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AW: [hegel] Brief Synopsis of PhdG Preface 1-22

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  • greuterb@bluewin.ch
    ... Von: robertfanelli2001@yahoo.com Datum: 29.12.2010 01:26 An: Betreff: [hegel] Brief Synopsis of PhdG Preface 1-22 Preface
    Message 1 of 3 , Dec 31, 2010
      ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
      Von: robertfanelli2001@...
      Datum: 29.12.2010 01:26
      An: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>

      Betreff: [hegel] Brief Synopsis of PhdG Preface 1-22

      Preface
      (Highlights) First 22 Paragraphs

      #1
      Individual concepts
      of reality as structured by consciousness must lead to universal concepts of this reality, and thus enhance the reality
      of the universe.

      #2
      Hegel offers the `progressive evolution of truth' in his diversity in a philosophical system.
      The progression of evolutionary truths are not just contradictions, but must contain a ceaseless activity of truth with
      organic unity.

      #3
      We must continue the process of philosophical thinking. Philosophical systems die on the vine. We
      need a complete process to arrive at any substantial conclusion.

      #4
      We are bombarded with the individual moments of
      `actual life,' and it is these moments which give us meaningful experience. Hegel seeks a point of movement with these
      determinate thoughts of our individual experiences. Hegel seeks cognition of `actual life.'

      #5
      We have to raise
      philosophy to the level of a scientific system and this is the systematic development of truth. The method in which we
      know things must become a science. . Only within the development of this System can we grasp `the true shape of
      truth.'

      #6
      `…truth finds the means or instrument of its existence in notions' means that these conceptually
      developed notions are cognitive forms of truth; that is, they are logical and empirical developing forms of truth.
      This method of seeking truth differs from the presuppositions of Hegel's day and the dogmas of the day.

      #7
      We need
      therefore decidedly to be rejuvenated. Fullness of life, the immediacy of belief, and the satisfaction and security
      of a reconciled reality both within and without are all now in the tail end of Aufklärung (Enlightenment) and are
      simply seeking rejuvenation, a rebirth, and even a feeling good effect.

      #8
      Experience and empirical knowledge have
      overtaken all other ideology and hence the search for more meaningful beliefs….Hegel, of course will offer his PhdG.
      Now (in this early nineteenth century) the natural sciences have burst on to the scene and the sensate or power of
      empiricism have taken hold.

      #9
      Philosophy is a dynamic living spirit. This human spirit must look to Hegel's kind of
      science and overcome simple edification. Hegel's theme is the avoidance of mere edification, that is, simple
      instruction, improvement, even moral improvement.

      #10
      The paragraph is a proclamation or invective against the
      romanticism and intuitiveness of the day. The contentment and edification which Hegel refers to is that of these anti-
      scientific texts overflowing the intellectual communities of his day.

      #11
      We have the spirit of the times, the
      Aufklärung (Enlightenment), along with the old order of things, including perhaps some of the religious doctrines of
      the past. There are changes in the air.

      #12
      Hegel's thesis includes the idea that science is the `crowning' part of
      the `spiritual world;' and the `spiritual world' includes, as the world of Spirit (Geist) , an entire historical and
      educational process subject to `revolutions in manifold forms.'

      #13
      Hegel makes no bones about pure rational thought
      being the king. Consciousness needs the discipline of the negative and of precise thinking. There is much information
      from the past which consciousness must sift through and make exoteric not esoteric.

      #14
      Hegel speaks of a type of
      Gordian Knot, (`the critical knot which scientific culture at present struggles to loosen, and about which so far it is
      not very clear'). It is an intractable problem to be solved by a bold stroke. It is a `parade' of sorts between two
      factions: one side shows the strength of the empirical `wealth of its material,' and the other side `intuitive
      rationality' with its corresponding divinity.

      #15
      We need the full `color' representation of reality. Fichte and
      Schelling merely offer `such a repetition of the same formula,' and to boot, they prove nothing. It is old hat and
      simply an empty absolute, so to speak. It is `the shapeless repetition of one and the same idea,' over and over
      again. Hegel seeks the developing concrete absolute Idea (the full development of dialectic thinking).

