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Re: [hegel] Heidegger on Hegel (1)

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  • Beat Greuter
    ... You seem to be the only Hegelian on this list!? ... It is no use to say what dialictic does mean. This precisely is the work of the understanding as you
    Message 1 of 85 , Mar 16, 2010
      Alan Ponikvar writes:

      > Hi Paul,
      > You have done quite a bit of work here. I have read all three of you
      > postings and I have one overriding impression: you wish to dismiss as
      > unworthy of serious consideration Heidegger's criticisms. You seem to
      > alternative between calling Heidegger either stupid or insulting. You also
      > make reference to a supposed obvious shared body of knowledge that
      > Hegelians
      > have that enable them to see how stupid or insulting Heidegger is. My
      > simply
      > summary of how I see you proceeding should be sufficient to indicate
      > that I
      > do not share your views. Am I being unfair? I leave it to you to
      > decide. But
      > to say Hegel obviously did not mean what he is accused if saying is
      > not the
      > same as saying what Hegel meant. My impression of Heidegger's
      > criticisms is
      > that they express doubts many readers have about Hegel's philosophy.
      > Trying
      > to answer them rather than dismiss them might be a good place for a
      > student
      > of Hegel to test his knowledge of Hegel.
      > I think the discomfort Heidegger may cause has much to do with how he
      > focuses attention on Hegel's absolute. In many respects it is quite
      > close to
      > Heidegger's notion of the ontological difference. That Heidegger is unable
      > to see this is in my view an indication of how his philosophy remains
      > within
      > the frame of what Hegel calls the understanding. But having said this I
      > believe that most Hegelians also remain within this limiting frame.

      You seem to be the only Hegelian on this list!?

      > Thus
      > they have no real good responses to Heidegger's criticisms because they
      > share Heidegger's limitations. You refer to the dialectic but do not say
      > what you mean by it - a common enough oversight of Hegelians.

      It is no use to say what dialictic does mean. This precisely is the work
      of the understanding as you can see for instance in the discussion of
      the antinomies with Kant. You have to demonstrate it in the matter
      without using the term 'dialectic' at all.

      > Your preoccupation with Heidegger's claim that Hegel presupposes what he
      > sets out to prove is proof to me that you are still stuck fighting the
      > wrong
      > battles. Hegel's absolute is both presupposed and posited without begging
      > the usual questions in part because Hegel does not proceed from what he
      > presupposes because the nature of what he presupposes does not allow it to
      > function as a guide. Abstractly put, Hegel's absolute can be characterized
      > as pure difference.

      What does this mean 'pure difference'? You could then also say that the
      pure being and pure nothing is the absolute. But this is only the
      beginning and to end here would precisely eliminate the absolute having
      become a mere expression of the understanding. The speculative task is
      to follow the development of the difference and to argue for the
      differentiation process. To say that "Hegel does not proceed from what
      he presupposes" is at least ambiguous though of course Hegel's Logic is
      not a linear or causal process. To take your statement downright would
      mean also to deny any systematics (I do not say 'system') and to
      pre-suppose an abstract result of the Absolute Idea as pure difference,
      a horrifying abstraction like on the other side the Absolute Idea as
      pure identity. This, however, is diametrically opposed to Hegels belief
      that the path is as important as the result.

      > It is not a big ball of everything nor a grounding
      > principle for a deductive argument. It is both present at each point along
      > the course of the Phenomenology and also the final shape of knowing. The
      > task for a Hegelian is to comprehend rather than deny this.
      > Regards, Alan

