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Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday

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  • Beat Greuter
    ... Hegel s philosophy as every good philosophy is a kind of divine service, as Hegel says. The reason for this is the search for the absolute that brings you
    Message 1 of 24 , Sep 12, 2010
      Oliver Scholz writes:

      >
      >
      > ................
      > But that's not all. There is in general something about
      > debates about god on this list which keeps nagging me. It is
      > not the god issue per se -- after all I do think that
      > Hegel's philosophy establishes the possibility of religion
      > as reasonable. After all I am convinced that atheism is a
      > Christian phenomenon -- in every ambivalence introduced by
      > the word phenomenon. I'm not sure whether I would agree with
      > Alan on all accounts, because Christianity is of utmost
      > importance within the 'having-become' of spirit and that in
      > many ways Hegel's philosophy can be regarded as a
      > philosophical reconstruction of this. And after all I'm
      > actually very much interested in theology.
      >
      > So, that's not it. It's something else. All this here SEEMS
      > to be religion in disguise of philosophy; but I have the
      > feeling that it only seems so. When I struggle to grasp
      > this intuition of mine, the phrase "it's not the real thing"
      > keeps coming into my mind. It does not feel genuine; this
      > use of philosophal terms and statements to express
      > representations that would ACTUALLY belong to the realm of
      > religion feels like a SUBSTITUTE for genuine religion. I
      > have to ask myself: maybe it is less the fact that it's
      > abused philosophy because of which I find it so obnoxious,
      > maybe it's the fact that it is only surrogate religion.
      >


      Hegel's philosophy as every good philosophy is a kind of divine service,
      as Hegel says. The reason for this is the search for the absolute that
      brings you into an opposition of the finite and the infinite. To find
      the convergence and coincidence of these opposites is the task of
      philosophy, poetry etc. as well as religion and theology. It is a
      mediating activity in thought and reality that generates a new immediacy
      which is the result of this activity, however, expresses more. The
      'more' expressed by the new immediacy leads to a dynamic process which
      can be called a divine service. Hegel's philosophy (and other
      philosophies) stands for making this process explicitly which elsewhere
      is 'only' implicitly.

      Regards,
      Beat Greuter


      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • eupraxis@aol.com
      Oliver, Out of mercy, I ll be brief. There is, at least, a two-fold development discussed in Hegel: the development of Religion itself according to its own
      Message 2 of 24 , Sep 12, 2010
        Oliver,

        Out of mercy, I'll be brief.

        There is, at least, a two-fold development discussed in Hegel: the development of Religion itself according to its own special dialectic, and the larger dialectic in which Religion finds itself as a penultimate moment, from the Philosophical point of view. I read these texts (I am thinking of both the S-L and Phen, and the Phil-Religion lectures) to mean the same thing: to wit, that God, when comprehended as Idea, cannot be an object of _worship_ by the philosopher -- worship is denied us; we can only be aesthetically towards this Absolute with gravity, wonder and awe.

        Wil






        -----Original Message-----
        From: Oliver Scholz <alkibiades@...>
        To: hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
        Sent: Sun, Sep 12, 2010 3:38 am
        Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday





        Alan: I think we will just have to agree to disagree.

        Wil: That would be different!

        I start to believe that part of the reason why debates of
        Gretchen's Question on this list are so very cumbersome,
        interminable, dissatisfying and eventually boring is that
        it's not the real thing which we are discussing.

        I've been studying Angelus Silesius lately, a German
        poet/mystic who was influenced by Jakob
        Boehme. (Interestingly, he was brought to my attention
        because Jorge Luis Borges mentions him with adoration in one
        of his poems.) I have to say: I love Angelus Silesius. And
        it is not just the poetic form that enarmours me, it is most
        definitely also the content. Musing about this, I asked
        myself: why did I actually find discussions about god and
        about Hegel's relation to mysticism on this mailing list so
        appalling in the past?

        Well, there is the obvious answers: It's not the same. It's
        not even similar. An Angelus Silesius and somebody living
        today uttering the exact same words would be saying quite
        different things.

        But that's not all. There is in general something about
        debates about god on this list which keeps nagging me. It is
        not the god issue per se -- after all I do think that
        Hegel's philosophy establishes the possibility of religion
        as reasonable. After all I am convinced that atheism is a
        Christian phenomenon -- in every ambivalence introduced by
        the word phenomenon. I'm not sure whether I would agree with
        Alan on all accounts, because Christianity is of utmost
        importance within the 'having-become' of spirit and that in
        many ways Hegel's philosophy can be regarded as a
        philosophical reconstruction of this. And after all I'm
        actually very much interested in theology.

        So, that's not it. It's something else. All this here SEEMS
        to be religion in disguise of philosophy; but I have the
        feeling that it only seems so. When I struggle to grasp
        this intuition of mine, the phrase "it's not the real thing"
        keeps coming into my mind. It does not feel genuine; this
        use of philosophal terms and statements to express
        representations that would ACTUALLY belong to the realm of
        religion feels like a SUBSTITUTE for genuine religion. I
        have to ask myself: maybe it is less the fact that it's
        abused philosophy because of which I find it so obnoxious,
        maybe it's the fact that it is only surrogate religion.

        I have always kept a gentle nostalgia for genuine religion
        and an actual god that is alive in the believer's
        creed. This nostalgia, this melancholy is, I think, the true
        atheist's counterpart to the true believer's constant
        struggle with his own disbelief. Now, this surrogate
        religion, this "philosophical" god, in other words: this
        dead god, this ungod -- it's if as if somebody would
        violently agitate me to start smoking again and it turns
        out: he's talking about chocolate cigarettes.

        Nevertheless, I'm indeed wondering whether this might put
        the finger on the point: what we increasingly encounter
        today, not only here, but also elsewhere, is "God" as a
        surrogate for god.

        The thing about representations (vorstellungen) is that even
        abstract thoughts can become representations if they are
        used as such. I believe, this is the case here. Debates here
        remind me a lot of discussions with somebody diagnosed with
        borderline personality disorder: there's quite some
        intelligence employed on the other side, and nevertheless
        any attempt to come to terms with the matter discussed in a
        reasonable way is ultimately futile, because that which in
        actuality organises the discourse never becomes itself
        thematic in the discourse. Never. Instead, the other does
        have quite a talent to infuriate one, even while maintaining
        the semblance of calmness and softness.

        All this has, I believe, something to do with the Death of
        God, understood as a historic event. Every kind of religion
        which we encounter today, every talk of god reacts in some
        way to the Death of God. (Fundamentalism -- Christian or
        otherwise is not only not an example against it, it is an
        example *for* it.) Contemporary theology, at least to the
        small extent that I have made acquaintance with it, actually
        reflects the Death of God, although I suppose that hardly
        any theologian would admit that metaphor -- it is, after
        all, a metaphor -- but they seem to me to reflect that for
        which the metaphor stands. The crucial difference is between
        "reflect on" and "unconsciously being driven by".

        This "philosophical" ungod should, I think, be analysed as a
        specific, though, like Fundamentalism, pathological reaction
        to the Death of God. So far, I've only started to think
        about it that way. Any thoughts?

        Oliver









        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      • stephen theron
        Dear Beat, A kind of divine service . This seems to go against Wil saying that worship for the philosopher is out. I thought of replying to that that we are
        Message 3 of 24 , Sep 12, 2010
          Dear Beat,



          "A kind of divine service". This seems to go against Wil saying that worship "for the philosopher" is out. I thought of replying to that that we are not just or always philosophers so that philosophers, i.e. such men or women, are not obliged to be non-religious. What you say though, citing Hegel, seems more satisfactory, that philosophising itself is worship, "divine service". So in the old marriage service the spouse-to-be says to the other, "With my body I thee worship". Worship names a constant of human life.

          Among devotees there have always been grades and styles of prayer, e.g. the admonition not to use many phrases, down to attitudes of waiting, of abandonment to providence, to "the cunning of Reason", differences again re what to ask for, Aquinas's prayer before study etc. And always that "God helps those who help themselves". Maybe I pray to myself, a variant upon the Franciscan "It is in loving that we are loved". It would be, in helping myself I am helped, I have self-respect, we say.

          It is a task, as you say, finding convergence, as we move in and out of poetry, music, art, religion, philosophy. The aesthetic is indeed prominent. Findlay suggests Hegel's whiole philosophy is an aesthetic. Probably Hegel would say the ideal is to pray as God prays. How does God pray? By being his own manifestation maybe, Nature. "I am myself".

          Thus we generate a new immediacy, you say. Music may first make one philosophise, or those phenomenal experiences Hegel starts off by discussing, or being in love, or great danger. "The poet is compared with the philosopher in that both are concerned with the marvellous" (Aquinas). This might seem un-Hegelian, but this is due to sticking with a false view of "mystery" as impenetrable to reason. Philosophy is itself the greatest motive for wonder, in self-admiration.

          "expresses more" in your text seems to be textually flawed. How should it be, if you remember? What then is the dynamic process, the divine service? Is it this wondering, this confrontation with manifestation as, for example, category after category falls away into something less abstract and particular? Difficult to say, maybe. I just think the root idea you express is good, and reconciling. And that it is here made explicit. There is more to say but I'll leave it there for now.

          Stephen.


          To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
          From: greuterb@...
          Date: Sun, 12 Sep 2010 14:05:25 +0200
          Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday






          Oliver Scholz writes:

          >
          >
          > ................
          > But that's not all. There is in general something about
          > debates about god on this list which keeps nagging me. It is
          > not the god issue per se -- after all I do think that
          > Hegel's philosophy establishes the possibility of religion
          > as reasonable. After all I am convinced that atheism is a
          > Christian phenomenon -- in every ambivalence introduced by
          > the word phenomenon. I'm not sure whether I would agree with
          > Alan on all accounts, because Christianity is of utmost
          > importance within the 'having-become' of spirit and that in
          > many ways Hegel's philosophy can be regarded as a
          > philosophical reconstruction of this. And after all I'm
          > actually very much interested in theology.
          >
          > So, that's not it. It's something else. All this here SEEMS
          > to be religion in disguise of philosophy; but I have the
          > feeling that it only seems so. When I struggle to grasp
          > this intuition of mine, the phrase "it's not the real thing"
          > keeps coming into my mind. It does not feel genuine; this
          > use of philosophal terms and statements to express
          > representations that would ACTUALLY belong to the realm of
          > religion feels like a SUBSTITUTE for genuine religion. I
          > have to ask myself: maybe it is less the fact that it's
          > abused philosophy because of which I find it so obnoxious,
          > maybe it's the fact that it is only surrogate religion.
          >

          Hegel's philosophy as every good philosophy is a kind of divine service,
          as Hegel says. The reason for this is the search for the absolute that
          brings you into an opposition of the finite and the infinite. To find
          the convergence and coincidence of these opposites is the task of
          philosophy, poetry etc. as well as religion and theology. It is a
          mediating activity in thought and reality that generates a new immediacy
          which is the result of this activity, however, expresses more. The
          'more' expressed by the new immediacy leads to a dynamic process which
          can be called a divine service. Hegel's philosophy (and other
          philosophies) stands for making this process explicitly which elsewhere
          is 'only' implicitly.

          Regards,
          Beat Greuter

          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]






          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        • eupraxis@aol.com
          Stephen, A kind of does not usually mean what the words manifestly suggest. In this sense, a kind of divine service does not mean one of several species
          Message 4 of 24 , Sep 12, 2010
            Stephen,

            "A kind of" does not usually mean what the words manifestly suggest. In this sense, "a kind of divine service" does not mean 'one of several species of divine service', but rather 'something akin to' or 'something resembling'. It is a rhetorical simile, in other words.

            Secondly, saying that the study of philosophy is "a kind of divine service" does not mean that the Absolute is tantamount to the Deity of Christianity who is worshiped by the latter faith as "God the Almighty". Such worship is foreign to, and anathematic to, the very spirit of the philosophical enterprise.

            And lastly, the "divine" has taken on a rich variety of meanings that are far more generous than the narrow religious denotation that you seem to reduce it to here. This is why I, and some others, feel less inclined to be open to the discussions on mysticism and the like on this list: such terms and topics always become rhetorical Trojan horses.

            Wil



            -----Original Message-----
            From: stephen theron <stephentheron@...>
            To: hegel hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
            Sent: Sun, Sep 12, 2010 3:04 pm
            Subject: RE: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday



            Dear Beat,



            "A kind of divine service". This seems to go against Wil saying that worship
            "for the philosopher" is out. I thought of replying to that that we are not just
            or always philosophers so that philosophers, i.e. such men or women, are not
            obliged to be non-religious. What you say though, citing Hegel, seems more
            satisfactory, that philosophising itself is worship, "divine service". So in the
            old marriage service the spouse-to-be says to the other, "With my body I thee
            worship". Worship names a constant of human life.

            Among devotees there have always been grades and styles of prayer, e.g. the
            admonition not to use many phrases, down to attitudes of waiting, of abandonment
            to providence, to "the cunning of Reason", differences again re what to ask for,
            Aquinas's prayer before study etc. And always that "God helps those who help
            themselves". Maybe I pray to myself, a variant upon the Franciscan "It is in
            loving that we are loved". It would be, in helping myself I am helped, I have
            self-respect, we say.

            It is a task, as you say, finding convergence, as we move in and out of poetry,
            music, art, religion, philosophy. The aesthetic is indeed prominent. Findlay
            suggests Hegel's whiole philosophy is an aesthetic. Probably Hegel would say the
            ideal is to pray as God prays. How does God pray? By being his own manifestation
            maybe, Nature. "I am myself".

            Thus we generate a new immediacy, you say. Music may first make one
            philosophise, or those phenomenal experiences Hegel starts off by discussing, or
            being in love, or great danger. "The poet is compared with the philosopher in
            that both are concerned with the marvellous" (Aquinas). This might seem
            un-Hegelian, but this is due to sticking with a false view of "mystery" as
            impenetrable to reason. Philosophy is itself the greatest motive for wonder, in
            self-admiration.

            "expresses more" in your text seems to be textually flawed. How should it be, if
            you remember? What then is the dynamic process, the divine service? Is it this
            wondering, this confrontation with manifestation as, for example, category after
            category falls away into something less abstract and particular? Difficult to
            say, maybe. I just think the root idea you express is good, and reconciling. And
            that it is here made explicit. There is more to say but I'll leave it there for
            now.

            Stephen.


            To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
            From: greuterb@...
            Date: Sun, 12 Sep 2010 14:05:25 +0200
            Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday






            Oliver Scholz writes:

            >
            >
            > ................
            > But that's not all. There is in general something about
            > debates about god on this list which keeps nagging me. It is
            > not the god issue per se -- after all I do think that
            > Hegel's philosophy establishes the possibility of religion
            > as reasonable. After all I am convinced that atheism is a
            > Christian phenomenon -- in every ambivalence introduced by
            > the word phenomenon. I'm not sure whether I would agree with
            > Alan on all accounts, because Christianity is of utmost
            > importance within the 'having-become' of spirit and that in
            > many ways Hegel's philosophy can be regarded as a
            > philosophical reconstruction of this. And after all I'm
            > actually very much interested in theology.
            >
            > So, that's not it. It's something else. All this here SEEMS
            > to be religion in disguise of philosophy; but I have the
            > feeling that it only seems so. When I struggle to grasp
            > this intuition of mine, the phrase "it's not the real thing"
            > keeps coming into my mind. It does not feel genuine; this
            > use of philosophal terms and statements to express
            > representations that would ACTUALLY belong to the realm of
            > religion feels like a SUBSTITUTE for genuine religion. I
            > have to ask myself: maybe it is less the fact that it's
            > abused philosophy because of which I find it so obnoxious,
            > maybe it's the fact that it is only surrogate religion.
            >

            Hegel's philosophy as every good philosophy is a kind of divine service,
            as Hegel says. The reason for this is the search for the absolute that
            brings you into an opposition of the finite and the infinite. To find
            the convergence and coincidence of these opposites is the task of
            philosophy, poetry etc. as well as religion and theology. It is a
            mediating activity in thought and reality that generates a new immediacy
            which is the result of this activity, however, expresses more. The
            'more' expressed by the new immediacy leads to a dynamic process which
            can be called a divine service. Hegel's philosophy (and other
            philosophies) stands for making this process explicitly which elsewhere
            is 'only' implicitly.

            Regards,
            Beat Greuter

            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]






            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
          • stephen theron
            Wil, What is worship really? That is the question here. I make no reduction. If calling the Absolute divine were religious in the abstract sense I would not
            Message 5 of 24 , Sep 12, 2010
              Wil,



              What is worship really? That is the question here.

              I make no reduction. If calling the Absolute divine were "religious" in the abstract sense I would not want to use it. I think, namely, that in isolation a person encounters the Absolute, as direct consequence of being rational, before he encounters notions of God, that is, he encounters God before he encounters "God". The religious tradition, however, is well aware of this. The last, philosophy, is also first. Whether cradle-Catholics, say, are disadvantaged here or given a head-start is not what we want to start discussing here, though my mentioning it might help the exchange. Religion has to be discussed dispassionately. Otherwise it is not philosophy of religion, still less this latter in the service of Logic.

              My whole point is to lift concepts such as "service" and "prayer" (as included in "divine service", Gottesdienst; I took "kind of" just as you do, by the way), meeting Beat's letter on its own ground, away from the purely "religious" or, in general, that religion is fulfilled, accomplished, in philosophy, that is in contemplation, as religious praxis has itself at times acknowledged. There it is no longer "religious" in the abstract sense. Rather, as Beat suggests, there is convergence of religion and philosophy, inter alia, as even in a sense opposites, the finitude clinging to "religious" notions in despite of their intentions. THis might seem to commit one to saying that art, too, is fulfilled, accomplished in philosophy. Could one say that? Well, I think so. But then, by parity with the first case, philosophy must have all the beauty that art has (as it perfects the prayer and "service" of religion: well, I have a slight hesitation, maybe just aesthetic, with this term "service", Dienst, if that is indeed the word here, Hegel notwithstanding: "liturgy" might do better, thinking maybe of the Byzantine experiments in philosophical theurgy). This in turn would imply identity of beauty with, in the first place, truth, but also with goodness, unity and being, i.e. inclusion in the old list of "transcendental predicates". This seems to me a, the, reasonable view.

              The book Leisure the Basis of Culture, by Joseph Pieper, usually published along with The Philosophical Act, goes into something of this, though not in a context of Hegel particularly. The original was called Muss und Kult, which means "Leisure and Worship", I think, much more uncompromising. It is a good book as a basis for thought, discussion etc. I don't know if I would still agree with it all. You maybe know it.

              Stephen.




              To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
              From: eupraxis@...
              Date: Sun, 12 Sep 2010 17:04:52 -0400
              Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday







              Stephen,

              "A kind of" does not usually mean what the words manifestly suggest. In this sense, "a kind of divine service" does not mean 'one of several species of divine service', but rather 'something akin to' or 'something resembling'. It is a rhetorical simile, in other words.

              Secondly, saying that the study of philosophy is "a kind of divine service" does not mean that the Absolute is tantamount to the Deity of Christianity who is worshiped by the latter faith as "God the Almighty". Such worship is foreign to, and anathematic to, the very spirit of the philosophical enterprise.

              And lastly, the "divine" has taken on a rich variety of meanings that are far more generous than the narrow religious denotation that you seem to reduce it to here. This is why I, and some others, feel less inclined to be open to the discussions on mysticism and the like on this list: such terms and topics always become rhetorical Trojan horses.

              Wil

              -----Original Message-----
              From: stephen theron <stephentheron@...>
              To: hegel hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
              Sent: Sun, Sep 12, 2010 3:04 pm
              Subject: RE: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday

              Dear Beat,

              "A kind of divine service". This seems to go against Wil saying that worship
              "for the philosopher" is out. I thought of replying to that that we are not just
              or always philosophers so that philosophers, i.e. such men or women, are not
              obliged to be non-religious. What you say though, citing Hegel, seems more
              satisfactory, that philosophising itself is worship, "divine service". So in the
              old marriage service the spouse-to-be says to the other, "With my body I thee
              worship". Worship names a constant of human life.

              Among devotees there have always been grades and styles of prayer, e.g. the
              admonition not to use many phrases, down to attitudes of waiting, of abandonment
              to providence, to "the cunning of Reason", differences again re what to ask for,
              Aquinas's prayer before study etc. And always that "God helps those who help
              themselves". Maybe I pray to myself, a variant upon the Franciscan "It is in
              loving that we are loved". It would be, in helping myself I am helped, I have
              self-respect, we say.

              It is a task, as you say, finding convergence, as we move in and out of poetry,
              music, art, religion, philosophy. The aesthetic is indeed prominent. Findlay
              suggests Hegel's whiole philosophy is an aesthetic. Probably Hegel would say the
              ideal is to pray as God prays. How does God pray? By being his own manifestation
              maybe, Nature. "I am myself".

              Thus we generate a new immediacy, you say. Music may first make one
              philosophise, or those phenomenal experiences Hegel starts off by discussing, or
              being in love, or great danger. "The poet is compared with the philosopher in
              that both are concerned with the marvellous" (Aquinas). This might seem
              un-Hegelian, but this is due to sticking with a false view of "mystery" as
              impenetrable to reason. Philosophy is itself the greatest motive for wonder, in
              self-admiration.

              "expresses more" in your text seems to be textually flawed. How should it be, if
              you remember? What then is the dynamic process, the divine service? Is it this
              wondering, this confrontation with manifestation as, for example, category after
              category falls away into something less abstract and particular? Difficult to
              say, maybe. I just think the root idea you express is good, and reconciling. And
              that it is here made explicit. There is more to say but I'll leave it there for
              now.

              Stephen.

              To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
              From: greuterb@...
              Date: Sun, 12 Sep 2010 14:05:25 +0200
              Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday

              Oliver Scholz writes:

              >
              >
              > ................
              > But that's not all. There is in general something about
              > debates about god on this list which keeps nagging me. It is
              > not the god issue per se -- after all I do think that
              > Hegel's philosophy establishes the possibility of religion
              > as reasonable. After all I am convinced that atheism is a
              > Christian phenomenon -- in every ambivalence introduced by
              > the word phenomenon. I'm not sure whether I would agree with
              > Alan on all accounts, because Christianity is of utmost
              > importance within the 'having-become' of spirit and that in
              > many ways Hegel's philosophy can be regarded as a
              > philosophical reconstruction of this. And after all I'm
              > actually very much interested in theology.
              >
              > So, that's not it. It's something else. All this here SEEMS
              > to be religion in disguise of philosophy; but I have the
              > feeling that it only seems so. When I struggle to grasp
              > this intuition of mine, the phrase "it's not the real thing"
              > keeps coming into my mind. It does not feel genuine; this
              > use of philosophal terms and statements to express
              > representations that would ACTUALLY belong to the realm of
              > religion feels like a SUBSTITUTE for genuine religion. I
              > have to ask myself: maybe it is less the fact that it's
              > abused philosophy because of which I find it so obnoxious,
              > maybe it's the fact that it is only surrogate religion.
              >

              Hegel's philosophy as every good philosophy is a kind of divine service,
              as Hegel says. The reason for this is the search for the absolute that
              brings you into an opposition of the finite and the infinite. To find
              the convergence and coincidence of these opposites is the task of
              philosophy, poetry etc. as well as religion and theology. It is a
              mediating activity in thought and reality that generates a new immediacy
              which is the result of this activity, however, expresses more. The
              'more' expressed by the new immediacy leads to a dynamic process which
              can be called a divine service. Hegel's philosophy (and other
              philosophies) stands for making this process explicitly which elsewhere
              is 'only' implicitly.

              Regards,
              Beat Greuter

              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

              ------------------------------------

              Homepage: http://hegel.net
              Hegel mailing lists: http://Hegel.net/en/ml.htm
              Listowners Homepage: http://kai.in
              Group policy:
              slightly moderated, only plain Text (no HTML/RTF), no attachments,
              only Hegel related mails, scientific level intended.

              Particpants are expected to show a respectfull and scientific attitude both to
              Hegel and to each other. The usual "netiquette" as well as scientific standards
              apply.

              The copyright policy for mails sent to this list is same as for Hegel.Net, that
              is the copyright of the mails belongs to the author and hegel.net. Permission is
              granted to copy, distribute and/or modify the mails of this list under the terms
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            • stephen theron
              Oliver, I read this through, I say yes. Then I add, but no. Perhaps your nostalgia is the trouble, from my viewpoint. The God you were brought up with, because
              Message 6 of 24 , Sep 12, 2010
                Oliver,



                I read this through, I say yes. Then I add, but no.

