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Re: [hegel] the kernel of truth in mysticism

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  • Beat Greuter
    Dear Stephen, ... Your last sentence above I absolutely do not understand! Hegel says (according to your quotation) speculative reason or truth means very
    Message 1 of 35 , Jul 21, 2010
      Dear Stephen,

      You write:

      >I agree with Beat's point of interpretation that if the validity of the abstractive understanding (Verstand) be denied then speculative reason (Vernünft) would also become abstractive (i.e. become what had been denied), thus ceasing to be itself. Hegel's target here, it seems to me, is the supernaturalist mysticism (postulating an utter mystery) discussed very much in or just before his time (Fenelon etc.) in terms of the opposition of Nature and Grace. A kind of quietism is recommended (it's all in terms of "states of prayer") , "contemplatives" are, at a given stage, "meant to cease all thinking" (John of the Cross, cf. the medieval English Cloud of Unknowing). Thus apparent quietism is distinguished positively against a really useless quietism (Mme. Guyon) by those in the know.
      >
      >Not only is this not what Hegel, or philosophy, is discussing but he reacts against, condemns, such "rationalist" religiosity as not rational. It is based on a dualism and/or on common-sense realism re the finite and infinite. "Each thing is itself and not another thing", it assumes merely.
      >
      >Thus, firstly, in what is being cited repeatedly as a proof-text here, he distinguishes "speculative truth" from "what, in special connection with religious experience and doctrines, used to be called Mysticism" (Enc. 82 Zus., my stress). At the same time he says it "means very much the same" (as speculative truth) and this implies that there is or should be a form of "mysticism!" free from such rationalist or dualist error. That we might prefer not to call this mysticism is trivial, not germane.
      >

      Your last sentence above I absolutely do not understand!

      Hegel says (according to your quotation) speculative reason or truth
      "means very much the same" as mysticism. What does this mean? Does it
      mean that the two are totally identical. But then why do we use two
      different terms? So, I guess there must be also a difference between
      (true) mysticism and speculative reason and only if we know also the
      difference (or the opposite, or the contradiction) we know the meaning
      of the two concepts. This at least is the procedure of Hegel's
      speculative reason where he thinks the unity of the differences, of the
      opposites, of the contradictions - as far as I understand it. So,
      instead of making long quotations for proving something presupposed in
      the mind we should think ourselves with help of Hegel's method instead
      of thinking about his method and producing only identities.

