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Re: [hegel] Chapter 1 Being : B. Nothing

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  • Beat Greuter
    ... Wil, The problem is that what the text suggests to us is not true. The text suggests that there is no reflection in the beginning, that is, no reflection
    Message 1 of 8 , Mar 11, 2011
      Am 10.03.2011 15:11, Wil writes:
      >
      > Beat,
      >
      > Yes, that is clearly what the text suggests to me, as well.
      >
      > Wil
      >


      Wil,

      The problem is that what the text suggests to us is not true. The text
      suggests that there is no reflection in the beginning, that is, no
      reflection in the positing of pure being and pure nothing: the first two
      concepts are described as non-reflective. However, this is impossible as
      the vast Hegel reception and Hegel's procedure itself show clearly. The
      German Hegel scholar Andreas Arndt therefore writes in his reader on
      "Hegels Seinslogik": "....... Hegel has failed to embed the starting
      reflection into the beginning of the Logic itself though he has to
      presuppose the fact of reflection for being able to transfer the
      beginning into the reflection of a reflection which mediates this fact.
      In this respect the beginning itself undermines the complexity of the
      reflection, a complexity which first renders the beginning. In the
      non-reflective immediacy this complexity of the reflection is simply
      forgotten and erased." ("Hegels Seinslogik, Interpretationen und
      Perspektiven", edited by Andreas Arndt and Christian Iber, "Die
      anfangende Reflexion .....", p. 139; my translation).

      Is this true? In my opinion Arndt claims something that Hegel cannot
      honour at the beginning since he beginns his Logic with the Logic of
      Being. With this he makes the presupposition of an immediate true being
      for thought in its activity of determination. The category of reflection
      itself cannot yet be thematized in this immediacy of being for thought.
      This only happens in the second part of the Objective Logic, that is, in
      the Logic of the Essence. So, Hegel ought to have begun with the Logic
      of the Essence? No and yes: no, since then the immediacy of the truth of
      thought would have been abandoned; yes, since being also is mediated by
      reflection and with this is posited between the Logic of the Essence and
      the Logic of the Concept. But the latter can only happen when the
      necessary steps of thought through being - essence - concept have been
      done - steps which indicate the circular path of thought. So, we are in
      a real dilemma and the only blame we could make on Hegel is that he has
      hardly clarified this dilemma in the preliminary passages of his Logic
      as he did for the Phenomenology.

      Regards,
      Beat Greuter


      > -----Original Message-----
      > From: Beat Greuter <greuterb@... <mailto:greuterb%40bluewin.ch>>
      > To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
      > Sent: Thu, Mar 10, 2011 3:48 am
      > Subject: Re: [hegel] Chapter 1 Being : B. Nothing
      >
      > Randall,
      >
      > Hegel writes at the end of A. Being: "The Being as the indeterminate
      > immediate is indeed NOTHING and no more and no less than Nothing". And
      > then he posits B. Nothing which is the same empty intuiting and thinking
      > as pure being - as you indicate. So, pure nothing follows from pure
      > being not because of a causal factor but because it expresses this same
      > total emptiness, this same indeterminate immediate as pure being. It
      > does this as its total other, its total opposite which, however, as mere
      > opposite also has not yet any difference but only sameness calling now
      > for difference which it is at the beginning only in-itself within pure
      > being and now has become an own concept - pure nothing - for positing
      > (making explicit) what being is. That is, pure nothing calls for
      > mediation between the two (limit-concept of determination) which then
      > can be first actualized in pure becoming but still without determination
      > because of the vanishing character of the two - in themselves not yet
      > mediated - moments mediated and mediating in pure becoming (C.
      > Becoming). Hegel adds in B. Nothing:
      >
      > "....... - In so far as intuiting or thinking can be mentioned here, it
      > counts as a distinction whether something or nothing is intuited or
      > thought. To intuit or think nothing has, therefore, a meaning; both are
      > distinguished and thus nothing IS (exists) in our intuiting or thinking;
      > or rather it is empty intuition and thought itself, and the same empty
      > intuition or thought as pure being. -......."
      >
      > I think that this also makes clear that pure nothing cannot be the
      > starting concept since it calls for mediation with what first is posited
      > and from which it comes from. Pure being cannot come from pure nothing
      > and call for mediation though of course somebody could say "creatio ex
      > nihilo". But as this Hegel's beginning of the Logic canNOT be taken
      > since it would imply an immediate 'creatio' of something determinate,
      > instead, the beginning is a limit-concept of determination.
      >
      > Regards,
      > Beat Greuter
      >


      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • eupraxis@aol.com
      Beat, I have to first of all say my general take on these very matters is not too unlike Houlgate s, who proffers less a transcendental method of
      Message 2 of 8 , Mar 11, 2011
        Beat,

        I have to first of all say my general take on these very matters is not too unlike Houlgate's, who proffers less a "transcendental" method of understanding the opening chapters than an 'immanentist' one. We are, that is, not concerned with the, as it were, transcendental conditions for the possibility of understand Being, but rather of thinking what we in fact use up, so to speak, in the concept along (what will eventually appear as) its notional transformations to Becoming.