                Perhaps your nostalgia is the trouble, from my viewpoint. The God you were brought up with, because of the infant's way of taking it, was, to invert your diagnosis, taken as surrogate for the Absolute, the true God.
                The adult convert, on the other hand, if he "submits" to the religious tradition, becomes thus far an "insider". He acknowledges from the start that this Absolute he/she have sought, since he/she first fell in love, heard music, walked in the hills, started to think, whatever, has chosen to offer himself (this of course belongs already to the figurative language converted to) under these finite forms of narrative, symbol, a body of disparate "believers", ultimately himself come in finite untransfigured form, to us. His nostalgia, therefore, will always be to get away from the stifling idiocies, the clinging finitude, of piety. The four walls of a church will remain almost the last thing he will feel nostalgia for.

                So I maybe want to offer as complement to your concerns the idea (Newman's) of the development of (Christian) doctrine, inclusive of the implied necessity (seen by Newman?) of a development of the very doctrine propounded of this development (of doctrine). Well, I think this idea is clearly Hegel's, a little before Newman, against which Newman would probably have been as prejudiced as you seem after all a little to be. You don't like Protestants, I remember you implying in a previous letter (their approach, attitudes, I mean).

                Re "the real thing", one naturally holds back a bit in discussing this rheme with people of every or no background relative to religious praxis. However, I can point you to discussions of mine on sacramental signs, on the Incarnation (I suggest there is no good reason not to allow consideration of whether Mary, given the "definitions", and even many or all others, are not divine incarnations), on "Christianity without (or within) God", the Trinity as rational, the sin-paradigm as legalistic and finite, etc. Some of these can be found in the E-book (I think), Unboundedly Rational Religion, courtesy of GRIN Verlag, M�nchen, and elsewhere, the on-line journal Open Theology, or as a trilogy of articles "On Thinking the Tradition" in The Downside Review from c. three years back now.

                In a way I thought, reading you, that you want to have your cake and eat it, as we say. I may be wrong. I have no wish to sit in judgment, rather maybe to invite a certain self-distance, which can be treated in common, so to say. This by way of general remark. Really I can only now go through your text commenting. Some ideas may appeal to you. Of course many won't, but no need for fury surely.



                ************************



                I agree about atheism as Christian, even that Christianity itself is trans-theistic maybe. "I and the Father are one." "He that has seen me has seen the Father." And who says this? Ecce homo. Behold the man, or behold man! What you do to others you do to me. If you listen to others you listen to me etc. We are interchangeable. The sin-paradigm, inherited from Judaism, obscures this. We see, e.g. early in EL, how Hegel transmogrifies this paradigm, equating it with the birth of knowledge simply. Of course I simplify.



                Not religion in disguise as philosophy. That would be no good, but the accomplishment, fulfilling, not "the prophecies" directly, but religion itself, just as Plato or Pythagoras or Kant or anyone else set out to do. In the process they themselves go over to the universality at the core of their individuality.



                Newman speaks of the self-indulgent philosopher and you are a little on the same line. Of course the martyrs (your nostalgia) only accidentally include a few philosophers in their ranks (Boethius? Justin Martyr? Thomas More? Edith Stein?). But we have all to be martyrs for, to, the truth, to be philosophers in fact. In the New Testament this is called "wisdom from above", which gets contrasted with "wisdom from below" (reflecting the conflict, the sword, between the new Christians and the old world). The contrast of wisdoms though, if truly both are wisdom, is only relative. Justin Martyr's dialogues read like a continuation of Platonic philosophy. Theology was invented later, on the base of some Pauline expressions. For me St. Paul is in general a dialectical thinker of genius and takes his place in the line of development. For this, as you say somewhere her, one must "thematise" concepts of revelation, mission, you name it. They can't be carried over unchanged from an implicit to an explicit philosophical culture. Hence the birth of "theology", with time perverting the sense theologia had for Aristotle, just inasmuch as these notioins are not thematised, as I find Hegel doing with them.



                You suggest actual philosophical terms are used representationally, and therefore inauthentically. You may be on to something there. I plead not guilty however, or at least declare an intention to make myself such, if I should have "sinned". It seems to me you do not easily conceive philosophy as something to live by. You are maybe bemused by the cant, or patter, of religious "authorities" speaking of philosophy as the "handmaid" (ancilla) of theology, which is just nonsense, I think. It depends upon that failure to thematise, to rise above "outside" and "inside". The theology you refer to is I think a human invention. It is not what you find in Augustine, even though re recognises (mints?) the concept of the regula fidei, rule of faith. That, even that, could certainly be considered philosophically (thematised too), like just about everything. This is what the "theologians", the upholders of tradition, find themselves repeatedly down the ages being obliged to do, from Chalcedon to Vatican II. The violent reaction against Modernism (c.1907) has been and can be of no avail. It simply illustrates that "the letter kills, the spirit gives life". In philosophy we interpret and breathe forth the spirit. We are it. All individuals are philosophers (cp. Porphyry on the Jews, first, as "a nation of philosophers").



                So here I am maybe showing you more clearly what "actually organises the discourse", and that you put well. It makes neither me nor Hegel an apologist for Christianity, but "if the cap fits, wear it".



                So this God, this Absolute, is not dead or un-God (except in the sense that this is shown to be proper to God), but "closer to me than I am to myself", in all literalness. I pursue it in every thought and action (necessarily, Aquinas cogently argues). As I suggested recently, Hegel's Logic can be viewed as a reformulation of Anselm's "argument", inclusive of his criticism of it. Now Anselm worshipped no un-god. His prayers etc. are on record. And the same applies to Eckhart and of course your Angelus Silesius and, I maintain, Hegel. The latter and I are constrained in similar ways (referred to above) in writing of these things, however.



                The God that has died (sic) was maybe an idol. In another sense the true God dies and must die, as not being bound to the finitude, the immediacy, of life simply. You know the Christian story, the dialectic of emptying and fulness, humiliation and exaltation, etc. If it was an idol and hence not essential to this Christian story then we are well rid of it as we move on to "pastures new", ever following after, in search of, the Absolute. Trahe me post te, ultimately a philosopher's prayer, pace Newman.



                Well, one can always add more. I begin my week with this.

                Yours,

                Stephen.





                To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                From: alkibiades@...
                Date: Sun, 12 Sep 2010 10:38:59 +0200
                Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday







                Alan: I think we will just have to agree to disagree.

                Wil: That would be different!

                I start to believe that part of the reason why debates of
                Gretchen's Question on this list are so very cumbersome,
                interminable, dissatisfying and eventually boring is that
                it's not the real thing which we are discussing.

                I've been studying Angelus Silesius lately, a German
                poet/mystic who was influenced by Jakob
                Boehme. (Interestingly, he was brought to my attention
                because Jorge Luis Borges mentions him with adoration in one
                of his poems.) I have to say: I love Angelus Silesius. And
                it is not just the poetic form that enarmours me, it is most
                definitely also the content. Musing about this, I asked
                myself: why did I actually find discussions about god and
                about Hegel's relation to mysticism on this mailing list so
                appalling in the past?

                Well, there is the obvious answers: It's not the same. It's
                not even similar. An Angelus Silesius and somebody living
                today uttering the exact same words would be saying quite
                different things.

                But that's not all. There is in general something about
                debates about god on this list which keeps nagging me. It is
                not the god issue per se -- after all I do think that
                Hegel's philosophy establishes the possibility of religion
                as reasonable. After all I am convinced that atheism is a
                Christian phenomenon -- in every ambivalence introduced by
                the word phenomenon. I'm not sure whether I would agree with
                Alan on all accounts, because Christianity is of utmost
                importance within the 'having-become' of spirit and that in
                many ways Hegel's philosophy can be regarded as a
                philosophical reconstruction of this. And after all I'm
                actually very much interested in theology.

                So, that's not it. It's something else. All this here SEEMS
                to be religion in disguise of philosophy; but I have the
                feeling that it only seems so. When I struggle to grasp
                this intuition of mine, the phrase "it's not the real thing"
                keeps coming into my mind. It does not feel genuine; this
                use of philosophal terms and statements to express
                representations that would ACTUALLY belong to the realm of
                religion feels like a SUBSTITUTE for genuine religion. I
                have to ask myself: maybe it is less the fact that it's
                abused philosophy because of which I find it so obnoxious,
                maybe it's the fact that it is only surrogate religion.

                I have always kept a gentle nostalgia for genuine religion
                and an actual god that is alive in the believer's
                creed. This nostalgia, this melancholy is, I think, the true
                atheist's counterpart to the true believer's constant
                struggle with his own disbelief. Now, this surrogate
                religion, this "philosophical" god, in other words: this
                dead god, this ungod -- it's if as if somebody would
                violently agitate me to start smoking again and it turns
                out: he's talking about chocolate cigarettes.

                Nevertheless, I'm indeed wondering whether this might put
                the finger on the point: what we increasingly encounter
                today, not only here, but also elsewhere, is "God" as a
                surrogate for god.

                The thing about representations (vorstellungen) is that even
                abstract thoughts can become representations if they are
                used as such. I believe, this is the case here. Debates here
                remind me a lot of discussions with somebody diagnosed with
                borderline personality disorder: there's quite some
                intelligence employed on the other side, and nevertheless
                any attempt to come to terms with the matter discussed in a
                reasonable way is ultimately futile, because that which in
                actuality organises the discourse never becomes itself
                thematic in the discourse. Never. Instead, the other does
                have quite a talent to infuriate one, even while maintaining
                the semblance of calmness and softness.

                All this has, I believe, something to do with the Death of
                God, understood as a historic event. Every kind of religion
                which we encounter today, every talk of god reacts in some
                way to the Death of God. (Fundamentalism -- Christian or
                otherwise is not only not an example against it, it is an
                example *for* it.) Contemporary theology, at least to the
                small extent that I have made acquaintance with it, actually
                reflects the Death of God, although I suppose that hardly
                any theologian would admit that metaphor -- it is, after
                all, a metaphor -- but they seem to me to reflect that for
                which the metaphor stands. The crucial difference is between
                "reflect on" and "unconsciously being driven by".

                This "philosophical" ungod should, I think, be analysed as a
                specific, though, like Fundamentalism, pathological reaction
                to the Death of God. So far, I've only started to think
                about it that way. Any thoughts?

                Oliver





                [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
              • Beat Greuter
                Dear Stephen, ... I don t think that to say a kind of divine service is opposed to saying that worship for the philosopher is out . In another mail Wil
                Message 7 of 24 , Sep 13, 2010
                  Dear Stephen,

                  You write:

                  >Dear Beat,
                  >
                  >"A kind of divine service". This seems to go against Wil saying that worship "for the philosopher" is out.
                  >

                  I don't think that to say "a kind of divine service" is opposed to
                  "saying that worship "for the philosopher" is out". In another mail Wil
                  wrote: "I read these texts (I am thinking of both the S-L and Phen, and
                  the Phil-Religion lectures) to mean the same thing: to wit, that God,
                  when comprehended as Idea, cannot be an object of _worship_ by the
                  philosopher -- worship is denied us;". I think this is what Hegel means
                  when he says that philosophy cannot have a fixed object you think or
                  worship on because then you miss the truth in this object and your
                  thinking is a mere abstract understanding. This exactly shows the
                  transition from the last, the religious consciousness, into pure thought
                  or knowing in the PhdG ("absolute" is not a good expression here; see
                  also SL, "With What must Science Begin?") - the sublation of religious
                  consciousness. The devine service is to be and think in pure thought.
                  This means also that Hegel's devine service is always a process.

                  >I thought of replying to that that we are not just or always philosophers so that philosophers, i.e. such men or women, are not obliged to be non-religious. What you say though, citing Hegel, seems more satisfactory, that philosophising itself is worship, "divine service". So in the old marriage service the spouse-to-be says to the other, "With my body I thee worship". Worship names a constant of human life.
                  >

                  Nobody ist "obliged to be non-religious" or religious. However, the
                  personal faith of a philosopher cannot be used without hesitation for
                  explaining his thought.

                  >Among devotees there have always been grades and styles of prayer, e.g. the admonition not to use many phrases, down to attitudes of waiting, of abandonment to providence, to "the cunning of Reason", differences again re what to ask for, Aquinas's prayer before study etc. And always that "God helps those who help themselves". Maybe I pray to myself, a variant upon the Franciscan "It is in loving that we are loved". It would be, in helping myself I am helped, I have self-respect, we say.
                  >

                  "Love" is an important concept in Hegel's philosphy. But its meaning and
                  relevance has changed in the course of Hegel's creative work.

                  >It is a task, as you say, finding convergence, as we move in and out of poetry, music, art, religion, philosophy. The aesthetic is indeed prominent. Findlay suggests Hegel's whiole philosophy is an aesthetic. Probably Hegel would say the ideal is to pray as God prays. How does God pray? By being his own manifestation maybe, Nature. "I am myself".
                  >

                  I think Wil says something similar though perhaps with a slightly other
                  meaning: "we can only be aesthetically towards this Absolute with
                  gravity, wonder and awe."

                  >Thus we generate a new immediacy, you say. Music may first make one philosophise, or those phenomenal experiences Hegel starts off by discussing, or being in love, or great danger. "The poet is compared with the philosopher in that both are concerned with the marvellous" (Aquinas). This might seem un-Hegelian, but this is due to sticking with a false view of "mystery" as impenetrable to reason. Philosophy is itself the greatest motive for wonder, in self-admiration.
                  >

                  Yes, I think also that "wonder" (astonishment) is the beginning of each
                  philosophy, but only the beginning. Later it must "lay aside the title
                  'love of knowing' and be actual knowing" in the form of Science (see
                  Preface of the PhdG, para 5).


                  >"expresses more" in your text seems to be textually flawed. How should it be, if you remember? What then is the dynamic process, the divine service? Is it this wondering, this confrontation with manifestation as, for example, category after category falls away into something less abstract and particular? Difficult to say, maybe. I just think the root idea you express is good, and reconciling. And that it is here made explicit. There is more to say but I'll leave it there for now.
                  >
                  >Stephen.
                  >

                  I said above that Hegel's divine service of philosophy is a dynamic
                  process in pure thought. But the categories do not merely "fall(s) away
                  into something less abstract and particular". This would be merely a
                  linear process of the understanding. Hegel's process is not linear but a
                  new category is more abstract and unconscious and one-sided first in its
                  new immediacy which then is the starting point for further mediations
                  with a more concrete result which could not have been achieved directly
                  from the previous mediated category (i.e. the transition from the
                  concrete concept of Pure Becoming into the one-sided concept of
                  Determinate Being in which Pure Becoming is merely sublated and has to
                  be made explicitly again into a more concrete level of the concept).
                  Each progress requires first a regression. I think that each science
                  requires such regressions and simplifications for its development.

                  Regards,
                  Beat Greuter


                  >To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                  >From: greuterb@...
                  >Date: Sun, 12 Sep 2010 14:05:25 +0200
                  >Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday
                  >
                  >Oliver Scholz writes:
                  >
                  >>................
                  >>But that's not all. There is in general something about
                  >>debates about god on this list which keeps nagging me. It is
                  >>not the god issue per se -- after all I do think that
                  >>Hegel's philosophy establishes the possibility of religion
                  >>as reasonable. After all I am convinced that atheism is a
                  >>Christian phenomenon -- in every ambivalence introduced by
                  >>the word phenomenon. I'm not sure whether I would agree with
                  >>Alan on all accounts, because Christianity is of utmost
                  >>importance within the 'having-become' of spirit and that in
                  >>many ways Hegel's philosophy can be regarded as a
                  >>philosophical reconstruction of this. And after all I'm
                  >>actually very much interested in theology.
                  >>
                  >>So, that's not it. It's something else. All this here SEEMS
                  >>to be religion in disguise of philosophy; but I have the
                  >>feeling that it only seems so. When I struggle to grasp
                  >>this intuition of mine, the phrase "it's not the real thing"
                  >>keeps coming into my mind. It does not feel genuine; this
                  >>use of philosophal terms and statements to express
                  >>representations that would ACTUALLY belong to the realm of
                  >>religion feels like a SUBSTITUTE for genuine religion. I
                  >>have to ask myself: maybe it is less the fact that it's
                  >>abused philosophy because of which I find it so obnoxious,
                  >>maybe it's the fact that it is only surrogate religion.
                  >>
                  >Hegel's philosophy as every good philosophy is a kind of divine service,
                  >as Hegel says. The reason for this is the search for the absolute that
                  >brings you into an opposition of the finite and the infinite. To find
                  >the convergence and coincidence of these opposites is the task of
                  >philosophy, poetry etc. as well as religion and theology. It is a
                  >mediating activity in thought and reality that generates a new immediacy
                  >which is the result of this activity, however, expresses more. The
                  >'more' expressed by the new immediacy leads to a dynamic process which
                  >can be called a divine service. Hegel's philosophy (and other
                  >philosophies) stands for making this process explicitly which elsewhere
                  >is 'only' implicitly.
                  >
                  >Regards,
                  >Beat Greuter
                  >


                  [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                • Paul Healey
                  Oliver, your post made me think of God is dead as a psychological problem which our culture has inherited from medieval metaphysics. For in order for the
                  Message 8 of 24 , Sep 13, 2010
                    Oliver, your post made me think of 'God is dead' as
                    a psychological problem which our culture has
                    inherited from medieval metaphysics.
                    For in order for the discussion to make any progress
                    from an Hegelian perspective, there should be some
                    agreement on what he is claiming according to the different
                    understandings which are identified in his works. Either that,
                    or demonstrate why any given proposal on such a mater is in error.
                    For instance, it seems just as absurd to propose the truth of such a proposition is based solely on its syntax (as Russell held with his correspondence theory of truth) as it is on its semantics (which Russell
                    mistakenly attributes to the Hegelians and
                    calls a coherence theory of truth).

                    Let me try to explain: given modus ponens is assumed to be one
                    form of valid inference: if p then q, p therefore q, you
                    can deduce if God then good, God therefore good as well as
                    if God then evil, God therefore evil. The same goes for
                    God being being mortal or immortal. Therefore God can
                    be whatever you like and whenever you like by expanding
                    such a rule in a consistent way.

                    For the medievals, God died but can be resureccted, so the
                    truth of such propositions is solely about what the agent believes.
                    Some might call this freedom; the freedom
                    to believe in what you want, but by the purely syntactical
                    notion of deduction the good and the evil can be the same
                    as can the mortal and the immortal, so how can there be any freedom from
                    that which is evil, if it is the same as that which is a good?

                    Certainly it can't if God has no reason for being either; if the good
                    cannot be greater than that which is evil. For if the good dies as God dies
                    as evil can die, or both together be immortal or one of each, there is no
                    escape. In fact, there would be no reason for the modality of their relations
                    to be absolute and yet such is the dogma of this thinking.

                    The semantics of the syntactic method for a 'correpondence theory of truth'
                    is based on an ambiguity that is assumed to be true. The idea of
                    a purely syntactic theory is therefore a false one.
                    That is, it can be proved that such an ambuiguity denies
                    what is actually true for the range of the understanding
                    within the function of the dialectic. This, rests my case
                    that Russell unlike Hegel bases his whole idea of logic
                    as developed and appropriated from the medievals via Aristotle
                    on a contradiction! <Russell didn't do his maths properly,
                    while Aristotle didn't even have the maths to show how the logic
                    of propositions could be based on it>.

                    This, is why I think Hegel argues that the medieval
                    use of inference (which is a crutch for its metaphysics)
                    belongs to a feeble understanding within the function
                    of the dialectic. As such it is even weaker than Hegel's
                    understanding of Speculative Logic, or even the Empirical one
                    of Hume and the Transcendental one of Kant.

                    The problem, is that such a dichotomy between
                    syntax and semantics has been drummed into
                    us for so long. For this reason, perhaps
                    it is likely we will return to barbarism (book
                    and flag burning leading to cries for war
                    disease and famine)?; I do not hold out much hope that
                    there will be a cure for those inffected by
                    such thinking, but did Hegel?


                    Regards,



                    Paul Healey






                    Oliver, your post made me think of 'God is dead' as
                    a psychological problem which our culture has
                    inherited from medieval metaphysics.
                    For in order for the discussion to make any progress
                    from an Hegelian perspective, there should be some
                    agreement on what he is claiming according to the different understandings
                    which are identifies in his works. Either that, or demonstrate why any given
                    proposal on such a mater is in error. For instance, it seems just
                    as absurd to propose the truth of such propositions is based
                    solely on their syntax (as Russell held with his correspondence theory
                    of truth) as it is on their semantics (which Russell
                    mistakenly attributes to the Hegelians and
                    calls a coherence theory of truth).
                     
                    Let me try to explain: given modus ponens is assumed to be one
                    form of valid inference: if p then q, p therefore q, you
                    can deduce if God then good, God therefore good as well as
                    if God then evil, God therefore evil. The same goes for
                    God being being mortal or immortal. Therefore God can
                    be whatever you like and whenever you like by expanding
                    such a rule in a consistent way.
                     
                    For the medievals, God died but can be resureccted, so the
                    truth of such propositions is solely about what the agent believes.
                    Some might call this freedom; the freedom
                    to believe in what you want, but by the purely syntactical
                    notion of deduction the good and the evil can be the same
                    as can the mortal and the immortal, so how can there be any freedom from
                    that which is evil, if it is the same as that which is a good?
                     
                    Certainly it can't if God has no reason for being either; if the good
                    cannot be greater than that which is evil. For if the good dies as God dies
                    as evil can die, or both together be immortal or one of each, there is no
                    escape. In fact, there would be no reason for the modality of their relations
                    to be absolute and yet such is the dogma of this thinking.
                     
                    The semantics of the syntactic method for a 'correpondence theory of truth'
                    is based on an ambiguity that is assumed to be true. The idea of
                    a purely syntactic theory is therefore a false one.
                    That is, it can be proved that such an ambuiguity denies
                    what is actually true for the range of the understanding
                    within the function of the dialectic. This, rests my case
                    that Russell unlike Hegel bases his whole idea of logic
                    as developed and appropriated from the medievals via Aristotle
                    on a contradiction! <Russell didn't do his maths properly,
                    while Aristotle didn't even have the maths to show how the logic
                    of propositions could be based on it>.
                     
                    This, is why I think Hegel argues that the medieval
                    use of inference (which is a crutch for its metaphysics)
                    belongs to a feeble understanding within the function
                    of the dialectic. As such it is even weaker than Hegel's
                    understanding of Speculative Logic, or even the empirical one
                    of Hume and the transcendental one of Kant.

                    The problem, is that such a dichotomy between
                    syntax and semantics has been drummed into
                    us for so long, I do not hold out much hope that
                    there will be a cure!
                     
                     
                    Regards,
                     
                    Paul Healey
                     
                     
                     
                    -- On Sun, 12/9/10, Oliver Scholz <alkibiades@...> wrote:


                    From: Oliver Scholz <alkibiades@...>
                    Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday
                    To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                    Date: Sunday, 12 September, 2010, 9:38


                     



                    Alan: I think we will just have to agree to disagree.

                    Wil: That would be different!

                    I start to believe that part of the reason why debates of
                    Gretchen's Question on this list are so very cumbersome,
                    interminable, dissatisfying and eventually boring is that
                    it's not the real thing which we are discussing.

                    I've been studying Angelus Silesius lately, a German
                    poet/mystic who was influenced by Jakob
                    Boehme. (Interestingly, he was brought to my attention
                    because Jorge Luis Borges mentions him with adoration in one
                    of his poems.) I have to say: I love Angelus Silesius. And
                    it is not just the poetic form that enarmours me, it is most
                    definitely also the content. Musing about this, I asked
                    myself: why did I actually find discussions about god and
                    about Hegel's relation to mysticism on this mailing list so
                    appalling in the past?

                    Well, there is the obvious answers: It's not the same. It's
                    not
                    even similar. An Angelus Silesius and somebody living
                    today uttering the exact same words would be saying quite
                    different things.

                    But that's not all. There is in general something about
                    debates about god on this list which keeps nagging me. It is
                    not the god issue per se -- after all I do think that
                    Hegel's philosophy establishes the possibility of religion
                    as reasonable. After all I am convinced that atheism is a
                    Christian phenomenon -- in every ambivalence introduced by
                    the word phenomenon. I'm not sure whether I would agree with
                    Alan on all accounts, because Christianity is of utmost
                    importance within the 'having-become' of spirit and that in
                    many ways Hegel's philosophy can be regarded as a
                    philosophical reconstruction of this. And after all I'm
                    actually very much interested in theology.

