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AW: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36

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  • greuterb@bluewin.ch
    ... Von: robertfanelli2001@yahoo.com Datum: 22.05.2011 23:19 An: chris fanelli , chris fanelli , hegel
    Message 1 of 16 , May 23, 2011
      ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
      Von: robertfanelli2001@...
      Datum: 22.05.2011 23:19
      An: "chris fanelli"
      <cfanelli@...>, "chris fanelli"<fanellichris@...>, "hegel hegel"<hegel@yahoogroups.com>
      Kopie: "ted ted"
      <tedhumphrey@...>
      Betreff: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36


      Dear group,

      Here are my
      comments on Preface paragraph # 36:

      Hegel takes consciousness to a new level of cognition. When we are consciously
      aware of our own existence, we exercise a cognitive awareness of things. Mind and its thinking process need a medium
      for this thinking process whose path of thinking develops moments of thinking and whose moments must rely on images,
      forms, and structures. Hegel's title to his treatise is, "Phenomenology of Spirit, The Science of the Experience of
      Consciousness." This means consciousness develops cognitive objects on which it reflects. Consciousness experiences
      these objects, as it structures them.

      Hegel thus offers us this unique phrase, 'The Experience of Consciousness,' but
      we must not confuse the general meaning of experience with 'Experience of Consciousness.' Hegel's phrase does not
      directly include all of our experience; that is, the sensations of the body, and empirical developements. His phrase
      deals only with the intellectual content of the human mind, and it is in the manner in which the content becomes an
      object of the self. Hegel calls this 'spiritual substance.' However, 'Experience of Consciousness' does, in the
      movement of Hegel's speculative dialectic, include rational structured forms related to our empirical and sensate
      exeriences.

      Experience has a spiritual nature and it must deal with both the mind's perspective of things and the
      perspective of the world itself, that is, the subjective and the objective. This is made evident by the enormous
      challenge made to consciousness by the bombardment of all that alienates it in the universe. Hegel calls this
      alienation, 'other,' which, if the reader is not careful will lead him down the path of abstraction. Rather, is is a
      cold, hard, and real 'other.' As we reflect on our own consciousness we face this 'other.' Consciousness thus
      reflects on itself as it is confronted by the alienation of the universe in the form of 'the other.'

      As we are
      conscious of our selves in a non-material or mental fashion, the very fact of this consciousness of ourselves creates
      an otherness of our selves-this ia an important Hegelian concept of 'self-conscious otherness,' and this pervades
      Hegelian philosophy.

      Thus Hegel assigns an independent existence to the conceptual object, but we must add that is is
      a conceptual object that is rationally structured, and which is an object which has the shape (Gestalt) of
      consciousness.


      Bob,

      This sounds very Kantian. In your mentioned passage Hegel writes about the Concept of Spirt in
      its phenomenological actuality, that is, as consciousness in its substantiality. With this - unlike Kant - Hegel denies
      an independent existence of the object from consciousness since consciousness does both, it puts first what is true in-
      itself and then makes the in-itsel for-itself with the necessary appearing result of contradiction. There is no
      "conceptual object that is rationally structured" but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the
      abstract of the sensual being and the understanding into itself. This is what is achieved in the chapter about self-
      consciousness and the truth of its self-certainty where Hegel writes: "A self-consciousness, in being an object, is
      just as much 'I' as 'object'. With this we already have before us the Concept of Spirit. What still lies ahead for
      consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different
      independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and
      'We' that is 'I'." (para 177, Miller's translation)

      In your para 36 Hegel gives the same definition of Spirit as
      absolute substance which as a mere starting definition by the sublation of immediate sensual being and understanding is
      still abstract and now has to become concrete or realized in the movement of expierence of self-consciousness: "the
      substance and its movement are viewed as the object of consciousness", or - what is the same - "what is in experience
      is only the spiritual substance as object of its [own] self" (para 36). Rationality only arises through this movement.
      There is a huge difference between Hegel and Kant for whom rationality is always already given.

      Regards,
      Beat Greuter
    • robert fanelli
      There is no  conceptual object that is rationally structured but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the  abstract of the sensual being
      Message 2 of 16 , May 23, 2011
        There is no  "conceptual object that is rationally structured" but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the  abstract of the sensual being and the understanding into itself. "
         
        Beat,
         
        Thanks for such a quick reply.  Let me make a point on your above comment.  'The movement of consciousness' requires rational structures both for Kant and for Hegel.  This is fundamental for both philosophers.  Consciousness requires conceptual structures. How else can you have any movement of conceptual thought without rational structures.  Hegel follows Kant's method here.  The only way else you move consciousness along is by the 'archaeology of silence' or, of course, aesthetic images etc.
         
        Will send you more response as I study your comments. 
         
        Bob

        --- On Mon, 5/23/11, greuterb@... <greuterb@...> wrote:


        From: greuterb@... <greuterb@...>
        Subject: AW: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36
        To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
        Date: Monday, May 23, 2011, 12:23 PM


         



        ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
        Von: robertfanelli2001@...
        Datum: 22.05.2011 23:19
        An: "chris fanelli"
        <cfanelli@...>, "chris fanelli"<fanellichris@...>, "hegel hegel"<hegel@yahoogroups.com>
        Kopie: "ted ted"
        <tedhumphrey@...>
        Betreff: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36

        Dear group,

        Here are my
        comments on Preface paragraph # 36:

        Hegel takes consciousness to a new level of cognition. When we are consciously
        aware of our own existence, we exercise a cognitive awareness of things. Mind and its thinking process need a medium
        for this thinking process whose path of thinking develops moments of thinking and whose moments must rely on images,
        forms, and structures. Hegel's title to his treatise is, "Phenomenology of Spirit, The Science of the Experience of
        Consciousness." This means consciousness develops cognitive objects on which it reflects. Consciousness experiences
        these objects, as it structures them.

        Hegel thus offers us this unique phrase, 'The Experience of Consciousness,' but
        we must not confuse the general meaning of experience with 'Experience of Consciousness.' Hegel's phrase does not
        directly include all of our experience; that is, the sensations of the body, and empirical developements. His phrase
        deals only with the intellectual content of the human mind, and it is in the manner in which the content becomes an
        object of the self. Hegel calls this 'spiritual substance.' However, 'Experience of Consciousness' does, in the
        movement of Hegel's speculative dialectic, include rational structured forms related to our empirical and sensate
        exeriences.

        Experience has a spiritual nature and it must deal with both the mind's perspective of things and the
        perspective of the world itself, that is, the subjective and the objective. This is made evident by the enormous
        challenge made to consciousness by the bombardment of all that alienates it in the universe. Hegel calls this
        alienation, 'other,' which, if the reader is not careful will lead him down the path of abstraction. Rather, is is a
        cold, hard, and real 'other.' As we reflect on our own consciousness we face this 'other.' Consciousness thus
        reflects on itself as it is confronted by the alienation of the universe in the form of 'the other.'

        As we are
        conscious of our selves in a non-material or mental fashion, the very fact of this consciousness of ourselves creates
        an otherness of our selves-this ia an important Hegelian concept of 'self-conscious otherness,' and this pervades
        Hegelian philosophy.

        Thus Hegel assigns an independent existence to the conceptual object, but we must add that is is
        a conceptual object that is rationally structured, and which is an object which has the shape (Gestalt) of
        consciousness.

        Bob,

        This sounds very Kantian. In your mentioned passage Hegel writes about the Concept of Spirt in
        its phenomenological actuality, that is, as consciousness in its substantiality. With this - unlike Kant - Hegel denies
        an independent existence of the object from consciousness since consciousness does both, it puts first what is true in-
        itself and then makes the in-itsel for-itself with the necessary appearing result of contradiction. There is no
        "conceptual object that is rationally structured" but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the
        abstract of the sensual being and the understanding into itself. This is what is achieved in the chapter about self-
        consciousness and the truth of its self-certainty where Hegel writes: "A self-consciousness, in being an object, is
        just as much 'I' as 'object'. With this we already have before us the Concept of Spirit. What still lies ahead for
        consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different
        independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and
        'We' that is 'I'." (para 177, Miller's translation)

        In your para 36 Hegel gives the same definition of Spirit as
        absolute substance which as a mere starting definition by the sublation of immediate sensual being and understanding is
        still abstract and now has to become concrete or realized in the movement of expierence of self-consciousness: "the
        substance and its movement are viewed as the object of consciousness", or - what is the same - "what is in experience
        is only the spiritual substance as object of its [own] self" (para 36). Rationality only arises through this movement.
        There is a huge difference between Hegel and Kant for whom rationality is always already given.

        Regards,
        Beat Greuter







        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      • robert fanelli
        With this - unlike Kant - Hegel denies an independent existence of the object from consciousness since consciousness does both, it puts first what is true in-
        Message 3 of 16 , May 23, 2011
          "With this - unlike Kant - Hegel denies an independent existence of the object from consciousness since consciousness does both, it puts first what is true in-
          itself and then makes the in-itsel for-itself with the necessary appearing result of contradiction. There is no "conceptual object that is rationally structured" but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the abstract of the sensual being and the understanding into itself."
           
          Beat,
           
          Let me expand on this.  Whether the object (conceptual object) is independent or part of the dialectic movement, it still needs consciousness to develop rational structures.  The movement of the in-itself and for -itself needs a medium and this medium contains thought structures.  In this sense Hegel continues the Kantian Critique. Even if we assign "the Concept of Spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different  independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence,"  even if we include all this within Spirit's object, consciousness needs the structured categories of the Science of Logic to
          fullfil the spectulaitve movement of Hegelian thought. 
           
          Regartds,
           
          Bob Fanelli

          --- On Mon, 5/23/11, greuterb@... <greuterb@...> wrote:


          From: greuterb@... <greuterb@...>
          Subject: AW: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36
          To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
          Date: Monday, May 23, 2011, 12:23 PM


           



          ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
          Von: robertfanelli2001@...
          Datum: 22.05.2011 23:19
          An: "chris fanelli"
          <cfanelli@...>, "chris fanelli"<fanellichris@...>, "hegel hegel"<hegel@yahoogroups.com>
          Kopie: "ted ted"
          <tedhumphrey@...>
          Betreff: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36

          Dear group,

          Here are my
          comments on Preface paragraph # 36:

          Hegel takes consciousness to a new level of cognition. When we are consciously
          aware of our own existence, we exercise a cognitive awareness of things. Mind and its thinking process need a medium
          for this thinking process whose path of thinking develops moments of thinking and whose moments must rely on images,
          forms, and structures. Hegel's title to his treatise is, "Phenomenology of Spirit, The Science of the Experience of
          Consciousness." This means consciousness develops cognitive objects on which it reflects. Consciousness experiences
          these objects, as it structures them.

