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RE: AW: RE: [hegel] the kernel of truth in mysticism

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  • stephen theron
    Dear Beat, Sublated and sublated. I have wanted to ask you, where exactly does that occur? I mean, mysticism is not a formal category. Hegel says it is very
    Message 1 of 2 , Jul 26, 2010
      Dear Beat,



      Sublated and sublated. I have wanted to ask you, where exactly does that occur? I mean, mysticism is not a formal category. Hegel says it is "very much the same as" speculative truth. Not even that, he only speaks of "what used to be called mysticism". But I let you, so to say, have that point in so far as I was pleased that you did not totally reject "mysticism" after all, as I had thought.

      I do not especially claim to be a mystic. It is a term the other side, qua other, uses pejoratively. We are philosophers and so we are mystics and mystics are philosophers too. Otherwise I can find no use for the term.

      Yes the one puts forth the other but I see nothing unmystical in dialectical thinking, specifically not in logic, pace Bertrand Russell. Here is Jan Lukasiewicz:



      "Whenever I am occupied with the tiniest logistical problem, e.g. trying to find the shortest axiom of the implicational calculus, I have the impression that I am confronted with a mighty construction, of indescribable complexity and immeasurable rigidity. This construction has the effect upon me of a concrete tangible object, fashioned from the hardest of materials, a hundred times stronger than concrete and steel. I cannot change anything in it; by intense labour I merely find in it ever new details, and attain unshakeable and eternal truths. Where and what is this ideal construction? A Catholic philosopher would say: it is in God, it is God's thought." (quoted in A Wittgenstein Workbook by four members of Leeds University philosophy faculty, 1970)



      I don't think he need have restricted himself to Catholics, not even to "mystics". It is reason itself, namely, that is mystical. This, I feel, is Hegel's point and characteristic insight. Of course the understanding is preserved, as you say, but that is mystical too (the quote seems to imply). As I say, I don't much care about or for the word. We are dealing with absolutes and philosophers are contemplatives. Pythagoras springs to mind. The academic industry of course obscures this, its existence I mean, as do finite things in general if we do not treat them as indeed mere moments, as you say. The academic moment in my life lasted about twenty years and is now indeed sublated. I regard this as an advance, in all humility. Wow!



      Or we might say, the mystical has no other (since outside is inside). Cf. John of the Cross: "God has spoken only one word." This is Hegel's point about the Notion/Concept surely.



      Well, I would like to give you your point. I think I do give it to you, but you will say I just stick to the same confusion. I think we are only arguing about words here, about this one m-word.



      For today this is all I can come up with.



      Yours, Stephen.





      To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      From: greuterb@...
      Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2010 09:14:53 +0000
      Subject: AW: RE: [hegel] the kernel of truth in mysticism






      ----Urspr�ngliche Nachricht----
      Von: stephentheron@...
      Datum: 22.07.2010 15:10
      An: "hegel hegel"
      <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
      Betreff: RE: [hegel] the kernel of truth in mysticism

      Dear Beat,

      Thank you for replying.
      To
      start at the end, of course I agree that true mysticism is sublated in Hegel's speculative thinking or in such similar
      "thinking" as any of us might engage in ("consciousness" might be a better word, volition after all being included as
      even a superior category to "cognition proper").
      I see the point about the dualism of content and "form". However, is
      it not evaded simply by reading and thinking "in a more perfect way or manner", avoiding the quasi-technical term,
      historically at least, "form"? Or is there still a dualism?

      That is, "the other way round" is actually the same.
      Mysticism is truly sublated in speculative philosophy. Why? Because mysticism is the search for the true and exact
      thinking of the absolute (or of absolutes, if that were possible). Everyone searches for this to some degree. This is
      Hegel's point about art and religion having the same Content. One might even say, thus meeting your point about a
      dualism, that they are not distinct "forms" of apprehending the content but even participate in philosophy. Thus, on
      the one hand we have Beethoven, a thinker, referring to music as a greater revelation (of the content) than philosophy
      (or religion), while we have Ricoeur and others stressing the essential figurativeness of any language whatever. Now
      the dialectic is, at least in appearance, a linguistic creation.

      On mysticism specifically one has often found it
      leading a marginal existence on the outer edges (or at the very centre) of an imposed "cataphatic" orthodoxy riddled,
      as it were, with figurative representations. These mystics, who speak maybe about "not thinking", have yet been, in
      their milieu, the most intensive thinkers of all, striving against the merely figurative and representational. So I see
      it anyhow.

      You find me "imaginative". Now this English word bears or can bear very much the sense of erfinderlich, as
      I hope I am in my philosophical writing and as Hegel certainly was. However, you more probably mean something like
      bildlich, if that is a word, or, as you say, "representational". I certainly wish and try to get beyond that, which of
      course need not mean that I make it a rule to exclude any such allusions from my texts, on the ground of the analogies
      of all reality and experience. This is human and right and it is easy to see when one is using an image or figure and
      when not.

      I cannot think mysticism is a mere moment in Hegel's thinking, though I maybe miss your intent here. I think
      he is a mystic through and through, a devotee, that is, of the Absolute. It is impressive that he could combine this
      with holding down something as finite as an academic position, and so triumphantly too. It also says a lot for the
      Prussia of that time.

      Dear Stephen,

      If you "agree that true mysticism is sublated in Hegel's speculative thinking"
      then you should also agree that mysticism has become a moment in Hegel's speculative or dialectical thinking. The one
      puts forth the other. Dialectic thinking is precisely this movement of the concept: an absolute is sublated and becomes
      a moment thereby losing its absoluteness whereas its truth is preserved in a more comprenhensive whole. In Hegel's
      Logic both, mysticism (or the synthesis or unity of the differences, the opposites, the contradictions) and the
      understanding (or the rational analysis), are preserved as moments within a clearly defined relationship between each
      other along the movement of the concept. None of them may claim absoluteness, otherwise the absolute would get lost
      since the other would be placed outside it.

