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Re: [hegel] Re: Rosenkranz on Hegel (17 of 67)

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  • Beat Greuter
    Stephen Theron writes ... Dear Stephen, Did you really think that I did not carefully read your text? The truth is that I read the passage at least ten times
    Message 1 of 49 , Dec 5, 2010
      Stephen Theron writes

      >
      >
      > Beat,
      >
      > Some further points from your letter. First, Berdyaev did not claim,
      > as you seem to imply, to eliminate the tragedy of knowledge
      > (objectification, in his terminology, in "The Destiny of Man") but
      > rather maintained the opposite, that it remained, that we cannot get
      > rid of it. I think I said this clearly, that he "credited" Kant with
      > awareness of this. I am not sure I agree or that Hegel agreed, in his
      > critique of "the critical philosophy". But you have no call from me to
      > denigrate Berdyaev on this point. Obviously though, I would myself
      > add, there would be no "tragedy" of divine or absolute knowledge. Then
      > it would not be knowledge after all.
      >
      > That is what you find "outrageous", or is it rhetorical? Probably Kant
      > recognised such an absolute knowledge, though he didn´t feel he could
      > "prove" it. For Hegel there was some kind of incipient identity
      > between anyone´s knowledge and that, this being in fact the key to
      > Reason´s "annulment"(EL) of the world (in favour of something more
      > "absolute"), its "vehemence", he says, probably with the Presocratics
      > in mind (EN), in, so to say, imposing its own format on everything
      > (their Concept as water, fire etc.)beyond even logical possibility of
      > questioning (self-conscious) reason (one falls immediately into
      > "contradiction in performance" if one tries this, such as he finds in
      > Kant). Reason, in short, is and has to be its own advocate. This is
      > quite different from or other than a failure of the reasoning person
      > to question his consciously adopted and stated first principles, which
      > you refer to in charging me with "a metaphysics which takes what it
      > thinks for granted" ("what it thinks" is maybe ambiguous here?). There
      > is, I fear, a confusion. I can´t easily understand how you can have
      > missed Hegel´s concern to avoid it, if you have. From one point of
      > view it is even a kind of synthesis with Hume, surpassing Kant´s. You
      > suggest I bypass Hume. Hegel too transcends both causality and the
      > abstract self. He thus shows us how to read Hume.
      > So I don´t think I miss what Hegel means by "absolute", how, for
      > instance, all previous "moments" are there taken up, "aufgehoben". I
      > am sorry my ambiguous "of" permitted you to ascribe to me an opinion
      > totally at variance with what I have been writing here for years now.
      > I meant, once again, this knowledge is not "held" by anyone or
      > anything as an instance apart from it. Thus God was always reckoned
      > one with (identical with) his knowledge and indeed his deity, which is
      > why, incidentally, one could question Hegel´s saying "God" is not a
      > scientific term, i.e. if it is always not only a "proper" name but
      > also a "nomen naturae".
      >
      > I accept that we see two Hegels. But I do not find this "outrageous",
      > talking about fanaticism etc. as you did. I see I bewilder you and I
      > am sorry. Someone remarked to me he did not think you read me very
      > carefully. One doesn´t read someone carefully until one has begun to
      > think he might be worth it. There lies the difficulty, perhaps. But
      > then he is not worth making an "outrage" out of either...
      >


      Dear Stephen,

      Did you really think that I did not carefully read your text? The truth
      is that I read the passage at least ten times before I wrote my answer
      and also I looked into my dictionary for English terms which I know but
      was affraid that there are also other meanings in them (i.e. accomplish,
      overcome, chasm). Also, I know others of your comments on this list, so,
      I could not have missed your context entirely. I think that our
      discussion is very painful because you always state that your text has
      an other meaning than I supposed. The 'tertium non datur' may not be
      fully ignored, otherwise no discourse is possible.

      On the other hand, you are right that "we see two Hegels". This, I
      guess, means that Hegel's text supports two (or even more) different
      world pictures (here I hear Bruce laughing). These world pictures each
      include basal beliefs which cannot be abandoned easily and which
      determine the cognitive-propositional world relation. Within a
      particular world picture there are also disagreements but these
      disagreements can be thrashed out and therefore bring positive results
      for the elaboration of such a world picture. The disagreements in
      statements belonging to two different world pictures, however, are
      fruitless due to these different basal beliefs. In this sense I admit
      what you and Berdayev say about Kant "bound to a falsifying
      "objectification" ". In contrast, for Hegel there is no EXTERNAL or
      ALIEN objectivity or fact which can be taken as a criterion for the
      truth. So, there is no meta level for proving Hegel's philosophy, there
      is only INTERPRETATION as Nietzsche would say.

      If this what I said is only halfway true then for our situation I see no
      other solution as to divide the hegel-list into two lists each for one
      of the two incompatible world pictures: the first one we could call the
      hegel-god-list, the second one the hegel-science-list. These labels are
      only working titles and the label can be changed later. Also, one has to
      draft a short text for each list which gives a characterization as a
      basis for the discussion. Of course, in principle somebody can
      participate in both lists, however, in this case he has to be a good
      guy, that is, he has to argue from the basal beliefs of the respective
      list, otherwise we have the same troubles as before. I propose that you
      take over the moderation for the hegel-god-list; I would do the same for
      the hegel-science-list at least as long as nobody else wants to do the
      job. Of course, before we can realize the division we have to contact
      Kai Froeb as the owner of the current hegel-list. Also, other members of
      the current list should give their arguments. However, I do not see any
      objections in principle.