      #16
      Absolute
      knowing is the encompassing of the reality of the world by means of dialectic thinking with the developing reality of
      the mind in the process. In the correspondence of the reality of the other (the world) with the reality of
      consciousness an absolute sense of reality has been manifested, and thus this is the way in which the concept of God is
      understood; for God is the ultimate reality for Hegel. The correspondence of the mind's thoughts with the objects of
      the world is actualized by the dialectic process itself.

      #17
      We can not get to the truth of things unless Substance
      and Subject are conjoined, that is, put together, for a common purpose, perhaps more. This concrete substantiality
      requires both a universal and individual perspective, again, both conjoined.

      #18 The subject is a basis for
      actuality. It is substance in the sense that it seeks to be independent of all the structures developed by the sensate
      mind. When we speak of substance and subject in the same breath, Hegel means we have grasped Spirit itself (Geist).


      #19
      The historical search for knowledge of the divine and divine intelligence is discussed here. The emphasis is on
      knowledge in the Hegelian sense not in a supernaturally revealed sense etc.

      #20
      This is one of Hegel's most
      fundamental statements. `The truth is the whole' (Miller translates, `the true is the whole'). It is the reflective
      autonomy of self-consciousness' own development of the whole truth. The subject (self-consciousness) in its rational
      development, produces at the end of this self-developing process, the absolute which is fully actualized.

      #21
      Hegel
      emphasizes the self conscious method of the `ego for itself' and the search for identities in thoughts, catching the
      moments of immediacy in these identities and negations, which is the process of simple becoming. This becoming is
      Hegel's initial goal.

      #22
      In Hegel's time of science the idea of self-moving purpose or a rational cosmos was becoming
      academic. Reason is intrinsically purposive. This is not, for Hegel a presupposition. Rather, it is an ongoing
      rational principle which dialectically proves its point of purposiveness by its very rational development.


      Dear
      Bob,

      Thanks for this summary of the first 22 paras from the Preface of the PhdG. I think that your comment on para
      22 does not fully conceive what Hegel writes there. In the following I quote the whole para 22 in the original and the
      English translation with some comments following:

      "22. Das Gesagte kann auch so ausgedrückt werden, daß die Vernunft
      das zweckmäßige Tun ist. Die Erhebung der vermeinten Natur über das mißkannte Denken, und zunächst die Verbannung der
      äußern Zweckmäßigkeit hat die Form des Zwecks überhaupt in Mißkredit gebracht. Allein, wie auch Aristoteles die Natur
      als das zweckmäßige Tun bestimmt, der Zweck ist das Unmittelbare, das Ruhende, welches selbst bewegend oder Subjekt
      ist. Seine abstrakte Kraft zu bewegen ist das Für-sich-sein oder die reine Negativität. Das Resultat ist nur darum
      dasselbe, was der Anfang, weil der Anfang Zweck ist; - oder das Wirkliche ist nur darum dasselbe, was sein Begriff,
      weil das Unmittelbare als Zweck das Selbst oder die reine Wirklichkeit in ihm selbst hat. Der ausgeführte Zweck oder
      das daseiende Wirkliche ist die Bewegung und das entfaltete Werden; eben diese Unruhe aber ist das Selbst; und jener
      Unmittelbarkeit und Einfachheit des Anfangs ist es darum gleich, weil es das Resultat, das in sich Zurückgekehrte, -
      das in sich Zurückgekehrte aber eben das Selbst, und das Selbst die sich auf sich beziehende Gleichheit und Einfachheit
      ist."

