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Re: [hegel] Re: Something from O'Regan

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  • Beat Greuter
    ... John, How can you tell us such a thing? What has Tillich or other theologian to do with Hegel who was a pure philosopher in the tradition of Plato,
    Message 1 of 28 , Apr 10, 2011
      Am 09.04.2011 11:58, John writes:

      > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, stephen
      > theron <stephentheron@...> wrote:
      >
      > >... Hegel could not possibly doubt the divine immutability. Motion
      > after all is imperfect act (of something in potency insofar as it is
      > in potency), perfect act is actually, fully and hence changelessly
      > active eternally (I can't say "all the time"), ever new, without past.
      > >
      >
      > >... There is no deficiency pointed to at the level of divine
      > immanence. Even if the Spirit seems presented as synthesis of Father
      > and Son in some way this is no indication of prior deficiency, since
      > there is no "prior".
      > >
      >
      > >... As for "creation", a great deal more philosophical work needs
      > doing on this concept than O'Regan seems aware of. This will come
      > under the heading of development of (Christian) doctrine and will be
      > orthodox.
      > >
      >
      > Dear Stephen,
      >
      > As I've mentioned before, Being-Nothing-Becoming has the same form for
      > Hegel as Father-Son-Spirit in the Immanent Trinity. And the transition
      > to Dasein (which I will translate as Existence) has the same form as
      > the transition in theology to creation.
      >
      > This raises two questions in particular. First, how can God be
      > associated with Nothing? And, second, how might this relate to
      > creation out of nothing? I think, in this regard, it has to be
      > recognized that Hegel's doctrine of Nothing is really quite unique.
      >
      > In _Systematic Theology_, vol. 1, Paul Tillich writes:
      >
      > "The genius of the Greek language has provided a possibility of
      > distinguishing the dialectical concept of nonbeing from the
      > nondialectical by calling the first me on and the second ouk on. Ouk
      > on is the 'nothing' which has no relation at all to being; me on is
      > the 'nothing' which has a dialectical relation to being. The Platonic
      > school identified me on with that which does not yet have being but
      > which can become being if it is united with essences or ideas. The
      > mystery of nonbeing was not, however, removed, for in spite of its
      > 'nothingness' nonbeing was credited with having the power of resisting
      > a complete union with the ideas. The me-ontic matter of Platonism
      > represents the dualistic element which underlies all paganism and
      > which is the ultimate ground of the tragic interpretation of life.
      > Christianity has rejected the concept of me-ontic matter on the basis
      > of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Matter is not a second principle
      > in addition to God. The nihil out of which God cr eates is ouk on, the
      > nondialectical negation of being." (page 187f)
      >
      > So it should first be noted that Hegel's Nothing DOES NOT have a
      > dialectical relation to Being. His Nothing is NOT me on. But, on the
      > other hand, although Hegel's Nothing has no relation to Being, it also
      > is not opposed to Being; it isn't, really, the negation of Being. So
      > his Nothing is ouk on, but ouk on as understood in a fairly unique way.
      >
      > Tillich further writes:
      >
      > "Historically it was not the theology of the via negativa which drove
      > Christian thinkers to the question of God and nonbeing. The nonbeing
      > of negative theology means 'not being anything special', being beyond
      > every concrete predicate. This nonbeing embraces everything; it means
      > being everything; it is being-itself." (188)
      >
      > This nonbeing of negative theology is being-itself?! Well, that sounds
      > familiar.
      >
      > Tillich continues:
      >
      > "The dialectical question of nonbeing was and is a problem of
      > affirmative theology. If God is called the living God, if He is the
      > ground of the creative processes of life, if history has significance
      > for Him, if there is no negative principle in addition to Him which
      > could account for evil and sin, how can one avoid positing a
      > dialectical negativity in God Himself? Such questions have forced
      > theologians to relate nonbeing dialectically to being-itself and
      > consequently to God. Boehme's Ungrund, Schelling's 'first potency',
      > Hegel's 'antithesis', Berdyaev's 'meonic freedom'--all are examples of
      > the problem of dialectical nonbeing exerting influence on the
      > Christian doctrine of God." (188f)
      >
      > Now, obviously, Hegel is very interested in all these questions of God
      > as a living God. But, even so, there is no dialectical relation, in
      > Hegel, between Being and Nothing.
      >


      John,

      How can you tell us such a thing? What has Tillich or other theologian
      to do with Hegel who was a pure philosopher in the tradition of Plato,
      Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant. I do not understand how
      you can take something totally alien to Hegel for explaining his
      philosophy instead of reading what he writes himself at the beginning of
      his Logic. There is no dialectical relation between Being and Nothing
      you write and in a further post that dialectic begins only with
      Determinate Being. But in total reversal of what you say it is quite the
      beginning which shows the prototype of Hegel's dialectic: the opposition
      of two absolutes not yet mediated which become mediated in a third
      absolute. The problem is that you and these theologian want a being
      beyond the dialectical process which for them and you is only finitude
      and has to be separated from this untouchable being. But with this you
      destroy Hegel's Logic and philosophy totally: It is exactly the
      mediation of the finite and the infinite in the Concept that Hegel want
      to show us in the process of the Whole Logic. With your disengagment of
      Being from Determinate Being you prevent this mediation from the very
      beginning since you have the non-mediated Whole already at the beginning
      which afterwards you call trinity. This representation is only the other
      extreme of those who want to eliminate Being (being - nothing -
      becoming) entirely and directly begin with Determinate Being: particular
      science and theology shake hands.

      Regards,
      Beat Greuter


      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • john
      ... Hegel presents his theology in the lectures on the philosophy of religion and in the penultimate chapter of the Phenomenology. So I am certainly not
      Message 2 of 28 , Apr 10, 2011
        --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Beat Greuter <greuterb@...> wrote:

        > John,
        >
        > How can you tell us such a thing? What has Tillich or other theologian
        > to do with Hegel who was a pure philosopher in the tradition of Plato,
        > Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant. I do not understand how
        > you can take something totally alien to Hegel for explaining his
        > philosophy instead of reading what he writes himself at the beginning of
        > his Logic.


        Hegel presents his theology in the lectures on the philosophy of religion and in the penultimate chapter of the Phenomenology. So I am certainly not introducing something alien to Hegel. I'm simply making reference to a suppressed part of Hegel's thought.

        You write:

        >There is no dialectical relation between Being and Nothing
        > you write and in a further post that dialectic begins only with
        > Determinate Being. But in total reversal of what you say it is quite the
        > beginning which shows the prototype of Hegel's dialectic: the opposition
        > of two absolutes not yet mediated which become mediated in a third
        > absolute.


        To speak of being, nothing and becoming as three absolutes that are related to each other seems quite different from what Hegel is saying. Treating each of the three as a hypostasis is, I believe, somthing Alan has been arguing against (if I understand him correctly).

        Further down you write:

        > It is exactly the
        > mediation of the finite and the infinite in the Concept that Hegel want
        > to show us in the process of the Whole Logic.

        That is exactly right. So it is necessary to have the infinite and the finite. Being-nothing-becoming is the infinite. Existence, the Something, etc is the finite. The first attempt to mediate the two is with true infinity. But, obviously, before they can be mediated, they have, first, to be established.

        You write:

        >With your disengagment of
        > Being from Determinate Being you prevent this mediation from the very
        > beginning since you have the non-mediated Whole already at the beginning
        > which afterwards you call trinity.


        In Hegel's theology this is the immanent trinity. But it certainly isn't the whole. Or if it is the whole, then it is, as you say, the "unmediated" whole. Basically it is the universal. The final result will be the mediated whole, the whole that contains the three moments of universal, particular and individual. But that is a long way off.


        John
      • stephen theron
        Dear John, You seem now to be just asserting. He can t believe that, unless of course we want to stipulate independent and self-subsistent as having a
        Message 3 of 28 , Apr 10, 2011
          Dear John,

          You seem now to be just asserting. He can't believe that, unless of course we want to stipulate "independent" and "self-subsistent" as having a relative meaning. They then lose their point and are confusing.
          He can't believe it because of all he has written about the infinite not being able to be limited by something real that is not it. Plus what he says about how the thinking this annuls the world. I don't feel I need a great many words and texts for this point, if you are understanding what I am saying. He need only say it plainly in one place. Having grasped this we don't really need the confirmation that nature itself, the "parts outside parts", is a moment in the dialectic, God revealing himself to us under veils. In viewing it as dialectical I don't mean to take an "abstract" view, i.e. existence is an idea like any other. Maybe I use the wrong word. Hegel (also Kant) speaks of not viewing nature "materially" and this comes to the same thing. "Turn but a stone and you touch a wing". Here belongs also my reference to the Orpheus myth, what drives the dialectic on "from shadows to reality".
          Aristotle has virtually the same doctrine when he says that anima est omnia, the mind is all things. As for this mind in relation to the Absolute, it too is, finally, that, its exemplar. As you say, Dasein is the Absolute, and so is creation. It is the absolute's manifestation and manifestation is what the Absolute is, in one and in all indifferently.
          This is what you are saying if you say the creation is independent and consistent. The common assumption however is that the creation forms a bigger composite together with God. This vulgarisation or whatever, this false representation, is already combated by the scholastic saying, with creation there are "more beings but not more being", which however leaves the paradox unresolved.

          We seem to agree on the divine persons though I don't know about difference that is no difference. i suppose you got it from Hegel somewhere. God is one, sure (though not in any mathematical sense).
          The Incarnation is a big topic. Christians are not I think committed to the purely philosophical dualism implicit to that term. If "flesh" (not now in the Biblical sense of finite life simply) is not something "composed" with Spirit ("incomplete substance"), i.e. if Spirit is all, the ultimate and highest form unifying all we call a human being then Incarnation means divine manifestation and is written into this at first blush more general term. Also, one cannot be held back from that same multiplicational universalising logic of this Idea we see already unfolding in the New Testament, This (bread) is me, You are me, I am you, I am "in" you, we are "in" one another, the branches are the vine, the vine branches. This has at least to coexist with the original exclusiveness. this exclusiveness, however, does not stand up in the same way, given the categories of Absolute Idealist philosophy (not really known in the first Christian times). Special mission, the one who is to come, take on a broader face. "Men have entertained angels unawares" is a constant Biblical thought. This represents a great opportunity.
          In a sense it was already envisaged when the Church in council in the fourteenth century defined the intellectual soul as forma corporis, the form of the body, a purely philosophical doctrine. Well, is anything that, remembering that "the spiritual man judges all things"? I mean, philosophy is not limited, the "play" of Holy Wisdom, set apart, sure, but only from folly.

          Incarnation of itself extends to apotheosis which itself reflects back upon itself as "the only way to be". Last is first, first last, etc.

          Stephen.


          To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
          From: jgbardis@...
          Date: Sat, 9 Apr 2011 23:59:36 +0000
          Subject: [hegel] Re: Something from O'Regan








          --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, stephen theron <stephentheron@...> wrote:

          > then he says the idea in absolute freedom "releases the other to exist as a free and independent being". It surely doesn't, if he is meaning nature, a moment set for sublation, "groaning and travailing". Must I hunt up the texts? but perhaps he doesn't mean nature. But in what sense are the divine persons "independent" of one another, and not rather the very relations?
          >

          Dear Stephen,

          According to Hegel it does. He believes "creation" to be wholly independent and self-subsistent. So in this sense Dasein, or Existence, is, in fact, the Absolute.

          Of course you should "hunt up the texts". There's no question about that.

          As for the divine persons, I don't beleive they are independent from each other. It is a difference that is no difference. With "creation" there is a difference that really is a difference. So that brings us to the reconciliation of finitude with infinite--the Incarnation.

          John





          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        • Beat Greuter
          ... John, But we are now at the beginning of the Logic and not in the Philosophy of Religion. In the Addition of para 88 of the EL Hegel writes (translated by
          Message 4 of 28 , Apr 11, 2011
            Am 10.04.2011 12:27, John writes:

            > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
            > Greuter <greuterb@...> wrote:
            >
            > > John,
            > >
            > > How can you tell us such a thing? What has Tillich or other theologian
            > > to do with Hegel who was a pure philosopher in the tradition of Plato,
            > > Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant. I do not understand how
            > > you can take something totally alien to Hegel for explaining his
            > > philosophy instead of reading what he writes himself at the
            > beginning of
            > > his Logic.
            >
            > Hegel presents his theology in the lectures on the philosophy of
            > religion and in the penultimate chapter of the Phenomenology. So I am
            > certainly not introducing something alien to Hegel. I'm simply making
            > reference to a suppressed part of Hegel's thought.
            >


            John,

            But we are now at the beginning of the Logic and not in the Philosophy
            of Religion. In the Addition of para 88 of the EL Hegel writes
            (translated by William Wallace):

            "And in the case of being, we are speaking of nothing concrete: for
            being is the utterly abstract. So far then the question regarding the
            being of God --- a being which is in itself concrete above all measure
            --- is of slight importance."


            > You write:
            >
            > >There is no dialectical relation between Being and Nothing
            > > you write and in a further post that dialectic begins only with
            > > Determinate Being. But in total reversal of what you say it is quite
            > the
            > > beginning which shows the prototype of Hegel's dialectic: the
            > opposition
            > > of two absolutes not yet mediated which become mediated in a third
            > > absolute.
            >
            > To speak of being, nothing and becoming as three absolutes that are
            > related to each other seems quite different from what Hegel is saying.
            > Treating each of the three as a hypostasis is, I believe, somthing
            > Alan has been arguing against (if I understand him correctly).
            >


            That's not a hypostasis but what Hegel writes at the beginning of his
            Logic (para 87, EL, translated by William Wallace):


            "But this mere Being, as it is mere abstraction, is therefore the
            absolutely negative: which, in a similarly immediate aspect, is just
            Nothing.
            1. Hence was derived the second definition of the Absolute: the Absolute
            is the Nought. In fact this definition is implied in saying that the
            thing-in-itself is the indeterminate, utterly without form and so
            without content --- or in saying that God is only the supreme Being and
            nothing more; for this is really declaring him to be the same negativity
            as above. The Nothing which the Buddhists make the universal principle,
            as well as the final aim and goal of everything, is the same abstraction.
            2. If the opposition in thought is stated in this immediacy as Being and
            Nothing, the shock of its nullity is too great not to stimulate the
            attempt to fix Being and secure it against the transition into Nothing.
            With this intent, reflection has recourse to the plan of discovering
            some fixed predicate for Being, to mark it off from Nothing. Thus we
            find Being identified with what persists amid all change, with matter,
            susceptible of innumerable determinations --- or even, unreflectingly,
            with a single existence, any chance object of the senses or of the mind.
            But every additional and more concrete characterisation causes Being to
            lose that integrity and simplicity it had in the beginning. Only in, and
            by virtue of, this mere generality is it Nothing, something
            inexpressible, whereof the distinction from Nothing is a mere intention
            or meaning."


            The opposition of the first two absolutes - Being and Nothing - is
            sublated in a third absolute - Becoming. With this the first two
            absolutes are no longer absolutes but merged in Becoming. This is what
            Hegel calls 'dialectics'. So, the opposition is sublated and each
            attempt to preserve Being from transition into Becoming means to
            identify Being with a quality trying thereby to state a difference
            between Being and Nothing what indeed would be a hypostasis, be it God
            or Trinity or whatsoever. Being has become Becoming what is equal to say
            Being is Nothing.


            > Further down you write:
            >
            > > It is exactly the
            > > mediation of the finite and the infinite in the Concept that Hegel want
            > > to show us in the process of the Whole Logic.
            >
            > That is exactly right. So it is necessary to have the infinite and the
            > finite. Being-nothing-becoming is the infinite. Existence, the
            > Something, etc is the finite. The first attempt to mediate the two is
            > with true infinity. But, obviously, before they can be mediated, they
            > have, first, to be established.
            >


            No, "Existence, the Something, etc" are not the finite but concepts on
            the path of determination or mediation like Being, Nothing and Becoming
            but already more concrete. Also the concept of True Infinity collapses
            in the One since it cannot hold its other in the Logic of Being. In the
            Logic there are no finite things separated from infinite ideas but only
            thoughts.


            > You write:
            >
            > >With your disengagment of
            > > Being from Determinate Being you prevent this mediation from the very
            > > beginning since you have the non-mediated Whole already at the
            > beginning
            > > which afterwards you call trinity.
            >
            > In Hegel's theology this is the immanent trinity. But it certainly
            > isn't the whole. Or if it is the whole, then it is, as you say, the
            > "unmediated" whole. Basically it is the universal. The final result
            > will be the mediated whole, the whole that contains the three moments
            > of universal, particular and individual. But that is a long way off.
            >
            > John
            >


            Yes, this is certainly a long way. But Hegel is no theologian, he is a
            philosopher. You have to go along pure thoughts on that long way.