      Regards,
      Beat


      At present I am wrestling with the objection of another
      mystic, also an atheist, McTaggart, who thinks Hegel "erred" in including the processes of cognition, analytic and
      synthetic, as sub-categories, so to say, of the dialectic, since it is only perfect knowledge which Hegel intends as in
      fact the only available example (sic) of a category he has chosen, for good or ill, merely to call cognition
      (Erkenntniss, even, more specifically, the Idea of the True and then the Good, actually higher, an advance on True, in
      WL). He has to argue, therefore, that Volition can be derived without passing through Lehrsatz. I am trying, in the
      31st chapter of my commentary or whatever, to show why I think this criticism cannot be right, despite insights behind
      it, and am hoping this will lead me to a deeper penetration of the whole thing. Any ideas?

      Anyhow, what is it I have
      not explained? why Hegel uses the word "mysticism" (I go on to say quite a lot about that)? something else? I don't
      quite get it. Maybe I don't quite see why you find my thinking unspeculative. Is it just because I have a bit of style?
      But so do you. And we need that, the aesthetic "moment". Do please put me right if you see some blindness. I know there
      is some, a lot, still. Domine, ut videam. I am not being ironical now. On my theory anyone can be called "Lord",
      mystical substitution if you like, which I find vindicated by Hegel's logic, I mean literally, i.e. mystically. I could
      quote hundreds of texts, literally (mystically?), but maybe you would say, have said, I quote unfairly.

      Once again, I
      am relieved you see Hegel as sublating mysticism. I got quite the opposite impression from the letter of yours to which
      I initially reacted some weeks ago.

      Sincerely,

      Stephen.

      To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      From: greuterb@...
      Date:
      Thu, 22 Jul 2010 10:51:45 +0200
      Subject: Re: [hegel] the kernel of truth in mysticism

      Dear Stephen,

      You write:

      >Dear Beat,
      >
      >I mean that we should not centre our disagreements upon the mere word or term, "mysticism" (any more
      than the term "God"). Hegel clearly finds "mysticism", and, maybe less clearly, "God", to "mean very much the same" as
      speculative reason and the absolute respectively. "Very much the same" clearly implies that they are at least possibly
      not absolutely the same. But it also allows that they can be treated as the same, the former terms can be used for the
      latter without falsehood or fault. We have merely to understand one another's usage (surely most important for reading
      Hegel himself).
      >
      >I say this is trivial in the sense that this is not what philosophy is interested in, not in words
      but rather in what they are used to signify, the "content" (Hegel's term) of the discourse, so to say. He gives this
      term, indeed, a very extensive sense.
      >

      But with this you get exactly the reverse of what you have intended: You

      replace one word by another one without explaining anything. And also,
      with this you encourages and produces
      representational thinking
      (imagination) instead of speculative thinking and this is quite the
      reverse of Hegel's
      purpose.

      >If anything I would say that mysticism is a more extensive or generic concept than that of speculative
      philosophy, i.e. it includes it (as Hegel's "content", besides philosophy, includes religion and art, "worthy of the
      name" he would add in all three cases. Nonetheless philosophy remains the perfect form of this and maybe, why not,
      therefore, of "mysticism").
      >

      For me it is quite the other way round: (true) mysticism is sublated in
      Hegel's
      speculative thinking and "sublated" means here what he has
      explained several times with help of the German term
      "aufheben": it is
      'negated' and at the same time 'saved'. However, "to negate" is not only
      a question of a more
      "perfect form" but includes both, content and form,
      otherwise you presuppose a dualistic relation between the two
      giving
      rise to a mere rationalizing of mysticism. What 'mysticism' has become
      as a moment in Hegel's speculative
      thinking (and this is the result of
      sublation) we have to find out reading Hegel's philosophy.

      >I should think that
      quotations from Hegel, long or short, should first be used for understanding Hegel and for communicating that
      understanding. We would not get far there without them. But I agree that we should "think ourselves".
      >

      I wrote:
      "instead of making long quotations for proving something
      presupposed in the mind". I did NOT deny the relevance of
      quotations.
      They have to be "fair", that is, enough comprehensive.

      >There is of course a genuine question as to
      "true" mysticism, as you imply and I do not deny.
      >
      >Stephen.
      >

      Regards,
      Beat

      >To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      >From:
      greuterb@...
      >Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2010 09:21:30 +0200
      >Subject: Re: [hegel] the kernel of truth in mysticism
      >
      >

      >Dear Stephen,
      >
      >You write:
      >
      >
      >>I agree with Beat's point of interpretation that if the validity of the abstractive
      understanding (Verstand) be denied then speculative reason (Vern�nft) would also become abstractive (i.e. become what
      had been denied), thus ceasing to be itself. Hegel's target here, it seems to me, is the supernaturalist mysticism
      (postulating an utter mystery) discussed very much in or just before his time (Fenelon etc.) in terms of the opposition
      of Nature and Grace. A kind of quietism is recommended (it's all in terms of "states of prayer") , "contemplatives"
      are, at a given stage, "meant to cease all thinking" (John of the Cross, cf. the medieval English Cloud of Unknowing).
      Thus apparent quietism is distinguished positively against a really useless quietism (Mme. Guyon) by those in the know.

