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Re: [hegel] B. Helm: Love, Friendship and the Self

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  • Beat Greuter
    The general meaning of love in Hegel s philosophy can only be grasped speculatively. It is the concept itself as the returning from its other to itself (see
    Message 1 of 8 , Jun 19, 2010
      The general meaning of love in Hegel's philosophy can only be grasped
      speculatively. It is the concept itself as the returning from its other
      to itself (see the beginning of the Subjective Logic), that is, the
      reconciliation of oppositions not being merely negated in an
      indeterminate and abstract identity but being recognized as moments in a
      further entity or coincidence. However, love in its particular meaning
      can achieve this reconciliation 'only' in an immediate form and thus its
      objectivity is most fragile. So, in Hegel's mature concept of the modern
      ethical life love has a quite specific determination and cannot be made
      responsible for the cohesion of the whole as it was the case in his
      early (theological) drafts of a superior ethical life grounded in an
      idealistic conception of the ancient Greek world.

      Regards,
      Beat


      Bruce Merrill writes:

      >
      >
      > There are also significant endorsements of Jesus' Love in Hegel's
      > so-called
      > "Early Theological Writings."
      >
      > Bruce M.
      >
      > On Fri, Jun 18, 2010 at 8:30 AM, Robert Wallace
      > <bob@... <mailto:bob%40robertmwallace.com>>wrote:
      >
      > > So can you give us a glimpse of what it's about? And can you see any
      > > relation to Hegel's treatment of love, say in The Science of Logic or
      > > the Phil of Right?
      > >
      > > Best, Bob
      > >
      > > On Jun 17, 2010, at 9:00 PM, Eric v.d. Luft, Ph.D., M.L.S. wrote:
      > >
      > > > One of the Young Hegelians, Karl Schmidt (1819-1864), wrote a book
      > > > called Liebesbriefe ohne Liebe (Love Letters Without Love) in 1846.
      > > > I'm
      > > > in the final phase of translating it into English. It should be
      > > > available on Amazon within a few months. I'll announce it here when
      > > > it's
      > > > ready: <http://www.gegensatzpress.com/loveletters.html>.
      > > >
      > > > Ça ira!
      > > >
      > > > Eric v.d. Luft, Ph.D., M.L.S.
      >

      >> Hello all,
      >>
      >> Are you interested in the nature of love? Hegel certainly is,
      >> following Plato and Aristotle. In fact Hegel speaks somewhere in a
      >> Zusatz of love as underlying the State.
      >>
      >> I've run across a new book that appears to follow in the footsteps of
      >> Plato, Aristotle and Hegel on this topic:
      >>
      >> Bennett Helm, _Love, Friendship, and the Self: Intimate Identification
      >> and the Sociality of Persons_ (Oxford U. Press, 2010).
      >>
      >> Reading bits of the book that are accessible through its listing on
      >> Amazon, we find that it describes "a new kind of freedom of action
      >> that is essentially interpersonal" (p. 303). (Meaning, of course, a
      >> kind of freedom of action that's not recognized by most familiar
      >> theories of freedom.)
      >>
      >> "The intimate identification at issue in love ought to be understood
      >> in terms of your having a concern for your beloved's identity that is
      >> the same in kind as your concern for your own identity" (p. 302).
      >>
      >> Helm rejects the theory that love is a "union" of two people into one.
      >> According to him, lovers continue each to be responsible for their own
      >> actions. But there is also a shared identity, and a shared
      >> responsibility. This interests me very much, because (a) I think it
      >> corresponds to my own experience of love, and also of friendship, and
      >> (b) it seems to correspond to what Plato, Aristotle and Hegel, and
      >> especially Hegel, are driving at in their descriptions of how we
      >> function.
      >>
      >> You've probably seen reference to the "sociality" of this and that, in
      >> interpretations of Hegel. Terry Pinkard uses the word, and Robert
      >> Brandom believes that according to Hegel's account of "recognition,"
      >> "to be a self...[is] to be recognized by those one recognizes" (Tales
      >> of the Mighty Dead, p. 217), and that according to Hegel, "man is not
      >> _objectively_ free." So what if a person is a solitary slave, in a
      >> society that denies her any recognition; is she then not a "self"? I
      >> can't buy this sort of social-constructivist theory, as I said in my
      >> book (where I gave a very different interpretation of the significance
      >> that Hegel attaches to "recognition").
      >>
      >> But neither am I attracted, on the other hand, to standard social
      >> atomist or rational egoist theories of human behavior, such as we see
      >> in Thomas Hobbes and in most theorizing in economics. They have no
      >> appreciation of the very intimate ways in which we can and do get
      >> involved with other individuals, in the family and elsewhere--ways
      >> that have very little resemblance to the "bargaining" that they
      >> suppose underlies all human relationships. Hegel is the only major
      >> modern philosopher who focuses on these intimate involvements. So I'm
      >> particularly interested in Bennett Helm's account because he seems,
      >> like Hegel, to aim to combine a robust sense of individual
      >> responsibility with a sophisticated sense of the intimate ways we can
      >> be involved with one another.
      >>
      >> Best, Bob W
      >


