Dear Bob Fanelli,

Certainly Hegel is not the kind of "idealist" that we know from
Berkeley, or from Kant. But Hegel asserts in the _Science of Logic_
(Miller translation, pp. 154-5):

"The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in
recognizing that the finite has no veritable being. Every philosophy
is essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its
principle, and the question then is only how far this principle is
carried out."

The Remark from which this is taken is the culmination of chapter 2
of the _Science of Logic_, on "Determinate Being" (Dasein), which
also contains Hegel's systematic introduction and dialectical
treatment of the concept of "Reality" (p. 11; cp. p. 149). If Hegel
has a definitive account of these concepts, this is it.

I gave a detailed explanation of this text, and thus of the sense in
which Hegel is an "idealist," in my _Hegel's Philosophy of Reality,
Freedom, and God_ (Cambridge U. Press, 2005), esp. pp. 92-96, and
243-246 on the "Idea." I hope that Prof. Maker and others who are
interested in the issue of Hegel's particular kind of "idealism" and
how to relate his thinking to other "idealisms" and "realisms" will
address these texts and my interpretation of them.

Best, Bob Wallace

>Dear Hegel Group,
>
>Hegel transcends both Idealism and Realism. Hegel, as Professor Maker
>asserts, is not an Idealist (“…Why Hegel is not an Idealist”) In the
>following passages taken from the Encyclopedia Hegel discusses the
>reality of the universal as it is engendered by the Mind.
>This ‘special mode of mental being’ is evidence par excellence of
>this reality. Mind becomes ‘an infinite, absolute, actuality;’ but
>not in the idealist sense of Leibniz or Descartes. Reality is
>manifested in the Mind by means of the phenomenological path of
>thought from sense certainty through perception and understanding
>along with the Force of Reason to ultimate actualized thought. The
>rational and the real merge. In dealing with all this, we may be able
>to offer that what is real is both in the Mind and elsewhere in the
>World. Why not? The problem, of course, is to connect the two.
>
><§ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being.
>Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing,
>whilst it still remains self-identical. Hence the special mode of
>mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit is not some one mode or
>meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a form distinct
>from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very
>mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility
>mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. >
>‘Revelation, for Hegel, is an ‘abstract Idea,’ but it is an Idea
>which in merging the objective with the subjective aspects of Nature,
>simply reveals the reality of the World and Nature, and captures the
>profundity of a real World ‘out there’ and a real Mind ‘in there.’
>
> <§ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract
>Idea, is an unmediated transition to Nature which comes to be. As
>mind is free, its manifestation is to set forth Nature as its world;
>but because it is reflection, it, in thus setting forth its world, at
>the same time presupposes the world as a nature independently
>existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a
>world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the
>affirmation and truth of its freedom.>
>
> Hegel connects the mind with the real world-a nexus indeed. He
>says, ‘transition to Nature’ and this is the transcendent nexus of
>cognition, (which must be rational at that, and not intuitive as
>Schelling offered), and the real world. He admits that the rational
>cognitive process is a ‘reflection,’ ‘setting forth its world and ‘at
>the same time presupposing the world as nature independently
>existing; which first seems to be a paradox. How can the world be as
>real in the mind and at the same ‘time’ be as real outside the mind?
>Hegel answers that the categories of Logic and all that they entail
>are the prime method of concrete rational thought. These forms of
>thought are just as real as the World of Nature.
>
>< 384,(cond’t)The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme
>definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its
>meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all
>education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the
>impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that must
>explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some
>glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the
>spirituality of God is the lesson of Christianity. It remains for
>philosophy in its own element of intelligible unity to get hold of
>what was thus given as a mental image, and what implicitly is the
>ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by rational
>methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the
>theme and the soul of philosophy.>
>
>Hegel crosses over to Spirit from Mind, which, though I do not have
>the German available, I must assume he uses the word ‘Geist’,
>meaning, of course, both Mind and Spirit. He obviously equates the
>development of the reality of what his System has established
>with ‘spirituality of God’ and the ‘lesson of Christianity.’
>These ‘mental images’ (Gestahlt der Wahrheit-the image of truth –
>Preface PhdG # 5) or ‘what is implicitly the ultimate reality,
>command, for Hegel, the identity of cognition and reality; that is,
>that the ultimate reality of God can be known through Hegel’s System;
>a task indeed.
>
>I welcome any comments.
>
>Regards,
>Bob Fanelli

--
Robert M. Wallace
2503 E. Olive St.
Shorewood, WI 53211
USA

This idea that Hegel transcends both Idealism and Realism will be a hard one to teach; if we want to keep both feet on the ground; I could define Realism for Hegel to mean, the truth of the ideal as the actual movement of the spirit; if taking extracts from the Encyclopaedia verbatim were the truth of the mater, there would be some question of whether those like Apostel, Arruda, Carroll and even Rudolf Kaehr following Gotthard Günther could even have a position on Idealism. The following I think supports an other interpretation:

Addition to §96: Reality and ideality are frequently considered as a pair of determinations that confront one another with equal independence, and therefore people say that apart from reality, there is "also" an ideality. But ideality is not something that is given outside of and apart from reality. On the contrary, the concept of ideality expressly consists in its being the truth of reality, or in other words, reality posited as what it is in-itself proves itself to be ideality.