          Hegel thus offers us this unique phrase, 'The Experience of Consciousness,' but
          we must not confuse the general meaning of experience with 'Experience of Consciousness.' Hegel's phrase does not
          directly include all of our experience; that is, the sensations of the body, and empirical developements. His phrase
          deals only with the intellectual content of the human mind, and it is in the manner in which the content becomes an
          object of the self. Hegel calls this 'spiritual substance.' However, 'Experience of Consciousness' does, in the
          movement of Hegel's speculative dialectic, include rational structured forms related to our empirical and sensate
          exeriences.

          Experience has a spiritual nature and it must deal with both the mind's perspective of things and the
          perspective of the world itself, that is, the subjective and the objective. This is made evident by the enormous
          challenge made to consciousness by the bombardment of all that alienates it in the universe. Hegel calls this
          alienation, 'other,' which, if the reader is not careful will lead him down the path of abstraction. Rather, is is a
          cold, hard, and real 'other.' As we reflect on our own consciousness we face this 'other.' Consciousness thus
          reflects on itself as it is confronted by the alienation of the universe in the form of 'the other.'

          As we are
          conscious of our selves in a non-material or mental fashion, the very fact of this consciousness of ourselves creates
          an otherness of our selves-this ia an important Hegelian concept of 'self-conscious otherness,' and this pervades
          Hegelian philosophy.

          Thus Hegel assigns an independent existence to the conceptual object, but we must add that is is
          a conceptual object that is rationally structured, and which is an object which has the shape (Gestalt) of
          consciousness.

          Bob,

          This sounds very Kantian. In your mentioned passage Hegel writes about the Concept of Spirt in
          its phenomenological actuality, that is, as consciousness in its substantiality. With this - unlike Kant - Hegel denies
          an independent existence of the object from consciousness since consciousness does both, it puts first what is true in-
          itself and then makes the in-itsel for-itself with the necessary appearing result of contradiction. There is no
          "conceptual object that is rationally structured" but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the
          abstract of the sensual being and the understanding into itself. This is what is achieved in the chapter about self-
          consciousness and the truth of its self-certainty where Hegel writes: "A self-consciousness, in being an object, is
          just as much 'I' as 'object'. With this we already have before us the Concept of Spirit. What still lies ahead for
          consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different
          independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and
          'We' that is 'I'." (para 177, Miller's translation)

          In your para 36 Hegel gives the same definition of Spirit as
          absolute substance which as a mere starting definition by the sublation of immediate sensual being and understanding is
          still abstract and now has to become concrete or realized in the movement of expierence of self-consciousness: "the
          substance and its movement are viewed as the object of consciousness", or - what is the same - "what is in experience
          is only the spiritual substance as object of its [own] self" (para 36). Rationality only arises through this movement.
          There is a huge difference between Hegel and Kant for whom rationality is always already given.

          Regards,
          Beat Greuter







          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        • vascojoao2003
          Hello Bob, The movement of the in-itself and for -itself needs a medium and this medium contains thought structures. In this sense Hegel continues the
          Message 4 of 16 , May 24, 2011
            Hello Bob,

            "The movement of the in-itself and for -itself needs a
            medium and this medium contains thought structures. In this sense Hegel continues the Kantian Critique."

            If i may put my 50 cents of this debate, and based fundamentaly in 3 and a half chapters read up to know, it seems to me that Hegel is not really continuing Kantian Critique. It seems to me that "The Science of the Experience of Consciousness" as it is dealt with in parag. 36, means the science of the effort of consciousness in unifying knowledge with objectivity. At this point one may say that there is a continuity with Kant, but i think that the tone is posited on the "effort" more than in the unification of knowledge and objectivity, which was Kant's effort, so to say.

            In positing the tone on the "effort", or the itinerary of this effort, the shapes that it assumed up to him, Hegel gets out of classic epistemology or gnosiology and gets into the phenomenology, or, i risk saying, the science of the appearing shapes of consciousness throughout the effort to establish a foothold, so to say, of objective knowledge in which to build a world of truth.

            Inside the itinerary the spirit is "acting" as a subject of knowledge looking for an object of truth but it is not aware of the trail of this search nor of what this trail brought, or is bringing, to its own development and the development of the terms of that search. And in this way it is alienated from itself, because this trail is its own trail and what this trail brough to consciousness is what consciousness brough to itself in its activity.

            When the phenomenoloy focusses on this effort, on this itinerary, it is focusing on the activity consciousness exerted on itself behind its own back and this would be the point where by consciousness in the itinerary of its activity becoming an object for consciousness, consciousness returns to itself and the experience is realized - or the in-itself is for-itself.

            Although the substance of this return to itself will only become concrete at the end of the Phenomenology, which, i, personaly, didn't yet got to.

            What do you think of these considerations?

            Regards,
            João.

            --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, robert fanelli <robertfanelli2001@...> wrote:
            >
            > "With this - unlike Kant - Hegel denies an independent existence of the object from consciousness since consciousness does both, it puts first what is true in-
            > itself and then makes the in-itsel for-itself with the necessary appearing result of contradiction. There is no "conceptual object that is rationally structured" but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the abstract of the sensual being and the understanding into itself."
            >  
            > Beat,
            >  
            > Let me expand on this.  Whether the object (conceptual object) is independent or part of the dialectic movement, it still needs consciousness to develop rational structures.  The movement of the in-itself and for -itself needs a medium and this medium contains thought structures.  In this sense Hegel continues the Kantian Critique. Even if we assign "the Concept of Spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different  independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence,"  even if we include all this within Spirit's object, consciousness needs the structured categories of the Science of Logic to
            > fullfil the spectulaitve movement of Hegelian thought. 
            >  
            > Regartds,
            >  
            > Bob Fanelli
            >
            > --- On Mon, 5/23/11, greuterb@... <greuterb@...> wrote:
            >
            >
            > From: greuterb@... <greuterb@...>
            > Subject: AW: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36
            > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
            > Date: Monday, May 23, 2011, 12:23 PM
            >
            >
            >  
            >
            >
            >
            > ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
            > Von: robertfanelli2001@...
            > Datum: 22.05.2011 23:19
            > An: "chris fanelli"
            > <cfanelli@...>, "chris fanelli"<fanellichris@...>, "hegel hegel"<hegel@yahoogroups.com>
            > Kopie: "ted ted"
            > <tedhumphrey@...>
            > Betreff: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36
            >
            > Dear group,
            >
            > Here are my
            > comments on Preface paragraph # 36:
            >
            > Hegel takes consciousness to a new level of cognition. When we are consciously
            > aware of our own existence, we exercise a cognitive awareness of things. Mind and its thinking process need a medium
            > for this thinking process whose path of thinking develops moments of thinking and whose moments must rely on images,
            > forms, and structures. Hegel's title to his treatise is, "Phenomenology of Spirit, The Science of the Experience of
            > Consciousness." This means consciousness develops cognitive objects on which it reflects. Consciousness experiences
            > these objects, as it structures them.
            >
            > Hegel thus offers us this unique phrase, 'The Experience of Consciousness,' but
            > we must not confuse the general meaning of experience with 'Experience of Consciousness.' Hegel's phrase does not
            > directly include all of our experience; that is, the sensations of the body, and empirical developements. His phrase
            > deals only with the intellectual content of the human mind, and it is in the manner in which the content becomes an
            > object of the self. Hegel calls this 'spiritual substance.' However, 'Experience of Consciousness' does, in the
            > movement of Hegel's speculative dialectic, include rational structured forms related to our empirical and sensate
            > exeriences.
            >
            > Experience has a spiritual nature and it must deal with both the mind's perspective of things and the
            > perspective of the world itself, that is, the subjective and the objective. This is made evident by the enormous
            > challenge made to consciousness by the bombardment of all that alienates it in the universe. Hegel calls this
            > alienation, 'other,' which, if the reader is not careful will lead him down the path of abstraction. Rather, is is a
            > cold, hard, and real 'other.' As we reflect on our own consciousness we face this 'other.' Consciousness thus
            > reflects on itself as it is confronted by the alienation of the universe in the form of 'the other.'
            >
            > As we are
            > conscious of our selves in a non-material or mental fashion, the very fact of this consciousness of ourselves creates
            > an otherness of our selves-this ia an important Hegelian concept of 'self-conscious otherness,' and this pervades
            > Hegelian philosophy.
            >
            > Thus Hegel assigns an independent existence to the conceptual object, but we must add that is is
            > a conceptual object that is rationally structured, and which is an object which has the shape (Gestalt) of
            > consciousness.
            >
            > Bob,
            >
            > This sounds very Kantian. In your mentioned passage Hegel writes about the Concept of Spirt in
            > its phenomenological actuality, that is, as consciousness in its substantiality. With this - unlike Kant - Hegel denies
            > an independent existence of the object from consciousness since consciousness does both, it puts first what is true in-
            > itself and then makes the in-itsel for-itself with the necessary appearing result of contradiction. There is no
            > "conceptual object that is rationally structured" but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the
            > abstract of the sensual being and the understanding into itself. This is what is achieved in the chapter about self-
            > consciousness and the truth of its self-certainty where Hegel writes: "A self-consciousness, in being an object, is
            > just as much 'I' as 'object'. With this we already have before us the Concept of Spirit. What still lies ahead for
            > consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different
            > independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and
            > 'We' that is 'I'." (para 177, Miller's translation)
            >
            > In your para 36 Hegel gives the same definition of Spirit as
            > absolute substance which as a mere starting definition by the sublation of immediate sensual being and understanding is
            > still abstract and now has to become concrete or realized in the movement of expierence of self-consciousness: "the
            > substance and its movement are viewed as the object of consciousness", or - what is the same - "what is in experience
            > is only the spiritual substance as object of its [own] self" (para 36). Rationality only arises through this movement.
            > There is a huge difference between Hegel and Kant for whom rationality is always already given.
            >
            > Regards,
            > Beat Greuter
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
            >
          • john
            So there are three things here: consciousness, and the two moments of consciousness which are knowing and the objectivity negative to knowing . It is in the
            Message 5 of 16 , May 25, 2011
              So there are three things here: consciousness, and the two moments of consciousness which are knowing and "the objectivity negative to knowing".

              It is in the element or medium of consciousness that spirit develops itself, on the one hand, and explicates its two moments (knowledge and objectivity) on the other.

              So the "effort of consciousness" to unify knowledge and objectivity goes on "behind the back" of consciosuness (though this isn't the case "for us").

              So in terms of the Logic, knowledge has to do with the Universal, objectivty with the Particular, and the "effort of consciousness" with the Individual.

