- Continuing with 118, I am a bit lost here too (this is my attempt, but corrections welcome):1. Perceptual Consciousness runs through the cycle of attributing essentiality to the object and then to the subject as it has with Sense Certainty.2. This happens because the model of perception as 'truth taking' has been corrupted. It is no longer simply accepting what is observed as true, but of reflecting on how the I (PC) perceives what it cannot take as a model of essential truth of the object as a simple -- the property.3. It becomes definitely known to consciousness that its 'perceiving is essentially constituted' as thus modulated: as it takes the truth it shifts its perspective on what it observes and begins to question what the truth is. In this questioning, it depends on what it itself (PC) contributes to the process and thus shifts the perceptual process away from a simple truth taking into a reflection into its own self as it perceives.4. This return into its own self is essential to perception, i.e., it is integral to the movement of the perceptual consciousness. And this alters the truth of perception (not of the act, but of the process) as not a simple truth taking.5. Consciousness immediately recognizes this shift and attributes the error to its own perceptual flaw. Thus this reflection does not result in the truth being what consciousness pointed to (as in Sense Certainty) but as the error of what the perceptual process brings about.6. "But by this very recognition it is able at once to supersede this untruth; it distinguishes its apprehension of the truth from the untruth of its perception, corrects this untruth, and since it undertakes to make this correction itself, the truth, qua truth of perception, falls of course within consciousness." In other words, since the perceptual consciousness actually corrects for the error and attributes the rightness to the object, the truth of perception as a process, is something that falls within consciousness. I.e. the truth of perception as a process is signalled by the way in which the PC deals with the possibility of deception.7. Thus consciousness proper in perception, is now a reflection what is true, differentiated from and at once intertwined with the taking of truth as an operation. I.e., perception is not a passive process, but an active engagement.In other words, the movement in which the perceptual consciousness attributes the truth to the essentially stable object is at the same time the very movement through which the perceptual consciousness is determining what is true without seeing that it is doing so.
SrivatsOn Tue, Jan 1, 2019 at 11:35 AM R Srivatsan <r.srivats@...> wrote:There is no doubt however, that Hegel takes in Leibniz's argument about internal differentiation and determination into his own account.SrivatsOn Tue, Jan 1, 2019 at 11:34 AM R Srivatsan <r.srivats@...> wrote:Pushing the Leibniz connection a little bit.The Britannica and the SEP entries on Leibniz, empiricism and rationalism are complicated and confusing. However, I thought of Hegel's History of Philosophy lectures and found Leibniz on the net. It just goes to show that Hegel's obscurity is not a lack of capability. He is so incredibly clear in relation to his account of Leibniz's philosophy. He divides his account of the philosophy into two parts a and b, in which a has seven characteristic features of monads. Of these, the third below shows the face off which Hegel's Perception section in the PhS bounces off (to a degree, there are of course many more things happeneing here):quoteIn the third place, “however, these monads must at the same time have certain qualities or determinations in themselves, inner actions, through which they are distinguished from others. There cannot be two things alike, for otherwise they would not be two, they would not be different but one and the same.”(9) Here then Leibnitz's axiom of the undistinguishable comes into words. What is not in itself distinguished is not distinguished. This may be taken in a trivial sense, as that there are not two individuals which are alike. To such sensuous things the maxim has no application, it is prima facie indifferent whether there are things which are alike or not; there may also be always a difference of space. This is the superficial sense, which does not concern us. The more intimate sense is, however, that each thing is in itself something determined, distinguishing itself from others implicitly or in itself. Whether two things are like or unlike is only a comparison which we make, which falls within our ken. But what we have further to consider is the determined difference in themselves. The difference must be a difference in themselves, not for our comparison, for the subject must have the difference as its own peculiar characteristic or determination, i.e., the determination must be immanent in the individual. Not only do we distinguish the animal by its claws, but it distinguishes itself essentially thereby, it defends itself, it preserves itself. If two things are different only in being two, then each of them is one; but the fact of their being two does not constitute a distinction between them; the determined difference in itself is the principal point.end quoteIt seems particularly apt to use Hegel's account of Leibniz here, because it would tell us exactly how Hegel thought of Leibniz, and not necessarily what Leibniz thought himself.SrivatsOn Tue, Jan 1, 2019 at 9:12 AM R Srivatsan <r.srivats@...> wrote:For some reason the first time I posted this my phone seems to have deleted it:---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: R Srivatsan <r.srivats@...>