      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • Paul Trejo
      Dear Hegel List,   Actually, Hegel is very plain - very explicit - about the nature of Love. Love is DIALECTICAL.  Hegel s scientific description of Love is
      Message 2 of 8 , Jun 20, 2010
        Dear Hegel List,
         
        Actually, Hegel is very plain - very explicit - about the nature of Love.
        Love is DIALECTICAL.  Hegel's scientific description of Love is offered
        in his lectures on the philosophy of religion (1818-1831).  Some salient
        point include:
         
        (1) Love is dialectical
        (2) Love is the two that become one; and the one that remains two
        (3) Love is the sublation of the Negative
        (4) Spirit is the sublation of the Negative
        (5) Thus, Love is Spirit, and Spirit is Love
        (6) Thus, God is Spirit, and God is Love
        (7) Thus, Love is God
         
        Here is my ultra-brief commentary on Hegel's narrative on Love in his theological lectures:
         
        The dialectical (speculative) procedure of the Negative emerging quasi-organically from the Spirit, so that the Other is created from the Spirit, and then separated from the Spirit, and then the Other working its way back to the Spirit, traces the basic activity of the Spirit, which is the dialectic.  This is also the basic activity of human history.  It is also the basic activity of the individual.  We seek Love at a spiritual level because we wish to return to the Original Spirit from which we emerged.
         
        Hegel presents his lectures on religion in three phases: the abstract idea of religion; the empirical expression of different religions; the consummation of religion in the dialectical concept of the Trinity.  The operative concept of the Trinity is Love.
         
        FWIW, it was because of Hegel's dialectic of Divinity that I converted from atheism to Christianity.
         
        Best regards,
        --Paul Trejo, MA
         

        --- On Sat, 6/19/10, Beat Greuter <greuterb@...> wrote:


        From: Beat Greuter <greuterb@...>
        Subject: Re: [hegel] B. Helm: Love, Friendship and the Self
        To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
        Date: Saturday, June 19, 2010, 2:45 PM


         



        The general meaning of love in Hegel's philosophy can only be grasped
        speculatively. It is the concept itself as the returning from its other
        to itself (see the beginning of the Subjective Logic), that is, the
        reconciliation of oppositions not being merely negated in an
        indeterminate and abstract identity but being recognized as moments in a
        further entity or coincidence. However, love in its particular meaning
        can achieve this reconciliation 'only' in an immediate form and thus its
        objectivity is most fragile. So, in Hegel's mature concept of the modern
        ethical life love has a quite specific determination and cannot be made
        responsible for the cohesion of the whole as it was the case in his
        early (theological) drafts of a superior ethical life grounded in an
        idealistic conception of the ancient Greek world.

