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Re: [hegel] hegel and Anstoss

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  • Beat Greuter
    ... Why do you write this to me? Does going back to Kant exclude that Hegel goes beyond Kant and thereby also adopts thoughts of Fichte and Schelling? If you
    Message 1 of 49 , Dec 4, 2010
      John Bardis writes:

      >
      >
      > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
      > Greuter <greuterb@...> wrote:
      > >
      >
      > > This is outrageous! Hegel has overcome Kant and found absolute
      > > knowledge!!! Hundred, thousands, millions of people have state the same
      > > since Hegel's death and even before. Because of this Hegel's philosophy
      > > declined short after his death and neo-Kantianism and later Analytical
      > > Philosophy arised from this destruction. It took about almost two
      > > centuries to overcome this prejudice. And now, in one sentence, Stephen
      > > Theron and Berdyaev do eliminate the attained. However, what is at
      > stake
      > > here is that Hegel went back again to Kant leaving Schelling and also
      > > Fichte behind for renewing Kant's project of a critical epistimology
      > > which because of its dualism with two absolutes against each other
      > could
      > > not really integrate the critical moment of thinking. With your
      > > statement you go back to a metaphysics which takes what it thinks for
      > > granted.
      > >
      >
      > Dear Beat,
      >
      > Hegel deals with force in the Understanding section of the
      > Phenomenology. Then he presents pretty much the same argument in "The
      > Essential Relation" chapter of the SL. In neither case is what he says
      > particularly understandable.
      >
      > The key to understanding what is going on here is supplied, I believe,
      > By Miller in his translation of the SL. There's a word in the
      > sub-section, "The Solicitation of Force" in the SL, that Miller
      > translates as "impulse" and di Giovanni translates as "stimulus".
      > Miller is nice enough to inform us that the word in question is
      > "Anstoss". (I wonder if the word "Anstoss" is also in the Phenomenology?)
      >
      > But "Anstoss" is, of course, a key term in Fichte's philosophy. Fichte
      > derives everything from the I. Perhaps his most controversial doctrine
      > is that of the Anstoss (translated in Fichte as "check"). This Anstoss
      > is not different from the I, because if it were then it would simply
      > be Kant's thing-in-itself, nor is it simply the same as the I, for in
      > that case Fichte's philosophy would simply be solipsim. So the Anstoss
      > is different from but part of the I.
      >
      > It turns out that when what Hegel has to say about all this in the
      > "Solicitation of Force" sub-section is deciphered, he is quite simply
      > agreeing with and restating Fichte's doctrine. Except for one point
      > where he corrects Fichte.
      >
      > Fichte's doctrine of Anstoss requires an infinite striving on the part
      > of the I. If this striving were finite, then no check would be
      > required. But this results in a bad infinite. This relates to Kant's
      > proof of the eternity of the soul, which is a bad infinite, and Fichte
      > follows Kant here.
      >
      > Hegel, while accepting Fichte's doctrine of Anstoss, changes it from a
      > bad infinity to a true infinity. According to Carlson the true
      > infinite is that which becomes its other while remaining itself. So,
      > then, the doctrine of Anstoss fits into this quite readily.
      >
      > So I think Hegel definitely goes beyond Kant, in regard to both of the
      > first two critiques. And he follows Fichte here though correcting him.
      >
      > John
      >

      Why do you write this to me? Does going back to Kant exclude that Hegel
      "goes beyond Kant" and thereby also adopts thoughts of Fichte and
      Schelling? If you think this then certainly you do not understand what
      happens in the history of philosophy and also in Hegel's dialectic. But
      let it be so.

      In the PhdG "Anstoss" appears three times only in para 238 of the
      preliminary thoughts on "Certainty and Truth of Reason" (Chapter V. in
      section C. (AA.) REASON, para 231-239). To understand the deep critique
      of Fichte's Doctrine of Science you have to read the whole preliminary
      passages of this chapter. For understanding also why he had to go back
      to Kant I cite the following text from this important para 238. However,
      for a better understanding of this 'going back to Kant' one has also to
      read Hegel's essay on "Faith and Knowledge" (1802). For this text I have
      no English translation.

      "Its first declaration is merely this abstract, empty phrase that
      everything is its own. For the certainty of being all reality is to
      begin with the pure category. Reason knowing itself in this sense in its
      object is what finds expression in abstract empty idealism [Fichte]; it
      merely takes reason as reason appears at first, and by its pointing out
      that in all being there is this bare consciousness of a "mine", and by
      expressing things as sensations or ideas, it fancies it has shown that
      abstract mine" of consciousness to be complete reality. It is bound,
      therefore, to be at the same time absolute Empiricism, because, for the
      filling of this empty "mine" , i.e. for the element of distinction and
      all the further development and embodiment of it, its reason needs an
      impact (Anstoss) operating from without, in which lies the fons et origo
      of the multiplicity of sensations or ideas. .......... Pure reason as
      conceived by this idealism, if it is to get at this "other" which is
      essential to it, i.e. really is per se, but which it does not possess in
      itself--is thus thrown back on that knowledge which is not a knowledge
      of the real truth. It thus condemns itself knowingly and voluntarily to
      being an untrue kind of knowledge, and cannot get away from "meaning"
      and "perceiving", which for it have no truth at all. It falls into a
      direct contradiction; it asserts that the real has a twofold nature,
      consists of elements in sheer opposition, is the unity of apperception
      and a "thing" as well; whether a thing is called an alien impact, or an
      empirical entity, or sensibility, or the "thing in itself", it remains
      in principle precisely the same, viz. something external and foreign to
      that unity." (PhdG, para 238, translated by J.B. Baillie)

