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Re: [hegel] ... (was: Heidegger on Hegel (1))

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  • Beat Greuter
    ... Hegel writes in your cited text from the preliminary chapter of the Science of Logic With What must Science Begin? : In the work just mentioned [PhdG]
    Message 1 of 10 , Apr 29, 2010
      Jürgen H. writes:

      >
      >
      > ... thanx for your reply, Beat ...
      >
      > JH wrote:
      > I do not agree with Hegel that all what stays unsublated of the
      > starting point is irrelevant Einzelnheit which is not wesentlich ...
      > thesis: the starting point in its Wesentlichkeit cannot be truely
      > sublated as the what that it is ...
      >
      > BG wrote:
      > What do "not to be sublated wholely" and "cannot be truely sublated"
      > mean for you? Can something be sublated partially?
      > JH:
      > ... jep, good questions that can help to get more precise ... or to
      > revise: "cannot be *fully* sublated" ... well then: can something be
      > sublated partially ... ? Good question.
      >
      > ... but I have to correct the ongoing sentence this way: ... sublate
      > sensual/senusous certainty as what it is, the starting point of the
      > **Aneignung im Begriffe** (appropriation in concept) of real
      > Gegenständlichkeit as such of the like of us here and now ...
      >
      > BG wrote:
      > In the case of sense-certainty - as you say the most immediate
      > consciousness and therefore the beginning of the PhdG ...
      >
      > JH:
      > ... sorry, I would like to maintain it's not me who says that
      > sensual/sensuous certainty is the most immediate form of conciousness:
      > it is Hegel himself ... isn't it, correct me if I'm wrong ... and if
      > sensual/sensuous certainty is not the beginning of PhdG what else is
      > the beginning of PhdG then ... ?
      >
      > BG:
      > In the case of sense-certainty (...) every attempt of mediation of the
      > opposition of the individuals and the universal is only an abstraction
      > and also in the space-time continuum no concrete mediation is possible
      > (as later in the becoming).
      >
      > JH:
      > ... as far as I have worked through the text, I would say that Hegel
      > is continually mediating throughout the text ... and IF mediation at
      > the level of sensual/sensuous certainty were abstract mediation,
      > nevertheless it is mediation im Begriffe ... more precisely put and in
      > my point of view: it is the **Aneignung im Begriffe** of a mediation
      > which is immer schon/yet always **given** mediation ... because I
      > would assert that Hegel is not a pure constructivist ... but does the
      > re-construction of an immer schon/yet always given mediation;
      > re-construction of real mediation im Medium des Begriffes/in the
      > medium of concept ...
      >
      > Doesn't he ... ? Correct me if you think that I'am wrong or misled ...
      >
      > ... to re-enact this process of mediation in one's mind would mean to
      > go into the very details of this text, would mean to do a full
      > Text-Durchgang; I am not yet prepared for doing that here in this list
      > while trying to work out or to confirm a certain approach ...
      >
      > BG:
      > Therefore the sense-certainty will be sublated in the consciousness of
      > perception where the universal become the (one-sided) truth of the
      > individuals which now have to be mediated with it (as later in the
      > determinate being). This sublation is not a mere negation but the
      > elements found in sense-certainty are again in perception within a new
      > constellation of mediation.
      >
      > JH:
      > ... I am not yet prepared for going into the very details of the text ...
      >
      > BG:
      > You write: "I do not agree with Hegel that all what stays unsublated
      > of the starting point is irrelevant Einzelnheit which is not
      > wesentlich ..." We have to ask what Hegel wants to say with this. You
      > do not give the exact quotation but it seems to be clear: In
      > sense-certainty the individuals stay non-mediated.
      >
      > JH:
      > ... I'm not at all convinced that the individuals stay non-mediated at
      > the level of sensual/sensuous certainty ...
      >
      > BG:
      > ... it seems to be clear: In sense-certainty the individuals stay
      > non-mediated. If they will be asserted furthermore as essential by the
      > immediacy of sense-certainty then this un-sublation is irrelevant
      > given the result of the movement of the consciousness of
      > sense-certainty. Of course, there are other philosophers who insist on
      > this immediacy as the truth. However, in this case Kierkegaard for
      > instance would be the better reference.
      >
      > JH:
      > ... of course I do not insist of immediacy as the truth (and as it is
      > rejected in the forewords by Hegel) ... but in my point of view this
      > immediacy is **immer schon** the immediacy of mediation ... because of
      > this circle-of-circles-thing ... (let this at last and vorerst be the
      > only reference to the Schwarzwald-germanizer Heidegger, with which the
      > thread was stimulatingly started, thanx to The Jack) ...
      >
      > regards - Jürgen H.
      >


