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Sense and Reference Dependence?

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  • Paul Healey
    From: Alan Ponikvar Subject: RE: [hegel] Hegel;s hierarchy of absolute spirit To: hegel@yahoogroups.com Date: Friday, 19 February, 2010,
    Message 1 of 3 , Mar 1, 2010
      From: Alan Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@...>
      Subject: RE: [hegel] Hegel;s hierarchy of absolute spirit
      To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
      Date: Friday, 19 February, 2010, 0:04

      >This is the inability to distinguish knowing from self-knowing
      >in a true knowing. He then shows how to make this distinction
      >with the help of dialectics.

      This is what Alan finished off by declaring; I found it interesting,
      and maybe it ties in with other comments he made,
      but I have lost the post on the significance of inferences to Hegel's analysis?; Brandom 2002, in 'Tales of the Mighty Dead' claims that
      'sense dependence does not entail reference dependence'. In this way,
      perhaps Hegel is pointing out that the relation between knowing what the senses can comprehend (See Section 109 of the PhG) and the
      presuppositions of the understanding that count?;
      when it comes to the identity of the agent, that which is determinate,
      is the truth for that which is in between. (See Martin J. De Nys.
      'Identity and Difference, Thought and Being', comment on Di Giovanni's
      quote from 'Reflections and Contradictions: A Commentary on
      Some Passages of Hegel's Science of Logic' Hegel
      Studien 8 (1973) in Philip T. Grier's. 2007. 'Identity and Difference'.
       
      What most in the analytical school following Kant do, is speculate
      about being (the dollars in his pocket to the size of the cosmos)
      with what amounts to, and I presume, can be called probablistic inferences; for the chance of events, but presuppose an indifference to the
      truth of their relation for the function. I.e., Russell and Whiteheads use of propositional functions, are just propositions in disguise; emperor's
      new clothes. That is, the fault with their reductionist program goes back to Aristotle. (I just had an abstract accepted: 'A Dialectical Theory of Opposition', but sent proof for abstract in booklet a bit late, but even so, I hope to get an article out before the conference)
       
      Perhaps, the build up in the Phenomenology as an introduction to the
      Science of Logic, is a way of trying to bring the reader, not well
      versed in the different understandings of logic, to appreciate
      the difficulty in revealing the Notion (principle of) of their concepts?
      Such though is the strength of the folk psychology behind the purple
      haze of contemporary abstractions; understandings of logic based
      on the faulty use of equality as an identity (see Spinozaism in the EL
      and section 45 of preface to PhG), that for a few, it either
      seems blazingly obvious; until the analysis is developed
      (a joke when I looked at the PhG for the first time) or totally  incomprehensible (from Popper's falsification to
      Searle's exposition of a Chinese 'ghost in the machine' see
      http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/%c2%a0and beyond).
       
      It is, perhaps a logic for ordinary people; not seduced by the duality
      offered up between the exoteric and esoteric use of language; the use of symbol pictures to protect vested interests, or the trappings of a celebrity culture; in Mure's words, from the translators preface of the SL:
      'philosophy is no longer the exclusive buisiness of professionals
      than art or religion. If there were not in every man, however
      intermittently he feels it, and however inadequately he interprets it,
      the nisus towards attaining a total and unreserved self-consciousness,
      there would be no professional philosophers.'
       
       
      Paul Healey
    • PAUL
      Speaking of the analytical school, it occurs to me that there are more than a few similarities between Hegel s approach to Ethics and the minority opinion of
      Message 2 of 3 , Mar 2, 2010
        Speaking of the analytical school, it occurs to me that there are more than a few similarities between Hegel's approach to Ethics and the minority opinion of Jonathan Dancy and his Particularist movement.

        In his recent book, "Ethics without Principles", Dancy speaks against the Generalist notion that principles are our guide in Ethics. That reminded me of Hegel's suggestion in his HISTORY (1830) that when the pressures of history become heavy, general 'principles' are of little value.

        More directly, Hegel and Schelling criticized Kant specifically because of his Ethics, and particularly for his "Ought", which they called the 'chill lump of Duty left in the stomach.'