                    So, that's not it. It's something else. All this here SEEMS
                    to be religion in disguise of philosophy; but I
                    have the
                    feeling that it only seems so. When I struggle to grasp
                    this intuition of mine, the phrase "it's not the real thing"
                    keeps coming into my mind. It does not feel genuine; this
                    use of philosophal terms and statements to express
                    representations that would ACTUALLY belong to the realm of
                    religion feels like a SUBSTITUTE for genuine religion. I
                    have to ask myself: maybe it is less the fact that it's
                    abused philosophy because of which I find it so obnoxious,
                    maybe it's the fact that it is only surrogate religion.

                    I have always kept a gentle nostalgia for genuine religion
                    and an actual god that is alive in the believer's
                    creed. This nostalgia, this melancholy is, I think, the true
                    atheist's counterpart to the true believer's constant
                    struggle with his own disbelief. Now, this surrogate
                    religion, this "philosophical" god, in other words: this
                    dead god, this ungod -- it's if as if somebody
                    would
                    violently agitate me to start smoking again and it turns
                    out: he's talking about chocolate cigarettes.

                    Nevertheless, I'm indeed wondering whether this might put
                    the finger on the point: what we increasingly encounter
                    today, not only here, but also elsewhere, is "God" as a
                    surrogate for god.

                    The thing about representations (vorstellungen) is that even
                    abstract thoughts can become representations if they are
                    used as such. I believe, this is the case here. Debates here
                    remind me a lot of discussions with somebody diagnosed with
                    borderline personality disorder: there's quite some
                    intelligence employed on the other side, and nevertheless
                    any attempt to come to terms with the matter discussed in a
                    reasonable way is ultimately futile, because that which in
                    actuality organises the discourse never becomes itself
                    thematic in the discourse. Never. Instead, the other does
                    have quite a talent to
                    infuriate one, even while maintaining
                    the semblance of calmness and softness.

                    All this has, I believe, something to do with the Death of
                    God, understood as a historic event. Every kind of religion
                    which we encounter today, every talk of god reacts in some
                    way to the Death of God. (Fundamentalism -- Christian or
                    otherwise is not only not an example against it, it is an
                    example *for* it.) Contemporary theology, at least to the
                    small extent that I have made acquaintance with it, actually
                    reflects the Death of God, although I suppose that hardly
                    any theologian would admit that metaphor -- it is, after
                    all, a metaphor -- but they seem to me to reflect that for
                    which the metaphor stands. The crucial difference is between
                    "reflect on" and "unconsciously being driven by".

                    This "philosophical" ungod should, I think, be analysed as a
                    specific, though, like Fundamentalism, pathological reaction
                    to the Death
                    of God. So far, I've only started to think
                    about it that way. Any thoughts?

                    Oliver
                  • stephen theron
                    Dear Beat, Thanks for the tips here. I appreciate them. I only meant, that I suppose that the philosopher as a man might go to church, say, without betraying
                    Message 9 of 24 , Sep 13, 2010
                      Dear Beat,



                      Thanks for the tips here. I appreciate them. I only meant, that I suppose that the philosopher as a man might go to church, say, without betraying himself, like Hegel in fact. Anyhow, I can see worship, like your "divine service", as an intrinsically analogical or focal concept including the spousal attitude I mentioned or indeed our stance before truth. Of course worshipping normally posits an external object and that idea has to be overcome, as it is implicitly in "the absolute religion" itself, however we interpret this description of Hegel's. All the church-going etc. was never more than a concession, the whole theology of the Temple implies.

                      "the sublation of religious consciousness" - that is an exciting phrase. As I once asked, expecting a "no", "Is God religious?" It means though, we adore (in the mediated sense referred to above) to the point of losing ourselves. Reality, infinity, that is, is necessarily maximal as form and content become fused. Only thus do we make room for the remarks about blessedness etc. Or, in becoming what we worship we no longer worship, or we worship "in spirit and in truth". It is the same, plenty of texts seem to indicate, if we didn't know it already. But I may seem to be jumping ahead there. "The divine service is to be and think in pure thought", "always a process" you write. Well, I made some comments on that recently. I think Hegel gives no support to "process theology" etc. The Notion itself is ultimately all of consciousness, in which alone "we" have our true being as "the very total which the notion is", "indissolubly one with it", indissolubly. No process there. But of course the word may be used here and there. But in so far as thought is the Notion, not the Judgment or the Syllogism, it is not discursive.

                      I agree that the personal faith of a philosopher cannot be used for explaining his thought. I hope I do not do that. Indeed I have said nothing about faith here. I find it a rather problematic concept. I do not think Hegel does that, though he refers often enough to ideas broached by Christians. But we do not abstract from our own individuality either, which is fulfilled in the universal.

                      The meaning of love has changed yes, as with Francis (the very point of my quote). By which I do not mean either to assert or deny that Francis was a philosopher.

                      Yes, Wil does say that, I was pleased to see. Yes I am familiar with this laying aside of the first title and progressing ("processing", but from shadows to reality, to our our own eternal reality, i.e. it is not a "real" but a dialectical process) to actual knowing. Some people find this an obstacle as indicative of Hegel's supposed "rationalism" (in the sense of being rationalist rather than rational), but what would be the point of loving knowing if we never could actually know. Of course only the Absolute knows the Absolute. This is indisputable I think. Therefore we must take seriously the various identities Hegel propounds, as of an absolute subject, "members one of another" (I cite this phrase as apposite, not as any declaration of "a personal faith". It pinpoints the sublation of Whole and Parts).

                      "Each progress requires first a regression". this is true I think more of the earlier dialectic than of the later, where a sheer Advance becomes more and more characteristic. McTaggart makes this point forcefully in his "Studies in the H. Dialectic" and elsewhere. I don't know if you would agree. I suspect not, as being "linear". It corresponds to my reading quite well. But yes, they do not merely fall away, you are right there.

                      Thank you again for these openings and fruits of your scholarship.

                      Stephen.


                      To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                      From: greuterb@...
                      Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2010 12:07:51 +0200
                      Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday






                      Dear Stephen,

                      You write:

                      >Dear Beat,
                      >
                      >"A kind of divine service". This seems to go against Wil saying that worship "for the philosopher" is out.
                      >

                      I don't think that to say "a kind of divine service" is opposed to
                      "saying that worship "for the philosopher" is out". In another mail Wil
                      wrote: "I read these texts (I am thinking of both the S-L and Phen, and
                      the Phil-Religion lectures) to mean the same thing: to wit, that God,
                      when comprehended as Idea, cannot be an object of _worship_ by the
                      philosopher -- worship is denied us;". I think this is what Hegel means
                      when he says that philosophy cannot have a fixed object you think or
                      worship on because then you miss the truth in this object and your
                      thinking is a mere abstract understanding. This exactly shows the
                      transition from the last, the religious consciousness, into pure thought
                      or knowing in the PhdG ("absolute" is not a good expression here; see
                      also SL, "With What must Science Begin?") - the sublation of religious
                      consciousness. The devine service is to be and think in pure thought.
                      This means also that Hegel's devine service is always a process.

                      >I thought of replying to that that we are not just or always philosophers so that philosophers, i.e. such men or women, are not obliged to be non-religious. What you say though, citing Hegel, seems more satisfactory, that philosophising itself is worship, "divine service". So in the old marriage service the spouse-to-be says to the other, "With my body I thee worship". Worship names a constant of human life.
                      >

                      Nobody ist "obliged to be non-religious" or religious. However, the
                      personal faith of a philosopher cannot be used without hesitation for
                      explaining his thought.

                      >Among devotees there have always been grades and styles of prayer, e.g. the admonition not to use many phrases, down to attitudes of waiting, of abandonment to providence, to "the cunning of Reason", differences again re what to ask for, Aquinas's prayer before study etc. And always that "God helps those who help themselves". Maybe I pray to myself, a variant upon the Franciscan "It is in loving that we are loved". It would be, in helping myself I am helped, I have self-respect, we say.
                      >

                      "Love" is an important concept in Hegel's philosphy. But its meaning and
                      relevance has changed in the course of Hegel's creative work.

                      >It is a task, as you say, finding convergence, as we move in and out of poetry, music, art, religion, philosophy. The aesthetic is indeed prominent. Findlay suggests Hegel's whiole philosophy is an aesthetic. Probably Hegel would say the ideal is to pray as God prays. How does God pray? By being his own manifestation maybe, Nature. "I am myself".
                      >

                      I think Wil says something similar though perhaps with a slightly other
                      meaning: "we can only be aesthetically towards this Absolute with
                      gravity, wonder and awe."

                      >Thus we generate a new immediacy, you say. Music may first make one philosophise, or those phenomenal experiences Hegel starts off by discussing, or being in love, or great danger. "The poet is compared with the philosopher in that both are concerned with the marvellous" (Aquinas). This might seem un-Hegelian, but this is due to sticking with a false view of "mystery" as impenetrable to reason. Philosophy is itself the greatest motive for wonder, in self-admiration.
                      >

                      Yes, I think also that "wonder" (astonishment) is the beginning of each
                      philosophy, but only the beginning. Later it must "lay aside the title
                      'love of knowing' and be actual knowing" in the form of Science (see
                      Preface of the PhdG, para 5).


                      >"expresses more" in your text seems to be textually flawed. How should it be, if you remember? What then is the dynamic process, the divine service? Is it this wondering, this confrontation with manifestation as, for example, category after category falls away into something less abstract and particular? Difficult to say, maybe. I just think the root idea you express is good, and reconciling. And that it is here made explicit. There is more to say but I'll leave it there for now.
                      >
                      >Stephen.
                      >

                      I said above that Hegel's divine service of philosophy is a dynamic
                      process in pure thought. But the categories do not merely "fall(s) away
                      into something less abstract and particular". This would be merely a
                      linear process of the understanding. Hegel's process is not linear but a
                      new category is more abstract and unconscious and one-sided first in its
                      new immediacy which then is the starting point for further mediations
                      with a more concrete result which could not have been achieved directly
                      from the previous mediated category (i.e. the transition from the
                      concrete concept of Pure Becoming into the one-sided concept of
                      Determinate Being in which Pure Becoming is merely sublated and has to
                      be made explicitly again into a more concrete level of the concept).
                      Each progress requires first a regression. I think that each science
                      requires such regressions and simplifications for its development.

                      Regards,
                      Beat Greuter

                      >To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                      >From: greuterb@...
                      >Date: Sun, 12 Sep 2010 14:05:25 +0200
                      >Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday
                      >
                      >Oliver Scholz writes:
                      >
                      >>................
                      >>But that's not all. There is in general something about
                      >>debates about god on this list which keeps nagging me. It is
                      >>not the god issue per se -- after all I do think that
                      >>Hegel's philosophy establishes the possibility of religion
                      >>as reasonable. After all I am convinced that atheism is a
                      >>Christian phenomenon -- in every ambivalence introduced by
                      >>the word phenomenon. I'm not sure whether I would agree with
                      >>Alan on all accounts, because Christianity is of utmost
                      >>importance within the 'having-become' of spirit and that in
                      >>many ways Hegel's philosophy can be regarded as a
                      >>philosophical reconstruction of this. And after all I'm
                      >>actually very much interested in theology.
                      >>
                      >>So, that's not it. It's something else. All this here SEEMS
                      >>to be religion in disguise of philosophy; but I have the
                      >>feeling that it only seems so. When I struggle to grasp
                      >>this intuition of mine, the phrase "it's not the real thing"
                      >>keeps coming into my mind. It does not feel genuine; this
                      >>use of philosophal terms and statements to express
                      >>representations that would ACTUALLY belong to the realm of
                      >>religion feels like a SUBSTITUTE for genuine religion. I
                      >>have to ask myself: maybe it is less the fact that it's
                      >>abused philosophy because of which I find it so obnoxious,
                      >>maybe it's the fact that it is only surrogate religion.
                      >>
                      >Hegel's philosophy as every good philosophy is a kind of divine service,
                      >as Hegel says. The reason for this is the search for the absolute that
                      >brings you into an opposition of the finite and the infinite. To find
                      >the convergence and coincidence of these opposites is the task of
                      >philosophy, poetry etc. as well as religion and theology. It is a
                      >mediating activity in thought and reality that generates a new immediacy
                      >which is the result of this activity, however, expresses more. The
                      >'more' expressed by the new immediacy leads to a dynamic process which
                      >can be called a divine service. Hegel's philosophy (and other
                      >philosophies) stands for making this process explicitly which elsewhere
                      >is 'only' implicitly.
                      >
                      >Regards,
                      >Beat Greuter
                      >

                      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]






                      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                    • eupraxis@aol.com
                      Stephen wrote, ... only the Absolute knows the Absolute. I have been looking at this phrase for a few minutes now. While I understand the gist the intent,
                      Message 10 of 24 , Sep 13, 2010
                        Stephen wrote, " ... only the Absolute knows the Absolute."

                        I have been looking at this phrase for a few minutes now. While I understand the gist the intent, if one pardons that presumption, I have to take issue with it insofar as the transitive nature of the verb "knows" implies that which the Absolute, in its utter in-and-for-itself transparency, has transcended. I am not sure if it is proper, ultimately, to say that the Absolute knows anything -- or, indeed, 'does' anything -- _qua_ Absolute.

                        If we say that the Absolute 'thinks' (struggles, meanders, discovers, etc.), this is only as a dialectical process, and as such it is always particularized, abstracted. The Absolute is attained in the activity and gesture of (conceptual) knowing; the 'known' being for it the freedom of Reason toward its end. (The finality of the process always appears (in the texts) oddly devoid of its content, bringing to mind Aristotle's 'thought thinking itself'.)

                        Wil






                        -----Original Message-----
                        From: stephen theron <stephentheron@...>
                        To: hegel hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                        Sent: Mon, Sep 13, 2010 9:36 am
                        Subject: RE: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday



                        Dear Beat,



                        Thanks for the tips here. I appreciate them. I only meant, that I suppose that
                        the philosopher as a man might go to church, say, without betraying himself,
                        like Hegel in fact. Anyhow, I can see worship, like your "divine service", as an
                        intrinsically analogical or focal concept including the spousal attitude I
                        mentioned or indeed our stance before truth. Of course worshipping normally
                        posits an external object and that idea has to be overcome, as it is implicitly
                        in "the absolute religion" itself, however we interpret this description of
                        Hegel's. All the church-going etc. was never more than a concession, the whole
                        theology of the Temple implies.

                        "the sublation of religious consciousness" - that is an exciting phrase. As I
                        once asked, expecting a "no", "Is God religious?" It means though, we adore (in
                        the mediated sense referred to above) to the point of losing ourselves. Reality,
                        infinity, that is, is necessarily maximal as form and content become fused. Only
                        thus do we make room for the remarks about blessedness etc. Or, in becoming what
                        we worship we no longer worship, or we worship "in spirit and in truth". It is
                        the same, plenty of texts seem to indicate, if we didn't know it already. But I
                        may seem to be jumping ahead there. "The divine service is to be and think in
                        pure thought", "always a process" you write. Well, I made some comments on that
                        recently. I think Hegel gives no support to "process theology" etc. The Notion
                        itself is ultimately all of consciousness, in which alone "we" have our true
                        being as "the very total which the notion is", "indissolubly one with it",
                        indissolubly. No process there. But of co
                        urse the word may be used here and there. But in so far as thought is the
                        Notion, not the Judgment or the Syllogism, it is not discursive.

                        I agree that the personal faith of a philosopher cannot be used for explaining
                        his thought. I hope I do not do that. Indeed I have said nothing about faith
                        here. I find it a rather problematic concept. I do not think Hegel does that,
                        though he refers often enough to ideas broached by Christians. But we do not
                        abstract from our own individuality either, which is fulfilled in the universal.

                        The meaning of love has changed yes, as with Francis (the very point of my
                        quote). By which I do not mean either to assert or deny that Francis was a
                        philosopher.

                        Yes, Wil does say that, I was pleased to see. Yes I am familiar with this laying
                        aside of the first title and progressing ("processing", but from shadows to
                        reality, to our our own eternal reality, i.e. it is not a "real" but a
                        dialectical process) to actual knowing. Some people find this an obstacle as
                        indicative of Hegel's supposed "rationalism" (in the sense of being rationalist
                        rather than rational), but what would be the point of loving knowing if we never
                        could actually know. Of course only the Absolute knows the Absolute. This is
                        indisputable I think. Therefore we must take seriously the various identities
                        Hegel propounds, as of an absolute subject, "members one of another" (I cite
                        this phrase as apposite, not as any declaration of "a personal faith". It
                        pinpoints the sublation of Whole and Parts).

                        "Each progress requires first a regression". this is true I think more of the
                        earlier dialectic than of the later, where a sheer Advance becomes more and more
                        characteristic. McTaggart makes this point forcefully in his "Studies in the H.
                        Dialectic" and elsewhere. I don't know if you would agree. I suspect not, as
                        being "linear". It corresponds to my reading quite well. But yes, they do not
                        merely fall away, you are right there.

                        Thank you again for these openings and fruits of your scholarship.

                        Stephen.


                        To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                        From: greuterb@...
                        Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2010 12:07:51 +0200
                        Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday






                        Dear Stephen,

                        You write:

                        >Dear Beat,
                        >
                        >"A kind of divine service". This seems to go against Wil saying that worship
                        "for the philosopher" is out.
                        >

                        I don't think that to say "a kind of divine service" is opposed to
                        "saying that worship "for the philosopher" is out". In another mail Wil
                        wrote: "I read these texts (I am thinking of both the S-L and Phen, and
                        the Phil-Religion lectures) to mean the same thing: to wit, that God,
                        when comprehended as Idea, cannot be an object of _worship_ by the
                        philosopher -- worship is denied us;". I think this is what Hegel means
                        when he says that philosophy cannot have a fixed object you think or
                        worship on because then you miss the truth in this object and your
                        thinking is a mere abstract understanding. This exactly shows the
                        transition from the last, the religious consciousness, into pure thought
                        or knowing in the PhdG ("absolute" is not a good expression here; see
                        also SL, "With What must Science Begin?") - the sublation of religious
                        consciousness. The devine service is to be and think in pure thought.
                        This means also that Hegel's devine service is always a process.

                        >I thought of replying to that that we are not just or always philosophers so
                        that philosophers, i.e. such men or women, are not obliged to be non-religious.
                        What you say though, citing Hegel, seems more satisfactory, that philosophising
                        itself is worship, "divine service". So in the old marriage service the
                        spouse-to-be says to the other, "With my body I thee worship". Worship names a
                        constant of human life.
                        >

                        Nobody ist "obliged to be non-religious" or religious. However, the
                        personal faith of a philosopher cannot be used without hesitation for
                        explaining his thought.

                        >Among devotees there have always been grades and styles of prayer, e.g. the
                        admonition not to use many phrases, down to attitudes of waiting, of abandonment
                        to providence, to "the cunning of Reason", differences again re what to ask for,
                        Aquinas's prayer before study etc. And always that "God helps those who help
                        themselves". Maybe I pray to myself, a variant upon the Franciscan "It is in
                        loving that we are loved". It would be, in helping myself I am helped, I have
                        self-respect, we say.
                        >

                        "Love" is an important concept in Hegel's philosphy. But its meaning and
                        relevance has changed in the course of Hegel's creative work.

                        >It is a task, as you say, finding convergence, as we move in and out of poetry,
                        music, art, religion, philosophy. The aesthetic is indeed prominent. Findlay
                        suggests Hegel's whiole philosophy is an aesthetic. Probably Hegel would say the
                        ideal is to pray as God prays. How does God pray? By being his own manifestation
                        maybe, Nature. "I am myself".
                        >

                        I think Wil says something similar though perhaps with a slightly other
                        meaning: "we can only be aesthetically towards this Absolute with
                        gravity, wonder and awe."

                        >Thus we generate a new immediacy, you say. Music may first make one
                        philosophise, or those phenomenal experiences Hegel starts off by discussing, or
                        being in love, or great danger. "The poet is compared with the philosopher in
                        that both are concerned with the marvellous" (Aquinas). This might seem
                        un-Hegelian, but this is due to sticking with a false view of "mystery" as
                        impenetrable to reason. Philosophy is itself the greatest motive for wonder, in
                        self-admiration.
                        >

                        Yes, I think also that "wonder" (astonishment) is the beginning of each
                        philosophy, but only the beginning. Later it must "lay aside the title
                        'love of knowing' and be actual knowing" in the form of Science (see
                        Preface of the PhdG, para 5).


                        >"expresses more" in your text seems to be textually flawed. How should it be,
                        if you remember? What then is the dynamic process, the divine service? Is it
                        this wondering, this confrontation with manifestation as, for example, category
                        after category falls away into something less abstract and particular? Difficult
                        to say, maybe. I just think the root idea you express is good, and reconciling.
                        And that it is here made explicit. There is more to say but I'll leave it there
                        for now.
                        >
                        >Stephen.
                        >

                        I said above that Hegel's divine service of philosophy is a dynamic
                        process in pure thought. But the categories do not merely "fall(s) away
                        into something less abstract and particular". This would be merely a
                        linear process of the understanding. Hegel's process is not linear but a
                        new category is more abstract and unconscious and one-sided first in its
                        new immediacy which then is the starting point for further mediations
                        with a more concrete result which could not have been achieved directly
                        from the previous mediated category (i.e. the transition from the
                        concrete concept of Pure Becoming into the one-sided concept of
                        Determinate Being in which Pure Becoming is merely sublated and has to
                        be made explicitly again into a more concrete level of the concept).
                        Each progress requires first a regression. I think that each science
                        requires such regressions and simplifications for its development.

                        Regards,
                        Beat Greuter

                        >To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                        >From: greuterb@...
                        >Date: Sun, 12 Sep 2010 14:05:25 +0200
                        >Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday
                        >
                        >Oliver Scholz writes:
                        >
                        >>................
                        >>But that's not all. There is in general something about
                        >>debates about god on this list which keeps nagging me. It is
                        >>not the god issue per se -- after all I do think that
                        >>Hegel's philosophy establishes the possibility of religion
                        >>as reasonable. After all I am convinced that atheism is a
                        >>Christian phenomenon -- in every ambivalence introduced by
                        >>the word phenomenon. I'm not sure whether I would agree with
                        >>Alan on all accounts, because Christianity is of utmost
                        >>importance within the 'having-become' of spirit and that in
                        >>many ways Hegel's philosophy can be regarded as a
                        >>philosophical reconstruction of this. And after all I'm
                        >>actually very much interested in theology.
                        >>
                        >>So, that's not it. It's something else. All this here SEEMS
                        >>to be religion in disguise of philosophy; but I have the
                        >>feeling that it only seems so. When I struggle to grasp
                        >>this intuition of mine, the phrase "it's not the real thing"
                        >>keeps coming into my mind. It does not feel genuine; this
                        >>use of philosophal terms and statements to express
                        >>representations that would ACTUALLY belong to the realm of
                        >>religion feels like a SUBSTITUTE for genuine religion. I
                        >>have to ask myself: maybe it is less the fact that it's
                        >>abused philosophy because of which I find it so obnoxious,
                        >>maybe it's the fact that it is only surrogate religion.
                        >>
                        >Hegel's philosophy as every good philosophy is a kind of divine service,
                        >as Hegel says. The reason for this is the search for the absolute that
                        >brings you into an opposition of the finite and the infinite. To find
                        >the convergence and coincidence of these opposites is the task of
                        >philosophy, poetry etc. as well as religion and theology. It is a
                        >mediating activity in thought and reality that generates a new immediacy
                        >which is the result of this activity, however, expresses more. The
                        >'more' expressed by the new immediacy leads to a dynamic process which
                        >can be called a divine service. Hegel's philosophy (and other
                        >philosophies) stands for making this process explicitly which elsewhere
                        >is 'only' implicitly.
                        >
                        >Regards,
                        >Beat Greuter
                        >

                        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]






                        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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                      • stephen theron
                        Wil, I appreciate this. But, as you say, transparency... It is probably not ultimately proper. Is Hegelian cognition, in the Logic at least, univocal with our
                        Message 11 of 24 , Sep 13, 2010
                          Wil,



                          I appreciate this. But, as you say, transparency... It is probably not ultimately proper.

                          Is Hegelian cognition, in the Logic at least, univocal with our ordinary term "knowledge", which always or necessarily "objectivizes" (intentionality etc.)?

                          So I at least wanted to exclude that anything else knows it, some other I or "we" for example, considered as external to it. It would then be finite, as I am seeing this, less than entirely act or active, as Hegel characterises (he has to) the Notion.



                          Stephen.