              So at this point what is explicitly involved is the relationship of the Universal to the Particular, as in a Judgment. The Individual is not yet explicit (except "for us"). Subjectivity has not yet emerged as an explicit third term. When it does emerge then the transition is made from the Judgment to the Syllogism.

              So, for instance, you can think about the thing and its properties (where the thing is substance and the properties are accidents), or you can think about the dissolution of the thing into its matters (where the matters are substance and the thing is an accidental bringing together of matters). But at this point the thinking, as the third term involved, is totally left out of account. Rather than being an independent third term, it is just the medium or element for the other two moments.

              John

              --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@...> wrote:
              >
              > Hello Bob,
              >
              > "The movement of the in-itself and for -itself needs a
              > medium and this medium contains thought structures. In this sense Hegel continues the Kantian Critique."
              >
              > If i may put my 50 cents of this debate, and based fundamentaly in 3 and a half chapters read up to know, it seems to me that Hegel is not really continuing Kantian Critique. It seems to me that "The Science of the Experience of Consciousness" as it is dealt with in parag. 36, means the science of the effort of consciousness in unifying knowledge with objectivity. At this point one may say that there is a continuity with Kant, but i think that the tone is posited on the "effort" more than in the unification of knowledge and objectivity, which was Kant's effort, so to say.
              >
              > In positing the tone on the "effort", or the itinerary of this effort, the shapes that it assumed up to him, Hegel gets out of classic epistemology or gnosiology and gets into the phenomenology, or, i risk saying, the science of the appearing shapes of consciousness throughout the effort to establish a foothold, so to say, of objective knowledge in which to build a world of truth.
              >
              > Inside the itinerary the spirit is "acting" as a subject of knowledge looking for an object of truth but it is not aware of the trail of this search nor of what this trail brought, or is bringing, to its own development and the development of the terms of that search. And in this way it is alienated from itself, because this trail is its own trail and what this trail brough to consciousness is what consciousness brough to itself in its activity.
              >
              > When the phenomenoloy focusses on this effort, on this itinerary, it is focusing on the activity consciousness exerted on itself behind its own back and this would be the point where by consciousness in the itinerary of its activity becoming an object for consciousness, consciousness returns to itself and the experience is realized - or the in-itself is for-itself.
              >
              > Although the substance of this return to itself will only become concrete at the end of the Phenomenology, which, i, personaly, didn't yet got to.
              >
              > What do you think of these considerations?
              >
              > Regards,
              > João.
              >
              > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, robert fanelli <robertfanelli2001@> wrote:
              > >
              > > "With this - unlike Kant - Hegel denies an independent existence of the object from consciousness since consciousness does both, it puts first what is true in-
              > > itself and then makes the in-itsel for-itself with the necessary appearing result of contradiction. There is no "conceptual object that is rationally structured" but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the abstract of the sensual being and the understanding into itself."
              > >  
              > > Beat,
              > >  
              > > Let me expand on this.  Whether the object (conceptual object) is independent or part of the dialectic movement, it still needs consciousness to develop rational structures.  The movement of the in-itself and for -itself needs a medium and this medium contains thought structures.  In this sense Hegel continues the Kantian Critique. Even if we assign "the Concept of Spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different  independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence,"  even if we include all this within Spirit's object, consciousness needs the structured categories of the Science of Logic to
              > > fullfil the spectulaitve movement of Hegelian thought. 
              > >  
              > > Regartds,
              > >  
              > > Bob Fanelli
              > >
              > > --- On Mon, 5/23/11, greuterb@ <greuterb@> wrote:
              > >
              > >
              > > From: greuterb@ <greuterb@>
              > > Subject: AW: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36
              > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
              > > Date: Monday, May 23, 2011, 12:23 PM
              > >
              > >
              > >  
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > > ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
              > > Von: robertfanelli2001@
              > > Datum: 22.05.2011 23:19
              > > An: "chris fanelli"
              > > <cfanelli@>, "chris fanelli"<fanellichris@>, "hegel hegel"<hegel@yahoogroups.com>
              > > Kopie: "ted ted"
              > > <tedhumphrey@>
              > > Betreff: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36
              > >
              > > Dear group,
              > >
              > > Here are my
              > > comments on Preface paragraph # 36:
              > >
              > > Hegel takes consciousness to a new level of cognition. When we are consciously
              > > aware of our own existence, we exercise a cognitive awareness of things. Mind and its thinking process need a medium
              > > for this thinking process whose path of thinking develops moments of thinking and whose moments must rely on images,
              > > forms, and structures. Hegel's title to his treatise is, "Phenomenology of Spirit, The Science of the Experience of
              > > Consciousness." This means consciousness develops cognitive objects on which it reflects. Consciousness experiences
              > > these objects, as it structures them.
              > >
              > > Hegel thus offers us this unique phrase, 'The Experience of Consciousness,' but
              > > we must not confuse the general meaning of experience with 'Experience of Consciousness.' Hegel's phrase does not
              > > directly include all of our experience; that is, the sensations of the body, and empirical developements. His phrase
              > > deals only with the intellectual content of the human mind, and it is in the manner in which the content becomes an
              > > object of the self. Hegel calls this 'spiritual substance.' However, 'Experience of Consciousness' does, in the
              > > movement of Hegel's speculative dialectic, include rational structured forms related to our empirical and sensate
              > > exeriences.
              > >
              > > Experience has a spiritual nature and it must deal with both the mind's perspective of things and the
              > > perspective of the world itself, that is, the subjective and the objective. This is made evident by the enormous
              > > challenge made to consciousness by the bombardment of all that alienates it in the universe. Hegel calls this
              > > alienation, 'other,' which, if the reader is not careful will lead him down the path of abstraction. Rather, is is a
              > > cold, hard, and real 'other.' As we reflect on our own consciousness we face this 'other.' Consciousness thus
              > > reflects on itself as it is confronted by the alienation of the universe in the form of 'the other.'
              > >
              > > As we are
              > > conscious of our selves in a non-material or mental fashion, the very fact of this consciousness of ourselves creates
              > > an otherness of our selves-this ia an important Hegelian concept of 'self-conscious otherness,' and this pervades
              > > Hegelian philosophy.
              > >
              > > Thus Hegel assigns an independent existence to the conceptual object, but we must add that is is
              > > a conceptual object that is rationally structured, and which is an object which has the shape (Gestalt) of
              > > consciousness.
              > >
              > > Bob,
              > >
              > > This sounds very Kantian. In your mentioned passage Hegel writes about the Concept of Spirt in
              > > its phenomenological actuality, that is, as consciousness in its substantiality. With this - unlike Kant - Hegel denies
              > > an independent existence of the object from consciousness since consciousness does both, it puts first what is true in-
              > > itself and then makes the in-itsel for-itself with the necessary appearing result of contradiction. There is no
              > > "conceptual object that is rationally structured" but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the
              > > abstract of the sensual being and the understanding into itself. This is what is achieved in the chapter about self-
              > > consciousness and the truth of its self-certainty where Hegel writes: "A self-consciousness, in being an object, is
              > > just as much 'I' as 'object'. With this we already have before us the Concept of Spirit. What still lies ahead for
              > > consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different
              > > independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and
              > > 'We' that is 'I'." (para 177, Miller's translation)
              > >
              > > In your para 36 Hegel gives the same definition of Spirit as
              > > absolute substance which as a mere starting definition by the sublation of immediate sensual being and understanding is
              > > still abstract and now has to become concrete or realized in the movement of expierence of self-consciousness: "the
              > > substance and its movement are viewed as the object of consciousness", or - what is the same - "what is in experience
              > > is only the spiritual substance as object of its [own] self" (para 36). Rationality only arises through this movement.
              > > There is a huge difference between Hegel and Kant for whom rationality is always already given.
              > >
              > > Regards,
              > > Beat Greuter
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
              > >
              >
            • vascojoao2003
              Hello John, So, for instance, you can think about the thing and its properties (where the thing is substance and the properties are accidents), or you can
              Message 6 of 16 , May 25, 2011
                Hello John,

                "So, for instance, you can think about the thing and its properties (where the thing is substance and the properties are accidents), or you can think about the dissolution of the thing into its matters (where the matters are substance and the thing is an accidental bringing together of matters). But at this point the thinking, as the third term involved, is totally left out of account. Rather than being an independent third term, it is just the medium or element for the other two moments."

                This seems to be true, as far as i think i am interpreting correctly your words, if we report to the first chapters of the phenomenology, but i ask if it is still and just so in the Preface where Hegel might be taking a broader approach to the Phenomenology, meaning, stating the braoad lines of its intent, scope and goal.

                Regards,
                João.



