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Re: [hegel] Re: Heidegger on Hegel (1)

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  • Beat Greuter
    ... Have we now reached the point where again we argue about the common content and the improvement of the form of Hegel s shapes of the absolute? We had in
    Message 1 of 85 , Apr 26, 2010
      Stephen Theron writes:

      >But the Content is separated from its "formal dealing" at the end of Encyclopaedia III, where Hegel distinguishes the common Content of Art, Religion and Philosophy from the grade of perfection of the Form of these three. Or do I read this wrong in some way? Of course I would agree that in Philosophy itself the Form and this Content are one (the Method) and this is precisely the imperfection of the other two.

      Have we now reached the point where again we argue about the common
      content and the improvement of the form of Hegel's shapes of the
      absolute? We had in past many discussions about this. Some of Hegel's
      remarks do indeed suggest it. But if it would be true then you can
      forget Hegel's speculative thinking. Art, religion and philosophy are
      not mere objects on which philosophy does think from outside, that is,
      dogmatically, but have their own relation and mediation of form and
      content, of identity and difference, of unity and manifoldness etc. To
      think about the shapes of the absolute philosophically means to think
      about these mediations, that is, to deal with them in speculative or
      dialectical manner. This is the scientific manner Hegel speaks about in
      my cited passage from the preliminary chapter of the Logic "With What
      must Science Begin?". With this Hegel gives his 'objects' their own
      right, and the shapes of the absolute accomplish their own movement and
      development. The form of the absolute cannot be found or determined at
      and along with the absolute (Fichte against Schelling's Philosophy of
      Nature), it is together with the content in a speculative or dialectical

      Beat Greuter

      >To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      >From: greuterb@...
      >Date: Sun, 25 Apr 2010 18:12:38 +0200
      >Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Heidegger on Hegel (1)
      >John writes:
      >>--- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>,
      >>"TheJack" <thejackjam@...> wrote:
      >>>[Heidegger] Lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
      >>>"The fact that the phenomenology is left out of the
      >>encyclopedia-system as a functional part of it is not a deficiency of
      >>this system. Rather, the omission of the phenomenology--after it
      >>inaugurated the system--marks the beginning of the which has the logic
      >>as its only appropriate beginning. This is so because the system of
      >>absolute knowing, if it understands itself correctly, must have an
      >>absolute beginning. Now, since on the one hand the phenomenology does
      >>not begin as the logic does and thus must be left out of the beginning
      >>of the system, while on the other hand the phenomenology prepares the
      >>domain for a possible absolute beginning, the omission of the
      >>phenomenology from the encyclopedia-system articulates its
      >>indispensable affiliation with and relationship to this system. But
      >>sufficient justice is not done to this affiliation when the
      >>phenomenology shrinks into a segment of a segment of the third part of
      >>the encyclopedia-system, although the system for its part also
      >>requires such shrinking. Therefore, the Phenomenology of Spirit
      >>occupies a double position in the encyclopedia-system: In a certain
      >>way the phenomenology is a foundational part of the system while being
      >>at the same time an affiliated component within the system."
      >>(Heidegger, p. 9)
      >>>I agree with everything that Heidegger says above.
      >>>But what I think Heidegger has left out of his interpretation is the
      >>relationship between the PHENOMENOLOGY (which stands outside the
      >>system) and the Phenomenology (which acts as a segment the final part
      >>of the system).
      >>>So, what I am arguing, is that the "double position" of the
      >>PHENOMENOLOGY fulfills Hegel's "systematic" demand that Philosophy
      >>must form a circle.
      >>Dear Randall,
      >>Thanks. That was all very clearly expressed.
      >>It isn't really true, though, that the Phenomenology was shrunk into
      >>the middle section of Subjective Spirit. Just a very small part of the
      >>Phenomenology is included there--Sense Certainty, Perception, a very
      >>small part of Understanding, only the first part of
      >>Self-consciousness, just the slightest reference to Reason.
      >>Basically all that is included in the Encyclopedia is just the bare
      >>idea of phenomenology as opposed to system. Phenomenology has to do
      >>with how we learn about things experientially. System is how we think
      >>about these things once we know them.
      >>This can be very clearly seen by comparing the Spirit chapter of the
      >>Phenomenology to the Objective Spirit part of the Encyclopedia.
      >>In the system Objective Spirit has the form of the syllogism:
      >>Right-Morality-Ethical Life, with Ethical Life itself also a
      >>syllogism: Family-Civil Society-the State.
      >>In the Spirit chapter of the Phenomenology all the content is
      >>there--family, state, rights, morality. Perhaps the idea of Civil
      >>Society wasn't fully developed in 1807. But Hegel at any rate deals
      >>with wealth. But there's no system here at all. In fact everything is
      >>dialectically related: the family in opposition to the state, wealth
      >>or individual rights in opposition to the state. Morality in a
      >>dialectical relation to, I quess, civil society.
      >>And the same is the case when the Absolute Spirit part of the
      >>Encyclopedia is compared withn the Religion chapter of the
      >>Phenomenology. In the Phenomenology art and religion are not separated
      >>out but rather dialectically related.
      >>Or, in other words, the Phenomenology, in regard to content at least,
      >>is the same as the Philosophy of Spirit--aside, that is, from the
      >>sections of Subjective Spirit on Anthropology and Psychology.
      >>The difference is that the content is dealt with phenomenologically in
      >>one and systematically in the other. Of course for something to be
      >>dealt with systematically, it is necessary first to phenomenologically
      >>engage with the material. So the order Phenomenology-Logic-[Nature,
      >>Spirit], is quite correct and necessary.
      >I think the distinction between dealing with a content
      >phenomenologically or systmeatically is dangerous. First, because there
      >would be a content separated from its formal dealing and secondly, this
      >distinction does at least suggest that there is on the one side a
      >process of knowledge and separated from it a result of knowing. Both
      >seems to be quite unhegelian.
      >For Hegel another distinction is much more important: to know something
      >about knowledge and recognition prior to science or in science itself.
      >At the beginning of the Science of Logic in the chapter about "With What
      >must Science Begin?" Hegel writes:
      >"Here we have only to consider how the logical beginning appears; the
      >two sides from which it can be taken have already been named, to wit,
      >either as a mediated result or as a beginning proper, as an immediacy.
      >This is not the place to deal with the question apparently so important
      >in present-day thought, whether the knowledge of truth is an immediate
      >knowledge having a pure beginning, a faith, or whether it is a mediated
      >knowledge . In so far as this can be dealt with preliminarily it has
      >been done elsewhere. Here we need only quote from it this, there is
      >nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in mind or anywhere else
      >which does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation, so that
      >these two determinations reveal themselves to be unseparated and
      >inseparable and the opposition between them to be a nullity. But as
      >regards the philosophical discussion of this, it is to be found in every
      >logical proposition in which occur the determinations of immediacy and
      >mediation and consequently also the discussion of their opposition and
      >their truth. Inasmuch as this opposition, as related to thinking, to
      >knowing, to cognition, acquires the more concrete form of immediate or
      >mediated knowledge, it is the nature of cognition as such which is
      >considered within the science of logic, while the more concrete form of
      >cognition falls to be considered in the philosophy of spirit and the
      >phenomenology of the same. But to want the nature of cognition clarified
      >prior to the science is to demand that it be considered outside the
      >science; outside the science this cannot be accomplished, at least not
      >in a scientific manner and such a manner is alone here in place."
      >(translated by A.V. Miller with my addtion according to the original in
      >the TWS: ... "and the phenomenology of the same.")
      >>From this, I think, also the relation between the Science of Logic and
      >the science of spirit and its phenomenology becomes quite clear.
      >Beat Greuter