      Regards,
      Beat

      >So he says "the term... is at present used. as a rule, to designate what is mysterious and incomprehensible." So "one class" use it to denote the real and the true while for "another" it names "everything connected with superstition and deception". On this, he says, "we first of all remark that there is mystery in the mystical, only however for the understanding... ruled by... abstract identity; whereas the mystical, as synonymous with the speculative is the concrete unity of those propositions, which understanding only accepts in their spearation and opposition" (my stress). Perhaps the most representative instance of this is the identification of "the Absolute", in the final stages of dialectic, with "the unity of subjective and objective" he has mentioned in the ptrevious paragraph, while adding that this is still "one-sided" since they are "not merely identical but also distinct", i.e. Verstand still gets its due.
      >
      >He rejects leaving Mysticism "in its original utter mystery" as reprehensible conduct, the stance that "truth can only be won by renouncing thought". This and nothing else, is what was meant by "leading the reason captive", a metaphor derived from the Pauline paradox that Christ "led captivity captive". Yet reason, Hegel shows, is freedom, Christian or otherwise and so not subject to captivity. Reason, in natural transcendence of Nature, is ad opposita and not determinata ad unum. This is the possibility of (free or) rational judgment. It "consists in embracing within itself these opposites" etc. (Hegel).
      >
      >"Thus the reason-world may be equally styled mystical." That is all; "not however because thought cannot both reach and comprehend it, but merely because it lies beyond the compass of understanding", i.e. of Verstand (my stress).
      >
      >
      >************************
      >
      >
      >The later Middle Ages and early modern thought in consequence were dominated by voluntarism. This arose from the abstract separation of intellect and will as faculties and was not, therefore, exclusively theological. God indeed could as well will evil and absurdity as the Good and the True, such theologians all the same argued. Natural inclinations were treated as limitations upon such an abstractly ab-solute freedom, the purely voluntary. It is in line with such Ockhamist voluntarism when Kant declares that there is nothing in heaven and earth "good without qualification" save a good will. All this was a departure from the unitary vision of Aquinas, taught by Aristotle, for whom will (voluntas) was the inclination of intellect itself towards the understood good (this is brought out in the late discussion of will, in connection with God's will, Summa theol. I:
      >
      >Hegel returns to this forgotten insight (also retained by Leibniz in his way) when he derives will, the voluntary, from the inner necessity of demonstration, in the Lehrsatz, theorem. It is Intellect, as Idea, which is free, Freedom, such as all judgment . Absolute knowledge is determinative and free, as is, therefore, dialectical method as such. This is why freedom is Love, the affinity of all being or beings, the Notion. It is false therefore to take the equation of Spirit with Love as essentially irrational.
      >
      >We have here the inclusive transcendence (overlapping) of Verstand by Vernünft. It is not suppressed. The next step should be critical analysis of precisely the transition here appealed to (Enc. 231-232).
      >
      >Stephen.
      >
      >
      >To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      >From: greuterb@...
      >Date: Thu, 8 Jul 2010 18:25:04 +0200
      >Subject: Re: [hegel] the kernel of truth in mysticism
      >
      >Dear Wil,
      >
      >You write:
      >
      >>ob,
      >>
      >>With all due respect, I think you have it wrong, or perhaps I am not
      >>understanding you. Let's view the paragraph again, much simplified:
      >>
      >>(1) Speculative truth means very much the same as Mysticism.
      >>
      >>Except that:
      >>
      >>(2) The term Mysticism is what is mysterious and incomprehensible.
      >>
      >>(3) There is mystery in the mystical for the understanding which is
      >>ruled by the principle of abstract identity;
      >>
      >>(3a) whereas the mystical as speculative is the concrete unity of
      >>those propositions, which understanding only accepts in their
      >>separation and opposition.
      >>
      >>(4) If those who recognise Mysticism as the highest truth are content
      >>to leave it in its original utter mystery, their conduct only proves
      >>that thinking means abstract identification, and that in their opinion
      >>truth can only be won by renouncing thought by leading the reason
      >>captive.
      >>
      >>(5) But, as we have seen, the abstract thinking of understanding is so
      >>far from being either ultimate or stable, that it shows a perpetual
      >>tendency to work its own dissolution and swing round into its opposite.
      >>
      >>Ergo:
      >>- the mystical as speculative is concrete unity
      >>- the abstract thinking of understanding only accepts separation and
      >>opposition, but it shows a perpetual tendency, via the rationally
      >>speculative, to work its own dissolution and swing round into its
      >>opposite.
      >>
      >>Wil
      >>
      >>
      >>
      >
      >I think your comment expresses the crucial point.
      >
      >I try to express it with my own words: There is no true speculative
      >rationality without abstract thinking of the understanding. If one take
      >speculative thinking as something for its own and beyond abstract
      >thinking of the understanding then it becomes itself abstract
      >identification and therefore "truth can only be won by renouncing
      >thought, or as it is frequently expressed, by leading the reason
      >captive" (ENC Logic, para 82, Addition ). If such an untrue speculative
      >thinking is taken as the "highest truth of mysticism" then "it leaves it
      >in its original utter mystery" (ENC Logic, para 82, Addition ).
      >
      >But this means also that in true speculative rationality mysticism must
      >be included, not as its mere external rationalizing, but as a moment of
      >the movement of the concept in a speculative or dialectic logic where
      >"the mystical as speculative is [becomes] concrete unity". If this would
      >not be the case there would be no absolute at all since something - the
      >non-rational or unconscious - would be excluded and therefore
      >rationality again would become an abstract one-sidedness and mere
      >opposite. It is our task to show this inclusion by comprehending the
      >movement of the concept in Hegel's Logic, that is, the concept of the
      >activity of thought.
      >
      >Regards,
      >Beat Greuter
      >
      >
      >
      >>-----Original Message-----
      >>From: Robert Wallace <bob@...
      >><mailto:bob%40robertmwallace.com>>
      >>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      >>Sent: Wed, Jul 7, 2010 11:37 am
      >>Subject: [hegel] the kernel of truth in mysticism
      >>
      >>Hi Wil,
      >>
      >>You write:
      >>
      >>
      >>
      >>>>What is truly mystical in mysticism is precisely what is not
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>rational, which is why the kernel of truth in mysticism when it is
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>thought in a speculative way (by us) prescinds from the mystical
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>its abstract mystery, and thus leaves us with "its opposite", which
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>is reason released from its (mystical) captivity.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>Here is the full paragraph again, with sentences numbered for
      >>
      >>reference. You appear to be appealing to sentences 4 and 5, in
      >>
      >>particular.
      >>
      >>
      >>
      >>>>(1) "Speculative truth, it may also be noted, means very much the
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>same as what, in special connexion with religious experience and
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>doctrines, used to be called Mysticism. (2) The term Mysticism is
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>at present used, as a rule, to designate what is mysterious and
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>incomprehensible: and in proportion as their general culture and
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>way of thinking vary, the epithet is applied by one class to denote
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>the real and the true, by another to name everything connected with
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>superstition and deception. (3) On which we first of all remark
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>that there is mystery in the mystical, only however for the
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>understanding which is ruled by the principle of abstract identity;
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>whereas the mystical, as synonymous with the speculative, is the
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>concrete unity of those propositions, which understanding only
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>accepts in their separation and opposition. (4) And if those who
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>recognise Mysticism as the highest truth are content to leave it in
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>its original utter mystery, their conduct only proves that for them
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>too, as well as for their antagonists, thinking means abstract
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>identification, and that in their opinion, therefore, truth can
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>only be won by renouncing thought, or as it is frequently
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>expressed, by leading the reason captive. (5) But, as we have seen,
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>the abstract thinking of understanding is so far from being either
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>ultimate or stable, that it shows a perpetual tendency to work its
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>own dissolution and swing round into its opposite. "
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>I agree that Hegel implies in 4 and 5 that (as you put it) "the kernel
      >>
      >>of truth in mysticism when it is thought in a speculative way (by us)
      >>
      >>prescinds from the mystical its abstract mystery."
      >>
      >>However, when Hegel refers to "its opposite," in 5, he is describing
      >>
      >>what happens to the "abstract thinking of understanding," due to its
      >>
      >>being neither ultimate nor stable. It "swings around into its
      >>
      >>opposite," which must refer to mysticism _as mystery_. The abstract
      >>
      >>understanding and mystery, Hegel says, are two sides of the same coin.
      >>
      >>He is _not_ saying (as you say he is) that _reason_ is the "opposite"
      >>
      >>of the mystical. The topic of sentence 5 is not reason, but the
      >>
      >>abstract understanding. The _abstract understanding_ is the
      >>
      >>"opposite," Hegel says in 5, of the mystical. (More specifically, it's
      >>
      >>the opposite of the mystical left "in its mystery.")
      >>
      >>As for the "captivity" of reason, Hegel ascribes this not to mysticism
      >>
      >>as such but to those who are content to leave mysticism "in its
      >>
      >>original utter mystery" (sentence 4).
      >>
      >>Thus Hegel does not say or imply that (as you put it) "what is truly
      >>
      >>mystical in mysticism is what is not rational." What he discusses in
      >>
      >>sentences 4 and 5 is not mysticism as such, but "mystery" on the one
      >>
      >>hand (which he presents as one possible interpretation of "the
      >>
      >>mystical"), and abstract understanding, on the other.
      >>
      >>It's clear that Hegel doesn't regard "mystery" as the kernel of truth
      >>
      >>in mysticism. He gives that role, in sentence 3, to "the mystical as
      >>
      >>synonymous with the speculative," which is to say, for Hegel, the
      >>
      >>truly rational. Having said this, he can hardly treat the mystical, as
      >>
      >>such, as the "opposite" of reason.
      >>
      >>Best, Bob
      >>
      >>On Jul 7, 2010, at 10:14 AM, eupraxis@...
      >><mailto:eupraxis%40aol.com> wrote:
      >>
      >>
      >>
      >>>Bob,
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>You are using (abusing?) Hegel to justify a mode of thinking that
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>Hegel, in fact, does _not_ advocate in his writing, as a way to
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>bolster your own mystical prejudices (which you are more than free
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>to have), and alleging in the same breath that any reading of Hegel,
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>and of this section in particular, is denying everyone his freedom.
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>This is a sophomoric way of 'arguing' that just doesn't do.
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>It is clear to me, at least, that Hegel performs the same dialectal
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>prescinding of the fabulous and pictorial (the irrational) from
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>mysticism as he does for God elsewhere, for example at the end of
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>the Phenomenology. The tendentious use of the word "abusing" for the
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>modern critical attitude towards things unreal smacks of a
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>reactionary and backwards leaning regard for free thought, not the
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>contrary.
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>Let's look at that paragraph again:
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>"Speculative truth, it may also be noted, means very much the same
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>as what, in special connexion with religious experience and
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>doctrines, used to be called Mysticism. The term Mysticism is at
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>present used, as a rule, to designate what is mysterious and
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>incomprehensible: and in proportion as their general culture and way
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>of thinking vary, the epithet is applied by one class to denote the
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>real and the true, by another to name everything connected with
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>superstition and deception. On which we first of all remark that
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>there is mystery in the mystical, only however for the understanding
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>which is ruled by the principle of abstract identity; whereas the
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>mystical, as synonymous with the speculative, is the concrete unity
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>of those propositions, which understanding only accepts in their
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>separation and opposition. And if those who recognise Mysticism as
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>the highest truth are content to leave it in its original utter
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>mystery, their conduct only proves that for them too, as well as for
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>their antagonists, thinking means abstract identification, and that
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>in their opinion, therefore, truth can only be won by renouncing
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>thought, or as it is frequently expressed, by leading the reason
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>captive. But, as we have seen, the abstract thinking of
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>understanding is so far from being either ultimate or stable, that
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>it shows a perpetual tendency to work its own dissolution and swing
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>round into its opposite. "
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>What is truly mystical in mysticism is precisely what is not
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>rational, which is why the kernel of truth in mysticism when it is
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>thought in a speculative way (by us) prescinds from the mystical its
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>abstract mystery, and thus leaves us with "its opposite", which is
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>reason released from its (mystical) captivity.
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>Best,
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>Wil
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>-----Original Message-----
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>From: Robert Wallace <bob@...
      >>>
      >>>
      >><mailto:bob%40robertmwallace.com>>
      >>
      >>
      >>
      >>>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>Sent: Wed, Jul 7, 2010 9:20 am
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>Subject: Re: [hegel] Speculative Logic comprehended with Analytic
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>Logic
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>Hi Wil,
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>Maybe you can explain what's silly about it? Taking it together with
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>the sentence that precedes it, which explains what
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>"criterion" (namely, what conception of freedom) I'm referring to.
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>Best, Bob
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>On Jul 7, 2010, at 9:11 AM, eupraxis@...
      >>>
      >>>
      >><mailto:eupraxis%40aol.com> wrote:
      >>
      >>
      >>
      >>>>Dear Bob,
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>You wrote: "The modern habit of abusing what is "pre-modern" (what
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>is "mystical" or "metaphysical") is precisely un-free, by this
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>criterion."
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>With all due respect, Bob, that is a silly bit of logic, if ever I
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>heard one.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>Wil
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>-----Original Message-----
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>From: Robert Wallace <bob@...
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >><mailto:bob%40robertmwallace.com>>
      >>
      >>
      >>
      >>>>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>Sent: Wed, Jul 7, 2010 9:02 am
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>Subject: Re: [hegel] Speculative Logic comprehended with Analytic
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>Logic
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>Dear Beat,
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>You write:
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>It seemed to me that your reply to Randall does approve
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>Paul's argumentation. If this is true then I would indeed doubt
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>whether
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>you already have found "what is rationally true in mysticism".
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>I don't think I made any reference to Paul's argumentation. I
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>confined
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>myself to criticizing Randall's one-line interpretation of Hegel's
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>paragraph.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>it requires a clear and logically sound argumentation
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>based on Hegel's text, otherwise, the "broader world" instead of
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>being
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>"liberated from some of its unproductive habits of thought" will
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>be
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>confirmed once more that Hegel is a mystic and metaphysician
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>without
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>any
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>rational basis.
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>If the larger world actually reads what I write, they will see that
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>it's about nothing but "rational basis." But I object strongly to
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>the
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>assumption that mysticism is always non-rational. Hegel himself
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>suggests in the paragraph we're discussing that mysticism in one
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>sense
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>is "synonymous with the speculative." I likewise object to the
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>assumption that "metaphysics" is without rational basis. These are
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>simply unexamined prejudices promoted by people who find it
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>convenient
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>to dismiss whole regions of human experience and cognitive effort
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>with
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>simple terms of abuse, so as to make their own cognitive projects
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>look
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>good by contrast with this supposedly "irrational" stuff.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>If Hegel teaches us anything, it should be that to be free, to be
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>"with oneself in the other," one must seriously try to understand
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>the
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>"other." The modern habit of abusing what is "pre-modern" (what is
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>"mystical" or "metaphysical") is precisely un-free, by this
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>criterion.
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>Hegel doesn't do it, and neither will we if we want to be free.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>Best, Bob
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>On Jul 7, 2010, at 7:47 AM, Beat Greuter wrote:
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>Dear Bob,
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>You write:
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>Dear Beat,
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>It seems to me that I've given a more detailed interpretation of
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>this
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>Hegel paragraph than you have, so far. As for the final
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>sentence on
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>mysticism's "original utter mystery," I commented on that in
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>replying
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>to Wil (under "Greater Reality Achieved..."). I said that like
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>Plato
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>and his followers (including as it seems to me, Hegel), I am
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>interesting in identifying what is rationally true in
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>mysticism, by
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>which it ceases to be a "mystery."
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>Best, Bob
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>I did not want to give an interpretation of this Hegel text on
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>mysticism, understanding and the speculative cited by Paul
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>Trejo. I
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>also
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>agree with your intention 'to identify what is rationally true in
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>mysticism, by which it ceases to be a "mystery" '. However,
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>Randall
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>has
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>noticed a contradiction between Paul's quotation and previous mail
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>about
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>the dialectic of love at which I wrote a reply arguing against
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>this
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>kind
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>of conclusions. It seemed to me that your reply to Randall does
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>approve
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>Paul's argumentation. If this is true then I would indeed doubt
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>whether
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>you already have found "what is rationally true in mysticism".
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>In a
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>subsequent mail you write:
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>'I think specialists in Hegel have a duty to try to convey to the
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>broader world how Hegel's style of thinking can liberate it from
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>some
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>of its unproductive habits of thought. My paper was an effort to
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>do
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>that, with regard to "consciousness." '
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>This intention I certainly appreciate and your paper may help to
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>achieve
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>it. Nevertheless, it requires a clear and logically sound
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>argumentation
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>based on Hegel's text, otherwise, the "broader world" instead of
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>being
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>"liberated from some of its unproductive habits of thought" will
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>be
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>confirmed once more that Hegel is a mystic and metaphysician
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>without
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>any
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>rational basis.
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>Regards,
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>Beat
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>On Jul 5, 2010, at 5:08 AM, Beat Greuter wrote:
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>
      >>>>>>>Dear Bob,
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>You write:
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>Dear Randall,
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>You write that:
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>t is impossible to reveal Hegel's concept of Love with
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>analytical
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>logic for the same reasons that Paul has outlined above about
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>why
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>analytical logic will necessarly find mysticism instead of
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>self-
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>determining logic.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>But what Hegel actually says in our paragraph is that the Pure
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Understanding will find
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Mystery
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>in the Mystical.
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>While by contrast
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>the Mystical, _as synonymous
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>with the Speculative_ [emphasis added], is
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>the concrete unity of those propositions
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>which the Pure Understanding only accepts
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>in their separation and opposition."
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>That is, the Understanding sees mystery in the mystical, while
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>speculative Reason sees speculative concrete unity in the
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>mystical.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>In
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>other words, the mystical is speculative concrete unity. But
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>speculative concrete unity is (I submit) self-determining
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>logic.
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>Thus,
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>the mystical is self-determining logic.
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>Best, Bob W
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>I think this is a game with words which neither makes clear the
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>idea
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>of
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>the mystical nor the idea of the self-determing logic. This kind
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>of
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>abstract identification - as Randall suggests - does certainly
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>not
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>exceed the realm of the understanding and its analytical
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>procedure.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>When
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>Hegel did the same then only in the discussion of the
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>preliminary
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>notion
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>or in a remark (§ 82 of the Encyclopaedia Logic belongs to both)
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>what
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>for Hegel - as you know - is located in the forecourt of
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>philosophy.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>Nevertheless, you should also read the subsequent sentence of
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>Paul's
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>quotation in § 82, Addition of the ENC Logic:
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>"And if those who recognise Mysticism as the highest truth are
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>content
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>to leave it in its original utter mystery, their conduct only
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>proves
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>that for them too, as well as for their antagonists, thinking
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>means
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>abstract identification, and that in their opinion, therefore
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>truth
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>can
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>only be won by renouncing thought, or as it is frequently
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>expressed,
