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Phenomenology of Spirit Introduction # 76

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robert fanelli
Dear Group, We need to suspend the terms objective and subjective, expressions about knowledge, as an instrument to take hold of the Absolute, or as a medium
Message 1 of 7 , Jan 4, 2015
Dear Group,

We need to suspend the terms objective and subjective, 'expressions about knowledge, as an instrument to take hold of the Absolute, or as a medium through which we have a glimpse of truth,' and get to the heart of the matter, that is, 'the true shape of things.' Objective and subjective make a 'mere empty show of knowledge.' Of course, as post modern philosophers will add, we still have the burden of language to contend with regardless of what terms we use. Hegel offers that 'science is itself a phenomenon.' Science must free itself of this phenomenal domain. The phenomena which is the empirical basis of our knowledge starts with things as they appear. They are on the bottom rungs of the Hegelian ladder of knowledge. Sensate empirical data are essential for the climb. As we apply logical structures and previous perceptions to such phenomena we climb the ladder and seek a more representative reality or a fuller reality. These rational structures turn against each other in the negative sense which Hegel utilizes to its fullest. Science (of Hegel's day) can not be presumptuous by just rejecting this kind of knowledge and then boast that its very nature will bypass the imperfections of what we know about things. It should not pretend to have this 'force and value' and to be able to reach absolute knowledge by offering all kinds of pleasant sounding dogmas and paradigms. These are merely 'barren assurances.' These are 'bad forms of its own existence.' They are merely 'illusion.' Science must get to its 'real and true nature.' It must get to an 'in and for itself.' It must lock in the objects in the universe with its own agency and its own representative reality which is the top of the Hegelian ladder.

Happy New Year to all.

Regards,

Bob Fanelli
C A V
I actually think that the sense which the subjective/objective distinction of contemporary parlance is derived from the Logical Positivists of the Vienna
Message 2 of 7 , Jan 4, 2015
I actually think that the sense which the subjective/objective distinction of contemporary parlance is derived from the Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle, who tried to reframe the analytic/distinction as a distinction which applies only to assertions, not to judgments. They partnered their linguistically fanged re-imagining of the analytic/synthetic distinction with an expressivist view of normative/moral assertions like "crime is unacceptable." Their assertions, I believe, ought to be read by us today as expressive of a kind of moral anti-realism, the idea that there are no 'facts of the matter' as regards moral concerns. The only facts, as far as they were concerned, were either facts of logic/mathematics, or facts of physics. The fact/norm dichotomy, which was implicit in Kant, was propagandized by them in such a way as to constrain intellectual activity to the point of keeping any expression of a realist attitude toward morality out of the discussion.

Moral realism, or the idea that there is nothing contradictory in saying that something may be "objectively good", is an old idea, and debates as to the status of its legitimacy are debates which I personally think should be back on the table. I think Hegel would agree.

-Chuck

On Sun, Jan 4, 2015 at 6:28 PM, robert fanelli robertfanelli2001@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:

Dear Group,

We need to suspend the terms objective and subjective, 'expressions about knowledge, as an instrument to take hold of the Absolute, or as a medium through which we have a glimpse of truth,' and get to the heart of the matter, that is, 'the true shape of things.' Objective and subjective make a 'mere empty show of knowledge.' Of course, as post modern philosophers will add, we still have the burden of language to contend with regardless of what terms we use. Hegel offers that 'science is itself a phenomenon.' Science must free itself of this phenomenal domain. The phenomena which is the empirical basis of our knowledge starts with things as they appear. They are on the bottom rungs of the Hegelian ladder of knowledge. Sensate empirical data are essential for the climb. As we apply logical structures and previous perceptions to such phenomena we climb the ladder and seek a more representative reality or a fuller reality. These rational structures turn against each other in the negative sense which Hegel utilizes to its fullest. Science (of Hegel's day) can not be presumptuous by just rejecting this kind of knowledge and then boast that its very nature will bypass the imperfections of what we know about things. It should not pretend to have this 'force and value' and to be able to reach absolute knowledge by offering all kinds of pleasant sounding dogmas and paradigms. These are merely 'barren assurances.' These are 'bad forms of its own existence.' They are merely 'illusion.' Science must get to its 'real and true nature.' It must get to an 'in and for itself.' It must lock in the objects in the universe with its own agency and its own representative reality which is the top of the Hegelian ladder.