      Regards,
      Beat Greuter


      > I would agree with Hegel, and you, that the accomplishment I mentioned
      > could not be absolute insofar as it is part of an early 19th century
      > philosopher´s achievement, merely. This will apply, however, to all
      > our words and judgments, so why pick that one out? Hegel´s
      > accomplishing of religion might still be a "historical" turning-point
      > in religion´s self-understanding, in theology´s development, in the
      > leading into all truth by Spirit or however you want to put it (or not
      > put it, more probably).
      >
      > As long as we keep on talking there will always be some absurdity
      > around. The remedy is to bear in mind that our speech is never
      > absolute, even when speaking of the absolute, as we must (contrary to
      > Wittgenstein´s dictum). Just this recalls or covers Hegel´s own
      > exposure of the pretended absoluteness of formal logic, the logic of
      > the understanding (e.g. "that everything is itself and not another
      > thing" and that it is ABSURD to mean otherwise). Would he have
      > therefore agreed with Descartes, perhaps against Aquinas, that God had
      > power over the "laws" of such logic? An interesting question, I find.
      >
      > Stephen
      >
      > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
      > Greuter <greuterb@...> wrote:
      > >
      > > Stephen Theron writes:
      > >
      > > >Dear Beat,
      > > >
      > > >Thanks. In using the phrase "higher concept" I did not have the
      > Concept as such in mind, though no doubt it comes ultimately to that.
      > I meant simply a higher conception of life in community, political or
      > other, higher than that of civic friendship or virtue (the ancient
      > ideal). I think Marx makes the same point; certainly I have heard many
      > Marxists who do. They even criticise Justice as a limited ideal.
      > > >Back to Hegel: where can you locate this idea, ideal? I think it is
      > at least included in the absolute idea in the same way as you say the
      > practical must be, on pain of not being absolute. Yet nothing is there
      > included without being identical with the whole (EL160 and following),
      > so it looks as if it must be the absolute idea, which you want to
      > pre-empt me from asserting. So you say you will ask what it is, and I
      > have just given about the best reference for that.
      > > >Of course when I cite "civilisation of love" and/or "the Marxian
      > ideal" I am being more specific than I need, as relating myself to the
      > particular discussion Stephen C. took up. You may not personally like
      > these particular connections, though I note you yourself refer to a
      > possible indeed desirable "political actualisation" of the concept, be
      > it here and now, out of time altogether or whatever (I don't wish to
      > start another controversy in saying that, but just keep things as wide
      > open as possible). But I suppose this actualisation, for you too,
      > would not have limits, as being of the Concept.
      > > >Another reference for what the Absolute Idea is would be the
      > chapter on Absolute Knowledge concluding the Ph.G. I think it is
      > implicit in Hegel that knowledge does not exclude "love" (there may be
      > a better term for what I have in mind) as being a kind of
      > identification, with the other as other or, rather, making it no
      > longer other. This is also pretty clear from the series of
      > identifications at the end of EL's Doctrine of Essence. The degree of
      > immediacy, so to say, of this term's application must, I concede,
      > depend upon how far we go along with the idea that the Hegelian
      > ontology is ultimately entirely one of persons or even just one
      > absolute person (in a sense to be defined) or subject. But even
      > without that we can still use the term, as a "higher concept",
      > especially within a specifically political and/or ecclesial context.
      > > >
      > > >Absolute knowledge, I conceive, is not the knowledge of anyone or
      > any other entity. Similarly with love. We have the term "harmony". In
      > this sense Hegel says that all is accomplished, contrary to our
      > habitual illusion. It is perhaps necessary not to lose sight of these
      > ultimates (one could say "absolutes"), though we find it more
      > practical to abstract from them at times. The ultimate praxis must be
      > free from this tragic chasm between itself and truth. But maybe I
      > stray from the theme proposed. Speaking of tragedy, Berdyaev referred
      > often to the tragedy of knowledge, he credited Kant with awareness of
      > this, as bound to a falsifying "objectification", exactly what, I
      > think, Hegelian absolute knowledge overcomes. The only question would
      > be whether this then is still properly called knowledge (as finite
      > name for something finite). Compare "God" in Hegel. The New Testament
      > speaks of knowledge made perfect in love, something not normally
      > associated with science, scientia, but perh
      > > >aps with wisdom,sapientia, it might seem more plausible. This last
      > paragraph is strictly optional for present purposes.
      > > >Stephen.
      > > >
      > >
      > > My English knowledge is quite at the end. What does 'optional' mean in
      > > your last sentence? Does it mean "take or leave it"? Or does it mean
      > > that it is voluntary to read this last paragraph, so, I could also read
      > > something else? But what? Or does it mean that what you have written is
      > > merely arbitrary? I can't help since your last paragraph is perfectly
      > > clear, however, does miss Hegel's philosophical intention entirely or
      > > more precisely it shows a completely opposite standpoint to the
      > > substance of his philosophy. In my previous comment I mentioned the
      > > absolute idea. I had not the slightest idea that you would try to
      > defend
      > > your standpoint raising the concept of absolute knowledge as if there
      > > would have been no Kant, no philosophy of rationality, no philosophy of
      > > empirism, no Spinoza, no Leibniz, no Hume only metaphysics without any
      > > epistemological criticism. That's wonderful and you did a great service
      > > to the reading of Hegel's philosophy after Analytical Philosophy and
      > > others did some laborious steps to understand Hegel really:
      > >
      > > >Absolute knowledge, I conceive, is not the knowledge of anyone or
      > any other entity.
      > > >
      > > If it would not ALSO be "knowledge of ... any other entity" then it
      > > would not be absolute knowledge. You miss already in your premise what
      > > Hegel means with 'absolute': that it contanins both moments of
      > > knowledge, basic convictions and the reflection on it which does
      > > undermine these basic convictions.
      > >
      > > >Similarly with love. We have the term "harmony".
      > > >
      > > Love is the immediate absolute, the concept not yet separated from its
      > > other. Therefore, there is not yet any objectivity but total
      > contingency
      > > what may be some beginning of knowledge (basal convictions) but staying
      > > in itself has no power to constitute knowledge. This then may be a
      > > haromony but this harmony confronted with a not yet built objectivity
      > > will turn into hateful fanatism.
      > >
      > > >In this sense Hegel says that all is accomplished, contrary to our
      > habitual illusion. It is perhaps necessary not to lose sight of these
      > ultimates (one could say "absolutes"), though we find it more
      > practical to abstract from them at times.
      > > >
      > > I wonder whether you ever read Hegel. What do you wish to make out of
      > > him? A gigantic solopsist who then due to practical reason does accept
      > > outer reality? In Hegel's philosophy there is nothing accomplished what
      > > does not turn again into unaccomplishment. And again, if you exclude
      > > habitual illusion - that is reflection - from absolute knowledge you
      > > alienate it.
      > >
      > > >The ultimate praxis must be free from this tragic chasm between
      > itself and truth. But maybe I stray from the theme proposed.
      > > >
      > > You do not 'stray from the theme', not at all. You are quite in the
      > > middle of the theme. You do not like tragic? Can you imagine what kind
      > > of truth you achieve without this tragic chasm? No truth at all but
      > > narcissistic convictions.
      > >
      > > >Speaking of tragedy, Berdyaev referred often to the tragedy of
      > knowledge, he credited Kant with awareness of this, as bound to a
      > falsifying "objectification", exactly what, I think, Hegelian absolute
      > knowledge overcomes.
      > > >
      > > This is outrageous! Hegel has overcome Kant and found absolute
      > > knowledge!!! Hundred, thousands, millions of people have state the same
      > > since Hegel's death and even before. Because of this Hegel's philosophy
      > > declined short after his death and neo-Kantianism and later Analytical
      > > Philosophy arised from this destruction. It took about almost two
      > > centuries to overcome this prejudice. And now, in one sentence, Stephen
      > > Theron and Berdyaev do eliminate the attained. However, what is at
      > stake
      > > here is that Hegel went back again to Kant leaving Schelling and also
      > > Fichte behind for renewing Kant's project of a critical epistimology
      > > which because of its dualism with two absolutes against each other
      > could
      > > not really integrate the critical moment of thinking. With your
      > > statement you go back to a metaphysics which takes what it thinks for
      > > granted.
      > >
      > > >The only question would be whether this then is still properly
      > called knowledge (as finite name for something finite). Compare "God"
      > in Hegel. The New Testament speaks of knowledge made perfect in love,
      > something not normally associated with science, scientia, but perhaps
      > with wisdom, sapientia, it might seem more plausible.
      > > >
      > > Yes, this is indeed the question because with your statements you have
      > > destroyed true knowledge entirely. Excluding finite thinking you make
      > > absolute thinking also a finite and with this an absurdity which is
      > > dangerous because it leads to fanatism and intolerance. " "God" in
      > > Hegel" has become a furious fetish and this has certainly neither to do
      > > with "science, scientia" nor with "wisdom, sapientia".
      > >
      > > >This last paragraph is strictly optional for present purposes.
      > > >
      > > Which purposes? The purpose of making Hegel absurd?
      > >
      > > Regards,
      > > Beat Greuter
      > >
      > >