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>by
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>leading the reason captive." (translated by William Wallace)
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>Regards,
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>Beat
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>On Jul 4, 2010, at 4:29 PM, TheJack wrote:
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Dear list,
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>I actually agree with Paul here. It is an excellent post by
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>him.
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>--- In hegel@yahoogroups.com
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >><mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Paul Trejo <petrejo@...> wrote:
      >>
      >>
      >>
      >>>>>>>>>>Dear Robert Wallace,
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>When discussing definitions of mysticism, it is useful
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>to examine Hegel's definition in his ENCYCLOPEDIA LOGIC.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Hegel says,
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>"The term Mysticism is at present
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>used, as a rule, to designate what
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>is mysterious and incomprehensible:
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>and in proportion as their general
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>culture and way of thinking vary,
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>the epithet is applied by one class
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>to denote the real and the true, and
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>by another class to name everything
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>connected with superstition and
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>deception. On which we first of all
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>remark, however, that there is Mystery
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>in the Mystical only for the Pure
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Understanding, which is ruled by the
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>principle of abstract identity [A=A].
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Whereas the Mystical, as synonymous
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>with the Speculative [synthetic], is
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>the concrete unity of those propositions
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>which the Pure Understanding only accepts
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>in their separation and opposition."
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>(Hegel, ENC LOGIC, para. 82)
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Hegel uses the term, "Pure Understanding," in
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Immanuel Kant's sense - the contrast to "Pure
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Reason." The principle of Analytic Logic is the
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>principle of identity, [A=A], and Hegel says this
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>is the principle 'of the "Pure Understanding".
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Analytic Logic is contrasted by Synthetic Logic
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>(aka Speculative Logic, aka Dialectical Logic).
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>It is a different orientation of Logic, so when
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Synthetic Logic produces a formula, Analytic
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Logic is likely to regard that as Mysticism.
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Again, I agree with almost everything Paul has to say above
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>about
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>the confusion that can arise when one tries to use analytic
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>logic to
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>comprehend speculative logic.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Yet, as Beat pointed out last week, Paul tried to use a type
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>of
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>analytic reasoning (i.e. propositional logic) to comprehend
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>Hegel's
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>concept of Love just a few weeks ago.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>And of course it is impossible to reveal Hegel's concept of
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>Love
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>with analytical logic for the same reasons that Paul has
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>outlined
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>above about why analytical logic will necessarly find
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>mysticism
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>instead of self-determining logic.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Hegel's concept of Love only reveals itself speculatively.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>And apparently, Paul already knows this, but then why do we
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>have
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>this statement below by him?:
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>[Paul]
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>Dear Hegel List,
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>Actually, Hegel is very plain - very explicit - about the
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>nature
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>of Love.
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>Love is DIALECTICAL. Hegel's scientific description of
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>Love is
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>offered in his lectures on the philosophy of religion (1818
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>-1831). Some salient points include:
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>(1) Love is dialectical
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>(2) Love is the two that become one; and the one that
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>remains
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>two
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>(3) Love is the sublation of the Negative
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>(4) Spirit is the sublation of the Negative
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>(5) Thus, Love is Spirit, and Spirit is Love
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>(6) Thus, God is Spirit, and God is Love
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>(7) Thus, Love is God
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>[Beat]
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Even if this is only an enumeration of salient points on
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>love,
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>>spirit and God in Hegel's philosophy of religion I cannot
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>allow
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>>your formally and substantially incorrect argumentation to
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>rest.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>Hegel did certainly not propound such sequences in his
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>lectures
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>>(or have you a precise quotation?).
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Hegel outlines precisely the limitations of such a
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>propositional
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>method in several places.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>----------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>[Hegel] EL: First Attitude To Objectivity
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>----------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>"It was the general assumption of this metaphysic that a
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>knowledge
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>of the Absolute was gained by assigning predicates to it. It
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>neither
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>inquired what the terms of the understanding specially meant
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>or
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>what
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>they were worth, nor did it test the method which
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>characterizes
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>the
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Absolute by the assignment of predicates..." (Hegel, EL trans.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Wallace p.48 para 28)
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-----------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Above Hegel suggest that...
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-the form of reason (i.e. the method) for the old Metaphysics
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>was a
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>presupposed given.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-The form of the Old Metaphysics and its primitive terms were
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>not
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>determined by thinking (i.e. they were not determined by the
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>Science
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>of Logic itself) but instead its modus operandi was given
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>prior to
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>the exercise of thinking.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>As a consequence of being given its form prior to its
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>exercise,
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>the
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>product of this type of reasoning cannot generate any new
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>content,
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>instead this inheretly formal type of reasoning must be
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>supplied
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>with an externally given content (for which the form is then
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>applied
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>to)
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>The product (and truth) then of this type of reasoning can
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>only
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>result in its operations being in conformity to its
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>antecedently
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>given form (i.e. its interally consistant identity with
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>itself).
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>This means that the Old Metaphysics was limited to analytic
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>results.
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>[Hegel]
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>"...We must look more closely into the procedure of that old
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>metaphysic. In the first place it never went beyond the
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>province
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>of
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>the analytic understanding. Without preliminary inquiry it
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>adopted
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>the abstract categories of thought and let them rank as
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>predicates
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>of truth..." (EL p.48 para 28)
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Hegel suggests above that...
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-the Old Metaphysics never went beyond the analytic
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>understanding
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-One mode of the analytic understanding in which the Old
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>Metaphysics
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>used was to assign predicates to the object of cognition.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>[Hegel]
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>"It was therefore the main question of the pre-Kantian
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>metaphysic to
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>discover whether predicates of the kind mentioned were to be
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>ascribed to its objects. Now these predicates are after all
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>only
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>limited formulae of the understanding which, instead of
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>expressing
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>the truth, merely impose a limit. More than this, it should be
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>noted
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>that the chief feature of the method lay in `assigning' or
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>`attributing' predicates to the object that was to be
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>cognised,
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>for
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>example, to God. But attribution is no more than an external
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>reflection about the object: the predicates by which the
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>object is
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>to be determined are supplied from the resources of picture-
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>thought,
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>and are applied in a mechanical way. Whereas, if we are to
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>have
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>genuine cognition, the object must characterise its own self
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>and
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>not
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>derive its predicates from without. (EL p.50 para 28)
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>------------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Hegel suggests above that...
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-More than expressing the truth, this method of assigning
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>predicates
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>to the object of cognition merely imposed a limit on the
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>object.
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>-The attribution of these predicates was no more than an
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>external
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>reflection about the object
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-the predicates by which the object was to be determined in
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>this
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>method were supplied from the resources of picture-thought and
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>were
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>applied in a mechanical way.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Hegel then contrasts this merely external application of
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>predicates,
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>with what he calls genuine cognition in which the object
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>characterizes its own self.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>--------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>[Hegel]
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>--------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>"Even supposing we follow the method of predicating, the mind
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>cannot
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>help feeling that predicates of this sort fail to exhaust the
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>object. From the same point of view the Orientals are quite
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>correct
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>in calling God the many-named or the myriad-named One. One
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>after
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>another of these finite categories leaves the soul
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>unsatisfied,
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>and
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>the Oriental sage is compelled unceasingly to seek for more
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>and
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>more
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>of such predicates. In finite things it is no doubt the case
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>that
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>they have to be characterised through finite predicates: and
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>with
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>these things the understanding finds proper scope for its
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>special
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>action. Itself finite, it knows only the nature of the
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>finite...But
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>the objects of reason cannot be defined by these finite
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>predicates.
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>To try to do so was the defect of the old metaphysic."(EL p.50
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>para
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>28)
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>--------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Hegel suggests above that...
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-Even if we dogmatically accept the above method of
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>predicating,
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>it
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>seems to leave us unsatisfied.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-Especially when we consider the Absolute, because it seems
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>that
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>even an infinite number of predicates could not satisfy the
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>term.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Now, even though he clearly outlines the limitations of this
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>form of
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>assigning predicates in the Introduction of the EL, Hegel does
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>pay
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>some positive lip service to this form in the Preface to the
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>PhG :
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>----------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>[Hegel] Preface to the Phenomenology
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>---------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>"The need to represent the Absolute as Subject has found
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>expression
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>in the propositions: God is the eternal, the moral world-
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>order,
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>love, and so on. In such propositions the True is only posited
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>immediately as Subject, but is not presented as the movement
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>of
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>reflecting itself into itself. In a proposition of this kind
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>one
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>begins with the word 'God'. This by itself is a meaningless
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>sound, a
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>mere name; it is only the predicate that says what God is,
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>gives
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>Him
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>content and meaning. Only in the end of the proposition does
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>the
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>empty beginning become actual knowledge. This being so, it is
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>not
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>clear why one does not speak merely of the eternal, of the
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>moral
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>world-order, and so on, or, as the ancients did, of pure
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>notions
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>like `being', `the One', and so on, in short, of that which
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>gives
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>meaning without adding the meaningless sound as well. But it
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>is
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>just
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>this word that indicates that what is posited is not a being
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>[i.e.
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>something that merely is], or essence, or a universal in
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>general,
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>but rather something that is reflected into itself, a Subject.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>But
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>at the same time this is only anticipated. The subject is
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>assumed as
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>a fixed point to which, as their support, the predicates are
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>affixed
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>by a movement belonging to the knower of this Subject, and
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>which
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>is
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>not regarded as belonging to the fixed point itself; yet it is
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>only
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>through this movement that the content could be represented as
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Subject. The way in which this movement has been brought about
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>is
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>such that it cannot belong to the fixed point; yet, after this
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>point
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>has been presupposed, the nature of the movement cannot really
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>be
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>other than what it is, it can only be external. Hence, the
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>mere
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>anticipation that the Absolute is Subject is not only not the
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>actuality of this Notion, but it even makes the actuality
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>impossible; for the anticipation posits the subject as an
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>inert
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>point, whereas actuality is self-movement." (Hegel, PhG trans.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Miller p. 12-13 para. 23)
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>------------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Hegel suggests above that...
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-The speculative form (i.e. the concept that unfolds
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>immanently as
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Subject) was in some ways anticipated by the propositional
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>form
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>(i.e. the method of assigning predicates to the object of
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>cognition)
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-the meaning of "the subject of the proposition" (e.g. God) is
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>only
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>revealed through the mediation of the predicates (e.g. God is
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>love,
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>God is the eternal, etc...).
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>In this way the meaning of "the subject of the proposition" is
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>never
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>an immediacy, but instead involves a movement (or development)
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>that
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>represents a reflection into "the subject of the proposition".
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>[At the same time,]
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-this propositional form is *only* an anticipation of the
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>speculative form because the predicates are merely affixed to
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>"the
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>subject of the proposition" by an external source (i.e. the
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>knower).
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>In addition to being merely formal, and external, there is an
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>additional limitation inherent in the propositional form:
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>The propositional form first posits an inert point (i.e. "the
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>subject of the proposition", e.g. `God'), and it is claimed
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>that
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>nothing is known about this inert point until the predicates
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>are
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>affixed.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>However as we will see below, Hegel makes an argument that
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>this
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>posited "inert point" is always loaded with the meanings
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>imported
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>from "common conception".
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>----------------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>[Hegel] EL: First Attitude To Objectivity
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>---------------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>"In the second place, the metaphysical systems adopted a wrong
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>criterion. Their objects were no doubt totalities which in
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>their
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>own
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>proper selves belong to reason that is, to the organised and
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>systematically developed universe of thought. But these
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>totalities
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>--
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>God, the Soul, the World -- were taken by the metaphysician as
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>subjects made and ready, to form the basis for an
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>application of
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>the
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>categories of the understanding. They were assumed from
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>popular
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>conception. Accordingly popular conception was the only canon
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>for
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>settling whether or not the predicates were suitable and
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>sufficient.
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>The common conceptions of God, the Soul, the World, may be
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>supposed
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>to afford thought a firm and fast footing. They do not
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>really do
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>so.
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Besides having a particular and subjective character
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>clinging to
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>them, and thus leaving room for great variety of
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>interpretation,
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>>>>>they themselves first of all require a firm and fast
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>definition by
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>thought." (Hegel, EL p. 50-51 para 30)
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>------------------
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Hegel suggests above that...
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-the objects of the old Metaphysics (e.g. God, the Soul, the
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>World)
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>were (to a large extent) pre-formulated by common conception.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-The pre-formulations of common conception acted as the basis
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>for an
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>application of the logical categories (as predicates).
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>-These pre-formulations also acted as the criteria for whether
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>or
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>not the categories predicated were suitable or not to be
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>applied
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>to
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>"the subject of the proposition".
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>That's all for today folks. I am looking forward to having
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>some
      >>>
      >>>
      >>>>>time
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>to post this month. I should have a least one quality post to
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>give
      >>>>
      >>>>
      >>>>>>>>>you guys. Unfortunately I have had only limited time recently
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>for my
      >>>>>
      >>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Hegel studies.
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Happy 4th of July,
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>
      >>>>>>>>>Randall
      >>>>>>>>>