Happy New Year to all.

Regards,

Bob Fanelli
paul81755
Hello Chuck, if moral realism, why not moral actualism?; consider what Hegel says given their is no need to translate Bradley: The real world perhaps
Message 3 of 7 , Jan 5, 2015
Hello Chuck,

if moral realism, why not moral actualism?;
consider what Hegel says
given their is no need to translate Bradley:

The real world perhaps consciously, may be identified with
a spatial system which we construct. This is 'actual fact' and
everything else may be set apart as mere thought, or as
mere imagination or feeling, all equally unreal.
(Appearence and Reality, 1930)

I don't get the perhaps, but the rest seems to easily undermine
the realists position.

Paul Healey
logik1002000
... Dear Group, We need to suspend the terms objective and subjective, expressions about knowledge, as an instrument to take hold of the Absolute, or as a
Message 4 of 7 , Jan 5, 2015
---In hegel@yahoogroups.com, <robertfanelli2001@...> wrote :

"Dear Group,

We need to suspend the terms objective and subjective, 'expressions about knowledge, as an instrument to take hold of the Absolute, or as a medium through which we have a glimpse of truth,' and get to the heart of the matter, that is, 'the true shape of things.' Objective and subjective make a 'mere empty show of knowledge.' Of course, as post modern philosophers will add, we still have the burden of language to contend with regardless of what terms we use. Hegel offers that 'science is itself a phenomenon.' Science must free itself of this phenomenal domain. The phenomena which is the empirical basis of our knowledge starts with things as they appear. They are on the bottom rungs of the Hegelian ladder of knowledge. Sensate empirical data are essential for the climb. As we apply logical structures and previous perceptions to such phenomena we climb the ladder and seek a more representative reality or a fuller reality. These rational structures turn against each other in the negative sense which Hegel utilizes to its fullest. Science (of Hegel's day) can not be presumptuous by just rejecting this kind of knowledge and then boast that its very nature will bypass the imperfections of what we know about things. It should not pretend to have this 'force and value' and to be able to reach absolute knowledge by offering all kinds of pleasant sounding dogmas and paradigms. These are merely 'barren assurances.' These are 'bad forms of its own existence.' They are merely 'illusion.' Science must get to its 'real and true nature.' It must get to an 'in and for itself.' "

"It must lock in the objects in the universe with its own agency and its own representative reality which is the top of the Hegelian ladder."

What does this mean? I cannot find any link to Hegels text!

Beat Greuter

Happy New Year to all.

Regards,

Bob Fanelli
C A V
I do not see how moral realism is incompatible with moral actualism. Perhaps you can say more about what moral actualism is? Moral Realism, to make it more
Message 5 of 7 , Jan 5, 2015
I do not see how moral realism is incompatible with moral actualism. Perhaps you can say more about what moral actualism is?

Moral Realism, to make it more explicit, is an answer to the Euthyphro problem in Plato's writings.

Moral realism says that the Gods (if any there be) love good things, because whether or not things themselves are good is a matter which swings free of the whims and fancies of the Gods.

Moral realism says beauty is essentially not 'in the eye of the beholder', rather, beauty is the thing which the beholders of beauty behold, and they behold beautiful things as beautiful, because even if there were no beholders the beautiful things would still nevertheless be beautiful.

I don't see how actualism is fundamentally incompatible with the assertions above. I also ought to make it explicit that I am agnostic towards the issue, though I certainly do believe there are good and beautiful things afoot in the world, for one reason or another.