                          To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                          From: eupraxis@...
                          Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2010 11:26:37 -0400
                          Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday






                          Stephen wrote, " ... only the Absolute knows the Absolute."

                          I have been looking at this phrase for a few minutes now. While I understand the gist the intent, if one pardons that presumption, I have to take issue with it insofar as the transitive nature of the verb "knows" implies that which the Absolute, in its utter in-and-for-itself transparency, has transcended. I am not sure if it is proper, ultimately, to say that the Absolute knows anything -- or, indeed, 'does' anything -- _qua_ Absolute.

                          If we say that the Absolute 'thinks' (struggles, meanders, discovers, etc.), this is only as a dialectical process, and as such it is always particularized, abstracted. The Absolute is attained in the activity and gesture of (conceptual) knowing; the 'known' being for it the freedom of Reason toward its end. (The finality of the process always appears (in the texts) oddly devoid of its content, bringing to mind Aristotle's 'thought thinking itself'.)

                          Wil

                          -----Original Message-----
                          From: stephen theron <stephentheron@...>
                          To: hegel hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                          Sent: Mon, Sep 13, 2010 9:36 am
                          Subject: RE: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday

                          Dear Beat,

                          Thanks for the tips here. I appreciate them. I only meant, that I suppose that
                          the philosopher as a man might go to church, say, without betraying himself,
                          like Hegel in fact. Anyhow, I can see worship, like your "divine service", as an
                          intrinsically analogical or focal concept including the spousal attitude I
                          mentioned or indeed our stance before truth. Of course worshipping normally
                          posits an external object and that idea has to be overcome, as it is implicitly
                          in "the absolute religion" itself, however we interpret this description of
                          Hegel's. All the church-going etc. was never more than a concession, the whole
                          theology of the Temple implies.

                          "the sublation of religious consciousness" - that is an exciting phrase. As I
                          once asked, expecting a "no", "Is God religious?" It means though, we adore (in
                          the mediated sense referred to above) to the point of losing ourselves. Reality,
                          infinity, that is, is necessarily maximal as form and content become fused. Only
                          thus do we make room for the remarks about blessedness etc. Or, in becoming what
                          we worship we no longer worship, or we worship "in spirit and in truth". It is
                          the same, plenty of texts seem to indicate, if we didn't know it already. But I
                          may seem to be jumping ahead there. "The divine service is to be and think in
                          pure thought", "always a process" you write. Well, I made some comments on that
                          recently. I think Hegel gives no support to "process theology" etc. The Notion
                          itself is ultimately all of consciousness, in which alone "we" have our true
                          being as "the very total which the notion is", "indissolubly one with it",
                          indissolubly. No process there. But of co
                          urse the word may be used here and there. But in so far as thought is the
                          Notion, not the Judgment or the Syllogism, it is not discursive.

                          I agree that the personal faith of a philosopher cannot be used for explaining
                          his thought. I hope I do not do that. Indeed I have said nothing about faith
                          here. I find it a rather problematic concept. I do not think Hegel does that,
                          though he refers often enough to ideas broached by Christians. But we do not
                          abstract from our own individuality either, which is fulfilled in the universal.

                          The meaning of love has changed yes, as with Francis (the very point of my
                          quote). By which I do not mean either to assert or deny that Francis was a
                          philosopher.

                          Yes, Wil does say that, I was pleased to see. Yes I am familiar with this laying
                          aside of the first title and progressing ("processing", but from shadows to
                          reality, to our our own eternal reality, i.e. it is not a "real" but a
                          dialectical process) to actual knowing. Some people find this an obstacle as
                          indicative of Hegel's supposed "rationalism" (in the sense of being rationalist
                          rather than rational), but what would be the point of loving knowing if we never
                          could actually know. Of course only the Absolute knows the Absolute. This is
                          indisputable I think. Therefore we must take seriously the various identities
                          Hegel propounds, as of an absolute subject, "members one of another" (I cite
                          this phrase as apposite, not as any declaration of "a personal faith". It
                          pinpoints the sublation of Whole and Parts).

                          "Each progress requires first a regression". this is true I think more of the
                          earlier dialectic than of the later, where a sheer Advance becomes more and more
                          characteristic. McTaggart makes this point forcefully in his "Studies in the H.
                          Dialectic" and elsewhere. I don't know if you would agree. I suspect not, as
                          being "linear". It corresponds to my reading quite well. But yes, they do not
                          merely fall away, you are right there.

                          Thank you again for these openings and fruits of your scholarship.

                          Stephen.

                          To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                          From: greuterb@...
                          Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2010 12:07:51 +0200
                          Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday

                          Dear Stephen,

                          You write:

                          >Dear Beat,
                          >
                          >"A kind of divine service". This seems to go against Wil saying that worship
                          "for the philosopher" is out.
                          >

                          I don't think that to say "a kind of divine service" is opposed to
                          "saying that worship "for the philosopher" is out". In another mail Wil
                          wrote: "I read these texts (I am thinking of both the S-L and Phen, and
                          the Phil-Religion lectures) to mean the same thing: to wit, that God,
                          when comprehended as Idea, cannot be an object of _worship_ by the
                          philosopher -- worship is denied us;". I think this is what Hegel means
                          when he says that philosophy cannot have a fixed object you think or
                          worship on because then you miss the truth in this object and your
                          thinking is a mere abstract understanding. This exactly shows the
                          transition from the last, the religious consciousness, into pure thought
                          or knowing in the PhdG ("absolute" is not a good expression here; see
                          also SL, "With What must Science Begin?") - the sublation of religious
                          consciousness. The devine service is to be and think in pure thought.
                          This means also that Hegel's devine service is always a process.

                          >I thought of replying to that that we are not just or always philosophers so
                          that philosophers, i.e. such men or women, are not obliged to be non-religious.
                          What you say though, citing Hegel, seems more satisfactory, that philosophising
                          itself is worship, "divine service". So in the old marriage service the
                          spouse-to-be says to the other, "With my body I thee worship". Worship names a
                          constant of human life.
                          >

                          Nobody ist "obliged to be non-religious" or religious. However, the
                          personal faith of a philosopher cannot be used without hesitation for
                          explaining his thought.

                          >Among devotees there have always been grades and styles of prayer, e.g. the
                          admonition not to use many phrases, down to attitudes of waiting, of abandonment
                          to providence, to "the cunning of Reason", differences again re what to ask for,
                          Aquinas's prayer before study etc. And always that "God helps those who help
                          themselves". Maybe I pray to myself, a variant upon the Franciscan "It is in
                          loving that we are loved". It would be, in helping myself I am helped, I have
                          self-respect, we say.
                          >

                          "Love" is an important concept in Hegel's philosphy. But its meaning and
                          relevance has changed in the course of Hegel's creative work.

                          >It is a task, as you say, finding convergence, as we move in and out of poetry,
                          music, art, religion, philosophy. The aesthetic is indeed prominent. Findlay
                          suggests Hegel's whiole philosophy is an aesthetic. Probably Hegel would say the
                          ideal is to pray as God prays. How does God pray? By being his own manifestation
                          maybe, Nature. "I am myself".
                          >

                          I think Wil says something similar though perhaps with a slightly other
                          meaning: "we can only be aesthetically towards this Absolute with
                          gravity, wonder and awe."

                          >Thus we generate a new immediacy, you say. Music may first make one
                          philosophise, or those phenomenal experiences Hegel starts off by discussing, or
                          being in love, or great danger. "The poet is compared with the philosopher in
                          that both are concerned with the marvellous" (Aquinas). This might seem
                          un-Hegelian, but this is due to sticking with a false view of "mystery" as
                          impenetrable to reason. Philosophy is itself the greatest motive for wonder, in
                          self-admiration.
                          >

                          Yes, I think also that "wonder" (astonishment) is the beginning of each
                          philosophy, but only the beginning. Later it must "lay aside the title
                          'love of knowing' and be actual knowing" in the form of Science (see
                          Preface of the PhdG, para 5).

                          >"expresses more" in your text seems to be textually flawed. How should it be,
                          if you remember? What then is the dynamic process, the divine service? Is it
                          this wondering, this confrontation with manifestation as, for example, category
                          after category falls away into something less abstract and particular? Difficult
                          to say, maybe. I just think the root idea you express is good, and reconciling.
                          And that it is here made explicit. There is more to say but I'll leave it there
                          for now.
                          >
                          >Stephen.
                          >

                          I said above that Hegel's divine service of philosophy is a dynamic
                          process in pure thought. But the categories do not merely "fall(s) away
                          into something less abstract and particular". This would be merely a
                          linear process of the understanding. Hegel's process is not linear but a
                          new category is more abstract and unconscious and one-sided first in its
                          new immediacy which then is the starting point for further mediations
                          with a more concrete result which could not have been achieved directly
                          from the previous mediated category (i.e. the transition from the
                          concrete concept of Pure Becoming into the one-sided concept of
                          Determinate Being in which Pure Becoming is merely sublated and has to
                          be made explicitly again into a more concrete level of the concept).
                          Each progress requires first a regression. I think that each science
                          requires such regressions and simplifications for its development.

                          Regards,
                          Beat Greuter

                          >To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                          >From: greuterb@...
                          >Date: Sun, 12 Sep 2010 14:05:25 +0200
                          >Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday
                          >
                          >Oliver Scholz writes:
                          >
                          >>................
                          >>But that's not all. There is in general something about
                          >>debates about god on this list which keeps nagging me. It is
                          >>not the god issue per se -- after all I do think that
                          >>Hegel's philosophy establishes the possibility of religion
                          >>as reasonable. After all I am convinced that atheism is a
                          >>Christian phenomenon -- in every ambivalence introduced by
                          >>the word phenomenon. I'm not sure whether I would agree with
                          >>Alan on all accounts, because Christianity is of utmost
                          >>importance within the 'having-become' of spirit and that in
                          >>many ways Hegel's philosophy can be regarded as a
                          >>philosophical reconstruction of this. And after all I'm
                          >>actually very much interested in theology.
                          >>
                          >>So, that's not it. It's something else. All this here SEEMS
                          >>to be religion in disguise of philosophy; but I have the
                          >>feeling that it only seems so. When I struggle to grasp
                          >>this intuition of mine, the phrase "it's not the real thing"
                          >>keeps coming into my mind. It does not feel genuine; this
                          >>use of philosophal terms and statements to express
                          >>representations that would ACTUALLY belong to the realm of
                          >>religion feels like a SUBSTITUTE for genuine religion. I
                          >>have to ask myself: maybe it is less the fact that it's
                          >>abused philosophy because of which I find it so obnoxious,
                          >>maybe it's the fact that it is only surrogate religion.
                          >>
                          >Hegel's philosophy as every good philosophy is a kind of divine service,
                          >as Hegel says. The reason for this is the search for the absolute that
                          >brings you into an opposition of the finite and the infinite. To find
                          >the convergence and coincidence of these opposites is the task of
                          >philosophy, poetry etc. as well as religion and theology. It is a
                          >mediating activity in thought and reality that generates a new immediacy
                          >which is the result of this activity, however, expresses more. The
                          >'more' expressed by the new immediacy leads to a dynamic process which
                          >can be called a divine service. Hegel's philosophy (and other
                          >philosophies) stands for making this process explicitly which elsewhere
                          >is 'only' implicitly.
                          >
                          >Regards,
                          >Beat Greuter
                          >

                          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



                          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

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                          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                        • paulmsrf@btinternet.com
                          Wil, I think you raised some interesting points;but instead of only the absolute knows the absolute , why not: only the agent that can comprehend what it
                          Message 12 of 24 , Sep 15, 2010
                            Wil, I think you raised some interesting points;but instead of 'only the absolute knows the absolute', why not: only the agent that can comprehend what it means for the understanding to have an identity in-its-difference can know the absolute?; is this not closer to Hegel's concept of it?

                            Paul Healey

                            -original message-
                            Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday
                            From: eupraxis@...
                            Date: 13/09/2010 4:27 pm

                            Stephen wrote, " ... only the Absolute knows the Absolute."

                            I have been looking at this phrase for a few minutes now. While I understand the gist the intent, if one pardons that presumption, I have to take issue with it insofar as the transitive nature of the verb "knows" implies that which the Absolute, in its utter in-and-for-itself transparency, has transcended. I am not sure if it is proper, ultimately, to say that the Absolute knows anything -- or, indeed, 'does' anything -- _qua_ Absolute.

                            If we say that the Absolute 'thinks' (struggles, meanders, discovers, etc.), this is only as a dialectical process, and as such it is always particularized, abstracted. The Absolute is attained in the activity and gesture of (conceptual) knowing; the 'known' being for it the freedom of Reason toward its end. (The finality of the process always appears (in the texts) oddly devoid of its content, bringing to mind Aristotle's 'thought thinking itself'.)

                            Wil






                            -----Original Message-----
                            From: stephen theron <stephentheron@...>
                            To: hegel hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                            Sent: Mon, Sep 13, 2010 9:36 am
                            Subject: RE: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday



                            Dear Beat,



                            Thanks for the tips here. I appreciate them. I only meant, that I suppose that
                            the philosopher as a man might go to church, say, without betraying himself,
                            like Hegel in fact. Anyhow, I can see worship, like your "divine service", as an
                            intrinsically analogical or focal concept including the spousal attitude I
                            mentioned or indeed our stance before truth. Of course worshipping normally
                            posits an external object and that idea has to be overcome, as it is implicitly
                            in "the absolute religion" itself, however we interpret this description of
                            Hegel's. All the church-going etc. was never more than a concession, the whole
                            theology of the Temple implies.

                            "the sublation of religious consciousness" - that is an exciting phrase. As I
                            once asked, expecting a "no", "Is God religious?" It means though, we adore (in
                            the mediated sense referred to above) to the point of losing ourselves. Reality,
                            infinity, that is, is necessarily maximal as form and content become fused. Only
                            thus do we make room for the remarks about blessedness etc. Or, in becoming what
                            we worship we no longer worship, or we worship "in spirit and in truth". It is
                            the same, plenty of texts seem to indicate, if we didn't know it already. But I
                            may seem to be jumping ahead there. "The divine service is to be and think in
                            pure thought", "always a process" you write. Well, I made some comments on that
                            recently. I think Hegel gives no support to "process theology" etc. The Notion
                            itself is ultimately all of consciousness, in which alone "we" have our true
                            being as "the very total which the notion is", "indissolubly one with it",
                            indissolubly. No process there. But of co
                            urse the word may be used here and there. But in so far as thought is the
                            Notion, not the Judgment or the Syllogism, it is not discursive.

                            I agree that the personal faith of a philosopher cannot be used for explaining
                            his thought. I hope I do not do that. Indeed I have said nothing about faith
                            here. I find it a rather problematic concept. I do not think Hegel does that,
                            though he refers often enough to ideas broached by Christians. But we do not
                            abstract from our own individuality either, which is fulfilled in the universal.

                            The meaning of love has changed yes, as with Francis (the very point of my
                            quote). By which I do not mean either to assert or deny that Francis was a
                            philosopher.

                            Yes, Wil does say that, I was pleased to see. Yes I am familiar with this laying
                            aside of the first title and progressing ("processing", but from shadows to
                            reality, to our our own eternal reality, i.e. it is not a "real" but a
                            dialectical process) to actual knowing. Some people find this an obstacle as
                            indicative of Hegel's supposed "rationalism" (in the sense of being rationalist
                            rather than rational), but what would be the point of loving knowing if we never
                            could actually know. Of course only the Absolute knows the Absolute. This is
                            indisputable I think. Therefore we must take seriously the various identities
                            Hegel propounds, as of an absolute subject, "members one of another" (I cite
                            this phrase as apposite, not as any declaration of "a personal faith". It
                            pinpoints the sublation of Whole and Parts).

                            "Each progress requires first a regression". this is true I think more of the
                            earlier dialectic than of the later, where a sheer Advance becomes more and more
                            characteristic. McTaggart makes this point forcefully in his "Studies in the H.
                            Dialectic" and elsewhere. I don't know if you would agree. I suspect not, as
                            being "linear". It corresponds to my reading quite well. But yes, they do not
                            merely fall away, you are right there.

                            Thank you again for these openings and fruits of your scholarship.

                            Stephen.


                            To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                            From: greuterb@...
                            Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2010 12:07:51 +0200
                            Subject: Re: [hegel] ContinuaStephen wrote, " ... only the Absolute knows the Absolute."

                            I have been looking at this phrase for a few minutes now. While I understand the gist the intent, if one pardons that presumption, I have to take issue with it insofar as the transitive nature of the verb "knows" implies that which the Absolute, in its utter in-and-for-itself transparency, has transcended. I am not sure if it is proper, ultimately, to say that the Absolute knows anything -- or, indeed, 'does' anything -- _qua_ Absolute.

                            If we say that the Absolute 'thinks' (struggles, meanders, discovers, etc.), this is only as a dialectical process, and as such it is always particularized, abstracted. The Absolute is attained in the activity and gesture of (conceptual) knowing; the 'known' being for it the freedom of Reason toward its end. (The finality of the process always appears (in the texts) oddly devoid of its content, bringing to mind Aristotle's 'thought thinking itself'.)

                            Wil






                            -----Original Message-----
                            From: stephen theron <stephentheron@...>
                            To: hegel hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                            Sent: Mon, Sep 13, 2010 9:36 am
                            Subject: RE: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday



                            Dear Beat,



                            Thanks for the tips here. I appreciate them. I only meant, that I suppose that
                            the philosopher as a man might go to church, say, without betraying himself,
                            like Hegel in fact. Anyhow, I can see worship, like your "divine service", as an
                            intrinsically analogical or focal concept including the spousal attitude I
                            mentioned or indeed our stance before truth. Of course worshipping normally
                            posits an external object and that idea has to be overcome, as it is implicitly
                            in "the absolute religion" itself, however we interpret this description of
                            Hegel's. All the church-going etc. was never more than a concession, the whole
                            theology of the Temple implies.

                            "the sublation of religious consciousness" - that is an exciting phrase. As I
                            once asked, expecting a "no", "Is God religious?" It means though, we adore (in
                            the mediated sense referred to above) to the point of losing ourselves. Reality,
                            infinity, that is, is necessarily maximal as form and content become fused. Only
                            thus do we make room for the remarks about blessedness etc. Or, in becoming what
                            we worship we no longer worship, or we worship "in spirit and in truth". It is
                            the same, plenty of texts seem to indicate, if we didn't know it already. But I
                            may seem to be jumping ahead there. "The divine service is to be and think in
                            pure thought", "always a process" you write. Well, I made some comments on that
                            recently. I think Hegel gives no support to "process theology" etc. The Notion
                            itself is ultimately all of consciousness, in which alone "we" have our true
                            being as "the very total which the notion is", "indissolubly one with it",
                            indissolubly. No process there. But of co
                            urse the word may be used here and there. But in so far as thought is the
                            Notion, not the Judgment or the Syllogism, it is not discursive.

                            I agree that the personal faith of a philosopher cannot be used for explaining
                            his thought. I hope I do not do that. Indeed I have said nothing about faith
                            here. I find it a rather problematic concept. I do not think Hegel does that,
                            though he refers often enough to ideas broached by Christians. But we do not
                            abstract from our own individuality either, which is fulfilled in the universal.

                            The meaning of love has changed yes, as with Francis (the very point of my
                            quote). By which I do not mean either to assert or deny that Francis was a
                            philosopher.

                            Yes, Wil does say that, I was pleased to see. Yes I am familiar with this laying
                            aside of the first title and progressing ("processing", but from shadows to
                            reality, to our our own eternal reality, i.e. it is not a "real" but a
                            dialectical process) to actual knowing. Some people find this an obstacle as
                            indicative of Hegel's supposed "rationalism" (in the sense of being rationalist
                            rather than rational), but what would be the point of loving knowing if we never
                            could actually know. Of course only the Absolute knows the Absolute. This is
                            indisputable I think. Therefore we must take seriously the various identities
                            Hegel propounds, as of an absolute subject, "members one of another" (I cite
                            this phrase as apposite, not as any declaration of "a personal faith". It
                            pinpoints the sublation of Whole and Parts).

                            "Each progress requires first a regression". this is true I think more of the
                            earlier dialectic than of the later, where a sheer Advance becomes more and more
                            characteristic. McTaggart makes this point forcefully in his "Studies in the H.
                            Dialectic" and elsewhere. I don't know if you would agree. I suspect not, as
                            being "linear". It corresponds to my reading quite well. But yes, they do not
                            merely fall away, you are right there.

                            Thank you again for these openings and fruits of your scholarship.

                            Stephen.


                            To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                            From: greuterb@...
                            Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2010 12:07:51 +0200
                            Subject: Re: [hegel] Continua
                          • stephen theron
                            Paul, If I may come in here. One might want to say. Everything in its proper existence is a constituent of the Absolute in the sense in which it is therefore
                            Message 13 of 24 , Sep 15, 2010
                              Paul, If I may come in here.


                              One might want to say. Everything in its proper existence is a constituent of the Absolute in the sense in which it is therefore one with it. (The Absolute Idea is the Absolute, says Hegel)

                              But anything that does not know is not one with the Absolute, since the Absolute knows or more than knows itself, simply as infinite.

                              Therefore only knowers (and hence persons, though some query this) exist (in the sense, at least, of Dennett's "intentional systems").

                              Further, those knowers who do not "yet" (I speak as a fool) know the Absolute ("comprehend what it means for the understanding to have an identity in-its-difference") are as "yet" neither knowers nor existents. They are but shadows of their former, future or abiding selves (to play upon a popular saying).

                              For most of "us" the I is but a construction (cf. Peter G�rdenfors, Prof. of cognition-theory, Lund, on this, some stuff in English; also work by the idealist Axel Randrup, internet).

                              We know the Absolute as one with the Absolute, the only way for a finite being, otherwise "evil" (sic Hegel), to be.



                              Having said all that, your suggestion opens for me a fresh way of understanding: of the Absolute as the infinite total of coincident possibilities which are just as such actual. There is no need for a tedious enumeration of them (Hegel's point), which would indeed be an endless tedium. Of course we seem at first to be faced here with an abstract, maybe Proclus-type Absolute, which would be inert, not active, not knowing. But this is impossible, since not infinite. The active and conscious has to come in; not "personal" as limited and finite, but including it, such that when I think "personal" I think "absolute". We, thus, are either not persons or somehow the Absolute, incarnations so to say, transcendently "personal", intentional etc. Therefore, if the System which is Absolute is not personal this is only because we are restricting this term to the finite (as we are free to do), in which case, I have been arguing here, this Absolute is entirely constituted by persons, as argued above. But there again, this (McTaggart's suggestion), does not seem to give us an Infinite, Act, with all that rational cunning Hegel comes repeatedly back to, just for one thing... But of course one may claim this is just a prejudice in favour of personality, to make it always self-transcendent. Why not say we just don't know the mode (there can actually be no mode) of the Absolute. Why is it "idea" then? etc. etc.



                              Stephen.


                              To: eupraxis@...
                              CC: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                              From: paulmsrf@...
                              Date: Wed, 15 Sep 2010 14:20:37 +0000
                              Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday






                              Wil, I think you raised some interesting points;but instead of 'only the absolute knows the absolute', why not: only the agent that can comprehend what it means for the understanding to have an identity in-its-difference can know the absolute?; is this not closer to Hegel's concept of it?

                              Paul Healey

                              -original message-
                              Subject: Re: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday
                              From: eupraxis@...
                              Date: 13/09/2010 4:27 pm

                              Stephen wrote, " ... only the Absolute knows the Absolute."

                              I have been looking at this phrase for a few minutes now. While I understand the gist the intent, if one pardons that presumption, I have to take issue with it insofar as the transitive nature of the verb "knows" implies that which the Absolute, in its utter in-and-for-itself transparency, has transcended. I am not sure if it is proper, ultimately, to say that the Absolute knows anything -- or, indeed, 'does' anything -- _qua_ Absolute.

                              If we say that the Absolute 'thinks' (struggles, meanders, discovers, etc.), this is only as a dialectical process, and as such it is always particularized, abstracted. The Absolute is attained in the activity and gesture of (conceptual) knowing; the 'known' being for it the freedom of Reason toward its end. (The finality of the process always appears (in the texts) oddly devoid of its content, bringing to mind Aristotle's 'thought thinking itself'.)