      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • stephen theron
      Dear Beat, Thank you for replying. To start at the end, of course I agree that true mysticism is sublated in Hegel s speculative thinking or in such similar
      Message 35 of 35 , Jul 22, 2010
        Dear Beat,

        Thank you for replying.
        To start at the end, of course I agree that true mysticism is sublated in Hegel's speculative thinking or in such similar "thinking" as any of us might engage in ("consciousness" might be a better word, volition after all being included as even a superior category to "cognition proper").
        I see the point about the dualism of content and "form". However, is it not evaded simply by reading and thinking "in a more perfect way or manner", avoiding the quasi-technical term, historically at least, "form"? Or is there still a dualism?

        That is, "the other way round" is actually the same. Mysticism is truly sublated in speculative philosophy. Why? Because mysticism is the search for the true and exact thinking of the absolute (or of absolutes, if that were possible). Everyone searches for this to some degree. This is Hegel's point about art and religion having the same Content. One might even say, thus meeting your point about a dualism, that they are not distinct "forms" of apprehending the content but even participate in philosophy. Thus, on the one hand we have Beethoven, a thinker, referring to music as a greater revelation (of the content) than philosophy (or religion), while we have Ricoeur and others stressing the essential figurativeness of any language whatever. Now the dialectic is, at least in appearance, a linguistic creation.

        On mysticism specifically one has often found it leading a marginal existence on the outer edges (or at the very centre) of an imposed "cataphatic" orthodoxy riddled, as it were, with figurative representations. These mystics, who speak maybe about "not thinking", have yet been, in their milieu, the most intensive thinkers of all, striving against the merely figurative and representational. So I see it anyhow.

        You find me "imaginative". Now this English word bears or can bear very much the sense of erfinderlich, as I hope I am in my philosophical writing and as Hegel certainly was. However, you more probably mean something like bildlich, if that is a word, or, as you say, "representational". I certainly wish and try to get beyond that, which of course need not mean that I make it a rule to exclude any such allusions from my texts, on the ground of the analogies of all reality and experience. This is human and right and it is easy to see when one is using an image or figure and when not.

        I cannot think mysticism is a mere moment in Hegel's thinking, though I maybe miss your intent here. I think he is a mystic through and through, a devotee, that is, of the Absolute. It is impressive that he could combine this with holding down something as finite as an academic position, and so triumphantly too. It also says a lot for the Prussia of that time.



        At present I am wrestling with the objection of another mystic, also an atheist, McTaggart, who thinks Hegel "erred" in including the processes of cognition, analytic and synthetic, as sub-categories, so to say, of the dialectic, since it is only perfect knowledge which Hegel intends as in fact the only available example (sic) of a category he has chosen, for good or ill, merely to call cognition (Erkenntniss, even, more specifically, the Idea of the True and then the Good, actually higher, an advance on True, in WL). He has to argue, therefore, that Volition can be derived without passing through Lehrsatz. I am trying, in the 31st chapter of my commentary or whatever, to show why I think this criticism cannot be right, despite insights behind it, and am hoping this will lead me to a deeper penetration of the whole thing. Any ideas?



