Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.
Attention: Starting December 14, 2019 Yahoo Groups will no longer host user created content on its sites. New content can no longer be uploaded after October 28, 2019. Sending/Receiving email functionality is not going away, you can continue to communicate via any email client with your group members. Learn More
 

"Central Claim of Aboslute Idealism"

Expand Messages
  • robertfanelli002@aol.com
    Dear Hegel Group, I had the privilege of attending the Hegel Conference in New York. There were many presentations read and discussed, among which was a most
    Message 1 of 6 , Apr 4, 2004
      Dear Hegel Group,

      I had the privilege of attending the Hegel Conference in New York. There
      were many presentations read and discussed, among which was a most excellent one
      of Professor Iain Macdonald of the University of Montreal. The following is a
      full quote of his first paragraph. My purpose in sending this quote is to
      ask the group what they think of the comment on the"central claim of absolute
      idealism." His quotes,one, two, and three are from Miller's Science of Logic
      translation, P826 for all three.

      If you wish a copy of the entire paper, "The Concept and Its Double..." I am
      sure that Professor Macdonald would not mind if I sent to you.

      Regards,

      Bob Fanelli



      The Concept and Its Double:
      Power and Powerlessness in Hegel's Subjective Logic
      Iain Macdonald
      Université de Montréal


      Introduction

      In a well known passage from the end of the Science of Logic, Hegel writes
      that the dialectical method is to be recognized "as the absolutely infinite
      force [die schlechthin unendliche Kraft], to which no object, presenting itself as
      external, remote from and independent of reason, could offer resistance or be
      of a particular nature in opposition to it, or could not be penetrated by
      it."1 The power of reason is infinite and irresistible or, in a word, absolute -
      which means first and foremost that reason understood as the movement of the
      concept reveals the "soul and substance"2 of things in such a way that, in
      principle, they are in themselves completely given over to and unravelled by the
      Concept. The method "is therefore not only the highest force, or rather the
      sole and absolute force of reason," says Hegel, "but also its supreme and sole
      urge to find and cognize itself by means of itself in everything."3 I know of no
      other passage in Hegel's works that states this central claim of absolute
      idealism more directly and unequivocally: the dialectical method, understood as
      absolute power, entitles us to adopt an attitude of logical optimism in respect
      of anything that presents itself as resistant to reason.


      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • Paul Edward Trejo
      Robert, Professor MacDonald is correct to emphasize that Hegel s science of logic overcomes Kant s challenges to any future metaphysics. Hegel s Logic shows
      Message 2 of 6 , Apr 4, 2004
        Robert,

        Professor MacDonald is correct to emphasize that
        Hegel's science of logic overcomes Kant's challenges
        to any future metaphysics. Hegel's Logic shows us
        that Reason is unstoppable. Kant was wrong.

        No doubt the postmodern accusations of Logomachy
        will fly, but Hegel's Logic lives on.

        All best,
        --Paul


        --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, robertfanelli002@a... wrote:
        >
        > Dear Hegel Group,
        >
        > I had the privilege of attending the Hegel Conference in New York.
        There
        > were many presentations read and discussed, among which was a most
        excellent one
        > of Professor Iain Macdonald of the University of Montreal. The
        following is a
        > full quote of his first paragraph. My purpose in sending this
        quote is to
        > ask the group what they think of the comment on the"central claim
        of absolute
        > idealism." His quotes,one, two, and three are from Miller's
        Science of Logic
        > translation, P826 for all three.
        >
        > If you wish a copy of the entire paper, "The Concept and Its
        Double..." I am
        > sure that Professor Macdonald would not mind if I sent to you.
        >
        > Regards,
        >
        > Bob Fanelli
        >
        >
        >
        > The Concept and Its Double:
        > Power and Powerlessness in Hegel's Subjective Logic
        > Iain Macdonald
        > Université de Montréal
        >
        >
        > Introduction
        >
        > In a well known passage from the end of the Science of Logic, Hegel
        writes
        > that the dialectical method is to be recognized "as the absolutely
        infinite
        > force [die schlechthin unendliche Kraft], to which no object,
        presenting itself as
        > external, remote from and independent of reason, could offer
        resistance or be
        > of a particular nature in opposition to it, or could not be
        penetrated by
        > it."1 The power of reason is infinite and irresistible or, in a
        word, absolute -
        > which means first and foremost that reason understood as the
        movement of the
        > concept reveals the "soul and substance"2 of things in such a way
        that, in
        > principle, they are in themselves completely given over to and
        unravelled by the
        > Concept. The method "is therefore not only the highest force, or
        rather the
        > sole and absolute force of reason," says Hegel, "but also its
        supreme and sole
        > urge to find and cognize itself by means of itself in everything."3
        I know of no
        > other passage in Hegel's works that states this central claim of
        absolute
        > idealism more directly and unequivocally: the dialectical method,
        understood as
        > absolute power, entitles us to adopt an attitude of logical
        optimism in respect
        > of anything that presents itself as resistant to reason.
        >
        >
        > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      • Beat Greuter
        ... What does Iain Macdonald mean with an attitude of logical optimism in respect of anything that presents itself as resistant to reason ? Hegel only wants
        Message 3 of 6 , Apr 5, 2004
          Robert Fanelli wrote:

          > Dear Hegel Group,
          >
          > I had the privilege of attending the Hegel Conference in New York. There
          > were many presentations read and discussed, among which was a most
          > excellent one
          > of Professor Iain Macdonald of the University of Montreal. The
          > following is a
          > full quote of his first paragraph. My purpose in sending this quote
          > is to
          > ask the group what they think of the comment on the"central claim of
          > absolute
          > idealism." His quotes,one, two, and three are from Miller's Science
          > of Logic
          > translation, P826 for all three.
          >
          > If you wish a copy of the entire paper, "The Concept and Its
          > Double..." I am
          > sure that Professor Macdonald would not mind if I sent to you.
          >
          > Regards,
          >
          > Bob Fanelli
          >
          >
          > The Concept and Its Double:
          > Power and Powerlessness in Hegel's Subjective Logic
          > Iain Macdonald
          > Université de Montréal
          >
          > Introduction
          >
          > In a well known passage from the end of the Science of Logic, Hegel
          > writes
          > that the dialectical method is to be recognized "as the absolutely
          > infinite
          > force [die schlechthin unendliche Kraft], to which no object,
          > presenting itself as
          > external, remote from and independent of reason, could offer
          > resistance or be
          > of a particular nature in opposition to it, or could not be penetrated by
          > it."1 The power of reason is infinite and irresistible or, in a word,
          > absolute -
          > which means first and foremost that reason understood as the movement
          > of the
          > concept reveals the "soul and substance"2 of things in such a way
          > that, in
          > principle, they are in themselves completely given over to and
          > unravelled by the
          > Concept. The method "is therefore not only the highest force, or
          > rather the
          > sole and absolute force of reason," says Hegel, "but also its supreme
          > and sole
          > urge to find and cognize itself by means of itself in everything."3 I
          > know of no
          > other passage in Hegel's works that states this central claim of absolute
          > idealism more directly and unequivocally: the dialectical method,
          > understood as
          > absolute power, entitles us to adopt an attitude of logical optimism
          > in respect
          > of anything that presents itself as resistant to reason.


          What does Iain Macdonald mean with "an attitude of logical optimism in
          respect of anything that presents itself as resistant to reason"? Hegel
          only wants to say (SL, para 1785) that the method of the dialectical
          movement is the absolute force of reason or absolute knowledge since it
          includes both, the subjective and objective side of the (theoretical and
          practical) concept and their mutual relationship and change. It does not
          mean that there is an absolute knowledge or reason which pulls in all
          existing objects like a black hole the stars. So, the question to
          Professor Macdonald should be: Does the power of reason include
          non-reason? If not, it could not be the absolute since it excludes
          something, or it is this "absolute as the night in which .... all cows
          are black" - the black hole which destroys reason as well as non-reason.
          The expression "Absolute Idealism' is totally misleading. It belongs to
          these prejudices which only want to give confused pictures instead of
          thoughts and classifications instead of philosophy. However, it would be
          certainly helpful if you could send us Macdonald's paper. Perhaps I do
          him a wrong.

          Best wishes,
          Beat Greuter


          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        • Iain Macdonald
          Dear all, A little hermeneutic generosity often goes a long way. That said, I believe my presentation of the passage I quote from the greater Logic is faithful
          Message 4 of 6 , Apr 5, 2004
            Dear all,

            A little hermeneutic generosity often goes a long way.

            That said, I believe my presentation of the passage I quote from the
            greater Logic is faithful to what Hegel means by reason and,
            especially, to what he means by power. My paper develops these
            themes and indeed addresses the role of "non-reason" (or better yet:
            powerlessness) in relation to reason at some length. Though again,
            as Hegel makes clear in the passage I cite in my first paragraph,
            nothing can resist the absolutely infinite force of the dialectical
            method; in other words, so-called non-reason is only transitory and
            always gives way to reason, in principle if not always in fact. This
            doesn't lead to any "black hole" as far as I'm concerned.