      "22. What has been said may also be expressed by saying that reason is purposive activity. The exaltation of so-
      called nature at the expense of thought misconceived, and more especially the rejection of external purposiveness, have
      brought the idea of purpose in general into disrepute. All the same, in the sense in which Aristotle, too,
      characterizes nature as purposive activity, purpose is the immediate, the undisturbed, the unmoved which is self-
      moving; as such it is subject. Its power of moving, taken abstractly, is its existence for itself, or pure negativity.
      The result is the same as the beginning solely because the beginning is purpose. Stated otherwise, what is actual and
      concrete is the same as its inner principle or notion simply because the immediate qua purpose contains within it the
      self or pure actuality. The realized purpose, or concrete actuality, is movement and development unfolded. But this
      very unrest is the self; and it is one and the same with that immediacy and simplicity characteristic of the beginning
      just for the reason that it is the result, and has returned upon itself-while this latter again is just the self, and
      the self is self-referring and self-relating identity and simplicity."


      Regarding the history of philosophy and of
      (natural) science the second sentence in this para is interesting. Hegel writes there:

      (1) "The elevation [Erhebung]
      of a deficient conception of nature above unappreciated thought ......": What does this mean? Is it the mechanical view
      on nature in the modern area (i.e. Hobbes, Descartes) against Aristotelian thinking on nature which only with Leibniz
      got a renaissance ? Or is it the Romantic view on nature which also Schelling adhered to neglecting thereby the freedom
      and autonomy of thought which Kant and Fichte had developed in their philosophies? The latter would justify
      "exaltation" as the translation of the German term "Erhebung"

      (2) "...... the rejection of external purposiveness,
      have brought the idea of purpose in general into disrepute.": This would suggest that Hegel reminds us of the Romantic
      view on nature in this para. The Romantic view did despise the external purposiveness of nature which for Hegel
      nevertheless is an important moment of reason, that is, of rational activity (see also SL, Doctrine of the Concept).
      But then Hegel proceeds to "the idea of purpose in general" which for him is essential for Aristotle’s view on nature
      against the modern mechanical view.


      For Hegel both views on nature (the mechanical and the Romantic) are
      inadequate. The first explains nature only in causal relationships and neglects the self-moving of the subject. The
      second has no concept of the pure negativity of the being-for-itself (the subject) but only positive internal
      purposiveness and forces which govern nature as a whole (exaltation). So, Hegel had to go back to Aristotle, however,
      now seen from the freedom of the subjet as Kant and Fichte have shown.

      Regards,
      Beat Greuter
    • robert fanelli
      Beat,   Happy New Year.  Thanks for your comments.  I ll study # 22 carefully.  I ve finished the 808 paragraphs and am now editing them.  Will send you
      Message 2 of 3 , Jan 2, 2011
        Beat,
         
        Happy New Year.  Thanks for your comments.  I'll study # 22 carefully.  I've finished the 808 paragraphs and am now editing them.  Will send you and the group more.
         
        Regards,
         
        Bob Fanelli

        --- On Fri, 12/31/10, greuterb@... <greuterb@...> wrote:


        From: greuterb@... <greuterb@...>
        Subject: AW: [hegel] Brief Synopsis of PhdG Preface 1-22
        To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
        Date: Friday, December 31, 2010, 4:58 PM


         



        ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
        Von: robertfanelli2001@...
        Datum: 29.12.2010 01:26
        An: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>

        Betreff: [hegel] Brief Synopsis of PhdG Preface 1-22

        Preface
        (Highlights) First 22 Paragraphs

        #1
        Individual concepts
        of reality as structured by consciousness must lead to universal concepts of this reality, and thus enhance the reality
        of the universe.

        #2
        Hegel offers the `progressive evolution of truth' in his diversity in a philosophical system.
        The progression of evolutionary truths are not just contradictions, but must contain a ceaseless activity of truth with
        organic unity.

        #3
        We must continue the process of philosophical thinking. Philosophical systems die on the vine. We
        need a complete process to arrive at any substantial conclusion.

        #4
        We are bombarded with the individual moments of
        `actual life,' and it is these moments which give us meaningful experience. Hegel seeks a point of movement with these
        determinate thoughts of our individual experiences. Hegel seeks cognition of `actual life.'

        #5
        We have to raise
        philosophy to the level of a scientific system and this is the systematic development of truth. The method in which we
        know things must become a science. . Only within the development of this System can we grasp `the true shape of
        truth.'