      Best wishes,
      Beat Greuter

      > From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>] On
      > Behalf Of Paul
      > Trejo
      > Sent: Monday, March 15, 2010 11:11 AM
      > To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
      > Subject: [hegel] Heidegger on Hegel (1)
      > Dear Hegel List,
      > Heidegger wrote three books dealing with Hegel directly.
      > The first of these books was entitled:
      > (Martin Heidegger, 1930, translated by
      > P. Emad and K. Maly, 1988, 153 pages)
      > Heidegger divided his Introduction into five sections, namely:
      > Section 1. The System of the PHENOMENOLOGY and of the
      > Section 2. Hegel's Concept of a System of Science
      > Section 3. Significance of the 1st Part of the System with
      > Regard to the Designation of Both of its Titles
      > Section 4. Inner Mission of the PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT as
      > the First Part of the System
      > Section 5. Presupposition of the PHENOMENOLOGY: Its
      > Absolute Beginning with the Absolute
      > This Introduction summarized Heidegger's approach to Hegel
      > quite well. To keep my e-mail fairly brief, I'll post today
      > only my review of Heidegger's Introduction.
      > Heidegger began by pondering the place of the PHENOMENOLOGY
      > OF SPIRIT in Hegel's work. Published before and perhaps as
      > an introduction to the LOGIC, the PHENOMENOLOGY appears after
      > the LOGIC in the ENCYCLOPEDIA progression of Logic-Nature-Spirit.
      > Heidegger believed this placement was very important, and
      > said, "We cannot avoid these questions" (p. 9). Actually
      > the question is marginal for an understanding of the inner
      > text of the PHENOMENOLOGY, and is of interest mainly for
      > an external analysis. His narrative here shone little
      > light on Hegel's project. So Heidegger opened by stalling.
      > Hegel refers to his philosophy as a science, but Heidegger
      > rejected that claim. Philosophy, he said, is not a science
      > and cannot be a science in the contemporary sense, because:
      > "This concept of philosophy as *the* science became
      > increasingly dominant from the 19th century to the
      > present. This took place, not on the basis of the
      > inner wealth and original impulses of philosophizing,
      > but rather...out of perplexity over the proper task
      > of philosophy...because the sciences have occupied
      > all fields of reality. Thus, nothing was left for
      > philosophy except to become the science of these
      > sciences..." (Heidegger, LHP, p. 11)
      > Heidegger resorted to Husserl's definition of the term,
      > science, and said:
      > "...It is only with Husserl that this conception of
      > the essence of philosophy...in the spirit of the
      > most radical scientificality takes on a positive
      > shape. Husserl [said]...that phenomenology
      > represents empiricism and positivism, properly
      > understood." (Heidegger, LHP, pp. 11, 20)
      > For Heidegger, only empirical science was science, so it is
      > reasonable to align him with Alfred Ayer in the 20th century
      > trend of allegedly overcoming metaphysics. Heidegger added,
      > "Now, in claiming that philosophy is *not*
      > science...I am suggesting parenthetically that
      > philosophy can find its way back into its
      > fundamental problems less than ever as long
      > as it is primarily conceived on the model of
      > the idea of a rigorous scientificality and
      > in terms of the founding of knowledge and
      > of the sciences." (Heidegger, LHP, p. 12)
      > Philosophy, according to Heidegger, was not the foundation of
      > the sciences, rather, it was becoming superfluous. Heidegger
      > added,
      > "We must keep the possibility open that the
      > time to come, as well as our own time,
      > remains with no real philosophy. Such
      > a lack would not be at all bad."
      > (Heidegger, LHP, p. 13)
      > Hegel's idea of the Absolute, in particular, was not
      > scientific, according to Heidegger. This is where, prior to
      > his HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE, Heidegger first mocked
      > Hegel, and said that 'Absolute' means 'absolved' of any
      > demonstration. Heidegger said,
      > "For knowledge to be qualitatively other
      > than relative knowledge...it must not
      > remain bound but must liberate and
      > ab-solve itself from what it knows and
      > yet as so ab-solved, as absolute, still
      > be a knowledge." (Heidegger, LHP, p. 15)
      > After this shrinking of the absolute, Heidegger offered a
      > conclusion:
      > "Hence it becomes clear how absurd it
      > would be to say, with regard to this
      > Hegelian concept of philosophy, that
      > it expresses a striving for a
      > 'scientific philosophy...'
      > (Heidegger, LHP, p. 17)
      > Every reader of Hegel immediately recognizes this as a