            As regards the expression "absolute idealism": I stand by it, partly
            because it's a convenient way of characterizing Hegel's thought. My
            reasoning is that it's intellectually productive to disabuse someone
            of their misconceptions regarding the expression "absolute
            idealism", whereas by contrast I find it unacceptable to allow
            Hegel's thought to wander about faceless and nameless, as though it
            were beyond any and every possible characterization (not that anyone
            in the group defended the latter). Hegel's thought is an idealism
            and indeed an idealism founded on knowledge of the absolute, hence
            it is an absolute idealism. The other reason I stand by the
            expression "absolute idealism" is that Hegel himself uses the
            expression:

            "The general standpoint of the Concept is indeed that of Absolute
            Idealism, and philosophy is conceptually comprehensive cognition,
            insofar as everything which in other forms of consciousness counts
            as something that is -- and because it is immediate, as independent -
            - is known within the Concept simply as an ideal moment." (Enz,
            §160, Zusatz.)

            In fact, this passage is a nice complement to the one I cite from
            the greater Logic.

            Best wishes,

            Iain Macdonald


            --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Beat Greuter <greuterb@b...> wrote:

            > What does Iain Macdonald mean with "an attitude of logical
            optimism in
            > respect of anything that presents itself as resistant to reason"?
            Hegel
            > only wants to say (SL, para 1785) that the method of the
            dialectical
            > movement is the absolute force of reason or absolute knowledge
            since it
            > includes both, the subjective and objective side of the
            (theoretical and
            > practical) concept and their mutual relationship and change. It
            does not
            > mean that there is an absolute knowledge or reason which pulls in
            all
            > existing objects like a black hole the stars. So, the question to
            > Professor Macdonald should be: Does the power of reason include
            > non-reason? If not, it could not be the absolute since it excludes
            > something, or it is this "absolute as the night in which .... all
            cows
            > are black" - the black hole which destroys reason as well as non-
            reason.
            > The expression "Absolute Idealism' is totally misleading. It
            belongs to
            > these prejudices which only want to give confused pictures instead
            of
            > thoughts and classifications instead of philosophy. However, it
            would be
            > certainly helpful if you could send us Macdonald's paper. Perhaps
            I do
            > him a wrong.
            >
            > Best wishes,
            > Beat Greuter
            >
            >
            > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
          • Beat Greuter
            ... I do not understand this, but applied to Hegel s philosophy I fully agree. ... It is very important to understand that the Concept releases its other from
            Message 5 of 6 , Apr 6, 2004
              Iain Macdonald wrote:

              > Dear all,
              >
              > A little hermeneutic generosity often goes a long way.

              I do not understand this, but applied to Hegel's philosophy I fully agree.

              > That said, I believe my presentation of the passage I quote from the
              > greater Logic is faithful to what Hegel means by reason and,
              > especially, to what he means by power. My paper develops these
              > themes and indeed addresses the role of "non-reason" (or better yet:
              > powerlessness) in relation to reason at some length. Though again,
              > as Hegel makes clear in the passage I cite in my first paragraph,
              > nothing can resist the absolutely infinite force of the dialectical
              > method; in other words, so-called non-reason is only transitory and
              > always gives way to reason, in principle if not always in fact. This
              > doesn't lead to any "black hole" as far as I'm concerned.

              It is very important to understand that the Concept releases its other
              from its identity. This also is the basic thought of Hegel's political
              philosophy. Reason is only Reason if it can stand what it is not. This
              is also the inherent presupposition for tolerance as Hegel describes it
              in the Philosophy of Right (i.e. § 270 about religion).

              > As regards the expression "absolute idealism": I stand by it, partly
              > because it's a convenient way of characterizing Hegel's thought. My
              > reasoning is that it's intellectually productive to disabuse someone
              > of their misconceptions regarding the expression "absolute
              > idealism",

              This I would doubt strongly. According to my experience it is deeply
              counter-productive. There are so many misunderstandings and prejudices
              about the terms 'absolute' and 'idealism', and the expression 'absolute
              idealism' is only seen as the opposite to Kant's subjective idealism and
              his so called openness of mind. Of course, you can follow the track
              subjective idealism (Kant, Fichte), objective idealism (Schelling) and
              absolute idealism (Hegel). Then, Hegel's absolute idealism would be a
              kind of synthesis of subjective and objective idealism. But all depends
              on grasping what this synthesis does mean.