-Chuck

On Mon, Jan 5, 2015 at 6:58 AM, paulmsrf@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:

Hello Chuck,

if moral realism, why not moral actualism?;
consider what Hegel says
given their is no need to translate Bradley:

The real world perhaps consciously, may be identified with
a spatial system which we construct. This is 'actual fact' and
everything else may be set apart as mere thought, or as
mere imagination or feeling, all equally unreal.
(Appearence and Reality, 1930)

I don't get the perhaps, but the rest seems to easily undermine
the realists position.

Paul Healey
paul81755
You might have a very different take on realism, but if there is to be a marked difference between it and actualism (I think Charles S. Chihara s 1998 is one
Message 6 of 7 , Jan 6, 2015
You might have a very different take on realism, but if there is
to be a marked difference between it and actualism (I think
Charles S. Chihara's 1998 is one iven his critique of realism
in 'The Worlds of Possibility) it it should I think rest on how
they stand torwards the dialectic method. Here's my spin:

Realism, or more specifically scientific realism seems to
be concerned with hypothetical thinking. The essential,
determinate and universal for the absolute is subjugated to
the accidental, indeterminate and particular. What counts
is just that which is experienced.

Actual experience includes the reasons for the understanding
of experience; the facts for what is good, bad, beautiful etc.,
are not independent of the mind. Unlike the realist, it seems
to me that what is actually the case includes the
speculative value of judgements. These are determined by the conditions of inference, not as Mill would have it
by the expectation of their uniformity. If the actualist
is also an idealist, these can constructed in a way that
is more or less coherent.

Paul healey
C A V
Thanks Paul, I do appreciate your remarks. There are puzzling questions which can yet be raised, but I ll set them aside given, as you know, my broad and
Message 7 of 7 , Jan 6, 2015
Thanks Paul,

I do appreciate your remarks. There are puzzling questions which can yet be raised, but I'll set them aside given, as you know, my broad and underdeveloped conception of realism in its manifold guises.

To be a tad more explicit, I ought to point out directly that for me, (at least presently,) the term 'realism' is something of a term of art, it is a concept which I use in order to frame my philosophical discourses, despite the fact that I've never really taken time to consider what realism actually is, or would be in an absolute sense, let alone a concrete sense. Generally speaking, the only philosopher I can think of off the top of my head who carried out discussion of the concept in a manner which would be fully intelligible to someone with my philosophical orientation (or prejudice, you decide) would be Michael Dummett. (I'm more analytically trained, but I prefer to avoid thinking of 'philosophical clubs', or 'philosophico-cultural?) divides'. Personally, I'm more interested in sharing thoughts, and having thoughts shared with me, rather than defeating someone in an argument, though there are occasions where such an action is called for.)

I'll check out this Chihara fellow. Thanks.

-Chuck

On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 8:36 AM, paulmsrf@... [hegel] <hegel@yahoogroups.com> wrote:

You might have a very different take on realism, but if there is
to be a marked difference between it and actualism (I think
Charles S. Chihara's 1998 is one iven his critique of realism
in 'The Worlds of Possibility) it it should I think rest on how
they stand torwards the dialectic method. Here's my spin:

Realism, or more specifically scientific realism seems to
be concerned with hypothetical thinking. The essential,
determinate and universal for the absolute is subjugated to
the accidental, indeterminate and particular. What counts
is just that which is experienced.

Actual experience includes the reasons for the understanding
of experience; the facts for what is good, bad, beautiful etc.,
are not independent of the mind. Unlike the realist, it seems
to me that what is actually the case includes the
speculative value of judgements. These are determined by the conditions of inference, not as Mill would have it
by the expectation of their uniformity. If the actualist
is also an idealist, these can constructed in a way that
is more or less coherent.

Paul healey

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Phenomenology of Spirit Introduction # 76