      > > >To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > > >From: greuterb@...
      > > >Date: Sat, 27 Nov 2010 10:55:06 +0100
      > > >Subject: [hegel] Rosenkranz on Hegel (17 of 67)
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >>----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
      > > >>Von: stephentheron@...
      > > >>Datum: 26.11.2010 21:27
      > > >>An: "hegel hegel"<hegel@yahoogroups.com
      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>>
      > > >>Betreff: RE: [hegel] Rosenkranz on Hegel (17 of 67)
      > > >>
      > > >>
      > > >>Thank you for this text.
      > > >>Of course we follow the Zeitgeist. The Concept thinks itself, rather.
      > > >>However, it would not be possible to show that Hegel never makes
      > > >>prescriptions, as he does negatively here in rejecting Kant´s
      > > >>prescription, re a dual allegiance to Church and State.
      > > >>Going more deeply, "Hegel does not wish", you say. Not even inasmuch
      > > >>as volition is subsumed into absolute knowledge, the Absolute Idea in
      > > >>which all is known? Just to compare, the Augustinian-Thomist idea of
      > > >>absolute omniscience, as Pure Act (Aristotle), is definitely ipso
      > > >>facto a willing, in the sense of a determining (one could maybe
      > relate
      > > >>this to Hegel's "positing"?), since otherwise such knowledge is
      > > >>passive, which is a contradiction. Thus Thomas defines will as the
      > > >>inclination of intellect itself: i.e. no separate faculties. Now you
      > > >>say, this is not Hegel. Quite so, but one recognises here as all
      > along
      > > >>the line a continuity with earlier "models", plus development, as
      > > >>Hegel himself stresses in his history of philosophy lectures surely.
      > > >>Therefore, I find it not out of place to see Hegel here as, if not
      > > >>prescribing a solution, at least posing a dilemma.
      > > >>Again, in saying that Hegel does not want to stay at the level of
      > > >>civic virtue I by no means propose a jumping over Rhodes, as you seem
      > > >>to suggest I do. Transcendence of this had been around since a long
      > > >>time before, even before "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity", since this
      > > >>is but an inspired instance of it.
      > > >>
      > > >>
      > > >
      > > >In your previous comment you wrote:
      > > >
      > > >"One thing I think we can be quite sure of from the Logic and the
      > Phil.
      > > >of Spirit (and the other big book) is that Hegel does not want to stay
      > > >at the level of "civic virtue" merely. He would wish to assume and
      > > >transform this in a higher concept, similar to that of Maritain´s
      > > >"civilization of love" (True Humanism, 1939) or the Marxian ideal, I
      > > >would more than guess."
      > > >
      > > >Could you tell me where I can locate this "higher concept" in Hegel's
      > > >writings, these 'ideals' as you write, and what it means. Please,
      > do not
      > > >answer it is Hegel's absolute idea, otherwise I would ask what the
      > > >absolute idea is.
      > > >
      > > >In my comment "Hegel does not wish, he thinks the concept" I did not
      > > >discuss the concept further. It is quite clear that Hegel's concept is
      > > >not only theoretical but includes also the practical side,
      > otherwise it
      > > >could not be the absolute. So, in the "civic virtue" (you mention)
      > as a
      > > >moment of the concept evidently both sides of the concept are
      > included.
      > > >Hegel's dialectic is precisely the movement of the concept between
      > these
      > > >sides. No side is basal. On the other side, I agree with you that wish
      > > >and hope is not merely excluded from the thinking of the concept.
      > Hegel
      > > >had much hope that his concept could be politically actualized within
      > > >the further development of the Prussian state. The 'Karlsbader
      > > >Beschlüsse' affected him deeply.
      > > >
      > > >Regards,
      > > >Beat Greuter
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >>But now you say Hegel does not "wish", a word I had used in passing,
      > > >>and of course taken absolutely this suggests something
      > ineffective, as
      > > >>contrasted with proper volition, more like a "velleity". I am not
      > > >>interested in "wishing" that on Hegel. Something of volition, I would
      > > >>like to suggest, ratrher, is to be found in "thinking the concept",
      > > >>just as there is volition in deciding to think at all. One wants
      > > >>something. But here I simply implied that in posing a dilemma Hegel,
      > > >>if following his usual practice, looks to resolve it.
      > > >>Can this not be related, tied, to thinking the concept, in a
      > > >>particular discussion (church and state)? You cannot mean we are to
      > > >>deny that Hegel takes part in particular discussions. We have just
      > > >>found him at it here. Of course he then relates it to everything
      > else,
      > > >>to the Idea, as I myself wish(!) to do.
      > > >>Stephen.
      > > >>
      > > >>
      > > >>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > > >>From: greuterb@...
      > > >>Date: Fri, 26 Nov 2010 14:43:42 +0000
      > > >>Subject: Re: [hegel] Rosenkranz on Hegel (17 of 67)
      > > >>
      > > >>
      > > >>Stephen Theron writes:
      > > >>
      > > >>I reply to both here as this is the first time I see Stephen C.'s
      > > >>reply to me (something odd about this new Hotmail system of grouping
      > > >>mails together):
      > > >>Probably Constantine didn´t quite realise what he was doing when he
      > > >>"permitted the Christians their rites". Hence his and successors'
      > > >>later attempts to reassert state absolutism via "new Rome" (founding
      > > >>Constantinople), encouraging Arian dissidents etc. Newman, the future
      > > >>cardinal, agrees with Hegel that the Church is a system of warfare
      > > >>against the state, against the established world in other words. Are
      > > >>they right?
      > > >>Either way, Hegel's criticism of Kant here is successful. The Gospel
      > > >>saying, very popular, about giving Caesar his due (and God what is
      > > >>his, as if they were both on a level: this is the Speaker's irony of
      > > >>course) is balanced and even overbalanced by the more trenchant "No
      > > >>man can serve two masters". Hegel agrees, as you quote, that "Man in
      > > >>the Church is a whole." This does not lead him to contemn the State,
      > > >>but nor does he want to be a Jesuit (he is rather too hard on these
      > > >>poor fellows).
      > > >>He seems not to condemn the Church "considered as visible, which acts
      > > >>and takes stances" precisely as keeping this feeling of totality. Yet
      > > >>he adds that when we act in this spirit we act against the entire
      > > >>spirit of the state and its laws, whether this gets observed or not.
      > > >>So he poses a dilemma. He makes of the Qs and Js two extremes,
      > > >>implying a middle ground of reconciliation. What could it be?
      > > >>One thing I think we can be quite sure of from the Logic and the
      > Phil.
      > > >>of Spirit (and the other big book) is that Hegel does not want to
      > stay
      > > >>at the level of "civic virtue" merely. He would wish to assume and
      > > >>transform this in a higher concept, similar to that of Maritain´s
      > > >>"civilization of love" (True Humanism, 1939) or the Marxian ideal, I
      > > >>would more than guess.
      > > >>
      > > >>Hegel does not wish, he thinks the concept:
      > > >>
      > > >>"To apprehend what is is the task of philosophy, because what
      > > >>is is reason. As for the individual, every one is a son of his
      > > >>time; so philosophy also is its time apprehended in thoughts. It is
      > > >>just as foolish to fancy that any philosophy can transcend its
      > > >>present world, as that an individual could leap out of his time
      > > >>or jump over Rhodes. If a theory transgresses its time, and builds
      > > >>up a world as it ought to be, it has an existence merely in the
      > > >>unstable element of opinion, which gives room to every wandering
      > > >>fancy. ......... Only one word more concerning the desire to teach the
      > > >>world what
      > > >>it ought to be. For such a purpose philosophy at least always
      > > >>comes too late. Philosophy, as the thought of the world, does
      > > >>not appear until reality has completed its formative process,
      > > >>and made itself ready. History thus corroborates the teaching
      > > >>of the conception that only in the maturity of reality does the
      > > >>ideal appear as counterpart to the real, apprehends the real world
      > > >>in its substance, and shapes it into an intellectual kingdom. When
      > > >>philosophy paints its grey in grey, one form of life has
      > > >>become old, and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but
      > > >>only known. The owl of Minerva, takes its flight only when the
      > > >>shades of night are gathering." (Phil of Right, Preface)
      > > >>
      > > >>Regards,
      > > >>
      > > >>Beat Greuter
      > > >>
      > > >>As Beat says here, Hegel's thought here as always is
      > "differentiated",
      > > >>and bows to no one. I have still to answer my own question. We might
      > > >>suggest, as a preliminary at least, that the State, in acknowledging
      > > >>"the spiritual power", does not refer to something alien. The Church,
      > > >>or, rather, that power, is not bound to see itself as alien to "the
      > > >>human effort" but rather aids and abets and even, as Spirit at least,
      > > >>perfects it, since, in Rahner's theological words, "Everything is
      > > >>grace", i.e. grace wherever it comes from, within or without is the
      > > >>same, i.e. they are superseded, as self is other, other self. Grace
      > > >>just names the positive, such as the Subject might bestow on himself.
      > > >>The meaning of democracy, surely, is that conflicts will occur, sure,
      > > >>but that these conflicts are within the state, otherwise the
      > Christian
      > > >>Democrat parties are "out on a limb" indeed and should never have
      > been
      > > >>founded.
      > > >>So there is a kind of totalitarianism there, in democracy, to
      > which de
      > > >>Tocqueville (Democracy in America) early drew attention. But this is
      > > >>not necessarily malignant. It is in the name of the total, the whole,
      > > >>that Hegel criticises Kant in the first place. The case is similar
      > > >>with eugenics. As someone asked recently, shall we ban breadknives
      > > >>because they are used to murder. What about the bread then?
      > > >>The sacral institution of monarchy was already a kind of