I.e., the objective idealist could hold that the absolute serves an end, as opposed to the truth of its relation being a universal measure. Where as the subjective idealist could hold that the truth of facts as sensory impressions means there are no ends to serve other than those that satisfy the senses. Hence, both idealisms appear to fall within the scope of a deontic square: Obligatory(a), Impermissable(e), Permissable(i) and Gratuitous(o).

Given Hegel's later proviso in the addition and taking his tome as upholding the synthetic apriori; only from a rational structure made up of relations can any analysis be done for the ontology of reason, there is still I believe much that can be understood and developed e.g. a deviant square of opposition that supports a broadly logistic model of phenomena as opposed to a normalised one.

Paul Healey

"robertfanelli@..." <robertfanelli@...> wrote:
Dear Hegel Group,

Hegel transcends both Idealism and Realism. Hegel, as Professor Maker
asserts, is not an Idealist (“…Why Hegel is not an Idealist”) In the
following passages taken from the Encyclopedia Hegel discusses the
reality of the universal as it is engendered by the Mind.
This ‘special mode of mental being’ is evidence par excellence of
this reality. Mind becomes ‘an infinite, absolute, actuality;’ but
not in the idealist sense of Leibniz or Descartes. Reality is
manifested in the Mind by means of the phenomenological path of
thought from sense certainty through perception and understanding
along with the Force of Reason to ultimate actualized thought. The
rational and the real merge. In dealing with all this, we may be able
to offer that what is real is both in the Mind and elsewhere in the
World. Why not? The problem, of course, is to connect the two.

<§ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being.
Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing,
whilst it still remains self-identical. Hence the special mode of
mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit is not some one mode or
meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a form distinct
from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very
mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility
mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. >
‘Revelation, for Hegel, is an ‘abstract Idea,’ but it is an Idea
which in merging the objective with the subjective aspects of Nature,
simply reveals the reality of the World and Nature, and captures the
profundity of a real World ‘out there’ and a real Mind ‘in there.’

<§ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract
Idea, is an unmediated transition to Nature which comes to be. As
mind is free, its manifestation is to set forth Nature as its world;
but because it is reflection, it, in thus setting forth its world, at
the same time presupposes the world as a nature independently
existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a
world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the
affirmation and truth of its freedom.>

Hegel connects the mind with the real world-a nexus indeed. He
says, ‘transition to Nature’ and this is the transcendent nexus of
cognition, (which must be rational at that, and not intuitive as
Schelling offered), and the real world. He admits that the rational
cognitive process is a ‘reflection,’ ‘setting forth its world and ‘at
the same time presupposing the world as nature independently
existing; which first seems to be a paradox. How can the world be as
real in the mind and at the same ‘time’ be as real outside the mind?
Hegel answers that the categories of Logic and all that they entail
are the prime method of concrete rational thought. These forms of
thought are just as real as the World of Nature.

< 384,(cond’t)The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme
definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its
meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all
education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the
impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that must
explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some
glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the
spirituality of God is the lesson of Christianity. It remains for
philosophy in its own element of intelligible unity to get hold of
what was thus given as a mental image, and what implicitly is the
ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by rational
methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the
theme and the soul of philosophy.>

Hegel crosses over to Spirit from Mind, which, though I do not have
the German available, I must assume he uses the word ‘Geist’,
meaning, of course, both Mind and Spirit. He obviously equates the
development of the reality of what his System has established
with ‘spirituality of God’ and the ‘lesson of Christianity.’
These ‘mental images’ (Gestahlt der Wahrheit-the image of truth –
Preface PhdG # 5) or ‘what is implicitly the ultimate reality,
command, for Hegel, the identity of cognition and reality; that is,
that the ultimate reality of God can be known through Hegel’s System;
a task indeed.

I welcome any comments.

Regards,
Bob Fanelli




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[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Bob(Wallace),

Thanks for the references on Idealism. I will study them.

Regards,

Bob Fanelli

You're welcome, Bob. I look forward to seeing your thoughts.
Best, Bob W

>Bob(Wallace),
>
>Thanks for the references on Idealism. I will study them.
>
>Regards,
>
>Bob Fanelli
>
>

--
Robert M. Wallace
2503 E. Olive St.
Shorewood, WI 53211
USA