        Regards,
        Beat

        Bruce Merrill writes:

        >
        >
        > There are also significant endorsements of Jesus' Love in Hegel's
        > so-called
        > "Early Theological Writings."
        >
        > Bruce M.
        >
        > On Fri, Jun 18, 2010 at 8:30 AM, Robert Wallace
        > <bob@... <mailto:bob%40robertmwallace.com>>wrote:
        >
        > > So can you give us a glimpse of what it's about? And can you see any
        > > relation to Hegel's treatment of love, say in The Science of Logic or
        > > the Phil of Right?
        > >
        > > Best, Bob
        > >
        > > On Jun 17, 2010, at 9:00 PM, Eric v.d. Luft, Ph.D., M.L.S. wrote:
        > >
        > > > One of the Young Hegelians, Karl Schmidt (1819-1864), wrote a book
        > > > called Liebesbriefe ohne Liebe (Love Letters Without Love) in 1846.
        > > > I'm
        > > > in the final phase of translating it into English. It should be
        > > > available on Amazon within a few months. I'll announce it here when
        > > > it's
        > > > ready: <http://www.gegensatzpress.com/loveletters.html>.
        > > >
        > > > Ça ira!
        > > >
        > > > Eric v.d. Luft, Ph.D., M.L.S.
        >

        >> Hello all,
        >>
        >> Are you interested in the nature of love? Hegel certainly is,
        >> following Plato and Aristotle. In fact Hegel speaks somewhere in a
        >> Zusatz of love as underlying the State.
        >>
        >> I've run across a new book that appears to follow in the footsteps of
        >> Plato, Aristotle and Hegel on this topic:
        >>
        >> Bennett Helm, _Love, Friendship, and the Self: Intimate Identification
        >> and the Sociality of Persons_ (Oxford U. Press, 2010).
        >>
        >> Reading bits of the book that are accessible through its listing on
        >> Amazon, we find that it describes "a new kind of freedom of action
        >> that is essentially interpersonal" (p. 303). (Meaning, of course, a
        >> kind of freedom of action that's not recognized by most familiar
        >> theories of freedom.)
        >>
        >> "The intimate identification at issue in love ought to be understood
        >> in terms of your having a concern for your beloved's identity that is
        >> the same in kind as your concern for your own identity" (p. 302).
        >>
        >> Helm rejects the theory that love is a "union" of two people into one.
        >> According to him, lovers continue each to be responsible for their own
        >> actions. But there is also a shared identity, and a shared
        >> responsibility. This interests me very much, because (a) I think it
        >> corresponds to my own experience of love, and also of friendship, and
        >> (b) it seems to correspond to what Plato, Aristotle and Hegel, and
        >> especially Hegel, are driving at in their descriptions of how we
        >> function.
        >>
        >> You've probably seen reference to the "sociality" of this and that, in
        >> interpretations of Hegel. Terry Pinkard uses the word, and Robert
        >> Brandom believes that according to Hegel's account of "recognition,"
        >> "to be a self...[is] to be recognized by those one recognizes" (Tales
        >> of the Mighty Dead, p. 217), and that according to Hegel, "man is not
        >> _objectively_ free." So what if a person is a solitary slave, in a
        >> society that denies her any recognition; is she then not a "self"? I
        >> can't buy this sort of social-constructivist theory, as I said in my
        >> book (where I gave a very different interpretation of the significance
        >> that Hegel attaches to "recognition").
        >>
        >> But neither am I attracted, on the other hand, to standard social
        >> atomist or rational egoist theories of human behavior, such as we see
        >> in Thomas Hobbes and in most theorizing in economics. They have no
        >> appreciation of the very intimate ways in which we can and do get
        >> involved with other individuals, in the family and elsewhere--ways
        >> that have very little resemblance to the "bargaining" that they
        >> suppose underlies all human relationships. Hegel is the only major
        >> modern philosopher who focuses on these intimate involvements. So I'm
        >> particularly interested in Bennett Helm's account because he seems,
        >> like Hegel, to aim to combine a robust sense of individual
        >> responsibility with a sophisticated sense of the intimate ways we can
        >> be involved with one another.
        >>
        >> Best, Bob W
        >

        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]








        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      • Beat Greuter
        ... Even if this is only an enumeration of salient points on love, spirit and God in Hegel s philosophy of religion I cannot allow your formally and
        Message 3 of 8 , Jun 23, 2010
          Paul Trejo writes:

          >
          >
          > Dear Hegel List,
          >
          > Actually, Hegel is very plain - very explicit - about the nature of Love.
          > Love is DIALECTICAL. Hegel's scientific description of Love is offered
          > in his lectures on the philosophy of religion (1818-1831). Some salient
          > point include:
          >
          > (1) Love is dialectical
          > (2) Love is the two that become one; and the one that remains two
          > (3) Love is the sublation of the Negative
          > (4) Spirit is the sublation of the Negative
          > (5) Thus, Love is Spirit, and Spirit is Love
          > (6) Thus, God is Spirit, and God is Love
          > (7) Thus, Love is God
          >

          Even if this is only an enumeration of salient points on love, spirit
          and God in Hegel's philosophy of religion I cannot allow your formally
          and substantially incorrect argumentation to rest. Hegel did certainly
          not propound such sequences in his lectures (or have you a precise
          quotation?). In my opinion we have to be very careful in our
          argumentation and may not use false logical forms of conclusions: if
          love is x and spirit is x then love does not have to be identical to
          spirit. Also, the general term x remains totally abstract and does not
          add anything for explaining what love and spirit really are and what
          their difference may be. In fact, with this you destroy Hegel's subtle
          dialectical thinking.


          > Here is my ultra-brief commentary on Hegel's narrative on Love in his
          > theological lectures:
          >
          > The dialectical (speculative) procedure of the Negative emerging
          > quasi-organically from the Spirit, so that the Other is created from
          > the Spirit, and then separated from the Spirit, and then the Other
          > working its way back to the Spirit, traces the basic activity of the
          > Spirit, which is the dialectic. This is also the basic activity of
          > human history. It is also the basic activity of the individual. We
          > seek Love at a spiritual level because we wish to return to the
          > Original Spirit from which we emerged.
          >
          > Hegel presents his lectures on religion in three phases: the abstract
          > idea of religion; the empirical expression of different religions; the
          > consummation of religion in the dialectical concept of the Trinity.
          > The operative concept of the Trinity is Love.
          >
          > FWIW, it was because of Hegel's dialectic of Divinity that I converted
          > from atheism to Christianity.
          >
          > Best regards,
          > --Paul Trejo, MA
          >

          Such a conversion may be the effect of reading Hegel's philosophy of
          religion. However, Hegel does explicitly exclude such a purpose in the
          Introduction of his Lectures. The only thing he presupposes there is
          that the listener or reader has and idea what or for what religion is
          even if this idea is much foggy. And for Hegel also an atheist or
          nihilist evidently has such an idea since he asks for the absolute. The
          true purpose of his Lectures on religion is however the overcoming of
          the diremption of the infinite of religious world relation, on the one
          side, and all the finite relations having become more and more important
          with the Enlightenment, on the other side, without putting the one or
          the other last. For Hegel such a reconciliation is the very own task of
          philosophy. And this task is regardless of whether the philosopher is a
          Christian or a Moslem or a Jew or a Buddhist or a Hindu or an atheist or
          a nihilist or whatever.