      >>
      >>Not only is this not what Hegel, or philosophy, is discussing but he reacts against, condemns, such "rationalist"
      religiosity as not rational. It is based on a dualism and/or on common-sense realism re the finite and infinite. "Each
      thing is itself and not another thing", it assumes merely.
      >>
      >>Thus, firstly, in what is being cited repeatedly as a
      proof-text here, he distinguishes "speculative truth" from "what, in special connection with religious experience and
      doctrines, used to be called Mysticism" (Enc. 82 Zus., my stress). At the same time he says it "means very much the
      same" (as speculative truth) and this implies that there is or should be a form of "mysticism!" free from such
      rationalist or dualist error. That we might prefer not to call this mysticism is trivial, not germane.
      >>
      >>
      >>
      >

      >Your last sentence above I absolutely do not understand!
      >
      >Hegel says (according to your quotation) speculative
      reason or truth
      >"means very much the same" as mysticism. What does this mean? Does it
      >mean that the two are totally
      identical. But then why do we use two
      >different terms? So, I guess there must be also a difference between
      >(true)
      mysticism and speculative reason and only if we know also the
      >difference (or the opposite, or the contradiction) we
      know the meaning
      >of the two concepts. This at least is the procedure of Hegel's
      >speculative reason where he thinks
      the unity of the differences, of the
      >opposites, of the contradictions - as far as I understand it. So,
      >instead of
      making long quotations for proving something presupposed in
      >the mind we should think ourselves with help of Hegel's
      method instead
      >of thinking about his method and producing only identities.
      >
      >Regards,
      >Beat
      >
      >
      >
      >>So he says "the
      term... is at present used. as a rule, to designate what is mysterious and incomprehensible." So "one class" use it to
      denote the real and the true while for "another" it names "everything connected with superstition and deception". On
      this, he says, "we first of all remark that there is mystery in the mystical, only however for the understanding...
      ruled by... abstract identity; whereas the mystical, as synonymous with the speculative is the concrete unity of those
      propositions, which understanding only accepts in their spearation and opposition" (my stress). Perhaps the most
      representative instance of this is the identification of "the Absolute", in the final stages of dialectic, with "the
      unity of subjective and objective" he has mentioned in the ptrevious paragraph, while adding that this is still "one-
      sided" since they are "not merely identical but also distinct", i.e. Verstand still gets its due.
      >>
      >>He rejects
      leaving Mysticism "in its original utter mystery" as reprehensible conduct, the stance that "truth can only be won by
      renouncing thought". This and nothing else, is what was meant by "leading the reason captive", a metaphor derived from
      the Pauline paradox that Christ "led captivity captive". Yet reason, Hegel shows, is freedom, Christian or otherwise
      and so not subject to captivity. Reason, in natural transcendence of Nature, is ad opposita and not determinata ad
      unum. This is the possibility of (free or) rational judgment. It "consists in embracing within itself these opposites"
      etc. (Hegel).
      >>
      >>"Thus the reason-world may be equally styled mystical." That is all; "not however because thought
      cannot both reach and comprehend it, but merely because it lies beyond the compass of understanding", i.e. of Verstand
      (my stress).
      >>
      >>
      >>************************
      >>
      >>
      >>The later Middle Ages and early modern thought in consequence
      were dominated by voluntarism. This arose from the abstract separation of intellect and will as faculties and was not,
      therefore, exclusively theological. God indeed could as well will evil and absurdity as the Good and the True, such
      theologians all the same argued. Natural inclinations were treated as limitations upon such an abstractly ab-solute
      freedom, the purely voluntary. It is in line with such Ockhamist voluntarism when Kant declares that there is nothing
      in heaven and earth "good without qualification" save a good will. All this was a departure from the unitary vision of
      Aquinas, taught by Aristotle, for whom will (voluntas) was the inclination of intellect itself towards the understood
      good (this is brought out in the late discussion of will, in connection with God's will, Summa theol. I:
      >>
      >>Hegel
      returns to this forgotten insight (also retained by Leibniz in his way) when he derives will, the voluntary, from the
      inner necessity of demonstration, in the Lehrsatz, theorem. It is Intellect, as Idea, which is free, Freedom, such as
      all judgment . Absolute knowledge is determinative and free, as is, therefore, dialectical method as such. This is why
      freedom is Love, the affinity of all being or beings, the Notion. It is false therefore to take the equation of Spirit
      with Love as essentially irrational.
      >>
      >>We have here the inclusive transcendence (overlapping) of Verstand by
      Vern�nft. It is not suppressed. The next step should be critical analysis of precisely the transition here appealed to
      (Enc. 231-232).
      >>
      >>Stephen.
      >>
      >>
      >>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      >>From: greuterb@...
      >>Date: Thu, 8 Jul 2010 18:
      25:04 +0200
      >>Subject: Re: [hegel] the kernel of truth in mysticism
      >>
      >>Dear Wil,
      >>
      >>You write:
      >>
      >>
      >>
      >>>ob,
      >>>

      >>>With all due respect, I think you have it wrong, or perhaps I am not
      >>>understanding you. Let's view the paragraph
      again, much simplified:
      >>>
      >>>(1) Speculative truth means very much the same as Mysticism.
      >>>
      >>>Except that:
      >>>
      >>>
      (2) The term Mysticism is what is mysterious and incomprehensible.
      >>>
      >>>(3) There is mystery in the mystical for the
      understanding which is
      >>>ruled by the principle of abstract identity;
      >>>
      >>>(3a) whereas the mystical as speculative
      is the concrete unity of
      >>>those propositions, which understanding only accepts in their
      >>>separation and
      opposition.
      >>>
      >>>(4) If those who recognise Mysticism as the highest truth are content
      >>>to leave it in its
      original utter mystery, their conduct only proves
      >>>that thinking means abstract identification, and that in their
      opinion
      >>>truth can only be won by renouncing thought by leading the reason
      >>>captive.
      >>>
      >>>(5) But, as we have
      seen, the abstract thinking of understanding is so
      >>>far from being either ultimate or stable, that it shows a
      perpetual
      >>>tendency to work its own dissolution and swing round into its opposite.
      >>>
      >>>Ergo:
      >>>- the mystical as
      speculative is concrete unity
      >>>- the abstract thinking of understanding only accepts separation and
      >>>opposition,
      but it shows a perpetual tendency, via the rationally
      >>>speculative, to work its own dissolution and swing round into
      its
      >>>opposite.
      >>>
      >>>Wil
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>I think your comment expresses the crucial point.
      >>
      >>I try to
      express it with my own words: There is no true speculative
      >>rationality without abstract thinking of the
      understanding. If one take
      >>speculative thinking as something for its own and beyond abstract
      >>thinking of the
      understanding then it becomes itself abstract
      >>identification and therefore "truth can only be won by renouncing

