizes. As Stephen Theron often says, there
      > >> are
      > >> >more things in traditional theology than you
      seem to be aware of.
      > >> >
      > >> >Best, Bob
      > >> >
      > >> >
      > >> >> What Hegel tells us is that this divide is
      > >> >>
      not the ultimate truth. So unless the theologically minded
      > have a
      > >> >> way of
      > >> >> finessing this divide it
      would appear that this is as good a
      > place
      > >> >> as any
      > >> >> to read Hegel as offering a 'critique' of
      religious belief as
      > >> >> practiced by
      > >> >> the vast majority of believers.
      > >> >>
      > >> >> Regards, Alan
      > >> >>

      > >> >> On 6/1/11 2:52 PM, "Robert Wallace" <bob@...>
      > wrote:
      > >> >>
      > >> >> >Hi Alan,
      > >> >> >
      >
      >> >> >Responses below.
      > >> >> >
      > >> >> >On Jun 1, 2011, at 1:00 PM, Alan Ponikvar wrote:
      > >> >> >
      > >> >> >> Hi
      Bob,
      > >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> I am looking at pages 97-8 of your 'infamous' chapter 3. On
      > >> page 97
      > >> >> >> you
      > >>
      >> >> say: "finite things achieve full reality only through their
      > >> >> >> relationship
      > >> >> >> to the infinite:
      that : finitude is only as a transcending of
      > >> >> >> itself.""
      > >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> You then say: "It is not an
      accident that explicitly
      > >> >> "naturalistic" or
      > >> >> >> atheistic interpretations of Hegel ignore his critique of
      the
      > >> >> finite."
      > >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> Then in footnote #38 you state: "But although true infinite
      > is
      > >> >>
      >> indeed not
      > >> >> >> "external to" the finite (as the spurious infinity tries to
      > >> be), it
      > >> >> >> does
      > >>
      >> >> "transcend" the finite. And in the Philosophy of Spirit,
      > Hegel
      > >> >> >> describes
      > >> >> >> Spirit as a
      "coming back out of Nature", to itself and the
      > >> >> "positing
      > >> >> >> of
      > >> >> >> Nature as its [Spirit's]
      world".
      > >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> Now comes your surprise: "We need to determine what Hegel
      > >> means by
      > >> >> >> these

      > >> >> >> formulations, and in the absence of other suggestions, it is
      > >> >> >> reasonable to
      > >> >> >> think that
      he means them to capture what is true in the
      > >> traditional
      > >> >> >> notion
      > >> >> >> of divine transcendence."
      >
      >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> I take this to mean that given the normal state of affairs in
      > >> >> Hegelian
      > >> >> >>
      scholarship - that there is no clear explanation of what
      > Hegel
      > >> >> means
      > >> >> >> in
      > >> >> >> the
      literature (something you mention in your post to Oliver)
      > >> - an
      > >> >> >> opening
      > >> >> >> is created for a
      theological reading of the true infinite.
      > >> Thus I
      > >> >> take
      > >> >> >> your reference to 'the traditional notion
      of divine
      > >> transcendence'
      > >> >> >> as an
      > >> >> >> endorsement of the conventional theological notion.
      > >> >> >

      > >> >> >Alan, when I refer to "the traditional notion of divine
      > >> >> transcendence"
      > >> >> >I refer to "_what is
      true in_" that notion. That is, the
      > portion
      > >> of
      > >> >> it
      > >> >> >that is true, as distinct from the portion
      that is false. I
      > make
      > >> this
      > >> >> >clear in the next paragraph, on p. 98, of the text to which
      > this
      > >>
      >> >footnote pertains: "What is _false_ in traditional
      > conceptions of
      > >> >> >transcendence and in traditional
      religion, Hegel brings out by
      > >> >> >criticizing a conception of God as _merely_ transcendent, as
      > >> simply a
      > >>
      >> >'beyond.' ... his objection to the 'spurious infinity.'...
      > [next
      > >> >> >paragraph:] how Hegel simultaneously
      defends _and criticizes_
      > >> >> >traditional theism."
      > >> >> >
      > >> >> >Thus I am simultaneously endorsing _what is
      true in_ the
      > >> conventional
      > >> >> >theological notion, and rejecting what's false in it.
      > >> >> >
      > >> >> >> What
      else you do
      > >> >> >> expect your reader to think? In my view, this is nothing more
      > >> >> than a
      > >> >> >> matter
      of confusing the bad for the true infinite.
      > >> >> >
      > >> >> >See above.
      > >> >> >
      > >> >> >>
      > >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> I,
      of course, favor what you refer to as a naturalistic or
      > >> >> atheistic
      > >> >> >> reading. Moreover, I have a
      question directed to those who
      > would
      > >> >> read
      > >> >> >> Hegel as a theological thinker: What is lost if we
      simply
      > delete
      > >> >> all
      > >> >> >> of
      > >> >> >> Hegel's asides or gratuitous references to God throughout the
      >
      >> Logic
      > >> >> >> and
      > >> >> >> the other parts of the system? Put another way, does god the
      > >> >> concept
      > >> >>
      >> do
      > >> >> >> any work within the system itself?
      > >> >> >
      > >> >> >I have granted you in past discussions that "God
      the concept"
      > does
      > >> >> not
      > >> >> >as such play any role within the system itself. The Absolute
      > >> Idea and
      >
      >> >> >Absolute Spirit--these play major roles. But unlike you, I
      > don't
      > >> >> think
      > >> >> >Hegel is merely
      covering his ass by introducing "gratuitous
      > >> >> >references" to "God" in his Remarks in the SL and elsewhere. I
      >
      >> take
      > >> >> >his Remarks as explaining how his systematic development
      > >> relates, in
      > >> >> >his view, to
      conventional religious discourse. It relates to
      > such
      > >> >> >discourse by capturing what's true in it, while
      rejecting
      > >> (implicitly
      > >> >> >criticizing) what's false in it.
      > >> >> >
      > >> >> >> My impression is that it does
      not and
      > >> >> >> never rises above the level of illustration, an illustration
      > >> that
      > >> >> in
      > >> >> >> my
      > >>
      >> >> view by making so much of what speculatively speaking is
      > really
      > >> >> of no
      > >> >> >> matter suggests that
      Hegel speaks about god rhetorically for
      > >> >> >> purposes that
      > >> >> >> have to do with certain 'realities' that
      anyone would have
      > had
      > >> to
      > >> >> deal
      > >> >> >> with in his time.
      > >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> I could be wrong so
      my invitation is sincere. Where is god in
      > >> the
      > >> >> >> system?
      > >> >> >
      > >> >> >See my just previous remarks.
      "God" as such is not in the
      > >> system, but
      > >> >> >Hegel believes that the system will show believers in "God"
      >
      what
      > >> it
      > >> >> is
      > >> >> >that they should really believe in (because it contains the
      > truth,
      > >> >> and
      >
      >> >> >omits the falsehood, in what they say they believe in), and
      > will
      > >> show
      > >> >> >unbelievers in "God"
      what it is that they are overlooking.
      > >> >> >
      > >> >> >This is the same line that I pursue, of course, in the
      > >>
      Introduction
      > >> >> >that I posted here recently to my _The God Within Us_.
      > >> >> >
      > >> >> >Best, Bob
      > >> >> >
      >
      >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> In the Philosophy of Religion and in his other references to
      > >> >> >> religion it
      > >> >> >>
      seems evident that Hegel is always concerned about picture
      > >> >> thinking.
      > >> >> >> He
      > >> >> >> cannot discuss
      religion except in light of this feature.
      > >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> Regards, Alan
      > >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> On 6/1/11 7:31 AM,
      "Robert Wallace" <bob@...>
      > >> wrote:
      > >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >Hello Alan and all,
      > >> >> >> >
      > >> >>
      >> >In fact I treasure Hegel's account of the interrelation of
      > >> >> "finite"
      > >> >> >> >and "infinite" in the true
      infinity, which is reflected in
      > the
      > >> >> quotes
      > >> >> >> >that you give. His remark, which I also treasure,
      about the
      > >> >> finite's
      > >> >> >> >lacking "true being," reflects this interrelation. Rather
      > than
      > >> >> >>
      >replacing the finite with the infinite, he sees the finite
      > >> being
      > >> >> >> >sublated by the infinite. In this
      way the finite does
      > indeed,
      > >> as
      > >> >> he
      > >> >> >> >says, "find itself born anew."
      > >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >>
      >Thus when you suggest that
      > >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >> >> It [the true infinite] is not as Bob suggests the
      > >>
      possibility of
      > >> >> >> >> creating an opening for a theological conception of the
      > >> >> infinite.
      > >> >> >> The
      >
      >> >> >> >> theological conception is really just one way of
      > >> >> characterizing the
      > >> >> >> >> bad
      > >> >> >> >>
      infinite.
      > >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >> >your guess as to what I have in mind is mistaken. The
      > >> "theological

      > >> >> >> >conception" that you have in mind is not what I have in
      > mind. I
      > >> >> make
      > >> >> >> >this very
      clear in my (infamous) chapter 3, in which I
      > >> emphasize
      > >> >> >> >Hegel's critique of conventional theology as
      promoting a
      > >> spurious
      > >> >> >> >infinity.
      > >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >> >Best, Bob W.
      > >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >> >On May
      31, 2011, at 11:08 PM, Alan Ponikvar wrote:
      > >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >> >> Hi Oliver,
      > >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> I think
      Bob's fixation on Hegel's remark about the finite
      > >> >> having no
      > >> >> >> >> veritable being creates a
      misimpression. In fact, the most
      > >> >> >> interesting
      > >> >> >> >> passages about the finite and infinite are in
      the
      > preceding
      > >> >> remark.
      > >> >> >> >> I will
      > >> >> >> >> pick out a few of the more interesting remarks.
      >
      >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> "the finite, over and beyond itself, falls into the
      > infinite,
      > >> >> but
      > >> >> >> >>
      that,
      > >> >> >> >> over and beyond this infinite, it equally finds itself
      > born
      > >> >> anew;
      > >> >> >> >> hence,

      > >> >> >> >> that it rejoins itself there, as is also the case for the
      > >> >> >> infinite -
      > >> >> >> >> so
      > >> >>
      >> >> that this same negation of negation results in
      > affirmation, a
      > >> >> >> result
      > >> >> >> >> that
      > >> >> >>
      >> thereby proves itself to be their truth and point of
      > >> origin. In
      > >> >> >> this
      > >> >> >> >> being
      > >> >> >>
      >> which is thus the ideality of the distinct moments, the
      > >> >> >> >> contradiction has
      > >> >> >> >> not vanished
      abstractly, but is resolved and reconciled,
      > >> and the
      > >> >> >> >> thoughts,
      > >> >> >> >> while left intact, are
      also brought together."
      > >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> "the infinite is rather for itself just as much finite as
      > >> >>
      >> infinite."
      > >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> "the infinite goes out of itself into the finite because,
      > >> in the
      > >> >>
      >> way
      > >> >> >> >> it is
      > >> >> >> >> grasped as abstract unity, it has no truth in it, no
      > >> standing;
      > >> >>
      and
      > >> >> >> >> conversely, the finite goes forth into the infinite for
      > the
      > >> same
      > >> >> >> >> reason."
      > >>
      >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> "If the unity is not taken abstractly and indeterminately,
      > >> but
      > >> >> >> >> rather, as
      >
      >> >> >> >> in the presupposition, as the determinate unity of the
      > finite
      > >> >> and
      > >> >> >> the
      > >> >> >> >>
      infinite, the distinguishing of these two is also present
      > >> in it.
      > >> >> >> And
      > >> >> >> >> this
      > >> >> >> >>
      distinguishing is not one that would also let them go
      > loose,
      > >> >> each
      > >> >> >> >> subsisting separately, but
      it rather leaves them in the
      > >> unity as
      > >> >> >> >> idealized. This unity of the infinite and the finite,
      > and
      the
      > >> >> >> >> distinguishing of them, are inseparable, in the same way
      > as
      > >> the
      > >> >> >> >> finite and
      >
      >> >> >> >> the infinite."
      > >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> As I understand Bob's claim, if we fix our attention on
      > the