        There seemed something unsatisfactory about the deontic 'Ought' for Hegel; perhaps it was the lack of Necessity.

        Hegel wrote no separate Treatise on Ethics, but he included sections on Morality and Ethics in his RIGHT (1821) in which he seems to have criticized Morality for its capricious subjectivity, and then he grounded Ethics in the larger, objective Institutions of Justice.

        Although some might argue that a Judge will take individual cases and decide which Statutes apply to them, Dancy has argued that this is not actually identical with the Generalist notion in Ethics of taking individual cases and deciding which Principles apply to them. That's clear, because Statutes are objective realities, while Principles are subjective maxims.

        So, Hegel and Dancy seem to be together in this line of reasoning. Has anybody here who is familiar with both Hegel and the Particularist school considered the similarities?

        Insofar as Particularism is also a variety of Intuitionism, which regards Reason and Reasons as unique realities (sui generis), this also may remind one of Hegel.

        Any thoughts out there?

        Best regards,
        --Paul Trejo, MA
      • Alan Ponikvar
        Hi Paul, I find myself in sympathy with the general drift of your comments. But I would like to approach your question one step removed. The question is not
        Message 3 of 3 , Mar 3, 2010
          Hi Paul,

          I find myself in sympathy with the general drift of your comments. But I
          would like to approach your question one step removed. The question is not
          only 'Does Hegel have an ethics?' but would he have had an ethics if he had
          written a treatise on ethics? I think it is one of the curiosities of his
          philosophy that it is difficult to turn his thought into a doctrine of any
          sort. So although the Phenomenology can be viewed as work about epistemology
          one would be hard pressed to delineate a Hegelian epistemology. Some have
          called him a fallibilist or a soft determinist, but I think that is just
          brought on by the demands of modern philosophers who like to see people
          slotted. The same applies to ethics. Hegel has much to say on the matter,
          but does he have an ethics? The problem is with the notion that Hegel has
          views that can be transformed into doctrines that one then might have. I
          think that Hegel is not a declarative philosopher of this sort. But I do
          believe that those philosophers who do declare on such matters tend to be
          his targets.

          Regards, Alan

          From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of PAUL
          Sent: Tuesday, March 02, 2010 6:30 AM
          To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
          Subject: [hegel] Hegel and the Particularism of Jonathan Dancy




          Speaking of the analytical school, it occurs to me that there are more than
          a few similarities between Hegel's approach to Ethics and the minority
          opinion of Jonathan Dancy and his Particularist movement.

          In his recent book, "Ethics without Principles", Dancy speaks against the
          Generalist notion that principles are our guide in Ethics. That reminded me
          of Hegel's suggestion in his HISTORY (1830) that when the pressures of
          history become heavy, general 'principles' are of little value.

          More directly, Hegel and Schelling criticized Kant specifically because of
          his Ethics, and particularly for his "Ought", which they called the 'chill
          lump of Duty left in the stomach.'

          There seemed something unsatisfactory about the deontic 'Ought' for Hegel;
          perhaps it was the lack of Necessity.

          Hegel wrote no separate Treatise on Ethics, but he included sections on
          Morality and Ethics in his RIGHT (1821) in which he seems to have criticized
          Morality for its capricious subjectivity, and then he grounded Ethics in the
          larger, objective Institutions of Justice.

          Although some might argue that a Judge will take individual cases and decide
          which Statutes apply to them, Dancy has argued that this is not actually
          identical with the Generalist notion in Ethics of taking individual cases
          and deciding which Principles apply to them. That's clear, because Statutes
          are objective realities, while Principles are subjective maxims.

          So, Hegel and Dancy seem to be together in this line of reasoning. Has
          anybody here who is familiar with both Hegel and the Particularist school
          considered the similarities?

          Insofar as Particularism is also a variety of Intuitionism, which regards
          Reason and Reasons as unique realities (sui generis), this also may remind
          one of Hegel.

          Any thoughts out there?

          Best regards,
          --Paul Trejo, MA



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