      Hegel writes in your cited text from the preliminary chapter of the
      Science of Logic "With What must Science Begin?":

      "In the work just mentioned [PhdG] immediate consciousness is also the
      first and that which is immediate in the science itself *, and therefore
      the presupposition; but in logic, the presupposition is that which has
      proved itself to be the result of that phenomenological consideration -
      the Idea as pure knowledge." (translated by A.V. Miller)
      * my translation: "... immediate consciousness is that which also in
      science is the first and immediate, ....."

      The same he writes at the beginning of the Sense-certainty chapter in
      the PhdG:

      "The knowledge, which is at the start or immediately our object, can be
      nothing else than just that which is immediate knowledge, knowledge of
      the immediate, of what is. We have, in dealing with it, to proceed, too,
      in an immediate way, to accept what is given, not altering anything in
      it as it is presented before us, and keeping mere apprehension
      (Auffassen) free from conceptual comprehension (Begreifen)." (translated
      by J.B. Baillie)

      So, it seems to be a difference between the beginning in the PhdG and
      the beginning in the Logic even though both belong to science: the
      latter is also result, the first is not, it is 'only' presupposition.
      Therefore your "immediacy of mediation" and "circle-of circles-thing"
      seem to be invalid for the beginning of the PhdG. And, if this would be
      true what does your statement mean in this context: "... it is the
      **Aneignung im Begriffe** of a mediation which is immer schon/yet always
      **given** mediation ... because I would assert that Hegel is not a pure
      constructivist ... but does the re-construction of an immer schon/yet
      always given mediation; re-construction of real mediation im Medium des
      Begriffes/in the medium of concept ..."?

      Now, we come back to your original statement which I have questioned: "I
      do not agree with Hegel that all what stays unsublated of the starting
      point is irrelevant Einzelnheit which is not wesentlich ...". Do you
      say this because the beginning of the PhdG is 'only' a presupposition
      which as such never can be recovered again, that is, sublated fully?

      Regards,
      Beat Greuter



      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • wmdepot
      ... yes, Stephen, to just say it were a take-off was a shortcut ... a shortcut, done to come through your mail; I got to know enough about Hegel to not doubt
      Message 2 of 10 , Apr 29, 2010
        ... yes, Stephen, to just say it were a take-off was a shortcut ... a
        shortcut, done to come through your mail; I got to know enough about Hegel
        to not doubt the relevance of the Trinity-topic ... and of course, I am
        aware of the abstractness of this abstract opposition of the historical and
        the systematic; but it's functional for what I am aiming at: keeping the
        feet on the ground ... and: I know nothing about Poinsot; but the
        relation-topic as such I find very interesting because it gives background;
        if you got reasons to give further input of material in this case, I'd be
        interested ...

        regards - Jürgen H.

        ST wrote:
        I referred to the background to Hegel´s thinking. This is not to be equated
        with my taking off into "onto-theology".
        I mean there is reason to think that his dialectical thinking re persons and
        relations (e.g. in mechanism/chemism) builds upon his acquaintance with
        Trinitarian thought, to which he himself refers (at this place) as I do.
        This would also be part of a way of overcoming your abstract opposition of
        the historical and the "systematic". History is itself, for Hegel, I think,
        systematic in this sense, and in particular the history of philosophy (and
        the systematic is "historical", just, for instance, through the use of
        historically laden language).
        In this perspective there seems no clear sense in which what I say about a
        contemporary of Descartes is historical and ipso facto not systematic in a
        way that what you say about Kant and relations/relata is not (or what any of
        us say about Hegel or about the letter I wrote to you yesterday). Of course
        I mention Poinsot (John of St. Thomas), thinking of his meta-logic, logica
        docens, theory of relations, signum formale etc., of course, like Hegel´s
        dialectic devised in the history of philosophy and, in a sense, by
        philosophy itself. It is of philosophical or "systematic" interest. Then we
        can all make our choices.