        Anyhow, what is it I have not explained? why Hegel uses the word "mysticism" (I go on to say quite a lot about that)? something else? I don't quite get it. Maybe I don't quite see why you find my thinking unspeculative. Is it just because I have a bit of style? But so do you. And we need that, the aesthetic "moment". Do please put me right if you see some blindness. I know there is some, a lot, still. Domine, ut videam. I am not being ironical now. On my theory anyone can be called "Lord", mystical substitution if you like, which I find vindicated by Hegel's logic, I mean literally, i.e. mystically. I could quote hundreds of texts, literally (mystically?), but maybe you would say, have said, I quote unfairly.

        Once again, I am relieved you see Hegel as sublating mysticism. I got quite the opposite impression from the letter of yours to which I initially reacted some weeks ago.

        Sincerely,

        Stephen.








        To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
        From: greuterb@...
        Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2010 10:51:45 +0200
        Subject: Re: [hegel] the kernel of truth in mysticism





        Dear Stephen,

        You write:

        >Dear Beat,
        >
        >I mean that we should not centre our disagreements upon the mere word or term, "mysticism" (any more than the term "God"). Hegel clearly finds "mysticism", and, maybe less clearly, "God", to "mean very much the same" as speculative reason and the absolute respectively. "Very much the same" clearly implies that they are at least possibly not absolutely the same. But it also allows that they can be treated as the same, the former terms can be used for the latter without falsehood or fault. We have merely to understand one another's usage (surely most important for reading Hegel himself).
        >
        >I say this is trivial in the sense that this is not what philosophy is interested in, not in words but rather in what they are used to signify, the "content" (Hegel's term) of the discourse, so to say. He gives this term, indeed, a very extensive sense.
        >

        But with this you get exactly the reverse of what you have intended: You
        replace one word by another one without explaining anything. And also,
        with this you encourages and produces representational thinking
        (imagination) instead of speculative thinking and this is quite the
        reverse of Hegel's purpose.

        >If anything I would say that mysticism is a more extensive or generic concept than that of speculative philosophy, i.e. it includes it (as Hegel's "content", besides philosophy, includes religion and art, "worthy of the name" he would add in all three cases. Nonetheless philosophy remains the perfect form of this and maybe, why not, therefore, of "mysticism").
        >

        For me it is quite the other way round: (true) mysticism is sublated in
        Hegel's speculative thinking and "sublated" means here what he has
        explained several times with help of the German term "aufheben": it is
        'negated' and at the same time 'saved'. However, "to negate" is not only
        a question of a more "perfect form" but includes both, content and form,
        otherwise you presuppose a dualistic relation between the two giving
        rise to a mere rationalizing of mysticism. What 'mysticism' has become
        as a moment in Hegel's speculative thinking (and this is the result of
        sublation) we have to find out reading Hegel's philosophy.

        >I should think that quotations from Hegel, long or short, should first be used for understanding Hegel and for communicating that understanding. We would not get far there without them. But I agree that we should "think ourselves".
        >

        I wrote: "instead of making long quotations for proving something
        presupposed in the mind". I did NOT deny the relevance of quotations.
        They have to be "fair", that is, enough comprehensive.

        >There is of course a genuine question as to "true" mysticism, as you imply and I do not deny.
        >
        >Stephen.
        >