            Regards,
            Beat Greuter


            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
          • Alan Ponikvar
            Hi Beat, The quote from paragraph 87 is playing the absolutely negative off against this same negative taken or considered immediately. Considered
            Message 5 of 28 , Apr 11, 2011
              Hi Beat,

              The quote from paragraph 87 is playing the 'absolutely negative' off against
              this same negative taken or considered immediately. Considered immediately,
              nothing is like being also a mere abstraction. But what it is abstracted
              from is its own movement of coming into being. To think nothing as an
              immediacy makes evident how these first two attempted thoughts are each
              one-sided abstractions indifferent to the movement which is their emergence.
              What pure being lacks ­ what makes it not absolute as immediately given to
              thought ­ is what makes a thought true: its emergent character.

              The reference to definitions of the absolute is historical. It is not meant
              as a gloss on Hegel's own thought.

              If being and nothing are truly two absolutes then why don't they live
              happily apart? What is it about being absolute that calls for a sublation?

              In my view, neither being or nothing are absolutes. They are both
              abstractions. Becoming is only absolute as the identity in difference of its
              moments: coming and ceasing to be.

              The alternation between being and nothing is obsessive as it marks the
              attempt of the understanding to grasp what keeps slipping away.

              In contrast, from a speculative point of view matters are more relaxed as
              attention simply takes in what is exhibited, the movement, and does not try
              as does the understanding to take hold of what never is except as a
              vanishing.

              I believe difference is the key. If one begins with being and nothing as
              thinkable thoughts and abstracts from the movement then they are the same
              empty thought. And if one then seeks out some difference one will find that
              as fixed thoughts they do not differ. If one then considers the movement one
              is hard pressed to explain how this takes place. There has to be a
              difference if there is to be any movement. But the understanding cannot find
              this difference.

              What I believe happens is that the movement of thought rests upon the inner
              difference of thought that enables an empty thinking to be transformed into
              a second empty thought. This comes about as you must be tired of hearing by
              now by means of the movement that is the shift of attention.

              You give an example of an alternative way of accounting for the movement
              from one thought to the next when you note:

              "Also the concept of True Infinity collapses in the One since it cannot hold
              its other in the Logic of Being."

              You seem to animate thought ­ provide thought with a soul of its own ­ when
              you say the One cannot hold its other. I think this way of speaking is
              common among Hegelians but I cannot help but see this as a metaphor that
              cannot be cashed out.

              Regards, Alan

              From: Beat Greuter <greuterb@...>
              Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
              Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2011 10:28:45 +0200
              To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
              Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Something from O'Regan






              Am 10.04.2011 12:27, John writes:

              > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
              <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
              > Greuter <greuterb@...> wrote:
              >
              > > John,
              > >
              > > How can you tell us such a thing? What has Tillich or other theologian
              > > to do with Hegel who was a pure philosopher in the tradition of Plato,
              > > Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant. I do not understand how
              > > you can take something totally alien to Hegel for explaining his
              > > philosophy instead of reading what he writes himself at the
              > beginning of
              > > his Logic.
              >
              > Hegel presents his theology in the lectures on the philosophy of
              > religion and in the penultimate chapter of the Phenomenology. So I am
              > certainly not introducing something alien to Hegel. I'm simply making
              > reference to a suppressed part of Hegel's thought.
              >

              John,

              But we are now at the beginning of the Logic and not in the Philosophy
              of Religion. In the Addition of para 88 of the EL Hegel writes
              (translated by William Wallace):

              "And in the case of being, we are speaking of nothing concrete: for
              being is the utterly abstract. So far then the question regarding the
              being of God --- a being which is in itself concrete above all measure
              --- is of slight importance."

              > You write:
              >
              > >There is no dialectical relation between Being and Nothing
              > > you write and in a further post that dialectic begins only with
              > > Determinate Being. But in total reversal of what you say it is quite
              > the
              > > beginning which shows the prototype of Hegel's dialectic: the
              > opposition
              > > of two absolutes not yet mediated which become mediated in a third
              > > absolute.
              >
              > To speak of being, nothing and becoming as three absolutes that are
              > related to each other seems quite different from what Hegel is saying.
              > Treating each of the three as a hypostasis is, I believe, somthing
              > Alan has been arguing against (if I understand him correctly).
              >

              That's not a hypostasis but what Hegel writes at the beginning of his
              Logic (para 87, EL, translated by William Wallace):

              "But this mere Being, as it is mere abstraction, is therefore the
              absolutely negative: which, in a similarly immediate aspect, is just
              Nothing.
              1. Hence was derived the second definition of the Absolute: the Absolute
              is the Nought. In fact this definition is implied in saying that the
              thing-in-itself is the indeterminate, utterly without form and so
              without content --- or in saying that God is only the supreme Being and
              nothing more; for this is really declaring him to be the same negativity
              as above. The Nothing which the Buddhists make the universal principle,
              as well as the final aim and goal of everything, is the same abstraction.
              2. If the opposition in thought is stated in this immediacy as Being and
              Nothing, the shock of its nullity is too great not to stimulate the
              attempt to fix Being and secure it against the transition into Nothing.
              With this intent, reflection has recourse to the plan of discovering
              some fixed predicate for Being, to mark it off from Nothing. Thus we
              find Being identified with what persists amid all change, with matter,
              susceptible of innumerable determinations --- or even, unreflectingly,
              with a single existence, any chance object of the senses or of the mind.
              But every additional and more concrete characterisation causes Being to
              lose that integrity and simplicity it had in the beginning. Only in, and
              by virtue of, this mere generality is it Nothing, something
              inexpressible, whereof the distinction from Nothing is a mere intention
              or meaning."

              The opposition of the first two absolutes - Being and Nothing - is
              sublated in a third absolute - Becoming. With this the first two
              absolutes are no longer absolutes but merged in Becoming. This is what
              Hegel calls 'dialectics'. So, the opposition is sublated and each
              attempt to preserve Being from transition into Becoming means to
              identify Being with a quality trying thereby to state a difference
              between Being and Nothing what indeed would be a hypostasis, be it God
              or Trinity or whatsoever. Being has become Becoming what is equal to say
              Being is Nothing.

              > Further down you write:
              >
              > > It is exactly the
              > > mediation of the finite and the infinite in the Concept that Hegel want
              > > to show us in the process of the Whole Logic.
              >
              > That is exactly right. So it is necessary to have the infinite and the
              > finite. Being-nothing-becoming is the infinite. Existence, the
              > Something, etc is the finite. The first attempt to mediate the two is
              > with true infinity. But, obviously, before they can be mediated, they
              > have, first, to be established.
              >

              No, "Existence, the Something, etc" are not the finite but concepts on
              the path of determination or mediation like Being, Nothing and Becoming
              but already more concrete. Also the concept of True Infinity collapses
              in the One since it cannot hold its other in the Logic of Being. In the
              Logic there are no finite things separated from infinite ideas but only
              thoughts.

              > You write:
              >
              > >With your disengagment of
              > > Being from Determinate Being you prevent this mediation from the very
              > > beginning since you have the non-mediated Whole already at the
              > beginning
              > > which afterwards you call trinity.
              >
              > In Hegel's theology this is the immanent trinity. But it certainly
              > isn't the whole. Or if it is the whole, then it is, as you say, the
              > "unmediated" whole. Basically it is the universal. The final result
              > will be the mediated whole, the whole that contains the three moments
              > of universal, particular and individual. But that is a long way off.
              >
              > John
              >

              Yes, this is certainly a long way. But Hegel is no theologian, he is a
              philosopher. You have to go along pure thoughts on that long way.

              Regards,
              Beat Greuter

              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]









              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
            • Stephen
              Dear Beat, While not seeing how it would destroy John s account of the mutual implication etc. of being and nothing, for example, I find confirmation of my own
              Message 6 of 28 , Apr 11, 2011
                Dear Beat,

                While not seeing how it would destroy John's account of the mutual implication etc. of being and nothing, for example, I find confirmation of my own interpretation in your account of how each category gives way to a more "just" absolute, i.e. they are all attempts to refer to or denominate the absolute. Hegel says as much.

                So as you say even the True Infinite "gives way" to the One, if it comes afterwards. This is disturbing in a way, in that it would oblige one to characterise just how the final Absolute (Idea) differs from, surpasses, the True Infinite (one clue would be Hegel's pointing out that "infinite" is a negative characterisation).

                Now, not to leave theology out in the cold, Hegel says that "the notion... results by abolishing the intermediation, and thus is immediate"(EL51). Again, he speaks of "the genuine nature of essential thought - by which it cancels the mediation in the very act of mediation" (EL50), as it were "forgetting those things which are before". Actually the things forget themselves, since they "are not".
                As you wrote here, "In the logic there are no finite things separated from infinite ideas but only thoughts."

                But suppose now that there are in fact only thoughts, no "things" as realism represents them. The "things" rather are nothing other than those names Hegel discusses in EG in a synthesis of nominalism, conceptualism and realism (Findlay). Then the dialectic is indeed a passage "from shadows to reality" and this is how I take the Orpheus myth, his leading Eurydice from the land of shadows (it is his "journey", not hers, though it is ultimately himself who is buried in the shadows and must not "look back"). So the dialectic is always per definition in error. It is only truth as a whole, as a method even, as reached at the end.

                I would like to connect with this Hegel's treatment of the Will under Practical Reason (EG) as itself superseding theoretical Mind but just therefore needing to be a Thinking Will (in Hegel's inclusive sense of "thinking"). Implied here, I would want to make out, is an eventual real (non-abstract, but as supplanting the abstract) fusion of the ethical with the metaphysical (echoing Aristotle's "contemplation is the highest praxis", but going further, probably), as canvassed more explicitly by some later thinkers. This fusion is the ultimate ground for why in Hegel things are never simply themselves and not another thing, thus putting out of court the question of being right or wrong about what they are. This is the question he explicitly rules out in connection with religion, for example.

                How far would you agree with my implicit view, finally, that dialectic is not abstractly or merely a process within (the) Logic but characterising all "reality" or, more immediately, the whole passage or development of the "Encyclopaedia", allowing for a bit of analogical fluidity in the term? Does this though, if affirmed tend not also at least to suggest (or confirm, rather, thinking of Hegel's work as a whole)that we are all the time dealing with Ideas, with Absolute Mind (and hence that there is nothing else, nor can there be, nothing "more" real)?

                --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Beat Greuter <greuterb@...> wrote:
                >
                > Am 10.04.2011 12:27, John writes:
                >
                > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
                > > Greuter <greuterb@> wrote:
                > >
                > > > John,
                > > >
                > > > How can you tell us such a thing? What has Tillich or other theologian
                > > > to do with Hegel who was a pure philosopher in the tradition of Plato,
                > > > Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant. I do not understand how
                > > > you can take something totally alien to Hegel for explaining his
                > > > philosophy instead of reading what he writes himself at the
                > > beginning of
                > > > his Logic.
                > >
                > > Hegel presents his theology in the lectures on the philosophy of
                > > religion and in the penultimate chapter of the Phenomenology. So I am
                > > certainly not introducing something alien to Hegel. I'm simply making
                > > reference to a suppressed part of Hegel's thought.
                > >
                >
                >
                > John,
                >
                > But we are now at the beginning of the Logic and not in the Philosophy
                > of Religion. In the Addition of para 88 of the EL Hegel writes
                > (translated by William Wallace):
                >
                > "And in the case of being, we are speaking of nothing concrete: for
                > being is the utterly abstract. So far then the question regarding the
                > being of God --- a being which is in itself concrete above all measure
                > --- is of slight importance."
                >
                >
                > > You write:
                > >
                > > >There is no dialectical relation between Being and Nothing
                > > > you write and in a further post that dialectic begins only with
                > > > Determinate Being. But in total reversal of what you say it is quite
                > > the
                > > > beginning which shows the prototype of Hegel's dialectic: the
                > > opposition
                > > > of two absolutes not yet mediated which become mediated in a third
                > > > absolute.
                > >
                > > To speak of being, nothing and becoming as three absolutes that are
                > > related to each other seems quite different from what Hegel is saying.
                > > Treating each of the three as a hypostasis is, I believe, somthing
                > > Alan has been arguing against (if I understand him correctly).
                > >
                >
                >
                > That's not a hypostasis but what Hegel writes at the beginning of his
                > Logic (para 87, EL, translated by William Wallace):
                >
                >
                > "But this mere Being, as it is mere abstraction, is therefore the
                > absolutely negative: which, in a similarly immediate aspect, is just
                > Nothing.
                > 1. Hence was derived the second definition of the Absolute: the Absolute
                > is the Nought. In fact this definition is implied in saying that the
                > thing-in-itself is the indeterminate, utterly without form and so
                > without content --- or in saying that God is only the supreme Being and
                > nothing more; for this is really declaring him to be the same negativity
                > as above. The Nothing which the Buddhists make the universal principle,
                > as well as the final aim and goal of everything, is the same abstraction.
                > 2. If the opposition in thought is stated in this immediacy as Being and
                > Nothing, the shock of its nullity is too great not to stimulate the
                > attempt to fix Being and secure it against the transition into Nothing.
                > With this intent, reflection has recourse to the plan of discovering
                > some fixed predicate for Being, to mark it off from Nothing. Thus we
                > find Being identified with what persists amid all change, with matter,
                > susceptible of innumerable determinations --- or even, unreflectingly,
                > with a single existence, any chance object of the senses or of the mind.
                > But every additional and more concrete characterisation causes Being to
                > lose that integrity and simplicity it had in the beginning. Only in, and
                > by virtue of, this mere generality is it Nothing, something
                > inexpressible, whereof the distinction from Nothing is a mere intention
                > or meaning."
                >
                >
                > The opposition of the first two absolutes - Being and Nothing - is
                > sublated in a third absolute - Becoming. With this the first two
                > absolutes are no longer absolutes but merged in Becoming. This is what
                > Hegel calls 'dialectics'. So, the opposition is sublated and each
                > attempt to preserve Being from transition into Becoming means to
                > identify Being with a quality trying thereby to state a difference
                > between Being and Nothing what indeed would be a hypostasis, be it God
                > or Trinity or whatsoever. Being has become Becoming what is equal to say
                > Being is Nothing.
                >
                >
                > > Further down you write:
                > >
                > > > It is exactly the
                > > > mediation of the finite and the infinite in the Concept that Hegel want
                > > > to show us in the process of the Whole Logic.
                > >
                > > That is exactly right. So it is necessary to have the infinite and the
                > > finite. Being-nothing-becoming is the infinite. Existence, the
                > > Something, etc is the finite. The first attempt to mediate the two is
                > > with true infinity. But, obviously, before they can be mediated, they
                > > have, first, to be established.
                > >
                >
                >
                > No, "Existence, the Something, etc" are not the finite but concepts on
                > the path of determination or mediation like Being, Nothing and Becoming
                > but already more concrete. Also the concept of True Infinity collapses
                > in the One since it cannot hold its other in the Logic of Being. In the
                > Logic there are no finite things separated from infinite ideas but only
                > thoughts.
                >
                >
                > > You write:
                > >
                > > >With your disengagment of
                > > > Being from Determinate Being you prevent this mediation from the very
                > > > beginning since you have the non-mediated Whole already at the
                > > beginning
                > > > which afterwards you call trinity.
                > >
                > > In Hegel's theology this is the immanent trinity. But it certainly
                > > isn't the whole. Or if it is the whole, then it is, as you say, the
                > > "unmediated" whole. Basically it is the universal. The final result
                > > will be the mediated whole, the whole that contains the three moments
                > > of universal, particular and individual. But that is a long way off.
                > >
                > > John
                > >
                >
                >
                > Yes, this is certainly a long way. But Hegel is no theologian, he is a
                > philosopher. You have to go along pure thoughts on that long way.
                >
                > Regards,
                > Beat Greuter
                >
                >
                > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                >
              • john
                ... The point I was making is that the development of Hegel s theology and of his philosophy are the same--just different terminology. That isn t the case with
                Message 7 of 28 , Apr 11, 2011
                  --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Beat Greuter <greuterb@...> wrote:
                  >
                  > Am 10.04.2011 12:27, John writes:
                  >
                  > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
                  > > Greuter <greuterb@> wrote:
                  > >
                  > > > John,
                  > > >
                  > > > How can you tell us such a thing? What has Tillich or other theologian
                  > > > to do with Hegel who was a pure philosopher in the tradition of Plato,
                  > > > Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant. I do not understand how
                  > > > you can take something totally alien to Hegel for explaining his
                  > > > philosophy instead of reading what he writes himself at the
                  > > beginning of
                  > > > his Logic.
                  > >
                  > > Hegel presents his theology in the lectures on the philosophy of
                  > > religion and in the penultimate chapter of the Phenomenology. So I am
                  > > certainly not introducing something alien to Hegel. I'm simply making
                  > > reference to a suppressed part of Hegel's thought.
                  > >
                  >
                  >
                  > John,
                  >
                  > But we are now at the beginning of the Logic and not in the Philosophy
                  > of Religion. In the Addition of para 88 of the EL Hegel writes
                  > (translated by William Wallace):
                  >
                  > "And in the case of being, we are speaking of nothing concrete: for
                  > being is the utterly abstract. So far then the question regarding the
                  > being of God --- a being which is in itself concrete above all measure
                  > --- is of slight importance."
                  >

                  The point I was making is that the development of Hegel's theology and of his philosophy are the same--just different terminology. That isn't the case with any of his other works. The philosophy of nature, for instance, is similar--but different. Space and time are not related in the same way as being and nothing, aside from the fact that both space and time have three dimensions. The transition from space and time to motion (and matter) is interrupted by the transition, first, to place. The relation of the logic to Hegel's political thought or aesthetics or history is even less direct.