Date: Tue, Jan 1, 2019, 9:08 AM
Subject: Re: [hegel] Some difficulty in 117 PhS Miller
To: <hegel@yahoogroups.com>I agree with you on the importance of the larger process at stake here. My difficulty here is when does focusing on the larger process allow me to disregard the importance of the close focus? How can I figure out when to disregard the detail? I can't. I have to push my reading to it's limit before I am able to take a step back. I'm fairly sure now, it will make larger sense as I go along. But when there is a movement that seems to follow the logic of the understanding, I feel compelled to follow it.SrivatsFor all the twists in the plot, Hegel stays with the common way of conceiving things and properties. It may sound convoluted but nothing he says strays far from common sense or what the empiricists have already said about the thing and properties.
And although common sense says contradictory things both about things and about properties, it employs various differences of respect to cope with these contradictions.
What Hegel is trying to do is show that these stratagems fail as the differences of respect do not hold. But most of this already is the common knowledge of empiricist philosophers.
So, we might wonder why philosophers appear here and nowhere else. Moreover, if Hegel is to have only one philosophical position appear over the course of the exposition, why empiricism?
Perception seems to be the one mode where what is for us and for consciousness intermingle.
I take this to be the structural feature that might be used to explain the appearance of philosophy at just this point in the exposition.
Perception is also the one mode where the reader and natural consciousness seem to occupy the same space in the same way. Or it is the one mode of Consciousness where Hegel does not seem to need us to step in for consciousness. Even though we do step in, consciousness seems also to be present and active along with us.
What I mean to suggest by these remarks is that we learn little about what Hegel is up to if we focus too narrowly on the problem of making sense of the thing with properties that Hegel is here considering. What really matters is what all this sound and fury might signify.
- Alan
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Monday, December 31, 2018 1:46 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [hegel] Some difficulty in 117 PhS MillerI differ with you here Paul,
The argument is the Perception section is not a description of a chrono-historical stage of consciousness. It is rather a description of a pattern which exists in a 'primitive' (structural) form even in consciousness today. It is something that emerges in different contexts in natural consciousness. Beyond any description, this section is an argument why a strict philosophy of perception based consciousness and knowledge cannot hold significance on its own. Therefore, Hegel has to choose a pattern that is the most rigorous of all in this pattern -- I don't know if this is so, but my guess is that he chooses Leibniz's. Again, he doesn't mention Leibniz, and is not fully faithful to him, but as in sense certainty the base model is a kind of sense-empiricism, the model of perception being examined in 117 is akin to the Leibnizian model.
The consequences that emerge in the most difficult sequences in this paragraph make sense when seen with the Leibniz model as the criterion of truth in exhibition. Such a view allows us to see the circular dance of the procession that the understanding goes through at this crossroads or way station. It allows the disproof of the criterion by means of an experience of consciousness of the property that contradicts the previously held opinion about the object as a single, simple One.
Srivats
On Mon, Dec 31, 2018 at 11:11 AM Paul Trejo petrejo@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
Srivats,
Here are the lines under examination:
4. The object I apprehend presents itself as purely “one” and single.
5. I am aware of the “properties” in it, properties which are Universal, thereby transcending its singularity!
6. The first form of being, the objective reality of singularity, was thus an illusion.
Here are you're questions:
> Why should 4 be the 'natural attitude' when
> my natural attitude is nothing like it?