      > >> fact
      > >> >> >> >> that the
      > >> >> >> >> finite has no veritable being this creates an opening for
      > >> what
      > >>
      >> does
      > >> >> >> >> has
      > >> >> >> >> being: the infinite. But the true infinite is the
      > identity in
      > >> >> >> >>
      difference
      > >> >> >> >> of the finite and infinite. It is not as Bob suggests the
      > >> >> >> >> possibility of
      > >> >>
      >> >> creating an opening for a theological conception of the
      > >> >> infinite.
      > >> >> >> The
      > >> >> >> >>
      theological conception is really just one way of
      > >> >> characterizing the
      > >> >> >> >> bad
      > >> >> >> >> infinite.
      >
      >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> Regards, Alan
      > >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> On 5/31/11 8:43 PM, "Oliver Scholz"
      <epameinondas@...>
      > >> wrote:
      > >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> >Here we go again ...
      > >> >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >> >> >Am
      31.05.2011 22:52, schrieb Robert Wallace:
      > >> >> >> >> >> Of course the question is, what do we mean, and what
      >
      does
      > >> >> Hegel
      > >> >> >> >> mean,
      > >> >> >> >> >> by "idealism"? Hegel states in the passage to which
      > Oliver

      > >> >> >> referred
      > >> >> >> >> >> at the end of the SL Quality chapter's discussion of
      > >> >> Infinity,
      > >> >> >>
      that
      > >> >> >> >> >> "idealism" is the doctrine that the finite is not real.
      > >> >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >> >> >Weellll,
      actually -- in *my* edition I have:
      > >> >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >> >> >"The statement that the *finite* is *ideal*
      constitutes
      > >> >> >> *idealism*."
      > >> >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >> >> >"Der Satz, daß das *Endliche ideell* ist, macht den

      > >> >> *Idealismus*
      > >> >> >> >> aus."
      > >> >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >> >> >Taken naively this would mean that in Hegel's
      view
      > idealism
      > >> >> would
      > >> >> >> >> take
      > >> >> >> >> >the finite as its principle.
      > >> >> >> >> >
      > >> >>
      >> >> >Of course, this passage continues: "The idealism of
      > >> philosophie
      > >> >> >> >> consists
      > >> >> >> >> >in
      nothing other than not acknowledging the finite as a
      > >> >> veritable
      > >> >> >> >> being."
      > >> >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >>
      >> >Together with the reading above that would suggest that
      > >> Hegel
      > >> >> has
      > >> >> >> >> little
      > >> >> >> >>
      >regard for idealism, since it would have as its principle
      > >> >> >> something
      > >> >> >> >> that
      > >> >> >> >> >is
      not a veritable being. Fortunately this reading is
      > >> >> thwarted by,
      > >> >> >> >> >presumably, quite a lot of other
      passages by Hegel
      > >> throughout
      > >> >> his
      > >> >> >> >> works,
      > >> >> >> >> >including the whole passage that
      follows these two
      > >> sentences.
      > >> >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >> >> >So this kind of approach to the text is out. The
      >
      passage can
      > >> >> >> >> obviously
      > >> >> >> >> >not mean "finite = ideal". It can not be concluded from
      > that
      >
      >> >> >> sentence
      > >> >> >> >> >that the finite is not real.
      > >> >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >> >> >Besides, I wouldn't know
      why. Reality is a comparatively
      > >> >> >> >> uninteresting
      > >> >> >> >> >category that doesn't even have its own
      place in the
      > table
      > >> of
      > >> >> >> >> contents
      > >> >> >> >> >and occurs just as an afterthought to quality --
      where it
      > >> >> indeed
      > >> >> >> >> >belongs. It didn't even make it into the Encyclopedia,
      > which
      > >> >> is a
      >
      >> >> >> >> >somewhat poor fate, given that even *excessiveness* has
      > >> its own
      > >> >> >> >> >paragraph. Now,
      *actuality* (wirklichkeit) that is
      > quite a
      > >> >> >> different
      > >> >> >> >> >matter, but actuality is, unlike
      reality, a reflective
      > >> >> >> determination.
      > >> >> >> >> >And exactly *this* would hint at why the finite is not a

      > >> >> veritable
      > >> >> >> >> being.
      > >> >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >> >> >> I haven't got
      > >> >> >> >> >> my text here,
      but that's just about word for word
      > what he
      > >> >> says.
      > >> >> >> >> >> Notice: He makes no reference whatever
      here to
      > >> >> "consciousness"
      > >> >> >> or
      > >> >> >> >> >> "mind"!!! Walter Jaeschke could have done his readers a

      > >> >> favor by
      > >> >> >> >> >> directing them to this passage and using it as the key
      > >> text
      > >> >> for
      > >> >>
      >> >> >> interpreting Hegel's "idealism," as I did in my book.
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> >Yes, he doesn't!!! Why
      should he??? Consciousness is of
      > no
      > >> >> >> concern in
      > >> >> >> >> >that passage!!! Are you saying that
      "consciousness"
      > does not
      > >> >> >> matter
      > >> >> >> >> for
      > >> >> >> >> >Hegel at all??? So we should never ever
      discuss it???
      > >> >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >> >> >I ... take it ... that you actually read Jaeschke's essay
      > >> from
      > >>
      >> >> >> which I
      > >> >> >> >> >quoted, since otherwise you would be implying that the
      > whole
      > >> >> essay
      > >> >>
      >> >> >consists just of the two paragraphs from which I quoted.
      > >> >> >> Needless to
      > >> >> >> >> >say, that's not
      the case. Frankly, I don't recall
      > whether he
      > >> >> cites
      > >> >> >> >> that
      > >> >> >> >> >passage. It's been a
      year since I read it. However, *I*
      > >> cited
      > >> >> it,
      > >> >> >> >> >because I find the passage interesting, though
      hardly a
      > key
      > >> >> >> text. I'm
      > >> >> >> >> >glad for you that it excites you more than it does me.
      > >> >> >>
      >> >
      > >> >> >> >> > Oliver
      > >> >> >> >> >
      > >> >> >> >> >> Best, Bob W
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >>
      >> >> On May 31, 2011, at 1:12 PM, Oliver Scholz wrote:
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> >>> Am 26.05.2011 15:40, schrieb
      Bruce Merrill:
      > >> >> >> >> >>>> Against this parallel,
      > >> >> >> >> >>>> Aristotle is generally taken (and by
      himself) to be
      > less
      > >> >> >> >> idealistic
      > >> >> >> >> >>>> that Plato (e.g. in regard to the forms)
      > >> >> >>
      >> >>>> while Hegel is generally taken (and by himself?) to
      > be
      > >> more
      > >> >> >> >> >>> idealistic
      > >> >> >> >>
      >>>> than Kant.
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>> Well, I suppose Hegel is indeed "generally" taken to
      > be
      > >>
      more
      > >> >> >> >> >>> idealistic
      > >> >> >> >> >>> than Kant, though certainly not by me. And not by
      > >> himself.
      >
      >> >> >> >> >>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>> The very renowned German Hegel scholar and philologist
      > >> >> Walter
      > >> >> >> >>
      Jaeschke
      > >> >> >> >> >>> argues that the whole term "German Idealism" for this
      > >> >> >> >> philosophical
      > >> >> >>
      >> >>> period is a misnomer. (Quotations from: Walter
      > >> Jaeschke: Zum
      > >> >> >> >> Begriff
      > >> >> >> >> >>> des
      >
      >> >> >> >> >>> Idealismus; in: Christoph Halbig, Michael Quante,
      > Ludwig
      > >> >> Siep
      > >> >> >> >> (Hg.):
      > >> >>
      >> >> >>> Hegels Erbe; Frankfurt a. M. (Suhrkamp): 2004; S.
      > >> 164-183.
      > >> >> My
      > >> >> >> >> >>> translations,
      German originals below.)
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>> "''German Idealism' may be German---but it isn't
      > >> >>
      >> >> >>> Idealism.' [Jaeschke is
      > >> >> >> >> >>> quoting himself here; O.S.] Those who understand
      > >> Classical
      >
      >> >> >> german
      > >> >> >> >> >>> Philosophy as 'German Idealism', do not only exclude a
      > >> lot
      > >> >> of
      > >> >> >>
      >> their
      > >> >> >> >> >>> most
      > >> >> >> >> >>> important exponents and undermine the possibility of
      > an
      > >> >>
      >> >> appropriate
      > >> >> >> >> >>> understanding of this most rich, but also complex
      > period
      > >> >> of the
      > >> >>
      >> >> >>> history
      > >> >> >> >> >>> of philosophy -- they also run in danger of loosing
      > from
      > >> >> sight
      > >> >>
      >> >> one of
      > >> >> >> >> >>> the most important and also for current discussions
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      [Auseinandersetzungen] most significant dimensions of
      > >> >> Classical
      > >> >> >> >> German
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      Philosophy: it isn't plainly 'idealism', but it is
      > that
      > >> >> >> period in
      > >> >> >> >> >>> philosophy in which
      the discussion
      > [Auseinandersetzung]
      > >> >> between
      > >> >> >> >> >>> idealism
      > >> >> >> >> >>> and realism took
      place in a new way, in a before
      > unknown
      > >> >> >> >> intensity,
      > >> >> >> >> >>> and
      > >> >> >> >> >>> on before
      unreached heights."
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>> And on Hegel specificially:
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      "It is [...] only half of a truth to call Hegel an
      > >> idealist.
      > >> >> >> The
      > >> >> >> >> other
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      half is his ontological and also epistemological
      > >> realism. He
      > >> >> >> >> holds to
      > >> >> >> >> >>> idealism --
      but he is also the exponent of an
      > >> >> epistemological
      > >> >> >> >> realism:
      > >> >> >> >> >>> The world is in our
      consciousness -- but it is *in our
      > >> >> >> >> >>> consciousness* as
      > >> >> >> >> >>> a world that *transcends
      consciousness*. And this
      > >> >> >> epistemological
      > >> >> >> >> >>> realism presupposes necessarily an ontological

      > realism:
      > >> the
      > >> >> >> >> assumption
      > >> >> >> >> >>> of an existence of the world independend of
      > >>
      consciousness."
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>> Hegel's understanding of idealism is obviously
      > >> peculiar: He
      >
      >> >> >> >> states --
      > >> >> >> >> >>> somewhere in the beginning of the Science of Logic,
      > if my
      > >> >> >> memory

      > >> >> >> >> >>> serves
      > >> >> >> >> >>> -- that *every* philosophy is idealism and that for
      > this
      > >> >> reason