        Regards,
        Beat

        >To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
        >From: greuterb@...
        >Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2010 09:21:30 +0200
        >Subject: Re: [hegel] the kernel of truth in mysticism
        >
        >
        >Dear Stephen,
        >
        >You write:
        >
        >
        >>I agree with Beat's point of interpretation that if the validity of the abstractive understanding (Verstand) be denied then speculative reason (Vern�nft) would also become abstractive (i.e. become what had been denied), thus ceasing to be itself. Hegel's target here, it seems to me, is the supernaturalist mysticism (postulating an utter mystery) discussed very much in or just before his time (Fenelon etc.) in terms of the opposition of Nature and Grace. A kind of quietism is recommended (it's all in terms of "states of prayer") , "contemplatives" are, at a given stage, "meant to cease all thinking" (John of the Cross, cf. the medieval English Cloud of Unknowing). Thus apparent quietism is distinguished positively against a really useless quietism (Mme. Guyon) by those in the know.
        >>
        >>Not only is this not what Hegel, or philosophy, is discussing but he reacts against, condemns, such "rationalist" religiosity as not rational. It is based on a dualism and/or on common-sense realism re the finite and infinite. "Each thing is itself and not another thing", it assumes merely.
        >>
        >>Thus, firstly, in what is being cited repeatedly as a proof-text here, he distinguishes "speculative truth" from "what, in special connection with religious experience and doctrines, used to be called Mysticism" (Enc. 82 Zus., my stress). At the same time he says it "means very much the same" (as speculative truth) and this implies that there is or should be a form of "mysticism!" free from such rationalist or dualist error. That we might prefer not to call this mysticism is trivial, not germane.
        >>
        >>
        >>
        >
        >Your last sentence above I absolutely do not understand!
        >
        >Hegel says (according to your quotation) speculative reason or truth
        >"means very much the same" as mysticism. What does this mean? Does it
        >mean that the two are totally identical. But then why do we use two
        >different terms? So, I guess there must be also a difference between
        >(true) mysticism and speculative reason and only if we know also the
        >difference (or the opposite, or the contradiction) we know the meaning
        >of the two concepts. This at least is the procedure of Hegel's
        >speculative reason where he thinks the unity of the differences, of the
        >opposites, of the contradictions - as far as I understand it. So,
        >instead of making long quotations for proving something presupposed in
        >the mind we should think ourselves with help of Hegel's method instead
        >of thinking about his method and producing only identities.
        >
        >Regards,
        >Beat
        >
        >
        >
        >>So he says "the term... is at present used. as a rule, to designate what is mysterious and incomprehensible." So "one class" use it to denote the real and the true while for "another" it names "everything connected with superstition and deception". On this, he says, "we first of all remark that there is mystery in the mystical, only however for the understanding... ruled by... abstract identity; whereas the mystical, as synonymous with the speculative is the concrete unity of those propositions, which understanding only accepts in their spearation and opposition" (my stress). Perhaps the most representative instance of this is the identification of "the Absolute", in the final stages of dialectic, with "the unity of subjective and objective" he has mentioned in the ptrevious paragraph, while adding that this is still "one-sided" since they are "not merely identical but also distinct", i.e. Verstand still gets its due.
        >>
        >>He rejects leaving Mysticism "in its original utter mystery" as reprehensible conduct, the stance that "truth can only be won by renouncing thought". This and nothing else, is what was meant by "leading the reason captive", a metaphor derived from the Pauline paradox that Christ "led captivity captive". Yet reason, Hegel shows, is freedom, Christian or otherwise and so not subject to captivity. Reason, in natural transcendence of Nature, is ad opposita and not determinata ad unum. This is the possibility of (free or) rational judgment. It "consists in embracing within itself these opposites" etc. (Hegel).
        >>
        >>"Thus the reason-world may be equally styled mystical." That is all; "not however because thought cannot both reach and comprehend it, but merely because it lies beyond the compass of understanding", i.e. of Verstand (my stress).
        >>
        >>
        >>************************
        >>
        >>
        >>The later Middle Ages and early modern thought in consequence were dominated by voluntarism. This arose from the abstract separation of intellect and will as faculties and was not, therefore, exclusively theological. God indeed could as well will evil and absurdity as the Good and the True, such theologians all the same argued. Natural inclinations were treated as limitations upon such an abstractly ab-solute freedom, the purely voluntary. It is in line with such Ockhamist voluntarism when Kant declares that there is nothing in heaven and earth "good without qualification" save a good will. All this was a departure from the unitary vision of Aquinas, taught by Aristotle, for whom will (voluntas) was the inclination of intellect itself towards the understood good (this is brought out in the late discussion of will, in connection with God's will, Summa theol. I:
        >>
        >>Hegel returns to this forgotten insight (also retained by Leibniz in his way) when he derives will, the voluntary, from the inner necessity of demonstration, in the Lehrsatz, theorem. It is Intellect, as Idea, which is free, Freedom, such as all judgment . Absolute knowledge is determinative and free, as is, therefore, dialectical method as such. This is why freedom is Love, the affinity of all being or beings, the Notion. It is false therefore to take the equation of Spirit with Love as essentially irrational.
        >>
        >>We have here the inclusive transcendence (overlapping) of Verstand by Vern�nft. It is not suppressed. The next step should be critical analysis of precisely the transition here appealed to (Enc. 231-232).
        >>
        >>Stephen.
        >>
        >>
        >>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
        >>From: greuterb@...
        >>Date: Thu, 8 Jul 2010 18:25:04 +0200
        >>Subject: Re: [hegel] the kernel of truth in mysticism
        >>
        >>Dear Wil,
        >>
        >>You write:
        >>
        >>
        >>
        >>>ob,
        >>>
        >>>With all due respect, I think you have it wrong, or perhaps I am not
        >>>understanding you. Let's view the paragraph again, much simplified:
        >>>
        >>>(1) Speculative truth means very much the same as Mysticism.
        >>>
        >>>Except that:
        >>>
        >>>(2) The term Mysticism is what is mysterious and incomprehensible.
        >>>
        >>>(3) There is mystery in the mystical for the understanding which is
        >>>ruled by the principle of abstract identity;
        >>>
        >>>(3a) whereas the mystical as speculative is the concrete unity of
        >>>those propositions, which understanding only accepts in their
        >>>separation and opposition.
        >>>
        >>>(4) If those who recognise Mysticism as the highest truth are content
        >>>to leave it in its original utter mystery, their conduct only proves
        >>>that thinking means abstract identification, and that in their opinion
        >>>truth can only be won by renouncing thought by leading the reason
        >>>captive.
        >>>
        >>>(5) But, as we have seen, the abstract thinking of understanding is so
        >>>far from being either ultimate or stable, that it shows a perpetual
        >>>tendency to work its own dissolution and swing round into its opposite.
        >>>
        >>>Ergo:
        >>>- the mystical as speculative is concrete unity
        >>>- the abstract thinking of understanding only accepts separation and
        >>>opposition, but it shows a perpetual tendency, via the rationally
        >>>speculative, to work its own dissolution and swing round into its
        >>>opposite.
        >>>
        >>>Wil
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>I think your comment expresses the crucial point.
        >>
        >>I try to express it with my own words: There is no true speculative
        >>rationality without abstract thinking of the understanding. If one take
        >>speculative thinking as something for its own and beyond abstract
        >>thinking of the understanding then it becomes itself abstract
        >>identification and therefore "truth can only be won by renouncing
        >>thought, or as it is frequently expressed, by leading the reason
        >>captive" (ENC Logic, para 82, Addition ). If such an untrue speculative
        >>thinking is taken as the "highest truth of mysticism" then "it leaves it
        >>in its original utter mystery" (ENC Logic, para 82, Addition ).
        >>
        >>But this means also that in true speculative rationality mysticism must
        >>be included, not as its mere external rationalizing, but as a moment of
        >>the movement of the concept in a speculative or dialectic logic where
        >>"the mystical as speculative is [becomes] concrete unity". If this would
        >>not be the case there would be no absolute at all since something - the
        >>non-rational or unconscious - would be excluded and therefore
        >>rationality again would become an abstract one-sidedness and mere
        >>opposite. It is our task to show this inclusion by comprehending the
        >>movement of the concept in Hegel's Logic, that is, the concept of the
        >>activity of thought.
        >>
        >>Regards,
        >>Beat Greuter
        >>
        >>
        >>
        >>
        >>
        >>>-----Original Message-----
        >>>From: Robert Wallace <bob@...
        >>><mailto:bob%40robertmwallace.com>>
        >>>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        >>>Sent: Wed, Jul 7, 2010 11:37 am
        >>>Subject: [hegel] the kernel of truth in mysticism
        >>>
        >>>Hi Wil,
        >>>
        >>>You write:
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>>>What is truly mystical in mysticism is precisely what is not
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>rational, which is why the kernel of truth in mysticism when it is
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>thought in a speculative way (by us) prescinds from the mystical
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>its abstract mystery, and thus leaves us with "its opposite", which
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>is reason released from its (mystical) captivity.
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>Here is the full paragraph again, with sentences numbered for
        >>>
        >>>reference. You appear to be appealing to sentences 4 and 5, in
        >>>
        >>>particular.
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>>>(1) "Speculative truth, it may also be noted, means very much the
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>same as what, in special connexion with religious experience and
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>doctrines, used to be called Mysticism. (2) The term Mysticism is
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>at present used, as a rule, to designate what is mysterious and
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>incomprehensible: and in proportion as their general culture and
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>way of thinking vary, the epithet is applied by one class to denote
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>the real and the true, by another to name everything connected with
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>superstition and deception. (3) On which we first of all remark
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>that there is mystery in the mystical, only however for the
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>understanding which is ruled by the principle of abstract identity;
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>whereas the mystical, as synonymous with the speculative, is the
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>concrete unity of those propositions, which understanding only
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>accepts in their separation and opposition. (4) And if those who
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>recognise Mysticism as the highest truth are content to leave it in
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>its original utter mystery, their conduct only proves that for them
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>too, as well as for their antagonists, thinking means abstract
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>identification, and that in their opinion, therefore, truth can
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>only be won by renouncing thought, or as it is frequently
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>expressed, by leading the reason captive. (5) But, as we have seen,
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>the abstract thinking of understanding is so far from being either
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>ultimate or stable, that it shows a perpetual tendency to work its
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>own dissolution and swing round into its opposite. "
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>I agree that Hegel implies in 4 and 5 that (as you put it) "the kernel
        >>>
        >>>of truth in mysticism when it is thought in a speculative way (by us)
        >>>
        >>>prescinds from the mystical its abstract mystery."
        >>>
        >>>However, when Hegel refers to "its opposite," in 5, he is describing
        >>>
        >>>what happens to the "abstract thinking of understanding," due to its
        >>>
        >>>being neither ultimate nor stable. It "swings around into its
        >>>
        >>>opposite," which must refer to mysticism _as mystery_. The abstract
        >>>
        >>>understanding and mystery, Hegel says, are two sides of the same coin.
        >>>
        >>>He is _not_ saying (as you say he is) that _reason_ is the "opposite"
        >>>
        >>>of the mystical. The topic of sentence 5 is not reason, but the
        >>>
        >>>abstract understanding. The _abstract understanding_ is the
        >>>
        >>>"opposite," Hegel says in 5, of the mystical. (More specifically, it's
        >>>
        >>>the opposite of the mystical left "in its mystery.")
        >>>
        >>>As for the "captivity" of reason, Hegel ascribes this not to mysticism
        >>>
        >>>as such but to those who are content to leave mysticism "in its
        >>>
        >>>original utter mystery" (sentence 4).
        >>>
        >>>Thus Hegel does not say or imply that (as you put it) "what is truly
        >>>
        >>>mystical in mysticism is what is not rational." What he discusses in
        >>>
        >>>sentences 4 and 5 is not mysticism as such, but "mystery" on the one
        >>>
        >>>hand (which he presents as one possible interpretation of "the
        >>>
        >>>mystical"), and abstract understanding, on the other.
        >>>
        >>>It's clear that Hegel doesn't regard "mystery" as the kernel of truth
        >>>
        >>>in mysticism. He gives that role, in sentence 3, to "the mystical as
        >>>
        >>>synonymous with the speculative," which is to say, for Hegel, the
        >>>
        >>>truly rational. Having said this, he can hardly treat the mystical, as
        >>>
        >>>such, as the "opposite" of reason.
        >>>
        >>>Best, Bob
        >>>
        >>>On Jul 7, 2010, at 10:14 AM, eupraxis@...
        >>><mailto:eupraxis%40aol.com> wrote:
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>>Bob,
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>You are using (abusing?) Hegel to justify a mode of thinking that
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>Hegel, in fact, does _not_ advocate in his writing, as a way to
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>bolster your own mystical prejudices (which you are more than free
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>to have), and alleging in the same breath that any reading of Hegel,
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>and of this section in particular, is denying everyone his freedom.
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>This is a sophomoric way of 'arguing' that just doesn't do.
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>It is clear to me, at least, that Hegel performs the same dialectal
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>prescinding of the fabulous and pictorial (the irrational) from
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>mysticism as he does for God elsewhere, for example at the end of
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>the Phenomenology. The tendentious use of the word "abusing" for the
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>modern critical attitude towards things unreal smacks of a
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>reactionary and backwards leaning regard for free thought, not the
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>contrary.
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>Let's look at that paragraph again:
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>"Speculative truth, it may also be noted, means very much the same
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>as what, in special connexion with religious experience and
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>doctrines, used to be called Mysticism. The term Mysticism is at
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>present used, as a rule, to designate what is mysterious and
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>incomprehensible: and in proportion as their general culture and way
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>of thinking vary, the epithet is applied by one class to denote the
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>real and the true, by another to name everything connected with
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>superstition and deception. On which we first of all remark that
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>there is mystery in the mystical, only however for the understanding
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>which is ruled by the principle of abstract identity; whereas the
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>mystical, as synonymous with the speculative, is the concrete unity
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>of those propositions, which understanding only accepts in their
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>separation and opposition. And if those who recognise Mysticism as
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>the highest truth are content to leave it in its original utter
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>mystery, their conduct only proves that for them too, as well as for
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>their antagonists, thinking means abstract identification, and that
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>in their opinion, therefore, truth can only be won by renouncing
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>thought, or as it is frequently expressed, by leading the reason
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>captive. But, as we have seen, the abstract thinking of
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>understanding is so far from being either ultimate or stable, that
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>it shows a perpetual tendency to work its own dissolution and swing
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>round into its opposite. "
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>What is truly mystical in mysticism is precisely what is not
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>rational, which is why the kernel of truth in mysticism when it is
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>thought in a speculative way (by us) prescinds from the mystical its
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>abstract mystery, and thus leaves us with "its opposite", which is
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>reason released from its (mystical) captivity.
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>Best,
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>Wil
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>-----Original Message-----
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>From: Robert Wallace <bob@...
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>><mailto:bob%40robertmwallace.com>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>Sent: Wed, Jul 7, 2010 9:20 am
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>Subject: Re: [hegel] Speculative Logic comprehended with Analytic
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>Logic
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>Hi Wil,
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>Maybe you can explain what's silly about it? Taking it together with
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>the sentence that precedes it, which explains what
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>"criterion" (namely, what conception of freedom) I'm referring to.
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>Best, Bob
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>On Jul 7, 2010, at 9:11 AM, eupraxis@...
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>><mailto:eupraxis%40aol.com> wrote:
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>>>Dear Bob,
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>You wrote: "The modern habit of abusing what is "pre-modern" (what
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>is "mystical" or "metaphysical") is precisely un-free, by this
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>criterion."
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>With all due respect, Bob, that is a silly bit of logic, if ever I
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>heard one.
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>Wil
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>-----Original Message-----
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>From: Robert Wallace <bob@...
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>><mailto:bob%40robertmwallace.com>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>>>To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>Sent: Wed, Jul 7, 2010 9:02 am
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>Subject: Re: [hegel] Speculative Logic comprehended with Analytic
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>Logic
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>Dear Beat,
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>You write:
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>It seemed to me that your reply to Randall does approve