                              Wil

                              -----Original Message-----
                              From: stephen theron <stephentheron@...>
                              To: hegel hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                              Sent: Mon, Sep 13, 2010 9:36 am
                              Subject: RE: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday

                              Dear Beat,

                              Thanks for the tips here. I appreciate them. I only meant, that I suppose that
                              the philosopher as a man might go to church, say, without betraying himself,
                              like Hegel in fact. Anyhow, I can see worship, like your "divine service", as an
                              intrinsically analogical or focal concept including the spousal attitude I
                              mentioned or indeed our stance before truth. Of course worshipping normally
                              posits an external object and that idea has to be overcome, as it is implicitly
                              in "the absolute religion" itself, however we interpret this description of
                              Hegel's. All the church-going etc. was never more than a concession, the whole
                              theology of the Temple implies.

                              "the sublation of religious consciousness" - that is an exciting phrase. As I
                              once asked, expecting a "no", "Is God religious?" It means though, we adore (in
                              the mediated sense referred to above) to the point of losing ourselves. Reality,
                              infinity, that is, is necessarily maximal as form and content become fused. Only
                              thus do we make room for the remarks about blessedness etc. Or, in becoming what
                              we worship we no longer worship, or we worship "in spirit and in truth". It is
                              the same, plenty of texts seem to indicate, if we didn't know it already. But I
                              may seem to be jumping ahead there. "The divine service is to be and think in
                              pure thought", "always a process" you write. Well, I made some comments on that
                              recently. I think Hegel gives no support to "process theology" etc. The Notion
                              itself is ultimately all of consciousness, in which alone "we" have our true
                              being as "the very total which the notion is", "indissolubly one with it",
                              indissolubly. No process there. But of co
                              urse the word may be used here and there. But in so far as thought is the
                              Notion, not the Judgment or the Syllogism, it is not discursive.

                              I agree that the personal faith of a philosopher cannot be used for explaining
                              his thought. I hope I do not do that. Indeed I have said nothing about faith
                              here. I find it a rather problematic concept. I do not think Hegel does that,
                              though he refers often enough to ideas broached by Christians. But we do not
                              abstract from our own individuality either, which is fulfilled in the universal.

                              The meaning of love has changed yes, as with Francis (the very point of my
                              quote). By which I do not mean either to assert or deny that Francis was a
                              philosopher.

                              Yes, Wil does say that, I was pleased to see. Yes I am familiar with this laying
                              aside of the first title and progressing ("processing", but from shadows to
                              reality, to our our own eternal reality, i.e. it is not a "real" but a
                              dialectical process) to actual knowing. Some people find this an obstacle as
                              indicative of Hegel's supposed "rationalism" (in the sense of being rationalist
                              rather than rational), but what would be the point of loving knowing if we never
                              could actually know. Of course only the Absolute knows the Absolute. This is
                              indisputable I think. Therefore we must take seriously the various identities
                              Hegel propounds, as of an absolute subject, "members one of another" (I cite
                              this phrase as apposite, not as any declaration of "a personal faith". It
                              pinpoints the sublation of Whole and Parts).

                              "Each progress requires first a regression". this is true I think more of the
                              earlier dialectic than of the later, where a sheer Advance becomes more and more
                              characteristic. McTaggart makes this point forcefully in his "Studies in the H.
                              Dialectic" and elsewhere. I don't know if you would agree. I suspect not, as
                              being "linear". It corresponds to my reading quite well. But yes, they do not
                              merely fall away, you are right there.

                              Thank you again for these openings and fruits of your scholarship.

                              Stephen.

                              To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                              From: greuterb@...
                              Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2010 12:07:51 +0200
                              Subject: Re: [hegel] ContinuaStephen wrote, " ... only the Absolute knows the Absolute."

                              I have been looking at this phrase for a few minutes now. While I understand the gist the intent, if one pardons that presumption, I have to take issue with it insofar as the transitive nature of the verb "knows" implies that which the Absolute, in its utter in-and-for-itself transparency, has transcended. I am not sure if it is proper, ultimately, to say that the Absolute knows anything -- or, indeed, 'does' anything -- _qua_ Absolute.

                              If we say that the Absolute 'thinks' (struggles, meanders, discovers, etc.), this is only as a dialectical process, and as such it is always particularized, abstracted. The Absolute is attained in the activity and gesture of (conceptual) knowing; the 'known' being for it the freedom of Reason toward its end. (The finality of the process always appears (in the texts) oddly devoid of its content, bringing to mind Aristotle's 'thought thinking itself'.)

                              Wil

                              -----Original Message-----
                              From: stephen theron <stephentheron@...>
                              To: hegel hegel <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
                              Sent: Mon, Sep 13, 2010 9:36 am
                              Subject: RE: [hegel] Continuation of my mail of yesterday

                              Dear Beat,

                              Thanks for the tips here. I appreciate them. I only meant, that I suppose that
                              the philosopher as a man might go to church, say, without betraying himself,
                              like Hegel in fact. Anyhow, I can see worship, like your "divine service", as an
                              intrinsically analogical or focal concept including the spousal attitude I
                              mentioned or indeed our stance before truth. Of course worshipping normally
                              posits an external object and that idea has to be overcome, as it is implicitly
                              in "the absolute religion" itself, however we interpret this description of
                              Hegel's. All the church-going etc. was never more than a concession, the whole
                              theology of the Temple implies.

                              "the sublation of religious consciousness" - that is an exciting phrase. As I
                              once asked, expecting a "no", "Is God religious?" It means though, we adore (in
                              the mediated sense referred to above) to the point of losing ourselves. Reality,
                              infinity, that is, is necessarily maximal as form and content become fused. Only
                              thus do we make room for the remarks about blessedness etc. Or, in becoming what
                              we worship we no longer worship, or we worship "in spirit and in truth". It is
                              the same, plenty of texts seem to indicate, if we didn't know it already. But I
                              may seem to be jumping ahead there. "The divine service is to be and think in
                              pure thought", "always a process" you write. Well, I made some comments on that
                              recently. I think Hegel gives no support to "process theology" etc. The Notion
                              itself is ultimately all of consciousness, in which alone "we" have our true
                              being as "the very total which the notion is", "indissolubly one with it",
                              indissolubly. No process there. But of co
                              urse the word may be used here and there. But in so far as thought is the
                              Notion, not the Judgment or the Syllogism, it is not discursive.

                              I agree that the personal faith of a philosopher cannot be used for explaining
                              his thought. I hope I do not do that. Indeed I have said nothing about faith
                              here. I find it a rather problematic concept. I do not think Hegel does that,
                              though he refers often enough to ideas broached by Christians. But we do not
                              abstract from our own individuality either, which is fulfilled in the universal.

                              The meaning of love has changed yes, as with Francis (the very point of my
                              quote). By which I do not mean either to assert or deny that Francis was a
                              philosopher.

                              Yes, Wil does say that, I was pleased to see. Yes I am familiar with this laying
                              aside of the first title and progressing ("processing", but from shadows to
                              reality, to our our own eternal reality, i.e. it is not a "real" but a
                              dialectical process) to actual knowing. Some people find this an obstacle as
                              indicative of Hegel's supposed "rationalism" (in the sense of being rationalist
                              rather than rational), but what would be the point of loving knowing if we never
                              could actually know. Of course only the Absolute knows the Absolute. This is
                              indisputable I think. Therefore we must take seriously the various identities
                              Hegel propounds, as of an absolute subject, "members one of another" (I cite
                              this phrase as apposite, not as any declaration of "a personal faith". It
                              pinpoints the sublation of Whole and Parts).

                              "Each progress requires first a regression". this is true I think more of the
                              earlier dialectic than of the later, where a sheer Advance becomes more and more
                              characteristic. McTaggart makes this point forcefully in his "Studies in the H.
                              Dialectic" and elsewhere. I don't know if you would agree. I suspect not, as
                              being "linear". It corresponds to my reading quite well. But yes, they do not
                              merely fall away, you are right there.

                              Thank you again for these openings and fruits of your scholarship.

                              Stephen.

                              To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                              From: greuterb@...
                              Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2010 12:07:51 +0200
                              Subject: Re: [hegel] Continua






                              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                            • Paul Trejo
                              ...   I agree with your characterization of Hegel s logical method, Beat. Nevertheless, it appears that the clash between Philosophy and Religion remains
                              Message 14 of 24 , Sep 22, 2010
                                In response to the 9/13/2010 post by Beat Greuter:

                                > ...I said above that Hegel's divine service of philosophy is a
                                > dynamic process in pure thought. But the categories do not
                                > merely "fall away into something less abstract and particular".
                                > This would be merely a  linear process of the understanding.
                                > Hegel's process is not linear but a  new category is more
                                > abstract and unconscious and one-sided first in its new
                                > immediacy which then is the starting point for further mediations 
                                > with a more concrete result which could not have been achieved
                                > directly from the previous mediated category (i.e. the transition
                                > from the concrete concept of Pure Becoming into the one-sided
                                > concept of Determinate Being in which Pure Becoming is merely
                                > sublated and has to be made explicitly again into a more concrete
                                > level of the concept).  Each progress requires first a regression.
                                > I think that each science requires such regressions and
                                > simplifications for its development.

                                > Regards,
                                > Beat Greuter
                                 
                                I agree with your characterization of Hegel's logical method, Beat.
                                Nevertheless, it appears that the clash between Philosophy and
                                Religion remains unaffected by your narrative.
                                 
                                Let's look again at Hegel's texts where he says that Philosophy
                                is itself the "service of God."  Hegel says:
                                 
                                     "But each of them, Religion as well as
                                      Philosophy, is the service of God in a
                                      way peculiar to it.  They differ in the
                                      peculiar character of their concern with
                                      God.  This is where the difficulties lie
                                      that impede Philosophy's grasp of Religion,
                                      and it often appears impossible for the
                                      two of them to be united.  The apprehensive
                                      attitude of Religion toward Philosophy and 
                                      the hostile stance of each toward the other
                                      arise from this."  (Hegel, LECTURES OF 1827
                                      ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, ed. Hodgson,
                                      1988, p. 79)
                                 
                                Religion sees the world from the moral and ethical viewpoint almost
                                exclusively.  It's a question of the Law, of what is Permitted and
                                what is Forbidden from a Cosmic perspective -- that's the focus of
                                Religion.  Furthermore, Theology, to be Theology, will almost never
                                broach the question of whether God exists (just as Psychology
                                will almost never broach the questoin of whether the psyche exists).
                                 
                                Philosophy, on the other hand, is handily characterized by its ancient
                                debate over the Existence of God.  There have been famous thinkers
                                on both sides of that debate, and the question is still unresolved to
                                this very day.  Hegel hoped to resolve the question with his dialectical
                                reworking of Anselm's Ontological Argument, but as Fate would have
                                it (or perhaps as God would have it), Hegel died while working on that
                                very project.
                                 
                                So, Religion takes God for granted, and Philosophy refuses to take
                                God for granted.  That is a legitimate difference -- yet that doesn't
                                prove they are incompatible.
                                 
                                There is another great difference between Religion and Philosophy
                                according to Hegel, namely, that "Religion is for Everybody -- it is
                                not Philosophy, which is not for Everybody."  (Hegel, LPR, vol I) 
                                One may object that Hegel is being elitist here - but he is really
                                only describing the naked fact under our noses -- less than 1% of
                                humanity reads academic Philosophical Journals.
                                 
                                Still - Hegel was one of those Philosophers who developed a new
                                approach to logic - and in his conclusions he decided that Religion
                                has a legitimate and useful contribution to make to human thought
                                and to the human condition generally.   Hegel's theology may be
                                unorthodox, but it remains genuinely Christian (just as the theology
                                of Jesus of Galilee was unorthodox, but remained genuinely Jewish).
                                 
                                Therefore, Hegel makes an interesting conclusion to his Lectures
                                on Religion.  Hegel says:

                                     "Two positions are opposed to Philosophy.
                                      Firstly, there is the vanity of the [Pure]
                                      Understanding, which is displeased by the
                                      fact that Philosophy still exhibits the
                                      truth in Religion and demonstrates that
                                      Reason still resides within it.    =*=
                                      This 'Enlightenment' wants to have nothing
                                      further to do with the Content, and therefore
                                      is highly displeased that Philosophy, as
                                      conscious, methodical thinking, curbs the
                                      fancies, the caprice, the contingency of
                                      thinking.                                 =*=
                                      Secondly, immature religiosity is opposed to
                                      Philosophy."  (Hegel, LECTURES OF 1827
                                      ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION,
                                      ed. Hodgson, 1988, p. 489)
                                 
                                Hegel had a somewhat lower opinion of those 'Enlightenment'
                                thinkers who failed to see the value in Religion.
                                 
                                Best regards,
                                --Paul Trejo, MA
                                 

                                [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                              • Beat Greuter
                                ... Thanks for your reply. I think it is not the task of THEOLOGY to consider the question of whether God exists or not. Its task is to provide the objective
                                Message 15 of 24 , Sep 23, 2010
                                  Paul Trejo writes:

                                  >
                                  >
                                  > In response to the 9/13/2010 post by Beat Greuter:
                                  >
                                  > > ...I said above that Hegel's divine service of philosophy is a
                                  > > dynamic process in pure thought. But the categories do not
                                  > > merely "fall away into something less abstract and particular".
                                  > > This would be merely a linear process of the understanding.
                                  > > Hegel's process is not linear but a new category is more
                                  > > abstract and unconscious and one-sided first in its new
                                  > > immediacy which then is the starting point for further mediations
                                  > > with a more concrete result which could not have been achieved
                                  > > directly from the previous mediated category (i.e. the transition
                                  > > from the concrete concept of Pure Becoming into the one-sided
                                  > > concept of Determinate Being in which Pure Becoming is merely
                                  > > sublated and has to be made explicitly again into a more concrete
                                  > > level of the concept). Each progress requires first a regression.
                                  > > I think that each science requires such regressions and
                                  > > simplifications for its development.
                                  > >
                                  > > Regards,
                                  > > Beat Greuter
                                  >
                                  > I agree with your characterization of Hegel's logical method, Beat.
                                  > Nevertheless, it appears that the clash between Philosophy and
                                  > Religion remains unaffected by your narrative.
                                  >
                                  > Let's look again at Hegel's texts where he says that Philosophy
                                  > is itself the "service of God." Hegel says:
                                  >
                                  > "But each of them, Religion as well as
                                  > Philosophy, is the service of God in a
                                  > way peculiar to it. They differ in the
                                  > peculiar character of their concern with
                                  > God. This is where the difficulties lie
                                  > that impede Philosophy's grasp of Religion,
                                  > and it often appears impossible for the
                                  > two of them to be united. The apprehensive
                                  > attitude of Religion toward Philosophy and
                                  > the hostile stance of each toward the other
                                  > arise from this." (Hegel, LECTURES OF 1827
                                  > ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, ed. Hodgson,
                                  > 1988, p. 79)
                                  >
                                  > Religion sees the world from the moral and ethical viewpoint almost
                                  > exclusively. It's a question of the Law, of what is Permitted and
                                  > what is Forbidden from a Cosmic perspective -- that's the focus of
                                  > Religion. Furthermore, Theology, to be Theology, will almost never
                                  > broach the question of whether God exists (just as Psychology
                                  > will almost never broach the questoin of whether the psyche exists).
                                  >


                                  Thanks for your reply.

                                  I think it is not the task of THEOLOGY to consider the question of
                                  whether God exists or not. Its task is to provide the objective basis
                                  for the faith (which is not merely a subjective phenomenon but provides
                                  social cohesion) and to develop this basis and embodiment in the course
                                  of social and religious changes which could threaten the faith. Therfore
                                  it has always an internal view and differs in this respect from the
                                  SCIENCE of religion which has a mere external view. Good PHILOSOPHIES of
                                  religion, however, unite these two views: on the one side they have to
                                  keep an internal view otherwise they would be merely abstract thinking
                                  and could not reconcile reason and religion. On the other side they have
                                  to be critical and therefore historical. I think in this respect Hegel
                                  did a good job: his philosophy in general and his philosophy of religion
                                  in particular have these two views combined within themselves. Today
                                  also Analytical Philosophy deals with the philosophy of religion
                                  (theism, reformed epistemology, pragmatism), partly also based on the
                                  philosophy of Wittgenstein. I am not sure if a critical philosophy of
                                  language can hold these two views together therefore I take now a
                                  lecture on this subject matter.

                                  Regards,
                                  Beat Greuter



                                  >
                                  > Philosophy, on the other hand, is handily characterized by its ancient
                                  > debate over the Existence of God. There have been famous thinkers
                                  > on both sides of that debate, and the question is still unresolved to
                                  > this very day. Hegel hoped to resolve the question with his dialectical
                                  > reworking of Anselm's Ontological Argument, but as Fate would have
                                  > it (or perhaps as God would have it), Hegel died while working on that
                                  > very project.
                                  >
                                  > So, Religion takes God for granted, and Philosophy refuses to take
                                  > God for granted. That is a legitimate difference -- yet that doesn't
                                  > prove they are incompatible.
                                  >
                                  > There is another great difference between Religion and Philosophy
                                  > according to Hegel, namely, that "Religion is for Everybody -- it is
                                  > not Philosophy, which is not for Everybody." (Hegel, LPR, vol I)
                                  > One may object that Hegel is being elitist here - but he is really
                                  > only describing the naked fact under our noses -- less than 1% of
                                  > humanity reads academic Philosophical Journals.
                                  >
                                  > Still - Hegel was one of those Philosophers who developed a new
                                  > approach to logic - and in his conclusions he decided that Religion
                                  > has a legitimate and useful contribution to make to human thought
                                  > and to the human condition generally. Hegel's theology may be
                                  > unorthodox, but it remains genuinely Christian (just as the theology
                                  > of Jesus of Galilee was unorthodox, but remained genuinely Jewish).
                                  >
                                  > Therefore, Hegel makes an interesting conclusion to his Lectures
                                  > on Religion. Hegel says:
                                  >
                                  > "Two positions are opposed to Philosophy.
                                  > Firstly, there is the vanity of the [Pure]
                                  > Understanding, which is displeased by the
                                  > fact that Philosophy still exhibits the
                                  > truth in Religion and demonstrates that
                                  > Reason still resides within it. =*=
                                  > This 'Enlightenment' wants to have nothing
                                  > further to do with the Content, and therefore
                                  > is highly displeased that Philosophy, as
                                  > conscious, methodical thinking, curbs the
                                  > fancies, the caprice, the contingency of
                                  > thinking. =*=
                                  > Secondly, immature religiosity is opposed to
                                  > Philosophy." (Hegel, LECTURES OF 1827
                                  > ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION,
                                  > ed. Hodgson, 1988, p. 489)
                                  >
                                  > Hegel had a somewhat lower opinion of those 'Enlightenment'
                                  > thinkers who failed to see the value in Religion.
                                  >
                                  > Best regards,
                                  > --Paul Trejo, MA
                                  >
                                  >


                                  [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                • stephen theron
                                  Dear Beat, May I say that I find your summary re philosophy and religion here extremely sure-footed. The internal/external dilemma and the need to surmount it
                                  Message 16 of 24 , Sep 23, 2010
                                    Dear Beat,



                                    May I say that I find your summary re philosophy and religion here extremely sure-footed.

                                    The internal/external dilemma and the need to surmount it is very clear. The tendency today is for theology, as purely internal, to give way to philosophy of religion of this "good" sort. I rather think myself that the history of academic theology reflects this triad of differentiating theology from philosophy and then sublating this difference. The differentiation resulted from the Christian idea of a regula fidei, developed from around Augustine's time I would think (or when Justinian closed the Academy). Hegel shows, however, how even this can be treated philosophically (making the outside inside, in a transferred sense to yours here), as a possible notion of or approach to religion, and one might view this as implicit in the Pauline notion of "wisdom from above", i.e. it is still wisdom. Similarly, some have tried to show how even Greek philosophy, Platonism in particular, was exercised in awareness of an overarching maybe sacred tradition taken "internally" if you like (cf.J. Pieper, �ber die platonischen Mythen). This view, however, often goes together with setting the internal (faith) above the external(philosophy), i.e. of making philosophy subservient, which is a contradiction. I have understood that this is not Hegel's way and my having said that God is the Hegelian Absolute should be taken in the light of that understanding. Of course nothing can be above God, conceptually, i.e. even if he should not exist.


                                    Philosophy of religion in Analytical Philosophy has also been an interest of mine. Frege speaks of "the Reason that is in the world", "What is the world without the reason? "I suspect that the eagerness with which Anglo-American analysts, such as M. Dummett, present Frege as philosophy's timely escape from the error of idealism may be itself an error. They are bemused by the reaction of Russell and Moore against their colleague McTaggart and against British Hegelianism (of which McTaggart was not typical). Work by Hans Sluga has helped me here (esp. two articles in Inquiry). I mention this since it is from the viewpoint of Absolute Idealism that one sees the religious roots (or windowon religion) of philosophy best. Marx is very religious, or at least Messianic. But there is also a lot of interesting stuff on the Ontological Argument, so central for Hegel, in G�del and other writers, especially maybe the Polish analytical philosophers from between the wars and after. Forgive me for listing stuff you probably know better than I. Your plans to read up on this, if I understand your last sentence rightly, remind me of my late mentor and friend in Germany, Fernando Inciarte, who wrote profoundly on Aristotelian philosophy and its link with German idealism (what's that?). He, namely, had a nervous breakdown as a result of too intensive Aristotelian studies. He spent his convalescence "taking a lecture" on, reading up on, "analytical philosophy" and his last postumous work was a heavy tome on first logical principles (the "excluded third"), substance and action).I helped with the English version. Myself, I'm a bit tired of analytical philosophy, but I suppose I have profited from having to work in and with it.

                                    Sincerely,

                                    Stephen.


                                    To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                                    From: greuterb@...
                                    Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2010 10:32:19 +0200
                                    Subject: Re: [hegel] Hegel versus Atheism






                                    Paul Trejo writes:

                                    >
                                    >
                                    > In response to the 9/13/2010 post by Beat Greuter:
                                    >
                                    > > ...I said above that Hegel's divine service of philosophy is a
                                    > > dynamic process in pure thought. But the categories do not
                                    > > merely "fall away into something less abstract and particular".
                                    > > This would be merely a linear process of the understanding.
                                    > > Hegel's process is not linear but a new category is more
                                    > > abstract and unconscious and one-sided first in its new
                                    > > immediacy which then is the starting point for further mediations
                                    > > with a more concrete result which could not have been achieved
                                    > > directly from the previous mediated category (i.e. the transition
                                    > > from the concrete concept of Pure Becoming into the one-sided
                                    > > concept of Determinate Being in which Pure Becoming is merely
                                    > > sublated and has to be made explicitly again into a more concrete
                                    > > level of the concept). Each progress requires first a regression.
                                    > > I think that each science requires such regressions and
                                    > > simplifications for its development.
                                    > >
                                    > > Regards,
                                    > > Beat Greuter
                                    >
                                    > I agree with your characterization of Hegel's logical method, Beat.
                                    > Nevertheless, it appears that the clash between Philosophy and
                                    > Religion remains unaffected by your narrative.
                                    >
                                    > Let's look again at Hegel's texts where he says that Philosophy
                                    > is itself the "service of God." Hegel says:
                                    >
                                    > "But each of them, Religion as well as
                                    > Philosophy, is the service of God in a
                                    > way peculiar to it. They differ in the
                                    > peculiar character of their concern with
                                    > God. This is where the difficulties lie
                                    > that impede Philosophy's grasp of Religion,
                                    > and it often appears impossible for the
                                    > two of them to be united. The apprehensive
                                    > attitude of Religion toward Philosophy and
                                    > the hostile stance of each toward the other
                                    > arise from this." (Hegel, LECTURES OF 1827
                                    > ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, ed. Hodgson,
                                    > 1988, p. 79)
                                    >
                                    > Religion sees the world from the moral and ethical viewpoint almost
                                    > exclusively. It's a question of the Law, of what is Permitted and
                                    > what is Forbidden from a Cosmic perspective -- that's the focus of
                                    > Religion. Furthermore, Theology, to be Theology, will almost never
                                    > broach the question of whether God exists (just as Psychology
                                    > will almost never broach the questoin of whether the psyche exists).
                                    >

                                    Thanks for your reply.

