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Re: [hegel] Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 32

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  • Beat Greuter
    ... Bob, As far as I know Kant s Critique of Judgement I agree with this. Nevertheless, it is interesting that in your previous quotation Kant speaks of
    Message 1 of 6 , Apr 29, 2011
      Am 29.04.2011 02:12, Robert Fanelli writes:

      > Beat,
      >
      > This is getting really interesting.
      >
      > You said:
      > <For Hegel Beauty and the Good are moments of the Absolute Spirit in
      > which these
      > moments are mediated and get their objective truth. >
      >
      > I agree # 32 is not about Beauty per se, but as soon as you refer to
      > Absolute Spirit and mediated moments, you are talking about rational
      > thought and knowledge of things. Kant's take on beauty has no
      > rational basis. It is out of the blue and pure intuition. KU is
      > loaded with quotes about this. I will try to research the texts and
      > offer them to the group. KU is however not an easy text.
      >
      > Regards,
      >
      > Bob
      >


      Bob,

      As far as I know Kant's Critique of Judgement I agree with this.
      Nevertheless, it is interesting that in your previous quotation Kant
      speaks of "NECESSARY satifsfaction" ("NOTWENDIGES Wohlgefallen") (in my
      German edition it is A 67 and B 68):

      “The beautiful is that which without any concept cognized as the object
      is a necessary satisfaction.”
      "Schön ist, was ohne Begriff als Gegenstand eines notwendigen
      Wohlgefallens erkannt wird."

      As far as I understand this, for Kant 'beautiful' is a qualification of
      an object without having a concept of this object. Nevertheless, this
      qualification is taken as 'necessary'. Why?

      Hegel and Kant have different ideas of a concept. For Kant the concept
      is a mere abstract identity of the understanding which has the object
      outside of itself. With such a form of the concept, of course, logically
      'the beautiful' as object of a satisfaction cannot be grasped
      conceptionally but only single qualities of the object and their
      combination in representations. Hegel would agree with this. But Hegel's
      concept grasps the mediation of the subjective and objective side within
      itself and with this he can derive the necessity within the movement of
      the concept. So, the question is how Kant can derive the necessity of
      such a (subjective) judgement on 'the beautiful'?