      > > >>acknowledgement of the principle here, and the medievals had a
      > > >>correspondingly harder task in deciding between King and Pope. It was
      > > >>as if the Pope himself invested or incarnated himself in the Emperor,
      > > >>and that is the axis on which it all turns. The Church is sign and
      > > >>sacrament of the perfect State or "city" (civitas). As pure sign it
      > > >>does not inhabit a common world alongside the State, even if it looks
      > > >>like that when we photograph the clergy or churchmen, read about
      > their
      > > >>sexual peccadilloes and so on. We are all Church in this sacramental
      > > >>sense, as the gradual erosion of the literal significance or
      > effect of
      > > >>baptism in recent theology and "pronouncements" indicates (we have
      > > >>gone from baptism of desire to anonymous Christian to Christians as
      > > >>anonymous Buddhists to the hidden Christ of Hinduism or the hidden
      > > >>Hindu under the stairs, the sacra scala, and so on). For, as was said
      > > >>early on, whatever you do to anyone you
      > > >>do to me, and this is the general principle of the I, universal of
      > > >>universals.
      > > >>Stephen T.
      > > >>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > > >>From: greuterb@...
      > > >>Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2010 10:40:31 +0100
      > > >>Subject: Re: [hegel] Rosenkranz on Hegel (17 of 67)
      > > >>Stephen Cowley writes:
      > > >>
      > > >>Hi Stephen,
      > > >>My comment was provoked by a remark of Hegel's on the Quakers,
      > whom I've
      > > >>always
      > > >>liked for their sincerity in addressing Charles II as 'friend
      > > >>Charles'. The
      > > >>remark is from Rosenkranz's account of Hegel's reading of Kant's
      > > >>'Metaphysic
      > > >>of Morals'. I
      > > >>think it may not have appeared in English, probably because it doesn't
      > > >>say
      > > >>anything worthy of Hegel. Rosenkranz writes as follows:
      > > >>"He [Hegel] now sought to find his bearings outside the
      > > >>dualism of church and state. He summarised Kant' opinion in the
      > following
      > > >>terms: 'It must be
      > > >>that the two, state and church, leave each other in peace without
      > mixing
      > > >>themselves together.' To which Hegel adds:
      > > >>'How and how far is this separation possible? If the state has
      > > >>property for
      > > >>its principle, then the law of the church is contrary to its law. This
      > > >>latter [law] concerns rights determined absolutely, man is here
      > > >>thought very
      > > >>incompletely as a possessor, whilst inversely, man in the church is a
      > > >>whole,
      > > >>and the goal of the church considered as visible, which acts and takes
      > > >>stances, aims to engender and keep the feeling of this totality.
      > > >>Acting in
      > > >>the
      > > >>spirit of the church, man acts as a whole not only against this or
      > > >>that law
      > > >>of the state, but against the entire spirit of it, against their [the
      > > >>laws']
      > > >>essence.
      > > >>It is either his relationship with the state or his relationship
      > with the
      > > >>church that the citizen does not take seriously, when he can remain in
      > > >>peace
      > > >>in both of them. Two extremes, the Jesuits and the Quakers, have
      > sought to
      > > >>take [one and the other] relationship seriously and to unify them: the
      > > >>latter
      > > >>in refusing themselves all political commitment where this would be
      > > >>contrary
      > > >>to the church (to a certain church, it is true which, [standing aside
      > > >>from]
      > > >>politics, erects into affairs of the church many things which are not,
      > > >>since
      > > >>they pertain to the law); the former in making every effort, whilst
      > > >>submitting outwardly to the laws of the state, to [deny it all
      > > >>civic virtues] by inward practice of their freedom of conscience.'
      > [...] "
      > > >>
      > > >>If you read one sentence more and compare it with what Hegel says
      > about
      > > >>the Jesuits you can see how differentiated Hegel's thought about the
      > > >>relationship between the state and church was already at this time and
      > > >>how he treats Kant's abstract dualistic thinking about this ("......
      > > >>leave each other in peace without mixing themselves together"). The
      > > >>Jesuit leaves the state in peace but defrauds it of the civil virtues
      > > >>through his (absolute and abstract) inwardness of the freedom of
      > > >>conscience (which then will be occupied by absolute and casuistical
      > > >>convictions). In contrast, Hegel continues, if the state retains its
      > > >>whole, that is, if it is absolute and excludes the church with force
      > > >>then it becomes inhuman and egregious and produces fanatism which sees
      > > >>the human relationships within the state only and therefore destroys
      > > >>these relationships and with them also the state itself. Hegel, quite
      > > >>distinct from Kant, thinks dynamically and therefore can predict what
      > > >>happens if Kants's thought were actualized without further
      > considerations.
      > > >>Regards,
      > > >>Beat Greuter
      > > >>
      > > >>The basic dissenting idea was that the force of the state can
      > enforce the
      > > >>law, outward observance, but is not an appropriate means to work
      > on the
      > > >>heart, which is the intended
      > > >>province of the church and about which various theories emerged. This
      > > >>seems
      > > >>much clearer than the above meanderings and in agreement with Kant, as
      > > >>indeed with Constantine when he permitted the Pagans and
      > Christians their
      > > >>rites. Hegel just seems confused here and to be using both "extremes"
      > > >>as a
      > > >>foil for his own views. I think the time to take the issue up
      > seriously
      > > >>will be in connection with the Philosophy of Right, so for now I will
      > > >>get on
      > > >>with the next chapter.
      > > >>All the best
      > > >>Stephen Cowley
      > > >>-----Original Message-----
      > > >>From: stephen theron
      > > >>Sent: Sunday, November 21, 2010 8:59 PM
      > > >>To: hegel hegel
      > > >>Subject: RE: [hegel] Rosenkranz on Hegel (17 of 67)
      > > >>Dear Stephen C.,
      > > >>Although not (yet) so well versed in Hegel´s political philosophy
      > I would
      > > >>like to take you up on a point you make when you say that his view
      > of the
      > > >>church as "all-encompassing" seems mistaken. Your objection I
      > > >>understand as
      > > >>in the Augustinian tradition of the two cities, hoping I read you
      > right. I
      > > >>would think Hegel's objecting to seeing church and state as unrelated
      > > >>would
      > > >>relate to his objections against abstraction, as indeed a not taking
      > > >>seriously or concretely. You can call it "principled" of course and it
      > > >>raises all the problems of the 1500 year Constantinian settlement.
      > > >>But he is surely on the right path in seeing the church as
      > > >>"all-encompassing", if it is anything at all. I think of Herbert
      > McCabe OP
      > > >>once writing on baptism that it is not "membership of the church" but
      > > >>membership of the (redeemed) human race, in its intention. Well, the
      > > >>church
      > > >>is of course a sacrament, not the actual mystical body and kingdom
      > of God,
      > > >>or this is the more recent line (though no need to reject Pius XII's
      > > >>Mystici
      > > >>corporis (1944) outright).
      > > >>In a similar way (church as sacrament only) he says the believing
      > > >>community
      > > >>does not fully grasp its own nature. Implicitly, there, he places us
      > > >>all in
      > > >>this community in a kind of universalism such as finds much
      > support in the
      > > >>canonical writings and authors. This is implied by philosophy's
      > > >>"accomplishing" religion.
      > > >>My only point here is that I think I am interpreting Hegel. There
      > is much
      > > >>more that could be said. I think Hegel is quite capable of
      > distinguishing
      > > >>church and state (abstractly!). What he objects to is separating them.
      > > >>There, he thinks, you trivialise the church. I am not talking at
      > the level
      > > >>of America versus England (established church) or something. One might
      > > >>want
      > > >>to say it is rather the state than the church that he sees
      > > >>all-encompassing
      > > >>but just therein taking on spiritual features, God on earth as he
      > says,
      > > >>somewhat alarmingly maybe. Basically, when we think church we
      > should think
      > > >>humanity, Spirit. That's the main idea I think. Glad of your comments
      > > >>if any
      > > >>occur.
      > > >>Stephen T.
      > > >>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com><mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > > >>From: stephen.cowley@...
      > > >><mailto:stephen.cowley%40blueyonder.co.uk>
      > > >>Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 11:53:02 +0000
      > > >>Subject: Re: [hegel] Rosenkranz on Hegel (17 of 67)
      > > >>Hi,
      > > >>Another chapter summary and an inadequate response to recent comments:
      > > >>Responses
      > > >>There does not seem to be any reference in Rosenkranz to the ?earliest
      > > >>system-program?, perhaps because of doubts about authorship or
      > because he
      > > >>did not have access to it. I seem to recall that the authorship
      > was still
      > > >>under dispute a few years ago and HS Harris discusses it in ?Hegel?s
      > > >>Development?. There?s a translation in ?Miscellaneous Writings of GWF
      > > >>Hegel?
      > > >>(ed. J Stewart. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 2002) and I agree that
      > it seems
      > > >>much more out of character for Hegel than it would be for Schelling.
      > > >>Rosenkranz tends to see Hegel and Schelling as opposed figures -
      > more on
      > > >>which later. I find Beat?s very abstract characterisation of ?the?
      > problem
      > > >>of philosophy in the 1790s as the ?relation of identity and
      > > >>non-identity? a
      > > >>bit obscure to say the least, though I?d be interested to hear more.
      > > >>As for Sinclair, Rosenkranz does in a letter relate Hölderlin and
      > Sinclair
      > > >>(1775-1815) together and Hegel certainly thought well of Sinclair.
      > > >>Rosenkranz later discusses a correspondence between them in detail and
      > > >>notes
      > > >>that much of of it has been lost. Apparently Sinclair?s book uses the
      > > >>concept of doubt as a middle term between certainty and its
      > opposite and
