Hi John,

I decided to take a look again at Carlson's book of which I do have a high
opinion. I did not remember that he too has read Zizek. It is a
mind-altering experience to see the same commentator dialogue with both
Winfield and Zizek. I have just reread the first 40 pages and would like to
make a few comments.

First, his best insight is what he borrows from Zizek about becoming as the
surplus that is its own lack (p. 24-5). I am also pleased to see that he
notices that the cycling between being and nothing is autistic. He does not
develop this thought entirely and identifies it with dialectical reason when
it is in fact one of two views of the dialectic - the view as enacted by the
understanding in contrast to the speculative view of dialectics. Thus he
misses how the speculative insight actually transforms the senseless cycle
into a meaningful dialectical totality that is then expressed as a stable
insight. He recognizes that the contrast between motion and rest is
important for understanding what is happening. And he properly takes
Winfield to task for his view that we can begin the Logic immediately
without reason (p. 36n). His view that becoming involves a dual view - one
to resolve being and nothing and the other to note how being and nothing
arise out of absolute knowing - is intriguing (p. 17). But when he finally
gets around to explaining why (p. 35) it seems that it functions as a fudge
for his problems with making sense of how Hegel actually can begin as he
does. He notices that the claim that 'nothing is' is paradoxical and he sees
that the Logic involves an interplay between the understanding and
speculative reason. He does not make much of his insight about nothing but
he does make good use of the fact that two kinds of thinking are present in
the Logic.

I don't think that the Venn diagrams help much, but then again I don't think
they hurt all that much either. My biggest problem - besides the fact that
his discussion about being and nothing adds little to the conventional
interpretations - is his view that we are to be "the audience that witnesses
the unfolding of Logic." (p. 13) He does not think we are to engage in
thinking. As he says: "Pure Being precludes an other that thinks. This means
you, among other things." (p, 13) He himself highlights the problem with
this view when he states: "All we are left with is "demand" for a beginning.
Whose demand? Ours, the fully formed beings in the audience, who want the
show to begin!" (p.36) But to justify this claim he offers in a footnote a
quote from Hegel which states: "the beginning has relation only to the
subject who decides to philosophize." (p. 36n) On my reading, Hegel is
suggesting that far from being an audience for a performance it is we who
are to philosophize. What is particularly puzzling about this is that
Carlson sees becoming as a truth where "we "name" the activity." (p. 24) By
this I believe he means we name the activity of thought that oscillates
between the thought of being and nothing. This would appear to require that
we be able to imaginatively inhabit this active thought so that we can
experience the reflection that allows for this truth to emerge. Finally, he
sees the Logic as an atemporal endeavor meaning for him that all the
determinations are present simultaneously (p. 16). This creates a
problematic appearance/reality divide. Thoughts may appear in sequence, but
the reality is that they are all present at once. To deal with this problem
he introduces a distinction between the fantasy time of the Logic and
empirical time.

In any case, this is a book full of interesting insights. I still do not
know if over a full reading the apparent promise of a coherent reading will
win out over what sometimes appear to be no more than scattered remarks
pulled together on flimsy grounds.

Regards, Alan

From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of john
Sent: Friday, December 18, 2009 10:34 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [hegel] Carlson's commentary


I've just finished reading the first part on Being of David Gray Carlson's
_A Commentary to Hegel's Science of Logic_ (2007).

This is without question THE definitive commentary on the SL. I don't mean
by that that it is the last word on the SL, but rather the first word,
namely just understanding what Hegel is saying--and not just in general but
in detail from beginning to end.

One odd thing about the book is that, with a very few exceptions, Carlson
refers only to English language secondary works on the SL. Very likely he is
missing a good deal because of this (although I don't personally have any
way of knowing that). But there is also something good about that. It's as
though enough has been written in English, or translated into English, on
the SL in the past thwenty years or so (actually I believe he goes back as
far as Mure), that it is now possible to carry on an autonomously English
conversation on the subject.

He even refers to Bob's book [Robert M. Wallace: _Hegel's Philosophy of
Reality, Freedom, and God_ (2005)] ten times.

John



[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Dear Alan,

Carlson's "wife" is a Lacan scholar of some sort. I believe that's where the access to Zizek comes from.

I think Zizek's best work is his essay on Schelling. I think Schelling's _Ages of the World_ throws much light on the SL. Schelling also begins with an "autistic" moment. But I better not go into that too much.

It's probably a bad idea to say bad things about Winfield, by the way. He's the resident Hegel scholar, so to speak, in Georgia where I live. He was also, I believe, Randall's teacher.

Concerning the beginning of Carlson's book, I believe he is warning against "external reflection" and allowing the material to develop for itself.

Also that the whole of the Logic is atemporal has to do with the fact that Absolute knowing, the end of the Phenomenology, is also the end of the Logic. So the end of the Logic goes back to the beginning, or something like that.

As I said, I've read the whole of Quality-Quantity-Measure--the latter two twice--and the book holds up very well.

John

--- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "Alan Ponikvar" <ponikvaraj@...> wrote:
>
> Hi John,
>
> I decided to take a look again at Carlson's book of which I do have a high
> opinion. I did not remember that he too has read Zizek. It is a
> mind-altering experience to see the same commentator dialogue with both
> Winfield and Zizek. I have just reread the first 40 pages and would like to
> make a few comments.
>
> First, his best insight is what he borrows from Zizek about becoming as the
> surplus that is its own lack (p. 24-5). I am also pleased to see that he
> notices that the cycling between being and nothing is autistic. He does not
> develop this thought entirely and identifies it with dialectical reason when
> it is in fact one of two views of the dialectic - the view as enacted by the
> understanding in contrast to the speculative view of dialectics. Thus he
> misses how the speculative insight actually transforms the senseless cycle
> into a meaningful dialectical totality that is then expressed as a stable
> insight. He recognizes that the contrast between motion and rest is
> important for understanding what is happening. And he properly takes
> Winfield to task for his view that we can begin the Logic immediately
> without reason (p. 36n). His view that becoming involves a dual view - one
> to resolve being and nothing and the other to note how being and nothing
> arise out of absolute knowing - is intriguing (p. 17). But when he finally
> gets around to explaining why (p. 35) it seems that it functions as a fudge
> for his problems with making sense of how Hegel actually can begin as he
> does. He notices that the claim that 'nothing is' is paradoxical and he sees
> that the Logic involves an interplay between the understanding and
> speculative reason. He does not make much of his insight about nothing but
> he does make good use of the fact that two kinds of thinking are present in
> the Logic.
>
> I don't think that the Venn diagrams help much, but then again I don't think
> they hurt all that much either. My biggest problem - besides the fact that
> his discussion about being and nothing adds little to the conventional
> interpretations - is his view that we are to be "the audience that witnesses
> the unfolding of Logic." (p. 13) He does not think we are to engage in
> thinking. As he says: "Pure Being precludes an other that thinks. This means
> you, among other things." (p, 13) He himself highlights the problem with
> this view when he states: "All we are left with is "demand" for a beginning.
> Whose demand? Ours, the fully formed beings in the audience, who want the
> show to begin!" (p.36) But to justify this claim he offers in a footnote a
> quote from Hegel which states: "the beginning has relation only to the
> subject who decides to philosophize." (p. 36n) On my reading, Hegel is
> suggesting that far from being an audience for a performance it is we who
> are to philosophize. What is particularly puzzling about this is that
> Carlson sees becoming as a truth where "we "name" the activity." (p. 24) By
> this I believe he means we name the activity of thought that oscillates
> between the thought of being and nothing. This would appear to require that
> we be able to imaginatively inhabit this active thought so that we can
> experience the reflection that allows for this truth to emerge. Finally, he
> sees the Logic as an atemporal endeavor meaning for him that all the
> determinations are present simultaneously (p. 16). This creates a
> problematic appearance/reality divide. Thoughts may appear in sequence, but
> the reality is that they are all present at once. To deal with this problem
> he introduces a distinction between the fantasy time of the Logic and
> empirical time.
>
> In any case, this is a book full of interesting insights. I still do not
> know if over a full reading the apparent promise of a coherent reading will
> win out over what sometimes appear to be no more than scattered remarks
> pulled together on flimsy grounds.
>
> Regards, Alan
>
> From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of john
> Sent: Friday, December 18, 2009 10:34 AM
> To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: [hegel] Carlson's commentary
>
>
> I've just finished reading the first part on Being of David Gray Carlson's
> _A Commentary to Hegel's Science of Logic_ (2007).
>
> This is without question THE definitive commentary on the SL. I don't mean
> by that that it is the last word on the SL, but rather the first word,
> namely just understanding what Hegel is saying--and not just in general but
> in detail from beginning to end.
>
> One odd thing about the book is that, with a very few exceptions, Carlson
> refers only to English language secondary works on the SL. Very likely he is
> missing a good deal because of this (although I don't personally have any
> way of knowing that). But there is also something good about that. It's as
> though enough has been written in English, or translated into English, on
> the SL in the past thwenty years or so (actually I believe he goes back as
> far as Mure), that it is now possible to carry on an autonomously English
> conversation on the subject.
>
> He even refers to Bob's book [Robert M. Wallace: _Hegel's Philosophy of
> Reality, Freedom, and God_ (2005)] ten times.
>
> John
>
>
>
> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
>