        #6
        `…truth finds the means or instrument of its existence in notions' means that these conceptually
        developed notions are cognitive forms of truth; that is, they are logical and empirical developing forms of truth.
        This method of seeking truth differs from the presuppositions of Hegel's day and the dogmas of the day.

        #7
        We need
        therefore decidedly to be rejuvenated. Fullness of life, the immediacy of belief, and the satisfaction and security
        of a reconciled reality both within and without are all now in the tail end of Aufklärung (Enlightenment) and are
        simply seeking rejuvenation, a rebirth, and even a feeling good effect.

        #8
        Experience and empirical knowledge have
        overtaken all other ideology and hence the search for more meaningful beliefs….Hegel, of course will offer his PhdG.
        Now (in this early nineteenth century) the natural sciences have burst on to the scene and the sensate or power of
        empiricism have taken hold.

        #9
        Philosophy is a dynamic living spirit. This human spirit must look to Hegel's kind of
        science and overcome simple edification. Hegel's theme is the avoidance of mere edification, that is, simple
        instruction, improvement, even moral improvement.

        #10
        The paragraph is a proclamation or invective against the
        romanticism and intuitiveness of the day. The contentment and edification which Hegel refers to is that of these anti-
        scientific texts overflowing the intellectual communities of his day.

        #11
        We have the spirit of the times, the
        Aufklärung (Enlightenment), along with the old order of things, including perhaps some of the religious doctrines of
        the past. There are changes in the air.

        #12
        Hegel's thesis includes the idea that science is the `crowning' part of
        the `spiritual world;' and the `spiritual world' includes, as the world of Spirit (Geist) , an entire historical and
        educational process subject to `revolutions in manifold forms.'

        #13
        Hegel makes no bones about pure rational thought
        being the king. Consciousness needs the discipline of the negative and of precise thinking. There is much information
        from the past which consciousness must sift through and make exoteric not esoteric.

        #14
        Hegel speaks of a type of
        Gordian Knot, (`the critical knot which scientific culture at present struggles to loosen, and about which so far it is
        not very clear'). It is an intractable problem to be solved by a bold stroke. It is a `parade' of sorts between two
        factions: one side shows the strength of the empirical `wealth of its material,' and the other side `intuitive
        rationality' with its corresponding divinity.

        #15
        We need the full `color' representation of reality. Fichte and
        Schelling merely offer `such a repetition of the same formula,' and to boot, they prove nothing. It is old hat and
        simply an empty absolute, so to speak. It is `the shapeless repetition of one and the same idea,' over and over
        again. Hegel seeks the developing concrete absolute Idea (the full development of dialectic thinking).

        #16
        Absolute
        knowing is the encompassing of the reality of the world by means of dialectic thinking with the developing reality of
        the mind in the process. In the correspondence of the reality of the other (the world) with the reality of
        consciousness an absolute sense of reality has been manifested, and thus this is the way in which the concept of God is
        understood; for God is the ultimate reality for Hegel. The correspondence of the mind's thoughts with the objects of
        the world is actualized by the dialectic process itself.

        #17
        We can not get to the truth of things unless Substance
        and Subject are conjoined, that is, put together, for a common purpose, perhaps more. This concrete substantiality
        requires both a universal and individual perspective, again, both conjoined.

        #18 The subject is a basis for
        actuality. It is substance in the sense that it seeks to be independent of all the structures developed by the sensate
        mind. When we speak of substance and subject in the same breath, Hegel means we have grasped Spirit itself (Geist).

        #19
        The historical search for knowledge of the divine and divine intelligence is discussed here. The emphasis is on
        knowledge in the Hegelian sense not in a supernaturally revealed sense etc.

        #20
        This is one of Hegel's most
        fundamental statements. `The truth is the whole' (Miller translates, `the true is the whole'). It is the reflective
        autonomy of self-consciousness' own development of the whole truth. The subject (self-consciousness) in its rational
        development, produces at the end of this self-developing process, the absolute which is fully actualized.