      > > >>surveys self, world and God from a standpoint that sees doubt as a
      > > >>road into
      > > >>science. There was a book by Glen Magee on ?Hegel and the Hermetic
      > > >>Tradition?
      > > >>(Cornell UP, 2008) that was discussed on the list some years ago and
      > > >>may be
      > > >>relevant to the alleged hocus-pocus side of things. My general view is
      > > >>that
      > > >>Hegel?s focus is firmly on the common high-road of reason so a
      > book with
      > > >>that title is likely to teach more about the hermetic tradition
      > than about
      > > >>Hegel, though I may be doing Magee an injustice as I took things no
      > > >>further.
      > > >>Rosenkranz certainly includes Meister Eckhardt and Jacob Boehme
      > amongst
      > > >>Hegel?s reading and I think they at least were an influence.
      > > >>Rosenkranz Hegel?s Leben (1844)
      > > >>Part 1 Chapter 17
      > > >>Political Studies
      > > >>R summarises Hegel?s political experience at this time by noting that
      > > >>he was
      > > >>from a civil service family and had seen a university town at
      > Tübingen and
      > > >>then a patriarchal hereditary aristocracy at Berne. Frankfurt in
      > contrast,
      > > >>was run by a monied merchant aristocracy. Hegel admired the (mixed)
      > > >>English
      > > >>constitution, as was then common, and also the development of
      > commercial
      > > >>relations there. He followed debates on the English poor law in
      > > >>journals (R
      > > >>doesn?t mention which ones, which is a shame as they?re mostly
      > available
      > > >>online these days) and the Prussian civil code. He also knew of
      > > >>arguments on
      > > >>penal sanctions including solitary confinement. (If I might interject
      > > >>here,
      > > >>this is very probably a reference to the English prison reformer
      > > >>Howard, who
      > > >>sought to reform prisons by instituting solitary confinement,
      > which proved
      > > >>worse for prisoners than some of the punishments it replaced, though
      > > >>it was
      > > >>well-intended.)
      > > >>In Frankfurt, Hegel wrote a commentary on Steuart?s ?Principles of
      > > >>Political
      > > >>Economy? (1767) using the German translation (Tübingen, 1769-72). Osmo
      > > >>says
      > > >>this commentary is now lost. It is important that not all Hegel?s
      > writings
      > > >>have come down to us and Rosenkranz is a valuable source of
      > information on
      > > >>the lost material. For example, this lost commentary justifies
      > Laurence
      > > >>Dickey?s use of a comparison with Steuart that is also developed in P
      > > >>Chamley ?Economie Politique et Philosophie chez Steuart et Hegel?
      > (Paris,
      > > >>1963). It suggests to me that Hegel was perhaps out of step with
      > the main
      > > >>line of liberal thought on the subject deriving from Adam Smith.
      > The lost
      > > >>commentary addressed several aspects of civil society that reappear
      > > >>only in
      > > >>the Philosophy of Right (1821) including:
      > > >>division of labour
      > > >>state power
      > > >>poor relief and police
      > > >>taxation.
      > > >>There also dates from this time summaries of Kant?s ?Critique of
      > Practical
      > > >>Reason? (1788) and Kant?s other late legal and moral writings
      > (i.e. the
      > > >>?Metaphysic of Morals?). As in his later published views, Hegel
      > thought
      > > >>there was an original unity of morality and positive law which he
      > > >>expressed
      > > >>by the terms Leben (?life?) and Sittlichkeit (usually translated as
      > > >>?ethics?).
      > > >>He disliked the degradation of nature implied in absolutism of Kant?s
      > > >>morality of duty. He also takes issue with Kant?s doctrines of law and
      > > >>morality that leave state and church mutually independent. For
      > Hegel the
      > > >>church is all-encompassing and to see church and state as unrelated is
      > > >>simply not to take one of them seriously. (If I might interject
      > here, this
      > > >>strikes me as completely mistaken as it confuses a principled refusal
      > > >>of the
      > > >>church to operate by force with a lack of seriousness. This was a live
      > > >>issue
      > > >>in much of Europe at this time.)
      > > >>Also in the Frankfurt period, Hegel worked on an essay on ?The German
      > > >>Constitution?. Here he vaguely contrasts an indeterminate outward hope
      > > >>with
      > > >>an enduring outward political reality that is inadequate to it.
      > The German
      > > >>emperor has ceased to be a source of law (?Recht?) and has
      > declined to a
      > > >>particular amongst particulars; whereas the character of law is to be
      > > >>universal. This universal in Germany is thus present only as thought,
      > > >>not as
      > > >>effective reality. (To interject again: this was translated by TM
      > Knox and
      > > >>if I recall rightly also contains quite a bit of empirical material.)
      > > >>Finally, Hegel also wrote in a more practical political vein an essay
      > > >>?That
      > > >>the Württemberg Magistrates should be elected by the People?. However,
      > > >>friends suggested revisions and then advised against publication.
      > > >>Rosenkranz
      > > >>describes him as wavering between Plato and Rousseau (I?m note
      > sure what
      > > >>that means). He evokes general images of hypocrisy setting aside
      > justice
      > > >>through self-interest ? that sounds like the the sort of youthful
      > idealism
      > > >>that he later characterised in ?Virtue and the Way of the World?.
      > However,
      > > >>the text has been more adequately commented on elsewhere, so I will
      > > >>hold my
      > > >>horses.
      > > >>More to follow
      > > >>Stephen Cowley
      > > >>From: Stephen Cowley
      > > >>Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2010 7:46 PM
      > > >>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com><mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > > >>Subject: Re: [hegel] Rosenkranz on Hegel (16 of 67)
      > > >>Hi,
      > > >>General response
      > > >>Thanks again to Beat and to Bob for his partial translation. I have
      > > >>long had
      > > >>the idea that thought and being coincide with the cogito (though
      > only as a
      > > >>kind of coincidence of philosophical grammar) and in the ontological
      > > >>argument and perhaps in the confrontation of self and non-self in the
      > > >>sense
      > > >>of touch, but that there must remain a large area between given
      > over to
      > > >>empirical investigation. I gather this is contained in Bachmann?s
      > response
      > > >>to Rosenkranz. However, I must keep going with Rosenkranz, as he
      > addresses
      > > >>something of these critical responses to Hegel as he explains how
      > Hegel?s
      > > >>ideas developed. This is interspersed with purely biographical
      > material.
      > > >>Rosenkranz: Hegels Leben - Part 1 chapter 16
      > > >>Life as a Tutor in Frankfurt-am-Main: New Year 1797 to end of 1800
      > > >>After his period in Berne in Switzerland, Hegel returned to his
      > family in
      > > >>Stuttgart where, we have it from his sister, he was withdrawn and
      > > >>morose. He
      > > >>then proceeded on northwards up to Frankfurt, hoping for more leisure,
      > > >>books
      > > >>and stimulating companionship. He stayed with a merchant family
      > the Gogels
      > > >>in the Roßmarkt ? I daresay the RAF bombed this flat in the war, but I
      > > >>think
      > > >>Goethe?s house survived, so you never know. Rosenkranz points out
      > that the
      > > >>same town was the cradle both of Goethe?s poetry and Hegel?s
      > philosophy.
      > > >>However, it appears later that he misallocates some texts from the
      > Jena
      > > >>period to Frankfurt, so that conclusion is not quite sound. Nor is his
      > > >>conclusion that Hegel did indeed have more leisure in Frankfurt for
      > > >>the same
      > > >>reason, though it may be true nonetheless. The fact that his
      > sister?s view
      > > >>is not corroborated might allow for a more favourable view of the
      > Berne
      > > >>period too, but Beat & Kai say that the Berne period has been
      > > >>investigated
      > > >>on its own account subsequently.
      > > >>In Frankfurt, says Rosenkranz, Hegel?s speculative talent took wing
      > > >>and his
      > > >>political ambitions were kept alive. However, again the
      > misallocation of
      > > >>texts casts doubt on the former of these assertions. Politically,
      > a friend
      > > >>died at the battle of Wagram fighting Napoleon in a Hessian regiment.
      > > >>Hegel met Hölderlin again and witnessed his ?catastrophic? affair with
      > > >>Suzette. He also met a Herr Sinclair who expressed concern about the
      > > >>subjectivity of idealism. He also met many other people who are less
      > > >>remembered. Sinclair later expressed his ideas in a book Truth and
      > > >>Certainty
      > > >>(1811). Hegel was receptive to such ?Christian romanticism? as
      > Rosenkranz
      > > >>describes it. I don?t think Sinclair has ever been much discussed in
      > > >>English.
      > > >>Rosenkranz describes Hegel?s thought as having moved on from
      > > >>rationalism and
      > > >>Fichte to a ?speculative mysticism? at this time. Again the apparent
      > > >>misdating of texts vitiates the reliability of this conclusion. Hegel
      > > >>spoke
      > > >>of Ceres, goddess of grain (fertility) in his early poem Eleusis
      > and now
      > > >>turns to nature-poetry. In one striking image, he says ?spring
      > > >>menaces...?;
      > > >>and in another that nature in winter is in mourning. This perhaps
      > presages
      > > >>his willingness to read meanings into natural phenomena, though of
      > > >>course it
      > > >>doesn?t justify it.
      > > >>More to follow
      > > >>Stephen Cowley
      > > >>From: Beat Greuter
      > > >>Sent: Monday, November 15, 2010 10:54 AM
      > > >>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      > <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com><mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > > >>Subject: Re: [hegel] Rosenkranz on Hegel (15 of 67)
      > > >>Stephen Cowley writes:
      > > >>
      > > >>Hi,
      > > >>Firstly, a reply to Beat and then a summary of the next brief chapter
      > > >>of Rosenkranz:
      > > >>Note on Bachmann (reply to Beat)
      > > >>Beat,
      > > >>Many thanks for the corrections and supplementary information ? I was
      > > >>having problems reading my own writing. Pierre Osmo gives a certain
      > > >>amount of information about Karl Friedrich Bachmann (1785-1855) who is
      > > >>mentioned several times in Rosenkranz?s book. In addition to citing
