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- Greetings, dear list members,
this is a series of little mails I write in response to Ralph Dumain.
Ralph, you mention in your mail several times "metaphysical" and from
ethe context it seems that you judge it as something bad, so bad
(and/or outdated), that it speaks against itself, that there is no
reason to give any reason *why* it is so bad, what the problem with it is.
The first problem I see here is the definition of "metaphysics". When
I look at the standard philocophical dictionary we use here in
Germany, the "Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (e.g.
http://www.schwabe.ch/docs/neu00-01/0692-5.htm ) I find nearly 100
pages describing "Metaphysik" and "Metaphysik-Kritik". And the article
begins with the concession that it has always been very much under
discussion what to understand under "metaphysics", and so they can't
realy help other than to explain what the various philosophers have
understood (in their total difference) under this concept.
So it seems difficult to speak just of "Metaphysics" in a naive way,
just implying that it already is understood in a certain way.
Of course, as we are here on a Hegel list, the background and context
of our use of words is Hegel's (at least unless not stated
expressively otherwise).
So the question is, how does Hegel uses the word "metaphysics"?
When we look at his use, we find two different use of the word:
Number one is that Hegel does criticise the "old" metaphysic,
especialy of the time before Kant (he thinks roughly from Descartes to
Wolff and may be also of the Sholastic Theology). See for example the
"First Attitude of Thought to Objectivity" in Hegel's Encyclopedia,
paragraphs 26ff). Here Hegel criticises the old "metaphyscis":
I highly sugest that you read his critique yourself, e.g. onlien at
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/sl_iii.htm
However, while Hegel does criticise the uncritical use of such
metaphysics and its errors, that doesn't mean that Hegel is against
all Metaphysics per se.
In the contrary, he does mention in several places how important
metaphysics as such is, and that it can't be avoided and so that those
who think they don't have a metaphysics and are against metaphysics
therefor only have no consciousness of the metaphysics they use and
therefor usualy have an especialy bad metaphysics
(see for example the "Zusatz" of paragraph 246 in the encyclopedia. I
have it only in German at the moment, as it is not online, may be it
will still be of help to some:
"Das, wodurch sich die Naturphilosophie von der Physik unterscheidet,
ist näher die Weise der Metaphysik, deren sich beide bedienen; denn
Metaphysik heißt nichts anderes als der Umfang der allgemeinen
Denkbestimmungen, gleichsam das diamantene Netz, in das wir allen
Stoff bringen und dadurch erst verständlich machen. Jedes gebildete
Bewußtsein hat seine Metaphysik, das instinktartige Denken, die
absolute Macht in uns, über die wir nur Meister werden, wenn wir sie
selbst zum Gegenstande unserer Erkenntnis machen. Die Philosophie
überhaupt hat als Philosophie andere Kategorien als das gewöhnliche
Bewußtsein; alle Bildung reduziert sich auf den Unterschied der
Kategorien. Alle Revolutionen, in den Wissenschaften nicht weniger als
in der Weltgeschichte, kommen nur daher, daß der Geist jetzt zum
Verstehen und Vernehmen seiner, um sich zu besitzen, seine Kategorien
geändert hat, sich wahrhafter, tiefer, sich inniger und einiger mit
sich erfassend.")
So for Hegel the solution is his "Science of Logic" which includes teh
tasks of the former Metaphysics but in a highly critical way (much
more self critical than i.e. Marxism or other philosophical concepts
who claim to replace the "errors" of Hegelianism).