        #21
        Hegel
        emphasizes the self conscious method of the `ego for itself' and the search for identities in thoughts, catching the
        moments of immediacy in these identities and negations, which is the process of simple becoming. This becoming is
        Hegel's initial goal.

        #22
        In Hegel's time of science the idea of self-moving purpose or a rational cosmos was becoming
        academic. Reason is intrinsically purposive. This is not, for Hegel a presupposition. Rather, it is an ongoing
        rational principle which dialectically proves its point of purposiveness by its very rational development.

        Dear
        Bob,

        Thanks for this summary of the first 22 paras from the Preface of the PhdG. I think that your comment on para
        22 does not fully conceive what Hegel writes there. In the following I quote the whole para 22 in the original and the
        English translation with some comments following:

        "22. Das Gesagte kann auch so ausgedrückt werden, daß die Vernunft
        das zweckmäßige Tun ist. Die Erhebung der vermeinten Natur über das mißkannte Denken, und zunächst die Verbannung der
        äußern Zweckmäßigkeit hat die Form des Zwecks überhaupt in Mißkredit gebracht. Allein, wie auch Aristoteles die Natur
        als das zweckmäßige Tun bestimmt, der Zweck ist das Unmittelbare, das Ruhende, welches selbst bewegend oder Subjekt
        ist. Seine abstrakte Kraft zu bewegen ist das Für-sich-sein oder die reine Negativität. Das Resultat ist nur darum
        dasselbe, was der Anfang, weil der Anfang Zweck ist; - oder das Wirkliche ist nur darum dasselbe, was sein Begriff,
        weil das Unmittelbare als Zweck das Selbst oder die reine Wirklichkeit in ihm selbst hat. Der ausgeführte Zweck oder
        das daseiende Wirkliche ist die Bewegung und das entfaltete Werden; eben diese Unruhe aber ist das Selbst; und jener
        Unmittelbarkeit und Einfachheit des Anfangs ist es darum gleich, weil es das Resultat, das in sich Zurückgekehrte, -
        das in sich Zurückgekehrte aber eben das Selbst, und das Selbst die sich auf sich beziehende Gleichheit und Einfachheit
        ist."

        "22. What has been said may also be expressed by saying that reason is purposive activity. The exaltation of so-
        called nature at the expense of thought misconceived, and more especially the rejection of external purposiveness, have
        brought the idea of purpose in general into disrepute. All the same, in the sense in which Aristotle, too,
        characterizes nature as purposive activity, purpose is the immediate, the undisturbed, the unmoved which is self-
        moving; as such it is subject. Its power of moving, taken abstractly, is its existence for itself, or pure negativity.
        The result is the same as the beginning solely because the beginning is purpose. Stated otherwise, what is actual and
        concrete is the same as its inner principle or notion simply because the immediate qua purpose contains within it the
        self or pure actuality. The realized purpose, or concrete actuality, is movement and development unfolded. But this
        very unrest is the self; and it is one and the same with that immediacy and simplicity characteristic of the beginning
        just for the reason that it is the result, and has returned upon itself-while this latter again is just the self, and
        the self is self-referring and self-relating identity and simplicity."

        Regarding the history of philosophy and of
        (natural) science the second sentence in this para is interesting. Hegel writes there:

        (1) "The elevation [Erhebung]
        of a deficient conception of nature above unappreciated thought ......": What does this mean? Is it the mechanical view
        on nature in the modern area (i.e. Hobbes, Descartes) against Aristotelian thinking on nature which only with Leibniz
        got a renaissance ? Or is it the Romantic view on nature which also Schelling adhered to neglecting thereby the freedom
        and autonomy of thought which Kant and Fichte had developed in their philosophies? The latter would justify
        "exaltation" as the translation of the German term "Erhebung"

        (2) "...... the rejection of external purposiveness,
        have brought the idea of purpose in general into disrepute.": This would suggest that Hegel reminds us of the Romantic
        view on nature in this para. The Romantic view did despise the external purposiveness of nature which for Hegel
        nevertheless is an important moment of reason, that is, of rational activity (see also SL, Doctrine of the Concept).
        But then Hegel proceeds to "the idea of purpose in general" which for him is essential for Aristotle’s view on nature
        against the modern mechanical view.