Hi John,

I suspected that Randall may have studied with Winfield. As I mentioned in
another posting I have known Richard since high school. When he comes to the
APA in New York City next week he and his family will stay at my brother's
place. He and I have been arguing about Hegel forever. Besides, he depends
on those few - myself included - who tend to make up the very small audience
for the sessions of The Society for Systematic Philosophy at the APA.
Moreover, Richard takes criticism very well. It never becomes personal for
him. He and I remain friends.

I guess my main concern about the atemporal aspect of Carlson's reading is
that I tend to think that the actual development depends upon being able to
reflect upon the activity of thinking and then posit what one sees happening
as itself a moment of the development. So, as Carlson himself notes,
becoming is the name put on the activity of thought that thinks the
oscillation between being and nothing. This can only happen if thinking
actually occurs which suggests time as the unspoken frame for the Logic.
Moreover, this reflective moment, as recollective, indicates that the Logic
involves a distinction between the forward flow of time and the backward
gaze of memory. This distinction as far as I can see is used but never
really made a theme in the Logic. So as you point out the seemingly forward
sequence is also a return. We begin and end with absolute knowing. I tend to
see this temporal distinction as related to the distinction between the
understanding which is forward looking and a dialectical reason that takes a
second look at what has already happened. I have a hunch - and at this point
this is all it is - that the turn to nature or the concept as external will
have as one of its tasks to enfold this unspoken temporal frame of the flow
of time into a newly developed totality. Time itself will then reveal a
distinction within itself between its natural and historical senses with the
turn to the Philosophy of Spirit.

In any case, I do like Carlson's book. It is rigorous and he does a good job
of discussing the secondary literature.

Regards, Alan

From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of john
Sent: Saturday, December 19, 2009 9:24 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [hegel] Re: Carlson's commentary


Dear Alan,

Carlson's "wife" is a Lacan scholar of some sort. I believe that's where the
access to Zizek comes from.

I think Zizek's best work is his essay on Schelling. I think Schelling's
_Ages of the World_ throws much light on the SL. Schelling also begins with
an "autistic" moment. But I better not go into that too much.

It's probably a bad idea to say bad things about Winfield, by the way. He's
the resident Hegel scholar, so to speak, in Georgia where I live. He was
also, I believe, Randall's teacher.

Concerning the beginning of Carlson's book, I believe he is warning against
"external reflection" and allowing the material to develop for itself.

Also that the whole of the Logic is atemporal has to do with the fact that
Absolute knowing, the end of the Phenomenology, is also the end of the
Logic. So the end of the Logic goes back to the beginning, or something like
that.

As I said, I've read the whole of Quality-Quantity-Measure--the latter two
twice--and the book holds up very well.

John

--- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , "Alan
Ponikvar" <ponikvaraj@...> wrote:

>
> Hi John,
>
> I decided to take a look again at Carlson's book of which I do have a high
> opinion. I did not remember that he too has read Zizek. It is a
> mind-altering experience to see the same commentator dialogue with both
> Winfield and Zizek. I have just reread the first 40 pages and would like

to

> make a few comments.
>
> First, his best insight is what he borrows from Zizek about becoming as

the

> surplus that is its own lack (p. 24-5). I am also pleased to see that he
> notices that the cycling between being and nothing is autistic. He does

not

> develop this thought entirely and identifies it with dialectical reason

when

> it is in fact one of two views of the dialectic - the view as enacted by

the

> understanding in contrast to the speculative view of dialectics. Thus he
> misses how the speculative insight actually transforms the senseless cycle
> into a meaningful dialectical totality that is then expressed as a stable
> insight. He recognizes that the contrast between motion and rest is
> important for understanding what is happening. And he properly takes
> Winfield to task for his view that we can begin the Logic immediately
> without reason (p. 36n). His view that becoming involves a dual view - one
> to resolve being and nothing and the other to note how being and nothing
> arise out of absolute knowing - is intriguing (p. 17). But when he finally
> gets around to explaining why (p. 35) it seems that it functions as a

fudge

> for his problems with making sense of how Hegel actually can begin as he
> does. He notices that the claim that 'nothing is' is paradoxical and he

sees

> that the Logic involves an interplay between the understanding and
> speculative reason. He does not make much of his insight about nothing but
> he does make good use of the fact that two kinds of thinking are present

in

> the Logic.
>
> I don't think that the Venn diagrams help much, but then again I don't

think

> they hurt all that much either. My biggest problem - besides the fact that
> his discussion about being and nothing adds little to the conventional
> interpretations - is his view that we are to be "the audience that

witnesses

> the unfolding of Logic." (p. 13) He does not think we are to engage in
> thinking. As he says: "Pure Being precludes an other that thinks. This

means

> you, among other things." (p, 13) He himself highlights the problem with
> this view when he states: "All we are left with is "demand" for a

beginning.

> Whose demand? Ours, the fully formed beings in the audience, who want the
> show to begin!" (p.36) But to justify this claim he offers in a footnote a
> quote from Hegel which states: "the beginning has relation only to the
> subject who decides to philosophize." (p. 36n) On my reading, Hegel is
> suggesting that far from being an audience for a performance it is we who
> are to philosophize. What is particularly puzzling about this is that
> Carlson sees becoming as a truth where "we "name" the activity." (p. 24)

By

> this I believe he means we name the activity of thought that oscillates
> between the thought of being and nothing. This would appear to require

that

> we be able to imaginatively inhabit this active thought so that we can
> experience the reflection that allows for this truth to emerge. Finally,

he

> sees the Logic as an atemporal endeavor meaning for him that all the
> determinations are present simultaneously (p. 16). This creates a
> problematic appearance/reality divide. Thoughts may appear in sequence,

but

> the reality is that they are all present at once. To deal with this

problem

> he introduces a distinction between the fantasy time of the Logic and
> empirical time.
>
> In any case, this is a book full of interesting insights. I still do not
> know if over a full reading the apparent promise of a coherent reading

will

> win out over what sometimes appear to be no more than scattered remarks
> pulled together on flimsy grounds.
>
> Regards, Alan
>
> From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>

[mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> ] On Behalf
Of john

> Sent: Friday, December 18, 2009 10:34 AM
> To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
> Subject: [hegel] Carlson's commentary
>
>
> I've just finished reading the first part on Being of David Gray Carlson's
> _A Commentary to Hegel's Science of Logic_ (2007).
>
> This is without question THE definitive commentary on the SL. I don't mean
> by that that it is the last word on the SL, but rather the first word,
> namely just understanding what Hegel is saying--and not just in general

but

> in detail from beginning to end.
>
> One odd thing about the book is that, with a very few exceptions, Carlson
> refers only to English language secondary works on the SL. Very likely he

is

> missing a good deal because of this (although I don't personally have any
> way of knowing that). But there is also something good about that. It's as
> though enough has been written in English, or translated into English, on
> the SL in the past thwenty years or so (actually I believe he goes back as
> far as Mure), that it is now possible to carry on an autonomously English
> conversation on the subject.
>
> He even refers to Bob's book [Robert M. Wallace: _Hegel's Philosophy of
> Reality, Freedom, and God_ (2005)] ten times.
>
> John
>
>
>
> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
>

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Hello Alan and John,

I enjoyed Alan's comments on Carlson's book. For sure the breadth of Alan's knowledge of Hegel secondary literature brings a great wealth of contemporary issues into play and undoubtedly Alan provides us with an added dimension to the list.