      > >> >> >> >> the
      > >> >> >> >> >>> traditional opposition between realism and idealism is
      > >> >> beside
      > >> >> >>
      the
      > >> >> >> >> >>> point.
      > >> >> >> >> >>> This means by implication that for Hegel even
      > >> philosophical
      > >> >>
      >> >> >>> materialism
      > >> >> >> >> >>> is an idealism. He explicitely gives Thales as an
      > example
      > >> >> for a
      >
      >> >> >> >> >>> philosophy that, surprisingly, turns out to be an
      > >> idealism
      > >> >> in
      > >> >> >> this
      > >> >> >>
      >> >>> account.
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>> Oliver
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>> (Next in line: Hegel's
      *two meanings* of
      > "metaphysics" --
      > >> >> my,
      > >> >> >> my,
      > >> >> >> >> >>> my ...)
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      > >> >>
      >> >> >>> "'Der 'Deutsche Idealismus' mag deutsch sein -- aber
      > er
      > >> ist
      > >> >> >> kein
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      Idealismus.' Wer die Klassische deutsche Philosophie
      > als
      > >> >> >> >> 'Deutschen
      > >> >> >> >> >>> Idealismus'
      versteht, schließt nicht allein etliche
      > ihrer
      > >> >> >> >> wichtigsten
      > >> >> >> >> >>> Repräsentanten aus und
      untergräbt damit die
      > Möglichkeit
      > >> >> ihres
      > >> >> >> >> >>> angemessenen Verständnisses als einer äußerst
      > >>
      >> reichhaltigen und
      > >> >> >> >> auch
      > >> >> >> >> >>> komplexen Epoche der Philosophiegeschichte, er läuft
      > >>
      zudem
      > >> >> >> Gefahr,
      > >> >> >> >> >>> eine
      > >> >> >> >> >>> der wichtigsten, auch für gegenwärtige
      > >>
      Auseinandersetzungen
      > >> >> >> >> >>> bedeutendsten Dimensionen der Klassischen deutschen
      > >> >> Philosophie
      > >> >>
      >> >> aus
      > >> >> >> >> >>> dem
      > >> >> >> >> >>> Blick zu verlieren: Sie ist nicht schlechthin
      > >> 'Idealismus',
      > >>
      >> >> >> sondern
      > >> >> >> >> >>> sie
      > >> >> >> >> >>> ist diejenige Epoche der Philosophie, in der die
      > >> >> >> >>
      Auseinandersetzung
      > >> >> >> >> >>> zwischen Idealismus und Realismus neuer Weise, in
      > zuvor
      > >> >> >> >>
      ungekannter
      > >> >> >> >> >>> Intensität und auf einer zuvor unerreichten Höhenlage
      > >> >> geführt
      > >> >> >> >>
      worden
      > >> >> >> >> >>> ist." S. 165 f.
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>> "Es ist [...] nur die halbe Wahrheit,
      Hegel einen
      > >> >> Idealisten zu
      > >> >> >> >> >>> nennen.
      > >> >> >> >> >>> Die andere Hälfte der Wahrheit ist sein

      > ontologischer und
      > >> >> auch
      > >> >> >> >> >>> epistemologischer Realismus. Er hält am Idealismus
      > fest
      > >> --

      > >> >> >> aber er
      > >> >> >> >> >>> vertritt zugleich einen epistemologischen Realismus:
      > Die
      > >> >> Welt
      > >> >>
      >> ist
      > >> >> >> >> >>> uns im
      > >> >> >> >> >>> Bewusstsein gegeben -- aber sie ist uns *im
      > >> Bewusstsein* als
      >
      >> >> >> eine
      > >> >> >> >> >>> *bewusstseinstranszendente* Welt gegeben. Und dieser
      > >> >> >> >> epistemologische
      >
      >> >> >> >> >>> Realismus setzt notwendig einen ontologischen
      > Realismus
      > >> >> voraus:
      > >> >> >> >> die
      > >> >>
      >> >> >>> Annahme einer vom Bewusstsein unabhängigen Existenz
      > der
      > >> >> Welt."
      > >> >> >> >> S. 180
      > >> >> >> >>
      >>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>>> Bruce
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>>> On 5/26/11, john<jgbardis@...> wrote:
      > >> >> >>
      >> >>>>> I came across Magee's _The Hegel Dictionary_ (2010)
      > >> >> recently.
      > >> >> >> >> This
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
      dictionary is aimed at the undergraduate, as
      > opposed to
      > >> >> >> Inwood's
      > >> >> >> >> >>> dictionary,
      > >> >>
      >> >> >>>>> which is aimed at "graduate students and
      > professional
      > >> >> >> scholars".
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
      > >> >>
      >> >> >>>>> Here is something from Magee's entry on Aristotle:
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> "Turning now to
      Hegel, it may easily be seen that
      > his
      > >> >> >> response
      > >> >> >> >> to
      > >> >> >> >> >>> Kant is
      > >> >> >> >>
      >>>>> structurally similar to Aristotle's response to
      > Plato.
      > >> >> Hegel
      > >> >> >> >> >>> asserts, contra
      > >>
      >> >> >> >>>>> Kant, that phenomena (appearances) do not cut us off
      > >> from
      > >> >> >> >> reality
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
      (things-in-themselves)--just as Aristotle responds
      > to
      > >> >> Plato
      > >> >> >> by
      > >> >> >> >> >>> claiming that
      >
      >> >> >> >> >>>>> sensibles do not cut us off from forms. Instead, for
      > >> both
      > >> >> >> >> >>> Aristotle and
      > >>
      >> >> >> >>>>> Hegel, appearance is just the expression or
      > unfolding
      > >> of
      > >> >> >> reality
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      itself.
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> "According to Hegel, considered in itself the
      > Absolute
      > >> >> Idea
      > >> >> >> of
      > >>
      >> >> >> >>> the Logic
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> (equivalent to Plato's Form of the One/Good) is
      > merely
      > >> >> >>
      ghostly
      > >> >> >> >> >>> and irreal.
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> It only acheives actuality by becoming manifest
      > through
      >
      >> >> the
      > >> >> >> >> world
      > >> >> >> >> >>> of nature
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> [and spirit].
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
      > >> >>
      >> >> >>>>> "Thus, in both Aristotle and Hegel we find a
      > rejection
      > >> >> of the
      > >> >> >> >> >>> idea that the
      >
      >> >> >> >> >>>>> world that appears to our senses somehow cuts us off
      > >> from
      > >> >> >> truth
      > >> >> >> >> >>> or
      from what
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> is real. Instead, nature is seen as the flowering of
      > >> truth
      > >> >> >> and
      > >> >> >>
      >> >>> being.
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> "Furthermore, like Aristotle, Hegel sees nature as a
      > >> >> scale in
      > >> >> >> >>
      >>> which true
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> self-relation or self-consciousness is being
      > >> >> approximated at
      > >> >> >> >>
      >>> every level.
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> For Hegel, however, self-consciousness is fully and
      > >> truly
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      manifested in
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> human Spirit (especially the Absolute Spirit of art,
      > >> >> religion
      > >> >> >> >>
      and
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> philosophy). Hegel thus immanentizes Aristotle's
      > >> >> transcendent
      > >> >> >> >> >>> God,
      insisting
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> that God in fact is actualized through human Spirit
      > >> >> itself.
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      Though this
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> seems like a radical revision of Aristotle, one
      > might
      > >> >> argue
      > >> >> >> that

      > >> >> >> >> >>> Hegel has
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> only made Aristotle more Aristotelian. The
      > opposition
      > >> of
      > >>
      >> the
      > >> >> >> >> >>> disembodied
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> Unmoved Mover to the world that only imperfectly
      > >> >> >>
      approximates it
      > >> >> >> >> >>> is a
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> vestige, it seems, of Platonism.
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
      > >> >>
      >> >> >>>>> "Hegel insists, however, that actuality--all
      > >> actuality--is
      > >> >> >> only
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      actualized
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> in and through nature, and human nature. Hegel
      > asserts,
      > >> >> >> further,
      > >> >>
      >> >> >>> that human
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> Spirit develops and comes to realize itself through
      > >> >> history.
      > >> >>
      >> >> >>> Aristotle, by
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> contrast, treats human beings much as he treats
      > every
      > >> >> other
      >
      >> >> >> >> being
      > >> >> >> >> >>> in nature:
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> as an eternal, unchanging species. Aristotle has
      >
      >> little to
      > >> >> >> say
      > >> >> >> >> >>> about the
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> historical development of humanity.
      > >> >>
      >> >> >>>>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> "One can thus see that despite significant
      > differences,
      > >> >> there
      > >> >> >> >>
      are
      > >> >> >> >> >>> striking
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> structural similarities between the central
      > >> metaphysical
      > >>
      >> >> ideas
      > >> >> >> >> of
      > >> >> >> >> >>> Aristotle,
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> and those of Hegel. Hegel seems to have
      been fully
      > >> aware
      > >> >> of
      > >> >> >> >> these.
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> "There are also many
      other similarities between
      > the two
      > >> >> >> >> thinkers.
      > >> >> >> >> >>> For
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> example,
      Hegel's Philosophy of Right insists that
      > >> ethics
      > >> >> is a
      > >> >> >> >> >>> political
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
      inquiry--that it has little meaning apart from a
      > social
      > >> >> >> context
      > >> >> >> >> >>> that serves
      > >> >> >>
      >> >>>>> to concretize moral rules and hone the judgement of
      > >> moral
      > >> >> >> >> agents.
      > >> >> >> >> >>> In
      fact,
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> this is one of the more famous claims made by
      > >> Aristotle in
      > >> >> >> his
      > >> >> >> >>
      >>> Nicomachean
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>> Ethics."
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
      > >> >> >> >>
      >>>>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      > >> >> >> >> >>>
      > >> >> >> >> >> Robert Wallace
      > >>
      >> >> >> >> website: www.robertmwallace.com
      > >> >> >> >> >> email: bob@...
      > >> >> >> >> >> phone: 414-
      617-3914
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      > >> >>
      >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> >> [Non-text portions of
      this message have been removed]
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      > >> >> >> >> >>
      ------------------------------------
      > >> >> >> >> >>
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    • Robert Wallace
      Hi Beat, Yes, I agree that true infinity is hardly yet the Concept or Spirit. My suggestion is only that ... The germ being the process whereby something
      Message 2 of 7 , Jun 3, 2011
        Hi Beat,

        Yes, I agree that true infinity is hardly yet the Concept or Spirit.
        My suggestion is only that

        >> True infinity contains the germ of the idea of Spirit, and
        >> thus the germ of the idea of God.


        The "germ" being the process whereby something finite constitutes
        (through Aufhebung/sublation) something infinite, showing us what true
        "transcendence" (transcendence that doesn't fall into a spurious
        infinity) would be and thus what ultimately a true "Spirit" and God
        would be.

        To develop this "germ" into Spirit itself, Hegel first has to explore
        its alienation in Quantity, Essence, Nature and so forth.

        In this sense I agree with you that

        >> So, as you write:
        >> 'transcendence doesn't need to be a spurious infinity". However,
        >> taken as 'true infinity' from the Logic of Being it
        >> is.


        There is still an unresolved "Other," in the Logic of Being, as we
        discover when true infinity "collapses" into the One, and in that
        sense true infinity is not yet true.

        When you say that

        >> , the problem is that the sublation in the Logic
        >> of Being - and here 'true infinity' is thematic - is always
        >> accompanied by the loss of the Other. So, 'true infinity'
        >> falls back into the One. It is this aporia in the Logic of Being we
        >> also find in Plato's Socrates' dialogues.


        I would like to know, in what sense is the Other "lost" in the Logic
        of Being? (And I'd also naturally like to know how you see this aporia
        functioning in Plato's Socratic dialogues.)