                --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "john" <jgbardis@...> wrote:
                >
                > So there are three things here: consciousness, and the two moments of consciousness which are knowing and "the objectivity negative to knowing".
                >
                > It is in the element or medium of consciousness that spirit develops itself, on the one hand, and explicates its two moments (knowledge and objectivity) on the other.
                >
                > So the "effort of consciousness" to unify knowledge and objectivity goes on "behind the back" of consciosuness (though this isn't the case "for us").
                >
                > So in terms of the Logic, knowledge has to do with the Universal, objectivty with the Particular, and the "effort of consciousness" with the Individual.
                >
                > So at this point what is explicitly involved is the relationship of the Universal to the Particular, as in a Judgment. The Individual is not yet explicit (except "for us"). Subjectivity has not yet emerged as an explicit third term. When it does emerge then the transition is made from the Judgment to the Syllogism.
                >
                > So, for instance, you can think about the thing and its properties (where the thing is substance and the properties are accidents), or you can think about the dissolution of the thing into its matters (where the matters are substance and the thing is an accidental bringing together of matters). But at this point the thinking, as the third term involved, is totally left out of account. Rather than being an independent third term, it is just the medium or element for the other two moments.
                >
                > John
                >
                > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
                > >
                > > Hello Bob,
                > >
                > > "The movement of the in-itself and for -itself needs a
                > > medium and this medium contains thought structures. In this sense Hegel continues the Kantian Critique."
                > >
                > > If i may put my 50 cents of this debate, and based fundamentaly in 3 and a half chapters read up to know, it seems to me that Hegel is not really continuing Kantian Critique. It seems to me that "The Science of the Experience of Consciousness" as it is dealt with in parag. 36, means the science of the effort of consciousness in unifying knowledge with objectivity. At this point one may say that there is a continuity with Kant, but i think that the tone is posited on the "effort" more than in the unification of knowledge and objectivity, which was Kant's effort, so to say.
                > >
                > > In positing the tone on the "effort", or the itinerary of this effort, the shapes that it assumed up to him, Hegel gets out of classic epistemology or gnosiology and gets into the phenomenology, or, i risk saying, the science of the appearing shapes of consciousness throughout the effort to establish a foothold, so to say, of objective knowledge in which to build a world of truth.
                > >
                > > Inside the itinerary the spirit is "acting" as a subject of knowledge looking for an object of truth but it is not aware of the trail of this search nor of what this trail brought, or is bringing, to its own development and the development of the terms of that search. And in this way it is alienated from itself, because this trail is its own trail and what this trail brough to consciousness is what consciousness brough to itself in its activity.
                > >
                > > When the phenomenoloy focusses on this effort, on this itinerary, it is focusing on the activity consciousness exerted on itself behind its own back and this would be the point where by consciousness in the itinerary of its activity becoming an object for consciousness, consciousness returns to itself and the experience is realized - or the in-itself is for-itself.
                > >
                > > Although the substance of this return to itself will only become concrete at the end of the Phenomenology, which, i, personaly, didn't yet got to.
                > >
                > > What do you think of these considerations?
                > >
                > > Regards,
                > > João.
                > >
                > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, robert fanelli <robertfanelli2001@> wrote:
                > > >
                > > > "With this - unlike Kant - Hegel denies an independent existence of the object from consciousness since consciousness does both, it puts first what is true in-
                > > > itself and then makes the in-itsel for-itself with the necessary appearing result of contradiction. There is no "conceptual object that is rationally structured" but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the abstract of the sensual being and the understanding into itself."
                > > >  
                > > > Beat,
                > > >  
                > > > Let me expand on this.  Whether the object (conceptual object) is independent or part of the dialectic movement, it still needs consciousness to develop rational structures.  The movement of the in-itself and for -itself needs a medium and this medium contains thought structures.  In this sense Hegel continues the Kantian Critique. Even if we assign "the Concept of Spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different  independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence,"  even if we include all this within Spirit's object, consciousness needs the structured categories of the Science of Logic to
                > > > fullfil the spectulaitve movement of Hegelian thought. 
                > > >  
                > > > Regartds,
                > > >  
                > > > Bob Fanelli
                > > >
                > > > --- On Mon, 5/23/11, greuterb@ <greuterb@> wrote:
                > > >
                > > >
                > > > From: greuterb@ <greuterb@>
                > > > Subject: AW: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36
                > > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                > > > Date: Monday, May 23, 2011, 12:23 PM
                > > >
                > > >
                > > >  
                > > >
                > > >
                > > >
                > > > ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
                > > > Von: robertfanelli2001@
                > > > Datum: 22.05.2011 23:19
                > > > An: "chris fanelli"
                > > > <cfanelli@>, "chris fanelli"<fanellichris@>, "hegel hegel"<hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                > > > Kopie: "ted ted"
                > > > <tedhumphrey@>
                > > > Betreff: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36
                > > >
                > > > Dear group,
                > > >
                > > > Here are my
                > > > comments on Preface paragraph # 36:
                > > >
                > > > Hegel takes consciousness to a new level of cognition. When we are consciously
                > > > aware of our own existence, we exercise a cognitive awareness of things. Mind and its thinking process need a medium
                > > > for this thinking process whose path of thinking develops moments of thinking and whose moments must rely on images,
                > > > forms, and structures. Hegel's title to his treatise is, "Phenomenology of Spirit, The Science of the Experience of
                > > > Consciousness." This means consciousness develops cognitive objects on which it reflects. Consciousness experiences
                > > > these objects, as it structures them.
                > > >
                > > > Hegel thus offers us this unique phrase, 'The Experience of Consciousness,' but
                > > > we must not confuse the general meaning of experience with 'Experience of Consciousness.' Hegel's phrase does not
                > > > directly include all of our experience; that is, the sensations of the body, and empirical developements. His phrase
                > > > deals only with the intellectual content of the human mind, and it is in the manner in which the content becomes an
                > > > object of the self. Hegel calls this 'spiritual substance.' However, 'Experience of Consciousness' does, in the
                > > > movement of Hegel's speculative dialectic, include rational structured forms related to our empirical and sensate
                > > > exeriences.
                > > >
                > > > Experience has a spiritual nature and it must deal with both the mind's perspective of things and the
                > > > perspective of the world itself, that is, the subjective and the objective. This is made evident by the enormous
                > > > challenge made to consciousness by the bombardment of all that alienates it in the universe. Hegel calls this
                > > > alienation, 'other,' which, if the reader is not careful will lead him down the path of abstraction. Rather, is is a
                > > > cold, hard, and real 'other.' As we reflect on our own consciousness we face this 'other.' Consciousness thus
                > > > reflects on itself as it is confronted by the alienation of the universe in the form of 'the other.'
                > > >
                > > > As we are
                > > > conscious of our selves in a non-material or mental fashion, the very fact of this consciousness of ourselves creates
                > > > an otherness of our selves-this ia an important Hegelian concept of 'self-conscious otherness,' and this pervades
                > > > Hegelian philosophy.
                > > >
                > > > Thus Hegel assigns an independent existence to the conceptual object, but we must add that is is
                > > > a conceptual object that is rationally structured, and which is an object which has the shape (Gestalt) of
                > > > consciousness.
                > > >
                > > > Bob,
                > > >
                > > > This sounds very Kantian. In your mentioned passage Hegel writes about the Concept of Spirt in
                > > > its phenomenological actuality, that is, as consciousness in its substantiality. With this - unlike Kant - Hegel denies
                > > > an independent existence of the object from consciousness since consciousness does both, it puts first what is true in-
                > > > itself and then makes the in-itsel for-itself with the necessary appearing result of contradiction. There is no
                > > > "conceptual object that is rationally structured" but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the
                > > > abstract of the sensual being and the understanding into itself. This is what is achieved in the chapter about self-
                > > > consciousness and the truth of its self-certainty where Hegel writes: "A self-consciousness, in being an object, is
                > > > just as much 'I' as 'object'. With this we already have before us the Concept of Spirit. What still lies ahead for
                > > > consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different
                > > > independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and
                > > > 'We' that is 'I'." (para 177, Miller's translation)
                > > >
                > > > In your para 36 Hegel gives the same definition of Spirit as
                > > > absolute substance which as a mere starting definition by the sublation of immediate sensual being and understanding is
                > > > still abstract and now has to become concrete or realized in the movement of expierence of self-consciousness: "the
                > > > substance and its movement are viewed as the object of consciousness", or - what is the same - "what is in experience
                > > > is only the spiritual substance as object of its [own] self" (para 36). Rationality only arises through this movement.
                > > > There is a huge difference between Hegel and Kant for whom rationality is always already given.
                > > >
                > > > Regards,
                > > > Beat Greuter
                > > >
                > > >
                > > >
                > > >
                > > >
                > > >
                > > >
                > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                > > >
                > >
                >
              • john
                ... Dear Joao (and I have to say that I don t have a clue how that name might be pronounced), The Preface is tricky. It doesn t present a continuous chain of
                Message 7 of 16 , May 25, 2011
                  --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@...> wrote:
                  >
                  > Hello John,
                  >
                  > "So, for instance, you can think about the thing and its properties (where the thing is substance and the properties are accidents), or you can think about the dissolution of the thing into its matters (where the matters are substance and the thing is an accidental bringing together of matters). But at this point the thinking, as the third term involved, is totally left out of account. Rather than being an independent third term, it is just the medium or element for the other two moments."
                  >
                  > This seems to be true, as far as i think i am interpreting correctly your words, if we report to the first chapters of the phenomenology, but i ask if it is still and just so in the Preface where Hegel might be taking a broader approach to the Phenomenology, meaning, stating the braoad lines of its intent, scope and goal.
                  >
                  > Regards,
                  > João.



                  Dear Joao (and I have to say that I don't have a clue how that name might be pronounced),

                  The Preface is tricky. It doesn't present a continuous chain of thought with a beginning, middle and end. It is just Hegel talking. And he talks about various things there. In other words, the Preface isn't "scientific".

                  So normally I wouldn't comment on it except in a fairly informal way. But there ARE some very important things in the Preface. One of these important things is definitely para. 37. And para. 36 that Bob is dealing with definitely leads up to this paragraph. The two paragraphs really should be considered together. I believe they form something of a whole without necessary connection to paragraphs 34 and 38. So that's one reason I commented.

                  Another reason I commented is that I liked the general drift of your post on the matter. To some extent I was commenting on your post just as much as I was commenting on the paragraph in question.

                  A third reason that I commented is that I am presently reading the Judgment section of the SL. On page 633 Hegel uses "a thing of manifold properties" and "the dissolution of the thing in which the manifold properties that inhere in it become isolated in acquiring self-subsistence as matters" as examples of the two forms of "the positive Judgment". Oddly enough this whole business about the thing and its properties is dealt with at some length as the first section of the middle chapter of the Doctrine of Essence. At any rate, as that was what I was reading at the time, I figured I'd throw it in there for better or worse.