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>Paul's argumentation. If this is true then I would indeed doubt
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>whether
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>you already have found "what is rationally true in mysticism".
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>I don't think I made any reference to Paul's argumentation. I
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>confined
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>myself to criticizing Randall's one-line interpretation of Hegel's
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>paragraph.
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>it requires a clear and logically sound argumentation
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>based on Hegel's text, otherwise, the "broader world" instead of
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>being
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>"liberated from some of its unproductive habits of thought" will
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>be
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>confirmed once more that Hegel is a mystic and metaphysician
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>without
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>any
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>rational basis.
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>If the larger world actually reads what I write, they will see that
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>it's about nothing but "rational basis." But I object strongly to
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>the
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>assumption that mysticism is always non-rational. Hegel himself
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>suggests in the paragraph we're discussing that mysticism in one
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>sense
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>is "synonymous with the speculative." I likewise object to the
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>assumption that "metaphysics" is without rational basis. These are
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>simply unexamined prejudices promoted by people who find it
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>convenient
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>to dismiss whole regions of human experience and cognitive effort
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>with
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>simple terms of abuse, so as to make their own cognitive projects
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>look
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>good by contrast with this supposedly "irrational" stuff.
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>If Hegel teaches us anything, it should be that to be free, to be
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>"with oneself in the other," one must seriously try to understand
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>the
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>"other." The modern habit of abusing what is "pre-modern" (what is
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>"mystical" or "metaphysical") is precisely un-free, by this
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>criterion.
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>Hegel doesn't do it, and neither will we if we want to be free.
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>Best, Bob
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>On Jul 7, 2010, at 7:47 AM, Beat Greuter wrote:
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>Dear Bob,
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>You write:
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>Dear Beat,
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>It seems to me that I've given a more detailed interpretation of
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>this
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>Hegel paragraph than you have, so far. As for the final
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>sentence on
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>mysticism's "original utter mystery," I commented on that in
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>replying
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>to Wil (under "Greater Reality Achieved..."). I said that like
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>Plato
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>and his followers (including as it seems to me, Hegel), I am
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>interesting in identifying what is rationally true in
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>mysticism, by
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>which it ceases to be a "mystery."
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>Best, Bob
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>I did not want to give an interpretation of this Hegel text on
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>mysticism, understanding and the speculative cited by Paul
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>Trejo. I
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>also
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>agree with your intention 'to identify what is rationally true in
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>mysticism, by which it ceases to be a "mystery" '. However,
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>Randall
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>has
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>noticed a contradiction between Paul's quotation and previous mail
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>about
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>the dialectic of love at which I wrote a reply arguing against
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>this
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>kind
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>of conclusions. It seemed to me that your reply to Randall does
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>approve
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>Paul's argumentation. If this is true then I would indeed doubt
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>whether
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>you already have found "what is rationally true in mysticism".
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>In a
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>subsequent mail you write:
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>'I think specialists in Hegel have a duty to try to convey to the
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>broader world how Hegel's style of thinking can liberate it from
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>some
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>of its unproductive habits of thought. My paper was an effort to
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>do
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>that, with regard to "consciousness." '
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>This intention I certainly appreciate and your paper may help to
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>achieve
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>it. Nevertheless, it requires a clear and logically sound
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>argumentation
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>based on Hegel's text, otherwise, the "broader world" instead of
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>being
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>"liberated from some of its unproductive habits of thought" will
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>be
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>confirmed once more that Hegel is a mystic and metaphysician
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>without
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>any
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>rational basis.
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>Regards,
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>Beat
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>On Jul 5, 2010, at 5:08 AM, Beat Greuter wrote:
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>Dear Bob,
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>You write:
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>Dear Randall,
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>You write that:
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>t is impossible to reveal Hegel's concept of Love with
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>analytical
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>logic for the same reasons that Paul has outlined above about
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>why
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>analytical logic will necessarly find mysticism instead of
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>self-
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>determining logic.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>But what Hegel actually says in our paragraph is that the Pure
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Understanding will find
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>Mystery
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>in the Mystical.
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>While by contrast
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>the Mystical, _as synonymous
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>with the Speculative_ [emphasis added], is
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>the concrete unity of those propositions
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>which the Pure Understanding only accepts
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>in their separation and opposition."
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>That is, the Understanding sees mystery in the mystical, while
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>speculative Reason sees speculative concrete unity in the
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>mystical.
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>In
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>other words, the mystical is speculative concrete unity. But
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>speculative concrete unity is (I submit) self-determining
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>logic.
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>Thus,
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>the mystical is self-determining logic.
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>Best, Bob W
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>I think this is a game with words which neither makes clear the
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>idea
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>of
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>the mystical nor the idea of the self-determing logic. This kind
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>of
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>abstract identification - as Randall suggests - does certainly
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>not
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>exceed the realm of the understanding and its analytical
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>procedure.
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>When
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>Hegel did the same then only in the discussion of the
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>preliminary
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>notion
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>or in a remark (� 82 of the Encyclopaedia Logic belongs to both)
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>what
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>for Hegel - as you know - is located in the forecourt of
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>philosophy.
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>Nevertheless, you should also read the subsequent sentence of
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>Paul's
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>quotation in � 82, Addition of the ENC Logic:
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>"And if those who recognise Mysticism as the highest truth are
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>content
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>to leave it in its original utter mystery, their conduct only
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>proves
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>that for them too, as well as for their antagonists, thinking
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>means
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>abstract identification, and that in their opinion, therefore
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>truth
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>can
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>only be won by renouncing thought, or as it is frequently
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>expressed,
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>by
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>leading the reason captive." (translated by William Wallace)
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>Regards,
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>Beat
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>On Jul 4, 2010, at 4:29 PM, TheJack wrote:
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Dear list,
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>I actually agree with Paul here. It is an excellent post by
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>him.
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>--- In hegel@yahoogroups.com
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>><mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>, Paul Trejo <petrejo@...> wrote:
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>Dear Robert Wallace,
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>When discussing definitions of mysticism, it is useful
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>to examine Hegel's definition in his ENCYCLOPEDIA LOGIC.
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>Hegel says,
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>"The term Mysticism is at present
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>used, as a rule, to designate what
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>is mysterious and incomprehensible:
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>and in proportion as their general
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>culture and way of thinking vary,
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>the epithet is applied by one class
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>to denote the real and the true, and
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>by another class to name everything
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>connected with superstition and
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>deception. On which we first of all
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>remark, however, that there is Mystery
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>in the Mystical only for the Pure
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>Understanding, which is ruled by the
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>principle of abstract identity [A=A].
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>Whereas the Mystical, as synonymous
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>with the Speculative [synthetic], is
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>the concrete unity of those propositions
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>which the Pure Understanding only accepts
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>in their separation and opposition."
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>(Hegel, ENC LOGIC, para. 82)
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>Hegel uses the term, "Pure Understanding," in
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>Immanuel Kant's sense - the contrast to "Pure
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>Reason." The principle of Analytic Logic is the
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>principle of identity, [A=A], and Hegel says this
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>is the principle 'of the "Pure Understanding".
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>Analytic Logic is contrasted by Synthetic Logic
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>(aka Speculative Logic, aka Dialectical Logic).
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>It is a different orientation of Logic, so when
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>Synthetic Logic produces a formula, Analytic
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>Logic is likely to regard that as Mysticism.
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Again, I agree with almost everything Paul has to say above
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>about
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>the confusion that can arise when one tries to use analytic
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>logic to
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>comprehend speculative logic.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Yet, as Beat pointed out last week, Paul tried to use a type
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>of
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>analytic reasoning (i.e. propositional logic) to comprehend
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>Hegel's
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>concept of Love just a few weeks ago.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>And of course it is impossible to reveal Hegel's concept of
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>Love
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>with analytical logic for the same reasons that Paul has
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>outlined
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>above about why analytical logic will necessarly find
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>mysticism
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>instead of self-determining logic.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Hegel's concept of Love only reveals itself speculatively.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>And apparently, Paul already knows this, but then why do we
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>have
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>this statement below by him?:
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>[Paul]
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>Dear Hegel List,
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>Actually, Hegel is very plain - very explicit - about the
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>nature
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>of Love.
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>Love is DIALECTICAL. Hegel's scientific description of
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>Love is
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>offered in his lectures on the philosophy of religion (1818
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>-1831). Some salient points include:
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>(1) Love is dialectical
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>(2) Love is the two that become one; and the one that
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>remains
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>two
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>(3) Love is the sublation of the Negative
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>(4) Spirit is the sublation of the Negative
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>(5) Thus, Love is Spirit, and Spirit is Love
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>(6) Thus, God is Spirit, and God is Love
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>(7) Thus, Love is God
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>[Beat]
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>Even if this is only an enumeration of salient points on
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>love,
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>spirit and God in Hegel's philosophy of religion I cannot
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>allow
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>your formally and substantially incorrect argumentation to
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>rest.
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>Hegel did certainly not propound such sequences in his
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>lectures
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>(or have you a precise quotation?).
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Hegel outlines precisely the limitations of such a
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>propositional
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>method in several places.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>----------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>[Hegel] EL: First Attitude To Objectivity
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>----------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>"It was the general assumption of this metaphysic that a
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>knowledge
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>of the Absolute was gained by assigning predicates to it. It
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>neither
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>inquired what the terms of the understanding specially meant
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>or
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>what
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>they were worth, nor did it test the method which
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>characterizes
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>the
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Absolute by the assignment of predicates..." (Hegel, EL trans.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Wallace p.48 para 28)
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-----------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Above Hegel suggest that...
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-the form of reason (i.e. the method) for the old Metaphysics
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>was a
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>presupposed given.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-The form of the Old Metaphysics and its primitive terms were
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>not