        Best, Bob


        On Jun 3, 2011, at 2:18 AM, greuterb@... wrote:

        > ----Urspr�ngliche Nachricht----
        > Von: bob@...
        > Datum: 02.06.2011 15:38
        > An: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
        >
        > Betreff: Re: [hegel] "Idealism"
        >
        > Hello Alan,
        >
        > On Jun 1, 2011, at 10:35 PM, Alan Ponikvar wrote:
        >
        > > Hi Bob,
        > >
        >
        > > To call God the true infinite is to me meaningless speech. There
        > is no
        > > reason to label the true infinite in this
        > way. Your theological
        > > enthusiasm
        > > is without reason.
        >
        > Alan, is it meaningless speech to you to call _Absolute
        > Spirit_ "God"?
        > Yes or no, please. If Yes, then I give up. I have explained this
        > enough times. You don't have to
        > agree that Absolute Spirit is God, in
        > order to see how how someone might think this, and thus how the
        > suggestion
        > has meaning. If No--if you _can_ see how the suggestion
        > that Absolute Spirit is God has meaning--then you should be
        > able to
        > see the connection to true infinity. Absolute Spirit is the ultimate
        > iteration of true infinity: as the
        > finite goes beyond itself and thus
        > constitutes true infinity, so Nature goes beyond itself and thus
        > constitutes
        > Spirit. Thus the pattern of transcendence that we first
        > see clearly in true infinity, is the pattern by which God is,
        > as
        > Spirit. True infinity contains the germ of the idea of Spirit, and
        > thus the germ of the idea of God.
        >
        > > What the
        > true infinite is most like in Hegel's universe
        > > is spirit in that what is before us is not merely present but
        > >
        > signifies.
        > > But spirit is not a transcendent entity.
        >
        > Of course Spirit is not a transcendent entity. It's not an
        > entity!! If
        > it were an entity, it would a spurious infinity; it wouldn't transcend
        > anything, because entities as
        > such are finite. Because it's _not_ an
        > entity, it's able to transcend nature. It transcends nature by being
        >
        > nature's going beyond itself [�ber sich selbst hinausgehen] and thus
        > being nature's achievement of being.
        >
        > > If there
        > is one thing that is
        > > true about Hegel's philosophy it is that it is a philosophy of
        > > immanence.
        >
        > Yeah, I know this
        > is your fundamental dogma. I don't think you've
        > given me any reason to accept it. I also have yet to see you
        > comment
        > on the Hegelian notion of transcendence, transcendence as true
        > infinity, that I explained on p. 100 of my
        > book (relying on my account
        > of true infinity on p. 77). Because Hegel is a thinker of Aufhebung,
        > of sublation (and
        > consequently of "going beyond oneself" [�ber sich
        > selbst hinausgehen]), Hegel is a thinker of transcendence.
        >
        > Transcendence is the vertical dimension that's expressed by the "auf"
        > and the "�ber."
        >
        > >
        > > As for Eckhart chew on
        > this:
        > >
        > > "motionless detachment makes a man superlatively godlike. For God is
        > > God
        > > because of his motionless
        > detachment; he gets his purity and his
        > > simplicity and his unchangeableness from his detachment. If, then, a
        > > man
        > >
        > is going to be like God, so far as any creature can resemble God, it
        > > will
        > > be by detachment. This leads to purity,
        > and from purity to
        > > simplicity, and
        > > from simplicity to immovablility."
        > >
        > > From the "Best of Meister Echart" pg.
        > 91.
        > >
        > > It seems that Eckhart has done nothing more than meditate on the
        > > notion of
        > > transcendence, coming up with
        > this.
        >
        > Absolutely. In this discussion, you're the one who believes that to
        > meditate on transcendence is ipso facto to
        > be committed to a spurious
        > infinity. You need to show me why I should agree with you on this! As
        > I see it, _Hegel_
        > meditates on the notion of transcendence, and comes
        > up with Aufhebung/sublation and true infinity. So transcendence
        >
        > doesn't need to be a spurious infinity.
        >
        > Bob,
        >
        > You are right. However, the problem is that the sublation in the Logic
        > of Being - and here 'true infinity' is thematic - is always
        > accompanied by the loss of the Other. So, 'true infinity'
        > falls back into the One. It is this aporia in the Logic of Being we
        > also find in Plato's Socrates' dialogues. So, the
        > Logic of Being has to be abandoned. This already Aristotles tried in
        > his metaphysics. But since he did not really
        > abandoned the immediate truth of Being in thought his procedure is
        > uncritical. Only with Kant Being get only
        > appearance. But with this he abandons also the ontological question,
        > that is, he leaves behind the aporia as a
        > philosophically unappealing contradiction. Now, Hegel shows in his
        > Logic of the Essence that the relations of
        > reflection dialectically observed (and not left behind as an
        > unsolvable contradiction) leads to the absolute necessity
        > of the substance without any freedom. Only the jump into the unity
        > of Being and Essence as the Concept in its own
        > IMMANENT movement brings back the freedom of thought. But this
        > immanence is not the immanence of consciousness and not
        > the immanence of substance but the immanence of thought. So, the
        > immanence of thought is at the same time the
        > transcendency of consiousness and substance. But with this it is
        > also said that true infinity as true freedom is no
        > longer a mere objective in-itself (God) but the movement of the
        > concept in its own objectification. So, as you write:
        > 'transcendence doesn't need to be a spurious infinity". However,
        > taken as 'true infinity' from the Logic of Being it
        > is.
        >
        > Regards,
        > Beat
        >
        > > On 6/1/11 10:22 PM, "Robert Wallace" <bob@...> wrote:
        > >
        > > >Hi Alan,
        > > >
        > > >On
        > Jun 1, 2011, at 7:53 PM, Alan Ponikvar wrote:
        > > >
        > > >> Hi Bob,
        > > >>
        > > >> You still seem to want to have it both ways.
        > God is transcendent
        > > and
        > > >> yet
        > > >> what is in front of us.
        > > >
        > > >God is in front of us in the sense that God
        > (meaning True Infinity,
        > > >Absolute Idea, Absolute Spirit) is what is true in the finite,
        > > Nature,
        > > >etc.--things
        > that are commonly said to be in front of us ("manifest,"
        > > >as you put it). God is transcendent in the sense that God
        > is the
        > > >finite's _going beyond_ itself (which it has to do in order to
        > "be":
        > > >"finitude _is_ only as a going beyond
        > itself" [�ber sich selbst
        > > >hinausgehen]; SL 145, quoted on my p.97), and Nature's going beyond
        > > >itself, and so
        > forth. These two propositions are perfectly
        > > compatible.
        > > >This is how Hegel goes beyond the conventional,
        > spuriously infinite
        > > >way of thinking about the relation between us and God, with its
        > > >contrast between what is
        > supposedly manifest (nature, etc.) and what
        > > >is supposedly veiled (God).
        > > >
        > > >> On my reading, what is in front of
        > us as the truth
        > > >> of the dialectic of the finite and infinite is what was behind us
        > > as
        > > >> our
        > > >> own
        > thinking of the paradoxical relation of the two. What this
        > > might
        > > >> have
        > > >> to do with god truly transcends
        > what I am able to comprehend. As
        > > for
        > > >> Eckhart, he strikes me as a bad infinite theologian. I have not
        > > read
        >
        > > >> what
        > > >> Hegel has to say about him and I am too tired to look at this
        > > point.
        > > >
        > > >Hegel is reported to
        > have said about Eckhart, "There, indeed, we have
        > > >what we want!" (p.256 n22 in my book) As far as I know he made no
        > >
        > >published comments about Eckhart; he discovered Eckhart only late.
        > > >Perhaps you could indicate what doctrine or
        > statement of Eckhart's
        > > >suggests to you a bad infinity.
        > > >
        > > >Best, Bob
        > > >
        > > >> But
        > > >> as I mentioned to Oliver,
        > Hegel has this curious habit of praising
        > > >> thoughts - even calling them speculative achievements - when they
        > >
        > were
        > > >> clearly not meant as such by the original author. Whether he does
        > > this
        > > >> with Eckhart remains to be
        > seen.
        > > >>
        > > >> Regards, Alan
        > > >>
        > > >> On 6/1/11 7:22 PM, "Robert Wallace" <bob@...>
        > wrote:
        > > >>
        > > >>
        > >Hi Alan,
        > > >> >
        > > >> >Responses below.
        > > >> >
        > > >> >On Jun 1, 2011, at 2:29 PM, Alan Ponikvar wrote:
        > > >> >
        > > >> >> Hi
        > Bob,
        > > >> >>
        > > >> >> In looking at page 98 my impression is that you want to have
        > it
        > > >> both
        > > >> >> ways.
        > > >> >>
        > That is, since you do not offer a speculative reconception of
        > > >> >> transcendence - something that you say we need to
        > do - you
        > > simply
        > > >> stay
        > > >> >> with the conventional sense and employ it in a contradictory
        > > >> fashion.
        > > >>
        > >> Thus, you use 'false' - never a good idea when we are speaking
        > > >> about a
        > > >> >> Hegelian exposition - to label
        > what Hegel has to say about the
        > > >> unhappy
        > > >> >> consciousness and yet want to hold on to the notion that true
        > > >>
        > infinity
        > > >> >> might nonetheless refer to a transcendent god.
        > > >> >
        > > >> >Alan, I use "false" on that page only as
        > part of the expression,
        > > >> "what
        > > >> >is false in," which (as I've explained a couple of times now)
        > > implies
        > > >>
        > >a critique, a sublation, not a flat rejection.
        > > >> >
        > > >> >> So how is this true
        > > >> >> conception different from
        > the false? They look pretty much the
        > > same
        > > >> >> to me.
        > > >> >
        > > >> >The true-infinity conception of transcendence
        > understands it as
        > > the
        > > >> >self-surpassing of what is transcended. "Infinity is only as a
        > > >> >transcending of
        > the finite" (SL Miller pp. 145-6; WL Suhrkamp
        > > 5:160).
        > > >> >I explain this in the long paragraph on p. 100, which
        > in turn
        > > draws
        > > >> on
        > > >> >my initial presentation of true infinity on pp. 77-8. This
        > > obviously
        > > >> >is quite
        > different from the conventional conception of
        > > transcendence,
        > > >> >which makes the transcendent a separate being
        > from that which it
        > > >> >(supposedly) transcends.
        > > >> >
        > > >> >>
        > > >> >> You go on to speak about transcendence but as
        > far as I can see
        > > do
        > > >> not
        > > >> >> really offer a reconception.
        > > >> >
        > > >> >See the long paragraph on p. 100, as
        > above.
        > > >> >
        > > >> >>
        > > >> >>
        > > >> >> For Hegel, reconceptions replace conventional dichotomies with
        > > >> >> identities
        >
        > > >> >> of mutually implicating differences. To transcend the
        > opposition
        > > >> >> between
        > > >> >> the finite and
        > infinite we need simply to recollect or look at
        > > what
        > > >> >> is in
        > > >> >> front of us such that the movement of
        > thought between the finite
        > > >> and
        > > >> >> infinite is not just what we do in trying to grasp these
        > thought
        > > >> >>
        > items but
        > > >> >> is in fact an essential moment of what is in view. Thus to
        > > >> transcend
        > > >> >> is
        > > >> >> not to
        > move away from or beyond or above what is in view. It
        > > is to
        > > >> >> recollect what is in view in view of the
        > movement of thought. In
        > > >> >> effect,
        > > >> >> it is to stay closer to what actually is manifest.
        > > >> >>
        > > >> >> The
        > problem with wanting to find theological references within
        > > >> Hegel's
        > > >> >> work is that it encourages us to look
        > at what is in front of
        > > us as
        > > >> >> if it
        > > >> >> points to a truth that transcends what is manifest. It is to
        > >
        > >> >> reinstitute
        > > >> >> the veil of appearance that separates us from the true.
        > > >> >
        > > >> >This would be the case
        > only if the theological reference
        > > proceeded in
        > > >> >the spurious-infinity way, contrasting "what is manifest"
        > with
        > > "what
        > > >> >transcends what is manifest." But as I just explained, Hegel's
        > > >> revised
        > > >> >conception of
        > transcendence does not proceed in that way. For
        > > Hegel,
        > > >> >"what is in front of us" is the infinite, and is God
        > (when that
        > > term
        > > >> >is properly understood), as much as anything else. There is no
        > > veil.
        > > >> >
        > > >> >
        > > >>
        > >> But this divide
        > > >> >> that would place us on one side and the absolute apart on the
        > > >> other is
        > > >> >>
        > according to Hegel the primary error of the understanding. Here
        > > >> with
        > > >> >> the
        > > >> >> divide between the finite
        > and infinite we have the divide that
        > > >> seems
        > > >> >> to
        > > >> >> inform theological thinking.
        > > >> >
        > > >> >Such a
        > divide informs only the aspect of theological thinking that
        > > >> >Hegel criticizes. It does not inform the aspect that
        > he
        > > preserves. He
        > > >> >clearly believes that such theologians as Meister Eckhart are
        > > free of
        > > >> >the errors
        > that he criticizes. As Stephen Theron often says, there
        > > >> are
        > > >> >more things in traditional theology than you
        > seem to be aware of.
        > > >> >
        > > >> >Best, Bob
        > > >> >
        > > >> >
        > > >> >> What Hegel tells us is that this divide is
        > > >> >>
        > not the ultimate truth. So unless the theologically minded
        > > have a
        > > >> >> way of
        > > >> >> finessing this divide it
        > would appear that this is as good a
        > > place
        > > >> >> as any
        > > >> >> to read Hegel as offering a 'critique' of
        > religious belief as
        > > >> >> practiced by
        > > >> >> the vast majority of believers.
        > > >> >>
        > > >> >> Regards, Alan
        > > >> >>
        >
        > > >> >> On 6/1/11 2:52 PM, "Robert Wallace" <bob@...>
        > > wrote:
        > > >> >>
        > > >> >> >Hi Alan,
        > > >> >> >
        > >
        > >> >> >Responses below.
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >On Jun 1, 2011, at 1:00 PM, Alan Ponikvar wrote:
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> Hi
        > Bob,
        > > >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> I am looking at pages 97-8 of your 'infamous' chapter 3. On
        > > >> page 97
        > > >> >> >> you
        > > >>
        > >> >> say: "finite things achieve full reality only through their