                                    I think it is not the task of THEOLOGY to consider the question of
                                    whether God exists or not. Its task is to provide the objective basis
                                    for the faith (which is not merely a subjective phenomenon but provides
                                    social cohesion) and to develop this basis and embodiment in the course
                                    of social and religious changes which could threaten the faith. Therfore
                                    it has always an internal view and differs in this respect from the
                                    SCIENCE of religion which has a mere external view. Good PHILOSOPHIES of
                                    religion, however, unite these two views: on the one side they have to
                                    keep an internal view otherwise they would be merely abstract thinking
                                    and could not reconcile reason and religion. On the other side they have
                                    to be critical and therefore historical. I think in this respect Hegel
                                    did a good job: his philosophy in general and his philosophy of religion
                                    in particular have these two views combined within themselves. Today
                                    also Analytical Philosophy deals with the philosophy of religion
                                    (theism, reformed epistemology, pragmatism), partly also based on the
                                    philosophy of Wittgenstein. I am not sure if a critical philosophy of
                                    language can hold these two views together therefore I take now a
                                    lecture on this subject matter.

                                    Regards,
                                    Beat Greuter

                                    >
                                    > Philosophy, on the other hand, is handily characterized by its ancient
                                    > debate over the Existence of God. There have been famous thinkers
                                    > on both sides of that debate, and the question is still unresolved to
                                    > this very day. Hegel hoped to resolve the question with his dialectical
                                    > reworking of Anselm's Ontological Argument, but as Fate would have
                                    > it (or perhaps as God would have it), Hegel died while working on that
                                    > very project.
                                    >
                                    > So, Religion takes God for granted, and Philosophy refuses to take
                                    > God for granted. That is a legitimate difference -- yet that doesn't
                                    > prove they are incompatible.
                                    >
                                    > There is another great difference between Religion and Philosophy
                                    > according to Hegel, namely, that "Religion is for Everybody -- it is
                                    > not Philosophy, which is not for Everybody." (Hegel, LPR, vol I)
                                    > One may object that Hegel is being elitist here - but he is really
                                    > only describing the naked fact under our noses -- less than 1% of
                                    > humanity reads academic Philosophical Journals.
                                    >
                                    > Still - Hegel was one of those Philosophers who developed a new
                                    > approach to logic - and in his conclusions he decided that Religion
                                    > has a legitimate and useful contribution to make to human thought
                                    > and to the human condition generally. Hegel's theology may be
                                    > unorthodox, but it remains genuinely Christian (just as the theology
                                    > of Jesus of Galilee was unorthodox, but remained genuinely Jewish).
                                    >
                                    > Therefore, Hegel makes an interesting conclusion to his Lectures
                                    > on Religion. Hegel says:
                                    >
                                    > "Two positions are opposed to Philosophy.
                                    > Firstly, there is the vanity of the [Pure]
                                    > Understanding, which is displeased by the
                                    > fact that Philosophy still exhibits the
                                    > truth in Religion and demonstrates that
                                    > Reason still resides within it. =*=
                                    > This 'Enlightenment' wants to have nothing
                                    > further to do with the Content, and therefore
                                    > is highly displeased that Philosophy, as
                                    > conscious, methodical thinking, curbs the
                                    > fancies, the caprice, the contingency of
                                    > thinking. =*=
                                    > Secondly, immature religiosity is opposed to
                                    > Philosophy." (Hegel, LECTURES OF 1827
                                    > ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION,
                                    > ed. Hodgson, 1988, p. 489)
                                    >
                                    > Hegel had a somewhat lower opinion of those 'Enlightenment'
                                    > thinkers who failed to see the value in Religion.
                                    >
                                    > Best regards,
                                    > --Paul Trejo, MA
                                    >
                                    >

                                    [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]






                                    [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                  • Beat Greuter
                                    Dear Stephen, ... You say that ..... setting the internal (faith) above the external (philosophy), i.e. [of] making philosophy subservient, which is a
                                    Message 17 of 24 , Oct 3, 2010
                                      Dear Stephen,

                                      You write:

                                      >Dear Beat,
                                      >
                                      >May I say that I find your summary re philosophy and religion here extremely sure-footed.
                                      >
                                      >The internal/external dilemma and the need to surmount it is very clear. The tendency today is for theology, as purely internal, to give way to philosophy of religion of this "good" sort. I rather think myself that the history of academic theology reflects this triad of differentiating theology from philosophy and then sublating this difference. The differentiation resulted from the Christian idea of a regula fidei, developed from around Augustine's time I would think (or when Justinian closed the Academy). Hegel shows, however, how even this can be treated philosophically (making the outside inside, in a transferred sense to yours here), as a possible notion of or approach to religion, and one might view this as implicit in the Pauline notion of "wisdom from above", i.e. it is still wisdom. Similarly, some have tried to show how even Greek philosophy, Platonism in particular, was exercised in awareness of an overarching maybe sacred tradition taken "internally" if you like (cf.J. Pieper, Über die platonischen Mythen). This view, however, often goes together with setting the internal (faith) above the external(philosophy), i.e. of making philosophy subservient, which is a contradiction. I have understood that this is not Hegel's way and my having said that God is the Hegelian Absolute should be taken in the light of that understanding. Of course nothing can be above God, conceptually, i.e. even if he should not exist.
                                      >

                                      You say that "..... setting the internal (faith) above the external
                                      (philosophy), i.e. [of] making philosophy subservient, which is a
                                      contradiction". Why a contradiction? Is it not rather one solution for
                                      overcoming the contradiction between faith and thought, also
                                      historically? I agree mostly with what you say in your text above.
                                      However, the last proposition makes me perplex: "nothing can be above
                                      God, conceptually, i.e. even if he should not exist". What does this
                                      mean?. I am afraid that you do not accede Hegel's last step in the PhdG
                                      from religion to pure (absolute) knowing. For you there is still
                                      'something' beyond or above the concept? The beginning of the activity
                                      of pure knowing later in the Logic, however, is one of the most brutal
                                      philosophical 'presupposition' in the history of philosophy. There is no
                                      presupposition at all - there is at the beginning no 'object' which
                                      philosophical thinking can adhere to. The 'object' arises together with
                                      thinking. Hegel does not begin his pure philosophy with God and he does
                                      neither end it with God. God is 'only' the process of pure thought in
                                      its circle. Now, if you state that "nothing can be above God,
                                      conceptually, i.e. even if he should not exist" then I wonder if you
                                      have to invent God since you need Him for your thinking as Kant needs
                                      God for making his practical philosophy working?


                                      >Philosophy of religion in Analytical Philosophy has also been an interest of mine. Frege speaks of "the Reason that is in the world", "What is the world without the reason? "I suspect that the eagerness with which Anglo-American analysts, such as M. Dummett, present Frege as philosophy's timely escape from the error of idealism may be itself an error. They are bemused by the reaction of Russell and Moore against their colleague McTaggart and against British Hegelianism (of which McTaggart was not typical). Work by Hans Sluga has helped me here (esp. two articles in Inquiry). I mention this since it is from the viewpoint of Absolute Idealism that one sees the religious roots (or windowon religion) of philosophy best. Marx is very religious, or at least Messianic. But there is also a lot of interesting stuff on the Ontological Argument, so central for Hegel, in Gödel and other writers, especially maybe the Polish analytical philosophers from between the wars and after. Forgive me for listing stuff you probably know better than I. Your plans to read up on this, if I understand your last sentence rightly, remind me of my late mentor and friend in Germany, Fernando Inciarte, who wrote profoundly on Aristotelian philosophy and its link with German idealism (what's that?). He, namely, had a nervous breakdown as a result of too intensive Aristotelian studies. He spent his convalescence "taking a lecture" on, reading up on, "analytical philosophy" and his last postumous work was a heavy tome on first logical principles (the "excluded third"), substance and action).I helped with the English version. Myself, I'm a bit tired of analytical philosophy, but I suppose I have profited from having to work in and with it.
                                      >
                                      >Sincerely,
                                      >
                                      >Stephen.
                                      >

                                      I think that Analytical Philosophy has become trapped in its
                                      self-created metaphysical riddles. This is the fate of thought Hegel
                                      demonstrates in his dialectic.With this Analytical Philosophy has
                                      actualized Hegel's thought as dialectical and therefore calls now for
                                      him for becoming clear what she has done historically.

                                      Regards,
                                      Beat Greuter


                                      >To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                                      >From: greuterb@...
                                      >Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2010 10:32:19 +0200
                                      >Subject: Re: [hegel] Hegel versus Atheism
                                      >
                                      >
                                      >Paul Trejo writes:
                                      >
                                      >>In response to the 9/13/2010 post by Beat Greuter:
                                      >>
                                      >>
                                      >>>...I said above that Hegel's divine service of philosophy is a
                                      >>>dynamic process in pure thought. But the categories do not
                                      >>>merely "fall away into something less abstract and particular".
                                      >>>This would be merely a linear process of the understanding.
                                      >>>Hegel's process is not linear but a new category is more
                                      >>>abstract and unconscious and one-sided first in its new
                                      >>>immediacy which then is the starting point for further mediations
                                      >>>with a more concrete result which could not have been achieved
                                      >>>directly from the previous mediated category (i.e. the transition
                                      >>>from the concrete concept of Pure Becoming into the one-sided
                                      >>>concept of Determinate Being in which Pure Becoming is merely
                                      >>>sublated and has to be made explicitly again into a more concrete
                                      >>>level of the concept). Each progress requires first a regression.
                                      >>>I think that each science requires such regressions and
                                      >>>simplifications for its development.
                                      >>>
                                      >>>Regards,
                                      >>>Beat Greuter
                                      >>>
                                      >>>
                                      >>I agree with your characterization of Hegel's logical method, Beat.
                                      >>Nevertheless, it appears that the clash between Philosophy and
                                      >>Religion remains unaffected by your narrative.
                                      >>
                                      >>Let's look again at Hegel's texts where he says that Philosophy
                                      >>is itself the "service of God." Hegel says:
                                      >>
                                      >>"But each of them, Religion as well as
                                      >>Philosophy, is the service of God in a
                                      >>way peculiar to it. They differ in the
                                      >>peculiar character of their concern with
                                      >>God. This is where the difficulties lie
                                      >>that impede Philosophy's grasp of Religion,
                                      >>and it often appears impossible for the
                                      >>two of them to be united. The apprehensive
                                      >>attitude of Religion toward Philosophy and
                                      >>the hostile stance of each toward the other
                                      >>arise from this." (Hegel, LECTURES OF 1827
                                      >>ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, ed. Hodgson,
                                      >>1988, p. 79)
                                      >>
                                      >>Religion sees the world from the moral and ethical viewpoint almost
                                      >>exclusively. It's a question of the Law, of what is Permitted and
                                      >>what is Forbidden from a Cosmic perspective -- that's the focus of
                                      >>Religion. Furthermore, Theology, to be Theology, will almost never
                                      >>broach the question of whether God exists (just as Psychology
                                      >>will almost never broach the questoin of whether the psyche exists).
                                      >>
                                      >Thanks for your reply.
                                      >
                                      >I think it is not the task of THEOLOGY to consider the question of
                                      >whether God exists or not. Its task is to provide the objective basis
                                      >for the faith (which is not merely a subjective phenomenon but provides
                                      >social cohesion) and to develop this basis and embodiment in the course
                                      >of social and religious changes which could threaten the faith. Therfore
                                      >it has always an internal view and differs in this respect from the
                                      >SCIENCE of religion which has a mere external view. Good PHILOSOPHIES of
                                      >religion, however, unite these two views: on the one side they have to
                                      >keep an internal view otherwise they would be merely abstract thinking
                                      >and could not reconcile reason and religion. On the other side they have
                                      >to be critical and therefore historical. I think in this respect Hegel
                                      >did a good job: his philosophy in general and his philosophy of religion
                                      >in particular have these two views combined within themselves. Today
                                      >also Analytical Philosophy deals with the philosophy of religion
                                      >(theism, reformed epistemology, pragmatism), partly also based on the
                                      >philosophy of Wittgenstein. I am not sure if a critical philosophy of
                                      >language can hold these two views together therefore I take now a
                                      >lecture on this subject matter.
                                      >
                                      >Regards,
                                      >Beat Greuter
                                      >
                                      >>hilosophy, on the other hand, is handily characterized by its ancient
                                      >>debate over the Existence of God. There have been famous thinkers
                                      >>on both sides of that debate, and the question is still unresolved to
                                      >>this very day. Hegel hoped to resolve the question with his dialectical
                                      >>reworking of Anselm's Ontological Argument, but as Fate would have
                                      >>it (or perhaps as God would have it), Hegel died while working on that
                                      >>very project.
                                      >>
                                      >>So, Religion takes God for granted, and Philosophy refuses to take
                                      >>God for granted. That is a legitimate difference -- yet that doesn't
                                      >>prove they are incompatible.
                                      >>
                                      >>There is another great difference between Religion and Philosophy
                                      >>according to Hegel, namely, that "Religion is for Everybody -- it is
                                      >>not Philosophy, which is not for Everybody." (Hegel, LPR, vol I)
                                      >>One may object that Hegel is being elitist here - but he is really
                                      >>only describing the naked fact under our noses -- less than 1% of
                                      >>humanity reads academic Philosophical Journals.
                                      >>
                                      >>Still - Hegel was one of those Philosophers who developed a new
                                      >>approach to logic - and in his conclusions he decided that Religion
                                      >>has a legitimate and useful contribution to make to human thought
                                      >>and to the human condition generally. Hegel's theology may be
                                      >>unorthodox, but it remains genuinely Christian (just as the theology
                                      >>of Jesus of Galilee was unorthodox, but remained genuinely Jewish).
                                      >>
                                      >>Therefore, Hegel makes an interesting conclusion to his Lectures
                                      >>on Religion. Hegel says:
                                      >>
                                      >>"Two positions are opposed to Philosophy.
                                      >>Firstly, there is the vanity of the [Pure]
                                      >>Understanding, which is displeased by the
                                      >>fact that Philosophy still exhibits the
                                      >>truth in Religion and demonstrates that
                                      >>Reason still resides within it. =*=
                                      >>This 'Enlightenment' wants to have nothing
                                      >>further to do with the Content, and therefore
                                      >>is highly displeased that Philosophy, as
                                      >>conscious, methodical thinking, curbs the
                                      >>fancies, the caprice, the contingency of
                                      >>thinking. =*=
                                      >>Secondly, immature religiosity is opposed to
                                      >>Philosophy." (Hegel, LECTURES OF 1827
                                      >>ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION,
                                      >>ed. Hodgson, 1988, p. 489)
                                      >>
                                      >>Hegel had a somewhat lower opinion of those 'Enlightenment'
                                      >>thinkers who failed to see the value in Religion.
                                      >>
                                      >>Best regards,
                                      >>--Paul Trejo, MA
                                      >>


                                      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                    • stephen theron
                                      Dear Beat, Thanks for yours. Why a contradiction, you ask? I mean simply it (philosophy as subservient to faith ) is a position in which one cannot rest,
                                      Message 18 of 24 , Oct 3, 2010
                                        Dear Beat,



                                        Thanks for yours.



                                        Why a contradiction, you ask? I mean simply it (philosophy as subservient to "faith") is a position in which one cannot rest, requiring dialectical supersession. This is implied I find in the Pauline epistles as well as in the so-called Alexandrian Fathers particularly, but also Augustine, "Credo ut intelligam", taken over by Anselm.

                                        So, in Boethius (alias, very probably, the Mantuan martyr, still venerated there, San Severino), the lady Philosophia represents the final appearance, manifestation,of the light of faith itself. So I take it and it is an at least possible reading, demystifying, so to say, "wisdom from above". I also think that in Old Testament tradition it becomes progressively clear that any other view of "God", any name in fact, amounts to idolatry (or the direct converse of Yahwism/Judaism).

                                        So much on religion. I mean then that this overcoming the contradiction between faith and thought, historical, itself contains contradiction (as I expect future ages will find in Hegel or have maybe already begun to do, thinking of aspects of the philosophy of language, its intrinsic metaphorical quality etc., though one might counter that he is already aware of this himself). On the other hand I do not quite see the contradiction between faith and thought on Thomistic principles. What I said was contradiction was the characterising of philosophy as subservient, which I see no need for doing in the dogmatic system as such.



                                        "nothing can be above God conceptually, even if he does not exist". Well, I understand "God" as superior to the category, in Essence, of Existence. I think Hegel makes the same point in several ways. He deprecates the religious term "God" as containing figurative elements, e.g. as suggesting that God is a substance among substances, though one might say the same of at least the grammatical form of "the Absolute". Hence he uses the term "God" fairly often without needing to feel he contradicts himself (in the Logic).



                                        For me this is quite compatible with his position that the Absolute is one with the Method. There is no need to conceive Method abstractly, or as in common life. It is ultimately Absolute Knowledge which is not knowledge, or method, of anything else or other, though this needs to be made more precise I realise.



                                        I think you need not fear, as you say, that I do not follow Hegel in this last step, from religion to absolute knowledge. "God", the purified religious concept, is simply the or a name for the "last step", whatever it is. For some this may mean the "death of God" absolutely, though this is of course a pictorial presentation itself related to the death believed divine on the Cross and hence a real death. When Hegel speaks of the death of God I take him to refer to just the dark night and perplexity of the understanding well known in mystical tradition and negative theology generally, though he maybe goes further (or not so far, if one thinks of, say, the 6th century Dionysius or Wittgenstein, enjoining absolute silence).



                                        There is nothing "beyond or above" the Concept and that is why, to reverse things, the Concept is itself God, absolute knowing (of self). That is, there is nothing "beside" the concept either, the world is "annulled" (Hegel's term).



                                        Well, God, or Hegel, doesn't end philosophy with God because God is process, Method, you seem to say. It seems to me I agree. Something like historical Trinitarianism is implied (a "development" or even simply "manifestation" of it, I rather think).



                                        I need God for my thinking and have to invent him, you suggest. No, not a merely "practical postulate", though maybe Kant does violence to his own view by that construction.

                                        Voltaire's dictum is implicitly dialectical, I find, and even finally Anselmian. It means that God cannot but be real or actual, since this is what "God" names, and that alone is why I said "even if he should not exist". (That atheism is a form of theism is implied by dialectical principles, as these too, I would want to argue, are implied by the ancient condemnation of idolatry). The word simply names that above which there can be nothing, names the "above", the "last step" which generates the whole. But of course I agree that use of this name implies that Hegel's philosophy might be false, or merely a "model". It would be false if God in fact were "above the concept". So I think the concept, absolute knowledge, includes and must include all that we mean by love, beauty, unity, truth or even, why not, absolute being. Similarly I think it includes, is one with, prayer, to recall your reference to "Gottesdienst" recently.



                                        Hegel often takes this line or one like it, e.g. when saying that religion does not depend upon any contingent truths. I connect this with the high place he gives to Volition as perfecting Cognition, i.e. I don't see this as straight antithesis to Knowing proper which the Idea synthesises. Synthesis implies composition, whereas knowledge is here identified with will, though "superseding" it. This has to be if it is absolute and so not externally determined. Similarly the freedom of this will is itself what we call necessity. So I want to suggest that the model of thesis-antithesis-synthesis does not so much yield place to as become more and more compatible (identical?) with a straight Advance, such has been admitted as latent (Advance, namely) all through the dialectic, albeit as indirect (like a sailing ship against the wind). This indirectness or zig-zag is necessitated by the dialectic's being an emergence "from shadows to reality", i.e. it must find its own foundation at the end of the progress/process only. Even Aristotle spoke of metaphysics beginning with "confused masses".



                                        This view of Hegel's seems to remove the contradiction you mention from faith in regard to Reason or thought. In fact the religious is not a hermetically sealed milieu, but belongs with thought's manifestation in history, I would want to say. But thought is manifested in history as that which finally annuls or "puts by" history. History was the groping after thought, Mind, by the shadows themselves and this is the final "order" (Anaxagoras) in which Mind itself "sets" them, these so-called "all things", being thus "all in all", though this too is dialectical. It should be "all" period.



                                        I hope this goes some way to meeting your first set of stimulating comments? Maybe I have missed the "brutality"? Or I am brutal myself. Ignorance and cocksureness, of course, is brutal and I would want to avoid those.



                                        Stephen.


                                        To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                                        From: greuterb@...
                                        Date: Sun, 3 Oct 2010 18:03:16 +0200
                                        Subject: Re: [hegel] Hegel versus Atheism






                                        Dear Stephen,

                                        You write:

                                        >Dear Beat,
                                        >
                                        >May I say that I find your summary re philosophy and religion here extremely sure-footed.
                                        >
                                        >The internal/external dilemma and the need to surmount it is very clear. The tendency today is for theology, as purely internal, to give way to philosophy of religion of this "good" sort. I rather think myself that the history of academic theology reflects this triad of differentiating theology from philosophy and then sublating this difference. The differentiation resulted from the Christian idea of a regula fidei, developed from around Augustine's time I would think (or when Justinian closed the Academy). Hegel shows, however, how even this can be treated philosophically (making the outside inside, in a transferred sense to yours here), as a possible notion of or approach to religion, and one might view this as implicit in the Pauline notion of "wisdom from above", i.e. it is still wisdom. Similarly, some have tried to show how even Greek philosophy, Platonism in particular, was exercised in awareness of an overarching maybe sacred tradition taken "internally" if you like (cf.J. Pieper, �ber die platonischen Mythen). This view, however, often goes together with setting the internal (faith) above the external(philosophy), i.e. of making philosophy subservient, which is a contradiction. I have understood that this is not Hegel's way and my having said that God is the Hegelian Absolute should be taken in the light of that understanding. Of course nothing can be above God, conceptually, i.e. even if he should not exist.

                                        You say that "..... setting the internal (faith) above the external
                                        (philosophy), i.e. [of] making philosophy subservient, which is a
                                        contradiction". Why a contradiction? Is it not rather one solution for
                                        overcoming the contradiction between faith and thought, also
                                        historically? I agree mostly with what you say in your text above.
                                        However, the last proposition makes me perplex: "nothing can be above
                                        God, conceptually, i.e. even if he should not exist". What does this
                                        mean?. I am afraid that you do not accede Hegel's last step in the PhdG
                                        from religion to pure (absolute) knowing. For you there is still
                                        'something' beyond or above the concept? The beginning of the activity
                                        of pure knowing later in the Logic, however, is one of the most brutal
                                        philosophical 'presupposition' in the history of philosophy. There is no
                                        presupposition at all - there is at the beginning no 'object' which
                                        philosophical thinking can adhere to. The 'object' arises together with
                                        thinking. Hegel does not begin his pure philosophy with God and he does
                                        neither end it with God. God is 'only' the process of pure thought in
                                        its circle. Now, if you state that "nothing can be above God,
                                        conceptually, i.e. even if he should not exist" then I wonder if you
                                        have to invent God since you need Him for your thinking as Kant needs
                                        God for making his practical philosophy working?

                                        >Philosophy of religion in Analytical Philosophy has also been an interest of mine. Frege speaks of "the Reason that is in the world", "What is the world without the reason? "I suspect that the eagerness with which Anglo-American analysts, such as M. Dummett, present Frege as philosophy's timely escape from the error of idealism may be itself an error. They are bemused by the reaction of Russell and Moore against their colleague McTaggart and against British Hegelianism (of which McTaggart was not typical). Work by Hans Sluga has helped me here (esp. two articles in Inquiry). I mention this since it is from the viewpoint of Absolute Idealism that one sees the religious roots (or windowon religion) of philosophy best. Marx is very religious, or at least Messianic. But there is also a lot of interesting stuff on the Ontological Argument, so central for Hegel, in G�del and other writers, especially maybe the Polish analytical philosophers from between the wars and after. Forgive me for listing stuff you probably know better than I. Your plans to read up on this, if I understand your last sentence rightly, remind me of my late mentor and friend in Germany, Fernando Inciarte, who wrote profoundly on Aristotelian philosophy and its link with German idealism (what's that?). He, namely, had a nervous breakdown as a result of too intensive Aristotelian studies. He spent his convalescence "taking a lecture" on, reading up on, "analytical philosophy" and his last postumous work was a heavy tome on first logical principles (the "excluded third"), substance and action).I helped with the English version. Myself, I'm a bit tired of analytical philosophy, but I suppose I have profited from having to work in and with it.
                                        >
                                        >Sincerely,
                                        >
                                        >Stephen.
                                        >

                                        I think that Analytical Philosophy has become trapped in its
                                        self-created metaphysical riddles. This is the fate of thought Hegel
                                        demonstrates in his dialectic.With this Analytical Philosophy has
                                        actualized Hegel's thought as dialectical and therefore calls now for
                                        him for becoming clear what she has done historically.

