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Bradley's Self and the Finite Centre

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  • paul81755
    To anyone who might know of some further reading; replies to What is the Real Julius Ceasar 1910-11 in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society; it seems the
    Message 1 of 2 , Jan 2, 2015

      To anyone who might know of some further reading;

      replies to 'What is the Real Julius Ceasar' 1910-11

      in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society;

      it seems the finite centre is not a self as no amount

      of conditioning can account for the conditions

      which make the self the self. 


      In this way it seems Bradley has gone further 

      than Hegel's reduction or negation of the soul 

      (being finite like the duality of Aquinas' substance 

      which being in time is also preserved for eternity?) 

      to the spirit or mind being infinite.


      Of course this is rough, but any corrections or

      contributions welcome.


      Paul Healey


    • stephen theron
      Perhaps McTaggart on the Hegelian Cosmology , 1901, ch. 2? Stephen. To: hegel@yahoogroups.com From: hegel@yahoogroups.com Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2015 13:46:50 -0800
      Message 2 of 2 , Feb 9, 2015
        Perhaps McTaggart on the "Hegelian Cosmology", 1901, ch. 2?

        Stephen.


        To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
        From: hegel@yahoogroups.com
        Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2015 13:46:50 -0800
        Subject: [hegel] Bradley's Self and the Finite Centre

         

        To anyone who might know of some further reading;
        replies to 'What is the Real Julius Ceasar' 1910-11
        in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society;
        it seems the finite centre is not a self as no amount
        of conditioning can account for the conditions
        which make the self the self. 


        In this way it seems Bradley has gone further 
        than Hegel's reduction or negation of the soul 
        (being finite like the duality of Aquinas' substance 
        which being in time is also preserved for eternity?) 
        to the spirit or mind being infinite.


        Of course this is rough, but any corrections or
        contributions welcome.


        Paul Healey



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