        > > >> >> >> relationship
        > > >> >> >> to the infinite:
        > that : finitude is only as a transcending of
        > > >> >> >> itself.""
        > > >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> You then say: "It is not an
        > accident that explicitly
        > > >> >> "naturalistic" or
        > > >> >> >> atheistic interpretations of Hegel ignore his critique of
        > the
        > > >> >> finite."
        > > >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> Then in footnote #38 you state: "But although true infinite
        > > is
        > > >> >>
        > >> indeed not
        > > >> >> >> "external to" the finite (as the spurious infinity tries to
        > > >> be), it
        > > >> >> >> does
        > > >>
        > >> >> "transcend" the finite. And in the Philosophy of Spirit,
        > > Hegel
        > > >> >> >> describes
        > > >> >> >> Spirit as a
        > "coming back out of Nature", to itself and the
        > > >> >> "positing
        > > >> >> >> of
        > > >> >> >> Nature as its [Spirit's]
        > world".
        > > >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> Now comes your surprise: "We need to determine what Hegel
        > > >> means by
        > > >> >> >> these
        >
        > > >> >> >> formulations, and in the absence of other suggestions, it
        > is
        > > >> >> >> reasonable to
        > > >> >> >> think that
        > he means them to capture what is true in the
        > > >> traditional
        > > >> >> >> notion
        > > >> >> >> of divine transcendence."
        > >
        > >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> I take this to mean that given the normal state of
        > affairs in
        > > >> >> Hegelian
        > > >> >> >>
        > scholarship - that there is no clear explanation of what
        > > Hegel
        > > >> >> means
        > > >> >> >> in
        > > >> >> >> the
        > literature (something you mention in your post to Oliver)
        > > >> - an
        > > >> >> >> opening
        > > >> >> >> is created for a
        > theological reading of the true infinite.
        > > >> Thus I
        > > >> >> take
        > > >> >> >> your reference to 'the traditional notion
        > of divine
        > > >> transcendence'
        > > >> >> >> as an
        > > >> >> >> endorsement of the conventional theological notion.
        > > >> >> >
        >
        > > >> >> >Alan, when I refer to "the traditional notion of divine
        > > >> >> transcendence"
        > > >> >> >I refer to "_what is
        > true in_" that notion. That is, the
        > > portion
        > > >> of
        > > >> >> it
        > > >> >> >that is true, as distinct from the portion
        > that is false. I
        > > make
        > > >> this
        > > >> >> >clear in the next paragraph, on p. 98, of the text to which
        > > this
        > > >>
        > >> >footnote pertains: "What is _false_ in traditional
        > > conceptions of
        > > >> >> >transcendence and in traditional
        > religion, Hegel brings out by
        > > >> >> >criticizing a conception of God as _merely_ transcendent, as
        > > >> simply a
        > > >>
        > >> >'beyond.' ... his objection to the 'spurious infinity.'...
        > > [next
        > > >> >> >paragraph:] how Hegel simultaneously
        > defends _and criticizes_
        > > >> >> >traditional theism."
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >Thus I am simultaneously endorsing _what is
        > true in_ the
        > > >> conventional
        > > >> >> >theological notion, and rejecting what's false in it.
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> What
        > else you do
        > > >> >> >> expect your reader to think? In my view, this is nothing
        > more
        > > >> >> than a
        > > >> >> >> matter
        > of confusing the bad for the true infinite.
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >See above.
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> I,
        > of course, favor what you refer to as a naturalistic or
        > > >> >> atheistic
        > > >> >> >> reading. Moreover, I have a
        > question directed to those who
        > > would
        > > >> >> read
        > > >> >> >> Hegel as a theological thinker: What is lost if we
        > simply
        > > delete
        > > >> >> all
        > > >> >> >> of
        > > >> >> >> Hegel's asides or gratuitous references to God throughout
        > the
        > >
        > >> Logic
        > > >> >> >> and
        > > >> >> >> the other parts of the system? Put another way, does god
        > the
        > > >> >> concept
        > > >> >>
        > >> do
        > > >> >> >> any work within the system itself?
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >I have granted you in past discussions that "God
        > the concept"
        > > does
        > > >> >> not
        > > >> >> >as such play any role within the system itself. The Absolute
        > > >> Idea and
        > >
        > >> >> >Absolute Spirit--these play major roles. But unlike you, I
        > > don't
        > > >> >> think
        > > >> >> >Hegel is merely
        > covering his ass by introducing "gratuitous
        > > >> >> >references" to "God" in his Remarks in the SL and
        > elsewhere. I
        > >
        > >> take
        > > >> >> >his Remarks as explaining how his systematic development
        > > >> relates, in
        > > >> >> >his view, to
        > conventional religious discourse. It relates to
        > > such
        > > >> >> >discourse by capturing what's true in it, while
        > rejecting
        > > >> (implicitly
        > > >> >> >criticizing) what's false in it.
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> My impression is that it does
        > not and
        > > >> >> >> never rises above the level of illustration, an
        > illustration
        > > >> that
        > > >> >> in
        > > >> >> >> my
        > > >>
        > >> >> view by making so much of what speculatively speaking is
        > > really
        > > >> >> of no
        > > >> >> >> matter suggests that
        > Hegel speaks about god rhetorically for
        > > >> >> >> purposes that
        > > >> >> >> have to do with certain 'realities' that
        > anyone would have
        > > had
        > > >> to
        > > >> >> deal
        > > >> >> >> with in his time.
        > > >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> I could be wrong so
        > my invitation is sincere. Where is god in
        > > >> the
        > > >> >> >> system?
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >See my just previous remarks.
        > "God" as such is not in the
        > > >> system, but
        > > >> >> >Hegel believes that the system will show believers in "God"
        > >
        > what
        > > >> it
        > > >> >> is
        > > >> >> >that they should really believe in (because it contains the
        > > truth,
        > > >> >> and
        > >
        > >> >> >omits the falsehood, in what they say they believe in), and
        > > will
        > > >> show
        > > >> >> >unbelievers in "God"
        > what it is that they are overlooking.
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >This is the same line that I pursue, of course, in the
        > > >>
        > Introduction
        > > >> >> >that I posted here recently to my _The God Within Us_.
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >Best, Bob
        > > >> >> >
        > >
        > >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> In the Philosophy of Religion and in his other references
        > to
        > > >> >> >> religion it
        > > >> >> >>
        > seems evident that Hegel is always concerned about picture
        > > >> >> thinking.
        > > >> >> >> He
        > > >> >> >> cannot discuss
        > religion except in light of this feature.
        > > >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> Regards, Alan
        > > >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> On 6/1/11 7:31 AM,
        > "Robert Wallace" <bob@...>
        > > >> wrote:
        > > >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >Hello Alan and all,
        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >>
        > >> >In fact I treasure Hegel's account of the interrelation of
        > > >> >> "finite"
        > > >> >> >> >and "infinite" in the true
        > infinity, which is reflected in
        > > the
        > > >> >> quotes
        > > >> >> >> >that you give. His remark, which I also treasure,
        > about the
        > > >> >> finite's
        > > >> >> >> >lacking "true being," reflects this interrelation. Rather
        > > than
        > > >> >> >>
        > >replacing the finite with the infinite, he sees the finite
        > > >> being
        > > >> >> >> >sublated by the infinite. In this
        > way the finite does
        > > indeed,
        > > >> as
        > > >> >> he
        > > >> >> >> >says, "find itself born anew."
        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >>
        > >Thus when you suggest that
        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >> It [the true infinite] is not as Bob suggests the
        > > >>
        > possibility of
        > > >> >> >> >> creating an opening for a theological conception of the
        > > >> >> infinite.
        > > >> >> >> The
        > >
        > >> >> >> >> theological conception is really just one way of
        > > >> >> characterizing the
        > > >> >> >> >> bad
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > infinite.
        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >your guess as to what I have in mind is mistaken. The
        > > >> "theological
        >
        > > >> >> >> >conception" that you have in mind is not what I have in
        > > mind. I
        > > >> >> make
        > > >> >> >> >this very
        > clear in my (infamous) chapter 3, in which I
        > > >> emphasize
        > > >> >> >> >Hegel's critique of conventional theology as
        > promoting a
        > > >> spurious
        > > >> >> >> >infinity.
        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >Best, Bob W.
        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >On May
        > 31, 2011, at 11:08 PM, Alan Ponikvar wrote:
        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >> Hi Oliver,
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> I think
        > Bob's fixation on Hegel's remark about the finite
        > > >> >> having no
        > > >> >> >> >> veritable being creates a
        > misimpression. In fact, the most
        > > >> >> >> interesting
        > > >> >> >> >> passages about the finite and infinite are in
        > the
        > > preceding
        > > >> >> remark.
        > > >> >> >> >> I will
        > > >> >> >> >> pick out a few of the more interesting remarks.
        > >
        > >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> "the finite, over and beyond itself, falls into the
        > > infinite,
        > > >> >> but
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > that,
        > > >> >> >> >> over and beyond this infinite, it equally finds itself
        > > born
        > > >> >> anew;
        > > >> >> >> >> hence,
        >
        > > >> >> >> >> that it rejoins itself there, as is also the case for
        > the
        > > >> >> >> infinite -
        > > >> >> >> >> so
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> that this same negation of negation results in
        > > affirmation, a
        > > >> >> >> result
        > > >> >> >> >> that
        > > >> >> >>
        > >> thereby proves itself to be their truth and point of
        > > >> origin. In
        > > >> >> >> this
        > > >> >> >> >> being
        > > >> >> >>
        > >> which is thus the ideality of the distinct moments, the
        > > >> >> >> >> contradiction has
        > > >> >> >> >> not vanished
        > abstractly, but is resolved and reconciled,
        > > >> and the
        > > >> >> >> >> thoughts,
        > > >> >> >> >> while left intact, are
        > also brought together."
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> "the infinite is rather for itself just as much finite
        > as
        > > >> >>
        > >> infinite."
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> "the infinite goes out of itself into the finite
        > because,
        > > >> in the
        > > >> >>
        > >> way
        > > >> >> >> >> it is
        > > >> >> >> >> grasped as abstract unity, it has no truth in it, no
        > > >> standing;
        > > >> >>
        > and
        > > >> >> >> >> conversely, the finite goes forth into the infinite for
        > > the
        > > >> same
        > > >> >> >> >> reason."
        > > >>
        > >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> "If the unity is not taken abstractly and
        > indeterminately,
        > > >> but
        > > >> >> >> >> rather, as
        > >
        > >> >> >> >> in the presupposition, as the determinate unity of the
        > > finite
        > > >> >> and
        > > >> >> >> the
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > infinite, the distinguishing of these two is also present
        > > >> in it.
        > > >> >> >> And
        > > >> >> >> >> this
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > distinguishing is not one that would also let them go
        > > loose,
        > > >> >> each
        > > >> >> >> >> subsisting separately, but
        > it rather leaves them in the
        > > >> unity as
        > > >> >> >> >> idealized. This unity of the infinite and the finite,
        > > and
        > the
        > > >> >> >> >> distinguishing of them, are inseparable, in the same way
        > > as
        > > >> the
        > > >> >> >> >> finite and
        > >
        > >> >> >> >> the infinite."
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> As I understand Bob's claim, if we fix our attention on
        > > the
        >
        > > >> fact
        > > >> >> >> >> that the
        > > >> >> >> >> finite has no veritable being this creates an opening
        > for
        > > >> what
        > > >>
        > >> does
        > > >> >> >> >> has
        > > >> >> >> >> being: the infinite. But the true infinite is the
        > > identity in
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > difference
        > > >> >> >> >> of the finite and infinite. It is not as Bob suggests
        > the
        > > >> >> >> >> possibility of
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> creating an opening for a theological conception of the
        > > >> >> infinite.
        > > >> >> >> The
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > theological conception is really just one way of
        > > >> >> characterizing the
        > > >> >> >> >> bad
        > > >> >> >> >> infinite.
        > >
        > >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> Regards, Alan
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> On 5/31/11 8:43 PM, "Oliver Scholz"
        > <epameinondas@...>
        > > >> wrote:
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> >Here we go again ...
        > > >> >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >> >Am
        > 31.05.2011 22:52, schrieb Robert Wallace:
        > > >> >> >> >> >> Of course the question is, what do we mean, and what
        > >
        > does
        > > >> >> Hegel
        > > >> >> >> >> mean,
        > > >> >> >> >> >> by "idealism"? Hegel states in the passage to which
        > > Oliver
        >
        > > >> >> >> referred
        > > >> >> >> >> >> at the end of the SL Quality chapter's discussion of
        > > >> >> Infinity,
        > > >> >> >>
        > that
        > > >> >> >> >> >> "idealism" is the doctrine that the finite is not
        > real.
        > > >> >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >> >Weellll,
        > actually -- in *my* edition I have:
        > > >> >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >> >"The statement that the *finite* is *ideal*
        > constitutes
        > > >> >> >> *idealism*."
        > > >> >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >> >"Der Satz, da� das *Endliche ideell* ist, macht den
        >
        > > >> >> *Idealismus*
        > > >> >> >> >> aus."
        > > >> >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >> >Taken naively this would mean that in Hegel's
        > view
        > > idealism
        > > >> >> would
        > > >> >> >> >> take