        Wil


        -----Original Message-----
        From: Beat Greuter <greuterb@...>
        To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
        Sent: Fri, Mar 11, 2011 2:55 pm
        Subject: Re: [hegel] Chapter 1 Being : B. Nothing





        Am 10.03.2011 15:11, Wil writes:
        >
        > Beat,
        >
        > Yes, that is clearly what the text suggests to me, as well.
        >
        > Wil
        >

        Wil,

        The problem is that what the text suggests to us is not true. The text
        suggests that there is no reflection in the beginning, that is, no
        reflection in the positing of pure being and pure nothing: the first two
        concepts are described as non-reflective. However, this is impossible as
        the vast Hegel reception and Hegel's procedure itself show clearly. The
        German Hegel scholar Andreas Arndt therefore writes in his reader on
        "Hegels Seinslogik": "....... Hegel has failed to embed the starting
        reflection into the beginning of the Logic itself though he has to
        presuppose the fact of reflection for being able to transfer the
        beginning into the reflection of a reflection which mediates this fact.
        In this respect the beginning itself undermines the complexity of the
        reflection, a complexity which first renders the beginning. In the
        non-reflective immediacy this complexity of the reflection is simply
        forgotten and erased." ("Hegels Seinslogik, Interpretationen und
        Perspektiven", edited by Andreas Arndt and Christian Iber, "Die
        anfangende Reflexion .....", p. 139; my translation).

        Is this true? In my opinion Arndt claims something that Hegel cannot
        honour at the beginning since he beginns his Logic with the Logic of
        Being. With this he makes the presupposition of an immediate true being
        for thought in its activity of determination. The category of reflection
        itself cannot yet be thematized in this immediacy of being for thought.
        This only happens in the second part of the Objective Logic, that is, in
        the Logic of the Essence. So, Hegel ought to have begun with the Logic
        of the Essence? No and yes: no, since then the immediacy of the truth of
        thought would have been abandoned; yes, since being also is mediated by
        reflection and with this is posited between the Logic of the Essence and
        the Logic of the Concept. But the latter can only happen when the
        necessary steps of thought through being - essence - concept have been
        done - steps which indicate the circular path of thought. So, we are in
        a real dilemma and the only blame we could make on Hegel is that he has
        hardly clarified this dilemma in the preliminary passages of his Logic
        as he did for the Phenomenology.

        Regards,
        Beat Greuter

        > -----Original Message-----
        > From: Beat Greuter <greuterb@... <mailto:greuterb%40bluewin.ch>>;
        > To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>;
        > Sent: Thu, Mar 10, 2011 3:48 am
        > Subject: Re: [hegel] Chapter 1 Being : B. Nothing
        >
        > Randall,
        >
        > Hegel writes at the end of A. Being: "The Being as the indeterminate
        > immediate is indeed NOTHING and no more and no less than Nothing". And
        > then he posits B. Nothing which is the same empty intuiting and thinking
        > as pure being - as you indicate. So, pure nothing follows from pure
        > being not because of a causal factor but because it expresses this same
        > total emptiness, this same indeterminate immediate as pure being. It
        > does this as its total other, its total opposite which, however, as mere
        > opposite also has not yet any difference but only sameness calling now
        > for difference which it is at the beginning only in-itself within pure
        > being and now has become an own concept - pure nothing - for positing
        > (making explicit) what being is. That is, pure nothing calls for
        > mediation between the two (limit-concept of determination) which then
        > can be first actualized in pure becoming but still without determination
        > because of the vanishing character of the two - in themselves not yet
        > mediated - moments mediated and mediating in pure becoming (C.
        > Becoming). Hegel adds in B. Nothing:
        >
        > "....... - In so far as intuiting or thinking can be mentioned here, it
        > counts as a distinction whether something or nothing is intuited or
        > thought. To intuit or think nothing has, therefore, a meaning; both are
        > distinguished and thus nothing IS (exists) in our intuiting or thinking;
        > or rather it is empty intuition and thought itself, and the same empty
        > intuition or thought as pure being. -......."
        >
        > I think that this also makes clear that pure nothing cannot be the
        > starting concept since it calls for mediation with what first is posited
        > and from which it comes from. Pure being cannot come from pure nothing
        > and call for mediation though of course somebody could say "creatio ex
        > nihilo". But as this Hegel's beginning of the Logic canNOT be taken
        > since it would imply an immediate 'creatio' of something determinate,
        > instead, the beginning is a limit-concept of determination.
        >
        > Regards,
        > Beat Greuter
        >