All the best,
Kai - In response to the Thu27Dec2018 post by Stephen Theron:> What one finds singled out in Aquinas is that we have> ens mobile (changeable being) and ens a se (being in itself).> Possibly there is already a minimal element of interpretation here?Yes, I like this -- there is mobile being (Physics) on the one hand, and there is being-in-itself (Metaphysics) on the other hand. One can call both, 'studies of Being.' Yet the distinction is vast, since it immediately implies the outer world and the inner world.> But as you say, logic applies to both.Yes -- the great linkage between all of the Sciences, both Physical and Metaphysical, is the Science of Logic. That was true for Aristotle and his two-valued logic. It will also prove true for Hegel and his three-valued logic.> So that in discussing such change as such (or analysing it as> in Physics II) it seems to me we at once ascend to metaphysics> (as we do in Hegel's analysis of the finite, or of matter and> form), or can you point out a difference, apart I mean from the> metaphysical one that Hegel analyses away the matter-form duo...?I read this, Stephen, as a return to the former analogy -- the Physics and Metaphysics are two different ways to study Being. Aquinas named the division: mobile-being and being-in-itself. You say that Hegel called the division (among other things), Finite Matter and Infinite Form. I will presume here (for the sake of argument) that you refer to Hegel's ENC NATURE (#192-#298), and especially to his opening arguments, e.g. in #203 where he says:"Space and Time constitute the Idea in-itself andfor-itself, with Space the real or immediatelyObjective side, and Time the purely Subjectiveside." (Hegel, 1817, ENC.NATURE, #203)Hegel will then synthesize these antithetic concepts of Space and Time into the concept of Motion, i.e. Change. Evidently, for Hegel, the Potential of Motion, which is to say in German Idealism, the Concept of Motion, "precedes" Motion itself.In that sense, yes, Stephen, I agree with your observation that Hegel folds Physics into Metaphysics -- and if he folds Metaphysics into Physics, it will only be through this curious Dialectical Logic.> ...Yet surely this is just what Aristotle does too in> Met. VII where he arrives, finally or not, at the view that> the form alone, as ultimate specific difference, accounts> for or is man as such, or, rather, substance as such?Again, Stephen (for the sake of argument), I will presume that you refer here to Aristotle's MET. VII Book 3, where he says:"We have now outlined the nature of Substance,showing that it is that which is not predicatedof a stratum, but of which all else is predicated...If we adopt this viewpoint, then, it follows thatMatter is Substance. But this is impossible; forboth separability and 'thisness' are thought tobelong chiefly to Substance. And so Form (or thecombination of Form and Matter) would be thoughtto be Substance, rather than Matter."(Aristotle, 300 BC, MET. VII, Book 3)So, here Aristotle denies that Matter is true Substance, but rather Form (or at least a combination of Form with Matter) can be regarded as Substance -- the Essence of all things.> The Thomistic dualism at least as a way of speaking goes> back from this - although Inciarte seems able to show that> Thomas gets it right in the end - see his Forma Formarum -> Scotus' account seems to be similarly affected by his> respect for the credal article "resurrection of the body",> or is it "flesh"?Here, Stephen, I will presume that you are reading the profound theologians, Thomas, Scotus and Inciarte to say that while Form remains senior to Matter, as the synthesis of Substance, Form and Physics are dialectically identical.> One might think of St. Paul's "It is sown a natural body, it is> raised a spiritual body" - he had no other vocabulary available...I had not thought of applying the Apostle Paul in this Hegelian context, Stephen. However, if one squints and turns ones head a little, the application fits -- the Natural Body, through the dialectical triad, becomes the Spiritual Body.> ...As did Hegel, who therefore, I maintain, does not depart from> orthodox doctrine of man's (always and only the so-called whole> man) eternal destiny in and with the infinite as in and with the> Mediator-Word, who is "the absolute person" (I cite as sign of> Hegel's orthodoxy only, just for now, though it's quite important> for the history of philosophy).>> Stephen Theron.Yes, Stephen, I agree with you (and not yet with everyone here) when I affirm that Hegel accepts the Christian doctrine fully, and yet as more than an article of Faith, but also as an article of Dialectical Logic.All best,--Paul--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Thursday, December 27, 2018, 5:50:46 AM CST, stephen theron@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
Thanks Paul,What one finds singled out in Aquinas is that we have ens mobile (changeable being) and ens a se (being in itself). Possibly there is already a minimal element of interpretation here?But as you say, logic applies to both. So that in discussing such change as such (or analysing it as in Physics II) it seems to me we at once ascend to metaphysics (as we do in Hegel's analysis of the finite, or of matter and form), or can you point out a difference, apart I mean from the metaphysical one that Hegel analyses away the matter-form duo, yet surely this is just what Aristotle does too in Met. VII where he arrives, finally or not, at the view that the form alone, as ultimate specific difference, accounts for or is man as such, or, rather, substance as such?The Thomistic dualism at least as a way of speaking goes back from this - although Inciarte seems able to show that Thomas gets it right in the end - see his Forma formarum - Scotus' account seems to be similarly affected by his respect for the credal article "resurrection of the body", or is it "flesh"? - Aquinas points out somewhere that "body" is a term for logicians only but has no place in metaphysics!One might think of St. Paul's "It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body" - he had no other vocabulary available, as did Hegel, who therefore, I maintain, does not depart from orthodox doctrine of man's (always and only the so-called whole man) eternal destiny in and with the infinite as in and with the Mediator-Word, who is "the absolute person" (I cite as sign of Hegel's orthodoxy only, just for now, though it's quite important for the history of philosophy).Stephen Theron.