I question this. Why is your "natural attitude" different from mine? I naturally perceive each objects in the world as "one" single object. Don't you? How do you "naturally" perceive each object?
> Why should 5 result in the falsifying of my
> 'natural attitude'?
Well, Srivats, insofar as the "natural attitude" is to perceive each object in the world as "one" single object, then the recognition that the object is a vehicle for countless "properties" that it shares with countless other objects requires careful thought and reflection.
Are you saying, Srivats, that you already perceive objects as Unified by some Cosmic Scheme of shared properties? That would be unusual, in my opinion. In my opinion, most people naturally perceive each object in the world as "one" single object. To see it otherwise requires careful thought and reflection. Most people are not "naturally" thoughtful or reflective. That takes TIME.
> And why, thus, should 6 result, i.e.., that as
> you put it, 'the objective reality of a singularity'
> be an illusion?
This is the result of Philosophy -- careful thought and reflection reveal that each object in the world is really one single carrier for Common Properties that are shared by countless objects in the world.
Since this is the case, then clearly, each object is not unique -- it isn't singular -- it's only one INSTANCE of a CLASS of objects. (This logic is also common to object-oriented programming.)
So, I hope I've made my interpretation clear, there. Then you wrote:
> What is the shape Hegel constrains his 'natural attitude'
> or this stage of perceptual consciousness to, so that this
> syllogism ensues?
Hegel's "natural attitude" of Perception Consciousness is only one stage removed from the most primitive stage of human thought, the Sense-Certain Consciousness, where all things are merely, "This," pointing; "That," pointing; "Here," pointing; "There," pointing; "Me," pointing; "You," pointing.
We have attained Perception Consciousness, where all things have Names. Even all the animals finally have Names. However, things are still not sophisticated or scientific. The "natural" attitude is that the world is composed of trillions of separate and unique objects -- each one separate, distinct and exclusive of all the others. That may be naive -- but that is the "natural attitude" as Hegel sees it -- and also as I see it. I see it in myself as well as in others.
> My answer based on all your (everybody who
> has responded, and my own thinking) is that this
> model of the perceptual consciousness in para 117
> is a model that is close to Leibniz's model, i.e., that
> the perceptual consciousness posits that its truth is
> simple (no necessity for predicates), single and
> self-sustaining, i.e., its truth is Substance.
I cannot agree, Srivats, because Substance is a Universal Category and automatically transcends the Particular and Individual. To attain the Concept of Substance is far beyond what Hegel calls the "natural attitude."
The Concept of Substance can suggest the philosophy of Materialism (and even Engels said that old Spinoza was right). Yet Hegel does not even have Materialism in mind when he speaks of the "natural attitude" in para. 117 of his PhG (1807).
Materialism is a thoughtful philosophy (even though it is mistaken, IMHO). It is beyond the "natural attitude," which in my interpretation is something like the attitude of a modern, seven-year old child. Everything is different and distinct and unique. They don't reflect very much about it.
> However, the moment the property is seen
> specifically, there is predication and the manner
> in which the object is constituted fails according
> to its own logic -- that of Leibniz's model. This is
> why it now moves on to the next, i.e., looking at
> the property, etc., which you have described,
> and which I will now focus on.
>
> Srivats
No, Srivats, I disagree on the same grounds. The concept of Leibniz is too advanced for Hegel's "natural attitude," here, and so the attribution of predicates is not what Hegel gets at with his next step, in my reading.
In any case, it seems you have moved on.
All best,
--Paul
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Sunday, December 30, 2018, 5:29:06 AM CST, R Srivatsan r.srivats@gmail..com [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
Paul,
Again thanks for this. My question was about 4, 5 and 6
quote
4. The object I apprehend presents itself as purely “one” and single..
5. I am aware of the “properties” in it, properties which are Universal, thereby transcending its singularity!
6. The first form of being, the objective reality of singularity, was thus an illusion.
end quote
Why should 4 be the 'natural attitude' when my natural attitude is nothing like it? Why should 5 result in the falsifying of my 'natural attitude'? And why, thus, should 6 result, i.e.., that as you put it, 'the objective reality of a singularity' be an illusion?