        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]









        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      • TheJack
        [Randall] ... [Alan] ... There is no justification Alan. I am providing a commentary on the Science of Logic. My commentary is in no way designed to
        Message 3 of 8 , Apr 1, 2011
          [Randall]

          >> When examining the above section on nothing we should
          >> first take note of its striking similarity to the
          >> section on being:

          >> - "Nothing, pure nothing: it is simply equality with
          >> itself"

          >> [compare]

          >> "Being, pure being,...is equal only to itself".

          >> - "Nothing, pure nothing ....is complete emptiness,
          >> absence of all determination and content."

          >> [compare]

          >> "Being, pure being, ...is pure indeterminateness
          >> and emptiness."

          >> - "Nothing, pure nothing...is undifferentiatedness
          >> in itself"

          >> [compare]

          >> "Being, pure being...has no diversity within itself"

          >> - "In so far as intuiting or thinking can be mentioned
          >> here,...nothing is (exists) in our thinking; or
          >> rather it is empty intuition and thought itself."

          >> [compare]

          >> "if one can speak here of intuiting, there is nothing
          >> to be intuited in being; or, it is only this pure
          >> intuiting itself."


          >> So, after being and nothing are spoken of in the
          >> almost identical terms listed above, Hegel then
          >> claims:

          >> - "To intuit or think nothing...is the same empty
          >> intuition or thought as pure being."

          >> So, Hegel has suggested above that "Nothing is the
          >> same empty thought as being", but how are they
          >> equatable?

          >> Hegel provides us with a direct answer:

          >> - "Nothing is, therefore, the same determination,
          >> or rather absence of determination, and thus
          >> altogether the same as, pure being.

          >> Being and nothing are only equatable in the sense that
          >> they are equally devoid of determinacy (or they are
          >> equally indeterminate).

          >> So, even though Hegel describes Being and Nothing
          >> similarly, they are both in no way related to anything,
          >> nor are they related to any determinating factors, so
          >> they are not equatible in terms of similar qualities
          >> they share.

          >> Being and nothing are not even in relation to each
          >> other, because there's nothing that can connect them,
          >> instead it's their sheer absence of determinacy that
          >> makes each immediately the other.


          [Alan]

          > Question #1: What justifies comparison as a method of inquiry?

          There is no justification Alan. I am providing a commentary on the Science of Logic. My commentary is in no way designed to facilitate the movement of the dialectical advance of the Logic itself.

          Instead, my reflections (see Hegel's use of the term on SL p. 110) are meant to help provide access to the text. It's the unfolding of the text itself where Hegel attempts to justify the method of advance of the Science of Logic.

          [Alan]

          > Question #2: Who is doing this comparing? If we are doing
          > this comparing then how does what we know by means of
          > comparison relate to what is true about nothing?


          I am doing the comparing Alan. There isn't any "we" here (except you and Oliver). At this point everybody on the list is advancing their own personal reading of the SL.

          By juxtaposing the "phrases that Hegel uses to describe the indeterminacy of being", side by side with the almost identical "phrases that Hegel uses to describe the indeterminacy of nothing", I am merely pointing to the fact that Hegel uses identical terminology to describe the indeterminacy of being and nothing.

          What we know about "what is true about nothing" from the comparison of terminology used to describe being and nothing, is simply "what Hegel tells us" is true about nothing.

          And what does he tell us? He tells us that being and nothing are equally indeterminate.

          Having said that, there *is* a major difference with the above comparative method that I have used, and the way that the text actually unfolds that could be potentially deceptive if not addressed.

          What am I doing when I compare being and nothing? I am holding them side by side in what could be said to be a persisting backdrop (spatial metaphor).

          But when we arrive to becoming, it will be clear that this is not how they actually emerge in the development of the SL.