          Regards,
          Beat Greuter



          > --- On Sat, 6/19/10, Beat Greuter <greuterb@...
          > <mailto:greuterb%40bluewin.ch>> wrote:
          >
          > From: Beat Greuter <greuterb@... <mailto:greuterb%40bluewin.ch>>
          > Subject: Re: [hegel] B. Helm: Love, Friendship and the Self
          > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
          > Date: Saturday, June 19, 2010, 2:45 PM
          >
          >
          >
          > The general meaning of love in Hegel's philosophy can only be grasped
          > speculatively. It is the concept itself as the returning from its other
          > to itself (see the beginning of the Subjective Logic), that is, the
          > reconciliation of oppositions not being merely negated in an
          > indeterminate and abstract identity but being recognized as moments in a
          > further entity or coincidence. However, love in its particular meaning
          > can achieve this reconciliation 'only' in an immediate form and thus its
          > objectivity is most fragile. So, in Hegel's mature concept of the modern
          > ethical life love has a quite specific determination and cannot be made
          > responsible for the cohesion of the whole as it was the case in his
          > early (theological) drafts of a superior ethical life grounded in an
          > idealistic conception of the ancient Greek world.
          >
          > Regards,
          > Beat
          >
          > Bruce Merrill writes:
          >
          > >
          > >
          > > There are also significant endorsements of Jesus' Love in Hegel's
          > > so-called
          > > "Early Theological Writings."
          > >
          > > Bruce M.
          > >
          > > On Fri, Jun 18, 2010 at 8:30 AM, Robert Wallace
          > > <bob@... <mailto:bob%40robertmwallace.com>
          > <mailto:bob%40robertmwallace.com>>wrote:
          > >
          > > > So can you give us a glimpse of what it's about? And can you see any
          > > > relation to Hegel's treatment of love, say in The Science of Logic or
          > > > the Phil of Right?
          > > >
          > > > Best, Bob
          > > >
          > > > On Jun 17, 2010, at 9:00 PM, Eric v.d. Luft, Ph.D., M.L.S. wrote:
          > > >
          > > > > One of the Young Hegelians, Karl Schmidt (1819-1864), wrote a book
          > > > > called Liebesbriefe ohne Liebe (Love Letters Without Love) in 1846.
          > > > > I'm
          > > > > in the final phase of translating it into English. It should be
          > > > > available on Amazon within a few months. I'll announce it here when
          > > > > it's
          > > > > ready: <http://www.gegensatzpress.com/loveletters.html>.
          > > > >
          > > > > Ça ira!
          > > > >
          > > > > Eric v.d. Luft, Ph.D., M.L.S.
          > >
          >
          > >> Hello all,
          > >>
          > >> Are you interested in the nature of love? Hegel certainly is,
          > >> following Plato and Aristotle. In fact Hegel speaks somewhere in a
          > >> Zusatz of love as underlying the State.
          > >>
          > >> I've run across a new book that appears to follow in the footsteps of
          > >> Plato, Aristotle and Hegel on this topic:
          > >>
          > >> Bennett Helm, _Love, Friendship, and the Self: Intimate Identification
          > >> and the Sociality of Persons_ (Oxford U. Press, 2010).
          > >>
          > >> Reading bits of the book that are accessible through its listing on
          > >> Amazon, we find that it describes "a new kind of freedom of action
          > >> that is essentially interpersonal" (p. 303). (Meaning, of course, a
          > >> kind of freedom of action that's not recognized by most familiar
          > >> theories of freedom.)
          > >>
          > >> "The intimate identification at issue in love ought to be understood
          > >> in terms of your having a concern for your beloved's identity that is
          > >> the same in kind as your concern for your own identity" (p. 302).
          > >>
          > >> Helm rejects the theory that love is a "union" of two people into one.
          > >> According to him, lovers continue each to be responsible for their own
          > >> actions. But there is also a shared identity, and a shared
          > >> responsibility. This interests me very much, because (a) I think it
          > >> corresponds to my own experience of love, and also of friendship, and
          > >> (b) it seems to correspond to what Plato, Aristotle and Hegel, and
          > >> especially Hegel, are driving at in their descriptions of how we
          > >> function.
          > >>
          > >> You've probably seen reference to the "sociality" of this and that, in
          > >> interpretations of Hegel. Terry Pinkard uses the word, and Robert
          > >> Brandom believes that according to Hegel's account of "recognition,"
          > >> "to be a self...[is] to be recognized by those one recognizes" (Tales
          > >> of the Mighty Dead, p. 217), and that according to Hegel, "man is not
          > >> _objectively_ free." So what if a person is a solitary slave, in a
          > >> society that denies her any recognition; is she then not a "self"? I
          > >> can't buy this sort of social-constructivist theory, as I said in my
          > >> book (where I gave a very different interpretation of the significance
          > >> that Hegel attaches to "recognition").
          > >>
          > >> But neither am I attracted, on the other hand, to standard social
          > >> atomist or rational egoist theories of human behavior, such as we see
          > >> in Thomas Hobbes and in most theorizing in economics. They have no
          > >> appreciation of the very intimate ways in which we can and do get
          > >> involved with other individuals, in the family and elsewhere--ways
          > >> that have very little resemblance to the "bargaining" that they
          > >> suppose underlies all human relationships. Hegel is the only major
          > >> modern philosopher who focuses on these intimate involvements. So I'm
          > >> particularly interested in Bennett Helm's account because he seems,
          > >> like Hegel, to aim to combine a robust sense of individual
          > >> responsibility with a sophisticated sense of the intimate ways we can
          > >> be involved with one another.
          > >>
          > >> Best, Bob W
          >
          >
          >



          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        • Paul Trejo
          Beat,   Actually, my statements were correct representations of Hegel s own statements, although, as I said, I *very* briefly summarized their formulation.  
          Message 4 of 8 , Jul 2, 2010
            Beat,
             
            Actually, my statements were correct representations of Hegel's
            own statements, although, as I said, I *very* briefly summarized
            their formulation.
             