What is the shape Hegel constrains his 'natural attitude' or this stage of perceptual consciousness to, so that this syllogism ensues. My answer based on all your (everybody who has responded, and my own thinking) is that this model of the perceptual consciousness in para 117 is a model that is close to Leibniz's model, i.e., that the perceptual consciousness posits that its truth is simple (no necessity for predicates), single and self-sustaining, i.e., its truth is substance. However the moment the property is seen specifically, there is predication and the manner in which the object is constituted fails according to its own logic -- that of Leibniz's model. This is why it now moves on to the next, i.e., looking at the property, etc., which you have described, and which I will now focus on.
SrivatsOn Sun, Dec 30, 2018 at 11:33 AM Paul Trejo petrejo@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
Srivats,
I will tackle all your questions with my interpretation here -- Hegel's entire Φ 117 poses three errors. that we normally make the dialectic of our experience. You are currently focused on only the first error. But the paragraph requires our attention to all three errors. Here's my take on Hegel's Φ 117:
1. Consciousness forms an experience in the course of its actual perception.
2. We, who analyze the process, find this experience inside the development of the object through the attitude of our consciousness towards it.
3. The experience will be merely the development of the contradictions that appear there.
4. The object I apprehend presents itself as purely “one” and single.
5. I am aware of the “properties” in it, properties which are Universal, thereby transcending its singularity!
6. The first form of being, the objective reality of singularity, was thus an illusion.
7. Yet the illusion was the fault of my own apprehension -- not the object's fault.
8. Because "properties" are Universal, I now take the Objective Entity as a Community.
9. I also see that the "properties" are defined, opposed to each other and exclude each other.
10. That's my second error -- "properties" never indicate a Community when they clash.
11. Next, I'll strictly define each property and define the object as a singularity that and excludes.
12. However, the singularity also has many properties that don't clash, but are content to sit side by side.
13. That was my third error -- the object does not simply "exclude". It also "includes."
14. Just as formerly it was merely continuity in general, without excluding properties, a mere Universal medium.
15. Now I see the particular property -- which is shared by many others, but is also exclusive of many others.
16. But any quality is a "property" only when attached to a “one”, and finite only in relation to "others."
17. A property, as self-related, remains mere stuff -- not even negative -- and the mode of consciousness of sense data, is merely a way of “meaning” or “intending”.
18. That is, it is no longer Perception, and now it is merely a Reflection..
19. But sensory life and “meaning” automatically pass over into Perception! Now I am back where I started!
20. Perception is trapped in a vicious circle that supersedes itself in every moment and as a whole.
There's my take on Hegel's Φ 117, Srivats. The entire paragraph is intended to show the Phenomenology of Experience in Perception -- its inner contradictions, and its vicious circle.
This is not the final stage of the Phenomenology -- it is really a very early stage. There is much more to come..
All best,
--Paul
-------------------------------------------------------------------
On Saturday, December 29, 2018, 8:44:36 PM CST, R Srivatsan r.srivats@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
Paul,
Thanks for confirming my own initial reading as something we see at first. My question is why does the model of this first seeing follow a system of seemingly invisible constraints, and not follow the fluidity of 'accommodation'. Why does Hegel pose this noticing of the property as a contradiction of the original 'simple substance'?