        For Hegel both views on nature (the mechanical and the Romantic) are
        inadequate. The first explains nature only in causal relationships and neglects the self-moving of the subject. The
        second has no concept of the pure negativity of the being-for-itself (the subject) but only positive internal
        purposiveness and forces which govern nature as a whole (exaltation). So, Hegel had to go back to Aristotle, however,
        now seen from the freedom of the subjet as Kant and Fichte have shown.

        Regards,
        Beat Greuter










        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      • robert fanelli
        Beat,   I m sending you my complete analysis of this difficult paragraph 22  which obviously offers a transcendence of both the mechanistic and romantic
        Message 3 of 3 , Jan 2, 2011
          Beat,
           
          I'm sending you my complete analysis of this difficult paragraph 22  which obviously offers a transcendence of both the mechanistic and romantic aspect of nature.  Am I on the right track here?
           
          My comments:
          In Hegel’s time of science the idea of self-moving purpose or a rational cosmos was becoming academic. Reason is intrinsically purposive.  This is not, for Hegel a presupposition.  Rather, it is an ongoing rational principle which dialectically proves its point of purposiveness by its very rational development.   Hegel wishes to revert back to the Aristotelian sense of the self moving Subject.  He translates this self moving ‘existence for itself’ as pure negativity, putting a beginning on purpose. In the ‘concrete actuality’ of what is real, is rational movement.  The Self comes into play as ‘self-referring and self-relating, identity and simplicity.’  Self-consciousness takes over and so too does reflective thinking.  Existence then stands to itself as a self-inflicted sense of purposiveness. Thus the purpose of all this rational thinking develops its own actuality and its own concreteness. The self reigns supreme in its own
          rational development.  All of this then is enveloped by the Hegelian rational developing forms which are not foundational.  I, with my own rational thinking grasp the actuality of ‘telos’ or ‘purpose’ of my thoughts.  My existence then is always on the line in terms of this kind of structural thinking.


          --- On Fri, 12/31/10, greuterb@... <greuterb@...> wrote:


          From: greuterb@... <greuterb@...>
          Subject: AW: [hegel] Brief Synopsis of PhdG Preface 1-22
          To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
          Date: Friday, December 31, 2010, 4:58 PM


           



          ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
          Von: robertfanelli2001@...
          Datum: 29.12.2010 01:26
          An: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>

          Betreff: [hegel] Brief Synopsis of PhdG Preface 1-22

          Preface
          (Highlights) First 22 Paragraphs

          #1
          Individual concepts
          of reality as structured by consciousness must lead to universal concepts of this reality, and thus enhance the reality
          of the universe.

          #2
          Hegel offers the `progressive evolution of truth' in his diversity in a philosophical system.
          The progression of evolutionary truths are not just contradictions, but must contain a ceaseless activity of truth with
          organic unity.

          #3
          We must continue the process of philosophical thinking. Philosophical systems die on the vine. We
          need a complete process to arrive at any substantial conclusion.

          #4
          We are bombarded with the individual moments of
          `actual life,' and it is these moments which give us meaningful experience. Hegel seeks a point of movement with these
          determinate thoughts of our individual experiences. Hegel seeks cognition of `actual life.'

          #5
          We have to raise
          philosophy to the level of a scientific system and this is the systematic development of truth. The method in which we
          know things must become a science. . Only within the development of this System can we grasp `the true shape of
          truth.'

          #6
          `…truth finds the means or instrument of its existence in notions' means that these conceptually
          developed notions are cognitive forms of truth; that is, they are logical and empirical developing forms of truth.
          This method of seeking truth differs from the presuppositions of Hegel's day and the dogmas of the day.

          #7
          We need
          therefore decidedly to be rejuvenated. Fullness of life, the immediacy of belief, and the satisfaction and security
          of a reconciled reality both within and without are all now in the tail end of Aufklärung (Enlightenment) and are
          simply seeking rejuvenation, a rebirth, and even a feeling good effect.

