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AW: Re: [hegel] Why still Hegel?

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  • greuterb@bluewin.ch
    ... Von: alkibiades@gmx.de Datum: 07.09.2009 11:54 An: Betreff: Re: [hegel] Why still Hegel? Beat Greuter writes:
    Message 1 of 3 , Sep 11, 2009
      ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
      Von: alkibiades@...
      Datum: 07.09.2009 11:54
      An: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
      Betreff: Re: [hegel] Why still Hegel?

      Beat Greuter <greuterb@...> writes:

      [...]

      > This is very interesting, above all what Andreas Arndt said in his first
      > answer:
      >
      > "Hegel versteht in seiner Logik die absolute Idee letztlich als Methode.
      > Für mich heißt das: sie ist
      > Denkmittel, das im Gebrauch zu bewähren und ggf. zu modifizieren ist.
      > Die Eigenart dieses
      > Mittels besteht aber genau darin, dass es auf das Ganze, auf die
      > Totalität unseres Wissens und
      > der Wirklichkeit geht und willkürliche Beschränkungen nicht akzeptiert.
      > In diesem
      > Absolutheitsanspruch liegt, wie schon Adorno klar formuliert hat, eine
      > fundamentale Kritik
      > jedes beschränkten Denkens, das in Wahrheit ein Begrenztes verabsolutiert."
      >
      > Hegel is one of the very few thinkers whose philosophy is truly critical
      > and that is what thinking the absolute means.
      [...]

      As so often, I couldn't agree more with you. It strikes me as odd that
      so many people, whenever 'the absolute', is mentioned, seem to react
      like bigots facing the appearance of what they, in their superstition,
      believe to be the devil. Whereas in fact, everybody refers to an
      absolute at least implicitely. For physicalism, the absolute is nature,
      understood as some sort of neopythagorean metaphysics. For Kantianism,
      the absolute is the thing-in-itself. For Heideggeriansim, the absolute
      is 'being'. And so forth. Even solipsim refers to an absolute -- its
      misunderstood 'I'. Yes, even every alleged so-called "postmodernist"
      whom I have encountered so far reveals on a close reading that he or she
      has an implicit reference to an absolute vorstellung at work.

      Starting from that, the interesting question would be: what can actually
      meaningfully be regarded as an absolute? And Hegel's answer is indeed
      the only truly critical one: the only true absolute is the very idea of
      an absolute.

      Oliver

      Your answer goes to the point. I think that the term 'implictely' is crucial: First we assume or set an entity. At
      this beginning the concept is only in itself. But now we think about this entity, that is we predicate or dismantle it.
      With this we change the entity and therefore it loses its initial assumed independent absoluteness. Thinking about this
      procedure is thinking the absolute which becomes thereby explicit - "the very idea of an absolute" - and therefore only
      a moment. This way of philosophical thinking we can call critical since it is critcal not only with respect to the
      predication but also with respect to the initially assumed absolute. In my opinion our thinking goes always along this
      procedure, however, we are not conscious of it. Hegel's philosophy makes this procedure explicit in the most general
      form which is called the logic.



      At the beginning of your comment you write: "It strikes me as odd that so many people, whenever 'the absolute', is
      mentioned, seem to react like bigots facing the appearance of what they, in their superstition, believe to be the
      devil." Quite right! This is because Hegel was sometimes too euphoric about the absolute. However, it is the thinking
      of the concept itself which is euphoric. There are people who call this the mystical side of Hegel's philosophy. I
      think they are right.



      Best regards,

      Beat Greuter
    • paul81755
      ... wrote: ... This sounds a bit simple. Is it a tautology?, whatever that is supposed to mean. How about, from the twisting and turning, much
      Message 2 of 3 , Sep 11, 2009
        --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "greuterb@..."
        <greuterb@...> wrote:

        Copied from what Oliver wrote:

        >Starting from that, the interesting question would be:
        >what can actually meaningfully be regarded as an absolute?
        >And Hegel's answer is indeed the only truly critical one:
        >the only true absolute is the very idea of
        >an absolute.

        This sounds a bit simple. Is it a tautology?,
        whatever that is supposed to mean.
        How about, from the twisting and turning,
        much pain, critiques and many headaches etc.,
        (See an account of the Newton Leibniz battle
        http://www.gap-system.org/~history/Extras/Bossut_Chapter_V.html understandings (Empirical, Formal, ...
        Paraconsistent, Fuzzy etc.,) of logic are sublated
        by the dialectic; what is true for
        their relation is absolute?

        Where, is the textual evidence to prove it
        otherwise; that an historical analysis
        (Hegel judgement in favour of Leibniz)
        does not entail an understanding
        and therefore the possibility of
        an exposition for the
        logics axioms (see 'The insight that
        absolute truth must be a result ..
        p70 of the SL)?