SrivatsOn Sun, Dec 30, 2018 at 5:54 AM Paul Trejo petrejo@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
Hi Srivats,
Let's look closer at Φ 117 in Hegel's PhG (1807). Hegel is speaking of Perception in the context of our simple analysis of an object. You note only two sentences from Hegel in that paragraph, as follows:
"(1) The object which I apprehend presents itself purely as a
One; but I also perceive in it a property which is universal,
and which, thereby transcends the singularity. (2) The first
being of the objective essence as a One was therefore not its
true being." (Hegel, 1807, PhG, Φ 117)
You puzzle over the meaning, i.e., "why
(Message over 64 KB, truncated) - I know the name only, never having got interested enough to read him or, better, I have entirely forgotten whatever I have read. However, the American tendency to be amused to the point of blindness by English peculiarities I witnessed as extending to Elizabeth Anscombe herself when visiting Pittsburgh with Geach in 1968. The aud9ience had it seemed not the slightest interest in her controversy with Bar Hillel, whom, as other invité, she was pitted against, simply howling with inane laughter every two minutes as, naturally with some wit, she made point after point against Hillel. He did the same, Israelis having also a good portion of humour, but she got the laughs. I guess (U.S.) she was used to it. Inane, I mean, necause out of proportion. I love and appreciate American humour, from Bob Hope to Henry Miller or whoever has succeeded (inadvertent temporal reversal there).When attendinga staff and students seminar at Leeds on Wittgenstein I brought the house down by remarking that "the beetle in the box is the fly in the ointment" - but the chairman James Cameron chided us, when the giggling persisted, for unnecessary distraction - still, "Cameron" is a Scottish name of course.Well anyhow, outrage is better than nothing. Try a second read!In general I myself find the Oxford philosophers insufferably dull or, when they are quite good, like Strawson, say, nearly so. This finding of mind reached, in the case of R.M. Hare, a reaction strong enough to set me off on my second wind in philosophy, c. 1973. In my undergraduate days (57 to 60) the philosopher I most enjoyed reading was Hume, before getting engulfed in my final year by R.P. Phillips' Modern Thomistic Philosophy (two vols., c. 1932), who makes little mention of Hegel and none, of course, of McTaggart.Not much point in all this, i fear!Stephen Theron.From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com> on behalf of 'Alan Ponikvar' ponikvaraj@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: 24 January 2019 18:49
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: RE: [hegel] Para 118 PhSNow I remember. It was Anthony Quinton.
- Alan
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Friday, January 18, 2019 6:34 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [hegel] Para 118 PhSIf Hegel ever calls the infinite a result this surely refers to what results from the "method" of thought itself, captured in speculative logic which thus "pictures" in linear spatial and for us temporal form what for infinity itself can only be all at once, on pain of not being infinite. You are talking about how we historically maybe arrive at something of this. This is a phenomenon, one or many indifferently, nothing else, interesting in its way but ......
The dialectic of finite/infinite. Where is that going on except in and for us human beings? Incidentally, and before I forget, you are stressing a lot finite and infinite as equal partners. Hegel expressly denies this - I am sure you know the main place in EL, for example, saying that the infinite absorbs the finite into itself, wholly. Of course this does not mean that at some time or real stage the infinite was without the finite. there is no finite potentiality, i.e. there cannot logically be, in the infinite.
Even existence cannot logically be applied to the infinite as if from outside. It rather spews it out in its finitude, hence we find it as a category in Hegel's Essence doctrine. Infinity is necessarily, whether this implies existence or not - and maybe Hegel's dialectic of being and nothing could be applied there, as mutatis mutandis Sartre applied it to our finite thinking (which as finite however has no reality outside of the infinite in which it lives and moves). Hegel of course finally identifies "true Being" as the (absolute) Idea. One can hardly doubt his familiarity with Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa's philosophy of infinity as a union of to us incompatibilities, great and small, being and nothing maybe. Infinity stands even if, e..g. for Hegel, 'the soulless word "is"' does not always.
Now you talk about "infinite movement". I think Aristotle was right to define movement as imperfect act (act of something in potency insofar as it is in potency). So there cannot, strictly, be infinite movement. Movement becomes perfect act, on one way of speaking and thinking, for the infinite. This perfection entails act as identical with perfect rest and untroubled tranquility, the truth behind the condemnation of "patripassianism" within Trinitarian thought. It also fits in well with the truth, seen by Hegel as by Aquinas, that infinity has no real relation with anything finite, since, as Hegel puts it, the latter is entirely "ideal" - is known and moved, one might wish to add, in and by the Idea in and as its thought of itself. This thought, by the way, can also be "musical" if you compare with EL 159. Dante pictures these conceptions by means of a circular dancing ever returning upon itself.
