Re: [hegel] Re: Heidegger on Hegel (1)
- John writes:
>I think the distinction between dealing with a content
> --- In firstname.lastname@example.org <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>,
> "TheJack" <thejackjam@...> wrote:
> > [Heidegger] Lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
> > ----------------
> > "The fact that the phenomenology is left out of the
> encyclopedia-system as a functional part of it is not a deficiency of
> this system. Rather, the omission of the phenomenology--after it
> inaugurated the system--marks the beginning of the which has the logic
> as its only appropriate beginning. This is so because the system of
> absolute knowing, if it understands itself correctly, must have an
> absolute beginning. Now, since on the one hand the phenomenology does
> not begin as the logic does and thus must be left out of the beginning
> of the system, while on the other hand the phenomenology prepares the
> domain for a possible absolute beginning, the omission of the
> phenomenology from the encyclopedia-system articulates its
> indispensable affiliation with and relationship to this system. But
> sufficient justice is not done to this affiliation when the
> phenomenology shrinks into a segment of a segment of the third part of
> the encyclopedia-system, although the system for its part also
> requires such shrinking. Therefore, the Phenomenology of Spirit
> occupies a double position in the encyclopedia-system: In a certain
> way the phenomenology is a foundational part of the system while being
> at the same time an affiliated component within the system."
> (Heidegger, p. 9)
> > -------------------
> > I agree with everything that Heidegger says above.
> > But what I think Heidegger has left out of his interpretation is the
> relationship between the PHENOMENOLOGY (which stands outside the
> system) and the Phenomenology (which acts as a segment the final part
> of the system).
> > So, what I am arguing, is that the "double position" of the
> PHENOMENOLOGY fulfills Hegel's "systematic" demand that Philosophy
> must form a circle.
> Dear Randall,
> Thanks. That was all very clearly expressed.
> It isn't really true, though, that the Phenomenology was shrunk into
> the middle section of Subjective Spirit. Just a very small part of the
> Phenomenology is included there--Sense Certainty, Perception, a very
> small part of Understanding, only the first part of
> Self-consciousness, just the slightest reference to Reason.
> Basically all that is included in the Encyclopedia is just the bare
> idea of phenomenology as opposed to system. Phenomenology has to do
> with how we learn about things experientially. System is how we think
> about these things once we know them.
> This can be very clearly seen by comparing the Spirit chapter of the
> Phenomenology to the Objective Spirit part of the Encyclopedia.
> In the system Objective Spirit has the form of the syllogism:
> Right-Morality-Ethical Life, with Ethical Life itself also a
> syllogism: Family-Civil Society-the State.
> In the Spirit chapter of the Phenomenology all the content is
> there--family, state, rights, morality. Perhaps the idea of Civil
> Society wasn't fully developed in 1807. But Hegel at any rate deals
> with wealth. But there's no system here at all. In fact everything is
> dialectically related: the family in opposition to the state, wealth
> or individual rights in opposition to the state. Morality in a
> dialectical relation to, I quess, civil society.
> And the same is the case when the Absolute Spirit part of the
> Encyclopedia is compared withn the Religion chapter of the
> Phenomenology. In the Phenomenology art and religion are not separated
> out but rather dialectically related.
> Or, in other words, the Phenomenology, in regard to content at least,
> is the same as the Philosophy of Spirit--aside, that is, from the
> sections of Subjective Spirit on Anthropology and Psychology.
> The difference is that the content is dealt with phenomenologically in
> one and systematically in the other. Of course for something to be
> dealt with systematically, it is necessary first to phenomenologically
> engage with the material. So the order Phenomenology-Logic-[Nature,
> Spirit], is quite correct and necessary.
phenomenologically or systmeatically is dangerous. First, because there
would be a content separated from its formal dealing and secondly, this
distinction does at least suggest that there is on the one side a
process of knowledge and separated from it a result of knowing. Both
seems to be quite unhegelian.
For Hegel another distinction is much more important: to know something
about knowledge and recognition prior to science or in science itself.
At the beginning of the Science of Logic in the chapter about "With What
must Science Begin?" Hegel writes:
"Here we have only to consider how the logical beginning appears; the
two sides from which it can be taken have already been named, to wit,
either as a mediated result or as a beginning proper, as an immediacy.
This is not the place to deal with the question apparently so important
in present-day thought, whether the knowledge of truth is an immediate
knowledge having a pure beginning, a faith, or whether it is a mediated
knowledge . In so far as this can be dealt with preliminarily it has
been done elsewhere. Here we need only quote from it this, there is
nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in mind or anywhere else
which does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation, so that
these two determinations reveal themselves to be unseparated and
inseparable and the opposition between them to be a nullity. But as
regards the philosophical discussion of this, it is to be found in every
logical proposition in which occur the determinations of immediacy and
mediation and consequently also the discussion of their opposition and
their truth. Inasmuch as this opposition, as related to thinking, to
knowing, to cognition, acquires the more concrete form of immediate or
mediated knowledge, it is the nature of cognition as such which is
considered within the science of logic, while the more concrete form of
cognition falls to be considered in the philosophy of spirit and the
phenomenology of the same. But to want the nature of cognition clarified
prior to the science is to demand that it be considered outside the
science; outside the science this cannot be accomplished, at least not
in a scientific manner and such a manner is alone here in place."
(translated by A.V. Miller with my addtion according to the original in
the TWS: ... "and the phenomenology of the same.")
From this, I think, also the relation between the Science of Logic and
the science of spirit and its phenomenology becomes quite clear.
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- I agree absolutely with your general point about beauty, surely the final refutation of "puritanism". St. Thomas associates the cardinal virtue of temperance especially with beauty. I should think where one "transcendental" is they all are. I find K�ng�s attempt to insert history or the historical among them, in his book on Hegel, very prosaic indeed, besides being wrong-headed (or are they the same?). They, especially Being, are perfectio prefectionum.
Hegel, i would guess, is reacting against the "beautiful souls" of the contemporary romanticism specifically, though of course he sees himself as representing the Romantic too, in art, for example and all he says about romantic art. Spirit, I suppose, is his final "category", as is "being" for Thomas, i.e. just a cut above the others it pulls in its train....
I only said "seeming"....
Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 17:26:05 +0000
Subject: [hegel] Re: relations
--- In email@example.com, stephen theron <stephentheron@...> wrote:
> In seeming contradiction of what I wrote you yesterday I find this:
> In revealed or manifest religion "all is proportionate to the notion; there is no longer anything secret in God. Here, then, is the consciousness of the developed conception of Spirit, of reconciliation, not in beauty, in joyousness, but in the Spirit." Lectures on Ph.R., Vol. I, pp. 84-85 (Speirs & Sanderson, London 1895, SW 15, p.100., otherwise quoted in van Riet�s article, Philosophy Today, summer 1967, p.85. "not in beauty"!
> Yours, Stephen
Well, that seems to be the end of my whole theory. Unfortunately I'm out of town this week and so can't look any thing up.
But I believe Hegel calls Greek religion the religion of art. He devoted a good deal of time to a recreation of what he imagined Greek religion to be. Up until he was about 30 he regarded Greek religion as the absolute religion. Then some how or another he came to the conclusion that Christianity was the absolute religion. So not reconciliation in beauty and joy (the Greek religion) but reconciliation in spirit (Christianity).
I still think you can't have truth and goodness, as Hegel does in the cognition section of the Logic, without also having beauty. Maybe Life has to do with beauty? In that case the absolute would have to do with some other transcendental--the One?
But very likely it all makes sense if one could figure it out.
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