            To prove that Hegel himself also arrived at the same conclusions,
            here are some direction quotations from Hegel:
             
            First - a direct equation of God as Spirit; Hegel says:
             
            "The definition of God is that God
            is the Absolute Idea -- i.e. that
            God is Spirit." (Hegel, LPR, 1827,
            ed. Hodgson, vol. 3, p. 66)
             
            And also,
             
            "God is *as* Spirit *for* Spirit.
            Spirit is essentially a being for
            Spirit, and Spirit *is* Spirit only
            insofar as Spirit is *for* Spirit."
            (Hegel, LPR, vol. 1, p. 383)
             
            And here is only one place where, Hegel identifies God, Spirit
            and Love:
             
            "The Concept is what is alive, is what
            mediates itself with itself. One of its
            determinations is also being...This is
            the Concept as such, the Concept of
            God, the Absolute Concept; this is just
            what God is. As Spirit or as Love, God
            is this Self-particularizing." (Hegel,
            vol. 1, LPR, p. 436)
             
            As for Hegel's explanation of his equation, here is Hegel's
            own logical set-up:
             
            "To the extent that God is grasped as
            an Essence of the Understanding, God
            is not grasped as Spirit. To the extent
            that God is grasped as Spirit, however,
            this concept includes the Subjective
            side within it. The Subjective side is
            introduced into this concept when it
            is defined as Religion." (Hegel, LPR,
            ed. Hodgson, vol. 1, p. 116)
             
            And here is Hegel's delivery:
             
            "God is thus grasped as what God is
            God within God. God makes God an
            object for God, then, in this object,
            God remains the undivided essence
            within the differentiation of God
            within God, and in this differentiation
            of God loves God, i.e. remains identical
            with God. This is God as Spirit."
            (Hegel, LPR, vol. 1, p. 126)
             
            This quotation offers additional support to Hegel's logical
            formulation of his dialectical grasp of Spirit and God:
             
            "Human Reason, human spiritual
            consciousness or consciousness of
            its own Essence, *is* Reason generally,
            *is* the Divine within humanity.
            Spirit, insofar as it is called Divine
            Spirit, is not a spirit beyond the stars
            or beyond the world, for God is Present,
            is Omnipresent, and strictly *as* Spirit
            is God present in Spirit. Religion is
            a begetting of the Divine Spirit, not
            an invention of human beings." (Hegel,
            LPR, vol. 1, p. 130)
             
            There are many, many other quotes from Hegel that I can
            share on this topic, Beat.  
             
            For example, in his lectures on the Philosophy of Religion
            (1818-1831) that Hegel gave more than any other lectures,
            he explicitly names Jesus Christ as the Son of Man and the
            Son of God.  You seem to have overlooked that vital fact.
             
            Best regards,
            --Paul Trejo, MA


            --- On Wed, 6/23/10, Beat Greuter <greuterb@...> wrote:


            From: Beat Greuter <greuterb@...>
            Subject: Re: [hegel] B. Helm: Love, Friendship and the Self
            To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
            Date: Wednesday, June 23, 2010, 9:46 AM


             



            Paul Trejo writes:

            >
            >
            > Dear Hegel List,
            >
            > Actually, Hegel is very plain - very explicit - about the nature of Love.
            > Love is DIALECTICAL. Hegel's scientific description of Love is offered
            > in his lectures on the philosophy of religion (1818-1831). Some salient
            > point include:
            >
            > (1) Love is dialectical
            > (2) Love is the two that become one; and the one that remains two
            > (3) Love is the sublation of the Negative
            > (4) Spirit is the sublation of the Negative
            > (5) Thus, Love is Spirit, and Spirit is Love
            > (6) Thus, God is Spirit, and God is Love
            > (7) Thus, Love is God
            >