I am more focused on providing a straight forward commentary of Hegel. The only three secondary sources that I have relied on have been Winfield, Pippin, and Heidegger. Other than that, I have been focused directly on Hegel's text for the last 6 years.

So, I benifit from Alan's objections and I am sure Winfield does as well.

I would be spreading myself too thin if I entered into your discussion at this time, but I did some significant work on the opening chapters of the SL two or three years ago. It needs some re-formulation, but I would appreciate any comments and would be open to objections, criticism, etc.

Have a look. My suggestion is to read the summery section first and then read the link at the top, and then move to the next section:

--------------------------

I. PURE BEING, NOTHING, AND BECOMING:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/hegel-scilogic/message/721

A. BEING

1. Recall that the affirmative immediacy of PURE BEING was
demonstrated to be a pure SELF-RELATION.

a. i.e. as an indeterminate immediacy, PURE BEING was not in any way
in a relationship to an other.

(1)If it were in a relationship to an other, it would have already
been mediated or determined in some way

(2)However, because BEING was devoid of all determination
whatsoever, it was NOT the affirmation which it had purported itself
to be; i.e. it was not being but NOTHING.


B. `PURE NOTHING'

1. PURE NOTHING is the absence of all determination and content

a. NOTHING is an indeterminate simplicity. This NOTHING, which is
supposed to be only nothing, is an affirmative NOTHING that is
granted an existence in thought, imagination, and speech.

(1) Thus PURE NOTHING as the *affirmation* of an indeterminate
simplicity immediately collapses into PURE BEING.

-----------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------

[NOTE] PURE LIGHT and PURE DARKNESS

[A] Hegel uses the analogy of "pure light" and "pure darkness" to
help illuminate the above relationship between PURE BEING and PURE
NOTHING .

[1] From the perspective of "seeing" we can relate the phenomena
of "pure light" with PURE BEING .

[a] `BEING' --which is usually associated with "affirmativeness"--
is of course identified with the illuminating quality of light.
Light has the power to surround "everything", and "illuminate"
everything in its articulated outline.

[b] As part of the 5 fold human sensorium, "Seeing" is
a "distantial grasping" of determinate things. "Seeing"
is "distantial" in the sense that it requires an "optimal nearness"
to illuminate what is percieved.

[c] In contrast, in the absence of light, all determinate things
are "extinguished" for the human eye. Consequently, the human eye
sees "NOTHING" in the absence of light .

[2] However, in the total brilliance of "pure light", all
determinate distinctions are also extinguished.

[a] Thus the human eye "sees" just as much in "pure light" as it
does in "pure darkness".

[b] From the above analogy of `Pure Light' and `Pure Darkness', we
can "see" how the affirmativeness of PURE BEING collapses into PURE
NOTHING

[3] Furthermore, using this same analogy with the human phenomenon
of "seeing", we can also indicate how PURE NOTHING is like PURE
BEING.

[a] It is true that the human eye "sees" nothing determinate
in "pure darkness", yet it is also true that the human eye
still "sees" the "open darkness".

[b] Therefore, even in absolute darkness, there is still
the "seeing" of the open and affirmative darkness (i.e. the open
possibility of seeing something).

[c] And so through the above analogy we can "see" how the
indeterminacy of `NOTHING' slips into the affirmativeness of PURE
BEING.

[B] Taking into consideration the utility of the above analogy, we
should at the same time make it crystal clear that `PURE BEING'
cannot be "seen" as a form of subjective representation.

[1] i.e. `PURE BEING' *cannot* be grasped from viewpoint of "natural
consciousness" .

[a] `PURE BEING' only came into "view" because the distance between
the "perceiving subject" and the "object percieved" had been
overcome (i.e. during the course of the Phenomenology of Spirit).

[b] The "distance" between `Subject' and `Object' was overcome when
the thinking subject became "self-consciouss" .

[c] This PURE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS constituted an overcoming of
the "distance" between the `Subject' and the `Object'.

[2] Thus, `PURE BEING' can not be grasped as an external object
from the "distantial" perspective of a `Subject' (i.e. natural
consciousness), instead the `Subject' and `Object' have at the
moment of `PURE BEING' collapsed into one another, and we
have "entered into" a non-distantial realm (i.e. the realm of a
PURE SELF-RELATION).

[a] Or we have "entered into" the logical SELF-RELATION of the
ABSOLUTE SUBJECT.

[3] Here with the mention of an "Absolute Subject" we must recall
what we learned about a `Subject' in general from Kant:

[a] Kant suggested that in order for a Subject to have
representational experience at all, a subject must be in a logical
SELF-RELATION to the rules that actively unify the
externally "given" sensory data.

[b] These "rules" or "functions" which were necessarily used by the
subject to actively unify representations were considered to be a
priori or "transcendentally prior" to representational experience.


[c] Hegel agreed with Kant that there could be no consciousness
without "SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS" (i.e. there could be no
representational experience without a prior "logical SELF-RELATION"
to the rules that actively unified those representations)


[but]

[d] Hegel suggested that for Kant, the "rules" that he outlined that
a `Subject' was necessarily in relation to (in order to have
determinate experience in the first place) were simply dogmatic
adaptations of the laws of logic that had been handed down from the
annals of traditional logic.


[4] Thus Hegel required that we first "enter into" this abstract
(and non-distantial) logical SELF-RELATION, and secondly he demanded
that we allow the rules (that a subject was necessarily in a self-
relation with) to autonomously self-develop.

[a] Once we enter into PURE BEING, there is no longer
any "distance" between subject and object. We have entered into a
pure SELF-RELATION.


[b] PURE BEING is not unequal relatively to an other; it has no
diversity
within itself nor any with a reference outwards.

[c] Conseqently, when we enter into PURE BEING our analogy
of "seeing" necessarily breaks down because "seeing" is necessarily
distantial (i.e. distance requires "relationship").

[d] An open question is whether there are other non-distantial
human sensory analogies availible to help concretise the moment
prior to the first speculative step. For example a non-
distantial "touching on" may be appropriate.
------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------


C. BECOMING

1. So the truth was neither `BEING' nor `NOTHING', but that `PURE
BEING' —did not pass over but had [already] passed over —
into `NOTHING', and vice versa.


a. i.e. `PURE BEING' immediately collapsed into `NOTHING' and vice
versa.

(1) An incessant dialectical transposition then ensued.

(a) `BEING' and `NOTHING' held-together in their movement into one
another constituted `BECOMING'.

II. Determinate Being:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/hegel-scilogic/message/747

A. DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH

1. `DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH' first issued forth from `BECOMING'
as a qualitative "oneness" (i.e. in the simple form of being) .

a. `DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH' was immediate (i.e. it was without
a "posited" relation to an other);

(1) As a qualitative "oneness", `DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH' was in
the affirmativeness of BEING,

[yet as mediated by `BECOMING']

(2) `DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH' also included *within* itself NON-
BEING

(a) Thus DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH was *not* the PURE SELF-RELATION
of the prior sphere of indeterminate BEING.

[instead]

(b) DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH was the immediacy of *DETERMINATE*
being.