                  But, as I say, the development of the theology and the logic is the same.

                  The immanent trinity, too, in his theology, is, in regard to God, of slight importance. I quoted Hegel here recently at some length on this point.

                  John
                • Beat Greuter
                  ... Stephen, Your interpretation seems to imply that there is a linear development of the absolute, from the most abstract to the most conrete. Basically I
                  Message 8 of 28 , Apr 15, 2011
                    Am 11.04.2011 13:18, Stephen writes:

                    > Dear Beat,
                    >
                    > While not seeing how it would destroy John's account of the mutual
                    > implication etc. of being and nothing, for example, I find
                    > confirmation of my own interpretation in your account of how each
                    > category gives way to a more "just" absolute, i.e. they are all
                    > attempts to refer to or denominate the absolute. Hegel says as much.
                    >


                    Stephen,

                    Your interpretation seems to imply that there is a linear development of
                    the absolute, from the most abstract to the most conrete. Basically I
                    agree with this, however, the movement is not linear and its 'aim' is
                    not to reach a "just" absolute but to dissolve the absolute with the
                    result of more 'justice' for the former absolutes having become moments
                    in a new mediated whole. The mentioned movement includes two opposite
                    directions which can not be sperated formally: the analytical and the
                    synthetical direction. In the analytical direction there is a mediation
                    of the achieved (one-sided) unity or identity with its arising other or
                    opposite. The synthectical direction is a falling back into a new
                    (one-sided) identity or unity for enabling a further mediation leading
                    to a more concrete (or mediated) shape of the absolute.

                    Examples:
                    Pure Knowing at the end of the PhdG is a knowing which is fully mediated
                    by the steps of consciousness but as the sublation of consciousness with
                    its assumed externally fixed truth Pure Knowing falls back into the
                    (one-sided) identiy or abstraction of Pure Being without any
                    determination. Now, it has to actualize itself analyzing this result
                    which leads to the other abstract concept of Pure Nothing as its
                    opposite and then to the first concrete concept of their mediation in
                    Pure Becoming. Though Pure Becoming is a concrete concept mediating two
                    moments it cannot really achieve determination since the two moments are
                    totally indifferent and equivalent. So, the Concept falls into a new
                    one-sided and abstract synthesis in 'Determinate Being in General' which
                    is the unity of Being and Nothing IN THE (one-sided) DETERMINATION OF
                    BEING. The analytical step then will develop again the right of the
                    Nothing as Quality leading to the Concepts of the Something and Reality
                    where a new one-sided synthesis stops their spurious infinity in the
                    Being-for-itself (the second negation of the true infinity). The
                    analysis of this one-sidedness then brings the loss of Quality at all in
                    the 'One' and the 'Many One' as the beginning of the quantitative
                    anaylsis of the Concept which later will achieve a more developed stage
                    of Quality in the Concept of the Measure.


                    > So as you say even the True Infinite "gives way" to the One, if it
                    > comes afterwards. This is disturbing in a way, in that it would oblige
                    > one to characterise just how the final Absolute (Idea) differs from,
                    > surpasses, the True Infinite (one clue would be Hegel's pointing out
                    > that "infinite" is a negative characterisation).
                    >


                    The Concept of the Absolue Idea belongs to the Subjective Logic, the
                    Logic of the Concept, where the Concpet has become the identity of the
                    identity and non-identity but at the beginning (the Concept as such)
                    only for-itself (one-sided) as a new synthesis. So, it has to develop
                    again the lost Actuality out of itself achieving thereby Objectivity.
                    The path again is a movement of analysis and synthesis. The Absolute
                    Idea only makes fully explict this speculative method of the described
                    conjunction of the analytical and synthetical movement. This is not an
                    outer method but the liquefaction (Verflüssigung) of all moments
                    developed on the path of the Logic without any further presupposition
                    not yet mediated - total mediated immediacy. Hegel writes in para 186
                    and 187 of the EL, 1817 (my translation):

                    "This progress [method] is both, analytical as the immanent reflection
                    positing only this that is included in the immediate Concept, as well as
                    synthetical as far as in this the difference is not yet posited." (para
                    186, EL, 1817)
                    "This progress [method] is in the Being an Other and the transition into
                    an Other, in the Essence Seeming [Scheinen] in the Opposite (in dem
                    Entgegengesetzten), in the Concept the differentiation of the individual
                    and the universality which as such does continue into that which is
                    distinguished from itself and is as identity with it (the individual)"
                    (para 187, EL, 1817)

                    Hegel does not separate the analytical concept from the synthetical
                    concept as in the Analytical Philosophy and Formal Logic. Neverthess, we
                    have to distinguish the two moments of the specualtive method,
                    otherwise, we miss the method. With this he makes a crucial relationship
                    between Plato's 'What is'- and 'How-is'- (context-) question. According
                    to Hegel it is not possible to answer the 'What is'-question (question
                    on the essence, definition) without the 'How is'-question (the context).
                    In the speculative method, therefore, both are integrated.


                    > Now, not to leave theology out in the cold, Hegel says that "the
                    > notion... results by abolishing the intermediation, and thus is
                    > immediate"(EL51). Again, he speaks of "the genuine nature of essential
                    > thought - by which it cancels the mediation in the very act of
                    > mediation" (EL50), as it were "forgetting those things which are
                    > before". Actually the things forget themselves, since they "are not".
                    > As you wrote here, "In the logic there are no finite things separated
                    > from infinite ideas but only thoughts."
                    >


                    These quotations belong to the section on the 'Pre-Concept' of the
                    EL-Logic and there to Kant's 'Critical Philosophy'. We have to
                    distinguish Hegel's critique on the 'Critical Philosophy' and what he
                    accepts as true in this Philosophy. Perhaps we can come back to this later.


                    > But suppose now that there are in fact only thoughts, no "things" as
                    > realism represents them. The "things" rather are nothing other than
                    > those names Hegel discusses in EG in a synthesis of nominalism,
                    > conceptualism and realism (Findlay). Then the dialectic is indeed a
                    > passage "from shadows to reality" and this is how I take the Orpheus
                    > myth, his leading Eurydice from the land of shadows (it is his
                    > "journey", not hers, though it is ultimately himself who is buried in
                    > the shadows and must not "look back"). So the dialectic is always per
                    > definition in error. It is only truth as a whole, as a method even, as
                    > reached at the end.
                    >


                    I do not understand why "the dialectic is always per definition in
                    error". Of course, until the end it always produces one-sidedness with
                    new presuppositions. However, these are necessary stages or shapes for
                    thought seeking its truth. In the Absolute Idea Pure Knowing realizes
                    the dialectical movement as its procedural truth and essence including
                    the unity of form and content only in this movement and not in a unity
                    or identity beyond this movement.

                    Regards,
                    Beat Greuter


                    > I would like to connect with this Hegel's treatment of the Will under
                    > Practical Reason (EG) as itself superseding theoretical Mind but just
                    > therefore needing to be a Thinking Will (in Hegel's inclusive sense of
                    > "thinking"). Implied here, I would want to make out, is an eventual
                    > real (non-abstract, but as supplanting the abstract) fusion of the
                    > ethical with the metaphysical (echoing Aristotle's "contemplation is
                    > the highest praxis", but going further, probably), as canvassed more
                    > explicitly by some later thinkers. This fusion is the ultimate ground
                    > for why in Hegel things are never simply themselves and not another
                    > thing, thus putting out of court the question of being right or wrong
                    > about what they are. This is the question he explicitly rules out in
                    > connection with religion, for example.
                    >
                    > How far would you agree with my implicit view, finally, that dialectic
                    > is not abstractly or merely a process within (the) Logic but
                    > characterising all "reality" or, more immediately, the whole passage
                    > or development of the "Encyclopaedia", allowing for a bit of
                    > analogical fluidity in the term? Does this though, if affirmed tend
                    > not also at least to suggest (or confirm, rather, thinking of Hegel's
                    > work as a whole)that we are all the time dealing with Ideas, with
                    > Absolute Mind (and hence that there is nothing else, nor can there be,
                    > nothing "more" real)?
                    >
                    > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
                    > Greuter <greuterb@...> wrote:
                    > >
                    > > Am 10.04.2011 12:27, John writes:
                    > >
                    > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                    > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
                    > > > Greuter <greuterb@> wrote:
                    > > >
                    > > > > John,
                    > > > >
                    > > > > How can you tell us such a thing? What has Tillich or other
                    > theologian
                    > > > > to do with Hegel who was a pure philosopher in the tradition of
                    > Plato,
                    > > > > Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant. I do not
                    > understand how
                    > > > > you can take something totally alien to Hegel for explaining his
                    > > > > philosophy instead of reading what he writes himself at the
                    > > > beginning of
                    > > > > his Logic.
                    > > >
                    > > > Hegel presents his theology in the lectures on the philosophy of
                    > > > religion and in the penultimate chapter of the Phenomenology. So I am
                    > > > certainly not introducing something alien to Hegel. I'm simply making
                    > > > reference to a suppressed part of Hegel's thought.
                    > > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > John,
                    > >
                    > > But we are now at the beginning of the Logic and not in the Philosophy
                    > > of Religion. In the Addition of para 88 of the EL Hegel writes
                    > > (translated by William Wallace):
                    > >
                    > > "And in the case of being, we are speaking of nothing concrete: for
                    > > being is the utterly abstract. So far then the question regarding the
                    > > being of God --- a being which is in itself concrete above all measure
                    > > --- is of slight importance."
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > > You write:
                    > > >
                    > > > >There is no dialectical relation between Being and Nothing
                    > > > > you write and in a further post that dialectic begins only with
                    > > > > Determinate Being. But in total reversal of what you say it is
                    > quite
                    > > > the
                    > > > > beginning which shows the prototype of Hegel's dialectic: the
                    > > > opposition
                    > > > > of two absolutes not yet mediated which become mediated in a third
                    > > > > absolute.
                    > > >
                    > > > To speak of being, nothing and becoming as three absolutes that are
                    > > > related to each other seems quite different from what Hegel is
                    > saying.
                    > > > Treating each of the three as a hypostasis is, I believe, somthing
                    > > > Alan has been arguing against (if I understand him correctly).
                    > > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > That's not a hypostasis but what Hegel writes at the beginning of his
                    > > Logic (para 87, EL, translated by William Wallace):
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > "But this mere Being, as it is mere abstraction, is therefore the
                    > > absolutely negative: which, in a similarly immediate aspect, is just
                    > > Nothing.
                    > > 1. Hence was derived the second definition of the Absolute: the
                    > Absolute
                    > > is the Nought. In fact this definition is implied in saying that the
                    > > thing-in-itself is the indeterminate, utterly without form and so
                    > > without content --- or in saying that God is only the supreme Being and
                    > > nothing more; for this is really declaring him to be the same
                    > negativity
                    > > as above. The Nothing which the Buddhists make the universal principle,
                    > > as well as the final aim and goal of everything, is the same
                    > abstraction.
                    > > 2. If the opposition in thought is stated in this immediacy as Being
                    > and
                    > > Nothing, the shock of its nullity is too great not to stimulate the
                    > > attempt to fix Being and secure it against the transition into Nothing.
                    > > With this intent, reflection has recourse to the plan of discovering
                    > > some fixed predicate for Being, to mark it off from Nothing. Thus we
                    > > find Being identified with what persists amid all change, with matter,
                    > > susceptible of innumerable determinations --- or even, unreflectingly,
                    > > with a single existence, any chance object of the senses or of the
                    > mind.
                    > > But every additional and more concrete characterisation causes Being to
                    > > lose that integrity and simplicity it had in the beginning. Only in,
                    > and
                    > > by virtue of, this mere generality is it Nothing, something
                    > > inexpressible, whereof the distinction from Nothing is a mere intention
                    > > or meaning."
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > The opposition of the first two absolutes - Being and Nothing - is
                    > > sublated in a third absolute - Becoming. With this the first two
                    > > absolutes are no longer absolutes but merged in Becoming. This is what
                    > > Hegel calls 'dialectics'. So, the opposition is sublated and each
                    > > attempt to preserve Being from transition into Becoming means to
                    > > identify Being with a quality trying thereby to state a difference
                    > > between Being and Nothing what indeed would be a hypostasis, be it God
                    > > or Trinity or whatsoever. Being has become Becoming what is equal to
                    > say
                    > > Being is Nothing.
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > > Further down you write:
                    > > >
                    > > > > It is exactly the
                    > > > > mediation of the finite and the infinite in the Concept that
                    > Hegel want
                    > > > > to show us in the process of the Whole Logic.
                    > > >
                    > > > That is exactly right. So it is necessary to have the infinite and
                    > the
                    > > > finite. Being-nothing-becoming is the infinite. Existence, the
                    > > > Something, etc is the finite. The first attempt to mediate the two is
                    > > > with true infinity. But, obviously, before they can be mediated, they
                    > > > have, first, to be established.
                    > > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > No, "Existence, the Something, etc" are not the finite but concepts on
                    > > the path of determination or mediation like Being, Nothing and Becoming
                    > > but already more concrete. Also the concept of True Infinity collapses
                    > > in the One since it cannot hold its other in the Logic of Being. In the
                    > > Logic there are no finite things separated from infinite ideas but only
                    > > thoughts.
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > > You write:
                    > > >
                    > > > >With your disengagment of
                    > > > > Being from Determinate Being you prevent this mediation from the
                    > very
                    > > > > beginning since you have the non-mediated Whole already at the
                    > > > beginning
                    > > > > which afterwards you call trinity.
                    > > >
                    > > > In Hegel's theology this is the immanent trinity. But it certainly
                    > > > isn't the whole. Or if it is the whole, then it is, as you say, the
                    > > > "unmediated" whole. Basically it is the universal. The final result
                    > > > will be the mediated whole, the whole that contains the three moments
                    > > > of universal, particular and individual. But that is a long way off.
                    > > >
                    > > > John
                    > > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > Yes, this is certainly a long way. But Hegel is no theologian, he is a
                    > > philosopher. You have to go along pure thoughts on that long way.
                    > >
                    > > Regards,
                    > > Beat Greuter
                    >
                    >



                    [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                  • stephen theron
                    Beat, Thank you for this painstaking reply which I will have to return to for further study. Strangely I was just now trying to clarify for myself Findlay s
                    Message 9 of 28 , Apr 15, 2011
                      Beat,

                      Thank you for this painstaking reply which I will have to return to for further study.
                      Strangely I was just now trying to clarify for myself Findlay's remark re beginning with Being that this was in fact dictated by the immediately previous moves in the Phenomenology, as you seem hereto confirm, as an example.

                      Stephen.


                      To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                      From: greuterb@...
                      Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 20:44:16 +0200
                      Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Something from O'Regan






                      Am 11.04.2011 13:18, Stephen writes:

                      > Dear Beat,
                      >
                      > While not seeing how it would destroy John's account of the mutual
                      > implication etc. of being and nothing, for example, I find
                      > confirmation of my own interpretation in your account of how each
                      > category gives way to a more "just" absolute, i.e. they are all
                      > attempts to refer to or denominate the absolute. Hegel says as much.
                      >

                      Stephen,

                      Your interpretation seems to imply that there is a linear development of
                      the absolute, from the most abstract to the most conrete. Basically I
                      agree with this, however, the movement is not linear and its 'aim' is
                      not to reach a "just" absolute but to dissolve the absolute with the
                      result of more 'justice' for the former absolutes having become moments
                      in a new mediated whole. The mentioned movement includes two opposite
                      directions which can not be sperated formally: the analytical and the
                      synthetical direction. In the analytical direction there is a mediation
                      of the achieved (one-sided) unity or identity with its arising other or
                      opposite. The synthectical direction is a falling back into a new
                      (one-sided) identity or unity for enabling a further mediation leading
                      to a more concrete (or mediated) shape of the absolute.