                  John



                  >
                  >
                  >
                  > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "john" <jgbardis@> wrote:
                  > >
                  > > So there are three things here: consciousness, and the two moments of consciousness which are knowing and "the objectivity negative to knowing".
                  > >
                  > > It is in the element or medium of consciousness that spirit develops itself, on the one hand, and explicates its two moments (knowledge and objectivity) on the other.
                  > >
                  > > So the "effort of consciousness" to unify knowledge and objectivity goes on "behind the back" of consciosuness (though this isn't the case "for us").
                  > >
                  > > So in terms of the Logic, knowledge has to do with the Universal, objectivty with the Particular, and the "effort of consciousness" with the Individual.
                  > >
                  > > So at this point what is explicitly involved is the relationship of the Universal to the Particular, as in a Judgment. The Individual is not yet explicit (except "for us"). Subjectivity has not yet emerged as an explicit third term. When it does emerge then the transition is made from the Judgment to the Syllogism.
                  > >
                  > > So, for instance, you can think about the thing and its properties (where the thing is substance and the properties are accidents), or you can think about the dissolution of the thing into its matters (where the matters are substance and the thing is an accidental bringing together of matters). But at this point the thinking, as the third term involved, is totally left out of account. Rather than being an independent third term, it is just the medium or element for the other two moments.
                  > >
                  > > John
                  > >
                  > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
                  > > >
                  > > > Hello Bob,
                  > > >
                  > > > "The movement of the in-itself and for -itself needs a
                  > > > medium and this medium contains thought structures. In this sense Hegel continues the Kantian Critique."
                  > > >
                  > > > If i may put my 50 cents of this debate, and based fundamentaly in 3 and a half chapters read up to know, it seems to me that Hegel is not really continuing Kantian Critique. It seems to me that "The Science of the Experience of Consciousness" as it is dealt with in parag. 36, means the science of the effort of consciousness in unifying knowledge with objectivity. At this point one may say that there is a continuity with Kant, but i think that the tone is posited on the "effort" more than in the unification of knowledge and objectivity, which was Kant's effort, so to say.
                  > > >
                  > > > In positing the tone on the "effort", or the itinerary of this effort, the shapes that it assumed up to him, Hegel gets out of classic epistemology or gnosiology and gets into the phenomenology, or, i risk saying, the science of the appearing shapes of consciousness throughout the effort to establish a foothold, so to say, of objective knowledge in which to build a world of truth.
                  > > >
                  > > > Inside the itinerary the spirit is "acting" as a subject of knowledge looking for an object of truth but it is not aware of the trail of this search nor of what this trail brought, or is bringing, to its own development and the development of the terms of that search. And in this way it is alienated from itself, because this trail is its own trail and what this trail brough to consciousness is what consciousness brough to itself in its activity.
                  > > >
                  > > > When the phenomenoloy focusses on this effort, on this itinerary, it is focusing on the activity consciousness exerted on itself behind its own back and this would be the point where by consciousness in the itinerary of its activity becoming an object for consciousness, consciousness returns to itself and the experience is realized - or the in-itself is for-itself.
                  > > >
                  > > > Although the substance of this return to itself will only become concrete at the end of the Phenomenology, which, i, personaly, didn't yet got to.
                  > > >
                  > > > What do you think of these considerations?
                  > > >
                  > > > Regards,
                  > > > João.
                  > > >
                  > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, robert fanelli <robertfanelli2001@> wrote:
                  > > > >
                  > > > > "With this - unlike Kant - Hegel denies an independent existence of the object from consciousness since consciousness does both, it puts first what is true in-
                  > > > > itself and then makes the in-itsel for-itself with the necessary appearing result of contradiction. There is no "conceptual object that is rationally structured" but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the abstract of the sensual being and the understanding into itself."
                  > > > >  
                  > > > > Beat,
                  > > > >  
                  > > > > Let me expand on this.  Whether the object (conceptual object) is independent or part of the dialectic movement, it still needs consciousness to develop rational structures.  The movement of the in-itself and for -itself needs a medium and this medium contains thought structures.  In this sense Hegel continues the Kantian Critique. Even if we assign "the Concept of Spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different  independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence,"  even if we include all this within Spirit's object, consciousness needs the structured categories of the Science of Logic to
                  > > > > fullfil the spectulaitve movement of Hegelian thought. 
                  > > > >  
                  > > > > Regartds,
                  > > > >  
                  > > > > Bob Fanelli
                  > > > >
                  > > > > --- On Mon, 5/23/11, greuterb@ <greuterb@> wrote:
                  > > > >
                  > > > >
                  > > > > From: greuterb@ <greuterb@>
                  > > > > Subject: AW: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36
                  > > > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                  > > > > Date: Monday, May 23, 2011, 12:23 PM
                  > > > >
                  > > > >
                  > > > >  
                  > > > >
                  > > > >
                  > > > >
                  > > > > ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
                  > > > > Von: robertfanelli2001@
                  > > > > Datum: 22.05.2011 23:19
                  > > > > An: "chris fanelli"
                  > > > > <cfanelli@>, "chris fanelli"<fanellichris@>, "hegel hegel"<hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                  > > > > Kopie: "ted ted"
                  > > > > <tedhumphrey@>
                  > > > > Betreff: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36
                  > > > >
                  > > > > Dear group,
                  > > > >
                  > > > > Here are my
                  > > > > comments on Preface paragraph # 36:
                  > > > >
                  > > > > Hegel takes consciousness to a new level of cognition. When we are consciously
                  > > > > aware of our own existence, we exercise a cognitive awareness of things. Mind and its thinking process need a medium
                  > > > > for this thinking process whose path of thinking develops moments of thinking and whose moments must rely on images,
                  > > > > forms, and structures. Hegel's title to his treatise is, "Phenomenology of Spirit, The Science of the Experience of
                  > > > > Consciousness." This means consciousness develops cognitive objects on which it reflects. Consciousness experiences
                  > > > > these objects, as it structures them.
                  > > > >
                  > > > > Hegel thus offers us this unique phrase, 'The Experience of Consciousness,' but
                  > > > > we must not confuse the general meaning of experience with 'Experience of Consciousness.' Hegel's phrase does not
                  > > > > directly include all of our experience; that is, the sensations of the body, and empirical developements. His phrase
                  > > > > deals only with the intellectual content of the human mind, and it is in the manner in which the content becomes an
                  > > > > object of the self. Hegel calls this 'spiritual substance.' However, 'Experience of Consciousness' does, in the
                  > > > > movement of Hegel's speculative dialectic, include rational structured forms related to our empirical and sensate
                  > > > > exeriences.
                  > > > >
                  > > > > Experience has a spiritual nature and it must deal with both the mind's perspective of things and the
                  > > > > perspective of the world itself, that is, the subjective and the objective. This is made evident by the enormous
                  > > > > challenge made to consciousness by the bombardment of all that alienates it in the universe. Hegel calls this
                  > > > > alienation, 'other,' which, if the reader is not careful will lead him down the path of abstraction. Rather, is is a
                  > > > > cold, hard, and real 'other.' As we reflect on our own consciousness we face this 'other.' Consciousness thus
                  > > > > reflects on itself as it is confronted by the alienation of the universe in the form of 'the other.'
                  > > > >
                  > > > > As we are
                  > > > > conscious of our selves in a non-material or mental fashion, the very fact of this consciousness of ourselves creates
                  > > > > an otherness of our selves-this ia an important Hegelian concept of 'self-conscious otherness,' and this pervades
                  > > > > Hegelian philosophy.
                  > > > >
                  > > > > Thus Hegel assigns an independent existence to the conceptual object, but we must add that is is
                  > > > > a conceptual object that is rationally structured, and which is an object which has the shape (Gestalt) of
                  > > > > consciousness.
                  > > > >
                  > > > > Bob,
                  > > > >
                  > > > > This sounds very Kantian. In your mentioned passage Hegel writes about the Concept of Spirt in
                  > > > > its phenomenological actuality, that is, as consciousness in its substantiality. With this - unlike Kant - Hegel denies
                  > > > > an independent existence of the object from consciousness since consciousness does both, it puts first what is true in-
                  > > > > itself and then makes the in-itsel for-itself with the necessary appearing result of contradiction. There is no
                  > > > > "conceptual object that is rationally structured" but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the
                  > > > > abstract of the sensual being and the understanding into itself. This is what is achieved in the chapter about self-
                  > > > > consciousness and the truth of its self-certainty where Hegel writes: "A self-consciousness, in being an object, is
                  > > > > just as much 'I' as 'object'. With this we already have before us the Concept of Spirit. What still lies ahead for
                  > > > > consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different
                  > > > > independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and
                  > > > > 'We' that is 'I'." (para 177, Miller's translation)
                  > > > >
                  > > > > In your para 36 Hegel gives the same definition of Spirit as
                  > > > > absolute substance which as a mere starting definition by the sublation of immediate sensual being and understanding is
                  > > > > still abstract and now has to become concrete or realized in the movement of expierence of self-consciousness: "the
                  > > > > substance and its movement are viewed as the object of consciousness", or - what is the same - "what is in experience
                  > > > > is only the spiritual substance as object of its [own] self" (para 36). Rationality only arises through this movement.
                  > > > > There is a huge difference between Hegel and Kant for whom rationality is always already given.
                  > > > >
                  > > > > Regards,
                  > > > > Beat Greuter
                  > > > >
                  > > > >
                  > > > >
                  > > > >
                  > > > >
                  > > > >
                  > > > >
                  > > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                  > > > >
                  > > >
                  > >
                  >
                • vascojoao2003
                  Hi John, I see that i didn t interpret your comment justly - i am sorry about that. Regards, João. P.S. About this: and I have to say that I don t have a clue
                  Message 8 of 16 , May 25, 2011
                    Hi John,

                    I see that i didn't interpret your comment justly - i am sorry about that.

                    Regards,

                    João.

                    P.S. About this:"and I have to say that I don't have a clue how that name might be pronounced":

                    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z9YEGuqT1o4

                    (forget the "Ruas" in "João Ruas", which is in here a surname, and the "João" sounds pretty much like that.)

                    "João" is the same as "John", but in portuguese.

                    :-)