      > > >>the comparison with Aristotle, Rosenkranz particularly mentions
      > > >>Bachmann as one of 30 students attending Hegel?s Winter 1804 course in
      > > >>Jena that covered his whole system. He later notes Hegel?s gratitude
      > > >>for Bachmann?s early positive account of the Phenomenology in the
      > > >>Heidelberger Jahrbücher (1810). In 1858 in his reply to Haym,
      > > >>Rosenkranz also names Bachmann as one of five protestant polemicists
      > > >>which Osmo takes to refer to his book ?Anti-Hegel? (1835) which
      > > >>provoked a reply from Feuerbach as his earlier one did from Rosenkranz
      > > >>himself.
      > > >>All this adds to my knowledge of the richness of early German
      > > >>reactions to Hegel. Bachmann?s use of ?formal logic? sounds similar to
      > > >>the early work of Trendelenberg on Aristotle that took an
      > > >>anti-Hegelian line. Frege comes at things from a more abstract,
      > > >>Meinongian angle, as far as I remember. Rosenkranz?s own view (which I
      > > >>will come to later) is that mind is a central concept for Hegel with
      > > >>propositional thinking an offshoot of this. Bachmann seems to have
      > > >>moved from comparing Hegel with Aristotle on the grounds of his
      > > >>interest in worldly matters of fact to contrasting him with Aristotle
      > > >>for not doing justice to the meaning of fixed terms ? but as I don?t
      > > >>have access to the original texts I can?t usefully comment further.
      > > >>
      > > >>On the following webside you can find the Google books written by
      > > >>Bachmann. I do not think that there are English translations.
      > >
      > >>http://www.google.de/search?tbs=bks%3A1&tbo=1&q=Carl+Friedrich+Bachmann&btnG=Nach+B%C3%BCchern+suchen
      > <http://www.google.de/search?tbs=bks%3A1&tbo=1&q=Carl+Friedrich+Bachmann&btnG=Nach+B%C3%BCchern+suchen>
      > >
      > >><http://www.google.de/search?tbs=bks%3A1&tbo=1&q=Carl+Friedrich+Bachmann&btnG=Nach+B%C3%BCchern+suchen
      > <http://www.google.de/search?tbs=bks%3A1&tbo=1&q=Carl+Friedrich+Bachmann&btnG=Nach+B%C3%BCchern+suchen>>
      > > >>I also find out that Bachmann's "Anti Hegel" (1835) was an answer to
      > > >>Rosenkranz's "Sendschreiben" I mentioned before. I quote here one
      > > >>extraordinary passage from this answer. A Hegelian or somebody who
      > knows
      > > >>Hegel's work well should be able to give an answer on this?
      > > >>"Wie kommt nun Hegel dazu, im diametralen Gegensatze zu diesen
      > > >>Thatsachen die absolute Identität des Denkens und Seyns zu behaupten,
      > > >>und zu versichren: der Gedanke sei die Sache an sich selbst, die Logik
      > > >>sei das System der reinen Vernunft,! des absoluten Denkens und
      > Wissens,
      > > >>die Wahrheit ohne alle Hülle, eine Darstellung Gottes selbst in seinem
      > > >>ewigen Wesen vor der Erschaffung der Natur und des endlichen Geistes?
      > > >>Das System der logischen Kategorien, die abstracte Idee, das reine
      > Seyn,
      > > >>in seiner Dialectik sich fortbewegend zum Werden, Daseyn / Für
      > sich seyn
      > > >>, zur Größe zc. sei das ewige Reich des Vaters; der durch den
      > logischen
      > > >>Prozeß sich dirimirend zum Sohn , und in seiner Rückkehr zu sich
      > selbst
      > > >>aus diesem Verlorenseyn zum heiligen Geiste wird? Waltet hier nicht
      > > >>augenscheinlich ein ungeheuerer Irrthum ob? und wenn nicht eine
      > > >>übermüthige Verachtung, so doch gewiß eine unbewußte Vernichtung aller
      > > >>Denkgesetze? In diesen transscendenten Dogmen ist ja gar nichts
      > mehr von
      > > >>einem Factum, oder von Schlüssen aus Thatsachen , oder vom
      > menschlichen
      > > >>Denken die Rede; sondern von dem göttlichen. Wie kommt nun Hegel zu
      > > >>diesem entsetzlichen, verzweifelten Sprunge? Wo liegt der Beweis von
      > > >>dieser absoluten Identitat des Denkes und Seyns? Ums Himmels Willen,
      > > >>haben Sie doch die Güte, mir die Seite der Schrift zu nennen, wo
      > > >>derselbe geführt worden! Sind es nicht vielmehr überall
      > Versicherungen,
      > > >>Decrete eines Selbstherrschers im Reiche der Gedanken an seine
      > > >>Unterthanen, Mit der Unterschrift: Ich, der König, gegeben in unserer
      > > >>Residenz auf dem Kupfergraben in Berlin; wornach sich jedermann zu
      > > >>achten. Und welche Geringschätzung des Publicums liegt darin!
      > Halten Sie
      > > >>und Ihre Schule uns andere für Kinder oder unverstandige Knaben, die
      > > >>diese goldenen Kalber anbeten, diese Tyrannei des Gedankens ertragen
      > > >>sollen? Was müßte die Nachwelt von uns denken, wenn man im neunzehnten
      > > >>Jahrhunderte dem Zeitalter so etwas geboten hatte, ohne daß Manner
      > > >>dagegen aufgetreten wären. Und Sie lieber Rosenkranz, Sie setzen auf
      > > >>derselben Seite Ihrer Schrift (Seite 40) das göttliche und menschliche
      > > >>Denken unmittelbar nebeneinander, ohne die leiseste Ahndung einer
      > > >>Differenz beider. Für Sie sind die Worte Ihres Meisters Befehle, seine
      > > >>Gedanken Gesetze der Wissenschaft, Maaß und Richtschnur aller
      > > >>vernünftigen Wesen." (p 58)
      > > >>Regards,
      > > >>Beat Greuter
      > > >>
      > > >>Rosenkranz: Hegels Leben (1844)
      > > >>Part 1 Chapter 15 ? Correspondence of Hegel with Hölderlin
      > > >>Rosenkranz (?R?) recounts how Hölderlin found another tutoring job for
      > > >>Hegel at Frankfurt-an-Main in Western Germany which Hegel accepted on
      > > >>Hölderlin?s word ? a bit of a hostage to fortune you would think and
      > > >>the reader is left waiting to see how things turn out in Frankfurt.
      > > >>R reproduces a letter from Hegel in this connection that he dates to
      > > >>summer 1796, but Osmo thinks this should be corrected to November 1796
      > > >>as it replies to one dated October 1796 from Hölderlin. In the letter,
      > > >>Hegel writes that a teacher should form character, but can only do so
      > > >>in harmony with the parents and he comes across as quite insightful
      > > >>and speaking from experience, which of course he was. He is happy to
      > > >>rely on Hölderlin as regards salary, which sounds like naivety
      > > >>speaking. The family with whom he is to stay are the Gogels.
      > > >>Finally, R reproduces Hegel?s poem Eleusis which he dates to August
      > > >>1796 and interprets it in the context of his affection for Hölderlin.
      > > >>Osmo notes that Jacques d?Hondt disputes this interpretation and sees
      > > >>the significance of the poem as ?free-masonic?, which strikes me as a
      > > >>bit far fetched as a contrast given that it?s inscribed ?To
      > > >>Hölderlin?, but you never know. (Osmo cites d?Hondt?s ?Hegel: a
      > > >>biography? (1998) for this and thinks d'Hondt ?profoundly reworked?
      > > >>our ideas of Hegel over many years.) Osmo notes also that the revised
      > > >>date of the letter might separate it from the poem.
      > > >>In the lines of the poem itself, Hegel refers to the freedom and
      > > >>leisure that night gives him from the busy-ness of the daylight world
      > > >>(an echo of his overburdened working hours at Berne, perhaps). He
      > > >>wants ?free truth? and not peace with dogmas ? the scholar may seek
      > > >>only love and wisdom, rather than being a toy of the merchant or
      > > >>sophist ? and Hegel worries over his ability to speak what he has
      > > >>discerned of the infinite. Again, the chapter breaks off with the end
      > > >>of the poem.
      > > >>More to follow
      > > >>Stephen Cowley
      > > >>From: Beat Greuter
      > > >>Sent: Friday, November 12, 2010 9:27 AM
      > > >>To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com<mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > > >>Subject: Re: [hegel] Rosenkranz on Hegel (14 of 67)
      > > >>Stephen Cowley writes:
      > > >>
      > > >>Hi,
      > > >>This is another edition to my chapter by chapter summary of
      > > >>Rosenkranz? (hereafter ?R?) Life of Hegel (1844). To any who wish to
      > > >>follow earlier posts, they are below. It occurs to me that it might be
      > > >>better to put this material on a blog, but there is probably not much
      > > >>in it and who reads other people?s blogs anyway.
      > > >>Part 1 Chapter 14 Correspondence of Hegel and Schelling (1794-95)
      > > >>This chapter features four early letters of Hegel to Schelling from
      > > >>Hegel?s Berne period, that is, before the famous one shortly before he
      > > >>joined Schelling in Jena. Part 1 of R?s book covers the period prior
      > > >>to the move to Jena around 1800 when his public life began. One
      > > >>interesting thing about these chapters is the degree to which they
      > > >>reproduce material often thought of as not printed until the 20th
      > > >>century by Nohl and others in Germany. In fact, much of it was
      > > >>available in Rosenkranz (R), either in summary or in the original. The
      > > >>other main interesting point is R?s own take on Hegel?s development,
      > > >>often in pithy remarks at the start of the chapters.
      > > >>R begins by observing that, while Hegel was deepening his knowledge by
      > > >>reflecting on his reading, he did this at this time without outward
      > > >>violence of changes of direction. Hegel progresses, rather than
      > > >>skipping from extreme to extreme, he puts it. To my mind, this
      > > >>indicates some mix of a historical method and a placid or scholarly
      > > >>temper in Hegel that stays close to the facts he is absorbing. R also
      > > >>expresses this by saying that Hegel ?made himself a stranger to
      > > >>himself?, proceeding by observation.
      > > >>Whilst in Berne, Hegel absorbed Schelling, Kant and Fichte, Plato,
      > > >>Aristotle and Spinoza. Of course, many of Fichte and more so
      > > >>Schelling?s works were still to appear at this point. Next, R
      > > >>illustrates his view of Hegel by a comparison with Schelling, citing a
      > > >>Buchmann who in 1810 compared Schelling to Plato and Hegel to
      > > >>
      > > >>Aristotle.
      > > >>
      > > >>It is not a 'Buchmann' but Carl Friedrich Bachmann (1785-1855) who
      > > >>listened to Schelling and Hegel as a young man still in Jena. Your
      > cited
      > > >>passage on Schelling and Hegel was written in the Heidelberger
      > > >>Jahrbücher 1810 when he was still a Schelling and Hegel scholar. Later
      > > >>Bachmann wrote a book on "System der Logik" (1828) based on
      > Aristotelian
      > > >>logic. After Hegel's death he wrote another book "Ueber Hegel's System
      > > >>und die Notwendigkeit einer nochmaligen Umgestaltung der Philosophie"
      > > >>(1833) where he repeated that the system of philosophy by Hegel
      > has not
      > > >>yet come to an end. He wrote also a polemic against the Hegelians