I think what I have said so far at least begins to mane visible, thinkable, where I part company from a lot of what you say in the rest of your letter (I have to stop for today only). So I hope you will not react violently to this. I mean, you either think me too stupid to discuss with or you don't, though saying this is maybe a bot un-Hegelian. Really, looking at your first sentence I wonder still if you have distinguished what we are able to say about it from the infinite itself. There has to be place here for trying to mean something we can't discursively directly say. Further that would have to be true for us finite existences in relation to the infinite. Analogy comes in here and whether there is reqal analogy in addition to or supporting the logical version of it.
Stephen Theron.
S
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com> on behalf of 'Alan Ponikvar' ponikvaraj@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: 17 January 2019 17:34
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: RE: [hegel] Para 118 PhSYou wonder how we distinguish the infinite from what we are able to say and develop about the infinite.
The true infinite is the result of a development.
The development begins with the common understanding that takes the infinite as that which is separate and beyond the finite.
This, of course, is the traditional metaphysical and theological understanding of the infinite.
Hegel shows how this disguises the dialectic of the finite and infinite.
The infinite as we then have it as a result of this development is not the infinite as understood by this tradition.
As Hegel says, it is the process by which it “lowers” itself.
This curious way of putting the matter speaks to what I have called Hegel’s deflationary or deconstructive speculative reconception of common concepts.
The infinite must be lowered and shown to be dialectically entangled with the finite. The initial infinite is now understood by Hegel as only one of the finites.
The true infinite “elevates” itself when the dialectical process is viewed by speculative self-thinking as its own self-affirmation. What is affirmed is the form of the infinite movement.
This is the true infinite.. It is what emerges as a result of this self-development.
So, in the end there are three ways of designating the infinite.
There is the spurious infinite that understands the infinite as separate from the finite.
There is the bad infinite which is the dialectical entanglement of the finite and infinite that circles seemingly to no purpose.
And finally, there is true infinite which is this same dialectic viewed with respect to the circle that is the absolute form of the dialectical movement.
- Alan
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Thursday, January 17, 2019 7:27 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [hegel] Para 118 PhSThank you, Alan. I have looked over this, and hope to engage with it more - shortly, having just written something of length to you and others in a perhaps different key (musical thought). Initially I am wondering here how you and/or Hegel distinguish the infinite from what we find ourselves able to say, and develop, about the infinite, as when he says, in your doubtless accurate version, "as in fact we now have it".
Stephen Theron.
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com> on behalf of 'Alan Ponikvar' ponikvaraj@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: 17 January 2019 09:40
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: RE: [hegel] Para 118 PhSI found the post. It was addressed to you and quotes from one of your posts.
I reprint here as it appeared then without further comment.
---
"The finite is determined as not infinite. But then at the same time the infinite is determined as not finite"
This is the common understanding of the finite and infinite. Hegel is not here telling us anything we do not already know. What he shows in his exposition of the finite and infinite is that this common understanding fails because of the self-reflexivity that plagues the infinite when determined as not finite. As Hegel tells the story the infinite shows itself to be a finite determination at the very moment that it is distinguished as not finite.
Why does this happen?
Because all determination of the understanding delimits. And when the infinite is delimited as not delimited the infinite shows itself as in conflict with itself. It is what it is only if it is what it is not.
Hegel’s philosophy is about how concepts are self-conflicted in just this way. Moreover, as a result of this way of understanding concepts the concepts themselves have their meaning altered. The infinite as self-conflicted is no longer that which lies beyond the finite. The infinite becomes conceptually entangled with what it first is not. And as a result, the infinite is not longer what subsists as substantial.