                                        Regards,
                                        Beat Greuter

                                        >To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                                        >From: greuterb@...
                                        >Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2010 10:32:19 +0200
                                        >Subject: Re: [hegel] Hegel versus Atheism
                                        >
                                        >
                                        >Paul Trejo writes:
                                        >
                                        >>In response to the 9/13/2010 post by Beat Greuter:
                                        >>
                                        >>
                                        >>>...I said above that Hegel's divine service of philosophy is a
                                        >>>dynamic process in pure thought. But the categories do not
                                        >>>merely "fall away into something less abstract and particular".
                                        >>>This would be merely a linear process of the understanding.
                                        >>>Hegel's process is not linear but a new category is more
                                        >>>abstract and unconscious and one-sided first in its new
                                        >>>immediacy which then is the starting point for further mediations
                                        >>>with a more concrete result which could not have been achieved
                                        >>>directly from the previous mediated category (i.e. the transition
                                        >>>from the concrete concept of Pure Becoming into the one-sided
                                        >>>concept of Determinate Being in which Pure Becoming is merely
                                        >>>sublated and has to be made explicitly again into a more concrete
                                        >>>level of the concept). Each progress requires first a regression.
                                        >>>I think that each science requires such regressions and
                                        >>>simplifications for its development.
                                        >>>
                                        >>>Regards,
                                        >>>Beat Greuter
                                        >>>
                                        >>>
                                        >>I agree with your characterization of Hegel's logical method, Beat.
                                        >>Nevertheless, it appears that the clash between Philosophy and
                                        >>Religion remains unaffected by your narrative.
                                        >>
                                        >>Let's look again at Hegel's texts where he says that Philosophy
                                        >>is itself the "service of God." Hegel says:
                                        >>
                                        >>"But each of them, Religion as well as
                                        >>Philosophy, is the service of God in a
                                        >>way peculiar to it. They differ in the
                                        >>peculiar character of their concern with
                                        >>God. This is where the difficulties lie
                                        >>that impede Philosophy's grasp of Religion,
                                        >>and it often appears impossible for the
                                        >>two of them to be united. The apprehensive
                                        >>attitude of Religion toward Philosophy and
                                        >>the hostile stance of each toward the other
                                        >>arise from this." (Hegel, LECTURES OF 1827
                                        >>ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, ed. Hodgson,
                                        >>1988, p. 79)
                                        >>
                                        >>Religion sees the world from the moral and ethical viewpoint almost
                                        >>exclusively. It's a question of the Law, of what is Permitted and
                                        >>what is Forbidden from a Cosmic perspective -- that's the focus of
                                        >>Religion. Furthermore, Theology, to be Theology, will almost never
                                        >>broach the question of whether God exists (just as Psychology
                                        >>will almost never broach the questoin of whether the psyche exists).
                                        >>
                                        >Thanks for your reply.
                                        >
                                        >I think it is not the task of THEOLOGY to consider the question of
                                        >whether God exists or not. Its task is to provide the objective basis
                                        >for the faith (which is not merely a subjective phenomenon but provides
                                        >social cohesion) and to develop this basis and embodiment in the course
                                        >of social and religious changes which could threaten the faith. Therfore
                                        >it has always an internal view and differs in this respect from the
                                        >SCIENCE of religion which has a mere external view. Good PHILOSOPHIES of
                                        >religion, however, unite these two views: on the one side they have to
                                        >keep an internal view otherwise they would be merely abstract thinking
                                        >and could not reconcile reason and religion. On the other side they have
                                        >to be critical and therefore historical. I think in this respect Hegel
                                        >did a good job: his philosophy in general and his philosophy of religion
                                        >in particular have these two views combined within themselves. Today
                                        >also Analytical Philosophy deals with the philosophy of religion
                                        >(theism, reformed epistemology, pragmatism), partly also based on the
                                        >philosophy of Wittgenstein. I am not sure if a critical philosophy of
                                        >language can hold these two views together therefore I take now a
                                        >lecture on this subject matter.
                                        >
                                        >Regards,
                                        >Beat Greuter
                                        >
                                        >>hilosophy, on the other hand, is handily characterized by its ancient
                                        >>debate over the Existence of God. There have been famous thinkers
                                        >>on both sides of that debate, and the question is still unresolved to
                                        >>this very day. Hegel hoped to resolve the question with his dialectical
                                        >>reworking of Anselm's Ontological Argument, but as Fate would have
                                        >>it (or perhaps as God would have it), Hegel died while working on that
                                        >>very project.
                                        >>
                                        >>So, Religion takes God for granted, and Philosophy refuses to take
                                        >>God for granted. That is a legitimate difference -- yet that doesn't
                                        >>prove they are incompatible.
                                        >>
                                        >>There is another great difference between Religion and Philosophy
                                        >>according to Hegel, namely, that "Religion is for Everybody -- it is
                                        >>not Philosophy, which is not for Everybody." (Hegel, LPR, vol I)
                                        >>One may object that Hegel is being elitist here - but he is really
                                        >>only describing the naked fact under our noses -- less than 1% of
                                        >>humanity reads academic Philosophical Journals.
                                        >>
                                        >>Still - Hegel was one of those Philosophers who developed a new
                                        >>approach to logic - and in his conclusions he decided that Religion
                                        >>has a legitimate and useful contribution to make to human thought
                                        >>and to the human condition generally. Hegel's theology may be
                                        >>unorthodox, but it remains genuinely Christian (just as the theology
                                        >>of Jesus of Galilee was unorthodox, but remained genuinely Jewish).
                                        >>
                                        >>Therefore, Hegel makes an interesting conclusion to his Lectures
                                        >>on Religion. Hegel says:
                                        >>
                                        >>"Two positions are opposed to Philosophy.
                                        >>Firstly, there is the vanity of the [Pure]
                                        >>Understanding, which is displeased by the
                                        >>fact that Philosophy still exhibits the
                                        >>truth in Religion and demonstrates that
                                        >>Reason still resides within it. =*=
                                        >>This 'Enlightenment' wants to have nothing
                                        >>further to do with the Content, and therefore
                                        >>is highly displeased that Philosophy, as
                                        >>conscious, methodical thinking, curbs the
                                        >>fancies, the caprice, the contingency of
                                        >>thinking. =*=
                                        >>Secondly, immature religiosity is opposed to
                                        >>Philosophy." (Hegel, LECTURES OF 1827
                                        >>ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION,
                                        >>ed. Hodgson, 1988, p. 489)
                                        >>
                                        >>Hegel had a somewhat lower opinion of those 'Enlightenment'
                                        >>thinkers who failed to see the value in Religion.
                                        >>
                                        >>Best regards,
                                        >>--Paul Trejo, MA
                                        >>

                                        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]






                                        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                      • Beat Greuter
                                        ... Dear Stephen I think I can agree with what you say in the above section of your text, however, I do not understand it fully. You say that the dialectic s
                                        Message 19 of 24 , Oct 13, 2010
                                          Stephen Ttheron writes:

                                          >Dear Beat,
                                          >
                                          >Thanks for yours.
                                          >
                                          >Why a contradiction, you ask? I mean simply it (philosophy as subservient to "faith") is a position in which one cannot rest, requiring dialectical supersession. This is implied I find in the Pauline epistles as well as in the so-called Alexandrian Fathers particularly, but also Augustine, "Credo ut intelligam", taken over by Anselm.
                                          >
                                          >So, in Boethius (alias, very probably, the Mantuan martyr, still venerated there, San Severino), the lady Philosophia represents the final appearance, manifestation,of the light of faith itself. So I take it and it is an at least possible reading, demystifying, so to say, "wisdom from above". I also think that in Old Testament tradition it becomes progressively clear that any other view of "God", any name in fact, amounts to idolatry (or the direct converse of Yahwism/Judaism).
                                          >
                                          >So much on religion. I mean then that this overcoming the contradiction between faith and thought, historical, itself contains contradiction (as I expect future ages will find in Hegel or have maybe already begun to do, thinking of aspects of the philosophy of language, its intrinsic metaphorical quality etc., though one might counter that he is already aware of this himself). On the other hand I do not quite see the contradiction between faith and thought on Thomistic principles. What I said was contradiction was the characterising of philosophy as subservient, which I see no need for doing in the dogmatic system as such.
                                          >
                                          >"nothing can be above God conceptually, even if he does not exist". Well, I understand "God" as superior to the category, in Essence, of Existence. I think Hegel makes the same point in several ways. He deprecates the religious term "God" as containing figurative elements, e.g. as suggesting that God is a substance among substances, though one might say the same of at least the grammatical form of "the Absolute". Hence he uses the term "God" fairly often without needing to feel he contradicts himself (in the Logic).
                                          >
                                          >For me this is quite compatible with his position that the Absolute is one with the Method. There is no need to conceive Method abstractly, or as in common life. It is ultimately Absolute Knowledge which is not knowledge, or method, of anything else or other, though this needs to be made more precise I realise.
                                          >
                                          >I think you need not fear, as you say, that I do not follow Hegel in this last step, from religion to absolute knowledge. "God", the purified religious concept, is simply the or a name for the "last step", whatever it is. For some this may mean the "death of God" absolutely, though this is of course a pictorial presentation itself related to the death believed divine on the Cross and hence a real death. When Hegel speaks of the death of God I take him to refer to just the dark night and perplexity of the understanding well known in mystical tradition and negative theology generally, though he maybe goes further (or not so far, if one thinks of, say, the 6th century Dionysius or Wittgenstein, enjoining absolute silence).
                                          >
                                          >There is nothing "beyond or above" the Concept and that is why, to reverse things, the Concept is itself God, absolute knowing (of self). That is, there is nothing "beside" the concept either, the world is "annulled" (Hegel's term).
                                          >
                                          >Well, God, or Hegel, doesn't end philosophy with God because God is process, Method, you seem to say. It seems to me I agree. Something like historical Trinitarianism is implied (a "development" or even simply "manifestation" of it, I rather think).
                                          >
                                          >I need God for my thinking and have to invent him, you suggest. No, not a merely "practical postulate", though maybe Kant does violence to his own view by that construction.
                                          >
                                          >Voltaire's dictum is implicitly dialectical, I find, and even finally Anselmian. It means that God cannot but be real or actual, since this is what "God" names, and that alone is why I said "even if he should not exist". (That atheism is a form of theism is implied by dialectical principles, as these too, I would want to argue, are implied by the ancient condemnation of idolatry). The word simply names that above which there can be nothing, names the "above", the "last step" which generates the whole. But of course I agree that use of this name implies that Hegel's philosophy might be false, or merely a "model". It would be false if God in fact were "above the concept". So I think the concept, absolute knowledge, includes and must include all that we mean by love, beauty, unity, truth or even, why not, absolute being. Similarly I think it includes, is one with, prayer, to recall your reference to "Gottesdienst" recently.
                                          >
                                          >Hegel often takes this line or one like it, e.g. when saying that religion does not depend upon any contingent truths. I connect this with the high place he gives to Volition as perfecting Cognition, i.e. I don't see this as straight antithesis to Knowing proper which the Idea synthesises. Synthesis implies composition, whereas knowledge is here identified with will, though "superseding" it. This has to be if it is absolute and so not externally determined. Similarly the freedom of this will is itself what we call necessity. So I want to suggest that the model of thesis-antithesis-synthesis does not so much yield place to as become more and more compatible (identical?) with a straight Advance, such has been admitted as latent (Advance, namely) all through the dialectic, albeit as indirect (like a sailing ship against the wind). This indirectness or zig-zag is necessitated by the dialectic's being an emergence "from shadows to reality", i.e. it must find its own foundation at the end of the progress/process only. Even Aristotle spoke of metaphysics beginning with "confused masses".
                                          >


                                          Dear Stephen

                                          I think I can agree with what you say in the above section of your text,
                                          however, I do not understand it fully. You say that "the dialectic's
                                          ....... must find its own foundation at the end of the
                                          progress/process only". It seems that you mean this for the real world.
                                          So, you mention Aristotle and his beginning with "confused masses" or
                                          you say that "dialectics being an emergence 'from shadows to reality' ".
                                          However, even Aristotle admit (after a long discussion in the
                                          Metaphysics) that Matter cannot be the Subjacent (das Zugrundeliegende)
                                          and then he looks for an other 'feature' which could be the Subjacent.
                                          As distinct from this for Hegel two points have to be noted:

                                          - There is no Subjacent which is already something
                                          - The dialectical progress/process is an ongoing foundation or mediation
                                          in pure thought with its other in itself. For Hegel the whole of this
                                          mediation is the Subjacent which, coming into its total other, into
                                          'reality', is exposed to contingency. Therefore for Hegel there is no
                                          teleological end, no foundation at the end of the progress/process as
                                          far as this process is actualized in the real world.

                                          This means also that for him there is no explanation of the real
                                          beginning and ending of the process, neither a theological nor a
                                          scientific explantion. All attempts to do so are condemned to failure
                                          and (or) are mere games of thought (which can be very illuminating). I
                                          think this is the meaning of the brutal beginning in the Logic with
                                          Being and Nothing: the two are in a mere identity or, what at the
                                          beginnning is the same, in a mere opposition. More cannot be said. You
                                          cannot even speak of a "shadow" which is already something.

                                          Regards,
                                          Beat Greuter


                                          >This view of Hegel's seems to remove the contradiction you mention from faith in regard to Reason or thought. In fact the religious is not a hermetically sealed milieu, but belongs with thought's manifestation in history, I would want to say. But thought is manifested in history as that which finally annuls or "puts by" history. History was the groping after thought, Mind, by the shadows themselves and this is the final "order" (Anaxagoras) in which Mind itself "sets" them, these so-called "all things", being thus "all in all", though this too is dialectical. It should be "all" period.
                                          >
                                          >I hope this goes some way to meeting your first set of stimulating comments? Maybe I have missed the "brutality"? Or I am brutal myself. Ignorance and cocksureness, of course, is brutal and I would want to avoid those.
                                          >
                                          >
                                          >Stephen.
                                          >
                                          >
                                          >To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                                          >From: greuterb@...
                                          >Date: Sun, 3 Oct 2010 18:03:16 +0200
                                          >Subject: Re: [hegel] Hegel versus Atheism
                                          >
                                          >
                                          >
                                          >Dear Stephen,
                                          >
                                          >You write:
                                          >
                                          >>Dear Beat,
                                          >>
                                          >>May I say that I find your summary re philosophy and religion here extremely sure-footed.
                                          >>
                                          >>The internal/external dilemma and the need to surmount it is very clear. The tendency today is for theology, as purely internal, to give way to philosophy of religion of this "good" sort. I rather think myself that the history of academic theology reflects this triad of differentiating theology from philosophy and then sublating this difference. The differentiation resulted from the Christian idea of a regula fidei, developed from around Augustine's time I would think (or when Justinian closed the Academy). Hegel shows, however, how even this can be treated philosophically (making the outside inside, in a transferred sense to yours here), as a possible notion of or approach to religion, and one might view this as implicit in the Pauline notion of "wisdom from above", i.e. it is still wisdom. Similarly, some have tried to show how even Greek philosophy, Platonism in particular, was exercised in awareness of an overarching maybe sacred tradition taken "internally" if you like (cf.J. Pieper, Über die platonischen Mythen). This view, however, often goes together with setting the internal (faith) above the external(philosophy), i.e. of making philosophy subservient, which is a contradiction. I have understood that this is not Hegel's way and my having said that God is the Hegelian Absolute should be taken in the light of that understanding. Of course nothing can be above God, conceptually, i.e. even if he should not exist.
                                          >>
                                          >>
                                          >
                                          >You say that "..... setting the internal (faith) above the external
                                          >(philosophy), i.e. [of] making philosophy subservient, which is a
                                          >contradiction". Why a contradiction? Is it not rather one solution for
                                          >overcoming the contradiction between faith and thought, also
                                          >historically? I agree mostly with what you say in your text above.
                                          >However, the last proposition makes me perplex: "nothing can be above
                                          >God, conceptually, i.e. even if he should not exist". What does this
                                          >mean?. I am afraid that you do not accede Hegel's last step in the PhdG
                                          >from religion to pure (absolute) knowing. For you there is still
                                          >'something' beyond or above the concept? The beginning of the activity
                                          >of pure knowing later in the Logic, however, is one of the most brutal
                                          >philosophical 'presupposition' in the history of philosophy. There is no
                                          >presupposition at all - there is at the beginning no 'object' which
                                          >philosophical thinking can adhere to. The 'object' arises together with
                                          >thinking. Hegel does not begin his pure philosophy with God and he does
                                          >neither end it with God. God is 'only' the process of pure thought in
                                          >its circle. Now, if you state that "nothing can be above God,
                                          >conceptually, i.e. even if he should not exist" then I wonder if you
                                          >have to invent God since you need Him for your thinking as Kant needs
                                          >God for making his practical philosophy working?
                                          >
                                          >
                                          >
                                          >>Philosophy of religion in Analytical Philosophy has also been an interest of mine. Frege speaks of "the Reason that is in the world", "What is the world without the reason? "I suspect that the eagerness with which Anglo-American analysts, such as M. Dummett, present Frege as philosophy's timely escape from the error of idealism may be itself an error. They are bemused by the reaction of Russell and Moore against their colleague McTaggart and against British Hegelianism (of which McTaggart was not typical). Work by Hans Sluga has helped me here (esp. two articles in Inquiry). I mention this since it is from the viewpoint of Absolute Idealism that one sees the religious roots (or windowon religion) of philosophy best. Marx is very religious, or at least Messianic. But there is also a lot of interesting stuff on the Ontological Argument, so central for Hegel, in Gödel and other writers, especially maybe the Polish analytical philosophers from between the wars and after. Forgive me for listing stuff you probably know better than I. Your plans to read up on this, if I understand your last sentence rightly, remind me of my late mentor and friend in Germany, Fernando Inciarte, who wrote profoundly on Aristotelian philosophy and its link with German idealism (what's that?). He, namely, had a nervous breakdown as a result of too intensive Aristotelian studies. He spent his convalescence "taking a lecture" on, reading up on, "analytical philosophy" and his last postumous work was a heavy tome on first logical principles (the "excluded third"), substance and action).I helped with the English version. Myself, I'm a bit tired of analytical philosophy, but I suppose I have profited from having to work in and with it.
                                          >>
                                          >>Sincerely,
                                          >>
                                          >>Stephen.
                                          >>
                                          >>
                                          >>
                                          >
                                          >I think that Analytical Philosophy has become trapped in its
                                          >self-created metaphysical riddles. This is the fate of thought Hegel
                                          >demonstrates in his dialectic.With this Analytical Philosophy has
                                          >actualized Hegel's thought as dialectical and therefore calls now for
                                          >him for becoming clear what she has done historically.
                                          >
                                          >Regards,
                                          >Beat Greuter
                                          >
                                          >
                                          >
                                          >>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                                          >>From: greuterb@...
                                          >>Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2010 10:32:19 +0200
                                          >>Subject: Re: [hegel] Hegel versus Atheism
                                          >>
                                          >>
                                          >>Paul Trejo writes:
                                          >>
                                          >>
                                          >>
                                          >>>In response to the 9/13/2010 post by Beat Greuter:
                                          >>>
                                          >>>
                                          >>>
                                          >>>
                                          >>>>...I said above that Hegel's divine service of philosophy is a
                                          >>>>dynamic process in pure thought. But the categories do not
                                          >>>>merely "fall away into something less abstract and particular".
                                          >>>>This would be merely a linear process of the understanding.
                                          >>>>Hegel's process is not linear but a new category is more
                                          >>>>abstract and unconscious and one-sided first in its new
                                          >>>>immediacy which then is the starting point for further mediations
                                          >>>>with a more concrete result which could not have been achieved
                                          >>>>directly from the previous mediated category (i.e. the transition
                                          >>>>
                                          >>>>
                                          >>>>from the concrete concept of Pure Becoming into the one-sided
                                          >>>
                                          >>>
                                          >>>>concept of Determinate Being in which Pure Becoming is merely
                                          >>>>sublated and has to be made explicitly again into a more concrete
                                          >>>>level of the concept). Each progress requires first a regression.
                                          >>>>I think that each science requires such regressions and
                                          >>>>simplifications for its development.
                                          >>>>
                                          >>>>Regards,
                                          >>>>Beat Greuter
                                          >>>>
                                          >>>>
                                          >>>>
                                          >>>>
                                          >>>I agree with your characterization of Hegel's logical method, Beat.
                                          >>>Nevertheless, it appears that the clash between Philosophy and
                                          >>>Religion remains unaffected by your narrative.
                                          >>>
                                          >>>Let's look again at Hegel's texts where he says that Philosophy
                                          >>>is itself the "service of God." Hegel says:
                                          >>>
                                          >>>"But each of them, Religion as well as
                                          >>>Philosophy, is the service of God in a
                                          >>>way peculiar to it. They differ in the
                                          >>>peculiar character of their concern with
                                          >>>God. This is where the difficulties lie
                                          >>>that impede Philosophy's grasp of Religion,
                                          >>>and it often appears impossible for the
                                          >>>two of them to be united. The apprehensive
                                          >>>attitude of Religion toward Philosophy and
                                          >>>the hostile stance of each toward the other
                                          >>>arise from this." (Hegel, LECTURES OF 1827
                                          >>>ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, ed. Hodgson,
                                          >>>1988, p. 79)
                                          >>>
                                          >>>Religion sees the world from the moral and ethical viewpoint almost
                                          >>>exclusively. It's a question of the Law, of what is Permitted and
                                          >>>what is Forbidden from a Cosmic perspective -- that's the focus of
                                          >>>Religion. Furthermore, Theology, to be Theology, will almost never
                                          >>>broach the question of whether God exists (just as Psychology
                                          >>>will almost never broach the questoin of whether the psyche exists).
                                          >>>
                                          >>>
                                          >>>
                                          >>Thanks for your reply.
                                          >>
                                          >>I think it is not the task of THEOLOGY to consider the question of
                                          >>whether God exists or not. Its task is to provide the objective basis
                                          >>for the faith (which is not merely a subjective phenomenon but provides
                                          >>social cohesion) and to develop this basis and embodiment in the course
                                          >>of social and religious changes which could threaten the faith. Therfore
                                          >>it has always an internal view and differs in this respect from the
                                          >>SCIENCE of religion which has a mere external view. Good PHILOSOPHIES of
                                          >>religion, however, unite these two views: on the one side they have to
                                          >>keep an internal view otherwise they would be merely abstract thinking
                                          >>and could not reconcile reason and religion. On the other side they have
                                          >>to be critical and therefore historical. I think in this respect Hegel
                                          >>did a good job: his philosophy in general and his philosophy of religion
                                          >>in particular have these two views combined within themselves. Today
                                          >>also Analytical Philosophy deals with the philosophy of religion
                                          >>(theism, reformed epistemology, pragmatism), partly also based on the
                                          >>philosophy of Wittgenstein. I am not sure if a critical philosophy of
                                          >>language can hold these two views together therefore I take now a
                                          >>lecture on this subject matter.
                                          >>
                                          >>Regards,
                                          >>Beat Greuter
                                          >>
                                          >>
                                          >>
                                          >>>hilosophy, on the other hand, is handily characterized by its ancient
                                          >>>debate over the Existence of God. There have been famous thinkers
                                          >>>on both sides of that debate, and the question is still unresolved to
                                          >>>this very day. Hegel hoped to resolve the question with his dialectical
                                          >>>reworking of Anselm's Ontological Argument, but as Fate would have
                                          >>>it (or perhaps as God would have it), Hegel died while working on that
                                          >>>very project.
                                          >>>
                                          >>>So, Religion takes God for granted, and Philosophy refuses to take
                                          >>>God for granted. That is a legitimate difference -- yet that doesn't
                                          >>>prove they are incompatible.
                                          >>>
                                          >>>There is another great difference between Religion and Philosophy
                                          >>>according to Hegel, namely, that "Religion is for Everybody -- it is
                                          >>>not Philosophy, which is not for Everybody." (Hegel, LPR, vol I)
                                          >>>One may object that Hegel is being elitist here - but he is really
                                          >>>only describing the naked fact under our noses -- less than 1% of
                                          >>>humanity reads academic Philosophical Journals.
                                          >>>
                                          >>>Still - Hegel was one of those Philosophers who developed a new
                                          >>>approach to logic - and in his conclusions he decided that Religion
                                          >>>has a legitimate and useful contribution to make to human thought
                                          >>>and to the human condition generally. Hegel's theology may be
                                          >>>unorthodox, but it remains genuinely Christian (just as the theology
                                          >>>of Jesus of Galilee was unorthodox, but remained genuinely Jewish).
                                          >>>
                                          >>>Therefore, Hegel makes an interesting conclusion to his Lectures
                                          >>>on Religion. Hegel says:
                                          >>>
                                          >>>"Two positions are opposed to Philosophy.
                                          >>>Firstly, there is the vanity of the [Pure]
                                          >>>Understanding, which is displeased by the
                                          >>>fact that Philosophy still exhibits the
                                          >>>truth in Religion and demonstrates that
                                          >>>Reason still resides within it. =*=
                                          >>>This 'Enlightenment' wants to have nothing
                                          >>>further to do with the Content, and therefore
                                          >>>is highly displeased that Philosophy, as
                                          >>>conscious, methodical thinking, curbs the
                                          >>>fancies, the caprice, the contingency of
                                          >>>thinking. =*=
                                          >>>Secondly, immature religiosity is opposed to
                                          >>>Philosophy." (Hegel, LECTURES OF 1827
                                          >>>ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION,
                                          >>>ed. Hodgson, 1988, p. 489)
                                          >>>
                                          >>>Hegel had a somewhat lower opinion of those 'Enlightenment'
                                          >>>thinkers who failed to see the value in Religion.
                                          >>>
                                          >>>Best regards,
                                          >>>--Paul Trejo, MA
                                          >>>
                                          >>>


                                          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                                        • stephen theron
                                          Dear Beat, Thanks for your reply! No, I didn t mean the dialectic would find a foundation for the real world , like discovering God as creator on a realist
                                          Message 20 of 24 , Oct 13, 2010
                                            Dear Beat,



                                            Thanks for your reply! No, I didn't mean the dialectic would "find a foundation for the real world", like discovering God as creator on a realist scheme. In my understanding "creation" comes out different under absolute idealism. The realist theologians distinguish among "divine ideas" between realised and unrealised possibilities. I rather would see Being as just one among the ideas, a moment of the Concept. I find this right through Hegel, e.g. when he says or implies that the truths of "religion" do not depend upon an inevitably contingent realisation.

