Re: [hegel] Re: the identity of the theoretical and the practical in the Absolute
- John writes:
> --- In email@example.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Beat
> Greuter <greuterb@...> wrote:
> > John writes:
> > >
> > > I beleive the relationship between Hegel's logic and his theology is
> > > pretty much the same as the relationship between the logic and his
> > > philosophy of nature. Hegel more or less derives the categories a
> > > priori. Then he looks around to see what physical phenomenon
> > > corresponds to a given category.
> > >
> > Dear John,
> > I am surprised to hear this from you. Hegel wrote the PhdG for avoiding
> > such an a priori derivation of the categories since in this way
> > skepticism would have an easy job: the Logic would not be the absolute
> > in thought since its other would be totally outside and only a
> > contingent use of the logical categories (as with Kant). Even if we
> > admit that Hegel had a pure logical view of the categories before he
> > wrote the PhdG we cannot deny that his Logic is the abstraction in pure
> > thought of the phenomenal world taken as the whole of the relationships
> > between subject and object.
> Dear Beat,
> It is all quite complicated. What I had in mind above in particualar
> was Hegel's manner of doing things in his Philosophy of Nature. There
> he pretty much comes up with the next category. Then he looks around
> to find a physical phenomenon that corresponds to the category. So on
> the one hand there is a very strict logical development, but on the
> other hand Hegel was very much interested in the details of all the
> sciences up to the day he died. There's a sort of synergy between
> empericism and logic that is hard for me at least to describe very well.
Yes, this is the crucial relationship which has to be truly grasped: the
relationship between the logical necessity of the movement of the
concept (the self emergence of reason where form and content are not
separated, the development of experience), on the one side, and the
empirical procedure for handling the plurality of the phenomenal world,
on the other side. The first has been shown and proved in Hegel's 'pure'
philosophy, in Hegel's science of philosophy (PhdG, Logic) and has
become therefore the inner presupposition for the observation of nature
and history. This presuppostion cannot be proved when dealing
philosophically with these matters which have to be taken as they are:
"we have to proceed historically, empirically ", and it is not allowed
to make a priori presuppositions about these objects as the particular
scientist of history and nature does (see "Lectures on the Philosophy of
History", Introduction, part A "Kind of treatment of history").
Now, you can reply that Hegel is a clever guts since he also cannot get
along without an priori presuppostion giving his Logic. So we would have
a contradiction. But here it decides whether one has understand Hegel's
approach or not. Because saying this you fall directly into the position
of the particular scientist with his a priori assumptions about
arbitrarily chosen sections of reality and arbitrarily chosen categories
for handling these sections of reality whereas Hegel has shown and
proved the inner reason in reality and its development and do not need
to bring reason from outside to a content having no idea if this content
really is rational according to the chosen categories.
On the other side, when Hegel says that "we have to proceed
historically, empirically", then we have to ask what this means for him.
It means that his philosophy depends on the result of the particular
sciences of his time and before. He has to absorb all these results and
make it an in itsef. Then he can give the phenomenal world its own right
and has not to make it rational where no rationality or only an apparent
rationality can be found.
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
- Hi Beat,
I will try to keep this brief.
1. That you believe a profound philosophy should be obscure is
interesting. Beyond that I dont know what to say.
2. Beisers quote does not give the reason for why Hegel writes as he
does. Is it because Hegel is a poor writer or is it because he is a precise
3. The indirection of Hegels philosophy is due to the fact that the
truth is exhibited inadvertently in the activity of thinking rather than in
the thought before thought.
4. The two ways of reading the text is a constant. A simple example:
self-consciousness can refer either to self-awareness or to thought that
returns out of otherness. The first reading is naïve while the second
requires appreciation of what is speculative. You can provide dual meanings
for pretty much every term used by Hegel. So, a concept can be abstract or
concrete depending upon ones way of reading or point of view.
5. The task of interpretation is to get the reader to challenge his
preconceptions that block his access to speculative thought. It is not to
allow him to remain satisfied with these preconceptions so that he can use
them to evaluate what Hegel has to say. This is the turning of the soul that
Kang has brought up with respect to Plato which I also believe is true of
6. You can slot skepticism if you like within the Phenomenology. But
it is clear from the Introduction that the skeptical critique of knowing
motivates what Hegel has to say when he speaks about the method of inquiry.
This is yet another place where Hegel can be read naively as being in fear
of the skeptic or speculatively as providing an implicit alternative
absolute knowing to what the skeptic has to say.
7. Representation ultimately is a mode of thinking enfolded within the
absolute. It is not merely a heuristic even if it is at time used this way.
It is an essential moment of speculative thinking.
8. The dialectic is the point in an Hegelian account where there can
be two possible readings: the negative skeptical or the positive
speculative. The naïve reader finds the first reading more natural and does
not know what to make of the second reading. As a result, much Hegelian
scholarship involves the effort of avoiding the speculative altogether.
9. As for god thinking unrestrictedly in pure thought, that is obscure
but alas not very profound.