      > slap in the face of Hegel. Hegel calls his System a
      > science, and Heidegger calls that claim 'absurd.'
      > Focusing on Hegel's early subtitle, 'Science of the Experience
      > of Consciousness,' Heidegger will not only revoke the term
      > 'scientific' from Hegel, but the term 'phenomenological' as
      > well. Heidegger said,
      > "With the expression, 'science of experience,'
      > Hegel does not want to emphasize that this
      > science should be confirmed and proved in
      > the experience of either a sensible or an
      > intelligible intuition. Therefore, it is
      > quite misleading to...establish a connection
      > between contemporary phenomenology and that
      > of Hegel...as if Hegel were concerned with
      > the analysis of the acts and experiences of
      > consciousness." (Heidegger, LHP, p. 21)
      > What an insult to claim that Hegel was not founding a
      > phenomenology! What an insult to claim that Hegel was not
      > contributing profoundly to a scientific phenomenological,
      > new and radical approach to understanding the evolution,
      > behavior and experience of consciousness!
      > Any reader of Hegel realizes that Heidegger made all this
      > up -- he was not reading Hegel deeply, but was evidently
      > trying to meet a deadline to publish something about Hegel,
      > a writer with whom he remained unfamiliar.
      > Heidegger also wished to contrast his philosophy of
      > being-in-the-world with Hegel's phenomenology of spirit.
      > In order to do this, Heidegger must define Hegel in some
      > limited and useless manner. So Heidegger wrote,
      > "For Hegel this way of undergoing an
      > experience is certainly not related
      > to events, tools or people."
      > (Heidegger, LHP, p. 21)
      > Such a statement betrays Heidegger's unfamiliarity with the
      > themes of the Kant-Fichte-Schelling-Hegel progression, and
      > with Chapters 4 through 8 of the PHENOMENOLOGY in particular.
      > Heidegger claimed to find 'three main errors' in previous
      > interpretations of Hegel's PHENOMENOLOGY: (1) that it was
      > related to a scientific phenomenology like Husserl's; (2)
      > that it wanted to align the types of philosophy of the
      > past into an orderly system; and (3)...
      > "Allied with these two misinterpretations,
      > there is a third which takes the
      > PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT as an introduction
      > to philosophy in the sense that this
      > phenomenology leads to a transition from
      > the so-called natural consciousness of
      > sensibility to a genuine speculative
      > philosophical knowledge."
      > (Heidegger, LHP, p. 29)
      > According to Heidegger, Hegel's own definition of his own
      > phenomenology, a portrait of the transitions from sensory
      > consciousness to an absolute, was a 'misinterpretation.'
      > How can Heidegger be forgiven this kind of sloppy reading?
      > Furthermore, Heidegger accused Hegel of irrationalism:
      > "Is it not the case today that Hegel's
      > conception is already completely overcome,
      > in that from various points of view it
      > is said that it is not just ratio and
      > rationalism that dominate in Hegel, but
      > rather that the most acute irrationalism
      > positively obtains in his work?"
      > (Heidegger, LHP, p. 30)
      > Heidegger did not demonstrate this 'overcoming' of Hegel,
      > he merely asserted it. Upon what basis? The modern
      > student of Philosophy immediately recognizes the Kantian
      > dogmatic of the Unknowable Thing-in-itself and therefore
      > the impossibility of Metaphysics. Hegel, the last of the
      > great Metaphysicians, does not deserve a fair hearing,
      > since 'everybody knows' that his project was already
      > 'overcome' before he wrote his first word.
      > Assuming this alleged overcoming of Hegel, Heidegger
      > outlined his conditions for his challenge to Hegel: The
      > reader must presume that Hegel presupposes Spirit, and
      > does not demonstrate a progression of enlightenment.
      > Heidegger said,
      > "We must repeat again and again that
      > Hegel presupposes already at the
      > beginning what he achieves at the
      > end...for philosophy is not concerned
      > with proving anything in the usual
      > sense of following a formal principle
      > of proof in logic which is not that
      > of philosophy itself." (Heidegger,
      > LHP, p. 30)
      > Upon this blatant falsehood Heidegger will build all
      > his further observations about Hegel's work. Hegel
      > first and foremost worked to prove all of his arguments
      > with formal logic and demonstration. Heidegger did
      > not know this because Heidegger failed to read Hegel.
      > Heidegger presumed his readers did not read Hegel,
      > either, and he was not disappointed. They had not.
      > Nor would they, after Heidegger got through with him,
      > as Heidegger labors to discount Hegel by any number of