                      Examples:
                      Pure Knowing at the end of the PhdG is a knowing which is fully mediated
                      by the steps of consciousness but as the sublation of consciousness with
                      its assumed externally fixed truth Pure Knowing falls back into the
                      (one-sided) identiy or abstraction of Pure Being without any
                      determination. Now, it has to actualize itself analyzing this result
                      which leads to the other abstract concept of Pure Nothing as its
                      opposite and then to the first concrete concept of their mediation in
                      Pure Becoming. Though Pure Becoming is a concrete concept mediating two
                      moments it cannot really achieve determination since the two moments are
                      totally indifferent and equivalent. So, the Concept falls into a new
                      one-sided and abstract synthesis in 'Determinate Being in General' which
                      is the unity of Being and Nothing IN THE (one-sided) DETERMINATION OF
                      BEING. The analytical step then will develop again the right of the
                      Nothing as Quality leading to the Concepts of the Something and Reality
                      where a new one-sided synthesis stops their spurious infinity in the
                      Being-for-itself (the second negation of the true infinity). The
                      analysis of this one-sidedness then brings the loss of Quality at all in
                      the 'One' and the 'Many One' as the beginning of the quantitative
                      anaylsis of the Concept which later will achieve a more developed stage
                      of Quality in the Concept of the Measure.

                      > So as you say even the True Infinite "gives way" to the One, if it
                      > comes afterwards. This is disturbing in a way, in that it would oblige
                      > one to characterise just how the final Absolute (Idea) differs from,
                      > surpasses, the True Infinite (one clue would be Hegel's pointing out
                      > that "infinite" is a negative characterisation).
                      >

                      The Concept of the Absolue Idea belongs to the Subjective Logic, the
                      Logic of the Concept, where the Concpet has become the identity of the
                      identity and non-identity but at the beginning (the Concept as such)
                      only for-itself (one-sided) as a new synthesis. So, it has to develop
                      again the lost Actuality out of itself achieving thereby Objectivity.
                      The path again is a movement of analysis and synthesis. The Absolute
                      Idea only makes fully explict this speculative method of the described
                      conjunction of the analytical and synthetical movement. This is not an
                      outer method but the liquefaction (Verfl�ssigung) of all moments
                      developed on the path of the Logic without any further presupposition
                      not yet mediated - total mediated immediacy. Hegel writes in para 186
                      and 187 of the EL, 1817 (my translation):

                      "This progress [method] is both, analytical as the immanent reflection
                      positing only this that is included in the immediate Concept, as well as
                      synthetical as far as in this the difference is not yet posited." (para
                      186, EL, 1817)
                      "This progress [method] is in the Being an Other and the transition into
                      an Other, in the Essence Seeming [Scheinen] in the Opposite (in dem
                      Entgegengesetzten), in the Concept the differentiation of the individual
                      and the universality which as such does continue into that which is
                      distinguished from itself and is as identity with it (the individual)"
                      (para 187, EL, 1817)

                      Hegel does not separate the analytical concept from the synthetical
                      concept as in the Analytical Philosophy and Formal Logic. Neverthess, we
                      have to distinguish the two moments of the specualtive method,
                      otherwise, we miss the method. With this he makes a crucial relationship
                      between Plato's 'What is'- and 'How-is'- (context-) question. According
                      to Hegel it is not possible to answer the 'What is'-question (question
                      on the essence, definition) without the 'How is'-question (the context).
                      In the speculative method, therefore, both are integrated.

                      > Now, not to leave theology out in the cold, Hegel says that "the
                      > notion... results by abolishing the intermediation, and thus is
                      > immediate"(EL51). Again, he speaks of "the genuine nature of essential
                      > thought - by which it cancels the mediation in the very act of
                      > mediation" (EL50), as it were "forgetting those things which are
                      > before". Actually the things forget themselves, since they "are not".
                      > As you wrote here, "In the logic there are no finite things separated
                      > from infinite ideas but only thoughts."
                      >

                      These quotations belong to the section on the 'Pre-Concept' of the
                      EL-Logic and there to Kant's 'Critical Philosophy'. We have to
                      distinguish Hegel's critique on the 'Critical Philosophy' and what he
                      accepts as true in this Philosophy. Perhaps we can come back to this later.

                      > But suppose now that there are in fact only thoughts, no "things" as
                      > realism represents them. The "things" rather are nothing other than
                      > those names Hegel discusses in EG in a synthesis of nominalism,
                      > conceptualism and realism (Findlay). Then the dialectic is indeed a
                      > passage "from shadows to reality" and this is how I take the Orpheus
                      > myth, his leading Eurydice from the land of shadows (it is his
                      > "journey", not hers, though it is ultimately himself who is buried in
                      > the shadows and must not "look back"). So the dialectic is always per
                      > definition in error. It is only truth as a whole, as a method even, as
                      > reached at the end.
                      >

                      I do not understand why "the dialectic is always per definition in
                      error". Of course, until the end it always produces one-sidedness with
                      new presuppositions. However, these are necessary stages or shapes for
                      thought seeking its truth. In the Absolute Idea Pure Knowing realizes
                      the dialectical movement as its procedural truth and essence including
                      the unity of form and content only in this movement and not in a unity
                      or identity beyond this movement.

                      Regards,
                      Beat Greuter

                      > I would like to connect with this Hegel's treatment of the Will under
                      > Practical Reason (EG) as itself superseding theoretical Mind but just
                      > therefore needing to be a Thinking Will (in Hegel's inclusive sense of
                      > "thinking"). Implied here, I would want to make out, is an eventual
                      > real (non-abstract, but as supplanting the abstract) fusion of the
                      > ethical with the metaphysical (echoing Aristotle's "contemplation is
                      > the highest praxis", but going further, probably), as canvassed more
                      > explicitly by some later thinkers. This fusion is the ultimate ground
                      > for why in Hegel things are never simply themselves and not another
                      > thing, thus putting out of court the question of being right or wrong
                      > about what they are. This is the question he explicitly rules out in
                      > connection with religion, for example.
                      >
                      > How far would you agree with my implicit view, finally, that dialectic
                      > is not abstractly or merely a process within (the) Logic but
                      > characterising all "reality" or, more immediately, the whole passage
                      > or development of the "Encyclopaedia", allowing for a bit of
                      > analogical fluidity in the term? Does this though, if affirmed tend
                      > not also at least to suggest (or confirm, rather, thinking of Hegel's
                      > work as a whole)that we are all the time dealing with Ideas, with
                      > Absolute Mind (and hence that there is nothing else, nor can there be,
                      > nothing "more" real)?
                      >
                      > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
                      > Greuter <greuterb@...> wrote:
                      > >
                      > > Am 10.04.2011 12:27, John writes:
                      > >
                      > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
                      > > > Greuter <greuterb@> wrote:
                      > > >
                      > > > > John,
                      > > > >
                      > > > > How can you tell us such a thing? What has Tillich or other
                      > theologian
                      > > > > to do with Hegel who was a pure philosopher in the tradition of
                      > Plato,
                      > > > > Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant. I do not
                      > understand how
                      > > > > you can take something totally alien to Hegel for explaining his
                      > > > > philosophy instead of reading what he writes himself at the
                      > > > beginning of
                      > > > > his Logic.
                      > > >
                      > > > Hegel presents his theology in the lectures on the philosophy of
                      > > > religion and in the penultimate chapter of the Phenomenology. So I am
                      > > > certainly not introducing something alien to Hegel. I'm simply making
                      > > > reference to a suppressed part of Hegel's thought.
                      > > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > John,
                      > >
                      > > But we are now at the beginning of the Logic and not in the Philosophy
                      > > of Religion. In the Addition of para 88 of the EL Hegel writes
                      > > (translated by William Wallace):
                      > >
                      > > "And in the case of being, we are speaking of nothing concrete: for
                      > > being is the utterly abstract. So far then the question regarding the
                      > > being of God --- a being which is in itself concrete above all measure
                      > > --- is of slight importance."
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > > You write:
                      > > >
                      > > > >There is no dialectical relation between Being and Nothing
                      > > > > you write and in a further post that dialectic begins only with
                      > > > > Determinate Being. But in total reversal of what you say it is
                      > quite
                      > > > the
                      > > > > beginning which shows the prototype of Hegel's dialectic: the
                      > > > opposition
                      > > > > of two absolutes not yet mediated which become mediated in a third
                      > > > > absolute.
                      > > >
                      > > > To speak of being, nothing and becoming as three absolutes that are
                      > > > related to each other seems quite different from what Hegel is
                      > saying.
                      > > > Treating each of the three as a hypostasis is, I believe, somthing
                      > > > Alan has been arguing against (if I understand him correctly).
                      > > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > That's not a hypostasis but what Hegel writes at the beginning of his
                      > > Logic (para 87, EL, translated by William Wallace):
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > "But this mere Being, as it is mere abstraction, is therefore the
                      > > absolutely negative: which, in a similarly immediate aspect, is just
                      > > Nothing.
                      > > 1. Hence was derived the second definition of the Absolute: the
                      > Absolute
                      > > is the Nought. In fact this definition is implied in saying that the
                      > > thing-in-itself is the indeterminate, utterly without form and so
                      > > without content --- or in saying that God is only the supreme Being and
                      > > nothing more; for this is really declaring him to be the same
                      > negativity
                      > > as above. The Nothing which the Buddhists make the universal principle,
                      > > as well as the final aim and goal of everything, is the same
                      > abstraction.
                      > > 2. If the opposition in thought is stated in this immediacy as Being
                      > and
                      > > Nothing, the shock of its nullity is too great not to stimulate the
                      > > attempt to fix Being and secure it against the transition into Nothing.
                      > > With this intent, reflection has recourse to the plan of discovering
                      > > some fixed predicate for Being, to mark it off from Nothing. Thus we
                      > > find Being identified with what persists amid all change, with matter,
                      > > susceptible of innumerable determinations --- or even, unreflectingly,
                      > > with a single existence, any chance object of the senses or of the
                      > mind.
                      > > But every additional and more concrete characterisation causes Being to
                      > > lose that integrity and simplicity it had in the beginning. Only in,
                      > and
                      > > by virtue of, this mere generality is it Nothing, something
                      > > inexpressible, whereof the distinction from Nothing is a mere intention
                      > > or meaning."
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > The opposition of the first two absolutes - Being and Nothing - is
                      > > sublated in a third absolute - Becoming. With this the first two
                      > > absolutes are no longer absolutes but merged in Becoming. This is what
                      > > Hegel calls 'dialectics'. So, the opposition is sublated and each
                      > > attempt to preserve Being from transition into Becoming means to
                      > > identify Being with a quality trying thereby to state a difference
                      > > between Being and Nothing what indeed would be a hypostasis, be it God
                      > > or Trinity or whatsoever. Being has become Becoming what is equal to
                      > say
                      > > Being is Nothing.
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > > Further down you write:
                      > > >
                      > > > > It is exactly the
                      > > > > mediation of the finite and the infinite in the Concept that
                      > Hegel want
                      > > > > to show us in the process of the Whole Logic.
                      > > >
                      > > > That is exactly right. So it is necessary to have the infinite and
                      > the
                      > > > finite. Being-nothing-becoming is the infinite. Existence, the
                      > > > Something, etc is the finite. The first attempt to mediate the two is
                      > > > with true infinity. But, obviously, before they can be mediated, they
                      > > > have, first, to be established.
                      > > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > No, "Existence, the Something, etc" are not the finite but concepts on
                      > > the path of determination or mediation like Being, Nothing and Becoming
                      > > but already more concrete. Also the concept of True Infinity collapses
                      > > in the One since it cannot hold its other in the Logic of Being. In the
                      > > Logic there are no finite things separated from infinite ideas but only
                      > > thoughts.
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > > You write:
                      > > >
                      > > > >With your disengagment of
                      > > > > Being from Determinate Being you prevent this mediation from the
                      > very
                      > > > > beginning since you have the non-mediated Whole already at the
                      > > > beginning
                      > > > > which afterwards you call trinity.
                      > > >
                      > > > In Hegel's theology this is the immanent trinity. But it certainly
                      > > > isn't the whole. Or if it is the whole, then it is, as you say, the
                      > > > "unmediated" whole. Basically it is the universal. The final result
                      > > > will be the mediated whole, the whole that contains the three moments
                      > > > of universal, particular and individual. But that is a long way off.
                      > > >
                      > > > John
                      > > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > Yes, this is certainly a long way. But Hegel is no theologian, he is a
                      > > philosopher. You have to go along pure thoughts on that long way.
                      > >
                      > > Regards,
                      > > Beat Greuter
                      >
                      >

                      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]





                      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                    • Alan Ponikvar
                      Hi Beat, This is an interesting set of comments. I am particularly interested in what you have to say about Plato. I agree that in Hegel the what is and how
                      Message 10 of 28 , Apr 15, 2011
                        Hi Beat,

                        This is an interesting set of comments. I am particularly interested in what
                        you have to say about Plato. I agree that in Hegel the 'what is' and 'how
                        is' questions both are relevant to his speculative thought. I was just
                        wondering what you have in mind ­ which dialogues are you thinking about ­
                        where this conjunct of questions is raised in Plato.

                        Regards, Alan

                        From: Beat Greuter <greuterb@...>
                        Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                        Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 20:44:16 +0200
                        To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                        Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Something from O'Regan






                        Am 11.04.2011 13:18, Stephen writes:

                        > Dear Beat,
                        >
                        > While not seeing how it would destroy John's account of the mutual
                        > implication etc. of being and nothing, for example, I find
                        > confirmation of my own interpretation in your account of how each
                        > category gives way to a more "just" absolute, i.e. they are all
                        > attempts to refer to or denominate the absolute. Hegel says as much.
                        >

                        Stephen,

                        Your interpretation seems to imply that there is a linear development of
                        the absolute, from the most abstract to the most conrete. Basically I
                        agree with this, however, the movement is not linear and its 'aim' is
                        not to reach a "just" absolute but to dissolve the absolute with the
                        result of more 'justice' for the former absolutes having become moments
                        in a new mediated whole. The mentioned movement includes two opposite
                        directions which can not be sperated formally: the analytical and the
                        synthetical direction. In the analytical direction there is a mediation
                        of the achieved (one-sided) unity or identity with its arising other or
                        opposite. The synthectical direction is a falling back into a new
                        (one-sided) identity or unity for enabling a further mediation leading
                        to a more concrete (or mediated) shape of the absolute.

                        Examples:
                        Pure Knowing at the end of the PhdG is a knowing which is fully mediated
                        by the steps of consciousness but as the sublation of consciousness with
                        its assumed externally fixed truth Pure Knowing falls back into the
                        (one-sided) identiy or abstraction of Pure Being without any
                        determination. Now, it has to actualize itself analyzing this result
                        which leads to the other abstract concept of Pure Nothing as its
                        opposite and then to the first concrete concept of their mediation in
                        Pure Becoming. Though Pure Becoming is a concrete concept mediating two
                        moments it cannot really achieve determination since the two moments are
                        totally indifferent and equivalent. So, the Concept falls into a new
                        one-sided and abstract synthesis in 'Determinate Being in General' which
                        is the unity of Being and Nothing IN THE (one-sided) DETERMINATION OF
                        BEING. The analytical step then will develop again the right of the
                        Nothing as Quality leading to the Concepts of the Something and Reality
                        where a new one-sided synthesis stops their spurious infinity in the
                        Being-for-itself (the second negation of the true infinity). The
                        analysis of this one-sidedness then brings the loss of Quality at all in
                        the 'One' and the 'Many One' as the beginning of the quantitative
                        anaylsis of the Concept which later will achieve a more developed stage
                        of Quality in the Concept of the Measure.