(b) DETERMINATE BEING is of course a being that is necessarily in a
RELATION to another DETERMINATE BEING

[Yet]

(3) DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH (as it had initially issued forth
from `BECOMING') was merely immediate (i.e. it was without a posited
relation to an other).

(a) DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH had to reveal its concealed negative
element, or it would have merely slipped into the prior sphere of
PURE BEING.

(b) Thus DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH preserved itself from falling
into the indeterminacy of PURE BEING by collapsing into NEGATION

(c) With the `NEGATION', DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH was no longer
immediate, it was now in relation to an `OTHER'.

B. THE `NEGATION'

1. The `NEGATION' was immediately demonstrated to be a `DETERMINATE
BEING' itself.

a. `NEGATION' was necessarily a `DETERMINATE BEING' of course
because of its *relation* to `DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH'

(1) Recall that *only* a `DETERMINATE BEING' can be in a relation to
another `DETERMINATE BEING'.

(2) Thus the self-collapse of `DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH'
into `NEGATION' resulted in the determinate opposition between:

(a) AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATE BEING (i.e. formerly `DETERMINATE BEING
AS SUCH')

[and]

(b) NEGATIVE DETERMINATE BEING (i.e. formerly `NEGATION').

(3) Insofar as AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATE BEING had "preserved" itself
in its relation to the external `NEGATION', it was determined as
a `BEING-FOR-OTHER'.

b. `BEING-FOR-OTHER'

(1) Determined as `BEING-FOR-OTHER' the `AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATE
BEING' and the `NEGATIVE DETERMINATE BEING' *essentially* referred
to one another

[OR in other words]

(a) As merely externally related, the `AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATE
BEING' and the `NEGATIVE DETERMINATE BEING' were demonstrated to be
inextricably adjoined with each other.

(b) That is, as a `BEING-FOR-OTHER', the determinancy of
the `AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATE BEING' necessarily slipped into
its `NEGATIVE DETERMINATE BEING' (i.e. its external `OTHER').

[And]

(c) In this way, in so far as the `AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATE BEING'
was merely determined (or "preserved") in its relation to an
external `OTHER' (i.e. in so far as it was determined as a `BEING-
FOR-OTHER'), the `AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATE BEING' of course lacked an
integral being of its own.


C. the `NEGATION OF THE NEGATION':

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/hegel-scilogic/message/749


1. NEGATION OF THE NEGATION: the simple restoration of DETERMINATE
BEING with itself

a. `BEING-IN-ITSELF'

(1) With the `NEGATION OF THE NEGATION', the `AFFIRMATIVE
DETERMINATE BEING' was deterimined to be: SELF-EQUAL IN OPPOSITION
TO ITS INEQUALITY.


[HOWEVER]


(a) Determined as such (i.e. "self-equal in opposition to its
inequality"), the `AFFIRMATIVE DETEMINATE BEING' (i.e.
the `SOMETHING') again proved itself to be indistinquishible from
its `NEGATIVE DETERMINATE BEING' (i.e. its `OTHER').

(b) Consequently an external dialectical transposition
between `SOMETHING' and the `OTHER' ensued.

(c) Thus the `SOMETHING' and its `OTHER' mutually slipped into one
another.

(2) This fluid "ALTERATION" between `SOMETHING' and its `OTHER'
represented a `BECOMING'.

[And the result of this *concrete* `BECOMING' was that]

(a) The `SOMETHING' was revealed to be the unity of `BEING-FOR-
OTHER' and `BEING-IN-ITSELF'.


[and]

(b) The `OTHER' was [also] revealed to be the unity of `BEING-IN-
ITSELF' and `BEING-FOR-OTHER'.

(3) At their point of contact, the `SOMETHING' and the `OTHER' were
reflected into themselves (i.e. into the moments of their own
immanent self-development).

(a) Each moment (i.e. `BEING-FOR-OTHER' and `BEING-IN-ITSELF') of
the `SOMETHING' necessarily *contained* the other moment in the
sense that each moment was either a "transition from" or a "pointing
to" the other moment.

(b) Again a dialectical transposition (i.e. a `BECOMING') ensued,
but this time it was a dialectical transposition that occurred
*WITHIN* the determinate being of the `SOMETHING' itself.

(c) This alteration of `BEING-IN-ITSELF' and `BEING-FOR-OTHER'
then "issued forth" into the qualitative "oneness" of the
affirmative `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF'.

III. THE `SOMETHING':

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/hegel-scilogic/message/753

A. `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF'

1. The affirmative `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF' was demonstrated to be
the simple "oneness" (i.e. `BEING-IN-ITSELF') that was "filled" with
what was necessarily present in it (i.e. `BEING-FOR-OTHER').

a. The `BEING-FOR-OTHER' ( that was immanently present in
the "oneness" ) of course had to `POSIT' itself, or this "oneness"
of the affirmative `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF' would [again] fall into
the indeterminacy of the sphere long since past, i.e. the sphere
of `PURE BEING'

(1) This `BEING-FOR-OTHER' then posited itself as the *immanent*
negative called `CONSTITUTION'.

[At this point..]

(2) The affirmative `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF' had then divided
itself into:

(a) `DETERMINATION' (i.e. the "oneness" of the affirmative
determinate `in-itself')

[and]

(b) `CONSTITUTION' (the articulation of the `otherness-within-
itself')


(c) The above two moments then fell into alteration (i.e. the
movement thus enters into BECOMING).

(3) The "oneness" of the affirmative `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF'
alternated into its own immanent `BEING-FOR-OTHER' .

(a) Yet now when the affirmative `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF' collapsed
into its negative element (i.e. its BEING-FOR-OTHER), it at the same
time remained identical with itself because that which it altered
into was the `OTHERNESS-WITHIN-ITSELF'.

(b) `CONSTITUTION' is the negative moment (i.e. BEING-WITHIN-
ITSELF'), but it is now clear that it is no longer the `BEING-FOR-
OTHER' of the prior sphere (i.e. the `being-for-other' that proved
itself to be the mere community with its `OTHER').

(c) Instead, as currently developed, `CONSTITUTION' is now the
unfolding of the `BEING-WITHIN-ITSELF' that is the AFFIRMATIVE
COMMUNITY WITH ITSELF (i.e. or the `DETERMINATE SELF-RELATION')

B. SELF-RELATED DETERMINATE BEING

1. The `SOMETHING' as an affirmative `DETERMINATE SELF-RELATION' is
the COINCIDENCE of its SELF-RELATION with the immanent unfolding of
its `BEING-FOR-OTHER'

a. The coincidence of the `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF' with the unfolding
of the immanent `OTHERNESS-WITHIN-ITSELF' represents the SUBLATION
of the difference between the above two moments.

(1) Moreover, the SUBLATION of the `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF'
and `CONSTITUTION' represents the positing of the `SOMETHING' in
general.

(a) The `SOMETHING' as a `DETERMINATE SELF-RELATION' is for the
first time an affirmative *stable* being.

(b) As an affirmative stable being the `SOMETHING' is itself the
qualitative `NEGATION' of its `OTHER'.

(c) Or as the affirmative and stable `DETERMINATE SELF-
RELATION', the `SOMETHING' is itself the ceasing of all external
otherness in it.

(2) Consequently the stable and affirmative `SOMETHING', as an
immediate, `SELF-RELATED DETERMINATE BEING' is first and foremost
the *LIMIT* for the an external `OTHER' (or it is the non-being of
the `OTHER').

------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------


also see:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/hegel-scilogic/message/789

Best,

Randall

Dear group,

1.
the "veen diagrams" used in Carlson's book are not realy important as such.

In fact, they do not give you more insights then the triangle
representations of Hegel'S traids at hegel.net, which are also not meant
to be an explenation, but rather a tool for thinking about the
connections between the parts in the triangles (what do the 3 parts have
in common, is something missing, how do the parts relate, how does one
explain there sequence, what would be different when their sequence
wouls change etc).

What Calson's veen diagrams do add compared to the hegel.net triangles
is a focus on the relations between the three parts, especialy,
what is the transition from one part of teh sequence to the other?