          Instead, when being vanishes, nothing issues forth, and when nothing vanishes being issues forth.

          When I compare them I have intervened between them, and have acted as a medium in which they are held together. But this is not part of the unfolding of the Logic, but only my reflection on what has already occurred.

          And what has actually occurred so far?:

          The indeterminacy of pure Being is immediately the equally indeterminate nothing. And yet the indeterminate nothing never ceases to be, so it is immediately the equally indeterminate being.

          That's it. That's what has happend so far.

          Having said that, I want to stop to examine the two statements above:

          - "Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing"

          The above proposition that Being and Nothing are the same expresses the identity of the terms.

          However, the statement equally contains being and nothing as distinguished. So, although the proposition explicitly affirms their identity it also exhibits their difference.

          And because some would like to impregnate being and nothing with a meaning that is beyond the scope of Hegel's use of the terms, I want to point out here that what I am talking about are two equally indeterminate terms that are explicitly identified, but are at the same time implicitly expressed as distinguished.

          The proposition above seems to just point out thier identity, but Hegel points out in REMARK 2, that their is something inherently limited about employing judgements here.

          But a judgement of this nature is precisely what is given at the conclusion of both sections A. BEING, and B. NOTHING.

          With the proposition "being is nothing", you have two terms whose unity is explicitly expressed, but the judgement also implicitly affirms the distinctness of the two terms. Yet, the judgement fails to explicitly express their distinctness.

          The judgement can of course correct this deficiency, if for example the proposition is stated in a negative judgement (e.g. Being is not Nothing).

          But then Hegel points out that this again would leave us only with one side, where in truth both an identity and difference apply (i.e. Being is nothing, and yet they are also distinct).

          So, how is it possible that the identity and difference of being and nothing can be expressed? Well, in remark 2, Hegel explicitly rules out the possibility of judgements achieving this task.

          With this in mind I issued my challenge to Oliver "to go ahead and make my day":

          And in response to this task you write in your last post:

          [Alan]

          > Hegel does not think like the common understanding. He does
          > not mean first to show that being and nothing are identical
          > and then show that they are also distinct. Instead, they are
          > identical in that they are in truth the same movement through
          > differences, differences that are only meant by the
          > understanding but never really thinkable as self-standing
          > thoughts. It is the coming to be and ceasing to be as the
          > truths of the meant thoughts of being and nothing that persist
          > as identities that move through differences. Only if we bring
          > the dead back to life can we make your day.

          Well, for the most part I don't get what you are saying and you have provided no textual support for what you have said.

          But in particular you write:

          "He does not mean first to show that being and nothing are identical and then show that they are also distinct"

          On the contrary, this is *exactly* what he does, in sections A. Being, and B. Nothing, he only expresses the identity of being and nothing and leaves thier distinction implict.

          It is only in section C. BECOMING where the distinction between being and nothing is explictly expressed (i.e. as an absolute distinction)

          I will discuss in my commentary on section C. BECOMING, how contrary to propositional judgements, becoming is capable of expressing the identity and difference of being and nothing, in my next post.

          So to recap:

          With the emergence of nothing, we have a second term that refers to the "genesis" of an equally immediate indeterminacy, and in virtue of its pure indeterminacy, it is indistinguishable from being, but at the same time as an emergent second category, nothing is also distinct. But then this equally indeterminate second category, in virtue of its indeterminacy, is immediately being.

          Randall
        • Alan Ponikvar
          Hi Randall, This time I can be reasonably brief. 1. If a commentary uses a tool of the understanding ­ comparison ­ and the dialectical advance is
          Message 4 of 8 , Apr 1, 2011
            Hi Randall,

            This time I can be reasonably brief.