                        > So as you say even the True Infinite "gives way" to the One, if it
                        > comes afterwards. This is disturbing in a way, in that it would oblige
                        > one to characterise just how the final Absolute (Idea) differs from,
                        > surpasses, the True Infinite (one clue would be Hegel's pointing out
                        > that "infinite" is a negative characterisation).
                        >

                        The Concept of the Absolue Idea belongs to the Subjective Logic, the
                        Logic of the Concept, where the Concpet has become the identity of the
                        identity and non-identity but at the beginning (the Concept as such)
                        only for-itself (one-sided) as a new synthesis. So, it has to develop
                        again the lost Actuality out of itself achieving thereby Objectivity.
                        The path again is a movement of analysis and synthesis. The Absolute
                        Idea only makes fully explict this speculative method of the described
                        conjunction of the analytical and synthetical movement. This is not an
                        outer method but the liquefaction (Verflüssigung) of all moments
                        developed on the path of the Logic without any further presupposition
                        not yet mediated - total mediated immediacy. Hegel writes in para 186
                        and 187 of the EL, 1817 (my translation):

                        "This progress [method] is both, analytical as the immanent reflection
                        positing only this that is included in the immediate Concept, as well as
                        synthetical as far as in this the difference is not yet posited." (para
                        186, EL, 1817)
                        "This progress [method] is in the Being an Other and the transition into
                        an Other, in the Essence Seeming [Scheinen] in the Opposite (in dem
                        Entgegengesetzten), in the Concept the differentiation of the individual
                        and the universality which as such does continue into that which is
                        distinguished from itself and is as identity with it (the individual)"
                        (para 187, EL, 1817)

                        Hegel does not separate the analytical concept from the synthetical
                        concept as in the Analytical Philosophy and Formal Logic. Neverthess, we
                        have to distinguish the two moments of the specualtive method,
                        otherwise, we miss the method. With this he makes a crucial relationship
                        between Plato's 'What is'- and 'How-is'- (context-) question. According
                        to Hegel it is not possible to answer the 'What is'-question (question
                        on the essence, definition) without the 'How is'-question (the context).
                        In the speculative method, therefore, both are integrated.

                        > Now, not to leave theology out in the cold, Hegel says that "the
                        > notion... results by abolishing the intermediation, and thus is
                        > immediate"(EL51). Again, he speaks of "the genuine nature of essential
                        > thought - by which it cancels the mediation in the very act of
                        > mediation" (EL50), as it were "forgetting those things which are
                        > before". Actually the things forget themselves, since they "are not".
                        > As you wrote here, "In the logic there are no finite things separated
                        > from infinite ideas but only thoughts."
                        >

                        These quotations belong to the section on the 'Pre-Concept' of the
                        EL-Logic and there to Kant's 'Critical Philosophy'. We have to
                        distinguish Hegel's critique on the 'Critical Philosophy' and what he
                        accepts as true in this Philosophy. Perhaps we can come back to this later.

                        > But suppose now that there are in fact only thoughts, no "things" as
                        > realism represents them. The "things" rather are nothing other than
                        > those names Hegel discusses in EG in a synthesis of nominalism,
                        > conceptualism and realism (Findlay). Then the dialectic is indeed a
                        > passage "from shadows to reality" and this is how I take the Orpheus
                        > myth, his leading Eurydice from the land of shadows (it is his
                        > "journey", not hers, though it is ultimately himself who is buried in
                        > the shadows and must not "look back"). So the dialectic is always per
                        > definition in error. It is only truth as a whole, as a method even, as
                        > reached at the end.
                        >

                        I do not understand why "the dialectic is always per definition in
                        error". Of course, until the end it always produces one-sidedness with
                        new presuppositions. However, these are necessary stages or shapes for
                        thought seeking its truth. In the Absolute Idea Pure Knowing realizes
                        the dialectical movement as its procedural truth and essence including
                        the unity of form and content only in this movement and not in a unity
                        or identity beyond this movement.

                        Regards,
                        Beat Greuter

                        > I would like to connect with this Hegel's treatment of the Will under
                        > Practical Reason (EG) as itself superseding theoretical Mind but just
                        > therefore needing to be a Thinking Will (in Hegel's inclusive sense of
                        > "thinking"). Implied here, I would want to make out, is an eventual
                        > real (non-abstract, but as supplanting the abstract) fusion of the
                        > ethical with the metaphysical (echoing Aristotle's "contemplation is
                        > the highest praxis", but going further, probably), as canvassed more
                        > explicitly by some later thinkers. This fusion is the ultimate ground
                        > for why in Hegel things are never simply themselves and not another
                        > thing, thus putting out of court the question of being right or wrong
                        > about what they are. This is the question he explicitly rules out in
                        > connection with religion, for example.
                        >
                        > How far would you agree with my implicit view, finally, that dialectic
                        > is not abstractly or merely a process within (the) Logic but
                        > characterising all "reality" or, more immediately, the whole passage
                        > or development of the "Encyclopaedia", allowing for a bit of
                        > analogical fluidity in the term? Does this though, if affirmed tend
                        > not also at least to suggest (or confirm, rather, thinking of Hegel's
                        > work as a whole)that we are all the time dealing with Ideas, with
                        > Absolute Mind (and hence that there is nothing else, nor can there be,
                        > nothing "more" real)?
                        >
                        > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                        <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
                        > Greuter <greuterb@...> wrote:
                        > >
                        > > Am 10.04.2011 12:27, John writes:
                        > >
                        > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                        <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                        > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
                        > > > Greuter <greuterb@> wrote:
                        > > >
                        > > > > John,
                        > > > >
                        > > > > How can you tell us such a thing? What has Tillich or other
                        > theologian
                        > > > > to do with Hegel who was a pure philosopher in the tradition of
                        > Plato,
                        > > > > Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant. I do not
                        > understand how
                        > > > > you can take something totally alien to Hegel for explaining his
                        > > > > philosophy instead of reading what he writes himself at the
                        > > > beginning of
                        > > > > his Logic.
                        > > >
                        > > > Hegel presents his theology in the lectures on the philosophy of
                        > > > religion and in the penultimate chapter of the Phenomenology. So I am
                        > > > certainly not introducing something alien to Hegel. I'm simply making
                        > > > reference to a suppressed part of Hegel's thought.
                        > > >
                        > >
                        > >
                        > > John,
                        > >
                        > > But we are now at the beginning of the Logic and not in the Philosophy
                        > > of Religion. In the Addition of para 88 of the EL Hegel writes
                        > > (translated by William Wallace):
                        > >
                        > > "And in the case of being, we are speaking of nothing concrete: for
                        > > being is the utterly abstract. So far then the question regarding the
                        > > being of God --- a being which is in itself concrete above all measure
                        > > --- is of slight importance."
                        > >
                        > >
                        > > > You write:
                        > > >
                        > > > >There is no dialectical relation between Being and Nothing
                        > > > > you write and in a further post that dialectic begins only with
                        > > > > Determinate Being. But in total reversal of what you say it is
                        > quite
                        > > > the
                        > > > > beginning which shows the prototype of Hegel's dialectic: the
                        > > > opposition
                        > > > > of two absolutes not yet mediated which become mediated in a third
                        > > > > absolute.
                        > > >
                        > > > To speak of being, nothing and becoming as three absolutes that are
                        > > > related to each other seems quite different from what Hegel is
                        > saying.
                        > > > Treating each of the three as a hypostasis is, I believe, somthing
                        > > > Alan has been arguing against (if I understand him correctly).
                        > > >
                        > >
                        > >
                        > > That's not a hypostasis but what Hegel writes at the beginning of his
                        > > Logic (para 87, EL, translated by William Wallace):
                        > >
                        > >
                        > > "But this mere Being, as it is mere abstraction, is therefore the
                        > > absolutely negative: which, in a similarly immediate aspect, is just
                        > > Nothing.
                        > > 1. Hence was derived the second definition of the Absolute: the
                        > Absolute
                        > > is the Nought. In fact this definition is implied in saying that the
                        > > thing-in-itself is the indeterminate, utterly without form and so
                        > > without content --- or in saying that God is only the supreme Being and
                        > > nothing more; for this is really declaring him to be the same
                        > negativity
                        > > as above. The Nothing which the Buddhists make the universal principle,
                        > > as well as the final aim and goal of everything, is the same
                        > abstraction.
                        > > 2. If the opposition in thought is stated in this immediacy as Being
                        > and
                        > > Nothing, the shock of its nullity is too great not to stimulate the
                        > > attempt to fix Being and secure it against the transition into Nothing.
                        > > With this intent, reflection has recourse to the plan of discovering
                        > > some fixed predicate for Being, to mark it off from Nothing. Thus we
                        > > find Being identified with what persists amid all change, with matter,
                        > > susceptible of innumerable determinations --- or even, unreflectingly,
                        > > with a single existence, any chance object of the senses or of the
                        > mind.
                        > > But every additional and more concrete characterisation causes Being to
                        > > lose that integrity and simplicity it had in the beginning. Only in,
                        > and
                        > > by virtue of, this mere generality is it Nothing, something
                        > > inexpressible, whereof the distinction from Nothing is a mere intention
                        > > or meaning."
                        > >
                        > >
                        > > The opposition of the first two absolutes - Being and Nothing - is
                        > > sublated in a third absolute - Becoming. With this the first two
                        > > absolutes are no longer absolutes but merged in Becoming. This is what
                        > > Hegel calls 'dialectics'. So, the opposition is sublated and each
                        > > attempt to preserve Being from transition into Becoming means to
                        > > identify Being with a quality trying thereby to state a difference
                        > > between Being and Nothing what indeed would be a hypostasis, be it God
                        > > or Trinity or whatsoever. Being has become Becoming what is equal to
                        > say
                        > > Being is Nothing.
                        > >
                        > >
                        > > > Further down you write:
                        > > >
                        > > > > It is exactly the
                        > > > > mediation of the finite and the infinite in the Concept that
                        > Hegel want
                        > > > > to show us in the process of the Whole Logic.
                        > > >
                        > > > That is exactly right. So it is necessary to have the infinite and
                        > the
                        > > > finite. Being-nothing-becoming is the infinite. Existence, the
                        > > > Something, etc is the finite. The first attempt to mediate the two is
                        > > > with true infinity. But, obviously, before they can be mediated, they
                        > > > have, first, to be established.
                        > > >
                        > >
                        > >
                        > > No, "Existence, the Something, etc" are not the finite but concepts on
                        > > the path of determination or mediation like Being, Nothing and Becoming
                        > > but already more concrete. Also the concept of True Infinity collapses
                        > > in the One since it cannot hold its other in the Logic of Being. In the
                        > > Logic there are no finite things separated from infinite ideas but only
                        > > thoughts.
                        > >
                        > >
                        > > > You write:
                        > > >
                        > > > >With your disengagment of
                        > > > > Being from Determinate Being you prevent this mediation from the
                        > very
                        > > > > beginning since you have the non-mediated Whole already at the
                        > > > beginning
                        > > > > which afterwards you call trinity.
                        > > >
                        > > > In Hegel's theology this is the immanent trinity. But it certainly
                        > > > isn't the whole. Or if it is the whole, then it is, as you say, the
                        > > > "unmediated" whole. Basically it is the universal. The final result
                        > > > will be the mediated whole, the whole that contains the three moments
                        > > > of universal, particular and individual. But that is a long way off.
                        > > >
                        > > > John
                        > > >
                        > >
                        > >
                        > > Yes, this is certainly a long way. But Hegel is no theologian, he is a
                        > > philosopher. You have to go along pure thoughts on that long way.
                        > >
                        > > Regards,
                        > > Beat Greuter
                        >
                        >

                        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]









                        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                      • Beat Greuter
                        ... Alan, In a group we read the Menon dialogue. In this dialogue there is a reflection on the What-is-x-Question . Among others two passages were interested
                        Message 11 of 28 , Apr 17, 2011
                          Am 16.04.2011 02:31, Alan Ponikvar writes:

                          > Hi Beat,
                          >
                          > This is an interesting set of comments. I am particularly interested
                          > in what
                          > you have to say about Plato. I agree that in Hegel the 'what is' and 'how
                          > is' questions both are relevant to his speculative thought. I was just
                          > wondering what you have in mind ­ which dialogues are you thinking about ­
                          > where this conjunct of questions is raised in Plato.
                          >
                          > Regards, Alan
                          >


                          Alan,

                          In a group we read the Menon dialogue. In this dialogue there is a
                          reflection on the 'What-is-x-Question'. Among others two passages were
                          interested for me:

                          (71b) "From what I do not know what it is how shall I know of this a
                          particular quality (hopoion, quale quid)"
                          (86d) "So, we must - as it seems - examine how something is (quale quid)
                          from what we do not yet know what it is"

                          I am not a Plato expert. However, it seems that these passages have some
                          references to Hegel's Logic of Being. Until know I thought that
                          Aristotle was more important for Hegel's philosophy and Logic. However,
                          this Menon dialogue (and perhaps also other dialogues) seems to be
                          important for our understanding of Hegel's procedure in the Logic of
                          Being. But, of course, I could be wrong.