        > > >> >> >> >> >the finite as its principle.
        > > >> >> >> >> >
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >Of course, this passage continues: "The idealism of
        > > >> philosophie
        > > >> >> >> >> consists
        > > >> >> >> >> >in
        > nothing other than not acknowledging the finite as a
        > > >> >> veritable
        > > >> >> >> >> being."
        > > >> >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >>
        > >> >Together with the reading above that would suggest that
        > > >> Hegel
        > > >> >> has
        > > >> >> >> >> little
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > >regard for idealism, since it would have as its principle
        > > >> >> >> something
        > > >> >> >> >> that
        > > >> >> >> >> >is
        > not a veritable being. Fortunately this reading is
        > > >> >> thwarted by,
        > > >> >> >> >> >presumably, quite a lot of other
        > passages by Hegel
        > > >> throughout
        > > >> >> his
        > > >> >> >> >> works,
        > > >> >> >> >> >including the whole passage that
        > follows these two
        > > >> sentences.
        > > >> >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >> >So this kind of approach to the text is out. The
        > >
        > passage can
        > > >> >> >> >> obviously
        > > >> >> >> >> >not mean "finite = ideal". It can not be concluded from
        > > that
        > >
        > >> >> >> sentence
        > > >> >> >> >> >that the finite is not real.
        > > >> >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >> >Besides, I wouldn't know
        > why. Reality is a comparatively
        > > >> >> >> >> uninteresting
        > > >> >> >> >> >category that doesn't even have its own
        > place in the
        > > table
        > > >> of
        > > >> >> >> >> contents
        > > >> >> >> >> >and occurs just as an afterthought to quality --
        > where it
        > > >> >> indeed
        > > >> >> >> >> >belongs. It didn't even make it into the Encyclopedia,
        > > which
        > > >> >> is a
        > >
        > >> >> >> >> >somewhat poor fate, given that even *excessiveness* has
        > > >> its own
        > > >> >> >> >> >paragraph. Now,
        > *actuality* (wirklichkeit) that is
        > > quite a
        > > >> >> >> different
        > > >> >> >> >> >matter, but actuality is, unlike
        > reality, a reflective
        > > >> >> >> determination.
        > > >> >> >> >> >And exactly *this* would hint at why the finite is
        > not a
        >
        > > >> >> veritable
        > > >> >> >> >> being.
        > > >> >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >> >> I haven't got
        > > >> >> >> >> >> my text here,
        > but that's just about word for word
        > > what he
        > > >> >> says.
        > > >> >> >> >> >> Notice: He makes no reference whatever
        > here to
        > > >> >> "consciousness"
        > > >> >> >> or
        > > >> >> >> >> >> "mind"!!! Walter Jaeschke could have done his
        > readers a
        >
        > > >> >> favor by
        > > >> >> >> >> >> directing them to this passage and using it as the
        > key
        > > >> text
        > > >> >> for
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >> interpreting Hegel's "idealism," as I did in my book.
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> >Yes, he doesn't!!! Why
        > should he??? Consciousness is of
        > > no
        > > >> >> >> concern in
        > > >> >> >> >> >that passage!!! Are you saying that
        > "consciousness"
        > > does not
        > > >> >> >> matter
        > > >> >> >> >> for
        > > >> >> >> >> >Hegel at all??? So we should never ever
        > discuss it???
        > > >> >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >> >I ... take it ... that you actually read Jaeschke's
        > essay
        > > >> from
        > > >>
        > >> >> >> which I
        > > >> >> >> >> >quoted, since otherwise you would be implying that the
        > > whole
        > > >> >> essay
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >consists just of the two paragraphs from which I quoted.
        > > >> >> >> Needless to
        > > >> >> >> >> >say, that's not
        > the case. Frankly, I don't recall
        > > whether he
        > > >> >> cites
        > > >> >> >> >> that
        > > >> >> >> >> >passage. It's been a
        > year since I read it. However, *I*
        > > >> cited
        > > >> >> it,
        > > >> >> >> >> >because I find the passage interesting, though
        > hardly a
        > > key
        > > >> >> >> text. I'm
        > > >> >> >> >> >glad for you that it excites you more than it does me.
        > > >> >> >>
        > >> >
        > > >> >> >> >> > Oliver
        > > >> >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >> >> Best, Bob W
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >>
        > >> >> On May 31, 2011, at 1:12 PM, Oliver Scholz wrote:
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> Am 26.05.2011 15:40, schrieb
        > Bruce Merrill:
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>> Against this parallel,
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>> Aristotle is generally taken (and by
        > himself) to be
        > > less
        > > >> >> >> >> idealistic
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>> that Plato (e.g. in regard to the forms)
        > > >> >> >>
        > >> >>>> while Hegel is generally taken (and by himself?) to
        > > be
        > > >> more
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> idealistic
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > >>>> than Kant.
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> Well, I suppose Hegel is indeed "generally" taken to
        > > be
        > > >>
        > more
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> idealistic
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> than Kant, though certainly not by me. And not by
        > > >> himself.
        > >
        > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> The very renowned German Hegel scholar and
        > philologist
        > > >> >> Walter
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > Jaeschke
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> argues that the whole term "German Idealism" for
        > this
        > > >> >> >> >> philosophical
        > > >> >> >>
        > >> >>> period is a misnomer. (Quotations from: Walter
        > > >> Jaeschke: Zum
        > > >> >> >> >> Begriff
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> des
        > >
        > >> >> >> >> >>> Idealismus; in: Christoph Halbig, Michael Quante,
        > > Ludwig
        > > >> >> Siep
        > > >> >> >> >> (Hg.):
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >>> Hegels Erbe; Frankfurt a. M. (Suhrkamp): 2004; S.
        > > >> 164-183.
        > > >> >> My
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> translations,
        > German originals below.)
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> "''German Idealism' may be German---but it isn't
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >>> Idealism.' [Jaeschke is
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> quoting himself here; O.S.] Those who understand
        > > >> Classical
        > >
        > >> >> >> german
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> Philosophy as 'German Idealism', do not only
        > exclude a
        > > >> lot
        > > >> >> of
        > > >> >> >>
        > >> their
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> most
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> important exponents and undermine the possibility of
        > > an
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> appropriate
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> understanding of this most rich, but also complex
        > > period
        > > >> >> of the
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >>> history
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> of philosophy -- they also run in danger of loosing
        > > from
        > > >> >> sight
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> one of
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> the most important and also for current discussions
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > [Auseinandersetzungen] most significant dimensions of
        > > >> >> Classical
        > > >> >> >> >> German
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > Philosophy: it isn't plainly 'idealism', but it is
        > > that
        > > >> >> >> period in
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> philosophy in which
        > the discussion
        > > [Auseinandersetzung]
        > > >> >> between
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> idealism
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> and realism took
        > place in a new way, in a before
        > > unknown
        > > >> >> >> >> intensity,
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> and
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> on before
        > unreached heights."
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> And on Hegel specificially:
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > "It is [...] only half of a truth to call Hegel an
        > > >> idealist.
        > > >> >> >> The
        > > >> >> >> >> other
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > half is his ontological and also epistemological
        > > >> realism. He
        > > >> >> >> >> holds to
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> idealism --
        > but he is also the exponent of an
        > > >> >> epistemological
        > > >> >> >> >> realism:
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> The world is in our
        > consciousness -- but it is *in our
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> consciousness* as
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> a world that *transcends
        > consciousness*. And this
        > > >> >> >> epistemological
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> realism presupposes necessarily an ontological
        >
        > > realism:
        > > >> the
        > > >> >> >> >> assumption
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> of an existence of the world independend of
        > > >>
        > consciousness."
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> Hegel's understanding of idealism is obviously
        > > >> peculiar: He
        > >
        > >> >> >> >> states --
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> somewhere in the beginning of the Science of Logic,
        > > if my
        > > >> >> >> memory
        >
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> serves
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> -- that *every* philosophy is idealism and that for
        > > this
        > > >> >> reason
        >
        > > >> >> >> >> the
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> traditional opposition between realism and
        > idealism is
        > > >> >> beside
        > > >> >> >>
        > the
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> point.
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> This means by implication that for Hegel even
        > > >> philosophical
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >>> materialism
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> is an idealism. He explicitely gives Thales as an
        > > example
        > > >> >> for a
        > >
        > >> >> >> >> >>> philosophy that, surprisingly, turns out to be an
        > > >> idealism
        > > >> >> in
        > > >> >> >> this
        > > >> >> >>
        > >> >>> account.
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> Oliver
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> (Next in line: Hegel's
        > *two meanings* of
        > > "metaphysics" --
        > > >> >> my,
        > > >> >> >> my,
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> my ...)
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >>> "'Der 'Deutsche Idealismus' mag deutsch sein -- aber
        > > er
        > > >> ist
        > > >> >> >> kein
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > Idealismus.' Wer die Klassische deutsche Philosophie
        > > als
        > > >> >> >> >> 'Deutschen
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> Idealismus'
        > versteht, schlie�t nicht allein etliche
        > > ihrer
        > > >> >> >> >> wichtigsten
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> Repr�sentanten aus und
        > untergr�bt damit die
        > > M�glichkeit
        > > >> >> ihres
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> angemessenen Verst�ndnisses als einer �u�erst
        > > >>
        > >> reichhaltigen und
        > > >> >> >> >> auch
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> komplexen Epoche der Philosophiegeschichte, er l�uft
        > > >>
        > zudem
        > > >> >> >> Gefahr,
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> eine
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> der wichtigsten, auch f�r gegenw�rtige
        > > >>
        > Auseinandersetzungen
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> bedeutendsten Dimensionen der Klassischen deutschen
        > > >> >> Philosophie
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> aus
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> dem
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> Blick zu verlieren: Sie ist nicht schlechthin
        > > >> 'Idealismus',
        > > >>
        > >> >> >> sondern
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> sie
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> ist diejenige Epoche der Philosophie, in der die
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > Auseinandersetzung
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> zwischen Idealismus und Realismus neuer Weise, in
        > > zuvor
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > ungekannter
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> Intensit�t und auf einer zuvor unerreichten
        > H�henlage
        > > >> >> gef�hrt
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > worden
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> ist." S. 165 f.
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> "Es ist [...] nur die halbe Wahrheit,
        > Hegel einen
        > > >> >> Idealisten zu
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> nennen.
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> Die andere H�lfte der Wahrheit ist sein
        >
        > > ontologischer und
        > > >> >> auch
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> epistemologischer Realismus. Er h�lt am Idealismus
        > > fest
        > > >> --
        >
        > > >> >> >> aber er
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> vertritt zugleich einen epistemologischen Realismus:
        > > Die
        > > >> >> Welt
        > > >> >>
        > >> ist
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> uns im
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> Bewusstsein gegeben -- aber sie ist uns *im
        > > >> Bewusstsein* als
        > >
        > >> >> >> eine
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> *bewusstseinstranszendente* Welt gegeben. Und dieser
        > > >> >> >> >> epistemologische
        > >
        > >> >> >> >> >>> Realismus setzt notwendig einen ontologischen
        > > Realismus
        > > >> >> voraus:
        > > >> >> >> >> die
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >>> Annahme einer vom Bewusstsein unabh�ngigen Existenz
        > > der
        > > >> >> Welt."
        > > >> >> >> >> S. 180
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > >>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>> Bruce
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>> On 5/26/11, john<jgbardis@...> wrote:
        > > >> >> >>
        > >> >>>>> I came across Magee's _The Hegel Dictionary_ (2010)
        > > >> >> recently.
        > > >> >> >> >> This
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
        > dictionary is aimed at the undergraduate, as
        > > opposed to
        > > >> >> >> Inwood's
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> dictionary,
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >>>>> which is aimed at "graduate students and
        > > professional