            1. If a commentary uses a tool of the understanding ­ comparison ­ and the
            dialectical advance is speculative, and if the understanding and speculative
            thinking are distinct, then what makes you think a comparison can be
            anything but a misleading commentary? Why not offer a speculatively guided
            commentary instead? Or do you believe that is not possible?
            2. You still have not addressed why Hegel can turn a predicate into a
            predicate nominative. How do we move from 'being, without determination' or
            'being is empty' to 'being is nothing'? How do we move from a description of
            being to an identity statement?
            3. I give a brief description of the infinite movement which replaces the
            immediacy of being with the mediated immediacy, coming to be, and the
            immediacy of nothing with the mediate immediacy, ceasing to be as does
            Hegel.
            > 1. The reason why these mediated thoughts replace being and nothing is that
            > being and nothing are never actually thinkable. They vanish before they can be
            > thought.
            > 2. I am not surprised that you do not know what I am talking about as I am
            > referencing the self-reflexivity of thought characteristic of the speculative
            > absolute, something you refuse to reference or even acknowledge is relevant.
            4. What Hegel does in the brief paragraphs on being and nothing is speak
            from the point of view of the understanding as if these are thought items
            that we can actually think.
            > 1. What is missing is what is provided in the following sections as an account
            > that references explicitly the movement of thought that is the truth of the
            > indeterminate immediate. As I have mentioned, for the understanding being and
            > nothing seem to be no more than two names for one thought.
            > 2. Thought is only divided ­ allowing for two thoughts - when we attend not
            > merely to the thought but to the thinking of the thought as is the case when
            > the thinking of the indeterminate immediate is treated as an absolute thought
            > in keeping with how it is properly given at the beginning as a presupposition
            > provided from the Phenomenology. Hegel has no trouble referring to the
            > presuppositional role of the Phenomenology.
            > 3. So rather than trying to think how a presupposition can provide an
            > indeterminate immediate as the first thought you offer your nonspeculative
            > procedure of skeptically motivated abstraction which gives us nothing that
            > would allow us to divide the indeterminate immediate.
            > 4. The skeptic who would be with you as you abstract your way to pure being
            > but would part ways over what it means to say we have nothing to think. You
            > want to say we can think this nothing. The skeptic would object and call this
            > a sophism. For the skeptic, if there is nothing to think then we are done
            > thinking.
            Regards, Alan

            From: TheJack <thejackjam@...>
            Reply-To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
            Date: Sat, 02 Apr 2011 00:00:30 -0000
            To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
            Subject: [hegel] Re: Chapter 1 Being : B. Nothing






            [Randall]

            >> When examining the above section on nothing we should
            >> first take note of its striking similarity to the
            >> section on being:

            >> - "Nothing, pure nothing: it is simply equality with
            >> itself"

            >> [compare]

            >> "Being, pure being,...is equal only to itself".

            >> - "Nothing, pure nothing ....is complete emptiness,
            >> absence of all determination and content."

            >> [compare]

            >> "Being, pure being, ...is pure indeterminateness
            >> and emptiness."

            >> - "Nothing, pure nothing...is undifferentiatedness
            >> in itself"

            >> [compare]

            >> "Being, pure being...has no diversity within itself"

            >> - "In so far as intuiting or thinking can be mentioned
            >> here,...nothing is (exists) in our thinking; or
            >> rather it is empty intuition and thought itself."

            >> [compare]

            >> "if one can speak here of intuiting, there is nothing
            >> to be intuited in being; or, it is only this pure
            >> intuiting itself."


            >> So, after being and nothing are spoken of in the
            >> almost identical terms listed above, Hegel then
            >> claims:

            >> - "To intuit or think nothing...is the same empty
            >> intuition or thought as pure being."

            >> So, Hegel has suggested above that "Nothing is the
            >> same empty thought as being", but how are they
            >> equatable?

            >> Hegel provides us with a direct answer:

            >> - "Nothing is, therefore, the same determination,
            >> or rather absence of determination, and thus
            >> altogether the same as, pure being.

            >> Being and nothing are only equatable in the sense that
            >> they are equally devoid of determinacy (or they are
            >> equally indeterminate).

            >> So, even though Hegel describes Being and Nothing
            >> similarly, they are both in no way related to anything,
            >> nor are they related to any determinating factors, so
            >> they are not equatible in terms of similar qualities
            >> they share.

            >> Being and nothing are not even in relation to each
            >> other, because there's nothing that can connect them,
            >> instead it's their sheer absence of determinacy that
            >> makes each immediately the other.

            [Alan]

            > Question #1: What justifies comparison as a method of inquiry?

            There is no justification Alan. I am providing a commentary on the Science
            of Logic. My commentary is in no way designed to facilitate the movement of
            the dialectical advance of the Logic itself.

            Instead, my reflections (see Hegel's use of the term on SL p. 110) are meant
            to help provide access to the text. It's the unfolding of the text itself
            where Hegel attempts to justify the method of advance of the Science of
            Logic.

            [Alan]

            > Question #2: Who is doing this comparing? If we are doing
            > this comparing then how does what we know by means of
            > comparison relate to what is true about nothing?

            I am doing the comparing Alan. There isn't any "we" here (except you and
            Oliver). At this point everybody on the list is advancing their own personal
            reading of the SL.