        Stephen







        To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
        From: wmdepot@...
        Date: Wed, 28 Apr 2010 12:49:14 +0200
        Subject: [hegel] ... (was: Heidegger on Hegel (1))





        ... thanx for your reply, Stephen ...

        ST wrote:
        Maybe one should point out that "ob-ject" breaks down etymologically in a
        near precisely analogous way to Gegen-stand.

        JH:
        ... the (german) PONS-Dictionary:
        "ob-iectum", past participle of "ob-icere" (ob-icio, ob-ieci, ob-iectum)
        ob-icere: 1. to throw against, to stand against ... 7. to present itself ...

        ... this gives the reader an orientation an object, an ob-iectum, which -
        when it is made explicit and complete - refers to an active subject which is
        throwing a meaning 'against' an object ... subject-object-relation then ...

        subject - relation - object
        ... with a subject that has - taken as a substantive - a 'stand'/Stand
        against/gegen an object:
        subject - stand-against - object
        subject - Gegen-Stand - object
        ... the term "Gegenstand" - thus and put in that way - refers to the
        *relation* before it refers to the relatum, the sense-thing, and (maybe
        also) before it refers to the subject for which it is a sense-thing: thus a
        subject standing in Gegen-stand/stand-against a sense-thing which makes this
        sense-thing an object with meaning ...

        there is a second type of relation, subject-subject-relation:
        subject - relation - subject
        subject - stand-against - subject
        subject - Gegen-Stand - subject

        ... this reference to a relation of relata: that's what is important for me
        to keep in mind with ' Gegenstand ' ... and this context is hidden in the
        standard way of speaking of "object" where the focus is put on the
        sense-thing ... and where the relation and the subject of that relation is
        neglected ...

        ... you would have to argue in the same and similar way towards a german,
        because the hiddenness of speech is the same in german ... but at the same
        time the term 'Gegen-Stand ' gives a hint ... as does the term 'ob-iectum'
        for the latin-speaker, but a hint not in the same way that is given '
        Gegenstand/Gegen-Stand ' ...

        ... nevertheless: explication would be necessary in both cases ...

        ST:
        If a term "had to be kept" as a German term, i.e. if there were no
        paraphrase at all, then I should think it was intellectually useless. So I
        try to suggest this is not so hard and fast the case and probably, of
        course, you do not mean it that way.

        JH:
        ... jep, I don't : no such privat-speech possible ...

        ST:
        The object stands against just because it has been thrown in the way of....
        or (we know) it is thrown in the way since it stands against....

        ST:
        ... the relation is primary to the relata because there have been found, in
        Essence, to be no substances.

        JH:
        ... sounds good ...

        ST:
        But, therefore, there are not any relations in the usual sense either.
        There is quite obviously, I would think, a background in Trinitarian thought
        here. Ipsae personae sunt relationes, but then neither persons nor relations
        are as we started off conceiving them.

        JH:
        ... I wouldn't follow you with that take-off into onto-theology ...

        ST:
        Do you think the account given by the Marburg Kantian school on relations
        vis a vis relata , with which I am not so familiar, might be connected with
        this background at all (Augustine, late Scholastics), historically or
        otherwise?

        JH:
        ... may be, but this refers to the historical dimension, while I - first of
        all - would prefer to stay within the systematical dimension ...

        ST:
        John Poinsot, a Scholastic contemporary of Descartes and deep into
        (logical) semiotics, made much of relations being properties ("accidents"of
        just one substance) of the one related and not of what it was related too.
        He was thus able to explain "intentional" relations, even to unreal objects,
        as real.

        JH:
        ... if you say this it will be true; that's to say: this could be an
        interesting topic for reseach in history of philosophy ... but the reason to
        do this research is the systematical position of this topic ... isn't it ...
        ?

        regards - Jürgen H.