      >>thought, or as it is frequently expressed, by leading the reason
      >>captive" (ENC Logic, para 82, Addition ). If such
      an untrue speculative
      >>thinking is taken as the "highest truth of mysticism" then "it leaves it
      >>in its original
      utter mystery" (ENC Logic, para 82, Addition ).
      >>
      >>But this means also that in true speculative rationality mysticism
      must
      >>be included, not as its mere external rationalizing, but as a moment of
      >>the movement of the concept in a
      speculative or dialectic logic where
      >>"the mystical as speculative is [becomes] concrete unity". If this would
      >>not
      be the case there would be no absolute at all since something - the
      >>non-rational or unconscious - would be excluded
      and therefore
      >>rationality again would become an abstract one-sidedness and mere
      >>opposite. It is our task to show
      this inclusion by comprehending the
      >>movement of the concept in Hegel's Logic, that is, the concept of the

      >>activity of thought.
      >>
      >>Regards,
      >>Beat Greuter
      >>
      >>
      >>
      >>
      >>
      >>>-----Original Message-----
      >>>From: Robert
      Wallace <bob@...
      >>><mailto:bob%40robertmwallace.com>>
      >>>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%
      40yahoogroups.com>
      >>>Sent: Wed, Jul 7, 2010 11:37 am
      >>>Subject: [hegel] the kernel of truth in mysticism
      >>>
      >>>Hi
      Wil,
      >>>
      >>>You write:
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>What is truly mystical in mysticism is precisely what is not
      >>>>>

      >>>>>
      >>>>>rational, which is why the kernel of truth in mysticism when it is
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>thought in a speculative
      way (by us) prescinds from the mystical
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>its abstract mystery, and thus leaves us with "its opposite",
      which
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>is reason released from its (mystical) captivity.
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>Here is the full
      paragraph again, with sentences numbered for
      >>>
      >>>reference. You appear to be appealing to sentences 4 and 5, in
      >>>

      >>>particular.
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>(1) "Speculative truth, it may also be noted, means very much the
      >>>>>
      >>>>>

      >>>>>same as what, in special connexion with religious experience and
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>doctrines, used to be called
      Mysticism. (2) The term Mysticism is
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>at present used, as a rule, to designate what is mysterious and

      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>incomprehensible: and in proportion as their general culture and
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>way of thinking
      vary, the epithet is applied by one class to denote
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>the real and the true, by another to name
      everything connected with
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>superstition and deception. (3) On which we first of all remark
      >>>>>
      >>>>>

      >>>>>that there is mystery in the mystical, only however for the
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>understanding which is ruled by the
      principle of abstract identity;
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>whereas the mystical, as synonymous with the speculative, is the
      >>>>>

      >>>>>
      >>>>>concrete unity of those propositions, which understanding only
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>accepts in their separation
      and opposition. (4) And if those who
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>recognise Mysticism as the highest truth are content to leave it
      in
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>its original utter mystery, their conduct only proves that for them
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>too, as well
      as for their antagonists, thinking means abstract
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>identification, and that in their opinion,
      therefore, truth can
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>only be won by renouncing thought, or as it is frequently
      >>>>>
      >>>>>

      >>>>>expressed, by leading the reason captive. (5) But, as we have seen,
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>the abstract thinking of
      understanding is so far from being either
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>ultimate or stable, that it shows a perpetual tendency to
      work its
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>own dissolution and swing round into its opposite. "
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>I agree that
      Hegel implies in 4 and 5 that (as you put it) "the kernel
      >>>
      >>>of truth in mysticism when it is thought in a
      speculative way (by us)
      >>>
      >>>prescinds from the mystical its abstract mystery."
      >>>
      >>>However, when Hegel refers to
      "its opposite," in 5, he is describing
      >>>
      >>>what happens to the "abstract thinking of understanding," due to its
      >>>