                    --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "john" <jgbardis@...> wrote:
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
                    > >
                    > > Hello John,
                    > >
                    > > "So, for instance, you can think about the thing and its properties (where the thing is substance and the properties are accidents), or you can think about the dissolution of the thing into its matters (where the matters are substance and the thing is an accidental bringing together of matters). But at this point the thinking, as the third term involved, is totally left out of account. Rather than being an independent third term, it is just the medium or element for the other two moments."
                    > >
                    > > This seems to be true, as far as i think i am interpreting correctly your words, if we report to the first chapters of the phenomenology, but i ask if it is still and just so in the Preface where Hegel might be taking a broader approach to the Phenomenology, meaning, stating the braoad lines of its intent, scope and goal.
                    > >
                    > > Regards,
                    > > João.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Dear Joao (and I have to say that I don't have a clue how that name might be pronounced),
                    >
                    > The Preface is tricky. It doesn't present a continuous chain of thought with a beginning, middle and end. It is just Hegel talking. And he talks about various things there. In other words, the Preface isn't "scientific".
                    >
                    > So normally I wouldn't comment on it except in a fairly informal way. But there ARE some very important things in the Preface. One of these important things is definitely para. 37. And para. 36 that Bob is dealing with definitely leads up to this paragraph. The two paragraphs really should be considered together. I believe they form something of a whole without necessary connection to paragraphs 34 and 38. So that's one reason I commented.
                    >
                    > Another reason I commented is that I liked the general drift of your post on the matter. To some extent I was commenting on your post just as much as I was commenting on the paragraph in question.
                    >
                    > A third reason that I commented is that I am presently reading the Judgment section of the SL. On page 633 Hegel uses "a thing of manifold properties" and "the dissolution of the thing in which the manifold properties that inhere in it become isolated in acquiring self-subsistence as matters" as examples of the two forms of "the positive Judgment". Oddly enough this whole business about the thing and its properties is dealt with at some length as the first section of the middle chapter of the Doctrine of Essence. At any rate, as that was what I was reading at the time, I figured I'd throw it in there for better or worse.
                    >
                    > John
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "john" <jgbardis@> wrote:
                    > > >
                    > > > So there are three things here: consciousness, and the two moments of consciousness which are knowing and "the objectivity negative to knowing".
                    > > >
                    > > > It is in the element or medium of consciousness that spirit develops itself, on the one hand, and explicates its two moments (knowledge and objectivity) on the other.
                    > > >
                    > > > So the "effort of consciousness" to unify knowledge and objectivity goes on "behind the back" of consciosuness (though this isn't the case "for us").
                    > > >
                    > > > So in terms of the Logic, knowledge has to do with the Universal, objectivty with the Particular, and the "effort of consciousness" with the Individual.
                    > > >
                    > > > So at this point what is explicitly involved is the relationship of the Universal to the Particular, as in a Judgment. The Individual is not yet explicit (except "for us"). Subjectivity has not yet emerged as an explicit third term. When it does emerge then the transition is made from the Judgment to the Syllogism.
                    > > >
                    > > > So, for instance, you can think about the thing and its properties (where the thing is substance and the properties are accidents), or you can think about the dissolution of the thing into its matters (where the matters are substance and the thing is an accidental bringing together of matters). But at this point the thinking, as the third term involved, is totally left out of account. Rather than being an independent third term, it is just the medium or element for the other two moments.
                    > > >
                    > > > John
                    > > >
                    > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@> wrote:
                    > > > >
                    > > > > Hello Bob,
                    > > > >
                    > > > > "The movement of the in-itself and for -itself needs a
                    > > > > medium and this medium contains thought structures. In this sense Hegel continues the Kantian Critique."
                    > > > >
                    > > > > If i may put my 50 cents of this debate, and based fundamentaly in 3 and a half chapters read up to know, it seems to me that Hegel is not really continuing Kantian Critique. It seems to me that "The Science of the Experience of Consciousness" as it is dealt with in parag. 36, means the science of the effort of consciousness in unifying knowledge with objectivity. At this point one may say that there is a continuity with Kant, but i think that the tone is posited on the "effort" more than in the unification of knowledge and objectivity, which was Kant's effort, so to say.
                    > > > >
                    > > > > In positing the tone on the "effort", or the itinerary of this effort, the shapes that it assumed up to him, Hegel gets out of classic epistemology or gnosiology and gets into the phenomenology, or, i risk saying, the science of the appearing shapes of consciousness throughout the effort to establish a foothold, so to say, of objective knowledge in which to build a world of truth.
                    > > > >
                    > > > > Inside the itinerary the spirit is "acting" as a subject of knowledge looking for an object of truth but it is not aware of the trail of this search nor of what this trail brought, or is bringing, to its own development and the development of the terms of that search. And in this way it is alienated from itself, because this trail is its own trail and what this trail brough to consciousness is what consciousness brough to itself in its activity.
                    > > > >
                    > > > > When the phenomenoloy focusses on this effort, on this itinerary, it is focusing on the activity consciousness exerted on itself behind its own back and this would be the point where by consciousness in the itinerary of its activity becoming an object for consciousness, consciousness returns to itself and the experience is realized - or the in-itself is for-itself.
                    > > > >
                    > > > > Although the substance of this return to itself will only become concrete at the end of the Phenomenology, which, i, personaly, didn't yet got to.
                    > > > >
                    > > > > What do you think of these considerations?
                    > > > >
                    > > > > Regards,
                    > > > > João.
                    > > > >
                    > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, robert fanelli <robertfanelli2001@> wrote:
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > "With this - unlike Kant - Hegel denies an independent existence of the object from consciousness since consciousness does both, it puts first what is true in-
                    > > > > > itself and then makes the in-itsel for-itself with the necessary appearing result of contradiction. There is no "conceptual object that is rationally structured" but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the abstract of the sensual being and the understanding into itself."
                    > > > > >  
                    > > > > > Beat,
                    > > > > >  
                    > > > > > Let me expand on this.  Whether the object (conceptual object) is independent or part of the dialectic movement, it still needs consciousness to develop rational structures.  The movement of the in-itself and for -itself needs a medium and this medium contains thought structures.  In this sense Hegel continues the Kantian Critique. Even if we assign "the Concept of Spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different  independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence,"  even if we include all this within Spirit's object, consciousness needs the structured categories of the Science of Logic to
                    > > > > > fullfil the spectulaitve movement of Hegelian thought. 
                    > > > > >  
                    > > > > > Regartds,
                    > > > > >  
                    > > > > > Bob Fanelli
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > --- On Mon, 5/23/11, greuterb@ <greuterb@> wrote:
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > From: greuterb@ <greuterb@>
                    > > > > > Subject: AW: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36
                    > > > > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                    > > > > > Date: Monday, May 23, 2011, 12:23 PM
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > >  
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
                    > > > > > Von: robertfanelli2001@
                    > > > > > Datum: 22.05.2011 23:19
                    > > > > > An: "chris fanelli"
                    > > > > > <cfanelli@>, "chris fanelli"<fanellichris@>, "hegel hegel"<hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                    > > > > > Kopie: "ted ted"
                    > > > > > <tedhumphrey@>
                    > > > > > Betreff: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > Dear group,
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > Here are my
                    > > > > > comments on Preface paragraph # 36:
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > Hegel takes consciousness to a new level of cognition. When we are consciously
                    > > > > > aware of our own existence, we exercise a cognitive awareness of things. Mind and its thinking process need a medium
                    > > > > > for this thinking process whose path of thinking develops moments of thinking and whose moments must rely on images,
                    > > > > > forms, and structures. Hegel's title to his treatise is, "Phenomenology of Spirit, The Science of the Experience of
                    > > > > > Consciousness." This means consciousness develops cognitive objects on which it reflects. Consciousness experiences
                    > > > > > these objects, as it structures them.
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > Hegel thus offers us this unique phrase, 'The Experience of Consciousness,' but
                    > > > > > we must not confuse the general meaning of experience with 'Experience of Consciousness.' Hegel's phrase does not
                    > > > > > directly include all of our experience; that is, the sensations of the body, and empirical developements. His phrase
                    > > > > > deals only with the intellectual content of the human mind, and it is in the manner in which the content becomes an
                    > > > > > object of the self. Hegel calls this 'spiritual substance.' However, 'Experience of Consciousness' does, in the
                    > > > > > movement of Hegel's speculative dialectic, include rational structured forms related to our empirical and sensate
                    > > > > > exeriences.
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > Experience has a spiritual nature and it must deal with both the mind's perspective of things and the
                    > > > > > perspective of the world itself, that is, the subjective and the objective. This is made evident by the enormous
                    > > > > > challenge made to consciousness by the bombardment of all that alienates it in the universe. Hegel calls this
                    > > > > > alienation, 'other,' which, if the reader is not careful will lead him down the path of abstraction. Rather, is is a
                    > > > > > cold, hard, and real 'other.' As we reflect on our own consciousness we face this 'other.' Consciousness thus
                    > > > > > reflects on itself as it is confronted by the alienation of the universe in the form of 'the other.'
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > As we are
                    > > > > > conscious of our selves in a non-material or mental fashion, the very fact of this consciousness of ourselves creates
                    > > > > > an otherness of our selves-this ia an important Hegelian concept of 'self-conscious otherness,' and this pervades
                    > > > > > Hegelian philosophy.
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > Thus Hegel assigns an independent existence to the conceptual object, but we must add that is is
                    > > > > > a conceptual object that is rationally structured, and which is an object which has the shape (Gestalt) of
                    > > > > > consciousness.
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > Bob,
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > This sounds very Kantian. In your mentioned passage Hegel writes about the Concept of Spirt in
                    > > > > > its phenomenological actuality, that is, as consciousness in its substantiality. With this - unlike Kant - Hegel denies
                    > > > > > an independent existence of the object from consciousness since consciousness does both, it puts first what is true in-
                    > > > > > itself and then makes the in-itsel for-itself with the necessary appearing result of contradiction. There is no
                    > > > > > "conceptual object that is rationally structured" but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the
                    > > > > > abstract of the sensual being and the understanding into itself. This is what is achieved in the chapter about self-
                    > > > > > consciousness and the truth of its self-certainty where Hegel writes: "A self-consciousness, in being an object, is
                    > > > > > just as much 'I' as 'object'. With this we already have before us the Concept of Spirit. What still lies ahead for
                    > > > > > consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different
                    > > > > > independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and
                    > > > > > 'We' that is 'I'." (para 177, Miller's translation)
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > In your para 36 Hegel gives the same definition of Spirit as
                    > > > > > absolute substance which as a mere starting definition by the sublation of immediate sensual being and understanding is
                    > > > > > still abstract and now has to become concrete or realized in the movement of expierence of self-consciousness: "the
                    > > > > > substance and its movement are viewed as the object of consciousness", or - what is the same - "what is in experience
                    > > > > > is only the spiritual substance as object of its [own] self" (para 36). Rationality only arises through this movement.
                    > > > > > There is a huge difference between Hegel and Kant for whom rationality is always already given.
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > Regards,
                    > > > > > Beat Greuter
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                    > > > > >
                    > > > >
                    > > >
                    > >
                    >
                  • robert fanelli
                    John said,     So there are three things here: consciousness, and the two moments of consciousness which are knowing and the objectivity negative to
                    Message 9 of 16 , May 25, 2011
                      John said,
                       
                       
                      "So there are three things here: consciousness, and the two moments of consciousness which are knowing and "the objectivity negative to knowing".
                       
                      Agreed, referring to Hegel's PhdG, but there is a fourth 'thing,' and that is the rational structure needed for consciousness to express 'the two moments,' and this is Kantian.  Hegel took up the torch here.
                       
                      Regards,
                       
                      Bob



                      --- On Wed, 5/25/11, john <jgbardis@...> wrote:


                      From: john <jgbardis@...>
                      Subject: [hegel] Re: Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36
                      To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                      Date: Wednesday, May 25, 2011, 5:17 AM


                       



                      So there are three things here: consciousness, and the two moments of consciousness which are knowing and "the objectivity negative to knowing".

                      It is in the element or medium of consciousness that spirit develops itself, on the one hand, and explicates its two moments (knowledge and objectivity) on the other.

                      So the "effort of consciousness" to unify knowledge and objectivity goes on "behind the back" of consciosuness (though this isn't the case "for us").

                      So in terms of the Logic, knowledge has to do with the Universal, objectivty with the Particular, and the "effort of consciousness" with the Individual.

                      So at this point what is explicitly involved is the relationship of the Universal to the Particular, as in a Judgment. The Individual is not yet explicit (except "for us"). Subjectivity has not yet emerged as an explicit third term. When it does emerge then the transition is made from the Judgment to the Syllogism.