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      • Alan Ponikvar
        Hi Beat, I just want to comment on the first two sentences of Sense Certainty that you quote: The knowledge, which is at the start or immediately our object,
        Message 3 of 10 , Apr 29, 2010
          Hi Beat,

          I just want to comment on the first two sentences of Sense Certainty that
          you quote:

          "The knowledge, which is at the start or immediately our object, can be
          nothing else than just that which is immediate knowledge, knowledge of the
          immediate, of what is. We have, in dealing with it, to proceed, too, in an
          immediate way, to accept what is given, not altering anything in it as it is
          presented before us, and keeping mere apprehension (Auffassen) free from
          conceptual comprehension (Begreifen)." (translated by J.B. Baillie)


          As I read this, immediate knowledge is the first knowing taken up by natural
          consciousness as a mediated result of our immediate turn to our object. How
          we attend determines what we attend to – sense certain knowing – which in
          turn itself recollects our manner of attending to it when it attends to its
          object. Thus, sense certain knowing is a posit related to – is a
          recollection of – the manner in which we turn our attention. It is a posit
          that presupposes our act. It is mediated by this turn and is itself a
          knowing mediated by what it turns to – what is immediately in view. We of
          course do not mean any of this. But this is in fact what happens behind our
          backs as it were. It also helps to explain why the Phenomenology is really
          about we readers as is finally made evident in Absolute Knowing when our
          knowing is recollected. We have to be held accountable for our original act
          (crime?).

          Regards, Alan

          From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Beat
          Greuter
          Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2010 4:20 AM
          To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
          Subject: Re: [hegel] ... (was: Heidegger on Hegel (1))


          Jürgen H. writes:

          >
          >
          > ... thanx for your reply, Beat ...
          >
          > JH wrote:
          > I do not agree with Hegel that all what stays unsublated of the
          > starting point is irrelevant Einzelnheit which is not wesentlich ...
          > thesis: the starting point in its Wesentlichkeit cannot be truely
          > sublated as the what that it is ...
          >
          > BG wrote:
          > What do "not to be sublated wholely" and "cannot be truely sublated"
          > mean for you? Can something be sublated partially?
          > JH:
          > ... jep, good questions that can help to get more precise ... or to
          > revise: "cannot be *fully* sublated" ... well then: can something be
          > sublated partially ... ? Good question.
          >
          > ... but I have to correct the ongoing sentence this way: ... sublate
          > sensual/senusous certainty as what it is, the starting point of the
          > **Aneignung im Begriffe** (appropriation in concept) of real
          > Gegenständlichkeit as such of the like of us here and now ...
          >
          > BG wrote:
          > In the case of sense-certainty - as you say the most immediate
          > consciousness and therefore the beginning of the PhdG ...
          >
          > JH:
          > ... sorry, I would like to maintain it's not me who says that
          > sensual/sensuous certainty is the most immediate form of conciousness:
          > it is Hegel himself ... isn't it, correct me if I'm wrong ... and if
          > sensual/sensuous certainty is not the beginning of PhdG what else is
          > the beginning of PhdG then ... ?
          >
          > BG:
          > In the case of sense-certainty (...) every attempt of mediation of the
          > opposition of the individuals and the universal is only an abstraction
          > and also in the space-time continuum no concrete mediation is possible
          > (as later in the becoming).
          >
          > JH:
          > ... as far as I have worked through the text, I would say that Hegel
          > is continually mediating throughout the text ... and IF mediation at
          > the level of sensual/sensuous certainty were abstract mediation,
          > nevertheless it is mediation im Begriffe ... more precisely put and in
          > my point of view: it is the **Aneignung im Begriffe** of a mediation
          > which is immer schon/yet always **given** mediation ... because I
          > would assert that Hegel is not a pure constructivist ... but does the
          > re-construction of an immer schon/yet always given mediation;
          > re-construction of real mediation im Medium des Begriffes/in the
          > medium of concept ...
          >
          > Doesn't he ... ? Correct me if you think that I'am wrong or misled ...
          >
          > ... to re-enact this process of mediation in one's mind would mean to
          > go into the very details of this text, would mean to do a full
          > Text-Durchgang; I am not yet prepared for doing that here in this list
          > while trying to work out or to confirm a certain approach ...
          >
          > BG:
          > Therefore the sense-certainty will be sublated in the consciousness of
          > perception where the universal become the (one-sided) truth of the
          > individuals which now have to be mediated with it (as later in the
          > determinate being). This sublation is not a mere negation but the
          > elements found in sense-certainty are again in perception within a new
          > constellation of mediation.
          >
          > JH:
          > ... I am not yet prepared for going into the very details of the text ...
          >
          > BG:
          > You write: "I do not agree with Hegel that all what stays unsublated
          > of the starting point is irrelevant Einzelnheit which is not
          > wesentlich ..." We have to ask what Hegel wants to say with this. You
          > do not give the exact quotation but it seems to be clear: In
          > sense-certainty the individuals stay non-mediated.
          >
          > JH:
          > ... I'm not at all convinced that the individuals stay non-mediated at
          > the level of sensual/sensuous certainty ...
          >
          > BG:
          > ... it seems to be clear: In sense-certainty the individuals stay
          > non-mediated. If they will be asserted furthermore as essential by the
          > immediacy of sense-certainty then this un-sublation is irrelevant
          > given the result of the movement of the consciousness of
          > sense-certainty. Of course, there are other philosophers who insist on
          > this immediacy as the truth. However, in this case Kierkegaard for
          > instance would be the better reference.
          >
          > JH:
          > ... of course I do not insist of immediacy as the truth (and as it is
          > rejected in the forewords by Hegel) ... but in my point of view this
          > immediacy is **immer schon** the immediacy of mediation ... because of
          > this circle-of-circles-thing ... (let this at last and vorerst be the
          > only reference to the Schwarzwald-germanizer Heidegger, with which the
          > thread was stimulatingly started, thanx to The Jack) ...
          >
          > regards - Jürgen H.
          >