2.
This way of working thru Hegel's science of Logic gains a bit
of a formal appearence that way, however, this is far more outweigth
by the fact that this way, Carlson (and in turn his readers)
is therby forced to dicsuss *every* part of the science of Logic
and *every* relation between the parts of each triads.

We have many books and artciels about the first triad of being,
niothing and bocoming, and we have many books and articles in
the neglsih speaking world, that talk of those parts of the
science of logic that has some parallels to the Phenomoenology,
loke absolute knowledge. We realy would not need another book
that just replicates what we already know.

The big chance that I see with Carlson's book is that for the first
time in the english speaking world, the *complete*, *unabridged*
Science of Logic has a chance to come into the spotlight
(so discussions here in the group that just discuss those topics
of teh book already covered in thousands of otehr books don't
give realy justice to teh book and its merrits IMHO).

3.
There also exist wonderful other books on Hegel's Logic in english:

* Erdman's classical German comment on Hegel's Logic, that focusses
on giving an overview of the complete work as well as establishing
a good base for the terminology Hegel uses within the different
part of his works is still a valuable basement for everyone who wants
to enter into Hegel'S work in short time in a systematic way, while
avoiding for the beginer any of the subtilities of the work. This
work has been translated into english in the end of teh 19th century
and is today available as free PDF (e.g. at http://hegel.net/en/e1.htm
). I am usure however, if the quality of the translation, I read
somewhere that the translation is the patchwork of 7 (!) translators
what would counterfeigth some of the merrits of teh work in German,
e.g. it's very clear and consistent use of terminology.

* Stephen Houlgate has provided a very detailed comment on the first
third of Hegel'S Science of Logic, with a focus on the chapter
on "Dasein" (Being-There) in a philoslogical way, that is on height
with the best literature available in German on this subject (and
in fact doiscusses a lot of teh literature).

* Robert Wallace wrote a very good overall book on Hegel's Logic,
focussing especialy on the point that is most oprecious to me,
teh relation between the limited/ending and the
unlimited/endless/eternal (where the limited is included in the
unlimited and
the unlimited is present in the limited, the unlimited is the
sublation of the limited). This he does by mainly focussing also
on teh logic of Dasein, but also discussing other parts of
Hegel's work.

* John Burbridge discusses not only the chapter on the Object of
the sciende of Logiuc, but also teh otehr parts of the Logic of
Concept and from there the otehr parts of the logic as well as well
as the relation of the logic to the rest of Hegel's system.

However, wheil all these books are advancements in the english
Hegel literature and try not to iimpose their own agenda into
Hegel's Logic but try to give justice to Hegel's thoughts and
therby are very helpful (and NOT replaced by Carlson's book),
the single most important thing when thinking Hegel's logic,
in the spirit of "the truth is the whole" is to
have a versy good overall overview of the complete logic,
as wella s an indepth knowledge of the various parts, so
that this knowledge doesn't remain abstract and that it does
not contain any holes.

In this part, Carlson's work excels.

(This is indepoendent of what Carlson writes in single places:
when we gain, with VCarlson's help, for the first time *all*
parts of the Sciense of Logic in our focus, especialy those
that have been neglected the last 100 years, we will then
be able to advance ourselsves further).


All the best
Kai
http://kai.froeb.net/hegel.html

Hi Randall,

In my usual manner I have rambled on a bit. I have limited myself to making
some comments about what appears in your post. I have not delved into your
more extensive writings. I intend take a look at these. As you will see,
many of my comments go off on what I take to be related issues (you might
say tangents) - particularly the issue of how one is to read a text. Feel
free to ignore most or all of this, or comment on what you like. It might be
helpful for those of us on this site if you would in a series of brief
bullet points express what you most want to convey about your reading of
Hegel.

So here are my comments:

1. You say and, for that matter, so does Hegel: "If pure being were in
a relationship to an other, it would have already been mediated or
determined in some way."
a. But this observation is itself a mediation. Moreover, it is a
mediation that reminds us of the mediating activity of abstraction by the
understanding that would precede the positing of pure being, or it reminds
us of the mediating genesis of pure being out of the Phenomenology.
b. Thus, you need to say more here about why these mediations do not
compromise the immediacy that is pure being.
2. You mention that: "because BEING was devoid of all determination
whatsoever, it was NOT the affirmation which it had purported itself to be;
i.e. it was not being but NOTHING. . PURE NOTHING is the absence of all
determination and content."
a. As I have mentioned in my discussion of nothing, an adequate
commentary needs to explain how this slide from "being is nothing" to
"nothing is" is not merely a trick of language or a sophism.
b. Why are not 'pure being' and 'nothing' simply two names for the same
empty thought rather than two internally related moments of indeterminate
being?
3. You say that: "This NOTHING, which is supposed to be only nothing,
is an affirmative NOTHING that is granted an existence in thought,
imagination, and speech."
a. One might want to know granted by whom and for what reason?
4. You say: "From the above analogy of 'Pure Light' and 'Pure
Darkness', we can "see" how the affirmativeness of PURE BEING collapses into
PURE NOTHING."
a. Analogies usually are both helpful and misleading at the same time.
What helps is what makes them analogies; but what is misleading is what
makes them merely analogies. You acknowledge this latter. But I believe that
the infection is more wide spread than you think with respect to this
analogy.
i. Here,
with the analogy, it makes sense to speak of pure light and pure darkness.
But it is misleading to take this too literally and relate these to pure
being and pure nothing. To begin with there is a problem with the phrase
'pure nothing'. In the proposition "Pure being is." 'pure' has a role to
play. It works in reference to the contrast between indeterminate and
determinate being. But 'pure' does not play the same role in the proposition
"Pure nothing is." 'Pure' here is simply redundant, or an empty adjective.
The reason for this contrast is that 'pure' is an implicit reference to a
process and is relevant to our grasp of being. We note that in the process
of abstraction we can think a more general term that has no specific
reference to its instances. It then becomes conceivable that being itself
might be thought - by means of analogy - in the same way as other
abstractions are thought. In my view, this is where the understanding
falters. The analogy does not really work - thought it seems to - for pure
being. Pure being is not a successfully achieved abstraction but the site of
a reversal as indicated by Hegel's discussion about being and nothing. But,
whatever we might think of this abstractive process, nothing simply is there
to be considered when this process of purification of being is completed, or
nothing is the state of our thought that we can consider simply by
eliminating from our mind any thought of those things or notions that are.
It does not involve a process based on an analogy. But of course at this
point we might wonder if with this elimination whether we are thinking
anything at all (see 2 above).
At this point, I believe it would be useful to pause to consider what I have
just said. It would seem that I am suggesting that 'pure nothing' should not
be used as Hegel uses it. It appears that I am accusing Hegel of either
sloppy wording or inexact thinking. But let's look at this more closely.

First, I could be mistaken. I might have just engaged in faulty reasoning,
or missed something that would subvert what I am saying, or have simply made
something out of what is really nothing because I do not really comprehend
what Hegel is trying to do here. But here is the surprise: this is all good!
I want to have these possibilities in mind whenever I read a text whether my
insights conform to or conflict with what I believe the author means to
convey. That is, being open to a text for me means being open to the
possibility that I do not properly comprehend what I am reading even if all
I think I am doing is being faithful to what is right there on the page.
Anything odd or out of joint is to be taken as an aid to understanding. This
issue of comprehension seems to be an almost unavoidable attribute of most
philosophic texts. I can think I understand the words, sentences, and
paragraphs, and even believe I have followed the reasoning and yet still
have doubts about whether I have comprehended what the philosopher means to
convey.

Now most readers of Hegel find themselves in this situation of
incomprehension because the text is difficult. One does not comprehend
simply because the words, sentences or 'arguments' (I do not believe that
Hegel is offering arguments) do not make any sense. Those of us who read
Hegel then often think that a clear commentary that tries to assure its
readers that indeed there is sense here to be found is all that is required.
But consider how we read other philosophers who write in a more
straightforward way. We quickly move on to evaluate what is being said. We
Hegelians seen content far too often to believe that all we need do is make
Hegel readable. This is typically done either by trying to tame his language
and reword what he has to say, or by reassuring the reader that one can be
fluent when employing Hegel's language. You seem to follow the latter option
in your commentary.