                      So, for instance, you can think about the thing and its properties (where the thing is substance and the properties are accidents), or you can think about the dissolution of the thing into its matters (where the matters are substance and the thing is an accidental bringing together of matters). But at this point the thinking, as the third term involved, is totally left out of account. Rather than being an independent third term, it is just the medium or element for the other two moments.

                      John

                      --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@...> wrote:
                      >
                      > Hello Bob,
                      >
                      > "The movement of the in-itself and for -itself needs a
                      > medium and this medium contains thought structures. In this sense Hegel continues the Kantian Critique."
                      >
                      > If i may put my 50 cents of this debate, and based fundamentaly in 3 and a half chapters read up to know, it seems to me that Hegel is not really continuing Kantian Critique. It seems to me that "The Science of the Experience of Consciousness" as it is dealt with in parag. 36, means the science of the effort of consciousness in unifying knowledge with objectivity. At this point one may say that there is a continuity with Kant, but i think that the tone is posited on the "effort" more than in the unification of knowledge and objectivity, which was Kant's effort, so to say.
                      >
                      > In positing the tone on the "effort", or the itinerary of this effort, the shapes that it assumed up to him, Hegel gets out of classic epistemology or gnosiology and gets into the phenomenology, or, i risk saying, the science of the appearing shapes of consciousness throughout the effort to establish a foothold, so to say, of objective knowledge in which to build a world of truth.
                      >
                      > Inside the itinerary the spirit is "acting" as a subject of knowledge looking for an object of truth but it is not aware of the trail of this search nor of what this trail brought, or is bringing, to its own development and the development of the terms of that search. And in this way it is alienated from itself, because this trail is its own trail and what this trail brough to consciousness is what consciousness brough to itself in its activity.
                      >
                      > When the phenomenoloy focusses on this effort, on this itinerary, it is focusing on the activity consciousness exerted on itself behind its own back and this would be the point where by consciousness in the itinerary of its activity becoming an object for consciousness, consciousness returns to itself and the experience is realized - or the in-itself is for-itself.
                      >
                      > Although the substance of this return to itself will only become concrete at the end of the Phenomenology, which, i, personaly, didn't yet got to.
                      >
                      > What do you think of these considerations?
                      >
                      > Regards,
                      > João.
                      >
                      > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, robert fanelli <robertfanelli2001@> wrote:
                      > >
                      > > "With this - unlike Kant - Hegel denies an independent existence of the object from consciousness since consciousness does both, it puts first what is true in-
                      > > itself and then makes the in-itsel for-itself with the necessary appearing result of contradiction. There is no "conceptual object that is rationally structured" but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the abstract of the sensual being and the understanding into itself."
                      > >  
                      > > Beat,
                      > >  
                      > > Let me expand on this.  Whether the object (conceptual object) is independent or part of the dialectic movement, it still needs consciousness to develop rational structures.  The movement of the in-itself and for -itself needs a medium and this medium contains thought structures.  In this sense Hegel continues the Kantian Critique. Even if we assign "the Concept of Spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different  independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence,"  even if we include all this within Spirit's object, consciousness needs the structured categories of the Science of Logic to
                      > > fullfil the spectulaitve movement of Hegelian thought. 
                      > >  
                      > > Regartds,
                      > >  
                      > > Bob Fanelli
                      > >
                      > > --- On Mon, 5/23/11, greuterb@ <greuterb@> wrote:
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > From: greuterb@ <greuterb@>
                      > > Subject: AW: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36
                      > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                      > > Date: Monday, May 23, 2011, 12:23 PM
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >  
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
                      > > Von: robertfanelli2001@
                      > > Datum: 22.05.2011 23:19
                      > > An: "chris fanelli"
                      > > <cfanelli@>, "chris fanelli"<fanellichris@>, "hegel hegel"<hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                      > > Kopie: "ted ted"
                      > > <tedhumphrey@>
                      > > Betreff: [hegel] Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36
                      > >
                      > > Dear group,
                      > >
                      > > Here are my
                      > > comments on Preface paragraph # 36:
                      > >
                      > > Hegel takes consciousness to a new level of cognition. When we are consciously
                      > > aware of our own existence, we exercise a cognitive awareness of things. Mind and its thinking process need a medium
                      > > for this thinking process whose path of thinking develops moments of thinking and whose moments must rely on images,
                      > > forms, and structures. Hegel's title to his treatise is, "Phenomenology of Spirit, The Science of the Experience of
                      > > Consciousness." This means consciousness develops cognitive objects on which it reflects. Consciousness experiences
                      > > these objects, as it structures them.
                      > >
                      > > Hegel thus offers us this unique phrase, 'The Experience of Consciousness,' but
                      > > we must not confuse the general meaning of experience with 'Experience of Consciousness.' Hegel's phrase does not
                      > > directly include all of our experience; that is, the sensations of the body, and empirical developements. His phrase
                      > > deals only with the intellectual content of the human mind, and it is in the manner in which the content becomes an
                      > > object of the self. Hegel calls this 'spiritual substance.' However, 'Experience of Consciousness' does, in the
                      > > movement of Hegel's speculative dialectic, include rational structured forms related to our empirical and sensate
                      > > exeriences.
                      > >
                      > > Experience has a spiritual nature and it must deal with both the mind's perspective of things and the
                      > > perspective of the world itself, that is, the subjective and the objective. This is made evident by the enormous
                      > > challenge made to consciousness by the bombardment of all that alienates it in the universe. Hegel calls this
                      > > alienation, 'other,' which, if the reader is not careful will lead him down the path of abstraction. Rather, is is a
                      > > cold, hard, and real 'other.' As we reflect on our own consciousness we face this 'other.' Consciousness thus
                      > > reflects on itself as it is confronted by the alienation of the universe in the form of 'the other.'
                      > >
                      > > As we are
                      > > conscious of our selves in a non-material or mental fashion, the very fact of this consciousness of ourselves creates
                      > > an otherness of our selves-this ia an important Hegelian concept of 'self-conscious otherness,' and this pervades
                      > > Hegelian philosophy.
                      > >
                      > > Thus Hegel assigns an independent existence to the conceptual object, but we must add that is is
                      > > a conceptual object that is rationally structured, and which is an object which has the shape (Gestalt) of
                      > > consciousness.
                      > >
                      > > Bob,
                      > >
                      > > This sounds very Kantian. In your mentioned passage Hegel writes about the Concept of Spirt in
                      > > its phenomenological actuality, that is, as consciousness in its substantiality. With this - unlike Kant - Hegel denies
                      > > an independent existence of the object from consciousness since consciousness does both, it puts first what is true in-
                      > > itself and then makes the in-itsel for-itself with the necessary appearing result of contradiction. There is no
                      > > "conceptual object that is rationally structured" but only the movement of consciousness as the return from the
                      > > abstract of the sensual being and the understanding into itself. This is what is achieved in the chapter about self-
                      > > consciousness and the truth of its self-certainty where Hegel writes: "A self-consciousness, in being an object, is
                      > > just as much 'I' as 'object'. With this we already have before us the Concept of Spirit. What still lies ahead for
                      > > consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different
                      > > independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and
                      > > 'We' that is 'I'." (para 177, Miller's translation)
                      > >
                      > > In your para 36 Hegel gives the same definition of Spirit as
                      > > absolute substance which as a mere starting definition by the sublation of immediate sensual being and understanding is
                      > > still abstract and now has to become concrete or realized in the movement of expierence of self-consciousness: "the
                      > > substance and its movement are viewed as the object of consciousness", or - what is the same - "what is in experience
                      > > is only the spiritual substance as object of its [own] self" (para 36). Rationality only arises through this movement.
                      > > There is a huge difference between Hegel and Kant for whom rationality is always already given.
                      > >
                      > > Regards,
                      > > Beat Greuter
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                      > >
                      >








                      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                    • john
                      ... Dear Bob, I would think that the knowing is the rational structure. But this does seem rather Kantian, with consciousness something like the
                      Message 10 of 16 , May 25, 2011
                        --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, robert fanelli <robertfanelli2001@...> wrote:
                        >
                        > John said,
                        >  
                        >  
                        > "So there are three things here: consciousness, and the two moments of consciousness which are knowing and "the objectivity negative to knowing".
                        >  
                        > Agreed, referring to Hegel's PhdG, but there is a fourth 'thing,' and that is the rational structure needed for consciousness to express 'the two moments,' and this is Kantian.  Hegel took up the torch here.
                        >  
                        > Regards,
                        >  
                        > Bob


                        Dear Bob,

                        I would think that the "knowing" is the rational structure.

                        But this does seem rather Kantian, with "consciousness" something like the Transcendental Unity of apperception.

                        What I happen to be reading at the moment might have something to do with this. On page 650 of the SL:

                        "Inasmuch as this identity, therefore divides, it is the inner nature by virtue of which a subject and predicate [object and knowing] are connected to each other. This is a connection of necessity wherein the two terms of the judgment are only unessential distinctions."

                        John
                      • vascojoao2003
                        Dear Bob and John, I still have some doubts about such a proximity with Kant. the rational structure needed for consciousness (...) With Kant this rational
                        Message 11 of 16 , May 25, 2011
                          Dear Bob and John,

                          I still have some doubts about such a proximity with Kant.

                          "the rational structure needed for consciousness (...)"

                          With Kant this rational structure is a form "a priori" and the form "a priori" is one of the themes Hegel deals with in the Introduction and, as far as i understood it, rejects as a valid method to establish the parameters of knowledge or objectivity.

                          So far in the PhG, i'm in Chapter IV, what is happening seems to be something like the dissolution of every presumption of consciousness in relation to its object - sense-certainty, perception and understanding all come up with indeterminate, contradictory or empty objects. Know self-consciouness is the object, but this object seems to be dependent on another to establish itself, in the case, so far, another self-consciousness as the living object already proved itself unable, through the dialectics of desire, to ground self-consciousness definitely in-and-for-itself.

                          It seems true that there are some recurrent structures in the PhG, but it seems also true that those recurrent structures resist a schematic form from which one can say "eureka!, here is the a priori form of all of consciousness movement". To say, for instance, that it is dialectics, this a priori form, might be correct (i'm not sure) but, even so, that form would be so general and empty that any objective knowledge would be dissolved in that generality, because the concrete content of every dialectical movement is very different from its previous (the "this here and now", the "thing with properties", "force and law", desire and...", etc) even if the movement is recurrent in some infraestructural features.

                          This said as i take it from less than half of the PhG.

                          Does this make sense?

                          Regards,
                          João.