              > whereas by contrast I find it unacceptable to allow
              > Hegel's thought to wander about faceless and nameless, as though it
              > were beyond any and every possible characterization (not that anyone
              > in the group defended the latter).

              With this I agree fully.

              > Hegel's thought is an idealism
              > and indeed an idealism founded on knowledge of the absolute, hence
              > it is an absolute idealism.

              I would say 'knowledge within the absolute movement' as the movement of
              thought, that is, the being-for-itself in its argument or examination of
              the being-in-itself which thereby is transformed or even undermined.

              > The other reason I stand by the
              > expression "absolute idealism" is that Hegel himself uses the
              > expression:
              >
              > "The general standpoint of the Concept is indeed that of Absolute
              > Idealism, and philosophy is conceptually comprehensive cognition,
              > insofar as everything which in other forms of consciousness counts
              > as something that is -- and because it is immediate, as independent -
              > - is known within the Concept simply as an ideal moment." (Enz,
              > §160, Zusatz.)
              >
              > In fact, this passage is a nice complement to the one I cite from
              > the greater Logic.
              >
              > Best wishes,
              >
              > Iain Macdonald

              A good point but I have even the better one. Some lines below your
              quotation Hegel writes:

              "Allerdings ist der Begriff als Form zu betrachten, allein als
              unendliche, schöpferische Form, welche die Fülle alles Inhalts in sich
              beschliesst und zugleich aus sich entlässt." (Enz, §160, Zusatz)

              "It [the Concept] certainly is a form, but an infinite and creative form
              which includes, but at the same time releases from itself, the fullness
              of all content." (Enc, §160, Addition, translated by William Wallace)

              Best wishes,
              Beat Greuter


              > --- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, Beat Greuter <greuterb@b...> wrote:
              >
              > > What does Iain Macdonald mean with "an attitude of logical optimism in
              > > respect of anything that presents itself as resistant to reason"? Hegel
              > > only wants to say (SL, para 1785) that the method of the dialectical
              > > movement is the absolute force of reason or absolute knowledge since it
              > > includes both, the subjective and objective side of the (theoretical
              > and
              > > practical) concept and their mutual relationship and change. It does
              > not
              > > mean that there is an absolute knowledge or reason which pulls in all
              > > existing objects like a black hole the stars. So, the question to
              > > Professor Macdonald should be: Does the power of reason include
              > > non-reason? If not, it could not be the absolute since it excludes
              > > something, or it is this "absolute as the night in which .... all cows
              > > are black" - the black hole which destroys reason as well as
              > non-reason.
              > > The expression "Absolute Idealism' is totally misleading. It belongs to
              > > these prejudices which only want to give confused pictures instead of
              > > thoughts and classifications instead of philosophy. However, it
              > would be
              > > certainly helpful if you could send us Macdonald's paper. Perhaps I do
              > > him a wrong.
              > >
              > > Best wishes,
              > > Beat Greuter



              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
            • Paul Edward Trejo
              Let s review that quotation cited by Professor MacDonald that started this exchange. It s on page 826 of the Miller translation of Hegel s SCIENCE OF LOGIC
              Message 6 of 6 , Apr 7, 2004
                Let's review that quotation cited by Professor MacDonald
                that started this exchange. It's on page 826 of the Miller
                translation of Hegel's SCIENCE OF LOGIC (1812). Hegel says:

                "...The Notion is everything, and its
                movement is the universal absolute
                activity, the self-determining and
                self-realising movement. The method
                is therefore to be recognised as the
                unrestrictedly universal, internal and
                external mode; and as the absolutely
                infinite force, to which no object,
                presenting itself as something external,
                remote from and independent of reason,
                could offer resistance or be of a
                particular nature in opposition to it,
                or could not be penetrated by it."
                (Hegel, SL, trans. Miller, p. 826)

                No object can resist it, oppose it or be free from its
                penetration -- here is Hegel's Absolute Idea. Hegel
                presents this Absolute Idea as *the* answer to Kant's famous
                PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS (1783). Hegel's Reason
                can know the Thing-in-itself, can prove it scientifically.