      > > >>("Anti-Hegel", 1835) who got for a short time much influence at the
      > > >>universities. He became very critical to Hegel's philosophy and as a
      > > >>basic error he mentioned the assumption of the identity of thought and
      > > >>being. This was an attack of the idea of a formal logic against
      > Hegel's
      > > >>ontological logic, an idea which later with Frege's modern logic
      > and his
      > > >>followers succeeded.
      > > >>It is very interesting that it was just Karl Rosenkranz - 10 years
      > > >>before he wrote his Hegel biography - who replied to Bachman's "Ueber
      > > >>Hegel's System und die Notwendigkeit einer nochmalige Umgestaltung der
      > > >>Philosophie". Bachmann was at this time - what an irony of destiny - a
      > > >>professor for philosophy at the university of Jena while
      > Rosenkranz had
      > > >>the same position in Königsberg, one of Kant's successor. Rosenkranz
      > > >>entitled his reply a "Sendschreiben an den Hofrath und Professor der
      > > >>Philosophie, Herrn Dr. Carl Friedrich Bachmann in Jena" (1834). The
      > > >>'Sendschreiben' is very polemic and begins with:
      > > >>"Daß man Ihre [Bachmann] Schrift als den Damm preisen werde, an dessen
      > > >>Festigkeit die überschwemmenden Fluthen Hegelscher Philosophie sich
      > > >>brechen, dürfen Sie zuversichtlich erwarten. Auch wegen der Humanität
      > > >>Ihres Tones wird man Sie loben. Meine Entgegnung wird man theils
      > als die
      > > >>letzten Anstrengungen des bösen Gewissens verschreien, daß die
      > Hegeische
      > > >>Philosophie doch nicht das sei, wofür sie sich halte, theils wegen
      > ihrer
      > > >>Form verachten, denn Ihre Gemessenheit werde ich nicht festhalten
      > > >>können. Es ist wahr, Sie sind nirgends grob gewesen ? aber boshaft,
      > > >>vielleicht, das gebe ich zu, in aller Unschuld; Sie wußten nicht, was
      > > >>Sie thaten; Sie sind immer in den Grenzen des Anstandes geblieben, wie
      > > >>die beliebte Formel lautet ? aber welche lügenhaften Dinge haben
      > Sie in
      > > >>diesem anständigen Gewande zu sagen sich erdreistet! S. 34 klagen Sie
      > > >>über den Ton, den Schelling in seiner Polemik gegen Reinhold 1802 mit
      > > >>der Philosophie angestimmt habe und finden darin eine gemüthlose,
      > > >>gemeine Gesinnung. Ich versichere Sie, daß Niederträchtigkeit,
      > Leerheit
      > > >>der Gesinnung auch in der zierlichsten Form erscheinen kann und
      > daß ich
      > > >>von Herzen wünsche, unsere Literatur möchte mehr solcher groben
      > > >>Beurtheilungen haben; statt der breiten und eleganten Höflichkeit, mit
      > > >>welcher, seltene Ausnahmen abgerechnet, in unseren Journalen die
      > Kritik
      > > >>der Philosophie gehandhabt zu werden pflegt, würde eine solche derbe
      > > >>Sprache doch zuweilen durchgreifen; die Barbarei würde unserer Cultur
      > > >>aufhelfen." (p 2)
      > > >>Rosenkranz anticipated already 1834 the speedy decline of Hegel's
      > > >>philosophy, of Hegel's ontology.
      > > >>Regards,
      > > >>Beat Greuter
      > > >>
      > > >>this was taken up in English by Hutcheson Stirling in his Secret of
      > > >>Hegel (1865). R says Schelling broke with subjective idealism, but
      > > >>often only by way of presentiment: quoting poets and using scholastic
      > > >>terms (often in Latin). Schelling was awarded a doctorate in 1792 and
      > > >>published in 1793. Hegel wrote to him the following year. R reproduces
      > > >>Hegel?s letters but not Schelling?s replies ? Schelling was still
      > > >>alive at this point of course and still harboured some resentment
      > > >>against Hegel and may not have permitted this. Of the four letters:
      > > >>The first letter (Dec 1794) amounts to little. Hegel writes to renew
      > > >>acquaintance, asks about a position and about responses to Kant on
      > > >>religion, news of the French guillotine, etc. Schelling replies.
      > > >>The second (Jan 1795) observes that he (Hegel) has been studying Kant
      > > >>and thinks it would be ?interesting? to disturb ?the theologians? in
      > > >>their ?gothic temple? with Kantian ideas. He mentions Fichte?s
      > > >>Critique of All Revelation (1792) that was at first mistaken for a
      > > >>work of Kant?s. He asks how far, starting from the Kantian moral law
      > > >>we might revise the idea of God. He still speaks of reason, freedom
      > > >>and the ?invisible church? as watchwords. Schelling replies.
      > > >>The third letter (April 1795) turns to politics and speaks
      > > >>contemptuously of a self-electing ?sovereign council?. He predicts
      > > >>that Kant will cause a revolution of ideas in Germany, though the idea
      > > >>of God as ?absolute self? will remain esoteric. He has been studying
      > > >>Kant?s ?postulates of practical reason? (that is, God, freedom and
      > > >>immortality) along with some printed sheets of Schelling and intends
      > > >>to go further into Fichte?s Wissenschaftslehre (1794), saying that
      > > >>people will be taken by vertigo by the extreme altitude from which
      > > >>Fichte writes. The ideas of human dignity and freedom have taken root
      > > >>and in this sense he relates his political experiences to the
      > > >>significance he attributes to Kant?s philosophy. Here philosophical
      > > >>proof, religion and politics go hand in hand. He disapproves of the
      > > >>fact that the Church taught human depravity to the benefit of
      > > >>despotism. (If I might interject a comment here, this is early
      > > >>evidence of the ?revolution of ideas? mentioned in the Science of
      > > >>Logic and elsewhere being that inaugurated by Kant and which he
      > > >>associates political reform. It also strikes me as a bit hard on the
      > > >>Church, given that the rulers were subject to original sin as much as
      > > >>the ruled, but we must allow Hegel to speak to his own experience.)
      > > >>Hegel also refers to Schiller?s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of
      > > >>Man and mentions that Hölderlin has been studying under Fichte at
      > > >>
      > > >>Jena.
      > > >>
      > > >>The fourth letter (August 1795) mentions Schelling?s early writings
      > > >>?The Self as Principle of Philosophy? and ?The Possibility of a Form
      > > >>of Philosophy in General? and is worried that people will not give up
      > > >>the idea of a not-self readily even when Kant?s ideas hit home. (If I
      > > >>might interject again, this seems plausible enough and has been one of
      > > >>the central weaknesses of the German idealist tradition from then to
      > > >>now.) Hegel mentions rumblings against Fichte in Jena and
      > > >>interestingly describes himself as being weak on Church history. The
      > > >>chapter breaks off with the end of this fourth letter.
      > > >>More to follow
      > > >>All the best
      > > >>Stephen Cowley
      > > >>From: Stephen Cowley
      > > >>Sent: Sunday, September 19, 2010 11:17 AM
      > > >>To: mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com<mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > > >>Subject: Re: [hegel] Rosenkranz on Hegel 7 (13 of 67)
      > > >>Hi,
      > > >>Thanks to Beat for the helpful remarks about Hegel and Switzerland.
      > > >>Osmo says that the Swiss travel journal was later published in French
      > > >>so I'm not sure whether or when or in what sense it was lost.
      > >From the
      > > >>references Beat gives to Kai's Hegel site, it is apparent that Hegel's
      > > >>time in Switzerland has been researched since Rosenkranz. I will
      > > >>continue to summarise what I think is new or distinctive about
      > > >>Rosenkranz's biography of Hegel, with enough context to make my
      > > >>comments intelligible on their own:
      > > >>Rosenkranz' Hegels Leben Book 1 Chapter 13
      > > >>Theological and Historical Studies of the Swiss Period
      > > >>Rosenkranz ("R") remarks that Hegel's works are products of an
      > > >>artistry that places an individual fact in a universal context;
      > > >>Schelling's in contrast are more spontaneous effusions of the joy of
      > > >>discovery. He intersperses his narrative with interesting comments of
      > > >>this kind. He discusses theology and history turn about.
      > > >>Theology
      > > >>R notes that in Switzerland Hegel "emancipated himself completely from
      > > >>the dead theology of Tübingen". Of course, this isn't very flattering
      > > >>about Tübingen. R glosses this by saying that the idea of "love"
      > > >>became central to Hegel, which he conceived as a "being with oneself
      > > >>in another" (meaning identification I guess) as indicated by Christ.
      > > >>The "Kingdom of Love" (the Church) was too contracted and mistaken in
      > > >>so far as it cut itself off from science, art and the state, he
      > > >>thought, which is presumably by implication a critique of Tübingen.
      > > >>Hegel develops the idea of a "positive" religion, in which an external
      > > >>authority pronounces on expressions of piety. This refers to the
      > > >>material since published in English in Hegel's Early Theological
      > > >>Writings (ed. Knox, OUP). However, R also describes some of Hegel's
      > > >>background reading, which included:
      > > >>Mosheim (Ecclesiastical History, presumably)
      > > >>Kant
      > > >>Fichte
      > > >>Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus)
      > > >>Marivaux' Novels
      > > >>Mosheim's was the standard Protestant church history of its day and
      > > >>also available in English. Spinoza's work is more valuable than his
      > > >>Ethics in my view and was widely read in Protestant circles (though
      > > >>not uncritically).
      > > >>In the light of the absence of reference to the Old Testament in the
      > > >>Phenomenology, it is interesting to note R's observation that Hegel's
      > > >>opinions on Jewish history fluctuated wildly. Thus he writes on
      > > >>Abraham and Moses in 'The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate',
      > > >>ignores it in the Phenomenology, sees it as close to the German spirit
      > > >>in the Philosophy of Right, likens it to Greece and Rome in the
      > > >>Philosophy of Religion and to Persia in the Philosophy of History.
      > > >>Some of this is explicable by the development of his own views.
      > > >>On Christianity proper, R notes that Klopstock's Messiah had appeared
      > > >>in 1773 along with many similar writings and Hegel too writes a Life
      > > >>of J<br/><br/>(Message over 64 KB, truncated)
    • Artur Jochlik
      It is true that there is no other remarks like that in Hegel s letters. On Sunday, March 20, 2016 8:06 PM, Alan Ponikvar ponikvaraj@gmail.com [hegel]
      Message 49 of 49 , Mar 20, 2016
        It is true that there is no other remarks like that in Hegel's letters.