                          Regards,
                          Beat Greuter


                          >
                          > From: Beat Greuter <greuterb@... <mailto:greuterb%40bluewin.ch>>
                          > Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
                          > Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 20:44:16 +0200
                          > To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
                          > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Something from O'Regan
                          >
                          > Am 11.04.2011 13:18, Stephen writes:
                          >
                          > > Dear Beat,
                          > >
                          > > While not seeing how it would destroy John's account of the mutual
                          > > implication etc. of being and nothing, for example, I find
                          > > confirmation of my own interpretation in your account of how each
                          > > category gives way to a more "just" absolute, i.e. they are all
                          > > attempts to refer to or denominate the absolute. Hegel says as much.
                          > >
                          >
                          > Stephen,
                          >
                          > Your interpretation seems to imply that there is a linear development of
                          > the absolute, from the most abstract to the most conrete. Basically I
                          > agree with this, however, the movement is not linear and its 'aim' is
                          > not to reach a "just" absolute but to dissolve the absolute with the
                          > result of more 'justice' for the former absolutes having become moments
                          > in a new mediated whole. The mentioned movement includes two opposite
                          > directions which can not be sperated formally: the analytical and the
                          > synthetical direction. In the analytical direction there is a mediation
                          > of the achieved (one-sided) unity or identity with its arising other or
                          > opposite. The synthectical direction is a falling back into a new
                          > (one-sided) identity or unity for enabling a further mediation leading
                          > to a more concrete (or mediated) shape of the absolute.
                          >
                          > Examples:
                          > Pure Knowing at the end of the PhdG is a knowing which is fully mediated
                          > by the steps of consciousness but as the sublation of consciousness with
                          > its assumed externally fixed truth Pure Knowing falls back into the
                          > (one-sided) identiy or abstraction of Pure Being without any
                          > determination. Now, it has to actualize itself analyzing this result
                          > which leads to the other abstract concept of Pure Nothing as its
                          > opposite and then to the first concrete concept of their mediation in
                          > Pure Becoming. Though Pure Becoming is a concrete concept mediating two
                          > moments it cannot really achieve determination since the two moments are
                          > totally indifferent and equivalent. So, the Concept falls into a new
                          > one-sided and abstract synthesis in 'Determinate Being in General' which
                          > is the unity of Being and Nothing IN THE (one-sided) DETERMINATION OF
                          > BEING. The analytical step then will develop again the right of the
                          > Nothing as Quality leading to the Concepts of the Something and Reality
                          > where a new one-sided synthesis stops their spurious infinity in the
                          > Being-for-itself (the second negation of the true infinity). The
                          > analysis of this one-sidedness then brings the loss of Quality at all in
                          > the 'One' and the 'Many One' as the beginning of the quantitative
                          > anaylsis of the Concept which later will achieve a more developed stage
                          > of Quality in the Concept of the Measure.
                          >
                          > > So as you say even the True Infinite "gives way" to the One, if it
                          > > comes afterwards. This is disturbing in a way, in that it would oblige
                          > > one to characterise just how the final Absolute (Idea) differs from,
                          > > surpasses, the True Infinite (one clue would be Hegel's pointing out
                          > > that "infinite" is a negative characterisation).
                          > >
                          >
                          > The Concept of the Absolue Idea belongs to the Subjective Logic, the
                          > Logic of the Concept, where the Concpet has become the identity of the
                          > identity and non-identity but at the beginning (the Concept as such)
                          > only for-itself (one-sided) as a new synthesis. So, it has to develop
                          > again the lost Actuality out of itself achieving thereby Objectivity.
                          > The path again is a movement of analysis and synthesis. The Absolute
                          > Idea only makes fully explict this speculative method of the described
                          > conjunction of the analytical and synthetical movement. This is not an
                          > outer method but the liquefaction (Verflüssigung) of all moments
                          > developed on the path of the Logic without any further presupposition
                          > not yet mediated - total mediated immediacy. Hegel writes in para 186
                          > and 187 of the EL, 1817 (my translation):
                          >
                          > "This progress [method] is both, analytical as the immanent reflection
                          > positing only this that is included in the immediate Concept, as well as
                          > synthetical as far as in this the difference is not yet posited." (para
                          > 186, EL, 1817)
                          > "This progress [method] is in the Being an Other and the transition into
                          > an Other, in the Essence Seeming [Scheinen] in the Opposite (in dem
                          > Entgegengesetzten), in the Concept the differentiation of the individual
                          > and the universality which as such does continue into that which is
                          > distinguished from itself and is as identity with it (the individual)"
                          > (para 187, EL, 1817)
                          >
                          > Hegel does not separate the analytical concept from the synthetical
                          > concept as in the Analytical Philosophy and Formal Logic. Neverthess, we
                          > have to distinguish the two moments of the specualtive method,
                          > otherwise, we miss the method. With this he makes a crucial relationship
                          > between Plato's 'What is'- and 'How-is'- (context-) question. According
                          > to Hegel it is not possible to answer the 'What is'-question (question
                          > on the essence, definition) without the 'How is'-question (the context).
                          > In the speculative method, therefore, both are integrated.
                          >
                          > > Now, not to leave theology out in the cold, Hegel says that "the
                          > > notion... results by abolishing the intermediation, and thus is
                          > > immediate"(EL51). Again, he speaks of "the genuine nature of essential
                          > > thought - by which it cancels the mediation in the very act of
                          > > mediation" (EL50), as it were "forgetting those things which are
                          > > before". Actually the things forget themselves, since they "are not".
                          > > As you wrote here, "In the logic there are no finite things separated
                          > > from infinite ideas but only thoughts."
                          > >
                          >
                          > These quotations belong to the section on the 'Pre-Concept' of the
                          > EL-Logic and there to Kant's 'Critical Philosophy'. We have to
                          > distinguish Hegel's critique on the 'Critical Philosophy' and what he
                          > accepts as true in this Philosophy. Perhaps we can come back to this
                          > later.
                          >
                          > > But suppose now that there are in fact only thoughts, no "things" as
                          > > realism represents them. The "things" rather are nothing other than
                          > > those names Hegel discusses in EG in a synthesis of nominalism,
                          > > conceptualism and realism (Findlay). Then the dialectic is indeed a
                          > > passage "from shadows to reality" and this is how I take the Orpheus
                          > > myth, his leading Eurydice from the land of shadows (it is his
                          > > "journey", not hers, though it is ultimately himself who is buried in
                          > > the shadows and must not "look back"). So the dialectic is always per
                          > > definition in error. It is only truth as a whole, as a method even, as
                          > > reached at the end.
                          > >
                          >
                          > I do not understand why "the dialectic is always per definition in
                          > error". Of course, until the end it always produces one-sidedness with
                          > new presuppositions. However, these are necessary stages or shapes for
                          > thought seeking its truth. In the Absolute Idea Pure Knowing realizes
                          > the dialectical movement as its procedural truth and essence including
                          > the unity of form and content only in this movement and not in a unity
                          > or identity beyond this movement.
                          >
                          > Regards,
                          > Beat Greuter
                          >
                          > > I would like to connect with this Hegel's treatment of the Will under
                          > > Practical Reason (EG) as itself superseding theoretical Mind but just
                          > > therefore needing to be a Thinking Will (in Hegel's inclusive sense of
                          > > "thinking"). Implied here, I would want to make out, is an eventual
                          > > real (non-abstract, but as supplanting the abstract) fusion of the
                          > > ethical with the metaphysical (echoing Aristotle's "contemplation is
                          > > the highest praxis", but going further, probably), as canvassed more
                          > > explicitly by some later thinkers. This fusion is the ultimate ground
                          > > for why in Hegel things are never simply themselves and not another
                          > > thing, thus putting out of court the question of being right or wrong
                          > > about what they are. This is the question he explicitly rules out in
                          > > connection with religion, for example.
                          > >
                          > > How far would you agree with my implicit view, finally, that dialectic
                          > > is not abstractly or merely a process within (the) Logic but
                          > > characterising all "reality" or, more immediately, the whole passage
                          > > or development of the "Encyclopaedia", allowing for a bit of
                          > > analogical fluidity in the term? Does this though, if affirmed tend
                          > > not also at least to suggest (or confirm, rather, thinking of Hegel's
                          > > work as a whole)that we are all the time dealing with Ideas, with
                          > > Absolute Mind (and hence that there is nothing else, nor can there be,
                          > > nothing "more" real)?
                          > >
                          > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                          > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                          > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
                          > > Greuter <greuterb@...> wrote:
                          > > >
                          > > > Am 10.04.2011 12:27, John writes:
                          > > >
                          > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                          > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                          > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                          > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
                          > > > > Greuter <greuterb@> wrote:
                          > > > >
                          > > > > > John,
                          > > > > >
                          > > > > > How can you tell us such a thing? What has Tillich or other
                          > > theologian
                          > > > > > to do with Hegel who was a pure philosopher in the tradition of
                          > > Plato,
                          > > > > > Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant. I do not
                          > > understand how
                          > > > > > you can take something totally alien to Hegel for explaining his
                          > > > > > philosophy instead of reading what he writes himself at the
                          > > > > beginning of
                          > > > > > his Logic.
                          > > > >
                          > > > > Hegel presents his theology in the lectures on the philosophy of
                          > > > > religion and in the penultimate chapter of the Phenomenology. So
                          > I am
                          > > > > certainly not introducing something alien to Hegel. I'm simply
                          > making
                          > > > > reference to a suppressed part of Hegel's thought.
                          > > > >
                          > > >
                          > > >
                          > > > John,
                          > > >
                          > > > But we are now at the beginning of the Logic and not in the Philosophy
                          > > > of Religion. In the Addition of para 88 of the EL Hegel writes
                          > > > (translated by William Wallace):
                          > > >
                          > > > "And in the case of being, we are speaking of nothing concrete: for
                          > > > being is the utterly abstract. So far then the question regarding the
                          > > > being of God --- a being which is in itself concrete above all measure
                          > > > --- is of slight importance."
                          > > >
                          > > >
                          > > > > You write:
                          > > > >
                          > > > > >There is no dialectical relation between Being and Nothing
                          > > > > > you write and in a further post that dialectic begins only with
                          > > > > > Determinate Being. But in total reversal of what you say it is
                          > > quite
                          > > > > the
                          > > > > > beginning which shows the prototype of Hegel's dialectic: the
                          > > > > opposition
                          > > > > > of two absolutes not yet mediated which become mediated in a third
                          > > > > > absolute.
                          > > > >
                          > > > > To speak of being, nothing and becoming as three absolutes that are
                          > > > > related to each other seems quite different from what Hegel is
                          > > saying.
                          > > > > Treating each of the three as a hypostasis is, I believe, somthing
                          > > > > Alan has been arguing against (if I understand him correctly).
                          > > > >
                          > > >
                          > > >
                          > > > That's not a hypostasis but what Hegel writes at the beginning of his
                          > > > Logic (para 87, EL, translated by William Wallace):
                          > > >
                          > > >
                          > > > "But this mere Being, as it is mere abstraction, is therefore the
                          > > > absolutely negative: which, in a similarly immediate aspect, is just
                          > > > Nothing.
                          > > > 1. Hence was derived the second definition of the Absolute: the
                          > > Absolute
                          > > > is the Nought. In fact this definition is implied in saying that the
                          > > > thing-in-itself is the indeterminate, utterly without form and so
                          > > > without content --- or in saying that God is only the supreme
                          > Being and
                          > > > nothing more; for this is really declaring him to be the same
                          > > negativity
                          > > > as above. The Nothing which the Buddhists make the universal
                          > principle,
                          > > > as well as the final aim and goal of everything, is the same
                          > > abstraction.
                          > > > 2. If the opposition in thought is stated in this immediacy as Being
                          > > and
                          > > > Nothing, the shock of its nullity is too great not to stimulate the
                          > > > attempt to fix Being and secure it against the transition into
                          > Nothing.
                          > > > With this intent, reflection has recourse to the plan of discovering
                          > > > some fixed predicate for Being, to mark it off from Nothing. Thus we
                          > > > find Being identified with what persists amid all change, with matter,
                          > > > susceptible of innumerable determinations --- or even, unreflectingly,
                          > > > with a single existence, any chance object of the senses or of the
                          > > mind.
                          > > > But every additional and more concrete characterisation causes
                          > Being to
                          > > > lose that integrity and simplicity it had in the beginning. Only in,
                          > > and
                          > > > by virtue of, this mere generality is it Nothing, something
                          > > > inexpressible, whereof the distinction from Nothing is a mere
                          > intention
                          > > > or meaning."
                          > > >
                          > > >
                          > > > The opposition of the first two absolutes - Being and Nothing - is
                          > > > sublated in a third absolute - Becoming. With this the first two
                          > > > absolutes are no longer absolutes but merged in Becoming. This is what
                          > > > Hegel calls 'dialectics'. So, the opposition is sublated and each
                          > > > attempt to preserve Being from transition into Becoming means to
                          > > > identify Being with a quality trying thereby to state a difference
                          > > > between Being and Nothing what indeed would be a hypostasis, be it God
                          > > > or Trinity or whatsoever. Being has become Becoming what is equal to
                          > > say
                          > > > Being is Nothing.
                          > > >
                          > > >
                          > > > > Further down you write:
                          > > > >
                          > > > > > It is exactly the
                          > > > > > mediation of the finite and the infinite in the Concept that
                          > > Hegel want
                          > > > > > to show us in the process of the Whole Logic.
                          > > > >
                          > > > > That is exactly right. So it is necessary to have the infinite and
                          > > the
                          > > > > finite. Being-nothing-becoming is the infinite. Existence, the
                          > > > > Something, etc is the finite. The first attempt to mediate the
                          > two is
                          > > > > with true infinity. But, obviously, before they can be mediated,
                          > they
                          > > > > have, first, to be established.
                          > > > >
                          > > >
                          > > >
                          > > > No, "Existence, the Something, etc" are not the finite but concepts on
                          > > > the path of determination or mediation like Being, Nothing and
                          > Becoming
                          > > > but already more concrete. Also the concept of True Infinity collapses
                          > > > in the One since it cannot hold its other in the Logic of Being.
                          > In the
                          > > > Logic there are no finite things separated from infinite ideas but
                          > only
                          > > > thoughts.
                          > > >
                          > > >
                          > > > > You write:
                          > > > >
                          > > > > >With your disengagment of
                          > > > > > Being from Determinate Being you prevent this mediation from the
                          > > very
                          > > > > > beginning since you have the non-mediated Whole already at the
                          > > > > beginning
                          > > > > > which afterwards you call trinity.
                          > > > >
                          > > > > In Hegel's theology this is the immanent trinity. But it certainly
                          > > > > isn't the whole. Or if it is the whole, then it is, as you say, the
                          > > > > "unmediated" whole. Basically it is the universal. The final result
                          > > > > will be the mediated whole, the whole that contains the three
                          > moments
                          > > > > of universal, particular and individual. But that is a long way off.
                          > > > >
                          > > > > John
                          > > > >
                          > > >
                          > > >
                          > > > Yes, this is certainly a long way. But Hegel is no theologian, he is a
                          > > > philosopher. You have to go along pure thoughts on that long way.
                          > > >
                          > > > Regards,
                          > > > Beat Greuter
                          >
                          >



                          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                        • Alan Ponikvar
                          Hi Beat, Okay. I thought you might have something like this in mind. I tend to look more to Plato than Aristotle in general and also in particular when I have
                          Message 12 of 28 , Apr 17, 2011
                            Hi Beat,

                            Okay. I thought you might have something like this in mind. I tend to look
                            more to Plato than Aristotle in general and also in particular when I have
                            Hegel in mind. But Hegel clearly seems to prefer Aristotle.

                            Regards, Alan

                            From: Beat Greuter <greuterb@...>
                            Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                            Date: Sun, 17 Apr 2011 18:38:48 +0200
                            To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                            Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Something from O'Regan






                            Am 16.04.2011 02:31, Alan Ponikvar writes:

                            > Hi Beat,
                            >
                            > This is an interesting set of comments. I am particularly interested
                            > in what
                            > you have to say about Plato. I agree that in Hegel the 'what is' and 'how
                            > is' questions both are relevant to his speculative thought. I was just
                            > wondering what you have in mind � which dialogues are you thinking about �
                            > where this conjunct of questions is raised in Plato.
                            >
                            > Regards, Alan
                            >

                            Alan,

                            In a group we read the Menon dialogue. In this dialogue there is a
                            reflection on the 'What-is-x-Question'. Among others two passages were
                            interested for me:

                            (71b) "From what I do not know what it is how shall I know of this a
                            particular quality (hopoion, quale quid)"
                            (86d) "So, we must - as it seems - examine how something is (quale quid)
                            from what we do not yet know what it is"

                            I am not a Plato expert. However, it seems that these passages have some
                            references to Hegel's Logic of Being. Until know I thought that
                            Aristotle was more important for Hegel's philosophy and Logic. However,
                            this Menon dialogue (and perhaps also other dialogues) seems to be
                            important for our understanding of Hegel's procedure in the Logic of
                            Being. But, of course, I could be wrong.