From: firstname.lastname@example.org [mailto:email@example.com] On Behalf Of Beat
Sent: Thursday, September 16, 2010 3:34 PM
Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: the identity of the theoretical and the practical
in the Absolute
Alan Ponikvar writes:
> Hi Beat,
> No one should start out with the presumption that to be profound a
> philosophy has to be opaque.
> That Hegel is difficult to read I would thinkAt least in this point you seem to be in line with the mainstream of the
> is about the most noncontroversial thing that can be said about his texts.
Hegel scholars. This is delightful to hear. I, unfortunately, do not agree.
> The reason why Hegel is difficult to read is something people can disagreeThe reasons are mostly always the same. As an example I can present you
the following passage from Frederick Beiser's book "Hegel" (2005), first
section of the Introduction as usual:
"Why read Hegel? It is a good question, one no Hegel scholar should
shirk. After all, the burden of proof lies heavily on his or her
shoulders. For Hegel's texts are not exactly exciting or enticing.
Notoriously, they are written in some of the worst prose in the history
of philosophy. Their language is dense, obscure and impenetrable.
Reading Hegel is often a trying and exhausting experience, the
intellectual equivalent of chewing gravel. 'And for what?' a prospective
student might well ask. To avoid such an ordeal, he or she will be
tempted to invoke the maxim of one of Hegel's old enemies whenever he
lost patience with a tiresome book: 'Life is short!' " (p. 1)
> I get the impression that you believe that if a reader has faith thatYour impression is correct! However, if you mean with this that with
> means in his texts to give a direct account of his philosophy - a
> that works by means of indirection - then all that is required is the
> effort of thoughtful attention.
your perception of "a philosophy that works by means of indirection" you
can explain the 'fact' or even necessity that and why Hegel's "texts
appear opaque" then you are on the wrong track, or as you say, on the
(opaque) detour track.
> In contrast, I believe that the way Hegel writes is faithful not to aI hope so!
> trusting reader but to the philosophy he wishes to present.
> Almost everything said in the various texts can be read eitherThat's at least dangerous. Aristotle would say that with this manner of
> or naively. Moreover, it serves Hegel's purposes to use words and phrases
> that easily lend themselves to multiple meanings.
speaking you would be similar to a plant since you would not be able to
justify yourself in mutual speech (Metaphysics IV, Chapter 4 a).
> The tradition of HegelianI think this is the task of each serious Hegel scholar.
> scholarship is to miss this basic point. Thus there is the persistent
> attempt to make Hegel's discourse appear reasonable to a sober-minded
> trusting reader.
> Hegel understands that what he has to say challenges the conventions aboutThis is well said and true!
> reasonable discourse. What is most distinctive about Hegel's
> take on reason is that the true emerges as an alternative perspective on
> what a skeptically inclined reader views as the point of breakdown for
> reason. In effect, dialectics is a site shared by both the skeptical and
> speculative philosopher.
> For the skeptic dialectic is what happens at theI don't think so. Skepticism is a constitutive moment within Hegel's
> limits of reason where reason runs away from itself in the form of a
> or a vicious circle. For the speculatively oriented thinker, this is the
> site of the absolute since it is reason as self-conditioning. In
> short, the
> same content can be viewed as either a skeptical problem or a speculative
dialectical or speculative thinking: the negative.
> The skeptic is the gadfly of representational thinking. RepresentationalAll Hegel scholars know this and Hegel repeats it again and again.
> thinking is the dominant mode of thinking about anything whatsoever.
> But as
> the skeptic is quick to point out, this mode of thinking has its limits.
> Most readers are brought up short by these limits as they have no
> reason to
> be oriented to thought in any way other than by means of
> representation. So
> when a philosopher such as Hegel suggests that at these limits reason
> manifests itself differently - absolutely - he is going to be met with
Nevertheless, picture thinking is an important human trait and Hegel
shows this in the PhdG. Only God alone can think unrestrictly in pure
thought. Therefore, also Hegel uses the representation for helping his
readers. Though these helping passages in his text have to be weighed
carefully they are necessary parts of his philosophy for discussing its
intentions. Moreover, representation is an important (dialectical)
moment of thinking itself (see ENC, part III).
> This resistance is compounded by the fact that speculativeI agree. The second part of your phrase is important.
> reason can only defend itself by means of speculative reason - a
> reason that
> arises inadvertent to the conventional attempt to nail things down at its
> own limits usually by some appeal to what is self-evident.
> Thus asFor my reply see above.
> frustrating as it might be, Hegel presents his thought by means of
> At least that is how I try to explain why the texts appear opaque.