This then leads to the next point about reading: if we are convinced that
there is something out of joint in the text this can simply indicate that we
still do not understand what is right there to be understood or that the
author has made a mistake, or . There actually is a third option that is
often dismissed out of hand: the author has intentionally written so that
things appear out of joint expecting that this will spark the kind of
reflections I mentioned above. That is, what if the philosopher is not so
much interested in communicating some doctrine - what is Hegel's doctrine
anyway? - but wishes instead to induce a certain way of thinking - a way
that flourishes when thought is disrupted, blocked, or otherwise knocked off
its moorings? Would it not be possible that a philosophy that does the
following - that does not argue from premises to conclusions, that engages
in presentations that involve reversals and inversions, or that requires
that what has been expressed be reconceived or recollected so that what is
true might emerge - might itself be written so that it could be read in the
same spirit?

It has been said often enough that Hegel does not apply a method of thought
to some independently given content. But he certainly does offer what can be
taken as heuristic directives, the most prominent of which might be the
insight that there is no direct or unmediated access to truth. Why might not
Hegel write in a manner consistent with this insight? If he were to do so,
then the cunning of reason would not merely be something that happens to the
thought items which we as Hegel's audience might observe but would be
something relevant to our status as readers.

Many commentators on the Phenomenology have raised the issue of the status
of the reader. The way the book is written makes this status itself a
peculiarity of the text. The issue is simply this: if the Phenomenology
means to overcome the opposition of consciousness then why does Hegel appear
to be silent about the overriding opposition between the reader and natural
consciousness? Did Hegel simply forget about this, or think we readers are
exempt based on what is said about the reader in the Introduction? Did he
think it did not need to be addressed or is somehow address indirectly by
what we learn about natural consciousness? Did he think that somehow this
opposition of consciousness is not relevant to the issue? Or did he leave it
as a task for the very reader for whom this opposition is about? Or,
finally, is there some other yet to be discovered reason?

More than anything else, what we have here are two distinct styles of
reading. As I read your postings, you mean to demonstrate the viability of a
direct reading predicated on the view that the text is intelligible as it
stands and all we as readers need to do is keep to the path and try to keep
our own stray thoughts out of the mix. As a result, our discussion seems to
repeat the same gesture time and again. You provide a retelling of the story
of the text while I tend to be fascinated by what I see as the disjointed
nature of the narrative. I think this discussion has been fruitful. All I
mean to do here is comment on how I see this discussion as it is shaped by
our differing outlooks.

5. You mention: "Kant suggested that in order for a Subject to have
representational experience at all, a subject must be in a logical
SELF-RELATION to the rules that actively unify the externally "given"
sensory data."
a. It is difficult to see why Kant's and Hegel's sense of self-relation
have much in common. Kant works within the opposition of consciousness while
Hegel does not. Kant seeks a grounding principle upon which to build his
edifice. Hegel does not offer self-relation as a grounding principle.
b. In general, you seem to be more convinced than I am that Hegel is
working within the Kantian framework.
6. You say: "Once we enter into PURE BEING, there is no longer any
"distance" between subject and object. We have entered into a pure
SELF-RELATION."
a. Hegel does seem to want us to entertain this thought. But I would
suggest that the distance is resolved not by eliminating differences but by
seeing that the interest in eliminating oppositions was itself the problem.
We are not separated from absolute knowing by some seeming gap that we need
to overcome. We are separated instead by our misconceptions about absolute
knowing. That is, the unspoken premise that underlies the attempt to grasp
the absolute is that if the gap were ever closed the absolute would be
directly present to our gaze. 'Presence to our gaze' is itself not seen as a
problem. It is only the distortions of distance that need to be resolved.
b. What I believe we are meant to learn about absolute knowing (It is
interesting to note how difficult it is to grasp absolute knowing even when
it becomes the theme at the end) is that difference is the essence of the
absolute. Differences are not meant to be suspended, they are meant to be
inhabited. This is how I interpret the Hegelian phrase 'identity in
difference'. Identity arises as the difference shifts. So in the
Phenomenology when natural consciousness comes to know its object (yes, it
does come to know its object) one difference is overcome - the difference
between the subject and object - so that a second difference - between what
makes sense from the perspective of speculative reason and what does not
from the perspective of the understanding - can be made evident. So in my
view, Hegel's whimsical remark in the Introduction of the Phenomenology
about the absolute being with us means to alert us to the fact that
difference is the essence of the absolute. We actually think we know what we
mean by the absolute before we set out to find it. The absolute is what is
one or a totality that we currently lack access to. And yes indeed it is
that if we are able to comprehend how this totality is the manifestation of
an inner difference that we fail to comprehend. But we always think we know
better. We know what we seek; we simply currently are some distance from it.
That is why when found the absolute is likely to go unnoticed. The first
step along the path is the first unavoidable error. We set out to seek what
we already have.
c. This has implications for the above remarks about how to read the
text. If we take Hegel's remark about the absolute as already with us then
clearly there really is no gap. But we still do not grasp what we inhabit.
The task of self-knowledge then becomes one of seeing what is already
evident in its proper significance. The distortion or distance is not due to
the limitation that is borrowed by analogy from perception between what is
in clear view and what is concealed or distorted. It is due instead to
misconceptions that prevent us from grasping the significance of what is
there to be seen. It is my contention that until one understands that the
hard labor of the negative involves a reorientation that we need to
undertake one will fail to see what is there to be seen in the text. In
other words, the text is the site where we are given a chance to work out
our issues. It is as much about us as it is about anything else. This is one
respect in which we can take the claim that the absolute is not only
substance but also subject.
7. You note: "So the truth was neither 'BEING' nor 'NOTHING', but that
'PURE BEING' -did not pass over but had [already] passed over - into
'NOTHING', and vice versa."
a. You mention this but seem to think that its meaning is transparent.
I have always taken this sentence as one of those test sentences. That is,
until I have an interpretation that makes sense of this I still will not
have cracked the mystery of these first thoughts of the Logic. I recently
came to an interpretation that for me brings this sentence to life. My
problem with most readings that mean to comfort and reassure the reader
about the intelligibility of the text as written is that they tend to either
ignore or gloss over the problems caused by these troublesome sentences.
8. You say: 'DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH' first issued forth from
'BECOMING' as a qualitative "oneness" (i.e. in the simple form of being)."
a. Again, this is one of those difficult transitions to get a handle
on. It is extremely important because it marks the transition from
indeterminate and determinate being. Again, I have my views on this. But I
am getting the same sort of feeling I get from many 'immanent' commentaries.
Each point along the way is treated equally with all others. There often
does not seem to be an awareness of when something difficult, challenging or
important is being said. If one does not come to the text with the
expectation that our philosophical notions are to be confronted then each
transition looks like all the others. Figuratively speaking, we are with
this transition at the point where God acts as the creative force of the
world. Schelling spent most of his mature years working on making this key
point intelligible. If our only concern in reading Hegel is to get on with
it we will end up having passed it by. Thus, an immanent reading might fall
into the trap of becoming a mindless reading where nothing sparks our
curiosity or raises anything worthy of further thought.
9. You state: "DETERMINATE BEING is of course a being that is
necessarily in a RELATION to another DETERMINATE BEING."
a. This 'of course' is not very reassuring. You follow it with four
propositions (3, a, b, c) that stray from your usual clarity. If they are
meant to be a gloss on this 'of course' they seem to be the revenge of the
inverted world where the evident is made by means of explication more
obscure.
You continue to fly by some really difficult stuff almost as if this is
meant to be more of an outline than a series of propositions meant to make
sense of the text - at least, that is my impression. So that must meant I am
getting tired. So I will stop here.