        > > >> >> >> scholars".
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >>>>> Here is something from Magee's entry on Aristotle:
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> "Turning now to
        > Hegel, it may easily be seen that
        > > his
        > > >> >> >> response
        > > >> >> >> >> to
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> Kant is
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > >>>>> structurally similar to Aristotle's response to
        > > Plato.
        > > >> >> Hegel
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> asserts, contra
        > > >>
        > >> >> >> >>>>> Kant, that phenomena (appearances) do not cut us off
        > > >> from
        > > >> >> >> >> reality
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
        > (things-in-themselves)--just as Aristotle responds
        > > to
        > > >> >> Plato
        > > >> >> >> by
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> claiming that
        > >
        > >> >> >> >> >>>>> sensibles do not cut us off from forms. Instead, for
        > > >> both
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> Aristotle and
        > > >>
        > >> >> >> >>>>> Hegel, appearance is just the expression or
        > > unfolding
        > > >> of
        > > >> >> >> reality
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > itself.
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> "According to Hegel, considered in itself the
        > > Absolute
        > > >> >> Idea
        > > >> >> >> of
        > > >>
        > >> >> >> >>> the Logic
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> (equivalent to Plato's Form of the One/Good) is
        > > merely
        > > >> >> >>
        > ghostly
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> and irreal.
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> It only acheives actuality by becoming manifest
        > > through
        > >
        > >> >> the
        > > >> >> >> >> world
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> of nature
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> [and spirit].
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >>>>> "Thus, in both Aristotle and Hegel we find a
        > > rejection
        > > >> >> of the
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> idea that the
        > >
        > >> >> >> >> >>>>> world that appears to our senses somehow cuts us off
        > > >> from
        > > >> >> >> truth
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> or
        > from what
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> is real. Instead, nature is seen as the
        > flowering of
        > > >> truth
        > > >> >> >> and
        > > >> >> >>
        > >> >>> being.
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> "Furthermore, like Aristotle, Hegel sees nature
        > as a
        > > >> >> scale in
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > >>> which true
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> self-relation or self-consciousness is being
        > > >> >> approximated at
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > >>> every level.
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> For Hegel, however, self-consciousness is fully
        > and
        > > >> truly
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > manifested in
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> human Spirit (especially the Absolute Spirit of
        > art,
        > > >> >> religion
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > and
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> philosophy). Hegel thus immanentizes Aristotle's
        > > >> >> transcendent
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> God,
        > insisting
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> that God in fact is actualized through human
        > Spirit
        > > >> >> itself.
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > Though this
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> seems like a radical revision of Aristotle, one
        > > might
        > > >> >> argue
        > > >> >> >> that
        >
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> Hegel has
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> only made Aristotle more Aristotelian. The
        > > opposition
        > > >> of
        > > >>
        > >> the
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> disembodied
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> Unmoved Mover to the world that only imperfectly
        > > >> >> >>
        > approximates it
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> is a
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> vestige, it seems, of Platonism.
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >>>>> "Hegel insists, however, that actuality--all
        > > >> actuality--is
        > > >> >> >> only
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > actualized
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> in and through nature, and human nature. Hegel
        > > asserts,
        > > >> >> >> further,
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >>> that human
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> Spirit develops and comes to realize itself
        > through
        > > >> >> history.
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >>> Aristotle, by
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> contrast, treats human beings much as he treats
        > > every
        > > >> >> other
        > >
        > >> >> >> >> being
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> in nature:
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> as an eternal, unchanging species. Aristotle has
        > >
        > >> little to
        > > >> >> >> say
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> about the
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> historical development of humanity.
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >>>>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> "One can thus see that despite significant
        > > differences,
        > > >> >> there
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > are
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> striking
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> structural similarities between the central
        > > >> metaphysical
        > > >>
        > >> >> ideas
        > > >> >> >> >> of
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> Aristotle,
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> and those of Hegel. Hegel seems to have
        > been fully
        > > >> aware
        > > >> >> of
        > > >> >> >> >> these.
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> "There are also many
        > other similarities between
        > > the two
        > > >> >> >> >> thinkers.
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> For
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> example,
        > Hegel's Philosophy of Right insists that
        > > >> ethics
        > > >> >> is a
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> political
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
        > inquiry--that it has little meaning apart from a
        > > social
        > > >> >> >> context
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> that serves
        > > >> >> >>
        > >> >>>>> to concretize moral rules and hone the judgement of
        > > >> moral
        > > >> >> >> >> agents.
        > > >> >> >> >> >>> In
        > fact,
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> this is one of the more famous claims made by
        > > >> Aristotle in
        > > >> >> >> his
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > >>> Nicomachean
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>> Ethics."
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > >>>>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>>
        > > >> >> >> >> >> Robert Wallace
        > > >>
        > >> >> >> >> website: www.robertmwallace.com
        > > >> >> >> >> >> email: bob@...
        > > >> >> >> >> >> phone: 414-
        > 617-3914
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> >> [Non-text portions of
        > this message have been removed]
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
        > ------------------------------------
        > > >> >> >> >> >>
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        > > >>
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        > > >> >> >> >> attitude
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        > > "netiquette" as
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        > > >> >> >> >> >
        > > >> >>
        > >> >> >------------------------------------
        > > >> >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >> >Homepage: http://hegel.net
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        > > >> >> >> >> >Particpants are expected to show a respectfull and
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        > > >> >> >> >> >both to Hegel and to each other. The usual "netiquette"
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        > > >> >> >> >> >
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        > > >>
        > >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >>
        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >Robert Wallace
        > > >> >> >> >website: www.robertmwallace.com
        > > >> >> >> >email: bob@...
        > > >> >> >> >phone: 414-617-3914
        >
        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >
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        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >
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        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >
        > >
        > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >
        > >
        > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >------------------------------------
        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >Homepage: http://hegel.net
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        > Text (no HTML/RTF), no
        > > >> attachments,
        > > >> >> >> >only Hegel related mails, scientific level intended.
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        >
        > > >> >> >> >Particpants are expected to show a respectfull and
        > > scientific
        > > >> >> >> attitude
        > > >> >> >> >both to
        > Hegel and to each other. The usual "netiquette" as
        > > >> well as
        > > >> >> >> >scientific standards apply.
        > > >> >> >> >
        > >
        > >> >> >> >The copyright policy for mails sent to this list is same
        > > as for
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        > > >> >> >> and
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        > copy, distribute and/or
        > > >> modify
        > > >> >> >> the
        > > >> >> >> >mails of this list under the terms of the GNU Free
        > > >>
        > Documentation
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        > > >> >> >> >Version 1.2 or any later version, published by the Free
        > > >> Software
        > >
        > >> >> >> >Foundation. The mails are also licensed under a Creative
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        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >> >
        > > >> >> >>
        > > >> >>
        > >>
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >Robert Wallace
        > > >> >> >website: www.robertmwallace.com
        > > >> >> >email: bob@...
        > > >> >> >phone: 414-617-3914
        > > >> >> >
        >
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >[Non-text
        > portions of this message have been removed]
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >------------------------------------
        >
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >Homepage: http://hegel.net
        > > >> >> >Hegel mailing lists: http://Hegel.net/en/ml.htm
        > > >> >> >Listowners Homepage: http://kai.in
        > > >> >> >Group policy:
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        > > >> >> >only Hegel related mails, scientific level intended.
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        > > >> >>
        > >Particpants are expected to show a respectfull and scientific
        > > >> >> attitude
        > > >> >> >both to Hegel and to each
        > other. The usual "netiquette" as
        > > well as
        > > >> >> >scientific standards apply.
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >The copyright
        > policy for mails sent to this list is same as for
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        >
        > > >> author
        > > >> >> and
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        > > modify
        > > >> >> the
        > >
        > >> >> >mails of this list under the terms of the GNU Free
        > > Documentation
        > > >> >> License,
        > > >> >> >Version 1.2 or
        > any later version, published by the Free
        > > Software
        > > >> >> >Foundation. The mails are also licensed under a
        > Creative
        > > Commons
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        > > >> >> >and under the Creative Commons Developing Nations license
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        > > >> >>
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        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >> >
        > > >> >>
        > > >> >>
        > > >> >
        > > >>
        > >Robert Wallace
        > > >> >website: www.robertmwallace.com
        > > >> >email: bob@...
        > > >> >phone: 414-617-3914
        > > >> >
        > > >> >
        > > >>
        > >
        > > >> >
        > > >> >
        > > >> >
        > > >> >
        > > >> >
        > > >> >
        > > >> >
        > > >> >
        > > >> >[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        > >
        > >> >
        > > >> >
        > > >> >
        > > >> >------------------------------------
        > > >> >
        > > >> >Homepage: http://hegel.net
        > > >> >Hegel mailing lists: http://Hegel.net/en/ml.htm
        > > >> >Listowners Homepage: http://kai.in
        > > >> >Group policy:
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        > > >> >only Hegel related mails, scientific level intended.
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        > > >> >Particpants are expected to
        > show a respectfull and scientific
        > > >> attitude
        > > >> >both to Hegel and to each other. The usual "netiquette" as well
        > as
        > > >> >scientific standards apply.
        > > >> >
        > > >> >The copyright policy for mails sent to this list is same as for
        > > >>
        > >Hegel.Net, that is the copyright of the mails belongs to the
        > > author
        > > >> and
        > > >> >hegel.net. Permission is
        > granted to copy, distribute and/or modify
        > > >> the
        > > >> >mails of this list under the terms of the GNU Free
        > Documentation
        > > >> License,
        > > >> >Version 1.2 or any later version, published by the Free Software
        > > >> >Foundation.
        > The mails are also licensed under a Creative Commons
        > > >> License
        > > >> >and under the Creative Commons Developing
        > Nations license (see
        > > >> footer of
        > > >> >http://hegel.net/en/e0.htm ) Yahoo! Groups Links
        > > >> >
        > > >> >
        > > >> >
        > > >>
        > > >>
        > > >
        > > >Robert Wallace
        > >
        > >website: www.robertmwallace.com
        > > >email: bob@...
        > > >phone: 414-617-3914
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > >
        > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > >
        > >------------------------------------
        > > >
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        email: bob@...
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        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      • john
        ... It is interesting, perhaps, that virtually this same transition takes place in the transition from the disjuctive syllogism (a version of true infinity)
        Message 3 of 7 , Jun 3, 2011
          --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Robert Wallace <bob@...> wrote:
          >