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>determined by thinking (i.e. they were not determined by the
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>Science
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>of Logic itself) but instead its modus operandi was given
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>prior to
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>the exercise of thinking.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>As a consequence of being given its form prior to its
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>exercise,
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>the
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>product of this type of reasoning cannot generate any new
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>content,
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>instead this inheretly formal type of reasoning must be
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>supplied
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>with an externally given content (for which the form is then
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>applied
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>to)
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>The product (and truth) then of this type of reasoning can
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>only
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>result in its operations being in conformity to its
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>antecedently
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>given form (i.e. its interally consistant identity with
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>itself).
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>This means that the Old Metaphysics was limited to analytic
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>results.
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>[Hegel]
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>"...We must look more closely into the procedure of that old
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>metaphysic. In the first place it never went beyond the
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>province
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>of
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>the analytic understanding. Without preliminary inquiry it
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>adopted
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>the abstract categories of thought and let them rank as
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>predicates
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>of truth..." (EL p.48 para 28)
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Hegel suggests above that...
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-the Old Metaphysics never went beyond the analytic
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>understanding
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-One mode of the analytic understanding in which the Old
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>Metaphysics
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>used was to assign predicates to the object of cognition.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>[Hegel]
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>"It was therefore the main question of the pre-Kantian
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>metaphysic to
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>discover whether predicates of the kind mentioned were to be
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>ascribed to its objects. Now these predicates are after all
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>only
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>limited formulae of the understanding which, instead of
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>expressing
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>the truth, merely impose a limit. More than this, it should be
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>noted
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>that the chief feature of the method lay in `assigning' or
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>`attributing' predicates to the object that was to be
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>cognised,
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>for
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>example, to God. But attribution is no more than an external
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>reflection about the object: the predicates by which the
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>object is
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>to be determined are supplied from the resources of picture-
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>thought,
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>and are applied in a mechanical way. Whereas, if we are to
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>have
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>genuine cognition, the object must characterise its own self
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>and
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>not
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>derive its predicates from without. (EL p.50 para 28)
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>------------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Hegel suggests above that...
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-More than expressing the truth, this method of assigning
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>predicates
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>to the object of cognition merely imposed a limit on the
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>object.
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-The attribution of these predicates was no more than an
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>external
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>reflection about the object
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-the predicates by which the object was to be determined in
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>this
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>method were supplied from the resources of picture-thought and
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>were
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>applied in a mechanical way.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Hegel then contrasts this merely external application of
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>predicates,
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>with what he calls genuine cognition in which the object
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>characterizes its own self.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>--------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>[Hegel]
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>--------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>"Even supposing we follow the method of predicating, the mind
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>cannot
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>help feeling that predicates of this sort fail to exhaust the
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>object. From the same point of view the Orientals are quite
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>correct
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>in calling God the many-named or the myriad-named One. One
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>after
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>another of these finite categories leaves the soul
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>unsatisfied,
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>and
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>the Oriental sage is compelled unceasingly to seek for more
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>and
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>more
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>of such predicates. In finite things it is no doubt the case
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>that
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>they have to be characterised through finite predicates: and
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>with
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>these things the understanding finds proper scope for its
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>special
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>action. Itself finite, it knows only the nature of the
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>finite...But
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>the objects of reason cannot be defined by these finite
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>predicates.
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>To try to do so was the defect of the old metaphysic."(EL p.50
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>para
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>28)
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>--------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Hegel suggests above that...
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-Even if we dogmatically accept the above method of
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>predicating,
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>it
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>seems to leave us unsatisfied.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-Especially when we consider the Absolute, because it seems
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>that
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>even an infinite number of predicates could not satisfy the
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>term.
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Now, even though he clearly outlines the limitations of this
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>form of
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>assigning predicates in the Introduction of the EL, Hegel does
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>pay
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>some positive lip service to this form in the Preface to the
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>PhG :
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>----------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>[Hegel] Preface to the Phenomenology
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>---------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>"The need to represent the Absolute as Subject has found
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>expression
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>in the propositions: God is the eternal, the moral world-
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>order,
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>love, and so on. In such propositions the True is only posited
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>immediately as Subject, but is not presented as the movement
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>of
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>reflecting itself into itself. In a proposition of this kind
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>one
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>begins with the word 'God'. This by itself is a meaningless
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>sound, a
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>mere name; it is only the predicate that says what God is,
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>gives
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>Him
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>content and meaning. Only in the end of the proposition does
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>the
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>empty beginning become actual knowledge. This being so, it is
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>not
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>clear why one does not speak merely of the eternal, of the
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>moral
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>world-order, and so on, or, as the ancients did, of pure
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>notions
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>like `being', `the One', and so on, in short, of that which
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>gives
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>meaning without adding the meaningless sound as well. But it
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>is
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>just
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>this word that indicates that what is posited is not a being
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>[i.e.
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>something that merely is], or essence, or a universal in
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>general,
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>but rather something that is reflected into itself, a Subject.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>But
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>at the same time this is only anticipated. The subject is
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>assumed as
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>a fixed point to which, as their support, the predicates are
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>affixed
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>by a movement belonging to the knower of this Subject, and
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>which
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>is
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>not regarded as belonging to the fixed point itself; yet it is
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>only
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>through this movement that the content could be represented as
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Subject. The way in which this movement has been brought about
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>is
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>such that it cannot belong to the fixed point; yet, after this
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>point
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>has been presupposed, the nature of the movement cannot really
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>be
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>other than what it is, it can only be external. Hence, the
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>mere
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>anticipation that the Absolute is Subject is not only not the
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>actuality of this Notion, but it even makes the actuality
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>impossible; for the anticipation posits the subject as an
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>inert
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>point, whereas actuality is self-movement." (Hegel, PhG trans.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Miller p. 12-13 para. 23)
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>------------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Hegel suggests above that...
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-The speculative form (i.e. the concept that unfolds
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>immanently as
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Subject) was in some ways anticipated by the propositional
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>form
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>(i.e. the method of assigning predicates to the object of
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>cognition)
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-the meaning of "the subject of the proposition" (e.g. God) is
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>only
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>revealed through the mediation of the predicates (e.g. God is
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>love,
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>God is the eternal, etc...).
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>In this way the meaning of "the subject of the proposition" is
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>never
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>an immediacy, but instead involves a movement (or development)
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>that
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>represents a reflection into "the subject of the proposition".
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>[At the same time,]
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-this propositional form is *only* an anticipation of the
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>speculative form because the predicates are merely affixed to
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>"the
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>subject of the proposition" by an external source (i.e. the
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>knower).
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>In addition to being merely formal, and external, there is an
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>additional limitation inherent in the propositional form:
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>The propositional form first posits an inert point (i.e. "the
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>subject of the proposition", e.g. `God'), and it is claimed
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>that
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>nothing is known about this inert point until the predicates
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>are
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>affixed.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>However as we will see below, Hegel makes an argument that
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>this
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>posited "inert point" is always loaded with the meanings
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>imported
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>from "common conception".
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>----------------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>[Hegel] EL: First Attitude To Objectivity
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>---------------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>"In the second place, the metaphysical systems adopted a wrong
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>criterion. Their objects were no doubt totalities which in
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>their
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>own
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>proper selves belong to reason that is, to the organised and
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>systematically developed universe of thought. But these
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>totalities
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>--
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>God, the Soul, the World -- were taken by the metaphysician as
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>subjects made and ready, to form the basis for an
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>application of
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>the
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>categories of the understanding. They were assumed from
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>popular
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>conception. Accordingly popular conception was the only canon
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>for
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>settling whether or not the predicates were suitable and
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>sufficient.
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>The common conceptions of God, the Soul, the World, may be
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>supposed
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>to afford thought a firm and fast footing. They do not
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>really do
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>so.
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Besides having a particular and subjective character
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>clinging to
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>them, and thus leaving room for great variety of
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>interpretation,
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>they themselves first of all require a firm and fast
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>definition by
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>thought." (Hegel, EL p. 50-51 para 30)
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>------------------
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Hegel suggests above that...
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-the objects of the old Metaphysics (e.g. God, the Soul, the
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>World)
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>were (to a large extent) pre-formulated by common conception.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-The pre-formulations of common conception acted as the basis
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>for an
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>application of the logical categories (as predicates).
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>-These pre-formulations also acted as the criteria for whether
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>or
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>not the categories predicated were suitable or not to be
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>applied
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>to
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>"the subject of the proposition".
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>That's all for today folks. I am looking forward to having
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>some
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>
        >>>>>>time
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>to post this month. I should have a least one quality post to
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>give
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>you guys. Unfortunately I have had only limited time recently
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>for my
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Hegel studies.
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Happy 4th of July,
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>
        >>>>>>>>>>Randall
        >>>>>>>>>>

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