      >>>being neither ultimate nor stable. It "swings around into its
      >>>
      >>>opposite," which must refer to mysticism _as
      mystery_. The abstract
      >>>
      >>>understanding and mystery, Hegel says, are two sides of the same coin.
      >>>
      >>>He is _not_
      saying (as you say he is) that _reason_ is the "opposite"
      >>>
      >>>of the mystical. The topic of sentence 5 is not
      reason, but the
      >>>
      >>>abstract understanding. The _abstract understanding_ is the
      >>>
      >>>"opposite," Hegel says in 5,
      of the mystical. (More specifically, it's
      >>>
      >>>the opposite of the mystical left "in its mystery.")
      >>>
      >>>As for the
      "captivity" of reason, Hegel ascribes this not to mysticism
      >>>
      >>>as such but to those who are content to leave
      mysticism "in its
      >>>
      >>>original utter mystery" (sentence 4).
      >>>
      >>>Thus Hegel does not say or imply that (as you put
      it) "what is truly
      >>>
      >>>mystical in mysticism is what is not rational." What he discusses in
      >>>
      >>>sentences 4 and 5
      is not mysticism as such, but "mystery" on the one
      >>>
      >>>hand (which he presents as one possible interpretation of
      "the
      >>>
      >>>mystical"), and abstract understanding, on the other.
      >>>
      >>>It's clear that Hegel doesn't regard "mystery"
      as the kernel of truth
      >>>
      >>>in mysticism. He gives that role, in sentence 3, to "the mystical as
      >>>
      >>>synonymous
      with the speculative," which is to say, for Hegel, the
      >>>
      >>>truly rational. Having said this, he can hardly treat the
      mystical, as
      >>>
      >>>such, as the "opposite" of reason.
      >>>
      >>>Best, Bob
      >>>
      >>>On Jul 7, 2010, at 10:14 AM,
      eupraxis@...
      >>><mailto:eupraxis%40aol.com> wrote:
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>Bob,
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>You are using
      (abusing?) Hegel to justify a mode of thinking that
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>Hegel, in fact, does _not_ advocate in his writing,
      as a way to
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>bolster your own mystical prejudices (which you are more than free
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>to have),
      and alleging in the same breath that any reading of Hegel,
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>and of this section in particular, is denying
      everyone his freedom.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>This is a sophomoric way of 'arguing' that just doesn't do.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>It is
      clear to me, at least, that Hegel performs the same dialectal
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>prescinding of the fabulous and pictorial
      (the irrational) from
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>mysticism as he does for God elsewhere, for example at the end of
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>the
      Phenomenology. The tendentious use of the word "abusing" for the
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>modern critical attitude towards things
      unreal smacks of a
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>reactionary and backwards leaning regard for free thought, not the
      >>>>
      >>>>

      >>>>contrary.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>Let's look at that paragraph again:
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>"Speculative truth, it may also be noted,
      means very much the same
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>as what, in special connexion with religious experience and
      >>>>
      >>>>

      >>>>doctrines, used to be called Mysticism. The term Mysticism is at
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>present used, as a rule, to
      designate what is mysterious and
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>incomprehensible: and in proportion as their general culture and way

      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>of thinking vary, the epithet is applied by one class to denote the
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>real and the true, by
      another to name everything connected with
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>superstition and deception. On which we first of all remark
      that
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>there is mystery in the mystical, only however for the understanding
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>which is ruled by
      the principle of abstract identity; whereas the
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>mystical, as synonymous with the speculative, is the
      concrete unity
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>of those propositions, which understanding only accepts in their
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>separation
      and opposition. And if those who recognise Mysticism as
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>the highest truth are content to leave it in its
      original utter
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>mystery, their conduct only proves that for them too, as well as for
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>their
      antagonists, thinking means abstract identification, and that
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>in their opinion, therefore, truth can only
      be won by renouncing
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>thought, or as it is frequently expressed, by leading the reason
      >>>>
      >>>>

      >>>>captive. But, as we have seen, the abstract thinking of
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>understanding is so far from being either
      ultimate or stable, that
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>it shows a perpetual tendency to work its own dissolution and swing
      >>>>
      >>>>

      >>>>round into its opposite. "
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>What is truly mystical in mysticism is precisely what is not
      >>>>
      >>>>

      >>>>rational, which is why the kernel of truth in mysticism when it is
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>thought in a speculative way (by
      us) prescinds from the mystical its
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>abstract mystery, and thus leaves us with "its opposite", which is

      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>reason released from its (mystical) captivity.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>Best,
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>Wil
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>-----
      Original Message-----
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>From: Robert Wallace <bob@...
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>><mailto:bob%
      40robertmwallace.com>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      >>>>
      >>>>

      >>>>Sent: Wed, Jul 7, 2010 9:20 am
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>Subject: Re: [hegel] Speculative Logic comprehended with Analytic
      >>>>

      >>>>
      >>>>Logic
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>Hi Wil,
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>Maybe you can explain what's silly about it? Taking it together with

      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>the sentence that precedes it, which explains what
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>"criterion" (namely, what conception of
      freedom) I'm referring to.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>Best, Bob
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>On Jul 7, 2010, at 9:11 AM, eupraxis@...
      >>>>

      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>><mailto:eupraxis%40aol.com> wrote:
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>Dear Bob,
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>You wrote:
      "The modern habit of abusing what is "pre-modern" (what
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>is "mystical" or "metaphysical") is precisely
      un-free, by this
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>criterion."
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>With all due respect, Bob, that is a silly bit of logic,
      if ever I
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>heard one.
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>Wil
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>-----Original Message-----
      >>>>>
      >>>>>

      >>>>>From: Robert Wallace <bob@...
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>><mailto:bob%40robertmwallace.com>>
      >>>

      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>Sent: Wed, Jul 7,
      2010 9:02 am
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>Subject: Re: [hegel] Speculative Logic comprehended with Analytic
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>Logic

      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>Dear Beat,
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>You write:
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>It seemed to me that your reply
      to Randall does approve
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>Paul's argumentation. If this is true then I would indeed doubt
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>whether
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>you already have found "what is rationally true in mysticism".
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>I don't think I made any reference to Paul's argumentation. I
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>confined

      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>myself to criticizing Randall's one-line interpretation of Hegel's
      >>>>>
      >>>>>

      >>>>>paragraph.
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>it requires a clear and logically sound argumentation
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>based on Hegel's text, otherwise, the "broader world" instead of
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>being
      >>>>>

      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>"liberated from some of its unproductive habits of thought" will
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>be
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>confirmed once more that Hegel is a mystic and metaphysician
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>
      >>>>without
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>any
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>rational basis.
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>If the larger world actually reads what I write, they will see that
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>it's about nothing but
      "rational basis." But I object strongly to
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>the
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>assumption that
      mysticism is always non-rational. Hegel himself
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>suggests in the paragraph we're discussing that
      mysticism in one
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>sense
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>is "synonymous with the speculative." I
      likewise object to the
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>assumption that "metaphysics" is without rational basis. These are
      >>>>>
      >>>>>