Regards, Alan



From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of
TheJack
Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2009 6:16 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [hegel] Re: Carlson's commentary


Hello Alan and John,

I enjoyed Alan's comments on Carlson's book. For sure the breadth of Alan's
knowledge of Hegel secondary literature brings a great wealth of
contemporary issues into play and undoubtedly Alan provides us with an added
dimension to the list.

I am more focused on providing a straight forward commentary of Hegel. The
only three secondary sources that I have relied on have been Winfield,
Pippin, and Heidegger. Other than that, I have been focused directly on
Hegel's text for the last 6 years.

So, I benifit from Alan's objections and I am sure Winfield does as well.

I would be spreading myself too thin if I entered into your discussion at
this time, but I did some significant work on the opening chapters of the SL
two or three years ago. It needs some re-formulation, but I would appreciate
any comments and would be open to objections, criticism, etc.

Have a look. My suggestion is to read the summery section first and then
read the link at the top, and then move to the next section:

--------------------------

I. PURE BEING, NOTHING, AND BECOMING:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/hegel-scilogic/message/721

A. BEING

1. Recall that the affirmative immediacy of PURE BEING was
demonstrated to be a pure SELF-RELATION.

a. i.e. as an indeterminate immediacy, PURE BEING was not in any way
in a relationship to an other.

(1)If it were in a relationship to an other, it would have already
been mediated or determined in some way

(2)However, because BEING was devoid of all determination
whatsoever, it was NOT the affirmation which it had purported itself
to be; i.e. it was not being but NOTHING.

B. `PURE NOTHING'

1. PURE NOTHING is the absence of all determination and content

a. NOTHING is an indeterminate simplicity. This NOTHING, which is
supposed to be only nothing, is an affirmative NOTHING that is
granted an existence in thought, imagination, and speech.

(1) Thus PURE NOTHING as the *affirmation* of an indeterminate
simplicity immediately collapses into PURE BEING.

----------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------

[NOTE] PURE LIGHT and PURE DARKNESS

[A] Hegel uses the analogy of "pure light" and "pure darkness" to
help illuminate the above relationship between PURE BEING and PURE
NOTHING .

[1] From the perspective of "seeing" we can relate the phenomena
of "pure light" with PURE BEING .

[a] `BEING' --which is usually associated with "affirmativeness"--
is of course identified with the illuminating quality of light.
Light has the power to surround "everything", and "illuminate"
everything in its articulated outline.

[b] As part of the 5 fold human sensorium, "Seeing" is
a "distantial grasping" of determinate things. "Seeing"
is "distantial" in the sense that it requires an "optimal nearness"
to illuminate what is percieved.

[c] In contrast, in the absence of light, all determinate things
are "extinguished" for the human eye. Consequently, the human eye
sees "NOTHING" in the absence of light .

[2] However, in the total brilliance of "pure light", all
determinate distinctions are also extinguished.

[a] Thus the human eye "sees" just as much in "pure light" as it
does in "pure darkness".

[b] From the above analogy of `Pure Light' and `Pure Darkness', we
can "see" how the affirmativeness of PURE BEING collapses into PURE
NOTHING

[3] Furthermore, using this same analogy with the human phenomenon
of "seeing", we can also indicate how PURE NOTHING is like PURE
BEING.

[a] It is true that the human eye "sees" nothing determinate
in "pure darkness", yet it is also true that the human eye
still "sees" the "open darkness".

[b] Therefore, even in absolute darkness, there is still
the "seeing" of the open and affirmative darkness (i.e. the open
possibility of seeing something).

[c] And so through the above analogy we can "see" how the
indeterminacy of `NOTHING' slips into the affirmativeness of PURE
BEING.

[B] Taking into consideration the utility of the above analogy, we
should at the same time make it crystal clear that `PURE BEING'
cannot be "seen" as a form of subjective representation.

[1] i.e. `PURE BEING' *cannot* be grasped from viewpoint of "natural
consciousness" .

[a] `PURE BEING' only came into "view" because the distance between
the "perceiving subject" and the "object percieved" had been
overcome (i.e. during the course of the Phenomenology of Spirit).

[b] The "distance" between `Subject' and `Object' was overcome when
the thinking subject became "self-consciouss" .

[c] This PURE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS constituted an overcoming of
the "distance" between the `Subject' and the `Object'.

[2] Thus, `PURE BEING' can not be grasped as an external object
from the "distantial" perspective of a `Subject' (i.e. natural
consciousness), instead the `Subject' and `Object' have at the
moment of `PURE BEING' collapsed into one another, and we
have "entered into" a non-distantial realm (i.e. the realm of a
PURE SELF-RELATION).

[a] Or we have "entered into" the logical SELF-RELATION of the
ABSOLUTE SUBJECT.

[3] Here with the mention of an "Absolute Subject" we must recall
what we learned about a `Subject' in general from Kant:

[a] Kant suggested that in order for a Subject to have
representational experience at all, a subject must be in a logical
SELF-RELATION to the rules that actively unify the
externally "given" sensory data.

[b] These "rules" or "functions" which were necessarily used by the
subject to actively unify representations were considered to be a
priori or "transcendentally prior" to representational experience.

[c] Hegel agreed with Kant that there could be no consciousness
without "SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS" (i.e. there could be no
representational experience without a prior "logical SELF-RELATION"
to the rules that actively unified those representations)

[but]

[d] Hegel suggested that for Kant, the "rules" that he outlined that
a `Subject' was necessarily in relation to (in order to have
determinate experience in the first place) were simply dogmatic
adaptations of the laws of logic that had been handed down from the
annals of traditional logic.

[4] Thus Hegel required that we first "enter into" this abstract
(and non-distantial) logical SELF-RELATION, and secondly he demanded
that we allow the rules (that a subject was necessarily in a self-
relation with) to autonomously self-develop.

[a] Once we enter into PURE BEING, there is no longer
any "distance" between subject and object. We have entered into a
pure SELF-RELATION.

[b] PURE BEING is not unequal relatively to an other; it has no
diversity
within itself nor any with a reference outwards.

[c] Conseqently, when we enter into PURE BEING our analogy
of "seeing" necessarily breaks down because "seeing" is necessarily
distantial (i.e. distance requires "relationship").

[d] An open question is whether there are other non-distantial
human sensory analogies availible to help concretise the moment
prior to the first speculative step. For example a non-
distantial "touching on" may be appropriate.
----------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------

C. BECOMING

1. So the truth was neither `BEING' nor `NOTHING', but that `PURE
BEING' -did not pass over but had [already] passed over -
into `NOTHING', and vice versa.

a. i.e. `PURE BEING' immediately collapsed into `NOTHING' and vice
versa.

(1) An incessant dialectical transposition then ensued.

(a) `BEING' and `NOTHING' held-together in their movement into one
another constituted `BECOMING'.

II. Determinate Being:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/hegel-scilogic/message/747

A. DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH

1. `DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH' first issued forth from `BECOMING'
as a qualitative "oneness" (i.e. in the simple form of being) .

a. `DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH' was immediate (i.e. it was without
a "posited" relation to an other);

(1) As a qualitative "oneness", `DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH' was in
the affirmativeness of BEING,

[yet as mediated by `BECOMING']

(2) `DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH' also included *within* itself NON-
BEING

(a) Thus DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH was *not* the PURE SELF-RELATION
of the prior sphere of indeterminate BEING.

[instead]

(b) DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH was the immediacy of *DETERMINATE*
being.

(b) DETERMINATE BEING is of course a being that is necessarily in a
RELATION to another DETERMINATE BEING

[Yet]

(3) DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH (as it had initially issued forth
from `BECOMING') was merely immediate (i.e. it was without a posited
relation to an other).

(a) DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH had to reveal its concealed negative
element, or it would have merely slipped into the prior sphere of
PURE BEING.

(b) Thus DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH preserved itself from falling
into the indeterminacy of PURE BEING by collapsing into NEGATION

(c) With the `NEGATION', DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH was no longer
immediate, it was now in relation to an `OTHER'.