      > falsehoods.
      > Throughout the remainder of this book, Heidegger repeated
      > his accusation that Hegel presupposed his conclusions.
      > This forms perhaps the main theme of Heidegger's charge.
      > Heidegger said,
      > "We understand nothing at all if we do
      > not already from the beginning know
      > in the mode of absolute knowledge."
      > (Heidegger, LHP, p. 33)
      > That is nothing more than a plain insult to Hegel's project.
      > As for the 'inner mission' of Hegel's PHENOMENOLOGY given in
      > the Table of Contents in three lettered sections:
      > C. REASON,
      > Heidegger fixated on section, (C), which is further divided
      > into:
      > C(AA) REASON,
      > C(BB) SPIRIT,
      > C(CC) RELIGION and
      > For Heidegger, that was sufficient 'proof' that Hegel
      > presupposed Spirit without any development. Heidegger
      > gleefully alliterates:
      > "Hegel himself hesitates here...From this
      > division we conclude once again that the
      > end of the work does not escape its
      > beginning, but presents a return to this
      > beginning. The end is the beginning which
      > has only become other and thus come to
      > itself...The absolute already exists --
      > how else could it be sought?"
      > (Heidegger, LHP, p. 36)
      > Not only Hegel, said Heidegger, but all philosophy before
      > Heidegger was guilty of this sin of presupposition!
      > Heidegger then announced a totally new fact in his eyes,
      > "...the fact that all philosophy from first
      > to last merely unfolds its presupposition
      > ...Philosophy's presupposition is...the
      > opening of the whole itself and is
      > precisely that which is there from the
      > first continuously to the end, waiting
      > to be unfolded." (Heidegger, LHP, p. 36)
      > With this amateur insight, Heidegger also justified his
      > own procedure -- to simply announce and assert his points,
      > without any formal proofs at all.
      > Heidegger perceived no real application for Hegel's idea
      > of Spirit, nor did he see that Hegel explained anything
      > at all. Heidegger said,
      > "Hegel...begins and must begin with
      > absolute knowledge. This is so because
      > the end is plainly at the beginning, and
      > because the way in which the end is the
      > beginning (and vice versa) has already
      > been decided...This is what we mean when
      > we say that the PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT
      > begins absolutely with the absolute."
      > (Heidegger, LHP, p. 37)
      > That insults Hegel to the highest degree. Hegel spent
      > his entire career demonstrating the build-up without any
      > presuppositions, from Nothingness up to the absolute
      > concrete Idea, a whole Encyclopedia of Knowledge given
      > in a Systematic method of Triadic Logic. But Heidegger
      > seems to be unaware of the A-B-C of Hegel's project.
      > That is because Heidegger is faking it.
      > I would demand that Martin Heidegger show us, using only
      > Hegel's texts as his objects, exactly how he might justify
      > these sweeping charges. But Heidegger already had an
      > answer ready-to-hand. Heidegger said,
      > "What is meant when we say the
      > absolutely with the absolute is
      > something that cannot be shown
      > in a formal discussion."
      > (Heidegger, LHP, p. 37)
      > In other words, Heidegger wished to be absolved of any
      > proofs, and wishes to be taken at his word -- using the
      > authority of his office. What a deceit!
      > Heidegger then attempted to contrast Hegel's infinite
      > Spirit with his own finite Dasein. That was his own
      > presupposed theme for this book. Heidegger said,
      > "We shall try to encounter Hegel on the
      > problematic of finitude. This means...
      > that through a confrontation with Hegel's
      > problematic of infinitude we shall try to
      > create, on the basis of our inquiry into
      > finitude, the kinship needed in order to
      > reveal the spirit of Hegel's philosophy."
      > (Heidegger, LHP, p. 38)
      > Who can doubt where Heidegger is headed? Where else but
      > toward a repetition of his own ideology about being and
      > Dasein:
      > "Infinitude and finitude say something
      > only insofar as they draw their meaning
      > from the guiding and basic question of
      > philosophy -- the question of being."
      > (Heidegger, LHP, p. 38)
      > We sensed Heidegger's objection a mile away; Hegel did not
      > truly understand the concept of the finite, the concept
      > of Dasein, and that was Hegel's alleged failing. So Hegel's
      > idea of an infinity that transcends finite reality is
      > ipso facto false, Heidegger said.
      > "Was it not Hegel, in fact, who ousted
      > finitude from philosophy in the sense
      > that he sublated it or overcame it by
      > putting it in its proper place? Certainly.