          Hegel writes in your cited text from the preliminary chapter of the
          Science of Logic "With What must Science Begin?":

          "In the work just mentioned [PhdG] immediate consciousness is also the
          first and that which is immediate in the science itself *, and therefore
          the presupposition; but in logic, the presupposition is that which has
          proved itself to be the result of that phenomenological consideration -
          the Idea as pure knowledge." (translated by A.V. Miller)
          * my translation: "... immediate consciousness is that which also in
          science is the first and immediate, ....."

          The same he writes at the beginning of the Sense-certainty chapter in
          the PhdG:

          "The knowledge, which is at the start or immediately our object, can be
          nothing else than just that which is immediate knowledge, knowledge of
          the immediate, of what is. We have, in dealing with it, to proceed, too,
          in an immediate way, to accept what is given, not altering anything in
          it as it is presented before us, and keeping mere apprehension
          (Auffassen) free from conceptual comprehension (Begreifen)." (translated
          by J.B. Baillie)

          So, it seems to be a difference between the beginning in the PhdG and
          the beginning in the Logic even though both belong to science: the
          latter is also result, the first is not, it is 'only' presupposition.
          Therefore your "immediacy of mediation" and "circle-of circles-thing"
          seem to be invalid for the beginning of the PhdG. And, if this would be
          true what does your statement mean in this context: "... it is the
          **Aneignung im Begriffe** of a mediation which is immer schon/yet always
          **given** mediation ... because I would assert that Hegel is not a pure
          constructivist ... but does the re-construction of an immer schon/yet
          always given mediation; re-construction of real mediation im Medium des
          Begriffes/in the medium of concept ..."?

          Now, we come back to your original statement which I have questioned: "I
          do not agree with Hegel that all what stays unsublated of the starting
          point is irrelevant Einzelnheit which is not wesentlich ...". Do you
          say this because the beginning of the PhdG is 'only' a presupposition
          which as such never can be recovered again, that is, sublated fully?

          Regards,
          Beat Greuter

          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        • wmdepot
          Hi Beat, you ask: Do you say this [: I do not agree with Hegel that all what stays unsublated of the starting point is irrelevant Einzelnheit which is not
          Message 4 of 10 , Apr 30, 2010
            Hi Beat, you ask: "Do you say this [:"I do not agree with Hegel that all what stays unsublated of the starting point is irrelevant Einzelnheit which is not wesentlich ..."] because the beginning of the PhdG is 'only' a presupposition which as such never can be recovered again, that is, sublated fully?" ...