      With the "unity of apperception" Hegel goes back to Kant. Out of this
      unity, as the absolute, the concept has to be developed. Kant tried this
      but he missed it since he left the unity again, threw away the key he
      found, and fell into an a priori dualistic construct taking the
      judgement as the starting point instead of the "unity of apperception".
      Fichte and later Schelling tried to overcome this dualistic relationship
      going into opposite extremes. Fichte: the I as the certainty and truth
      of reason with an alien impact ("impact" is not a good translation for
      "Anstoss"; better: "impetus" or "impulse" or "push"); Schelling: the
      unity of the intellectual intuition which has no power for a critical
      development of the concept but - according to Hegel - remains where the
      absolute is mere abstract identity, A=A:

      "To pit this single assertion, that "in the Absolute all is one",
      against the organized whole of determinate and complete knowledge, or of
      knowledge which at least aims at and demands complete development - to
      give out its Absolute as the night in which, as we say, all cows are
      black - that is the very naïveté of emptiness of knowledge." (PhdG,
      Preface, para 16, translated by J.B. Baillie)

      It is this "organized whole" which Hegel found in Kant. Compare the
      'Table of the Categories' in the First Critique (B 106, A 80) with the
      Science of Logic. Even the terminology he took partly from Kant (i.e.
      Reality, Negation, Limitation). The organized whole can neither start
      from the I nor from the intellectual intuition. But both are reflections
      on Kants' dualism which Hegel took into consideration when he went back
      to Kant's "unity of apperception" which now he could develop from a
      higher level since with Kant it was only a technical term, now it is the
      beginning of the life of thought. This is what Hegel calls dialectic.

      Regards,
      Beat Greuter

      >



      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • Artur Jochlik
      It is true that there is no other remarks like that in Hegel s letters. On Sunday, March 20, 2016 8:06 PM, Alan Ponikvar ponikvaraj@gmail.com [hegel]
      Message 49 of 49 , Mar 20, 2016
        It is true that there is no other remarks like that in Hegel's letters.


        On Sunday, March 20, 2016 8:06 PM, "'Alan Ponikvar' ponikvaraj@... [hegel]" <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:


         
        Allusions need be nothing more than that.
         
        I see no need to make anything of this.
         
        -          Alan
        From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com]
        Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2016 8:59 AM
        To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
        Subject: Re: [hegel] Sinclair
         
         
        But on the other hand we have this little quote, from page 572 of the letters. It comes from a letter to von Baader (January 19, 1824):
         
        “The sore point with which our age and our North are afflicted you yourself have accurately hit upon and very well characterized as religious Kotzebuanism. It will not shrink from offering resistance, though resistance of a peculiar nature. Here we indeed have world-wisdom to use the label with which these people again affect to designate philosophy – which has thus severed itself from form as well as content, and has swept its house clean [la maison nette]. The hangman, while not merely riding the [horse of] world-wisdom religiously, does not do so in a purely nonreligious manner either. He does so to try his hand at theology as well, and thus to despise and contest content and thoughts alike, bearing spiritless witness to conceits, to subjective as well as objective futilities of grammatical, historical, and still other sorts. The resistance [in question] thus becomes the force of inertia against the concept, the force of conceit against it, as at once activity directed at reversing rather than apprehending it, bedeviling [bekratzen] it with the scabs it inflicts upon it”.
         
        Hegel is writing about the hangman as if it was a well known topic to von Baader. Salem Tarot: The Hanged Man We need to keep in mind that Hegel loved to spend his time with cards and that he was not alone in his passion.
         
        In a letter to Goethe (page 701, August 2, 1821) we read:
         
        “What can this cup be but the all-embracing transparent enclosure by the yellow belt of the Zodiac adorned with the Twelve Signs in gold. Turned as much toward the radiant Ahura-Mazda as toward the darkness of Ahriman, this zodiacal belt brings to manifestation the whole variegated world of colors”.
         
        Hegel was aware of esoterism, and so was Newton. But we need to understand that the term esoterism and occultism was coined only by Eliphas Levi, just in age of positivism. It was made popular only from the time of Helena Blavatsky, that is: after the time of Hegel. I get the impression that what we understand as esoterism was in modern times up to the times of Hegel something that the well educated people would not be ashamed of.
         
        Sincerely,
        Artur
         
         


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