            Even if this is only an enumeration of salient points on love, spirit
            and God in Hegel's philosophy of religion I cannot allow your formally
            and substantially incorrect argumentation to rest. Hegel did certainly
            not propound such sequences in his lectures (or have you a precise
            quotation?). In my opinion we have to be very careful in our
            argumentation and may not use false logical forms of conclusions: if
            love is x and spirit is x then love does not have to be identical to
            spirit. Also, the general term x remains totally abstract and does not
            add anything for explaining what love and spirit really are and what
            their difference may be. In fact, with this you destroy Hegel's subtle
            dialectical thinking.

            > Here is my ultra-brief commentary on Hegel's narrative on Love in his
            > theological lectures:
            >
            > The dialectical (speculative) procedure of the Negative emerging
            > quasi-organically from the Spirit, so that the Other is created from
            > the Spirit, and then separated from the Spirit, and then the Other
            > working its way back to the Spirit, traces the basic activity of the
            > Spirit, which is the dialectic. This is also the basic activity of
            > human history. It is also the basic activity of the individual. We
            > seek Love at a spiritual level because we wish to return to the
            > Original Spirit from which we emerged.
            >
            > Hegel presents his lectures on religion in three phases: the abstract
            > idea of religion; the empirical expression of different religions; the
            > consummation of religion in the dialectical concept of the Trinity.
            > The operative concept of the Trinity is Love.
            >
            > FWIW, it was because of Hegel's dialectic of Divinity that I converted
            > from atheism to Christianity.
            >
            > Best regards,
            > --Paul Trejo, MA
            >

            Such a conversion may be the effect of reading Hegel's philosophy of
            religion. However, Hegel does explicitly exclude such a purpose in the
            Introduction of his Lectures. The only thing he presupposes there is
            that the listener or reader has and idea what or for what religion is
            even if this idea is much foggy. And for Hegel also an atheist or
            nihilist evidently has such an idea since he asks for the absolute. The
            true purpose of his Lectures on religion is however the overcoming of
            the diremption of the infinite of religious world relation, on the one
            side, and all the finite relations having become more and more important
            with the Enlightenment, on the other side, without putting the one or
            the other last. For Hegel such a reconciliation is the very own task of
            philosophy. And this task is regardless of whether the philosopher is a
            Christian or a Moslem or a Jew or a Buddhist or a Hindu or an atheist or
            a nihilist or whatever.