                            Regards,
                            Beat Greuter

                            >
                            > From: Beat Greuter <greuterb@... <mailto:greuterb%40bluewin.ch>
                            <mailto:greuterb%40bluewin.ch>>
                            > Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                            <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
                            > Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 20:44:16 +0200
                            > To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                            <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
                            > Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Something from O'Regan
                            >
                            > Am 11.04.2011 13:18, Stephen writes:
                            >
                            > > Dear Beat,
                            > >
                            > > While not seeing how it would destroy John's account of the mutual
                            > > implication etc. of being and nothing, for example, I find
                            > > confirmation of my own interpretation in your account of how each
                            > > category gives way to a more "just" absolute, i.e. they are all
                            > > attempts to refer to or denominate the absolute. Hegel says as much.
                            > >
                            >
                            > Stephen,
                            >
                            > Your interpretation seems to imply that there is a linear development of
                            > the absolute, from the most abstract to the most conrete. Basically I
                            > agree with this, however, the movement is not linear and its 'aim' is
                            > not to reach a "just" absolute but to dissolve the absolute with the
                            > result of more 'justice' for the former absolutes having become moments
                            > in a new mediated whole. The mentioned movement includes two opposite
                            > directions which can not be sperated formally: the analytical and the
                            > synthetical direction. In the analytical direction there is a mediation
                            > of the achieved (one-sided) unity or identity with its arising other or
                            > opposite. The synthectical direction is a falling back into a new
                            > (one-sided) identity or unity for enabling a further mediation leading
                            > to a more concrete (or mediated) shape of the absolute.
                            >
                            > Examples:
                            > Pure Knowing at the end of the PhdG is a knowing which is fully mediated
                            > by the steps of consciousness but as the sublation of consciousness with
                            > its assumed externally fixed truth Pure Knowing falls back into the
                            > (one-sided) identiy or abstraction of Pure Being without any
                            > determination. Now, it has to actualize itself analyzing this result
                            > which leads to the other abstract concept of Pure Nothing as its
                            > opposite and then to the first concrete concept of their mediation in
                            > Pure Becoming. Though Pure Becoming is a concrete concept mediating two
                            > moments it cannot really achieve determination since the two moments are
                            > totally indifferent and equivalent. So, the Concept falls into a new
                            > one-sided and abstract synthesis in 'Determinate Being in General' which
                            > is the unity of Being and Nothing IN THE (one-sided) DETERMINATION OF
                            > BEING. The analytical step then will develop again the right of the
                            > Nothing as Quality leading to the Concepts of the Something and Reality
                            > where a new one-sided synthesis stops their spurious infinity in the
                            > Being-for-itself (the second negation of the true infinity). The
                            > analysis of this one-sidedness then brings the loss of Quality at all in
                            > the 'One' and the 'Many One' as the beginning of the quantitative
                            > anaylsis of the Concept which later will achieve a more developed stage
                            > of Quality in the Concept of the Measure.
                            >
                            > > So as you say even the True Infinite "gives way" to the One, if it
                            > > comes afterwards. This is disturbing in a way, in that it would oblige
                            > > one to characterise just how the final Absolute (Idea) differs from,
                            > > surpasses, the True Infinite (one clue would be Hegel's pointing out
                            > > that "infinite" is a negative characterisation).
                            > >
                            >
                            > The Concept of the Absolue Idea belongs to the Subjective Logic, the
                            > Logic of the Concept, where the Concpet has become the identity of the
                            > identity and non-identity but at the beginning (the Concept as such)
                            > only for-itself (one-sided) as a new synthesis. So, it has to develop
                            > again the lost Actuality out of itself achieving thereby Objectivity.
                            > The path again is a movement of analysis and synthesis. The Absolute
                            > Idea only makes fully explict this speculative method of the described
                            > conjunction of the analytical and synthetical movement. This is not an
                            > outer method but the liquefaction (Verfl�ssigung) of all moments
                            > developed on the path of the Logic without any further presupposition
                            > not yet mediated - total mediated immediacy. Hegel writes in para 186
                            > and 187 of the EL, 1817 (my translation):
                            >
                            > "This progress [method] is both, analytical as the immanent reflection
                            > positing only this that is included in the immediate Concept, as well as
                            > synthetical as far as in this the difference is not yet posited." (para
                            > 186, EL, 1817)
                            > "This progress [method] is in the Being an Other and the transition into
                            > an Other, in the Essence Seeming [Scheinen] in the Opposite (in dem
                            > Entgegengesetzten), in the Concept the differentiation of the individual
                            > and the universality which as such does continue into that which is
                            > distinguished from itself and is as identity with it (the individual)"
                            > (para 187, EL, 1817)
                            >
                            > Hegel does not separate the analytical concept from the synthetical
                            > concept as in the Analytical Philosophy and Formal Logic. Neverthess, we
                            > have to distinguish the two moments of the specualtive method,
                            > otherwise, we miss the method. With this he makes a crucial relationship
                            > between Plato's 'What is'- and 'How-is'- (context-) question. According
                            > to Hegel it is not possible to answer the 'What is'-question (question
                            > on the essence, definition) without the 'How is'-question (the context).
                            > In the speculative method, therefore, both are integrated.
                            >
                            > > Now, not to leave theology out in the cold, Hegel says that "the
                            > > notion... results by abolishing the intermediation, and thus is
                            > > immediate"(EL51). Again, he speaks of "the genuine nature of essential
                            > > thought - by which it cancels the mediation in the very act of
                            > > mediation" (EL50), as it were "forgetting those things which are
                            > > before". Actually the things forget themselves, since they "are not".
                            > > As you wrote here, "In the logic there are no finite things separated
                            > > from infinite ideas but only thoughts."
                            > >
                            >
                            > These quotations belong to the section on the 'Pre-Concept' of the
                            > EL-Logic and there to Kant's 'Critical Philosophy'. We have to
                            > distinguish Hegel's critique on the 'Critical Philosophy' and what he
                            > accepts as true in this Philosophy. Perhaps we can come back to this
                            > later.
                            >
                            > > But suppose now that there are in fact only thoughts, no "things" as
                            > > realism represents them. The "things" rather are nothing other than
                            > > those names Hegel discusses in EG in a synthesis of nominalism,
                            > > conceptualism and realism (Findlay). Then the dialectic is indeed a
                            > > passage "from shadows to reality" and this is how I take the Orpheus
                            > > myth, his leading Eurydice from the land of shadows (it is his
                            > > "journey", not hers, though it is ultimately himself who is buried in
                            > > the shadows and must not "look back"). So the dialectic is always per
                            > > definition in error. It is only truth as a whole, as a method even, as
                            > > reached at the end.
                            > >
                            >
                            > I do not understand why "the dialectic is always per definition in
                            > error". Of course, until the end it always produces one-sidedness with
                            > new presuppositions. However, these are necessary stages or shapes for
                            > thought seeking its truth. In the Absolute Idea Pure Knowing realizes
                            > the dialectical movement as its procedural truth and essence including
                            > the unity of form and content only in this movement and not in a unity
                            > or identity beyond this movement.
                            >
                            > Regards,
                            > Beat Greuter
                            >
                            > > I would like to connect with this Hegel's treatment of the Will under
                            > > Practical Reason (EG) as itself superseding theoretical Mind but just
                            > > therefore needing to be a Thinking Will (in Hegel's inclusive sense of
                            > > "thinking"). Implied here, I would want to make out, is an eventual
                            > > real (non-abstract, but as supplanting the abstract) fusion of the
                            > > ethical with the metaphysical (echoing Aristotle's "contemplation is
                            > > the highest praxis", but going further, probably), as canvassed more
                            > > explicitly by some later thinkers. This fusion is the ultimate ground
                            > > for why in Hegel things are never simply themselves and not another
                            > > thing, thus putting out of court the question of being right or wrong
                            > > about what they are. This is the question he explicitly rules out in
                            > > connection with religion, for example.
                            > >
                            > > How far would you agree with my implicit view, finally, that dialectic
                            > > is not abstractly or merely a process within (the) Logic but
                            > > characterising all "reality" or, more immediately, the whole passage
                            > > or development of the "Encyclopaedia", allowing for a bit of
                            > > analogical fluidity in the term? Does this though, if affirmed tend
                            > > not also at least to suggest (or confirm, rather, thinking of Hegel's
                            > > work as a whole)that we are all the time dealing with Ideas, with
                            > > Absolute Mind (and hence that there is nothing else, nor can there be,
                            > > nothing "more" real)?
                            > >
                            > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                            <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                            > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                            > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
                            > > Greuter <greuterb@...> wrote:
                            > > >
                            > > > Am 10.04.2011 12:27, John writes:
                            > > >
                            > > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                            <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                            > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                            > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                            > > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
                            > > > > Greuter <greuterb@> wrote:
                            > > > >
                            > > > > > John,
                            > > > > >
                            > > > > > How can you tell us such a thing? What has Tillich or other
                            > > theologian
                            > > > > > to do with Hegel who was a pure philosopher in the tradition of
                            > > Plato,
                            > > > > > Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant. I do not
                            > > understand how
                            > > > > > you can take something totally alien to Hegel for explaining his
                            > > > > > philosophy instead of reading what he writes himself at the
                            > > > > beginning of
                            > > > > > his Logic.
                            > > > >
                            > > > > Hegel presents his theology in the lectures on the philosophy of
                            > > > > religion and in the penultimate chapter of the Phenomenology. So
                            > I am
                            > > > > certainly not introducing something alien to Hegel. I'm simply
                            > making
                            > > > > reference to a suppressed part of Hegel's thought.
                            > > > >
                            > > >
                            > > >
                            > > > John,
                            > > >
                            > > > But we are now at the beginning of the Logic and not in the Philosophy
                            > > > of Religion. In the Addition of para 88 of the EL Hegel writes
                            > > > (translated by William Wallace):
                            > > >
                            > > > "And in the case of being, we are speaking of nothing concrete: for
                            > > > being is the utterly abstract. So far then the question regarding the
                            > > > being of God --- a being which is in itself concrete above all measure
                            > > > --- is of slight importance."
                            > > >
                            > > >
                            > > > > You write:
                            > > > >
                            > > > > >There is no dialectical relation between Being and Nothing
                            > > > > > you write and in a further post that dialectic begins only with
                            > > > > > Determinate Being. But in total reversal of what you say it is
                            > > quite
                            > > > > the
                            > > > > > beginning which shows the prototype of Hegel's dialectic: the
                            > > > > opposition
                            > > > > > of two absolutes not yet mediated which become mediated in a third
                            > > > > > absolute.
                            > > > >
                            > > > > To speak of being, nothing and becoming as three absolutes that are
                            > > > > related to each other seems quite different from what Hegel is
                            > > saying.
                            > > > > Treating each of the three as a hypostasis is, I believe, somthing
                            > > > > Alan has been arguing against (if I understand him correctly).
                            > > > >
                            > > >
                            > > >
                            > > > That's not a hypostasis but what Hegel writes at the beginning of his
                            > > > Logic (para 87, EL, translated by William Wallace):
                            > > >
                            > > >
                            > > > "But this mere Being, as it is mere abstraction, is therefore the
                            > > > absolutely negative: which, in a similarly immediate aspect, is just
                            > > > Nothing.
                            > > > 1. Hence was derived the second definition of the Absolute: the
                            > > Absolute
                            > > > is the Nought. In fact this definition is implied in saying that the
                            > > > thing-in-itself is the indeterminate, utterly without form and so
                            > > > without content --- or in saying that God is only the supreme
                            > Being and
                            > > > nothing more; for this is really declaring him to be the same
                            > > negativity
                            > > > as above. The Nothing which the Buddhists make the universal
                            > principle,
                            > > > as well as the final aim and goal of everything, is the same
                            > > abstraction.
                            > > > 2. If the opposition in thought is stated in this immediacy as Being
                            > > and
                            > > > Nothing, the shock of its nullity is too great not to stimulate the
                            > > > attempt to fix Being and secure it against the transition into
                            > Nothing.
                            > > > With this intent, reflection has recourse to the plan of discovering
                            > > > some fixed predicate for Being, to mark it off from Nothing. Thus we
                            > > > find Being identified with what persists amid all change, with matter,
                            > > > susceptible of innumerable determinations --- or even, unreflectingly,
                            > > > with a single existence, any chance object of the senses or of the
                            > > mind.
                            > > > But every additional and more concrete characterisation causes
                            > Being to
                            > > > lose that integrity and simplicity it had in the beginning. Only in,
                            > > and
                            > > > by virtue of, this mere generality is it Nothing, something
                            > > > inexpressible, whereof the distinction from Nothing is a mere
                            > intention
                            > > > or meaning."
                            > > >
                            > > >
                            > > > The opposition of the first two absolutes - Being and Nothing - is
                            > > > sublated in a third absolute - Becoming. With this the first two
                            > > > absolutes are no longer absolutes but merged in Becoming. This is what
                            > > > Hegel calls 'dialectics'. So, the opposition is sublated and each
                            > > > attempt to preserve Being from transition into Becoming means to
                            > > > identify Being with a quality trying thereby to state a difference
                            > > > between Being and Nothing what indeed would be a hypostasis, be it God
                            > > > or Trinity or whatsoever. Being has become Becoming what is equal to
                            > > say
                            > > > Being is Nothing.
                            > > >
                            > > >
                            > > > > Further down you write:
                            > > > >
                            > > > > > It is exactly the
                            > > > > > mediation of the finite and the infinite in the Concept that
                            > > Hegel want
                            > > > > > to show us in the process of the Whole Logic.
                            > > > >
                            > > > > That is exactly right. So it is necessary to have the infinite and
                            > > the
                            > > > > finite. Being-nothing-becoming is the infinite. Existence, the
                            > > > > Something, etc is the finite. The first attempt to mediate the
                            > two is
                            > > > > with true infinity. But, obviously, before they can be mediated,
                            > they
                            > > > > have, first, to be established.
                            > > > >
                            > > >
                            > > >
                            > > > No, "Existence, the Something, etc" are not the finite but concepts on
                            > > > the path of determination or mediation like Being, Nothing and
                            > Becoming
                            > > > but already more concrete. Also the concept of True Infinity collapses
                            > > > in the One since it cannot hold its other in the Logic of Being.
                            > In the
                            > > > Logic there are no finite things separated from infinite ideas but
                            > only
                            > > > thoughts.
                            > > >
                            > > >
                            > > > > You write:
                            > > > >
                            > > > > >With your disengagment of
                            > > > > > Being from Determinate Being you prevent this mediation from the
                            > > very
                            > > > > > beginning since you have the non-mediated Whole already at the
                            > > > > beginning
                            > > > > > which afterwards you call trinity.
                            > > > >
                            > > > > In Hegel's theology this is the immanent trinity. But it certainly
                            > > > > isn't the whole. Or if it is the whole, then it is, as you say, the
                            > > > > "unmediated" whole. Basically it is the universal. The final result
                            > > > > will be the mediated whole, the whole that contains the three
                            > moments
                            > > > > of universal, particular and individual. But that is a long way off.
                            > > > >
                            > > > > John
                            > > > >
                            > > >
                            > > >
                            > > > Yes, this is certainly a long way. But Hegel is no theologian, he is a
                            > > > philosopher. You have to go along pure thoughts on that long way.
                            > > >
                            > > > Regards,
                            > > > Beat Greuter
                            >
                            >

                            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]









                            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                          • stephen theron
                            Beat, I am pondering still your last to me, looking up Hegel on method(s) and comparing with other views of this. I am noticing, for example, that you say the
                            Message 13 of 28 , Apr 20, 2011
                              Beat,

                              I am pondering still your last to me, looking up Hegel on method(s) and comparing with other views of this.
                              I am noticing, for example, that you say the movement is "not linear", but comes as it were now from one direction, now from another. This recalls to me at least McTaggart's "zigzag motion", one like a sailing-ship "tacking" against the wind, he says, indirect. I am wondering how far the two views, his and yours, coincide.

                              Just one thing first, you say the aim is to "dissolve" the absolute and do more justice to "the former absolutes" though you say they have now become moments in a new mediated whole. But of course there are no former absolutes, right? And you can't dissolve the absolute, right? You only get to it at the end, though we must distinguish getting to the absolute and having names for it merely, which one replaces and replaces until one can't go further. One cartainly cannot reach a correct "definition" of the ab-solute.

                              So when Hegel says the Absolute Idea is in fact the Absolute he cannot there be simply talking about names. But this is where we get to. Now what McTaggart concludes here is that up to this point the dialectic has been in error the whole time. He stresses (SHD 1896, ch. IV) the development of the method itself towards a "linear" development (in the doctrine of the Notion progressively) and away from "in Being, an other and transition into another; in essence, showing a reflection in the opposite" (EL240). Of what I have called "linear" Hegel says, in the same place, "in notion, the distinction of individual from universality. which continues itself as such into, and is as an identity with, what is distinguished from it."

                              So there are three forms of advance which actually are one fluid development of such a progress, first from Being to an Other, then from different into different (both not vanishing but remaining in their relation) and finally passing from reflection to sheer development from within itself, the Notion (like the plant from the germ, and obviously thinking of an innate idea properly interpreted: he refers to this, Hegel does) "The notion keeps to itself"... here we have the link with Plato's Meno you have been highlighting.

                              This is the meaning, easily missed, of his reference to divine generation and creation at EL161, note, viz. that the "other which it sets up is in reality not another". The Notion, in creation, is still keeping to itself (acosmism: "all in all" as Scripture has it).

                              Here is part (only) of my difficulty with your account. Of course the aim is to reach a "just" presentation, as far as words go, of the unique absolute, not in relation to anything not itself. Hegel claims to show this; it has nothing much to do with whatever we thought or believed before. To understand how McTaggart, atheist, can view this one needs to read chapter 2 of his Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology of 1901, "Immortality". Of course I am only citing a third person as putting very much my own view (short-circuiting therefore a wish to present the latter independently).

                              As he says, "the transition is the categories", once we get to the Notion. So Life transits to Cognition and on. We do not get or go back to it in reaching the Absolute Idea. The idea of development is progressively substituted for the idea of reconciling contradictions as even difference yields to identity, the whole in each part. In a correct dialectic, which is impossible, the development woiuld be continuous.

                              Here you can see the congruence with my own linking of it to the journey of Orpheus "from shadows to reality". Of course it is Orpheus who looked back, not his wife, though they are of course the same, he is rescuing or transfiguring himself only. In the Genesis story it is rather Lot's wife who looks back (against instructions) to the vanishing and shadowy (for us) "cities of the plain", becoming in consequence a pillar of salt (whatever we are to make of that). So, baldly, truth is approached only via error. Don't look back.

                              So the Method changes inj "use" and it was never anything separate from the dialectic anyway. The Absolute Idea, of course, "does not reject all the finite categories as absolutely false, but pronounces them to be partly false and partly true, and it sums up in itself the truth of all of them." The point is, as consequence of this, that the relation the moments bear to one another in the Absolute Idea cannot be "just the same as that which they bear to one another, as finite categories in the dialectic process" (McT. 118). McTaggart suggests this latter is in fact how Hegel may have viewed it, saying that all the same, as a conclusion, it "seems open to doubt":

                              "the change of method results, as we have seen, from a gradually growing perception of the truth which is at the bottom of the whole dialectic - the unreality of any finite category as against its synthesis, since the truth and reality of each category consists only in its reference to the next, and in its passage onwards to it." (119) "If this was not true all through the dialectic, there could be no dialectic at all..." But this "real meaning and essence of the dialectic... is only explicitly perceived in the Notion, and at the End of the notion - or rather... we never attain to complete perception of it, but only approximate towards it... The very existence of the dialectic thus tends to prove that it is not in every sense objectively correct." He adds that any transtion would be impossible "unless the terms were really related according to the type belonging to the Notion. But no transition in the dialectic does take place exactly according to that type... We must therefore suppose that the dialectic does not exactly represent the truth." There must be in it "another element... due to the inadequacy of our finite thought." So "the change of method is no real change" but a making explicit.