            ... your questions lead to crucial points:
            a) I say 'this' because I am not convinced of the full-subsumtion of the Einzelnen - 'me and you', 'me and the others of my-self' - under the Allgemeines (if it IS a full-subsumtion then); and this is 'only' a reproduction of the critique of 'several others'; I want to keep the non-identical ... etc.
            b) the beginning of PhdG - in my view - can be read a "phänomenologische Reduktion" - a reduction of 'psychological immediatness of the Lebenswelt' to a level which unterschreitet the level of Wahrnehmung in the Anstrengung of the Begriff / strength of concept ... while at the same time it is (and 'has to be') an "Abhalten des Begreifens vom Auffassen"; my approach is: the beginning of PhdG reduces "Wahrnehmung oder das Wahrnehmungsding und die Täuschung" to somewhat ' I ' cannot be deceived about ... : Gegenständlichkeit as such (in space and time) ... that's to say: every trial (of any psychologist) to show something to be a deception at the level of Wahrnehmung has got the 'strong' Voraussetzung that there is a **relation of Gegenständlichkeit** which is the condition of possibility of any possible deception at the level of Wahrnehmung ...
            c) this fits wonderfully with a sentence of Stephen T.: "the relation is primary to the relata because there have been found (...) to be no substances." ... and I would like to add: ... found to be no substances in the sense of classical Cartesian substancialism ... which refers to the substance-problem in "Kritik der reinen Vernunft" and to the 'construction' of "Analogien der Erfahrung"... etc.

            regards - Jürgen H:

            ******

            BG wrote:

            Hegel writes in your cited text from the preliminary chapter of the
            Science of Logic "With What must Science Begin?":

            "In the work just mentioned [PhdG] immediate consciousness is also the
            first and that which is immediate in the science itself *, and therefore
            the presupposition; but in logic, the presupposition is that which has
            proved itself to be the result of that phenomenological consideration -
            the Idea as pure knowledge." (translated by A.V. Miller)
            * my translation: "... immediate consciousness is that which also in
            science is the first and immediate, ....."

            The same he writes at the beginning of the Sense-certainty chapter in
            the PhdG:

            "The knowledge, which is at the start or immediately our object, can be
            nothing else than just that which is immediate knowledge, knowledge of
            the immediate, of what is. We have, in dealing with it, to proceed, too,
            in an immediate way, to accept what is given, not altering anything in
            it as it is presented before us, and keeping mere apprehension
            (Auffassen) free from conceptual comprehension (Begreifen)." (translated
            by J.B. Baillie)

            So, it seems to be a difference between the beginning in the PhdG and
            the beginning in the Logic even though both belong to science: the
            latter is also result, the first is not, it is 'only' presupposition.
            Therefore your "immediacy of mediation" and "circle-of circles-thing"
            seem to be invalid for the beginning of the PhdG. And, if this would be
            true what does your statement mean in this context: "... it is the
            **Aneignung im Begriffe** of a mediation which is immer schon/yet always
            **given** mediation ... because I would assert that Hegel is not a pure
            constructivist ... but does the re-construction of an immer schon/yet
            always given mediation; re-construction of real mediation im Medium des
            Begriffes/in the medium of concept ..."?

            Now, we come back to your original statement which I have questioned: "I
            do not agree with Hegel that all what stays unsublated of the starting
            point is irrelevant Einzelnheit which is not wesentlich ...". Do you
            say this because the beginning of the PhdG is 'only' a presupposition
            which as such never can be recovered again, that is, sublated fully?

            Regards,
            Beat Greuter



            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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          • wmdepot
            ... a/my subversive, malicious and reductive reading of the first sentence of PhdG: Gegenständlichkeit überhaupt, Gegenständlichkeit als solche,
            Message 5 of 10 , Apr 30, 2010
              ... a/my subversive, 'malicious' and reductive reading of the first sentence of PhdG: Gegenständlichkeit überhaupt, Gegenständlichkeit als solche, Gegenständlichkeit as such, pure Gegenständlichkeit ...

              "Das Wissen, welches unmittelbar unser (sic!) Gegenstand (SIC !!) ist ..."

              "The knowledge which immediately is our (sic!) 'standing-against' (SIC!) ..."

              Thesis: Wissen is "unser Gegenstand", "unser Gegenstand" IS Wissen - 'unsere Gegen-Ständlichkeit' als solche ist, zeigt sich, shows to be, lässt sich zeigen als Bedingung der Möglichkeit für Wissen in seiner Unmittelbarkeit ... etc. ...

              ... just a (hypo)-thesis then, just another approach ...

              ... and - as it was said: "the relation is primary to the relata because there have been found (...) to be no substances." ... in the sense of classical Cartesian substancialism ...

              regards - jh

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