We could go on to note that Hegel’s infinite does not exist in a realm beyond the finite. The infinite simply instigates transformations in the one and only realm that there is, the natural world inhabited by cognitive beings. If one were to ask what is this infinite that instigates, the proper response would be the infinite is the gap in being, the void of pure negativity.
What else could the infinite movement of the concept be when considered in isolation than this pure self-turning? It is only because this self-turning propagates that there is more than this self-turning.
Because you are shackled to a nonspeculative understanding of the infinite you are not prepared to think Hegel’s infinite. You say: “The finite does not itself become infinite: Hegel is explicit..”
Here is what Hegel says (all italics are by Hegel; all bold is my doing) at one point in his long account of the true infinite: “The infinite is one of two; but, as only one of them, it is itself finite … it is the finite infinite. We have before us only two finites.” (21.131)
So, here is my basic claim: for Hegel, the infinite is itself finite.
A page later Hegel says: “The infinite, determined as such, has in it the finitude which is distinct from it; in this unity, the infinite is the in-itself while the finite is only determinateness, the limit in the infinite. But such a limit is the absolute other of the infinite, its opposite. The infinite’s determination, which is the in-itself as such, is corrupted by being saddled with a quality of this sort; the infinite is thus a finitized infinite. Likewise, since the finite is as such only the non-in-itself but equally has its opposite in it by virtue of the said unity, it is elevated above its worth and, so to speak, infinitely elevated; it is posited as the infinitized finite.” (21.132)
This is the paradoxical identity which has a finite that is infinite and an infinite that is finite.
Further on as Hegel speaks about the dialectical dynamic he says: “the finite and the infinite are both this movement of each returning to itself through its negation; … the affirmative of each contains the negative of each and is the negation of the negation. They are thus a result and as such, not in the determination that they had at the beginning: neither is the finite an existence on its side nor the infinite an existence or a being-in-itself beyond that existence, that is, beyond existence in the determination of finitude.” (21.135)
So, clearly, the infinite that is not the finite is not an existent beyond finitude.
Further on Hegel says: “Since both, the finite and the infinite, are themselves moments of the progress, they are jointly the finite, and, since they are equally jointly negated in it and in the result, this result as the negation of their joint finitude is called with truth the infinite.” (21.135)
In other words, the original presumption of an infinite that lies beyond the finite must be negated if we are to get the true infinite.
Finally, “Therefore, as in fact we now have it, the nature of the infinite is that it is the process in which it lowers itself to be only one of its determinations over against the finite and therefore itself only one of the finites, and elevates this distinction of itself and itself to be self-affirmation and, through this mediation, the true infinite.” (21.135-6)
The common notion of the infinite needs to be deflated or as Hegel says here the infinite “lowers itself”. Only then do we get the true infinite.
So, while I am interpreting what Hegel is saying I think it should be clear to anyone who reads the text that what I say is also said by Hegel. What you wish to be so has nothing to do with what Hegel says to be so.
- Alan
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Wednesday, January 16, 2019 6:34 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [hegel] Para 118 PhSWell, my comparatively mild derogatory phrase (compared to umpteen of yours) is too much for you. I would be glad if you would point me to the letter you mention (give the date or resend) that I have not responded to so that I can tell you what I think of it without, I promise, any such phrases. Oblige me please before treading the ramp.
Stephen Theron.
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <hegel@yahoogroups.com> on behalf of 'Alan Ponikvar' ponikvaraj@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: 15 January 2019 15:22
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: RE: [hegel] Para 118 PhSIt is interesting how by letting a little time pass a thoughtful quote laden exegesis of Hegel’s account of the true infinite in the Logic becomes “some screed or other”.
At the time you were more respectful arguing a lack of time to give my post the attention it clearly in your eyes at the time deserved.
There are at least two problems: you do not wish to examine Hegel’s account of the true infinite and even if you did you lack the ability to do so.
In Paul, you have a willing dialogic partner.
For myself, I am taking the exit ramp.
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