      >>>>>simply unexamined prejudices promoted by people who find it
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>convenient
      >>>>
      >>>>

      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>to dismiss whole regions of human experience and cognitive effort
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>with

      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>simple terms of abuse, so as to make their own cognitive projects
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>

      >>>>look
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>good by contrast with this supposedly "irrational" stuff.
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>If Hegel
      teaches us anything, it should be that to be free, to be
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>"with oneself in the other," one must
      seriously try to understand
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>the
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>"other." The modern habit of
      abusing what is "pre-modern" (what is
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>"mystical" or "metaphysical") is precisely un-free, by this

      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>criterion.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>Hegel doesn't do it, and neither will we if we want
      to be free.
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>Best, Bob
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>On Jul 7, 2010, at 7:47 AM, Beat Greuter wrote:
      >>>>>
      >>>>>

      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>Dear Bob,
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>You write:
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>Dear Beat,
      >>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>It seems to me that I've given a more detailed interpretation of
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>

      >>>>>this
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>Hegel paragraph than you have, so far. As for the final
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>sentence on
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>mysticism's "original utter mystery," I commented on that
      in
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>replying
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>to Wil (under "Greater Reality
      Achieved..."). I said that like
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>Plato
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>and his
      followers (including as it seems to me, Hegel), I am
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>interesting in identifying what is
      rationally true in
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>mysticism, by
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>which it ceases to be
      a "mystery."
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>Best, Bob
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>I did not want to give an
      interpretation of this Hegel text on
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>mysticism, understanding and the speculative cited by Paul

      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>Trejo. I
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>also
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>agree with your intention
      'to identify what is rationally true in
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>mysticism, by which it ceases to be a "mystery" '. However,

      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>Randall
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>has
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>noticed a contradiction
      between Paul's quotation and previous mail
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>about
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>the dialectic of love at which
      I wrote a reply arguing against
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>this
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>kind
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>of conclusions. It seemed to me that your reply to Randall does
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>approve
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>Paul's argumentation. If this is true then I would indeed doubt
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>whether
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>you already have found "what is rationally true in mysticism".
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>In a
      >>>>
      >>>>

      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>subsequent mail you write:
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>'I think specialists in Hegel have a duty to try to
      convey to the
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>broader world how Hegel's style of thinking can liberate it from
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>some
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>of its unproductive habits of thought. My paper was an effort
      to
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>do
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>that, with regard to "consciousness." '
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>This intention I certainly appreciate and your paper may help to
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>achieve
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>it. Nevertheless, it requires a clear and logically sound
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>argumentation
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>based on Hegel's text, otherwise, the "broader world" instead of
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>being
      >>>>>

      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>"liberated from some of its unproductive habits of thought" will
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>be
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>confirmed once more that Hegel is a mystic and metaphysician
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>
      >>>>without
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>any
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>rational basis.
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>Regards,

      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>Beat
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>On Jul 5, 2010, at 5:08 AM, Beat Greuter wrote:
      >>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>Dear Bob,
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>You write:
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>Dear Randall,
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>You write that:
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>t is impossible to reveal Hegel's concept of Love with
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>analytical
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>logic for the same reasons that Paul has outlined above about

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>why
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>analytical logic will
      necessarly find mysticism instead of
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>self-
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>determining logic.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>But what Hegel actually says in our paragraph is that the
      Pure
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Understanding will find
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>Mystery
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>in the Mystical.
      >>>>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>While by contrast
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>the Mystical, _as synonymous
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>with the
      Speculative_ [emphasis added], is
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>the concrete unity of those propositions

      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>which the Pure Understanding only accepts
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>>in their separation and opposition."
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>That is,
      the Understanding sees mystery in the mystical, while
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>speculative Reason sees speculative
      concrete unity in the
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>mystical.
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>In

      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>other words, the mystical is speculative concrete unity. But
      >>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>speculative concrete unity is (I submit) self-determining
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>

      >>>>logic.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>Thus,
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>the mystical is self-
      determining logic.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Best, Bob W
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>I think
      this is a game with words which neither makes clear the
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>idea
      >>>>>
      >>>>>

      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>of
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>the mystical nor the idea of the self-determing logic. This kind

      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>of
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>abstract identification - as Randall
      suggests - does certainly
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>not
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>exceed the realm of
      the understanding and its analytical
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>procedure.
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>

      >>>>>>>>When
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>Hegel did the same then only in the discussion of the
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>preliminary
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>notion
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>or in a remark (� 82
      of the Encyclopaedia Logic belongs to both)
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>what
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>for Hegel - as you know - is located in the forecourt of
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>

      >>>>>philosophy.
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>Nevertheless, you should also read the subsequent sentence of

      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>Paul's
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>quotation in � 82, Addition of the
      ENC Logic:
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>"And if those who recognise Mysticism as the highest truth are
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>content
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>to leave it in its original utter mystery, their
      conduct only
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>proves
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>that for them too, as
      well as for their antagonists, thinking
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>means
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>

      >>>>>>>>abstract identification, and that in their opinion, therefore
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>truth

      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>can
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>only be won by renouncing thought, or as it is
      frequently
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>expressed,
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>by
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>leading the reason captive." (translated by William Wallace)
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>Regards,
      >>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>Beat
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>On Jul 4, 2010, at 4:29 PM, TheJack wrote:

      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Dear list,
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>I actually agree with
      Paul here. It is an excellent post by
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>him.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>--- In hegel@yahoogroups.com
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>><mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.
      com>, Paul Trejo <petrejo@...> wrote:
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>Dear Robert Wallace,
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>When discussing definitions of mysticism, it is useful
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>to examine Hegel's
      definition in his ENCYCLOPEDIA LOGIC.
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>Hegel says,
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>"The term Mysticism is at present
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>used, as a rule, to designate what