          #8
          Experience and empirical knowledge have
          overtaken all other ideology and hence the search for more meaningful beliefs….Hegel, of course will offer his PhdG.
          Now (in this early nineteenth century) the natural sciences have burst on to the scene and the sensate or power of
          empiricism have taken hold.

          #9
          Philosophy is a dynamic living spirit. This human spirit must look to Hegel's kind of
          science and overcome simple edification. Hegel's theme is the avoidance of mere edification, that is, simple
          instruction, improvement, even moral improvement.

          #10
          The paragraph is a proclamation or invective against the
          romanticism and intuitiveness of the day. The contentment and edification which Hegel refers to is that of these anti-
          scientific texts overflowing the intellectual communities of his day.

          #11
          We have the spirit of the times, the
          Aufklärung (Enlightenment), along with the old order of things, including perhaps some of the religious doctrines of
          the past. There are changes in the air.

          #12
          Hegel's thesis includes the idea that science is the `crowning' part of
          the `spiritual world;' and the `spiritual world' includes, as the world of Spirit (Geist) , an entire historical and
          educational process subject to `revolutions in manifold forms.'

          #13
          Hegel makes no bones about pure rational thought
          being the king. Consciousness needs the discipline of the negative and of precise thinking. There is much information
          from the past which consciousness must sift through and make exoteric not esoteric.

          #14
          Hegel speaks of a type of
          Gordian Knot, (`the critical knot which scientific culture at present struggles to loosen, and about which so far it is
          not very clear'). It is an intractable problem to be solved by a bold stroke. It is a `parade' of sorts between two
          factions: one side shows the strength of the empirical `wealth of its material,' and the other side `intuitive
          rationality' with its corresponding divinity.

          #15
          We need the full `color' representation of reality. Fichte and
          Schelling merely offer `such a repetition of the same formula,' and to boot, they prove nothing. It is old hat and
          simply an empty absolute, so to speak. It is `the shapeless repetition of one and the same idea,' over and over
          again. Hegel seeks the developing concrete absolute Idea (the full development of dialectic thinking).

          #16
          Absolute
          knowing is the encompassing of the reality of the world by means of dialectic thinking with the developing reality of
          the mind in the process. In the correspondence of the reality of the other (the world) with the reality of
          consciousness an absolute sense of reality has been manifested, and thus this is the way in which the concept of God is
          understood; for God is the ultimate reality for Hegel. The correspondence of the mind's thoughts with the objects of
          the world is actualized by the dialectic process itself.

          #17
          We can not get to the truth of things unless Substance
          and Subject are conjoined, that is, put together, for a common purpose, perhaps more. This concrete substantiality
          requires both a universal and individual perspective, again, both conjoined.

          #18 The subject is a basis for
          actuality. It is substance in the sense that it seeks to be independent of all the structures developed by the sensate
          mind. When we speak of substance and subject in the same breath, Hegel means we have grasped Spirit itself (Geist).

          #19
          The historical search for knowledge of the divine and divine intelligence is discussed here. The emphasis is on
          knowledge in the Hegelian sense not in a supernaturally revealed sense etc.

          #20
          This is one of Hegel's most
          fundamental statements. `The truth is the whole' (Miller translates, `the true is the whole'). It is the reflective
          autonomy of self-consciousness' own development of the whole truth. The subject (self-consciousness) in its rational
          development, produces at the end of this self-developing process, the absolute which is fully actualized.

          #21
          Hegel
          emphasizes the self conscious method of the `ego for itself' and the search for identities in thoughts, catching the
          moments of immediacy in these identities and negations, which is the process of simple becoming. This becoming is
          Hegel's initial goal.

          #22
          In Hegel's time of science the idea of self-moving purpose or a rational cosmos was becoming
          academic. Reason is intrinsically purposive. This is not, for Hegel a presupposition. Rather, it is an ongoing
          rational principle which dialectically proves its point of purposiveness by its very rational development.