          > When you [Beat] say that
          >
          > >> , the problem is that the sublation in the Logic
          > >> of Being - and here 'true infinity' is thematic - is always
          > >> accompanied by the loss of the Other. So, 'true infinity'
          > >> falls back into the One. It is this aporia in the Logic of Being we
          > >> also find in Plato's Socrates' dialogues.
          >
          >
          > I would like to know, in what sense is the Other "lost" in the Logic
          > of Being? (And I'd also naturally like to know how you see this aporia
          > functioning in Plato's Socratic dialogues.)
          >
          > Best, Bob
          >

          It is interesting, perhaps, that virtually this same transition takes place in the transition from the disjuctive syllogism (a version of true infinity) and mechanism. In the first paragraph of the Mechanism chapter of the SL, Hegel writes:

          "In so far as it has the concept immanent in it, the difference of the concept is present in it; but on account of the objective totality, the differentiated moments are complete and self-subsistent objects that, consequently, even in connection relate to one another as each standing on its own, each maintaining itself in every combination as external. This is what constitutes the character of mechanism, namely, that whatever the connection that obtains between the things combined, the connection remains one that is alien to them, that does not affect their nature, and even when a reflective semblance of unity is associated with it, the connection remains nothing more than composition, mixture, aggregate, etc."

          With Life the Idea (true infinity finally established) is attained, and the story finally ends happily.

          John
        • eupraxis@aol.com
          With Life the Idea (true infinity finally established) is attained, and the story finally ends happily. The story doesn t end. As to happiness as eschaton,
          Message 4 of 7 , Jun 3, 2011
            "With Life the Idea (true infinity finally established) is attained, and the story finally ends happily."

            The story doesn't end. As to happiness as eschaton, even if that ere so, it would be at the expense of a cosmos of suffering.

            Wil








            -----Original Message-----
            From: john <jgbardis@...>
            To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
            Sent: Fri, Jun 3, 2011 10:31 am
            Subject: Re: [hegel] "Idealism"







            --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Robert Wallace <bob@...> wrote:
            >

            > When you [Beat] say that
            >
            > >> , the problem is that the sublation in the Logic
            > >> of Being - and here 'true infinity' is thematic - is always
            > >> accompanied by the loss of the Other. So, 'true infinity'
            > >> falls back into the One. It is this aporia in the Logic of Being we
            > >> also find in Plato's Socrates' dialogues.
            >
            >
            > I would like to know, in what sense is the Other "lost" in the Logic
            > of Being? (And I'd also naturally like to know how you see this aporia
            > functioning in Plato's Socratic dialogues.)
            >
            > Best, Bob
            >

            It is interesting, perhaps, that virtually this same transition takes place in the transition from the disjuctive syllogism (a version of true infinity) and mechanism. In the first paragraph of the Mechanism chapter of the SL, Hegel writes:

            "In so far as it has the concept immanent in it, the difference of the concept is present in it; but on account of the objective totality, the differentiated moments are complete and self-subsistent objects that, consequently, even in connection relate to one another as each standing on its own, each maintaining itself in every combination as external. This is what constitutes the character of mechanism, namely, that whatever the connection that obtains between the things combined, the connection remains one that is alien to them, that does not affect their nature, and even when a reflective semblance of unity is associated with it, the connection remains nothing more than composition, mixture, aggregate, etc."

            With Life the Idea (true infinity finally established) is attained, and the story finally ends happily.

            John









            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
          • Kang
            Beat: In your message to Bob you draw a distinction between consciousness, substance, and thought, specifically: the immanence of thought is at the same time
            Message 5 of 7 , Jun 3, 2011
              Beat:

              In your message to Bob you draw a distinction between consciousness, substance, and thought, specifically: "the immanence of thought is at the same time the transcendency of consiousness and substance." But isn't thought, conceptual thought, itself a mode or shape of consciousness? Doesn't Hegel make (or suggest) a distinction between the natural consciousness and (what I will call) the speculative consciousness?

              Thanks!
              Kang


              > Bob,
              >
              > You are right. However, the problem is that the sublation in the Logic
              > of Being - and here 'true infinity' is thematic - is always accompanied by the loss of the Other. So, 'true infinity'
              > falls back into the One. It is this aporia in the Logic of Being we also find in Plato's Socrates' dialogues. So, the
              > Logic of Being has to be abandoned. This already Aristotles tried in his metaphysics. But since he did not really
              > abandoned the immediate truth of Being in thought his procedure is uncritical. Only with Kant Being get only
              > appearance. But with this he abandons also the ontological question, that is, he leaves behind the aporia as a
              > philosophically unappealing contradiction. Now, Hegel shows in his Logic of the Essence that the relations of
              > reflection dialectically observed (and not left behind as an unsolvable contradiction) leads to the absolute necessity
              > of the substance without any freedom. Only the jump into the unity of Being and Essence as the Concept in its own
              > IMMANENT movement brings back the freedom of thought. But this immanence is not the immanence of consciousness and not
              > the immanence of substance but the immanence of thought. So, the immanence of thought is at the same time the
              > transcendency of consiousness and substance. But with this it is also said that true infinity as true freedom is no
              > longer a mere objective in-itself (God) but the movement of the concept in its own objectification. So, as you write:
              > 'transcendence doesn't need to be a spurious infinity". However, taken as 'true infinity' from the Logic of Being it
              > is.
              >
              > Regards,
              > Beat
              >
            • jgbardis
              ... Yes, actually the same transition happens yet again with the transition from the Absolute Idea (the ultimate true infinity of the Logic) to space and time.
              Message 6 of 7 , Jun 3, 2011
                --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, eupraxis@... wrote:
                >
                >
                > "With Life the Idea (true infinity finally established) is attained, and the story finally ends happily."
                >
                > The story doesn't end. As to happiness as eschaton, even if that ere so, it would be at the expense of a cosmos of suffering.
                >
                > Wil


                Yes, actually the same transition happens yet again with the transition from the Absolute Idea (the ultimate true infinity of the Logic) to space and time. This is followed, indeed, by a cosmos of suffering--until the happy ending does come with Absolute Spirit--art, religion and philosophy.

                John
              • greuterb@bluewin.ch
                ... Von: kchen28@yahoo.com Datum: 03.06.2011 22:58 An: Betreff: Re: [hegel] Idealism Beat: In your message to Bob you draw a
                Message 7 of 7 , Jun 4, 2011
                  ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
                  Von: kchen28@...
                  Datum: 03.06.2011 22:58
                  An: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                  Betreff: Re:
                  [hegel] "Idealism"

                  Beat:

                  In your message to Bob you draw a distinction between consciousness, substance, and thought,
                  specifically: "the immanence of thought is at the same time the transcendency of consiousness and substance." But
                  isn't thought, conceptual thought, itself a mode or shape of consciousness? Doesn't Hegel make (or suggest) a
                  distinction between the natural consciousness and (what I will call) the speculative consciousness?

                  Thanks!
                  Kang



                  Kang,

                  You are right. Transcendeny may not be taken as an own realm beyond consciousness. The Concept expresses the
                  mediating world relation of consciousness (and more general of what is) or, as you say, 'a mode of consciousness' and
                  is not an abstraction of the understanding. So, Hegel indeed makes a distinction between natural and appearing
                  consciousness. The latter appears as shapes which are unfolded speculatively in their necessary sequence - reason or
                  the Concept in its other. But in the Logic he shows this mediation as such. This I think is a transcendental
                  perspective: 'God before the creation of the world'. However, one certainly cannot take this metaphor as a
                  chronological sequence. So, what is it? I think it is pure thought showing its inherent principles and levels of
                  mediation in their universality thereby the logical content (level) and form (principles) taken as related to each
                  other. A separating hyposatization of the content or of a moment of the content would lead to a misinterpretation of
                  Hegel's Logic. Perhaps we could call it the immanent transcendency.

                  Regards,
                  Beat


                  > Bob,
                  >
                  > You are right.
                  However, the problem is that the sublation in the Logic
                  > of Being - and here 'true infinity' is thematic - is always
                  accompanied by the loss of the Other. So, 'true infinity'
                  > falls back into the One. It is this aporia in the Logic of
                  Being we also find in Plato's Socrates' dialogues. So, the
                  > Logic of Being has to be abandoned. This already
                  Aristotles tried in his metaphysics. But since he did not really
                  > abandoned the immediate truth of Being in thought
                  his procedure is uncritical. Only with Kant Being get only
                  > appearance. But with this he abandons also the
                  ontological question, that is, he leaves behind the aporia as a
                  > philosophically unappealing contradiction. Now,
                  Hegel shows in his Logic of the Essence that the relations of
                  > reflection dialectically observed (and not left behind
                  as an unsolvable contradiction) leads to the absolute necessity
                  > of the substance without any freedom. Only the jump
                  into the unity of Being and Essence as the Concept in its own
                  > IMMANENT movement brings back the freedom of thought.
                  But this immanence is not the immanence of consciousness and not
                  > the immanence of substance but the immanence of
                  thought. So, the immanence of thought is at the same time the
                  > transcendency of consiousness and substance. But with
                  this it is also said that true infinity as true freedom is no
                  > longer a mere objective in-itself (God) but the
                  movement of the concept in its own objectification. So, as you write:
                  > 'transcendence doesn't need to be a spurious
                  infinity". However, taken as 'true infinity' from the Logic of Being it
                  > is.
                  >
                  > Regards,
                  > Beat
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