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- Hi there,I’d like to devote a bit of energy to the problem of the origin of the unchangeable wing of the unhappy or divided consciousness out of the skeptical standpoint in Chapter Four of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (paras 205-08). This follows from the discussion of the unhappy consciousness in a previous thread.The Skeptical Origin of the Divided ConsciousnessThere are several lines of inquiry I’d like to pursue. These include:
- The Berlin Phenomenology
- Hegel’s Essay on Skepticism
- Jacobi’s book on Hume
- Labarrière and Jarzyk’s commentary
- Michael Forster and Bertrand Quentin’s books on Hegel and Skepticism
- Essays by Claus Düsing and Klaus Vieweg
- Anything else I’ve forgotten or that anyone else can suggest.
I don’t expect these all to be fruitful for my purposes, but negative answers are still progress of a sort.The Berlin PhenomenologyHegel gave five sets of lectures on self-consciousness in Berlins on the basis of the Encyclopedia (1817, 1827, 1830). However, the structure of this treatment is different from that in the Phenomenology. In Berlin, we proceed directly from the economic (in a broad sense) concepts of desire and work, master and servant to their institutional embodiment in the structures of the family, civil society and the state. There is no historical diversion through Graeco-Roman philosophy and the unhappy consciousness, as in the Phenomenology (Chapter 4b). Instead, similar material is displaced into discussions of education or given in popular lectures on history.The reason seems to be that the Berlin lectures are a systematic presentation of the content of philosophy, rather than the historical presentation of the emergence of the systematic viewpoint in the Phenomenology.There are English versions of the Berlin material in the translations and commentaries of Wallace/Miller (Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind) and Petry (Subjective Spirit, Berlin Phenomenology).Hegel’s Essay on SkepticismThis essay on The Relation of Skepticism to Philosophy first appeared in the Critical Journal of Philosophy (1801-03) and there is an English translation in Between Kant and Hegel (Eds. Giovanni & Harris. Hacker, 1985). It elaborates several arguments about the project of thinking in the absence of knowledge claims. Here I wish to focus solely on matters that affect the interpretation of the arising of the unchangeable from skepticism in Chapter Four of the Phenomenology. The main argument of the article is an engagement with Schulze, the author of Aenesidemus (1794) and Critique of Theoretical Philosophy (2 vols, 1801). Hegel points out that Schulze confines the field of doubt to theoretical reason. Unlike the ancient skeptics, Schulze excludes the facts of consciousness, analytic statements, and physics which “sets all doubt all defiance” from the scope of skeptical doubt. In the remaining range of “theoretical philosophy”, he opposes dogmatism and skepticism and takes the part of the latter. Hegel argues:“Without the determination of the true relationship of skepticism to philosophy, and without the insight that skepticism itself in its inmost heart is at one with every true philosophy, and hence that there is a philosophy which is neither skepticism nor dogmatism, and is thus both at once, without this, all the histories, and reports, and new editions of skepticism lead to a dead end.” (322-23)In this sense, Hegel identifies Plato’s Parmenides as a skeptical work: “it is itself the negative side of the cognition of the absolute, and directly presupposes reason as the positive side. [...] This skepticism that comes on the scene in its pure explicit shape in the Parmenides can, however, be found implicit in every genuine philosophical system.” (323-24) Hegel illustrates his concept of reason by Spinoza’s definition of a cause of itself. He observes that Zweifel (doubt) is an inadequate translation for the skeptical epoche (suspension of judgement).Hegel offers a rewriting of the history of skepticism in line with this classification, adverting to Stäudlin’s History of Skepticism (2 vols, 1794). Pyrrho was the founder of skepticism. His “singular personality became increasingly blurred by time, and the philosophical interest emerged in its purity.” This was found in the “10 tropes” (turnings) of early skepticism, which were directed against knowledge from the senses. It appears to be this that is referred to in the Preface to the Phenomenology when Hegel says:“The skepticism that is directed against the whole range of phenomenal consciousness, on the other hand, renders the spirit for the first time competent to examine what truth is.” (para 78)Only in its later developments did a further five tropes appear (and then a further two) directed against reason itself. Hegel gives an account of the five tropes, along with his answers to them. To the first, diversity of opinions among philosophers, he points out that disagreement presupposes a minimal prior level of agreement and that one can thus search out identity behind apparent conflicts. For the other four, reason is at home with considerations of infinite regress, relationship, assumption and circular argument – and not disabled by them. This is evident in the paradox that appears when it is noticed that statements of universal skeptical doubt are included in their own scope.Hegel extends his argument by questioning the separation of thought and being that he sees as an assumption of modern skepticism. This is a version of Thomas Reid’s critique of the skeptical assumptions of Hume and the “way of ideas” in Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764). This British debate was familiar in Germany through the translations of Garve. Hegel observes of the skeptic:“This sundering of the rational, in which thinking and being are one, and the absolute insistence on this opposition, in other words the intellect made absolute, constitutes the endlessly repeated and universally applied