                          --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "john" <jgbardis@...> wrote:
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, robert fanelli <robertfanelli2001@> wrote:
                          > >
                          > > John said,
                          > >  
                          > >  
                          > > "So there are three things here: consciousness, and the two moments of consciousness which are knowing and "the objectivity negative to knowing".
                          > >  
                          > > Agreed, referring to Hegel's PhdG, but there is a fourth 'thing,' and that is the rational structure needed for consciousness to express 'the two moments,' and this is Kantian.  Hegel took up the torch here.
                          > >  
                          > > Regards,
                          > >  
                          > > Bob
                          >
                          >
                          > Dear Bob,
                          >
                          > I would think that the "knowing" is the rational structure.
                          >
                          > But this does seem rather Kantian, with "consciousness" something like the Transcendental Unity of apperception.
                          >
                          > What I happen to be reading at the moment might have something to do with this. On page 650 of the SL:
                          >
                          > "Inasmuch as this identity, therefore divides, it is the inner nature by virtue of which a subject and predicate [object and knowing] are connected to each other. This is a connection of necessity wherein the two terms of the judgment are only unessential distinctions."
                          >
                          > John
                          >
                        • vascojoao2003
                          Please read, Now self-consciouness is the object (...) instead of Know self-consciouness is the object (...) Thanks and sorry about that. João.
                          Message 12 of 16 , May 25, 2011
                            Please read,

                            "Now self-consciouness is the object (...)"

                            instead of

                            "Know self-consciouness is the object (...)"

                            Thanks and sorry about that.

                            João.

                            --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@...> wrote:
                            >
                            > Dear Bob and John,
                            >
                            > I still have some doubts about such a proximity with Kant.
                            >
                            > "the rational structure needed for consciousness (...)"
                            >
                            > With Kant this rational structure is a form "a priori" and the form "a priori" is one of the themes Hegel deals with in the Introduction and, as far as i understood it, rejects as a valid method to establish the parameters of knowledge or objectivity.
                            >
                            > So far in the PhG, i'm in Chapter IV, what is happening seems to be something like the dissolution of every presumption of consciousness in relation to its object - sense-certainty, perception and understanding all come up with indeterminate, contradictory or empty objects. Know self-consciouness is the object, but this object seems to be dependent on another to establish itself, in the case, so far, another self-consciousness as the living object already proved itself unable, through the dialectics of desire, to ground self-consciousness definitely in-and-for-itself.
                            >
                            > It seems true that there are some recurrent structures in the PhG, but it seems also true that those recurrent structures resist a schematic form from which one can say "eureka!, here is the a priori form of all of consciousness movement". To say, for instance, that it is dialectics, this a priori form, might be correct (i'm not sure) but, even so, that form would be so general and empty that any objective knowledge would be dissolved in that generality, because the concrete content of every dialectical movement is very different from its previous (the "this here and now", the "thing with properties", "force and law", desire and...", etc) even if the movement is recurrent in some infraestructural features.
                            >
                            > This said as i take it from less than half of the PhG.
                            >
                            > Does this make sense?
                            >
                            > Regards,
                            > João.
                            >
                            >
                            > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "john" <jgbardis@> wrote:
                            > >
                            > >
                            > >
                            > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, robert fanelli <robertfanelli2001@> wrote:
                            > > >
                            > > > John said,
                            > > >  
                            > > >  
                            > > > "So there are three things here: consciousness, and the two moments of consciousness which are knowing and "the objectivity negative to knowing".
                            > > >  
                            > > > Agreed, referring to Hegel's PhdG, but there is a fourth 'thing,' and that is the rational structure needed for consciousness to express 'the two moments,' and this is Kantian.  Hegel took up the torch here.
                            > > >  
                            > > > Regards,
                            > > >  
                            > > > Bob
                            > >
                            > >
                            > > Dear Bob,
                            > >
                            > > I would think that the "knowing" is the rational structure.
                            > >
                            > > But this does seem rather Kantian, with "consciousness" something like the Transcendental Unity of apperception.
                            > >
                            > > What I happen to be reading at the moment might have something to do with this. On page 650 of the SL:
                            > >
                            > > "Inasmuch as this identity, therefore divides, it is the inner nature by virtue of which a subject and predicate [object and knowing] are connected to each other. This is a connection of necessity wherein the two terms of the judgment are only unessential distinctions."
                            > >
                            > > John
                            > >
                            >
                          • john
                            ... Dear Joao, First, in regard to any sort of schematic form that might be found in Hegel--schematic forms underlie everything in Hegel from beginning to end
                            Message 13 of 16 , May 26, 2011
                              --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "vascojoao2003" <vascojoao2003@...> wrote:
                              >
                              > Dear Bob and John,
                              >
                              > I still have some doubts about such a proximity with Kant.
                              >
                              > "the rational structure needed for consciousness (...)"
                              >
                              > With Kant this rational structure is a form "a priori" and the form "a priori" is one of the themes Hegel deals with in the Introduction and, as far as i understood it, rejects as a valid method to establish the parameters of knowledge or objectivity.
                              >
                              > So far in the PhG, i'm in Chapter IV, what is happening seems to be something like the dissolution of every presumption of consciousness in relation to its object - sense-certainty, perception and understanding all come up with indeterminate, contradictory or empty objects. Know self-consciouness is the object, but this object seems to be dependent on another to establish itself, in the case, so far, another self-consciousness as the living object already proved itself unable, through the dialectics of desire, to ground self-consciousness definitely in-and-for-itself.
                              >
                              > It seems true that there are some recurrent structures in the PhG, but it seems also true that those recurrent structures resist a schematic form from which one can say "eureka!, here is the a priori form of all of consciousness movement". To say, for instance, that it is dialectics, this a priori form, might be correct (i'm not sure) but, even so, that form would be so general and empty that any objective knowledge would be dissolved in that generality, because the concrete content of every dialectical movement is very different from its previous (the "this here and now", the "thing with properties", "force and law", desire and...", etc) even if the movement is recurrent in some infraestructural features.
                              >
                              > This said as i take it from less than half of the PhG.
                              >
                              > Does this make sense?
                              >
                              > Regards,
                              > João.


                              Dear Joao,

                              First, in regard to any sort of schematic form that might be found in Hegel--schematic forms underlie everything in Hegel from beginning to end and from top to bottom. In the SL Hegel writes:

                              "Therefore the common practice of separating understanding [schematic form] and reason is to be rejected on all counts. On the contrary, to consider the concept as void of reason should itself be considered as an incapacity of reason to recognize itself in the concept. The determinate and abstract concept [the schematic form] is the condition, or rather an essential moment, of reason; it is form quickened by spirit in which the finite, through the universality in which it refers to itself, is internally kindled, is posited as dialectical and thereby is the beginning of the appearance of reason."
                              [page, 540, di Giovanni]

                              Second, when you bring in the Self-consciousness chapter of the Phenomenology, that and all that follows from it would be related to Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. Something that Hegel brings into German Idealism in a big way is social and political theory. Kant and Fichte were big into morality, but they almost completely neglected the social and political side of Practical Reason. So this is a major correction of them on Hegel's part.

                              John
                            • robert fanelli
                              A good point.  Knowing could include rational structures, but knowedge and the act of knowiing things is not the same as the ratiional structures needed to
                              Message 14 of 16 , May 27, 2011
                                A good point.  Knowing could include rational structures, but knowedge and the act of knowiing things is not the same as the ratiional structures needed to develop  and express such knowledge.  That's why I separate them.  Popper said that there are three aspects to reality.  One is consciousness, the second is the world itself, and third are the statements, logic,  and  verbal  structures needed  to express them.

                                --- On Wed, 5/25/11, john <jgbardis@...> wrote:


                                From: john <jgbardis@...>
                                Subject: [hegel] Re: Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36
                                To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                                Date: Wednesday, May 25, 2011, 10:08 PM


                                 





                                --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, robert fanelli <robertfanelli2001@...> wrote:
                                >
                                > John said,
                                >  
                                >  
                                > "So there are three things here: consciousness, and the two moments of consciousness which are knowing and "the objectivity negative to knowing".
                                >  
                                > Agreed, referring to Hegel's PhdG, but there is a fourth 'thing,' and that is the rational structure needed for consciousness to express 'the two moments,' and this is Kantian.  Hegel took up the torch here.
                                >  
                                > Regards,
                                >  
                                > Bob

                                Dear Bob,

                                I would think that the "knowing" is the rational structure.

                                But this does seem rather Kantian, with "consciousness" something like the Transcendental Unity of apperception.

                                What I happen to be reading at the moment might have something to do with this. On page 650 of the SL:

                                "Inasmuch as this identity, therefore divides, it is the inner nature by virtue of which a subject and predicate [object and knowing] are connected to each other. This is a connection of necessity wherein the two terms of the judgment are only unessential distinctions."

                                John








                                [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                              • john
                                ... Of course that is pretty much the same as Hegel s Spirit-Nature-Logic. At a rudimentary level this would be something like consciousness-object-knowledge.
                                Message 15 of 16 , May 27, 2011
                                  --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, robert fanelli <robertfanelli2001@...> wrote:
                                  >
                                  > A good point.  Knowing could include rational structures, but knowedge and the act of knowiing things is not the same as the ratiional structures needed to develop  and express such knowledge.  That's why I separate them.  Popper said that there are three aspects to reality.  One is consciousness, the second is the world itself, and third are the statements, logic,  and  verbal  structures needed  to express them.
                                  >


                                  Of course that is pretty much the same as Hegel's Spirit-Nature-Logic. At a rudimentary level this would be something like consciousness-object-knowledge.

                                  John
                                • robert fanelli
                                  Yes, and the main problem throughout the entire history of philosophy is the correspondence or linking of the three, that is, a unified being of all three.
                                  Message 16 of 16 , May 28, 2011
                                    Yes, and the main problem throughout the entire history of philosophy is the 'correspondence' or linking of the three, that is, a unified being of all three.
                                     
                                    Bob Fanelli

                                    --- On Fri, 5/27/11, john <jgbardis@...> wrote:


                                    From: john <jgbardis@...>
                                    Subject: [hegel] Re: Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 36
                                    To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                                    Date: Friday, May 27, 2011, 9:42 PM


                                     





                                    --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, robert fanelli <robertfanelli2001@...> wrote:
                                    >
                                    > A good point.  Knowing could include rational structures, but knowedge and the act of knowiing things is not the same as the ratiional structures needed to develop  and express such knowledge.  That's why I separate them.  Popper said that there are three aspects to reality.  One is consciousness, the second is the world itself, and third are the statements, logic,  and  verbal  structures needed  to express them.
                                    >

                                    Of course that is pretty much the same as Hegel's Spirit-Nature-Logic. At a rudimentary level this would be something like consciousness-object-knowledge.

                                    John








                                    [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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