> Regards, Alan
> From: firstname.lastname@example.org <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com><mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
> [mailto:email@example.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com><mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>] On
> Behalf Of Beat<mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
> Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2010 6:15 AM
> To: firstname.lastname@example.org <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
> Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: the identity of the theoretical and the practical<mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
> in the Absolute
> Alan Ponikvar writes:
> > Hi Kang,
> > I do not like labeling philosophic positions in part because I rarely am
> > sure what exactly is being claimed. As I understand the non-metaphysical
> > reading of Hegel there is a focus on the self-determination and
> > ordering of concepts. This sound innocent enough, but the
> > crowd also seems to avoid discussion of dialectics and are
> embarrassed by
> > talk of the absolute. Since I read Hegel as providing a dialectic in
> > of his original take on the absolute I guess then that I am not a
> > member of
> > this group. If I were to generalize about Hegel - put a label on his
> > philosophy - I would say that his is the first nontheological
> > since Plato. My discussion of Hegel's absolute as pure difference is
> > one way
> > I try to make this point. With Gertrude Stein in mind we can say
> that for
> > Hegel's absolute there is no ultimate there there to grasp when we
> > consider
> > the absolute apart from its finite manifestations, god being the most
> > grand
> > of these finititudes.
> > It is certainly true that Plato can be read with pleasure with no
> > philosophic preparation whereas Hegel cannot.
> This is not true. A SPIEGEL discussion on the occasion of the second
> centenary of the PhdG with the title "Hegel has won" begins with the
> following answer by Prof. Liessmann
> "SPIEGEL: Professor Liessmann, was geht uns die "Phänomenologie des
> Geistes", die vor 200 Jahren erschien, heute an?
> Liessmann: Sie ist ein Sprachkunstwerk und gerade im Jahr der
> Geisteswissenschaften eine positive Provokation, weil Geist hier noch in
> seiner umfassenden Pracht begriffen wird, Wissenschaft, Kultur,
> Religion, alles einbeziehend. Die von Hegel formulierte Dialektik ist
> eine Bewegung voller Übergänge und Vorläufigkeiten. Hegel ist der
> einzige Philosoph, der das getan hat, was wir so gern proklamieren: Er
> hat tatsächlich vernetzt, rekursiv und dynamisch gedacht. Ohne
> Hegel-Lektüre bleiben diese modischen Begriffe leere Worthülsen."
> This text demonstrates very well that Hegel's linguistic masterpiece is
> intelligible for everybody who likes and is willing to think about the
> whole of science, culture, religion etc. and their dynamic
> interconnections. The only thing we have to avoid is to make Hegel's
> writings sophistic and thereby opaque.
> Beat Greuter
> > But in my view - which is not
> > the common view - if we were to divide Plato's and Hegel's readers
> > those who approach the philosophy in the proper spirit and those who
> > are not
> > able to I believe the divide would roughly split humanity into the
> > same two
> > groups. This is because I believe that Plato is as poorly understood as
> > Hegel. In particular, I do not believe that Plato's philosophy is
> the same
> > as what has come to be identified as Platonic doctrine by the
> tradition of
> > Platonic scholarship. This is what happens when one has studied
> Plato with
> > Seth Benardette who once said: "I hear all this talk about Platonic
> > But I have yet to come across one."
> > As to why philosophy, I can do no better than point to Aristotle's
> > reference
> > to wonder. I often am puzzled when I hear that someone has decided
> that he
> > should read Plato or Hegel for instance just because this is what
> > of philosophy do. In my view, until there is a motivating reason to
> > read one
> > should resist the urge. In fact, I usually reread a text only when I
> > have a
> > question to orient my reading.
> > Regards, Alan
> > From: email@example.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
> > [mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
> <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>] On
> > Behalf Of
> > kchen28
> > Sent: Tuesday, September 14, 2010 2:51 PM
> > To: email@example.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
> <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
> > Subject: [hegel] Re: the identity of the theoretical and the
> practical in
> > the Absolute
> > Hi Alan:
> > My reply must be briefer than I like, as work compels my attention.
> > That is an interesting take on Hegel; "only with a different eye"; that
> > sounds very similar to the various "two-worlds" interpretations of
> > Kant. It
> > also sounds, programatically if not substantively, like Klaus Hartmann's
> > non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel. Do you in fact view Hegel as
> > "non-metaphysical"?
> > I did not say that Plato's work is only a summons to philosophy; I
> > say that Plato's work is also a summons to philosophy whereas Hegel's is
> > not. The Phenomenology does not summon anyone to philosophy; it will not
> > turn nonphilosophers to philosophers; it only shows philosophers or
> > would-be
> > philosophers how to actualize their intentions (bring philosophy
> from love
> > of wisdom to wisdom). The Phenomenology is not a book for
> > the way, say, Plato's Apology is a work for nonphilosophers. Those
> > some pretty serious interest in philosophy can hardly be expected to
> > through the whole of the Phenomenology.
> > Having said all that, I do think it probably true that whereas Plato
> > to believe in a hierarchy of souls, Hegel seems not to. This means that
> > Hegel's understanding of the difference between philosophers and
> > nonphilosophers cannot be the same as Plato's, but it bears noting
> > that for
> > Hegel that distinction nevertheless remains of some importance, as he
> > suggests in one of the prefaces to the Science of Logic.
> > The philosophers and nonphilosophers do, to a certain extent, share a
> > common
> > interest in this question: why philosophy? That Q, of course, cannot be
> > answered except in light of an understanding of human being.
> > Best,
> > Kang
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