        Nothing can afford us to reason beyond the truth
        of the Notion. This is My anti-Humean principle for
        modality in honour of Hegel's never ending trial
        and dedicated to those who can produce the evidence.
        Others less academic; with not such an extensive
        historical knowledge and memory,
        should re-read the intro and try to get
        what it means in other contexts.

        Regards,

        Paul Healey
      • Oliver Scholz
        greuterb@bluewin.ch writes: [...] ... [...] I fully agree. The quest for something which is the verwirklichung of that very idea of an
        Message 3 of 3 , Sep 11, 2009
          "greuterb@..." <greuterb@...> writes:

          [...]
          > Your answer goes to the point. I think that the term 'implictely' is
          > crucial: First we assume or set an entity. At this beginning the
          > concept is only in itself. But now we think about this entity, that is
          > we predicate or dismantle it. With this we change the entity and
          > therefore it loses its initial assumed independent absoluteness.
          > Thinking about this procedure is thinking the absolute which becomes
          > thereby explicit - "the very idea of an absolute" - and therefore only
          > a moment. This way of philosophical thinking we can call critical
          > since it is critcal not only with respect to the predication but also
          > with respect to the initially assumed absolute. In my opinion our
          > thinking goes always along this procedure, however, we are not
          > conscious of it. Hegel's philosophy makes this procedure explicit in
          > the most general form which is called the logic.
          [...]

          I fully agree. The quest for something which is the verwirklichung of
          that very idea of an absolute comes to it's conclusion only in the
          philosophy of absolute spirit -- though, compared to all the other
          candidates this is something infinitely less palpable.

          > At the beginning of your comment you write: "It strikes me as odd that
          > so many people, whenever 'the absolute', is mentioned, seem to react
          > like bigots facing the appearance of what they, in their superstition,
          > believe to be the devil." Quite right! This is because Hegel was
          > sometimes too euphoric about the absolute. However, it is the thinking
          > of the concept itself which is euphoric. There are people who call
          > this the mystical side of Hegel's philosophy. I think they are right.

          Well, about that: I would not in principle have so much of a problem
          with speaking of a mystical side, in this metaphorical sense. But it
          seems to me that people here *actually mean it*. The difference, becomes
          obvious, once "mystical" pops up in the discussion of a demarcation or
          determination with regard to Hegel's philosophy. And it becomes obvious,
          once "reason" is brought into the play as if it were the simple *other*
          (in the sense of that category) of understanding.

          Obviously, we have both experienced the euphory that comes with studying
          the Logic. That Hegel himself, catering to picture-thought, used a
          couple of metaphors to express that euphory and its source, is almost
          unfortunate. Because it seems to mislead people to mistake those
          picture-thoughts for the actual thing. The actual content is the long
          hard work of thought, the dialectics of doubt and doubt of the doubt,
          the arduous business of critical philosophy. Such metaphors that cater
          to picture-thought (vorstellung) are fine and dandy when people "in the
          know" are chatting about the feelings which -- as a side-effect --
          accompany their studies. But pursuing a study of the science of logic is
          not the same as simply reading the book of that name and letting your
          picture-thought freely and fancyfully provide a meaning to its obscure
          sentences. If there's any ambiguity -- and from what you wrote in the
          past, I know that I'm preaching to the choir here -- about the role of
          understanding/intellect and criticism, then those metaphors become
          harmful. For this reason, I have half a mind to treat this euphory as a
          modern school-secret.

          One thing that I particularly like on the preface to the 1832 edtion of
          the Wissenschaft der Logik is that Hegel expresses the source of that
          feeling in a much more sober way. There he draws an interesting parallel
          between the categories that we, as a natural logic, apply unconciously
          -- "instinktartig" -- every day and everywhere, and psycholgical drives,
          feelings, customs etc. that guard our actions. With regard to what we
          are talking about here, I'd sum up those passages up like this: studying
          the logical science is itself an experience of freedom and, and that
          euphory is a feeling of freedom.

          This, metaphorically speaking, "mystical side of Hegel's philosophy"
          could, in the same sense and with the same justification be called its
          "poetical side" or its "lyrical side". I mean it: *as a work of
          philosophy* I find the WdL, its content, and even its language -- it
          seems to be that I'm quite alone on this latter point -- to be of great
          beauty; only when taken *as a poetical work in the actual sense* I'd
          find it rather ugly and inferior to *real* poetry.

          In that sense, the context of discourse does matter. If the fad here and
          elsewhere were to regard Hegel's philosophy as a form of lyricism -- and
          if people were answering problems what this or that expression, this or
          that passage means with: "It's lyrical." -- then I'd feel obliged to
          attack lyricism, although poetry is very dear to me.

          In his own time, Hegel did not feel any need to be very explicit on the
          demarcation line to mysticism, because nobody in his time would have
          ever dreamed of accusing him of that. That kind of crazy is entirely
          modern. It is rather telling, though, that he felt the need to very
          carefully draw the demarcation line to skepticism.


          Sorry, for my long rant ...


          Oliver
          --
          25 Fructidor an 217 de la Révolution
          Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité!
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