      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>is mysterious and incomprehensible:
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>and in
      proportion as their general
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>culture and way of thinking vary,
      >>>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>the epithet is applied by one class
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>to denote the real and
      the true, and
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>by another class to name everything
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>connected with superstition and
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>deception. On which we first of all

      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>remark, however, that there is Mystery
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>in the
      Mystical only for the Pure
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>Understanding, which is ruled by the
      >>>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>principle of abstract identity [A=A].
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>Whereas the Mystical,
      as synonymous
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>with the Speculative [synthetic], is
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>the concrete unity of those propositions
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>which the Pure Understanding
      only accepts
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>in their separation and opposition."
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      (Hegel, ENC LOGIC, para. 82)
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>Hegel uses the term, "Pure Understanding," in

      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>Immanuel Kant's sense - the contrast to "Pure
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>Reason." The principle of Analytic Logic is the
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>principle of identity,
      [A=A], and Hegel says this
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>is the principle 'of the "Pure Understanding".

      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>Analytic Logic is contrasted by Synthetic Logic
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      (aka Speculative Logic, aka Dialectical Logic).
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>It is a different orientation of
      Logic, so when
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>Synthetic Logic produces a formula, Analytic
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>Logic is likely to regard that as Mysticism.
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>Again, I agree with almost everything Paul has to say above
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>about
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>the confusion that can arise when one tries to use analytic
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>logic to
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>comprehend speculative logic.

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Yet, as Beat pointed out last week, Paul tried to use a type
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>of
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>analytic reasoning (i.e. propositional logic) to
      comprehend
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>Hegel's
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>concept of
      Love just a few weeks ago.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>And of course it is impossible to reveal Hegel's concept of

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>Love
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>with analytical logic for the same
      reasons that Paul has
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>outlined
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>above about why analytical logic will necessarly find
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>mysticism
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>instead of self-determining logic.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Hegel's
      concept of Love only reveals itself speculatively.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>And apparently, Paul already knows
      this, but then why do we
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>have
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>this
      statement below by him?:
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>[Paul]
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>>Dear Hegel List,
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>Actually, Hegel is very plain - very explicit -
      about the
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>nature
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>of
      Love.
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>Love is DIALECTICAL. Hegel's scientific description of
      >>>>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>Love is
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>offered in his lectures on the
      philosophy of religion (1818
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>-1831). Some salient points include:
      >>>>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>(1) Love is dialectical
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>(2) Love is the two that become
      one; and the one that
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>remains
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>two

      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>(3) Love is the sublation of the Negative
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>>(4) Spirit is the sublation of the Negative
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>(5) Thus, Love is Spirit,
      and Spirit is Love
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>(6) Thus, God is Spirit, and God is Love
      >>>>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>(7) Thus, Love is God
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>[Beat]

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>Even if this is only an enumeration of salient points on

      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>love,
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>spirit and God in Hegel's
      philosophy of religion I cannot
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>allow
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>your formally and substantially incorrect argumentation to
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>rest.
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>Hegel did certainly not propound such sequences in his
      >>>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>lectures
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>(or have you a precise quotation?).

      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Hegel outlines precisely the limitations of such a

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>propositional
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>method in several places.

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>----------------
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>[Hegel] EL: First Attitude To
      Objectivity
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>----------------
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>"It was the general
      assumption of this metaphysic that a
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>knowledge
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>

      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>of the Absolute was gained by assigning predicates to it. It
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>neither
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>inquired what the terms of the understanding specially
      meant
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>or
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>what
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>they were worth, nor did it test the method which
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>characterizes
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>the
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Absolute by the assignment of
      predicates..." (Hegel, EL trans.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Wallace p.48 para 28)
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>-----------------
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Above Hegel suggest that...
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>-the form of reason (i.e. the method) for the old Metaphysics
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>was a
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>presupposed given.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>-The form of the
      Old Metaphysics and its primitive terms were
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>not
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>

      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>determined by thinking (i.e. they were not determined by the
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>Science
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>of Logic itself) but instead its modus operandi was
      given
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>prior to
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>the exercise of
      thinking.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>As a consequence of being given its form prior to its
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>exercise,
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>the
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>product of
      this type of reasoning cannot generate any new
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>content,
      >>>>>
      >>>>>

      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>instead this inheretly formal type of reasoning must be
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>supplied
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>with an externally given content (for which the form is then

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>applied
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>to)
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>The product (and truth) then of this type of reasoning can
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>only
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>result in its operations being in conformity to its
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>antecedently
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>given form (i.e. its interally
      consistant identity with
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>itself).
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>This
      means that the Old Metaphysics was limited to analytic
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>results.

      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>-------------
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>[Hegel]
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>-------------
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>"...We must look more closely into the procedure of that old

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>metaphysic. In the first place it never went beyond the
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>province
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>of
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>the analytic
      understanding. Without preliminary inquiry it
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>adopted
      >>>>>
      >>>>>

      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>the abstract categories of thought and let them rank as
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>predicates
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>of truth..." (EL p.48 para 28)
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>-------------
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Hegel suggests above that...
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>-
      the Old Metaphysics never went beyond the analytic
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>understanding

      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>-One mode of the analytic understanding in which the Old
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>Metaphysics
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>used was to assign predicates to the
      object of cognition.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>-------------
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>[Hegel]
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>-------------
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>"It was therefore the main question of the pre-
      Kantian
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>metaphysic to
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>discover whether predicates of the kind mentioned were to be
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>ascribed to its
      objects. Now these predicates are after all
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>only
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>limited formulae of the understanding which, instead of
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>expressing
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>the truth, merely impose a limit. More than this, it should be