      Regards,
      Beat Greuter


      --- On Thu, 4/28/11, Beat Greuter <greuterb@...
      <mailto:greuterb%40bluewin.ch>> wrote:
      >
      >
      > From: Beat Greuter <greuterb@... <mailto:greuterb%40bluewin.ch>>
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 32
      > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > Date: Thursday, April 28, 2011, 11:07 AM
      >
      >
      >
      > Am 28.04.2011 02:06, Robert Fanelli writes:
      >
      > > Beat, your quote is well taken. I refer to Kant's Critique of
      > > Judgment (KU):
      > >
      > > “The beautiful is that which without any concept cognized as the
      > > object is a necessary satisfaction.” KU 77A (Bernard)
      > >
      >
      > Bob,
      >
      > Schelling and Jacobi did refer also to Kant's Critique of Judgement for
      > founding the immediate cognition as truth. With this all three tried to
      > overcome the result of the Critique of Pure Reason that the
      > thing-in-itself cannot be known by the understanding. For Hegel just
      > this means to transcend the mediation what he criticizes in para 32 of
      > the Preface of the PhdG. He says elsewhere: "Hic Rhodus, hic saltus".
      >
      > > "Beauty, powerless and helpless, hates understanding, because the
      > > latter exacts from it what it cannot perform." (PhdG, Preface, para
      > > 32, translated by J.B. Baillie)
      > >
      > > <We try to understand beauty itself, but we cannot reason it. It is
      > > beyond understanding. Beauty for Kant has no cognitive substance.>
      > > from my analysis-
      > >
      > > Hegel, of course, would argue that 'understanding' is a lower level of
      > > cognition and thus would not have the final say on whether beauty is
      > > subject to the laws of Reason.
      > >
      >
      > I am afraid that you offer us an inadequate interpretation of this Hegel
      > quotation. In this text Hegel does not refer to the comprehension of
      > Beauty itself but he simply compares the power of abstraction of the
      > understanding with the powerless and helpless talking about Beauty as
      > intuitive (subjective or objective) grasping of the truth. For Hegel
      > Beauty and the Good are moments of the Absolute Spirit in which these
      > moments are mediated and get their objective truth. In para 32 of the
      > PhdG there is no reasoning on the Absolute Spirit but on epistemological
      > questions showing the necessity and function of the abstracting power of
      > the understanding for speculative thought. This abstracting power is
      > precisely the opposite of the intuition of Beauty since it dissects the
      > concrete whole and as this negative moment of speculative thought it is
      > by no means on a lower level.
      >
      > Regards,
      > Beat Greuter
      >
      > > Referring to your other comments on # 32, one would need considerable
      > > prerequisites in philosophy and the history of philosophy in order to
      > > grasp your analysis of the speculative aspects of Hegel's thesis. My
      > > comments on each paragraph attempt to offer Hegel on a more prosaic
      > > and primer type of exposition. This is my goal, to get people more
      > > interested in understanding Hegel.
      > >
      > > Thanks for your reply.
      > >
      > > Bob Fanelli
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > > --- On Wed, 4/27/11, Beat Greuter <greuterb@...
      > <mailto:greuterb%40bluewin.ch>
      > > <mailto:greuterb%40bluewin.ch>> wrote:
      > >
      > > From: Beat Greuter <greuterb@...
      > <mailto:greuterb%40bluewin.ch> <mailto:greuterb%40bluewin.ch>>
      > > Subject: Re: [hegel] Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 32
      > > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > > Date: Wednesday, April 27, 2011, 5:13 AM
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > > Am 26.04.2011 01:04, Robert Fanelli writes:
      > >
      > > > Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit Preface # 32
      > > > Comments on # 32:
      > > >
      > > > These are difficult concepts. Ideas have familiarity. Ideas can be
      > > > broken up into elements each with moments-the meaning of moment takes
      > > > on more than time. Moments are fleeting. In the analysis of the
      > > > moments of an idea, we are not left with the forms of these moments,
      > > > because they are fleeting, but strictly with the self, apparently
      > > > meaning the self-conscious or reflective aspects of the thinking self.
      > > > But at this point in our analysis we are left with inert
      > > > determinations, that is, determinations which are not interrelated.
      > > > What is left are concrete facts self divided and turning into
      > > > non-reality, because we cannot structure them adequately. Thus
      > > > understanding takes command and circular thought comes into play. This
      > > > thinking process, along with its negative methods has through self
      > > > consciousness, properties of freedom (freedom of thinking),
      > > > independence (from the other in reality), and what Hegel calls an
      > > > existence of its own, not a limited
      > > > finite being (dasein), but a universal type of being. Here then is the
      > > > rub. Thinking has the portentous power of the negative, a great
      > > > energy, and within the confines of self-consciousness, a powerful
      > > > intellectual ego. The power of death is great. We try to understand
      > > > Beauty itself, but we cannot reason it. It is beyond understanding.
      > > > Beauty for Kant has no cognitive substance. A taste of the concept of
      > > > immortality shows itself, perhaps, in these words of death and mind.
      > > > Mind has the power to face death, which is the greatest negative of
      > > > all. The negative has its own being. Consciousness can eliminate the
      > > > abstract nature of immediacy and all that goes with this abstractness.
      > > >
      > > > This paragraph is all about negativity and its potential to be a
      > > > complete statement of what is. Death is the ultimate negative and the
      > > > most profound of all negation. It is the height of Hegel’s thesis on
      > > > the reality of Being as it is conceptualized by consciousness and
      > > > self-consciousness. The human mind adhering to Hegel’s System has the
      > > > capability to generate enormous images of reality, of absolute
      > > > reality, and of even confrontation with the full meaning of reality,
      > > > and thereby, with life itself. These images, for Hegel, far outweigh
      > > > the empirical or experiential entities we are bombarded with in life.
      > > > It is thus a case of reality as it impresses us from without and
      > > > reality as we conjure it through the development of a consciousness of
      > > > Spirit and Substance. It is not a dualism in any sense of the word. It
      > > > is a substance that rears its head through the world and through the
      > > > Self. It is evident, for example in art and in the sublime, revealing
      > > > itself as substance subjectively and objectively. Hegel does not deny
      > > > the reality of the objective universe, but he does offer a philosophy
      > > > which can generate a reality that can structure an immense absolute
      > > > inner reality.
      > > >
      > > > Regards,
      > > >
      > > > Bob Fanelli
      > > >
      > > >
      > >
      > > What para 32 does deal with is the sublation of the immediate truth of
      > > being. It is at the same time the transition from the classical and
      > > medieval philosophy into modern philosophy (starting from Descartes but
      > > prepared already by some philosophers of the Middle Ages and the
      > > Renaissance) as well as the transition from Hegel's Logic of Being into
      > > his Logic of the Essence. Kant was the first who brought to mind this
      > > epistemological turn of the modern age. For Hegel this was an important
      > > step of spirit as the labour of the abstraction from the concrete and
      > > cannot be withdrawn by an epistemoglogy of intuition and beauty which
      > > looks for a new immediacy without this negative labour of the concept
      > > (Schelling, Jacobi):
      > >
      > > "Beauty, powerless and helpless, hates understanding, because the latter
      > > exacts from it what it cannot perform." (PhdG, Preface, para 32,
      > > translated by J.B. Baillie)
      > >
      > > However, according to Hegel Kant did not overcome the negativity of the
      > > understanding with its fixed unreal determinations as determinations of
      > > self-consciousness (the I), the outer being taken only as semblance
      > > while creating an own divorced actuality. In his Logic of the Essence
      > > then Hegel shows the inherent movement of these fixed and opposite
      > > determinations what is the presupposition for the arising of the pure
      > > concept which has the sublation of its other fully in its own movement.
      > > With this a new immediacy is initiated which, however, is only as
      > > mediating (see also the continuation in para 33).
      > >
      > > Regards,
      > > Beat Greuter
      >
      >




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