                              McTaggart then says that we must admit that this conclusion "must be admitted, I think, to have no warrant in Hegel". Really? We "are forced, on his own premises, to dissent" from his apparently regarding "the procession of the categories... as presenting absolute truth - as fully expressing the deepest nature of pure thought". "There is no contradiction, no opposition, and consequently, no reconciliation... only development... the growth of the seed to the plant." "In the dialectic there is always opposition, and therefore always reconciliation." "We do not go straight onward, but more or less from side to side", as Beat too seems to say. It "is Hegel himself who refutes his own doctrine". "The other which the notion sets up is in reality not another" (EL161, note). This, McTaggart declares, in no way diminishes the importance of the dialectic, only showing that it "is to some degree subjective" (McT. 121), in a sense he defines. It has "cogency for us". It shows men and women "what they must think". The relations of the categories to one another, in the dialectic, "represent more or less the error through which the human mind is gradually attaining to the truth... they do not represent the relations existing in the truh itself."

                              All this shows is that "the dialectic is a process through error to truth". We knew this before. It follows from the dialectic, McTaggart says, and it is quite clear, "that if we can predicate any category whatever of a thing, we are thereby entitled to predicate the Absolute Idea of it." This leads the mind to Being, inasmuch as being is enclosed within the very act of predication as such. Cf. Augustine, non aliquo modo est, sed est, est... Thus, even to categorise anything as Nothing is already to have admitted it as a "being of reason". I realise that not everyone therefore will find this a great discovery, therefore, on McTaggart�s part. He adds though that "the Absolute Idea is simply the description in abstract terms of the human spirit, or, in other words, the human spirit is the incarnation of the Absolute Idea." The mind could, ideally, "see a nature like its own in everything". This, he thinks, is harmony, "by which alone science and religion can be ultimately justified". It is not important whether the process expresses truth fully provided that the final conclusion does so."

                              I think, Beat, from my point of view, that this takes care of your very pertinent example of a process from absolute knowing as the sublation of consciousness to "pure Being without any determinations", its apparent Other and a new beginning. I also want to go further into those methods called Analytical and Synthetic which you in fact take up and refer to here. I am not sure if they bear out your main statements about the opposite directions, one-sidedness and so on. Here too I was relieved to find McTaggart writing (well I have known it for years now) under the category of "the True" that this "distinction can have no place in the present category". Why? Because the example able to be offered of this "is not the acquisition of knowedge, but the possession of knowledge when acquired". Similarly the category of Life "does not deal with the gradual production of Life" (McTaggart, Commentary on Hegel's Logic, 1910, 281). So the principle on which these divisions were introduced "seems unjustified", has no significance with regard to the category. His error, however, if so, "does not destroy the line of his argument". We can go directly from the Idea of the True to the Idea of the Good. Hegel could have made the transition just as well as he makes it from "Synthetic Cognition".

                              This topic however I am still in the midst of studying as also your own text and how much it would be affected if these observations turn out to be valid. I just mention it for completeness sake. I hope this is interesting to people, whatever mistakes I may have made in presenting it.

                              Stephen.


                              To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                              From: greuterb@...
                              Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 20:44:16 +0200
                              Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Something from O'Regan






                              Am 11.04.2011 13:18, Stephen writes:

                              > Dear Beat,
                              >
                              > While not seeing how it would destroy John's account of the mutual
                              > implication etc. of being and nothing, for example, I find
                              > confirmation of my own interpretation in your account of how each
                              > category gives way to a more "just" absolute, i.e. they are all
                              > attempts to refer to or denominate the absolute. Hegel says as much.
                              >

                              Stephen,

                              Your interpretation seems to imply that there is a linear development of
                              the absolute, from the most abstract to the most conrete. Basically I
                              agree with this, however, the movement is not linear and its 'aim' is
                              not to reach a "just" absolute but to dissolve the absolute with the
                              result of more 'justice' for the former absolutes having become moments
                              in a new mediated whole. The mentioned movement includes two opposite
                              directions which can not be sperated formally: the analytical and the
                              synthetical direction. In the analytical direction there is a mediation
                              of the achieved (one-sided) unity or identity with its arising other or
                              opposite. The synthectical direction is a falling back into a new
                              (one-sided) identity or unity for enabling a further mediation leading
                              to a more concrete (or mediated) shape of the absolute.

                              Examples:
                              Pure Knowing at the end of the PhdG is a knowing which is fully mediated
                              by the steps of consciousness but as the sublation of consciousness with
                              its assumed externally fixed truth Pure Knowing falls back into the
                              (one-sided) identiy or abstraction of Pure Being without any
                              determination. Now, it has to actualize itself analyzing this result
                              which leads to the other abstract concept of Pure Nothing as its
                              opposite and then to the first concrete concept of their mediation in
                              Pure Becoming. Though Pure Becoming is a concrete concept mediating two
                              moments it cannot really achieve determination since the two moments are
                              totally indifferent and equivalent. So, the Concept falls into a new
                              one-sided and abstract synthesis in 'Determinate Being in General' which
                              is the unity of Being and Nothing IN THE (one-sided) DETERMINATION OF
                              BEING. The analytical step then will develop again the right of the
                              Nothing as Quality leading to the Concepts of the Something and Reality
                              where a new one-sided synthesis stops their spurious infinity in the
                              Being-for-itself (the second negation of the true infinity). The
                              analysis of this one-sidedness then brings the loss of Quality at all in
                              the 'One' and the 'Many One' as the beginning of the quantitative
                              anaylsis of the Concept which later will achieve a more developed stage
                              of Quality in the Concept of the Measure.

                              > So as you say even the True Infinite "gives way" to the One, if it
                              > comes afterwards. This is disturbing in a way, in that it would oblige
                              > one to characterise just how the final Absolute (Idea) differs from,
                              > surpasses, the True Infinite (one clue would be Hegel's pointing out
                              > that "infinite" is a negative characterisation).
                              >

                              The Concept of the Absolue Idea belongs to the Subjective Logic, the
                              Logic of the Concept, where the Concpet has become the identity of the
                              identity and non-identity but at the beginning (the Concept as such)
                              only for-itself (one-sided) as a new synthesis. So, it has to develop
                              again the lost Actuality out of itself achieving thereby Objectivity.
                              The path again is a movement of analysis and synthesis. The Absolute
                              Idea only makes fully explict this speculative method of the described
                              conjunction of the analytical and synthetical movement. This is not an
                              outer method but the liquefaction (Verfl�ssigung) of all moments
                              developed on the path of the Logic without any further presupposition
                              not yet mediated - total mediated immediacy. Hegel writes in para 186
                              and 187 of the EL, 1817 (my translation):

                              "This progress [method] is both, analytical as the immanent reflection
                              positing only this that is included in the immediate Concept, as well as
                              synthetical as far as in this the difference is not yet posited." (para
                              186, EL, 1817)
                              "This progress [method] is in the Being an Other and the transition into
                              an Other, in the Essence Seeming [Scheinen] in the Opposite (in dem
                              Entgegengesetzten), in the Concept the differentiation of the individual
                              and the universality which as such does continue into that which is
                              distinguished from itself and is as identity with it (the individual)"
                              (para 187, EL, 1817)

                              Hegel does not separate the analytical concept from the synthetical
                              concept as in the Analytical Philosophy and Formal Logic. Neverthess, we
                              have to distinguish the two moments of the specualtive method,
                              otherwise, we miss the method. With this he makes a crucial relationship
                              between Plato's 'What is'- and 'How-is'- (context-) question. According
                              to Hegel it is not possible to answer the 'What is'-question (question
                              on the essence, definition) without the 'How is'-question (the context).
                              In the speculative method, therefore, both are integrated.

                              > Now, not to leave theology out in the cold, Hegel says that "the
                              > notion... results by abolishing the intermediation, and thus is
                              > immediate"(EL51). Again, he speaks of "the genuine nature of essential
                              > thought - by which it cancels the mediation in the very act of
                              > mediation" (EL50), as it were "forgetting those things which are
                              > before". Actually the things forget themselves, since they "are not".
                              > As you wrote here, "In the logic there are no finite things separated
                              > from infinite ideas but only thoughts."
                              >

                              These quotations belong to the section on the 'Pre-Concept' of the
                              EL-Logic and there to Kant's 'Critical Philosophy'. We have to
                              distinguish Hegel's critique on the 'Critical Philosophy' and what he
                              accepts as true in this Philosophy. Perhaps we can come back to this later.

                              > But suppose now that there are in fact only thoughts, no "things" as
                              > realism represents them. The "things" rather are nothing other than
                              > those names Hegel discusses in EG in a synthesis of nominalism,
                              > conceptualism and realism (Findlay). Then the dialectic is indeed a
                              > passage "from shadows to reality" and this is how I take the Orpheus
                              > myth, his leading Eurydice from the land of shadows (it is his
                              > "journey", not hers, though it is ultimately himself who is buried in
                              > the shadows and must not "look back"). So the dialectic is always per
                              > definition in error. It is only truth as a whole, as a method even, as
                              > reached at the end.
                              >

                              I do not understand why "the dialectic is always per definition in
                              error". Of course, until the end it always produces one-sidedness with
                              new presuppositions. However, these are necessary stages or shapes for
                              thought seeking its truth. In the Absolute Idea Pure Knowing realizes
                              the dialectical movement as its procedural truth and essence including
                              the unity of form and content only in this movement and not in a unity
                              or identity beyond this movement.

                              Regards,
                              Beat Greuter

                              > I would like to connect with this Hegel's treatment of the Will under
                              > Practical Reason (EG) as itself superseding theoretical Mind but just
                              > therefore needing to be a Thinking Will (in Hegel's inclusive sense of
                              > "thinking"). Implied here, I would want to make out, is an eventual
                              > real (non-abstract, but as supplanting the abstract) fusion of the
                              > ethical with the metaphysical (echoing Aristotle's "contemplation is
                              > the highest praxis", but going further, probably), as canvassed more
                              > explicitly by some later thinkers. This fusion is the ultimate ground
                              > for why in Hegel things are never simply themselves and not another
                              > thing, thus putting out of court the question of being right or wrong
                              > about what they are. This is the question he explicitly rules out in
                              > connection with religion, for example.
                              >
                              > How far would you agree with my implicit view, finally, that dialectic
                              > is not abstractly or merely a process within (the) Logic but
                              > characterising all "reality" or, more immediately, the whole passage
                              > or development of the "Encyclopaedia", allowing for a bit of
                              > analogical fluidity in the term? Does this though, if affirmed tend
                              > not also at least to suggest (or confirm, rather, thinking of Hegel's
                              > work as a whole)that we are all the time dealing with Ideas, with
                              > Absolute Mind (and hence that there is nothing else, nor can there be,
                              > nothing "more" real)?
                              >
                              > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
                              > Greuter <greuterb@...> wrote:
                              > >
                              > > Am 10.04.2011 12:27, John writes:
                              > >
                              > > > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
                              > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
                              > > > Greuter <greuterb@> wrote:
                              > > >
                              > > > > John,
                              > > > >
                              > > > > How can you tell us such a thing? What has Tillich or other
                              > theologian
                              > > > > to do with Hegel who was a pure philosopher in the tradition of
                              > Plato,
                              > > > > Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant. I do not
                              > understand how
                              > > > > you can take something totally alien to Hegel for explaining his
                              > > > > philosophy instead of reading what he writes himself at the
                              > > > beginning of
                              > > > > his Logic.
                              > > >
                              > > > Hegel presents his theology in the lectures on the philosophy of
                              > > > religion and in the penultimate chapter of the Phenomenology. So I am
                              > > > certainly not introducing something alien to Hegel. I'm simply making
                              > > > reference to a suppressed part of Hegel's thought.
                              > > >
                              > >
                              > >
                              > > John,
                              > >
                              > > But we are now at the beginning of the Logic and not in the Philosophy
                              > > of Religion. In the Addition of para 88 of the EL Hegel writes
                              > > (translated by William Wallace):
                              > >
                              > > "And in the case of being, we are speaking of nothing concrete: for
                              > > being is the utterly abstract. So far then the question regarding the
                              > > being of God --- a being which is in itself concrete above all measure
                              > > --- is of slight importance."
                              > >
                              > >
                              > > > You write:
                              > > >
                              > > > >There is no dialectical relation between Being and Nothing
                              > > > > you write and in a further post that dialectic begins only with
                              > > > > Determinate Being. But in total reversal of what you say it is
                              > quite
                              > > > the
                              > > > > beginning which shows the prototype of Hegel's dialectic: the
                              > > > opposition
                              > > > > of two absolutes not yet mediated which become mediated in a third
                              > > > > absolute.
                              > > >
                              > > > To speak of being, nothing and becoming as three absolutes that are
                              > > > related to each other seems quite different from what Hegel is
                              > saying.
                              > > > Treating each of the three as a hypostasis is, I believe, somthing
                              > > > Alan has been arguing against (if I understand him correctly).
                              > > >
                              > >
                              > >
                              > > That's not a hypostasis but what Hegel writes at the beginning of his
                              > > Logic (para 87, EL, translated by William Wallace):
                              > >
                              > >
                              > > "But this mere Being, as it is mere abstraction, is therefore the
                              > > absolutely negative: which, in a similarly immediate aspect, is just
                              > > Nothing.
                              > > 1. Hence was derived the second definition of the Absolute: the
                              > Absolute
                              > > is the Nought. In fact this definition is implied in saying that the
                              > > thing-in-itself is the indeterminate, utterly without form and so
                              > > without content --- or in saying that God is only the supreme Being and
                              > > nothing more; for this is really declaring him to be the same
                              > negativity
                              > > as above. The Nothing which the Buddhists make the universal principle,
                              > > as well as the final aim and goal of everything, is the same
                              > abstraction.
                              > > 2. If the opposition in thought is stated in this immediacy as Being
                              > and
                              > > Nothing, the shock of its nullity is too great not to stimulate the
                              > > attempt to fix Being and secure it against the transition into Nothing.
                              > > With this intent, reflection has recourse to the plan of discovering
                              > > some fixed predicate for Being, to mark it off from Nothing. Thus we
                              > > find Being identified with what persists amid all change, with matter,
                              > > susceptible of innumerable determinations --- or even, unreflectingly,
                              > > with a single existence, any chance object of the senses or of the
                              > mind.
                              > > But every additional and more concrete characterisation causes Being to
                              > > lose that integrity and simplicity it had in the beginning. Only in,
                              > and
                              > > by virtue of, this mere generality is it Nothing, something
                              > > inexpressible, whereof the distinction from Nothing is a mere intention
                              > > or meaning."
                              > >
                              > >
                              > > The opposition of the first two absolutes - Being and Nothing - is
                              > > sublated in a third absolute - Becoming. With this the first two
                              > > absolutes are no longer absolutes but merged in Becoming. This is what
                              > > Hegel calls 'dialectics'. So, the opposition is sublated and each
                              > > attempt to preserve Being from transition into Becoming means to
                              > > identify Being with a quality trying thereby to state a difference
                              > > between Being and Nothing what indeed would be a hypostasis, be it God
                              > > or Trinity or whatsoever. Being has become Becoming what is equal to
                              > say
                              > > Being is Nothing.
                              > >
                              > >
                              > > > Further down you write:
                              > > >
                              > > > > It is exactly the
                              > > > > mediation of the finite and the infinite in the Concept that
                              > Hegel want
                              > > > > to show us in the process of the Whole Logic.
                              > > >
                              > > > That is exactly right. So it is necessary to have the infinite and
                              > the
                              > > > finite. Being-nothing-becoming is the infinite. Existence, the
                              > > > Something, etc is the finite. The first attempt to mediate the two is
                              > > > with true infinity. But, obviously, before they can be mediated, they
                              > > > have, first, to be established.
                              > > >
                              > >
                              > >
                              > > No, "Existence, the Something, etc" are not the finite but concepts on
                              > > the path of determination or mediation like Being, Nothing and Becoming
                              > > but already more concrete. Also the concept of True Infinity collapses
                              > > in the One since it cannot hold its other in the Logic of Being. In the
                              > > Logic there are no finite things separated from infinite ideas but only
                              > > thoughts.
                              > >
                              > >
                              > > > You write:
                              > > >
                              > > > >With your disengagment of
                              > > > > Being from Determinate Being you prevent this mediation from the
                              > very
                              > > > > beginning since you have the non-mediated Whole already at the
                              > > > beginning
                              > > > > which afterwards you call trinity.
                              > > >
                              > > > In Hegel's theology this is the immanent trinity. But it certainly
                              > > > isn't the whole. Or if it is the whole, then it is, as you say, the
                              > > > "unmediated" whole. Basically it is the universal. The final result
                              > > > will be the mediated whole, the whole that contains the three moments
                              > > > of universal, particular and individual. But that is a long way off.
                              > > >
                              > > > John
                              > > >
                              > >
                              > >
                              > > Yes, this is certainly a long way. But Hegel is no theologian, he is a
                              > > philosopher. You have to go along pure thoughts on that long way.
                              > >
                              > > Regards,
                              > > Beat Greuter
                              >
                              >

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