B. THE `NEGATION'

1. The `NEGATION' was immediately demonstrated to be a `DETERMINATE
BEING' itself.

a. `NEGATION' was necessarily a `DETERMINATE BEING' of course
because of its *relation* to `DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH'

(1) Recall that *only* a `DETERMINATE BEING' can be in a relation to
another `DETERMINATE BEING'.

(2) Thus the self-collapse of `DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH'
into `NEGATION' resulted in the determinate opposition between:

(a) AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATE BEING (i.e. formerly `DETERMINATE BEING
AS SUCH')

[and]

(b) NEGATIVE DETERMINATE BEING (i.e. formerly `NEGATION').

(3) Insofar as AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATE BEING had "preserved" itself
in its relation to the external `NEGATION', it was determined as
a `BEING-FOR-OTHER'.

b. `BEING-FOR-OTHER'

(1) Determined as `BEING-FOR-OTHER' the `AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATE
BEING' and the `NEGATIVE DETERMINATE BEING' *essentially* referred
to one another

[OR in other words]

(a) As merely externally related, the `AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATE
BEING' and the `NEGATIVE DETERMINATE BEING' were demonstrated to be
inextricably adjoined with each other.

(b) That is, as a `BEING-FOR-OTHER', the determinancy of
the `AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATE BEING' necessarily slipped into
its `NEGATIVE DETERMINATE BEING' (i.e. its external `OTHER').

[And]

(c) In this way, in so far as the `AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATE BEING'
was merely determined (or "preserved") in its relation to an
external `OTHER' (i.e. in so far as it was determined as a `BEING-
FOR-OTHER'), the `AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATE BEING' of course lacked an
integral being of its own.

C. the `NEGATION OF THE NEGATION':

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/hegel-scilogic/message/749

1. NEGATION OF THE NEGATION: the simple restoration of DETERMINATE
BEING with itself

a. `BEING-IN-ITSELF'

(1) With the `NEGATION OF THE NEGATION', the `AFFIRMATIVE
DETERMINATE BEING' was deterimined to be: SELF-EQUAL IN OPPOSITION
TO ITS INEQUALITY.

[HOWEVER]

(a) Determined as such (i.e. "self-equal in opposition to its
inequality"), the `AFFIRMATIVE DETEMINATE BEING' (i.e.
the `SOMETHING') again proved itself to be indistinquishible from
its `NEGATIVE DETERMINATE BEING' (i.e. its `OTHER').

(b) Consequently an external dialectical transposition
between `SOMETHING' and the `OTHER' ensued.

(c) Thus the `SOMETHING' and its `OTHER' mutually slipped into one
another.

(2) This fluid "ALTERATION" between `SOMETHING' and its `OTHER'
represented a `BECOMING'.

[And the result of this *concrete* `BECOMING' was that]

(a) The `SOMETHING' was revealed to be the unity of `BEING-FOR-
OTHER' and `BEING-IN-ITSELF'.

[and]

(b) The `OTHER' was [also] revealed to be the unity of `BEING-IN-
ITSELF' and `BEING-FOR-OTHER'.

(3) At their point of contact, the `SOMETHING' and the `OTHER' were
reflected into themselves (i.e. into the moments of their own
immanent self-development).

(a) Each moment (i.e. `BEING-FOR-OTHER' and `BEING-IN-ITSELF') of
the `SOMETHING' necessarily *contained* the other moment in the
sense that each moment was either a "transition from" or a "pointing
to" the other moment.

(b) Again a dialectical transposition (i.e. a `BECOMING') ensued,
but this time it was a dialectical transposition that occurred
*WITHIN* the determinate being of the `SOMETHING' itself.

(c) This alteration of `BEING-IN-ITSELF' and `BEING-FOR-OTHER'
then "issued forth" into the qualitative "oneness" of the
affirmative `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF'.

III. THE `SOMETHING':

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/hegel-scilogic/message/753

A. `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF'

1. The affirmative `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF' was demonstrated to be
the simple "oneness" (i.e. `BEING-IN-ITSELF') that was "filled" with
what was necessarily present in it (i.e. `BEING-FOR-OTHER').

a. The `BEING-FOR-OTHER' ( that was immanently present in
the "oneness" ) of course had to `POSIT' itself, or this "oneness"
of the affirmative `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF' would [again] fall into
the indeterminacy of the sphere long since past, i.e. the sphere
of `PURE BEING'

(1) This `BEING-FOR-OTHER' then posited itself as the *immanent*
negative called `CONSTITUTION'.

[At this point..]

(2) The affirmative `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF' had then divided
itself into:

(a) `DETERMINATION' (i.e. the "oneness" of the affirmative
determinate `in-itself')

[and]

(b) `CONSTITUTION' (the articulation of the `otherness-within-
itself')

(c) The above two moments then fell into alteration (i.e. the
movement thus enters into BECOMING).

(3) The "oneness" of the affirmative `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF'
alternated into its own immanent `BEING-FOR-OTHER' .

(a) Yet now when the affirmative `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF' collapsed
into its negative element (i.e. its BEING-FOR-OTHER), it at the same
time remained identical with itself because that which it altered
into was the `OTHERNESS-WITHIN-ITSELF'.

(b) `CONSTITUTION' is the negative moment (i.e. BEING-WITHIN-
ITSELF'), but it is now clear that it is no longer the `BEING-FOR-
OTHER' of the prior sphere (i.e. the `being-for-other' that proved
itself to be the mere community with its `OTHER').

(c) Instead, as currently developed, `CONSTITUTION' is now the
unfolding of the `BEING-WITHIN-ITSELF' that is the AFFIRMATIVE
COMMUNITY WITH ITSELF (i.e. or the `DETERMINATE SELF-RELATION')

B. SELF-RELATED DETERMINATE BEING

1. The `SOMETHING' as an affirmative `DETERMINATE SELF-RELATION' is
the COINCIDENCE of its SELF-RELATION with the immanent unfolding of
its `BEING-FOR-OTHER'

a. The coincidence of the `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF' with the unfolding
of the immanent `OTHERNESS-WITHIN-ITSELF' represents the SUBLATION
of the difference between the above two moments.

(1) Moreover, the SUBLATION of the `DETERMINATE IN-ITSELF'
and `CONSTITUTION' represents the positing of the `SOMETHING' in
general.

(a) The `SOMETHING' as a `DETERMINATE SELF-RELATION' is for the
first time an affirmative *stable* being.

(b) As an affirmative stable being the `SOMETHING' is itself the
qualitative `NEGATION' of its `OTHER'.

(c) Or as the affirmative and stable `DETERMINATE SELF-
RELATION', the `SOMETHING' is itself the ceasing of all external
otherness in it.

(2) Consequently the stable and affirmative `SOMETHING', as an
immediate, `SELF-RELATED DETERMINATE BEING' is first and foremost
the *LIMIT* for the an external `OTHER' (or it is the non-being of
the `OTHER').

----------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------

also see:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/hegel-scilogic/message/789

Best,

Randall



[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

--- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Kai Froeb <froeb-list@...> wrote:

>

>
> * Robert Wallace wrote a very good overall book on Hegel's Logic,
> focussing especialy on the point that is most oprecious to me,
> teh relation between the limited/ending and the
> unlimited/endless/eternal (where the limited is included in the
> unlimited and
> the unlimited is present in the limited, the unlimited is the
> sublation of the limited). This he does by mainly focussing also
> on teh logic of Dasein, but also discussing other parts of
> Hegel's work.
>

I just happened to notice that you can get Bob's book now used for $25. That's a steal! I've been re-reading parts of it lately in conjunction with Carlson's commentary. It really is an excellent book. Bob's chapter on Essence is especially interesting, being at a somewhat more advanced level than Carlson's commentary--and this is the chapter of the book, too, that Carlson mainly references. At any rate, especially for those who are generally knowledgable about the SL, Wallace's book is definitely something to get.

John