      > But the question is whether the finitude
      > that was determinant in philosophy before
      > Hegel was the original and effective
      > finitude installed in philosophy...The
      > question must be asked whether Hegel's
      > concept of infinitude did not arise from
      > that incidental finitude, in order to
      > reach back and absorb it." (Heidegger,
      > LHP, p. 38)
      > Heidegger showed himself to be ignorant of Hegel's synthetic
      > method that sublates the finite within the infinite, and
      > did not 'oust' finitude from philosophy. Yet this is among
      > the elementary ideas of Hegel's System. Heidegger does not
      > debate with Hegel, then, but only with himself.
      > Heidegger further exposed himself as unwilling to review
      > any idea of Spirit in an objective investigation.
      > Heidegger said,
      > "Two brief remarks on Hegel's terminology.
      > It was stated earlier...that the
      > PHENOMENOLOGY presents the self-exposition
      > of reason, which is recognized in German
      > Idealism as absolute and is explicated by
      > Hegel as spirit. But the guiding problem
      > of ancient philosophy is the question...
      > What is being?" (Heidegger, LHP, p. 41)
      > Hegel's project, the project of Reason and its Freedom,
      > are not dealt with by Heidegger -- only dismissed. They
      > are to be taken off of the table without ceremony because
      > Heidegger's authority demands it.
      > This question -- what is being -- (a question that
      > Heidegger would never answer) was Heidegger's obsession
      > and he wanted to deal with *that*. But because he failed
      > to read Hegel deeply, he also failed to see that Hegel's
      > project of Reason had completely answered the problem of
      > Being, that is, of Ontology, with Hegel's dialectical
      > improvements to Anselm's Ontological Argument.
      > This is the critical factor for Hegel readers -- to
      > realize that Heidegger never dipped his little toe into
      > the waters of the dialectic. He simply refused to go in.
      > The final question for Heidegger, who posed as the lonely
      > knight of the quest for ontology, was about Hegel's use
      > of the terms, 'being and beings.'
      > But rather than go directly to Hegel for a discussion,
      > Heidegger already had a conclusion! Heidegger wrote:
      > "Hegel uses the terms being and beings
      > terminologically only for a certain region
      > of beings as we understand this term...What
      > Hegel calls beings and being we designate
      > with the terms extant and extantness."
      > (Heidegger, LHP, p. 41)
      > Heidegger's erroneous claim that Hegel did not grasp the
      > project of ontology amounts to the simple-minded notion that
      > Hegel merely failed to use the terms, 'being and beings' in
      > the finite Heideggerian sense. So Heidegger said,
      > "Thus, from first to last being means
      > something radically different for Hegel
      > than it does for us. But this is not a
      > difference between two points of view
      > that are side by side but indifferent
      > ...Rather, it is difference itself..."
      > (Heidegger, LHP, p. 42)
      > Here Heidegger prefigured Derrida's own faulty review of
      > Hegel's texts. Being is precisely the question of Ontology
      > and should be dealt with scientifically. Yet we can see
      > that Heidegger did not want to delve too deeply - he simply
      > wanted to dismiss Hegel's work from the competition, not by
      > proofs or demonstrations, but by accusations and misdirection.
      > By contrast, Hegel's labor with the idea of Being amounts to
      > refined genius.
      > Although we only reviewed the Introduction to this short
      > book, we have already reviewed nearly one-third of its
      > pages. The rest of the book will repeat the same themes
      > in other words.
      > What, therefore, justified Heidegger's review of Hegel's
      > PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT in any degree? Heidegger's closing
      > sentence in his Introduction may give the clue, since in
      > this sentence Heidegger sought to patronize Hegel's
      > so-called onto-theo-logic. Heidegger wrote:
      > "For philosophy is, like art and religion,
      > a human-superhuman affair of primary and
      > ultimate significance. Clearly separated
      > from both art and religion and yet equally
      > primary with both of them, philosophy
      > necessarily stands in the radiance of what
      > is beautiful and in the throes of the holy."
      > (Heidegger, LHP, p. 42)
      > Hegel was to be admired, per Heidegger, because Religion
      > has its own realm, even if it can never be scientific.
      > It is clear that Hegel's scientific and logical project was
      > entirely lost on Martin Heidegger. One can never obtain
      > an accurate portrait of Hegel's System from Heidegger's
      > lazy and faulty reading.
      > Best regards,
      > --Paul Trejo, MA