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>noted
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>that the chief feature
      of the method lay in `assigning' or
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>`attributing' predicates to the object that was to
      be
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>cognised,
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>for
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>example, to God. But attribution is no more than an external
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>reflection about the object: the predicates by which the
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>object is
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>to be determined are supplied from the resources of picture-

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>thought,
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>and are applied in a
      mechanical way. Whereas, if we are to
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>have
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>genuine cognition, the object must characterise its own self
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>and
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>not
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>derive its predicates from without. (EL p.
      50 para 28)
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>------------------
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Hegel suggests above
      that...
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>-More than expressing the truth, this method of assigning
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>predicates
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>to the object of cognition merely
      imposed a limit on the
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>object.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>-The
      attribution of these predicates was no more than an
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>external
      >>>>>

      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>reflection about the object
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>-the predicates by which the
      object was to be determined in
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>this
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>method were supplied from the resources of picture-thought and
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>were
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>applied in a mechanical way.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Hegel
      then contrasts this merely external application of
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>predicates,

      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>with what he calls genuine cognition in which the object
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>characterizes its own self.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>--------------
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      [Hegel]
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>--------------
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>"Even supposing we follow the
      method of predicating, the mind
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>cannot
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>help feeling that predicates of this sort fail to exhaust the
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>object. From
      the same point of view the Orientals are quite
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>correct
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>in calling God the many-named or the myriad-named One. One
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>after
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>another of these finite categories leaves the soul
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>unsatisfied,
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>and
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>the Oriental sage is compelled unceasingly to seek for more
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>and
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>more
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>of such predicates. In finite things it
      is no doubt the case
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>that
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>they
      have to be characterised through finite predicates: and
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>with
      >>>>>

      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>these things the understanding finds proper scope for its
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>special
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>action. Itself finite, it knows only the nature
      of the
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>finite...But
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>the
      objects of reason cannot be defined by these finite
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>predicates.

      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>To try to do so was the defect of the old metaphysic."(EL p.50
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>para
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>28)
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>--------------
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Hegel suggests above that...
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>-
      Even if we dogmatically accept the above method of
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>predicating,
      >>>>

      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>it
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>seems to leave us unsatisfied.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>-Especially when we consider the Absolute, because it seems
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>that
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>even an infinite number of predicates could not satisfy the
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>term.
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Now, even though he clearly outlines
      the limitations of this
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>form of
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>assigning predicates in the Introduction of the EL, Hegel does
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>pay
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>some positive lip service to this form in the Preface to the
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>PhG :
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>----------------
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>[Hegel] Preface to the Phenomenology
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>---------------
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>"The need to represent the Absolute as Subject has found
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>expression
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>in the propositions: God is the eternal, the moral world-

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>order,
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>love, and so on. In such
      propositions the True is only posited
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>immediately as Subject, but is not presented as
      the movement
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>of
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>reflecting itself into
      itself. In a proposition of this kind
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>one
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>begins with the word 'God'. This by itself is a meaningless
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>sound, a
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>mere name; it is only the predicate that says what God is,

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>gives
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>Him
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>content and meaning. Only in the end of the proposition does
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>the
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>empty beginning become actual knowledge. This being so, it is
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>not
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>clear why one does not speak merely of
      the eternal, of the
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>moral
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>world-order,
      and so on, or, as the ancients did, of pure
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>notions
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>

      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>like `being', `the One', and so on, in short, of that which
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>gives
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>meaning without adding the meaningless sound as well. But it
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>is
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>just
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>this
      word that indicates that what is posited is not a being
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>[i.e.
      >>>>>

      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>something that merely is], or essence, or a universal in
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>general,
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>but rather something that is reflected into itself, a
      Subject.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>But
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>at the same time this
      is only anticipated. The subject is
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>assumed as
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>a fixed point to which, as their support, the predicates are
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>affixed
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>by a movement belonging to the knower of this Subject,
      and
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>which
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>is
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>not regarded as belonging to the fixed point itself; yet it is
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>only
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>through this movement that the content could be represented as

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Subject. The way in which this movement has been brought about
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>is
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>such that it cannot belong to the fixed point; yet,
      after this
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>point
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>has been
      presupposed, the nature of the movement cannot really
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>be
      >>>>>
      >>>>>

      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>other than what it is, it can only be external. Hence, the
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>mere
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>anticipation that the Absolute is Subject is not only not the

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>actuality of this Notion, but it even makes the actuality
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>impossible; for the anticipation posits the subject as an
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>inert
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>point, whereas actuality is self-movement." (Hegel, PhG trans.
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Miller p. 12-13 para. 23)
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>------------------
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>Hegel suggests above that...
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>-The speculative form (i.e. the concept that
      unfolds
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>immanently as
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Subject) was
      in some ways anticipated by the propositional
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>form
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>

      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>(i.e. the method of assigning predicates to the object of
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>cognition)
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>-the meaning of "the subject of the proposition" (e.g. God) is

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>only
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>revealed through the
      mediation of the predicates (e.g. God is
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>love,
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>God is the eternal, etc...).
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>In this way the meaning of "the subject
      of the proposition" is
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>never
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>an immediacy, but instead involves a movement (or development)
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>that
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>represents a reflection into "the subject of the proposition".

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>[At the same time,]
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>-this propositional form is *only*
      an anticipation of the
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>speculative form because the predicates are merely affixed to

      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>"the
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>subject of the proposition"
      by an external source (i.e. the
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>knower).
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>

      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>In addition to being merely formal, and external, there is an
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>

      >>>>>>>>>>additional limitation inherent in the propositional form:
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>The propositional
      form first posits an inert point (i.e. "the
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>subject of the proposition", e.g. `God'),
      and it is claimed
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>that
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>nothing is known
      about this inert point until the predicates
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >><br/><br/>(Message over 64 KB, truncated)
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