        On Sunday, March 20, 2016 8:06 PM, "'Alan Ponikvar' ponikvaraj@... [hegel]" <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:


         
        Allusions need be nothing more than that.
         
        I see no need to make anything of this.
         
        -          Alan
        From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com]
        Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2016 8:59 AM
        To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
        Subject: Re: [hegel] Sinclair
         
         
        But on the other hand we have this little quote, from page 572 of the letters. It comes from a letter to von Baader (January 19, 1824):
         
        “The sore point with which our age and our North are afflicted you yourself have accurately hit upon and very well characterized as religious Kotzebuanism. It will not shrink from offering resistance, though resistance of a peculiar nature. Here we indeed have world-wisdom to use the label with which these people again affect to designate philosophy – which has thus severed itself from form as well as content, and has swept its house clean [la maison nette]. The hangman, while not merely riding the [horse of] world-wisdom religiously, does not do so in a purely nonreligious manner either. He does so to try his hand at theology as well, and thus to despise and contest content and thoughts alike, bearing spiritless witness to conceits, to subjective as well as objective futilities of grammatical, historical, and still other sorts. The resistance [in question] thus becomes the force of inertia against the concept, the force of conceit against it, as at once activity directed at reversing rather than apprehending it, bedeviling [bekratzen] it with the scabs it inflicts upon it”.
         
        Hegel is writing about the hangman as if it was a well known topic to von Baader. Salem Tarot: The Hanged Man We need to keep in mind that Hegel loved to spend his time with cards and that he was not alone in his passion.
         
        In a letter to Goethe (page 701, August 2, 1821) we read:
         
        “What can this cup be but the all-embracing transparent enclosure by the yellow belt of the Zodiac adorned with the Twelve Signs in gold. Turned as much toward the radiant Ahura-Mazda as toward the darkness of Ahriman, this zodiacal belt brings to manifestation the whole variegated world of colors”.
         
        Hegel was aware of esoterism, and so was Newton. But we need to understand that the term esoterism and occultism was coined only by Eliphas Levi, just in age of positivism. It was made popular only from the time of Helena Blavatsky, that is: after the time of Hegel. I get the impression that what we understand as esoterism was in modern times up to the times of Hegel something that the well educated people would not be ashamed of.
         
        Sincerely,
        Artur
         
         


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