            Regards,
            Beat Greuter

            > --- On Sat, 6/19/10, Beat Greuter <greuterb@...
            > <mailto:greuterb%40bluewin.ch>> wrote:
            >
            > From: Beat Greuter <greuterb@... <mailto:greuterb%40bluewin.ch>>
            > Subject: Re: [hegel] B. Helm: Love, Friendship and the Self
            > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
            > Date: Saturday, June 19, 2010, 2:45 PM
            >
            >
            >
            > The general meaning of love in Hegel's philosophy can only be grasped
            > speculatively. It is the concept itself as the returning from its other
            > to itself (see the beginning of the Subjective Logic), that is, the
            > reconciliation of oppositions not being merely negated in an
            > indeterminate and abstract identity but being recognized as moments in a
            > further entity or coincidence. However, love in its particular meaning
            > can achieve this reconciliation 'only' in an immediate form and thus its
            > objectivity is most fragile. So, in Hegel's mature concept of the modern
            > ethical life love has a quite specific determination and cannot be made
            > responsible for the cohesion of the whole as it was the case in his
            > early (theological) drafts of a superior ethical life grounded in an
            > idealistic conception of the ancient Greek world.
            >
            > Regards,
            > Beat
            >
            > Bruce Merrill writes:
            >
            > >
            > >
            > > There are also significant endorsements of Jesus' Love in Hegel's
            > > so-called
            > > "Early Theological Writings."
            > >
            > > Bruce M.
            > >
            > > On Fri, Jun 18, 2010 at 8:30 AM, Robert Wallace
            > > <bob@... <mailto:bob%40robertmwallace.com>
            > <mailto:bob%40robertmwallace.com>>wrote:
            > >
            > > > So can you give us a glimpse of what it's about? And can you see any
            > > > relation to Hegel's treatment of love, say in The Science of Logic or
            > > > the Phil of Right?
            > > >
            > > > Best, Bob
            > > >
            > > > On Jun 17, 2010, at 9:00 PM, Eric v.d. Luft, Ph.D., M.L.S. wrote:
            > > >
            > > > > One of the Young Hegelians, Karl Schmidt (1819-1864), wrote a book
            > > > > called Liebesbriefe ohne Liebe (Love Letters Without Love) in 1846.
            > > > > I'm
            > > > > in the final phase of translating it into English. It should be
            > > > > available on Amazon within a few months. I'll announce it here when
            > > > > it's
            > > > > ready: <http://www.gegensatzpress.com/loveletters.html>.
            > > > >
            > > > > Ça ira!
            > > > >
            > > > > Eric v.d. Luft, Ph.D., M.L.S.
            > >
            >
            > >> Hello all,
            > >>
            > >> Are you interested in the nature of love? Hegel certainly is,
            > >> following Plato and Aristotle. In fact Hegel speaks somewhere in a
            > >> Zusatz of love as underlying the State.
            > >>
            > >> I've run across a new book that appears to follow in the footsteps of
            > >> Plato, Aristotle and Hegel on this topic:
            > >>
            > >> Bennett Helm, _Love, Friendship, and the Self: Intimate Identification
            > >> and the Sociality of Persons_ (Oxford U. Press, 2010).
            > >>
            > >> Reading bits of the book that are accessible through its listing on
            > >> Amazon, we find that it describes "a new kind of freedom of action
            > >> that is essentially interpersonal" (p. 303). (Meaning, of course, a
            > >> kind of freedom of action that's not recognized by most familiar
            > >> theories of freedom.)
            > >>
            > >> "The intimate identification at issue in love ought to be understood
            > >> in terms of your having a concern for your beloved's identity that is
            > >> the same in kind as your concern for your own identity" (p. 302).
            > >>
            > >> Helm rejects the theory that love is a "union" of two people into one.
            > >> According to him, lovers continue each to be responsible for their own
            > >> actions. But there is also a shared identity, and a shared
            > >> responsibility. This interests me very much, because (a) I think it
            > >> corresponds to my own experience of love, and also of friendship, and
            > >> (b) it seems to correspond to what Plato, Aristotle and Hegel, and
            > >> especially Hegel, are driving at in their descriptions of how we
            > >> function.
            > >>
            > >> You've probably seen reference to the "sociality" of this and that, in
            > >> interpretations of Hegel. Terry Pinkard uses the word, and Robert
            > >> Brandom believes that according to Hegel's account of "recognition,"
            > >> "to be a self...[is] to be recognized by those one recognizes" (Tales
            > >> of the Mighty Dead, p. 217), and that according to Hegel, "man is not
            > >> _objectively_ free." So what if a person is a solitary slave, in a
            > >> society that denies her any recognition; is she then not a "self"? I
            > >> can't buy this sort of social-constructivist theory, as I said in my
            > >> book (where I gave a very different interpretation of the significance
            > >> that Hegel attaches to "recognition").
            > >>
            > >> But neither am I attracted, on the other hand, to standard social
            > >> atomist or rational egoist theories of human behavior, such as we see
            > >> in Thomas Hobbes and in most theorizing in economics. They have no
            > >> appreciation of the very intimate ways in which we can and do get
            > >> involved with other individuals, in the family and elsewhere--ways
            > >> that have very little resemblance to the "bargaining" that they
            > >> suppose underlies all human relationships. Hegel is the only major
            > >> modern philosopher who focuses on these intimate involvements. So I'm
            > >> particularly interested in Bennett Helm's account because he seems,
            > >> like Hegel, to aim to combine a robust sense of individual
            > >> responsibility with a sophisticated sense of the intimate ways we can
            > >> be involved with one another.
            > >>
            > >> Best, Bob W
            >
            >
            >

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