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    • stephen theron
      I agree absolutely with your general point about beauty, surely the final refutation of puritanism . St. Thomas associates the cardinal virtue of temperance
      Message 85 of 85 , May 10, 2010
        I agree absolutely with your general point about beauty, surely the final refutation of "puritanism". St. Thomas associates the cardinal virtue of temperance especially with beauty. I should think where one "transcendental" is they all are. I find K�ng�s attempt to insert history or the historical among them, in his book on Hegel, very prosaic indeed, besides being wrong-headed (or are they the same?). They, especially Being, are perfectio prefectionum.

        Hegel, i would guess, is reacting against the "beautiful souls" of the contemporary romanticism specifically, though of course he sees himself as representing the Romantic too, in art, for example and all he says about romantic art. Spirit, I suppose, is his final "category", as is "being" for Thomas, i.e. just a cut above the others it pulls in its train....

        I only said "seeming"....


        To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
        From: jgbardis@...
        Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 17:26:05 +0000
        Subject: [hegel] Re: relations

        --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, stephen theron <stephentheron@...> wrote:
        > John,
        > In seeming contradiction of what I wrote you yesterday I find this:
        > In revealed or manifest religion "all is proportionate to the notion; there is no longer anything secret in God. Here, then, is the consciousness of the developed conception of Spirit, of reconciliation, not in beauty, in joyousness, but in the Spirit." Lectures on Ph.R., Vol. I, pp. 84-85 (Speirs & Sanderson, London 1895, SW 15, p.100., otherwise quoted in van Riet�s article, Philosophy Today, summer 1967, p.85. "not in beauty"!
        > Yours, Stephen

        Dear Stephen,

        Well, that seems to be the end of my whole theory. Unfortunately I'm out of town this week and so can't look any thing up.

        But I believe Hegel calls Greek religion the religion of art. He devoted a good deal of time to a recreation of what he imagined Greek religion to be. Up until he was about 30 he regarded Greek religion as the absolute religion. Then some how or another he came to the conclusion that Christianity was the absolute religion. So not reconciliation in beauty and joy (the Greek religion) but reconciliation in spirit (Christianity).

        I still think you can't have truth and goodness, as Hegel does in the cognition section of the Logic, without also having beauty. Maybe Life has to do with beauty? In that case the absolute would have to do with some other transcendental--the One?

        But very likely it all makes sense if one could figure it out.


        Disfruta de Messenger y Hotmail en tu BlackBerry �Hazlo ya!

        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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