          Dear
          Bob,

          Thanks for this summary of the first 22 paras from the Preface of the PhdG. I think that your comment on para
          22 does not fully conceive what Hegel writes there. In the following I quote the whole para 22 in the original and the
          English translation with some comments following:

          "22. Das Gesagte kann auch so ausgedrückt werden, daß die Vernunft
          das zweckmäßige Tun ist. Die Erhebung der vermeinten Natur über das mißkannte Denken, und zunächst die Verbannung der
          äußern Zweckmäßigkeit hat die Form des Zwecks überhaupt in Mißkredit gebracht. Allein, wie auch Aristoteles die Natur
          als das zweckmäßige Tun bestimmt, der Zweck ist das Unmittelbare, das Ruhende, welches selbst bewegend oder Subjekt
          ist. Seine abstrakte Kraft zu bewegen ist das Für-sich-sein oder die reine Negativität. Das Resultat ist nur darum
          dasselbe, was der Anfang, weil der Anfang Zweck ist; - oder das Wirkliche ist nur darum dasselbe, was sein Begriff,
          weil das Unmittelbare als Zweck das Selbst oder die reine Wirklichkeit in ihm selbst hat. Der ausgeführte Zweck oder
          das daseiende Wirkliche ist die Bewegung und das entfaltete Werden; eben diese Unruhe aber ist das Selbst; und jener
          Unmittelbarkeit und Einfachheit des Anfangs ist es darum gleich, weil es das Resultat, das in sich Zurückgekehrte, -
          das in sich Zurückgekehrte aber eben das Selbst, und das Selbst die sich auf sich beziehende Gleichheit und Einfachheit
          ist."

          "22. What has been said may also be expressed by saying that reason is purposive activity. The exaltation of so-
          called nature at the expense of thought misconceived, and more especially the rejection of external purposiveness, have
          brought the idea of purpose in general into disrepute. All the same, in the sense in which Aristotle, too,
          characterizes nature as purposive activity, purpose is the immediate, the undisturbed, the unmoved which is self-
          moving; as such it is subject. Its power of moving, taken abstractly, is its existence for itself, or pure negativity.
          The result is the same as the beginning solely because the beginning is purpose. Stated otherwise, what is actual and
          concrete is the same as its inner principle or notion simply because the immediate qua purpose contains within it the
          self or pure actuality. The realized purpose, or concrete actuality, is movement and development unfolded. But this
          very unrest is the self; and it is one and the same with that immediacy and simplicity characteristic of the beginning
          just for the reason that it is the result, and has returned upon itself-while this latter again is just the self, and
          the self is self-referring and self-relating identity and simplicity."

          Regarding the history of philosophy and of
          (natural) science the second sentence in this para is interesting. Hegel writes there:

          (1) "The elevation [Erhebung]
          of a deficient conception of nature above unappreciated thought ......": What does this mean? Is it the mechanical view
          on nature in the modern area (i.e. Hobbes, Descartes) against Aristotelian thinking on nature which only with Leibniz
          got a renaissance ? Or is it the Romantic view on nature which also Schelling adhered to neglecting thereby the freedom
          and autonomy of thought which Kant and Fichte had developed in their philosophies? The latter would justify
          "exaltation" as the translation of the German term "Erhebung"

          (2) "...... the rejection of external purposiveness,
          have brought the idea of purpose in general into disrepute.": This would suggest that Hegel reminds us of the Romantic
          view on nature in this para. The Romantic view did despise the external purposiveness of nature which for Hegel
          nevertheless is an important moment of reason, that is, of rational activity (see also SL, Doctrine of the Concept).
          But then Hegel proceeds to "the idea of purpose in general" which for him is essential for Aristotle’s view on nature
          against the modern mechanical view.


          For Hegel both views on nature (the mechanical and the Romantic) are
          inadequate. The first explains nature only in causal relationships and neglects the self-moving of the subject. The
          second has no concept of the pure negativity of the being-for-itself (the subject) but only positive internal
          purposiveness and forces which govern nature as a whole (exaltation). So, Hegel had to go back to Aristotle, however,
          now seen from the freedom of the subjet as Kant and Fichte have shown.

          Regards,
          Beat Greuter










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