            By juxtaposing the "phrases that Hegel uses to describe the indeterminacy of
            being", side by side with the almost identical "phrases that Hegel uses to
            describe the indeterminacy of nothing", I am merely pointing to the fact
            that Hegel uses identical terminology to describe the indeterminacy of being
            and nothing.

            What we know about "what is true about nothing" from the comparison of
            terminology used to describe being and nothing, is simply "what Hegel tells
            us" is true about nothing.

            And what does he tell us? He tells us that being and nothing are equally
            indeterminate.

            Having said that, there *is* a major difference with the above comparative
            method that I have used, and the way that the text actually unfolds that
            could be potentially deceptive if not addressed.

            What am I doing when I compare being and nothing? I am holding them side by
            side in what could be said to be a persisting backdrop (spatial metaphor).

            But when we arrive to becoming, it will be clear that this is not how they
            actually emerge in the development of the SL.

            Instead, when being vanishes, nothing issues forth, and when nothing
            vanishes being issues forth.

            When I compare them I have intervened between them, and have acted as a
            medium in which they are held together. But this is not part of the
            unfolding of the Logic, but only my reflection on what has already occurred.

            And what has actually occurred so far?:

            The indeterminacy of pure Being is immediately the equally indeterminate
            nothing. And yet the indeterminate nothing never ceases to be, so it is
            immediately the equally indeterminate being.

            That's it. That's what has happend so far.

            Having said that, I want to stop to examine the two statements above:

            - "Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing"

            The above proposition that Being and Nothing are the same expresses the
            identity of the terms.

            However, the statement equally contains being and nothing as distinguished.
            So, although the proposition explicitly affirms their identity it also
            exhibits their difference.

            And because some would like to impregnate being and nothing with a meaning
            that is beyond the scope of Hegel's use of the terms, I want to point out
            here that what I am talking about are two equally indeterminate terms that
            are explicitly identified, but are at the same time implicitly expressed as
            distinguished.

            The proposition above seems to just point out thier identity, but Hegel
            points out in REMARK 2, that their is something inherently limited about
            employing judgements here.

            But a judgement of this nature is precisely what is given at the conclusion
            of both sections A. BEING, and B. NOTHING.

            With the proposition "being is nothing", you have two terms whose unity is
            explicitly expressed, but the judgement also implicitly affirms the
            distinctness of the two terms. Yet, the judgement fails to explicitly
            express their distinctness.

            The judgement can of course correct this deficiency, if for example the
            proposition is stated in a negative judgement (e.g. Being is not Nothing).

            But then Hegel points out that this again would leave us only with one side,
            where in truth both an identity and difference apply (i.e. Being is nothing,
            and yet they are also distinct).

            So, how is it possible that the identity and difference of being and nothing
            can be expressed? Well, in remark 2, Hegel explicitly rules out the
            possibility of judgements achieving this task.

            With this in mind I issued my challenge to Oliver "to go ahead and make my
            day":

            And in response to this task you write in your last post:

            [Alan]

            > Hegel does not think like the common understanding. He does
            > not mean first to show that being and nothing are identical
            > and then show that they are also distinct. Instead, they are
            > identical in that they are in truth the same movement through
            > differences, differences that are only meant by the
            > understanding but never really thinkable as self-standing
            > thoughts. It is the coming to be and ceasing to be as the
            > truths of the meant thoughts of being and nothing that persist
            > as identities that move through differences. Only if we bring
            > the dead back to life can we make your day.

            Well, for the most part I don't get what you are saying and you have
            provided no textual support for what you have said.

            But in particular you write:

            "He does not mean first to show that being and nothing are identical and
            then show that they are also distinct"

            On the contrary, this is *exactly* what he does, in sections A. Being, and
            B. Nothing, he only expresses the identity of being and nothing and leaves
            thier distinction implict.

            It is only in section C. BECOMING where the distinction between being and
            nothing is explictly expressed (i.e. as an absolute distinction)

            I will discuss in my commentary on section C. BECOMING, how contrary to
            propositional judgements, becoming is capable of expressing the identity and
            difference of being and nothing, in my next post.

            So to recap:

            With the emergence of nothing, we have a second term that refers to the
            "genesis" of an equally immediate indeterminacy, and in virtue of its pure
            indeterminacy, it is indistinguishable from being, but at the same time as
            an emergent second category, nothing is also distinct. But then this equally
            indeterminate second category, in virtue of its indeterminacy, is
            immediately being.

            Randall









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