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    • stephen theron
      I agree absolutely with your general point about beauty, surely the final refutation of puritanism . St. Thomas associates the cardinal virtue of temperance
      Message 85 of 85 , May 10, 2010
        I agree absolutely with your general point about beauty, surely the final refutation of "puritanism". St. Thomas associates the cardinal virtue of temperance especially with beauty. I should think where one "transcendental" is they all are. I find K�ng�s attempt to insert history or the historical among them, in his book on Hegel, very prosaic indeed, besides being wrong-headed (or are they the same?). They, especially Being, are perfectio prefectionum.

        Hegel, i would guess, is reacting against the "beautiful souls" of the contemporary romanticism specifically, though of course he sees himself as representing the Romantic too, in art, for example and all he says about romantic art. Spirit, I suppose, is his final "category", as is "being" for Thomas, i.e. just a cut above the others it pulls in its train....

        I only said "seeming"....


        To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
        From: jgbardis@...
        Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 17:26:05 +0000
        Subject: [hegel] Re: relations

        --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, stephen theron <stephentheron@...> wrote:
        > John,
        > In seeming contradiction of what I wrote you yesterday I find this:
        > In revealed or manifest religion "all is proportionate to the notion; there is no longer anything secret in God. Here, then, is the consciousness of the developed conception of Spirit, of reconciliation, not in beauty, in joyousness, but in the Spirit." Lectures on Ph.R., Vol. I, pp. 84-85 (Speirs & Sanderson, London 1895, SW 15, p.100., otherwise quoted in van Riet�s article, Philosophy Today, summer 1967, p.85. "not in beauty"!
        > Yours, Stephen

        Dear Stephen,

        Well, that seems to be the end of my whole theory. Unfortunately I'm out of town this week and so can't look any thing up.

        But I believe Hegel calls Greek religion the religion of art. He devoted a good deal of time to a recreation of what he imagined Greek religion to be. Up until he was about 30 he regarded Greek religion as the absolute religion. Then some how or another he came to the conclusion that Christianity was the absolute religion. So not reconciliation in beauty and joy (the Greek religion) but reconciliation in spirit (Christianity).

        I still think you can't have truth and goodness, as Hegel does in the cognition section of the Logic, without also having beauty. Maybe Life has to do with beauty? In that case the absolute would have to do with some other transcendental--the One?

        But very likely it all makes sense if one could figure it out.


        Disfruta de Messenger y Hotmail en tu BlackBerry �Hazlo ya!

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