ground of this dogmatic skepticism.” (339)The significance of this for interpretation of the skeptical self-consciousness in Chapter 4b of the Phenomenology is we ought not to assume that the “unchangeable” counterpart to the wavering skeptic is a finite dogmatism that might be aligned with an earthly authority. For Schulze’s dogmatism and skepticism alike “the truth resides in temporality.” (330) Instead, Hegel’s idea of the skeptic ought to evoke in us the idea of reason, which in Hegel’s reading of Spinoza and others, is akin to the idea of God.I omit consideration of Hegel’s discussion of Schulze’s analysis of Locke, Leibniz and Kant, as the key point relates to the discussion of ancient skepticism. It is worth noting that he cites Jacobi’s remark on modern skepticism, that “we get sick of it, once all the moves and turns are known.” (Werke III, 29-30). We now turn to consider Jacobi’s essay on Hume.More to followStephen Cowley - I would like to add, as either helpful or maddening, that the nearest analogue I know to the thrust of Hegel's writings, outside of Scripture itself, is/are the writings and of St. John of the Cross, not in the main hortatory but saying how it is. Hegel is of course very, even extremely, discreet, but the same absolute spirit is there and the same matter as far as End is concerned. This is what McTaggart picked up, on my reading, the spirituality I mean, not wishing on him any dabbling where he may never have dabbled.Stephen TheronFrom: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com> on behalf of Mary Malo reading_for_meaning@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: 22 July 2019 16:18
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Subject: Re: [hegel] Notes on the skeptical self-consciousnessPaul and Bob,Thank you both. I'm slowly working my way through the LPR 3 and see Hegel's discussion of unio mystica just around the corner. Then my questions re comparison of older mystical representations vs. Christian mystical representations may be answered. I see the mysteries are addressed in Volume 2 also. What seems of importance is the movement/idea of reconciliation and unity, from the abstract and external to the concrete and internal, from the universal to the particular. His extensive treatment of communion in Volume 3 looks helpful in this regard. I'm interested in how Hegel makes his case.MaryOn Sunday, July 21, 2019, 09:40:05 PM CDT, Paul Trejo petrejo@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:Robert,Many thanks for responding to Mary's query about the German words that Hegel used here.Of course, Mary used the term "unveil," rather than "veil," and one can make the case (in English) that to reveal and to "unveil" are very similar if not identical.I agree that "To Consummate" in the sense of "to fulfill", is not the same as "To Reveal" in the sense of "to unveil".I think we see where Mary is going with her query. The conjugal marriage metaphors of ancient Religions -- including the Old Testament -- are continued in the Christian Religion when the Church is called the Bride of Christ (e...g. Matthew 22, 25; 2 Corinthians 11; Ephesians 5; Revelation 19, 21, 22).Hegel refers to Christianity in two ways: (1) as the Revealed Religion; and (2) as the Consummate Religion. I agree with you, Robert, that the terms "Consummate" and "Revealed" are quite different in the English as well as in the German usage -- and Hegel does not immediately equate them.Yet, in some manner, Hegel regards Christianity as both.There is a natural sequence -- when a Revelation results in a Consummation -- there we return to the conjugal marriage metaphor common to perhaps all Religions from pre-Christian to Christian.I think this is what Mary alludes. Yet the relationship between the terms seems to be a process, rather than an identity.All best,--Paul--------------------------------------------------------------------On Saturday, July 20, 2019, 09:42:23 AM CDT, Robert M Wallace bob@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:Hi Mary,"Consummate,” as in “The Consummate Religion” (LPR), is vollendet. Vollenden is often translated as “to perfect.” You can look it up. Voll means “full,” so vollenden is to “fill” or fulfil. “Revealed” is geoffenbart, from offenbaren, from offen, which means “open” or public. So, to “make open” or public. No “veil” in there, as far as I can see.Best, Bob W
---------------------------------------------------------------------From: <hegel@yahoogroups.com> on behalf of "Mary MaloDate: Friday, July 19, 2019 at 10:07 PMTo: "hegel@yahoogroups.com" <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Subject: Re: [hegel] Notes on the skeptical self-consciousnessPaul or anyone,
What are the exact German words Hegel uses that are translated consummation and revealed? Do they have etymologies and denotations akin to what I've suggested?
Mary
---------------------------------------On Friday, July 19, 2019, 10:52:21 AM CDT, reading_for_meaning@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
Hi Paul,Please note that you responded to my earlier unedited version of this post which I deleted from the group page but not in my email...here's the right one!
Correction: I meant the conjugal meaning, not connotation, of consummation. Etymology for consume is different of course but may apply whenever Hegel means abolish, which I doubt he intends for the unfolding idea of incarnation and reconciliation.
Although I suppose devouring something to make it part of yourself is not the same as destroying or wasting. Consummation is appropriate whenever he means completion or perfection. Taken together they may relate to the activity of aufheben/aufhebung.
Hegel's use of revealed/revelatory, from the root unveil, along with consummate imply a speculative unity in difference. Ancient religions' sacred marriage and Christianity's bridal chamber, marriage feast of the Lamb, etc. represent/resemble this unity... The unveiling and completion of difference is what spirit does, making its subjectivity objective.