                Hegel seems reasonably enthusiastic about his new, scientific
                discovery. Near the beginning of the SL, Hegel says:

                "The method that I follow in this
                System of Logic (or rather, that this
                System itself follows)...is the *only*
                true method. This is self-evident simply
                from the fact that it is not something
                distinct from its Object and Content.
                For it is the Inwardness of the Content,
                the dialectic which it possesses within
                itself, that is the mainspring of its
                advance." (Hegel, 1812, SL, trans.
                Miller, p. 54)

                In this part of his SCIENCE OF LOGIC (SL) Hegel contrasted
                his methodology with others of his day, including that
                of J. Fries (SYSTEM OF LOGIC, 1811). About this ordinary
                exposition of the rules of logic, Hegel says:

                "In the present state of logic one
                can scarcely recognize even a trace
                of scientific method." (Hegel, SL,
                p. 53)

                The rules of logic are typically announced as though they
                were self-evident. However, Kant correctly showed that
                these categories of the 'Pure Understanding' are limited
                to analytic and tautological data. They cannot attain an
                idea of metaphysics, or a reliable synthetic methodology.

                Unless the modern science of logic deals with Kant's challenge,
                what is the point of repeating the rules of logic yet again?
                For Hegel, progress in logic must come only by answering
                Kant's challenges.

                For Hegel, the solution to Kant's brilliantly stated riddle
                is a Synthetic Method of logic that can address the problems
                of metaphysics and also resolve the Antinomy that Kant
                could not resolve. Such a Science of Logic would be, like
                our definition of God, self-contained, self-referent and
                self-justifying because all contradictions would be dealt
                with directly, and resolved using the same set of rules.

                This means that both the world of the Internal and the
                world of the External domains would be treated in the same
                way. We do not need Kant's dualism that treats Subjective
                data differently than Objective data. Getting back to the
                quotation that Professor MacDonald shared, Hegel says,

                "...Anything whatever is comprehended
                and known in its truth only when it
                is completely subjugated to the Method.
                It is the Method proper to every subject
                matter because its activity is the Notion.
                ...According to the universality of the
                Idea, it is both the manner peculiar to
                cognition -- to the Subjectively self-
                knowing Notion, and also the Objective
                manner, or rather the Substantiality...
                of Notions." (Hegel, SL, p. 826)

                This clearly announces, as Professor MacDonald suggested,
                a profoundly optimistic attitude about Reason. Hegel is
                clearly self-aware of the implications of his breakthrough.
                Hegel has solved the logical problem of Epistemology as
                well as the metaphysical problem of Ontology with one and
                the same method. Therefore we can agree that Hegel speaks
                scientifically when he asserts:

                "It is therefore not only the highest
                force, or rather the sole and Absolute
                force of Reason, but also its Supreme
                and sole urge to find and cognise itself
                by means of itself in everything."
                (Hegel, SL, p. 826)

                Hegel affirms that Reason can surmount any resistance
                whatsoever, and Kant must now be admitted to have been
                mistaken about his theory of an Unknowable Thing-in-itself.

                Now, if his Speculative Method also solved the problems of
                metaphysics as Kant would demand, then Hegel's Logic must
                also resolve all the problems of Antinomy that Kant cited
                in his first Critique. This includes the problem of God.

                Indeed, Hegel's SCIENCE OF LOGIC does solve the problem of
                God. Hegel says,

                "It can therefore be said that this
                content is the exposition of God as
                God is in God's eternal essence,
                before the creation of Nature and
                a finite mind." (Hegel, SL, p. 50)

                This kind of language is outrageous to the modern reader.
                If anything ever smacked of Logomachy, this is it. Not
                only do modern skeptics chafe at this language, modern
                theologians also chafe at this language! How dare Hegel
                reduce the transcendental to human logic!

                Yet that is the only possible solution to Kant's riddle!
                Hegel's Concept provides the correct method because the
                Concept is God -- not another notion or picture-image of
                God, but the real, living God.

                Talk about Logomachy! Yet this is what Hegel says. God
                is free, God is the all-inclusive totality. Further, God
                is in-and-for-itself determinate. That is also the
                definition of the Concept. That is the proper solution
                to Kant's riddle.

                The nature of God provides the Methodology of Logic that
                can resolve all problems of Science, whether they are
                empirical or metaphysical. What is the nature of God?
                Today we say it is DIALECTICAL. (Hegel used the word,
                speculative, but that word has common meanings far from
                Hegel's meaning.)

                The DIALECTICAL is all-inclusive, all-encompassing, and
                nothing can resist its penetrating insight. This is God.

                The DIALECTICAL is in-and-for-itself, the Whole, a special
                and Creative Form that includes itself but also transcends
                itself (ENC LOGIC, para. 160). This is God.

                How are we to understand this new concept? Hegel's theology
                offers a clue: what definition of God views God as the One,
                the Other and the Reconciliation?

                Best regards,
                --Paul Trejo
              Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.