                                            So no. Or to put it another way, when Hegel talks about having done with, annulling, such a "real world", what he means is that we are thinking with absolute mind, from the viewpoint of which the world is nothing extra or "outside" at all. This is so even though the Logic ends with the free going forth as nature. This going forth is precisely an alienation and we don't have to view Nature "materially",e.g. of repulsed atoms, or as in space in time, the points or instants different and the same at once, i.e. the realist picture is contradictory. Hence we must come back from it (Spirit), while in Nature viewed rightly the whole, the Notion, is identical with every part or rather "moment". So I see it and I think it is Hegel's view. You would be the right man to point out a systematic mistake if I am making one, although one can to some extent choose how one reads it, maybe. Conversely, do people always understand what they write themselves? But I maybe digress, make it too rich.

                                            So I meant rather the foundation, perhaps a bad expression, of the dialectic itself. Again, the confused masses Aristotle starts with.... I had no thought of these being matter as "hypokeimenon" (is this the Zugrundeliegende and is this the Ground of the English translations?) or substrate. I think Hegel makes a point of not making matter prior to the process, of this being an especial Christian insight corresponding to "creation out of nothing", does he not? I never suspect him of conjuring tricks, like some. The confused masses are rather in the Mind, though for Aristotle I don't think this would rigorously mean they were immaterial. This would be indifferent for him, to start with at least. Thus he does consider the possibility of things, objects, being really in the mind and explains referential terms, words, as arising out of the impossibility of this which otherwise ought to be, so to say, since there is knowing, or the mind becoming its other, which is typically material (De soph. elench. I think).



                                            So there is no pre-substrate which is already something, I absolutely agree. In fact in my understanding the Scholastic materia prima means precisely possibility (potentia) and, contrariwise, perishability and nothing else. For (absolute) idealism this becomes something else, what I have called shadows, the untrue finite, etc. etc.

                                            Your second point, difficult for me, but I want to understand it. The whole process, of mediation, is the Concept or Absolute become explicit at the end, yes, and this means also that there is no End (telos) distinct from the rest seen as Means. As he says, it is a matter of realising, in our thinking, that all is "accomplished". Some say he goes wrong there. I don't think so. From the absolute viewpoint it must be so.

                                            Again, the foundation at the end of the dialectic is not a foundation for a spurious "real world". The dialectic is what is real and the Absolute Idea terminating it is foundation for thinking (as being what thinking is, the Notion/Concept/Begriff). So when I took over the phrase (Newman's motto) "from shadows to reality", perhaps ill-advisedly, I meant to refer to this ascent or process from mutually contradictory finite notions to the Absolute Idea which is indeed "harmony between thought and reality" but precisely because reality turns out to be just this absolute Idea, which Hegel says is the Absolute. Hence he says idealism is the cardinal doctrine of philosophy as such, if I remember right.



                                            What you say about this meaning there is no possible explanation of the beginning and ending of the dialectic... you mean the thought that it is like a circle, that one may break into at any point? People today sometimes want to explain God(!) as "the self-explanatory" and that seems to me an incorrect, rationalist move. Ex-planation means unfolding what is composite. The Absolute Idea is rather the discovery of perfect, supra-organic unity, beyond talk of parts and whole in juxtaposition. Identity is the relation wanted, a relation that is no relation or a relatio rationis only.



                                            But the beginning brutal? Perhaps you mean because denial of the phenomenal world as anything other than just that is already implicit. Or even that making a beginning as such is already wrong. We should not have put ourselves outside in order to get inside. All is flow, and that, as the truth of thinking, is motionless and eternal therefore. No, I don't quite get the focus here, so if you can explain more I would be interested.... as also where you think I diverge from or misunderstand Hegel, if you do.....



                                            Sincerely,

                                            Stephen.





                                            To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                                            From: greuterb@...
                                            Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2010 11:24:24 +0200
                                            Subject: Re: [hegel] Hegel versus Atheism







                                            Stephen Ttheron writes:

                                            >Dear Beat,
                                            >
                                            >Thanks for yours.
                                            >
                                            >Why a contradiction, you ask? I mean simply it (philosophy as subservient to "faith") is a position in which one cannot rest, requiring dialectical supersession. This is implied I find in the Pauline epistles as well as in the so-called Alexandrian Fathers particularly, but also Augustine, "Credo ut intelligam", taken over by Anselm.
                                            >
                                            >So, in Boethius (alias, very probably, the Mantuan martyr, still venerated there, San Severino), the lady Philosophia represents the final appearance, manifestation,of the light of faith itself. So I take it and it is an at least possible reading, demystifying, so to say, "wisdom from above". I also think that in Old Testament tradition it becomes progressively clear that any other view of "God", any name in fact, amounts to idolatry (or the direct converse of Yahwism/Judaism).
                                            >
                                            >So much on religion. I mean then that this overcoming the contradiction between faith and thought, historical, itself contains contradiction (as I expect future ages will find in Hegel or have maybe already begun to do, thinking of aspects of the philosophy of language, its intrinsic metaphorical quality etc., though one might counter that he is already aware of this himself). On the other hand I do not quite see the contradiction between faith and thought on Thomistic principles. What I said was contradiction was the characterising of philosophy as subservient, which I see no need for doing in the dogmatic system as such.
                                            >
                                            >"nothing can be above God conceptually, even if he does not exist". Well, I understand "God" as superior to the category, in Essence, of Existence. I think Hegel makes the same point in several ways. He deprecates the religious term "God" as containing figurative elements, e.g. as suggesting that God is a substance among substances, though one might say the same of at least the grammatical form of "the Absolute". Hence he uses the term "God" fairly often without needing to feel he contradicts himself (in the Logic).
                                            >
                                            >For me this is quite compatible with his position that the Absolute is one with the Method. There is no need to conceive Method abstractly, or as in common life. It is ultimately Absolute Knowledge which is not knowledge, or method, of anything else or other, though this needs to be made more precise I realise.
                                            >
                                            >I think you need not fear, as you say, that I do not follow Hegel in this last step, from religion to absolute knowledge. "God", the purified religious concept, is simply the or a name for the "last step", whatever it is. For some this may mean the "death of God" absolutely, though this is of course a pictorial presentation itself related to the death believed divine on the Cross and hence a real death. When Hegel speaks of the death of God I take him to refer to just the dark night and perplexity of the understanding well known in mystical tradition and negative theology generally, though he maybe goes further (or not so far, if one thinks of, say, the 6th century Dionysius or Wittgenstein, enjoining absolute silence).
                                            >
                                            >There is nothing "beyond or above" the Concept and that is why, to reverse things, the Concept is itself God, absolute knowing (of self). That is, there is nothing "beside" the concept either, the world is "annulled" (Hegel's term).
                                            >
                                            >Well, God, or Hegel, doesn't end philosophy with God because God is process, Method, you seem to say. It seems to me I agree. Something like historical Trinitarianism is implied (a "development" or even simply "manifestation" of it, I rather think).
                                            >
                                            >I need God for my thinking and have to invent him, you suggest. No, not a merely "practical postulate", though maybe Kant does violence to his own view by that construction.
                                            >
                                            >Voltaire's dictum is implicitly dialectical, I find, and even finally Anselmian. It means that God cannot but be real or actual, since this is what "God" names, and that alone is why I said "even if he should not exist". (That atheism is a form of theism is implied by dialectical principles, as these too, I would want to argue, are implied by the ancient condemnation of idolatry). The word simply names that above which there can be nothing, names the "above", the "last step" which generates the whole. But of course I agree that use of this name implies that Hegel's philosophy might be false, or merely a "model". It would be false if God in fact were "above the concept". So I think the concept, absolute knowledge, includes and must include all that we mean by love, beauty, unity, truth or even, why not, absolute being. Similarly I think it includes, is one with, prayer, to recall your reference to "Gottesdienst" recently.
                                            >
                                            >Hegel often takes this line or one like it, e.g. when saying that religion does not depend upon any contingent truths. I connect this with the high place he gives to Volition as perfecting Cognition, i.e. I don't see this as straight antithesis to Knowing proper which the Idea synthesises. Synthesis implies composition, whereas knowledge is here identified with will, though "superseding" it. This has to be if it is absolute and so not externally determined. Similarly the freedom of this will is itself what we call necessity. So I want to suggest that the model of thesis-antithesis-synthesis does not so much yield place to as become more and more compatible (identical?) with a straight Advance, such has been admitted as latent (Advance, namely) all through the dialectic, albeit as indirect (like a sailing ship against the wind). This indirectness or zig-zag is necessitated by the dialectic's being an emergence "from shadows to reality", i.e. it must find its own foundation at the end of the progress/process only. Even Aristotle spoke of metaphysics beginning with "confused masses".
                                            >

                                            Dear Stephen

                                            I think I can agree with what you say in the above section of your text,
                                            however, I do not understand it fully. You say that "the dialectic's
                                            ....... must find its own foundation at the end of the
                                            progress/process only". It seems that you mean this for the real world.
                                            So, you mention Aristotle and his beginning with "confused masses" or
                                            you say that "dialectics being an emergence 'from shadows to reality' ".
                                            However, even Aristotle admit (after a long discussion in the
                                            Metaphysics) that Matter cannot be the Subjacent (das Zugrundeliegende)
                                            and then he looks for an other 'feature' which could be the Subjacent.
                                            As distinct from this for Hegel two points have to be noted:

                                            - There is no Subjacent which is already something
                                            - The dialectical progress/process is an ongoing foundation or mediation
                                            in pure thought with its other in itself. For Hegel the whole of this
                                            mediation is the Subjacent which, coming into its total other, into
                                            'reality', is exposed to contingency. Therefore for Hegel there is no
                                            teleological end, no foundation at the end of the progress/process as
                                            far as this process is actualized in the real world.

                                            This means also that for him there is no explanation of the real
                                            beginning and ending of the process, neither a theological nor a
                                            scientific explantion. All attempts to do so are condemned to failure
                                            and (or) are mere games of thought (which can be very illuminating). I
                                            think this is the meaning of the brutal beginning in the Logic with
                                            Being and Nothing: the two are in a mere identity or, what at the
                                            beginnning is the same, in a mere opposition. More cannot be said. You
                                            cannot even speak of a "shadow" which is already something.

                                            Regards,
                                            Beat Greuter

                                            >This view of Hegel's seems to remove the contradiction you mention from faith in regard to Reason or thought. In fact the religious is not a hermetically sealed milieu, but belongs with thought's manifestation in history, I would want to say. But thought is manifested in history as that which finally annuls or "puts by" history. History was the groping after thought, Mind, by the shadows themselves and this is the final "order" (Anaxagoras) in which Mind itself "sets" them, these so-called "all things", being thus "all in all", though this too is dialectical. It should be "all" period.
                                            >
                                            >I hope this goes some way to meeting your first set of stimulating comments? Maybe I have missed the "brutality"? Or I am brutal myself. Ignorance and cocksureness, of course, is brutal and I would want to avoid those.
                                            >
                                            >
                                            >Stephen.
                                            >
                                            >
                                            >To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                                            >From: greuterb@...
                                            >Date: Sun, 3 Oct 2010 18:03:16 +0200
                                            >Subject: Re: [hegel] Hegel versus Atheism
                                            >
                                            >
                                            >
                                            >Dear Stephen,
                                            >
                                            >You write:
                                            >
                                            >>Dear Beat,
                                            >>
                                            >>May I say that I find your summary re philosophy and religion here extremely sure-footed.
                                            >>
                                            >>The internal/external dilemma and the need to surmount it is very clear. The tendency today is for theology, as purely internal, to give way to philosophy of religion of this "good" sort. I rather think myself that the history of academic theology reflects this triad of differentiating theology from philosophy and then sublating this difference. The differentiation resulted from the Christian idea of a regula fidei, developed from around Augustine's time I would think (or when Justinian closed the Academy). Hegel shows, however, how even this can be treated philosophically (making the outside inside, in a transferred sense to yours here), as a possible notion of or approach to religion, and one might view this as implicit in the Pauline notion of "wisdom from above", i.e. it is still wisdom. Similarly, some have tried to show how even Greek philosophy, Platonism in particular, was exercised in awareness of an overarching maybe sacred tradition taken "internally" if you like (cf.J. Pieper, �ber die platonischen Mythen). This view, however, often goes together with setting the internal (faith) above the external(philosophy), i.e. of making philosophy subservient, which is a contradiction. I have understood that this is not Hegel's way and my having said that God is the Hegelian Absolute should be taken in the light of that understanding. Of course nothing can be above God, conceptually, i.e. even if he should not exist.
                                            >>
                                            >>
                                            >
                                            >You say that "..... setting the internal (faith) above the external
                                            >(philosophy), i.e. [of] making philosophy subservient, which is a
                                            >contradiction". Why a contradiction? Is it not rather one solution for
                                            >overcoming the contradiction between faith and thought, also
                                            >historically? I agree mostly with what you say in your text above.
                                            >However, the last proposition makes me perplex: "nothing can be above
                                            >God, conceptually, i.e. even if he should not exist". What does this
                                            >mean?. I am afraid that you do not accede Hegel's last step in the PhdG
                                            >from religion to pure (absolute) knowing. For you there is still
                                            >'something' beyond or above the concept? The beginning of the activity
                                            >of pure knowing later in the Logic, however, is one of the most brutal
                                            >philosophical 'presupposition' in the history of philosophy. There is no
                                            >presupposition at all - there is at the beginning no 'object' which
                                            >philosophical thinking can adhere to. The 'object' arises together with
                                            >thinking. Hegel does not begin his pure philosophy with God and he does
                                            >neither end it with God. God is 'only' the process of pure thought in
                                            >its circle. Now, if you state that "nothing can be above God,
                                            >conceptually, i.e. even if he should not exist" then I wonder if you
                                            >have to invent God since you need Him for your thinking as Kant needs
                                            >God for making his practical philosophy working?
                                            >
                                            >
                                            >
                                            >>Philosophy of religion in Analytical Philosophy has also been an interest of mine. Frege speaks of "the Reason that is in the world", "What is the world without the reason? "I suspect that the eagerness with which Anglo-American analysts, such as M. Dummett, present Frege as philosophy's timely escape from the error of idealism may be itself an error. They are bemused by the reaction of Russell and Moore against their colleague McTaggart and against British Hegelianism (of which McTaggart was not typical). Work by Hans Sluga has helped me here (esp. two articles in Inquiry). I mention this since it is from the viewpoint of Absolute Idealism that one sees the religious roots (or windowon religion) of philosophy best. Marx is very religious, or at least Messianic. But there is also a lot of interesting stuff on the Ontological Argument, so central for Hegel, in G�del and other writers, especially maybe the Polish analytical philosophers from between the wars and after. Forgive me for listing stuff you probably know better than I. Your plans to read up on this, if I understand your last sentence rightly, remind me of my late mentor and friend in Germany, Fernando Inciarte, who wrote profoundly on Aristotelian philosophy and its link with German idealism (what's that?). He, namely, had a nervous breakdown as a result of too intensive Aristotelian studies. He spent his convalescence "taking a lecture" on, reading up on, "analytical philosophy" and his last postumous work was a heavy tome on first logical principles (the "excluded third"), substance and action).I helped with the English version. Myself, I'm a bit tired of analytical philosophy, but I suppose I have profited from having to work in and with it.
                                            >>
                                            >>Sincerely,
                                            >>
                                            >>Stephen.
                                            >>
                                            >>
                                            >>
                                            >
                                            >I think that Analytical Philosophy has become trapped in its
                                            >self-created metaphysical riddles. This is the fate of thought Hegel
                                            >demonstrates in his dialectic.With this Analytical Philosophy has
                                            >actualized Hegel's thought as dialectical and therefore calls now for
                                            >him for becoming clear what she has done historically.
                                            >
                                            >Regards,
                                            >Beat Greuter
                                            >
                                            >
                                            >
                                            >>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
                                            >>From: greuterb@...
                                            >>Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2010 10:32:19 +0200
                                            >>Subject: Re: [hegel] Hegel versus Atheism
                                            >>
                                            >>
                                            >>Paul Trejo writes:
                                            >>
                                            >>
                                            >>
                                            >>>In response to the 9/13/2010 post by Beat Greuter:
                                            >>>
                                            >>>
                                            >>>
                                            >>>
                                            >>>>...I said above that Hegel's divine service of philosophy is a
                                            >>>>dynamic process in pure thought. But the categories do not
                                            >>>>merely "fall away into something less abstract and particular".
                                            >>>>This would be merely a linear process of the understanding.
                                            >>>>Hegel's process is not linear but a new category is more
                                            >>>>abstract and unconscious and one-sided first in its new
                                            >>>>immediacy which then is the starting point for further mediations
                                            >>>>with a more concrete result which could not have been achieved
                                            >>>>directly from the previous mediated category (i.e. the transition
                                            >>>>
                                            >>>>
                                            >>>>from the concrete concept of Pure Becoming into the one-sided
                                            >>>
                                            >>>
                                            >>>>concept of Determinate Being in which Pure Becoming is merely
                                            >>>>sublated and has to be made explicitly again into a more concrete
                                            >>>>level of the concept). Each progress requires first a regression.
                                            >>>>I think that each science requires such regressions and
                                            >>>>simplifications for its development.
                                            >>>>
                                            >>>>Regards,
                                            >>>>Beat Greuter
                                            >>>>
                                            >>>>
                                            >>>>
                                            >>>>
                                            >>>I agree with your characterization of Hegel's logical method, Beat.
                                            >>>Nevertheless, it appears that the clash between Philosophy and
                                            >>>Religion remains unaffected by your narrative.
                                            >>>
                                            >>>Let's look again at Hegel's texts where he says that Philosophy
                                            >>>is itself the "service of God." Hegel says:
                                            >>>
                                            >>>"But each of them, Religion as well as
                                            >>>Philosophy, is the service of God in a
                                            >>>way peculiar to it. They differ in the
                                            >>>peculiar character of their concern with
                                            >>>God. This is where the difficulties lie
                                            >>>that impede Philosophy's grasp of Religion,
                                            >>>and it often appears impossible for the
                                            >>>two of them to be united. The apprehensive
                                            >>>attitude of Religion toward Philosophy and
                                            >>>the hostile stance of each toward the other
                                            >>>arise from this." (Hegel, LECTURES OF 1827
                                            >>>ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, ed. Hodgson,
                                            >>>1988, p. 79)
                                            >>>
                                            >>>Religion sees the world from the moral and ethical viewpoint almost
                                            >>>exclusively. It's a question of the Law, of what is Permitted and
                                            >>>what is Forbidden from a Cosmic perspective -- that's the focus of
                                            >>>Religion. Furthermore, Theology, to be Theology, will almost never
                                            >>>broach the question of whether God exists (just as Psychology
                                            >>>will almost never broach the questoin of whether the psyche exists).
                                            >>>
                                            >>>
                                            >>>
                                            >>Thanks for your reply.
                                            >>
                                            >>I think it is not the task of THEOLOGY to consider the question of
                                            >>whether God exists or not. Its task is to provide the objective basis
                                            >>for the faith (which is not merely a subjective phenomenon but provides
                                            >>social cohesion) and to develop this basis and embodiment in the course
                                            >>of social and religious changes which could threaten the faith. Therfore
                                            >>it has always an internal view and differs in this respect from the
                                            >>SCIENCE of religion which has a mere external view. Good PHILOSOPHIES of
                                            >>religion, however, unite these two views: on the one side they have to
                                            >>keep an internal view otherwise they would be merely abstract thinking
                                            >>and could not reconcile reason and religion. On the other side they have
                                            >>to be critical and therefore historical. I think in this respect Hegel
                                            >>did a good job: his philosophy in general and his philosophy of religion
                                            >>in particular have these two views combined within themselves. Today
                                            >>also Analytical Philosophy deals with the philosophy of religion
                                            >>(theism, reformed epistemology, pragmatism), partly also based on the
                                            >>philosophy of Wittgenstein. I am not sure if a critical philosophy of
                                            >>language can hold these two views together therefore I take now a
                                            >>lecture on this subject matter.
                                            >>
                                            >>Regards,
                                            >>Beat Greuter
                                            >>
                                            >>
                                            >>
                                            >>>hilosophy, on the other hand, is handily characterized by its ancient
                                            >>>debate over the Existence of God. There have been famous thinkers
                                            >>>on both sides of that debate, and the question is still unresolved to
                                            >>>this very day. Hegel hoped to resolve the question with his dialectical
                                            >>>reworking of Anselm's Ontological Argument, but as Fate would have
                                            >>>it (or perhaps as God would have it), Hegel died while working on that
                                            >>>very project.
                                            >>>
                                            >>>So, Religion takes God for granted, and Philosophy refuses to take
                                            >>>God for granted. That is a legitimate difference -- yet that doesn't
                                            >>>prove they are incompatible.
                                            >>>
                                            >>>There is another great difference between Religion and Philosophy
                                            >>>according to Hegel, namely, that "Religion is for Everybody -- it is
                                            >>>not Philosophy, which is not for Everybody." (Hegel, LPR, vol I)
                                            >>>One may object that Hegel is being elitist here - but he is really
                                            >>>only describing the naked fact under our noses -- less than 1% of
                                            >>>humanity reads academic Philosophical Journals.
                                            >>>
                                            >>>Still - Hegel was one of those Philosophers who developed a new
                                            >>>approach to logic - and in his conclusions he decided that Religion
                                            >>>has a legitimate and useful contribution to make to human thought
                                            >>>and to the human condition generally. Hegel's theology may be
                                            >>>unorthodox, but it remains genuinely Christian (just as the theology
                                            >>>of Jesus of Galilee was unorthodox, but remained genuinely Jewish).
                                            >>>
                                            >>>Therefore, Hegel makes an interesting conclusion to his Lectures
                                            >>>on Religion. Hegel says:
                                            >>>
                                            >>>"Two positions are opposed to Philosophy.
                                            >>>Firstly, there is the vanity of the [Pure]
                                            >>>Understanding, which is displeased by the
                                            >>>fact that Philosophy still exhibits the
                                            >>>truth in Religion and demonstrates that
                                            >>>Reason still resides within it. =*=
                                            >>>This 'Enlightenment' wants to have nothing
                                            >>>further to do with the Content, and therefore
                                            >>>is highly displeased that Philosophy, as
                                            >>>conscious, methodical thinking, curbs the
                                            >>>fancies, the caprice, the contingency of
                                            >>>thinking. =*=
                                            >>>Secondly, immature religiosity is opposed to
                                            >>>Philosophy." (Hegel, LECTURES OF 1827
                                            >>>ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION,
                                            >>>ed. Hodgson, 1988, p. 489)
                                            >>>
                                            >>>Hegel had a somewhat lower opinion of those 'Enlightenment'
                                            >>>thinkers who failed to see the value in Religion.
                                            >>>
                                            >>>Best regards,
                                            >>>--Paul Trejo, MA
                                            >>>
                                            >>>

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